Effect of Self-Awareness 1
Running head: SELF-AWARENESS AND DISCREPANT LOW SELF-ESTEEM
Effect of Self-Awareness on Negative Affect among Individuals with Discrepant Low SelfEsteem
Clara Michelle Cheng
American University
Olesya Govorun
TNS
Tanya L. Chartrand
Duke University
Keywords: self-esteem; implicit self-esteem; self-awareness; negative affect
Correspondence should be addressed to:
Clara Cheng
Department of Psychology
American University
4400 Massachusetts Ave NW
Washington, DC 20016
Phone: (202)885-1711
Fax: (202)885-1023
Email: [email protected]
Effect of Self-Awareness 2
Abstract
Past research suggests that individuals with discrepant low self-esteem (low explicit and high
implicit self-esteem) may hold themselves against higher standards and judge themselves more
critically when they fall short of those standards (V. Zeigler-Hill & C. Terry, 2007). We
postulated that for discrepant low self-esteem individuals, self-awareness would activate their
stringent standards and the fact that they have failed to meet those standards, thereby inducing
negative affect. In this study, 145 participants completed implicit and explicit self-esteem
measures, and half were then made to be self-aware by completing a task with a mirror in front
of them for 3 min. We found that self-awareness increased negative affect among discrepant low
self-esteem participants.
Effect of Self-Awareness 3
Effect of Self-Awareness on Negative Affect among Individuals with Discrepant Low SelfEsteem
For many years, research findings have supported the conventional wisdom that high
self-esteem is associated with positive outcomes, such as happiness and life-satisfaction (Diener
& Diener, 1995), persistence following failure (McFarlin, Baumeister, & Blascovich, 1984), and
better academic performance (Hansford & Hattie, 1982). Traditionally, self-esteem had been
conceptualized as one’s conscious or explicit evaluations of oneself, and is commonly measured
using self-report questionnaires such as the Rosenberg self-esteem scale (Rosenberg, 1965).
More recently, with the advent of implicit measures in social cognition, researchers have begun
to show that it is also useful to take into account people’s implicit self-esteem, defined as ‘‘the
introspectively unidentified…effect of the self-attitude on evaluation of self-associated and selfdissociated objects” (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995, p. 11). Implicit measures of self-esteem
typically do not require overt self-evaluation, but rather, assess how quickly one can associate
positive stimuli with the self or the degree to which one evaluates objects related to the self, such
as one’s name letters (see Bosson, Swann, & Pennebaker, 2000, for a review). Interestingly,
while both explicit and implicit self-esteem are forms of self-evaluation, measures of the two
constructs are not highly correlated (Bosson et al., 2000). Indeed, many theorists have postulated
that explicit and implicit self-esteem are distinct but related constructs, with explicit self-esteem
arising from conscious beliefs of the self, and implicit self-esteem stemming from intuitive,
automatic, and less conscious evaluative associations of the self (Koole & DeHart, 2007; Koole,
Dijksterhuis, & van Knippenberg, 2001; but see Olson, Fazio, & Hermann, 2007; Sherman et al.,
2008, for alternative views).
Effect of Self-Awareness 4
The notion that explicit and implicit self-esteem are based in different processes suggests
that it is possible for some individuals to possess a mismatch between their level of explicit selfesteem and their level of implicit self-esteem. Indeed, recent research has begun to examine
such discrepant forms of self-esteem. Individuals with high explicit and low implicit self-esteem
– also known as defensive, fragile high, or discrepant high self-esteem in the literature – are
believed to regard themselves highly at the conscious level, but to feel insecure “underneath the
surface.” Converging evidence suggests that people with discrepant high self-esteem experience
less stable self-esteem, and are more likely to act defensively and engage in self-enhancement
strategies, especially when threatened (Bosson, Brown, Zeigler-Hill, & Swann, 2003; Jordan,
Spencer, Zanna, Hoshino-Browne, & Correll, 2003; Zeigler-Hill, 2006; Kernis, Lakey, &
Heppner, 2008; Kernis et al., 2005). Furthermore, discrepant high self-esteem individuals are
less willing to forgive those who have transgressed against them (Eaton, Struthers, Shomrony, &
Santelli, 2007). Such findings suggest that there is a “dark side” to high self-esteem, when it is
paired with low implicit self-esteem.
Relatively little research thus far has focused on the other form of discrepant self-esteem
– discrepant low self-esteem – which consists of low explicit but high implicit self-esteem.
Spencer and his colleagues (Spencer, Jordan, Logel, & Zanna, 2005) suggested that discrepant
low self-esteem individuals may approach future tasks with a “glimmer of hope” that buffers
them against defensiveness, citing evidence that these individuals are more optimistic, more
likely to persevere on a previously failed task, and less likely to self-handicap. Based on this
idea, Zeigler-Hill and Terry (2007) hypothesized that the optimism that discrepant low selfesteem individuals possess may lead them to adopt higher standards for themselves, and to judge
themselves more critically when those standards are not met. In line with this reasoning,
Effect of Self-Awareness 5
Zeigler-Hill and Terry found that discrepant low self-esteem is correlated with both adaptive and
maladaptive forms of perfectionism – the latter of which have been linked to a whole host of
symptoms of maladjustment, including depression, anxiety, and obsessive-compulsiveness
(Hewitt & Flett, 1991). Thus, while discrepant low self-esteem may be associated with such
positive traits as optimism, the high self-standards adopted by discrepant low self-esteem
individuals may also result in negative psychological outcomes. It is therefore important to
understand the conditions under which individuals with discrepant low self-esteem might be
susceptible to such negative outcomes.
In this research, we examined negative affect as one such undesirable consequence.
Specifically, our investigation focused on whether self-awareness triggers negative affect among
individuals with discrepant low self-esteem. According to the objective self-awareness theory
(Duval & Wicklund, 1972), self-focused attention leads people to compare their current state to
their standards or ideals. When one’s current state falls short of one’s ideals, negative affect
ensues. It has been suggested that implicit measures of self-esteem tap our “ideal self-schemas”
while explicit measures tap our “actual self-schemas” (Franck, De Raedt, & De Houwer, 2007).
Thus, for individuals with discrepant low self-esteem, the high implicit self-esteem portion
indicates that they hold themselves to higher standards and lofty ideals, and the low explicit selfesteem portion indicates that they feel their current state fails to match those ideals. Selfawareness should therefore activate this discrepancy, resulting in negative affect.
In this study, we measured implicit and explicit self-esteem and exposed half of the
participants to a self-awareness manipulation. We then assessed negative affect as our dependent
variable.
Method
Effect of Self-Awareness 6
Participants
Participants were 145 undergraduate students (119 females) who participated in the study
in exchange for extra credit in a psychology course.
Materials
Rosenberg self-esteem scale. The Rosenberg self-esteem scale (Rosenberg, 1965) was
used to measure explicit self-esteem. Participants responded to 10 statements using a response
scale that ranged from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree). Sample items include “I feel
that I am a person of worth, at least on an equal basis with others” and “All in all, I am inclined
to feel that I am a failure” (reverse scored). Participants’ responses on the 10 items were
averaged to form an explicit self-esteem score (ESE).
Self-esteem Implicit Associations Test (IAT). Our measure of implicit self-esteem was the
Self-esteem IAT (Greenwald & Farnham, 2000), which has been found to have some of the
highest reliability and validity indicators among existing implicit self-esteem measures (Bosson
et al., 2000). The Self-esteem IAT assesses the ease of associating the self with pleasant and
unpleasant stimuli. Participants were instructed to categorize various words into self/other
(“target”) categories or pleasant/unpleasant (“attribute”) categories. The word stimuli included
self- and other-related pronouns (e.g., I, me, they, theirs), and pleasant and unpleasant words
(e.g., good, palace, poor, war). Participants first categorized the stimuli into the attribute
categories (Block 1; 20 trials) and into target categories (Block 2; 20 trials). The attribute and
target categories were then paired, and participants were to categorize the stimuli as belonging to
either of the combined categories (Block 3; 20 practice and 40 critical trials). In Block 4 the
target categories were reversed, and participants completed 20 practice trials to familiarize
themselves with the new order. In Block 5, the reversed categories were paired with the attribute
Effect of Self-Awareness 7
categories from Block 1. Participants completed 20 practice and 40 critical trials in this block.
Blocks 3 and 5 were congruent if the “self” and “pleasant” shared a response key, and were
incongruent if the “self” and “unpleasant” shared a response key. Half of the participants
completed the congruent block first followed by the incongruent block; the remaining
participants completed the blocks in the reverse order. The order of the congruent versus
incongruent blocks did not interact with any of the other factors in our analyses and will not be
further discussed.
The implicit self-esteem score (ISE) comprised of the D index computed according to the
new IAT scoring algorithm (Greenwald, Nosek, & Banaji, 2003)1. Essentially, this value
represents the difference in reaction time between congruent trials and incongruent trials, divided
by the standard deviation. Higher values of D indicate a greater ease of associating self-related
pronouns with pleasant words and thus higher ISE.
Self-awareness manipulation. The self-awareness manipulation was posed as a
memorization task in which participants were given 3 mins to memorize nine small objects (e.g.,
a glue stick, a pack of crayons) attached to a 22” x 28” poster board. Participants in the selfawareness condition were exposed to a poster board containing a small mirror in the center of the
board. Participants were instructed to hold the board on their laps. This was to ensure that the
mirror would be leveled with participants’ faces, causing them to see their own reflection while
they completed the memorization task, though they were not explicitly told to focus on the
mirror or on themselves in any way. Participants in the control condition were instead exposed to
an envelope in the center of the board.
Affect measure. We used a disguised affect measure adapted from previous research
(Hass, Katz, Rizzo, Bailey, & Moore, 1992; Koole, Smeets, van Knippenberg, & Dijksterhuis,
Effect of Self-Awareness 8
1999). The task was described to participants as a test of subliminal perception. Participants
were shown a series of flashes on the computer, which were ostensibly words presented beyond
conscious recognition. In reality, participants were shown subliminal nonsense words for 15 ms,
backmasked by a string of # signs for 100 ms. After each flash, participants were given four
alternatives, one of which was said to correspond to the subliminally presented word.
Participants were asked to rely on their “gut feeling” in deciding which of the four words was the
one they saw in the flash. Ten of the trials consisted of a negatively valenced word (e.g., down,
depressed) as one of the four response alternatives, and 10 other trials consisted of a positively
valenced word (e.g., happy, joyful). There were also 5 filler trials containing emotionally neutral
words. All 25 trials were presented to participants in a random order, and the measure was given
twice, once pre-manipulation and once post-manipulation, with different stimulus words each
time. Negative and positive affect scores were calculated by adding the number of times
participants chose negative and positive items as their responses, respectively, and a change
score was computed by subtracting the pre-manipulation negative and positive affect scores from
the post-manipulation negative and positive affect scores. Thus, a higher score indicates a
negative or positive affect change, respectively. Even though this task yields both positive and
negative affect scores, our hypothesis is specific to the negative affect component because selfawareness has not been consistently linked with positive affect (Mor & Winquist, 2002). Our
data analyses will therefore be focused on the negative affect score.
The disguised affect measure is based on the notion that our affect can be misattributed to
a neutral source (Murphy & Zajonc, 1993; Payne, Cheng, Govorun, & Stewart, 2005) – in this
case, to the perception of purportedly subliminal words. Similar misattribution-based measures
of affect have been shown to correlate with self-reported affect and trait measures of positivity
Effect of Self-Awareness 9
and negativity (Quirin, Kazén, & Kuhl, in press), and to serve as a better predictor of endocrine
stress responses than self-reported affect (Quirin, Kazén, Rohrmann, & Kuhl, 2009). Because
our self-awareness manipulation is rather subtle, we felt that a disguised measure of affect would
be a better tool than a self-report measure for capturing the automatic activation of affect. In
addition, a disguised affect measure would serve to avoid the biases on self-reported affect that
may result from conscious reflection or self-presentational concerns (see Quirin et al., in press;
Robinson & Clore, 2002, for further discussion on biases in self-reports of affect). Nevertheless,
in this task participants were specifically instructed to use their “gut feelings” to guide their
subliminal perception. We thus believe that responses on this measure arise from participants’
(misattributed) affect rather than purely cognitive associations.
Procedure. Up to three participants took part in each experimental session. Participants
were led to the laboratory and seated at individual computer workstations separated by solid
panels and equipped with the MediaLab and DirectRT software. Participants were told that the
study examined the relationship between different personality and cognitive tasks. Participants
completed the pre-manipulation affect measure, the Self-esteem IAT, and the Rosenberg selfesteem scale. Then, participants were given a 10-min filler task in which they were asked to read
the profiles of six cities from various parts of the world (e.g., Hong Kong, China; Winnipeg,
Canada) and remember the information. The purpose of the filler task was to diminish any selfawareness or self-related affect that may have been activated as a result of having just completed
the self-esteem measures. Following the filler task, participants were each given a poster board
for the memorization task, which was in fact the self-awareness manipulation. Half of the
sessions were randomly assigned to the self-awareness condition while the other half were in the
control condition. Participants in the same session were assigned to the same condition to avoid
Effect of Self-Awareness 10
any suspicion if participants were to accidentally catch a glimpse of another participants’ poster
board. Following the self-awareness manipulation, participants completed the post-manipulation
affect measure and were thoroughly debriefed, thanked, and dismissed.
Results
Negative affect. As in previous research, participants’ ESE and ISE scores did not
correlate with one another, r(145) = .09, p = .30. A hierarchical multiple regression analysis
based on recommendations by Aiken and West (1991) was conducted with negative affect
change score as the dependent variable. We entered participants’ ESE scores (centered on the
mean), ISE scores (centered on the mean), and self-awareness condition in the first step of the
regression, the two-way interaction terms in the second step, and the three-way interaction term
in the third step. This analysis found no significant overall main effects or two-way interactions,
but a significant three-way interaction emerged, β = -.22, t(137) = -2.17, p =.03. As can be seen
in Figure 1, there was a ESE x ISE two-way interaction in the self-awareness condition, β = -.71,
t(137) = -2.31, p =.02, but not in the control condition, β = -.07, t(137) = -.84, p =.40.
Decomposing this interaction at 1 SD above and below the mean of the two continuous
variables revealed that in the self-awareness condition, participants low in ESE and high in ISE
showed a greater change in negative affect than participants with low ESE and low ISE, β = .58,
t(137) = 2.29, p =.02. They also scored marginally higher than participants with high ESE and
high ISE, β = .40, t(137) = 1.92, p =.06. In addition, among low ESE/high ISE participants,
those in the self-awareness condition showed higher negative affect change compared to those in
the control condition, β = -.43, t(137) = -2.03, p =.04. These results confirmed our hypothesis
that self-awareness increases negative affect among participants with discrepant low self-esteem.
Effect of Self-Awareness 11
Somewhat unexpectedly, it was also found that participants with low ESE and low ISE
showed a significant reduction of negative affect in the self-awareness condition compared to the
control condition, β = .36, t(137) = 2.06, p =.04.
For the control condition, we found no main effects or ISE x ESE interaction, ps > .39.
Positive affect. A separate hierarchical multiple regression analysis on the positive affect
scores yielded no significant main effects or interactions.
Discussion
Individuals with discrepant low self-esteem – or the combination of high implicit selfesteem and low explicit self-esteem – have been shown in previous literature to exhibit greater
perfectionism (Zeigler-Hill & Terry, 2007). In this study, we sought to examine whether a selfawareness induction would increase negative affect for discrepant low self-esteem individuals.
The rationale for this hypothesis was that self-awareness activates a comparison between the
current self and the ideal self (Duval & Wicklund, 1972); for discrepant low self-esteem
individuals – who have high, perfectionistic standards for themselves (Zeigler-Hill & Terry,
2007) yet believe that they have failed to achieve those standards – the unfavorable comparison
brought on by self-awareness should increase negative affect. Our hypothesis was confirmed:
Discrepant low self-esteem participants showed greater increases in negative affect following
self-awareness compared to participants with congruent high or low self-esteem, as well as
participants in the control condition who were not exposed to the self-awareness manipulation.
Unexpectedly, participants with congruent low self-esteem (low in both explicit and
implicit self-esteem) in the self-awareness condition showed a significant reduction in negative
affect following the self-awareness induction. Previous research has found that people are
motivated to seek out information that confirms their existing self-views, even if those self-views
Effect of Self-Awareness 12
are negative (Swann, Rentfrow, & Guinn, 2002). Thus, it is possible that self-awareness may
have activated ideal self-schemas among the low ESE/low ISE participants that are consistent
with what they already believe, thereby reducing negative affect relative to the control condition.
We did not find the same drop in negative affect among participants with congruent high selfesteem in the self-awareness condition, however. Because high self-esteem is associated with
more emotional stability (Judge, Erez, Bono, & Thoresen, 2002), it is possible that congruent
high self-esteem individuals were simply less susceptible to changes in affect that may have been
invoked by self-verification.
The findings of the current research contribute a greater understanding of the discrepant
low self-esteem phenomenon. In general, the findings of this study suggest that high implicit
self-esteem is not necessarily linked to positive outcomes. Indeed, our data lend support to
previous work showing that high implicit self-esteem predicts depressive symptomatology
(Franck et al., 2007), as well as research linking discrepant low self-esteem to greater anger
suppression, depressed attributional style, nervousness, and lower mental health (Schröder-Abé,
Rudolph, & Schütz, 2007). Our findings also provide one possible explanation for the link
between discrepant low self-esteem and poorer mental health: that self-awareness may be one
chronic source of negative affect for discrepant low self-esteem individuals, as there are many
opportunities in our daily lives for self-awareness to be provoked (such as looking at oneself in
the mirror every morning). Indeed, our research shows that even a subtle form of self-awareness
can activate negative affect among discrepant low self-esteem individuals.
One limitation of the current study is that we did not explicitly ask participants to report
on their mood. Thus, while we were able to detect automatically activated negative affect among
discrepant low self-esteem individuals after a self-awareness induction, it is unclear whether
Effect of Self-Awareness 13
these participants consciously experienced a lowered mood. And if participants are not explicitly
aware of their negative affect, is it truly a harmful consequence? We argue that it is. First, while
a single self-awareness episode may not cause dramatic changes in overall affect, repeated
instances of self-awareness may have an accumulative effect (Chartrand, van Baaren, & Bargh,
2006). Thus, over time, subtle activations of negative affect may amass into much stronger
negative emotions, which can eventually lead to depressive symptoms. Secondly, studies have
shown that affect that is not consciously felt can nonetheless exert an influence on our behavior
(Winkielman, Berridge, & Wilbarger, 2005), social judgments (Ric, 2004), and psychosomatic
symptoms (Lane, 2008), suggesting that negative affect can have a potentially adverse impact on
our well-being, regardless of our conscious awareness of the affect.
One potential direction for future research would be to examine the downstream
consequences of self-awareness-induced negative affect among individuals with discrepant low
self-esteem. One such downstream consequence may be stereotyping and prejudice, which can
be a result of implicit self-threat (Cheng, 2009). As research in the domain of discrepant low
self-esteem is only in its infancy, more studies will help us better understand the implications of
discrepant low self-esteem for psychological functioning.
Effect of Self-Awareness 14
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Effect of Self-Awareness 19
Author Note
Clara Michelle Cheng, Department of Psychology, American University; Olesya
Govorun, TNS; Tanya L. Chartrand, The Fuqua School of Business, Duke University.
We would like to thank Jane Ledbetter, Lisa McQuighan, and Gigi Petito for their able
assistance with data collection.
Correspondence should be addressed to Clara Michelle Cheng, Department of
Psychology, American University, 4400 Massachusetts Ave NW, Washington, DC 20016;
Email: [email protected].
Effect of Self-Awareness 20
Footnotes
1
Due to an oversight on our part, we had used an older version of the Self-esteem IAT
that was programmed before the publication of the new scoring algorithm (Greenwald et al.,
2003). As a result, data from the practice blocks of the IAT were not recorded and were thus not
used in calculating participants’ IAT scores. We otherwise followed all steps of the new scoring
algorithm.
Effect of Self-Awareness 21
Figure Caption
Figure 1. Effect of self-awareness manipulation on negative affect change as a function of
implicit self-esteem and explicit self-esteem levels. Both implicit and explicit self-esteem are
plotted at 1 SD above and below the mean. Higher values on the y-axis indicate greater levels of
post-manipulation negative affect compared to pre-manipulation negative affect.
Effect of Self-Awareness 22