Normative Vs. Counter-Normative Identities: The
Structural Identity Model
A thesis submitted
To Kent State University in partial
Fulfillment of the requirements for the
Degree of Master of Arts
by
Fritz William Yarrison
August, 2013
Thesis written by
Fritz William Yarrison
B.A., The Pennsylvania State University, 2011
M.A., Kent State University, 2013
Approved by,
______________________Richard T. Serpe, Advisor
_____________________ Richard T. Serpe, Chair, Department
of Sociology
_____________________ Raymond Craig, Associate Dean of
Graduate Studies
ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF FIGURES……………………………………………………………iv
LIST OF TABLES…………………………………………………………….v
1
INTRODUCTION…………………………………………………......1
2
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE……………………………………5
Identity Theory………………………..………………………..5
Normative Vs. Counter-Normative Identities….………………14
Religious Affiliation………………………………........14
Relationship Status……………………………………..15
Parental Identity………………………………………..18
Hypotheses ……………………………………………………..20
3
METHODS……………………………………………………………..23
Analytic Strategy……………………………………………….23
Data…………………………………………………………….24
Measurement…………………………………………………...25
4
RESULTS……………………………………………………………...33
Results for Religious Identity………………………………….39
Results for Relationship Status………………………………...43
Results for Parental Identity…………………………………...46
5
DISCUSSION…………………………………………………………49
6
CONCLUSION………………………………………………………..53
BIBLIOGRAPHY……………………………………………………………..57
iii
LIST OF FIGURES
FIGURE 1……………………………………………………………………..23
iv
LIST OF TABLES
TABLE 1……………………………………………………………………..34
TABLE 2……………………………………………………………………..35
TABLE 3……………………………………………………………………..36
TABLE 4……………………………………………………………………..37
TABLE 5……………………………………………………………………..37
TABLE 6……………………………………………………………………..38
TABLE 7……………………………………………………………………..42
TABLE 8……………………………………………………………………..45
TABLE 9……………………………………………………………………..48
v
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Identity theory has been one of the major theoretical research programs in
sociological social psychology for the past four decades. In theoretical terms the goal of
identity theory is to explain the relationship between social structure and self/identity.
One of the main focuses is on the impact social structure has on the identities an
individual internalizes as a portion of their “self” (Stryker 1968). Measuring this
relationship is empirically one of the most important issues in the development of the
theoretical research program within identity theory. One solution for Stryker and his
colleagues has been to attend to what makes individuals activate a specific identity
(Stryker 1980; Stryker and Serpe 1982, 1983; Serpe 1987, 1991; Serpe and Stryker 1987,
1993, 2011). Activation of an identity refers to enacting or invoking a role. Individuals
have multiple identities that they have internalized as part of their self (James 1892), the
question is under what contextual situations is a specific identity activated. The example
often used is "Why does one father take his child to the zoo on a free Saturday afternoon
while another opts to play golf with his buddies?” (Stryker and Serpe 1994:18). Much of
the work on identity theory has focused on answering this question. Activation of an
1
2
identity is operationalized as “role enactment” (i.e. Stryker and Serpe 1982), representing
the identity claims and behaviors that focus on a specific role in everyday life. Previous
research in identity theory has been fruitful in finding factors that help predict the answer
to this question.
Previous work in identity theory has resulted in a fairly well tested theoretical
model for predicting time in role, along with a number of other outcomes connected to
identities. A majority of this work, however, has focused mainly on positively evaluated,
normative role identities (Stets and Serpe 2013). This presents a gap in the identity
literature. Little work has been done regarding how the identity process works for
individuals who occupy identities that may not be normative. The goal of this study is to
begin to fill that gap by focusing on role-identities that can be characterized as counternormative identities. These are just what the name implies, identities that run counter to
the norms of American society such as being single, being childless, etc. This is not
referring to what has been previously termed “counter-identities” (Burke and Tully
1977). A counter identity, as discussed by Burke and Tully (1977), refers to the idea that
a role cannot exist without its counter-role. For example, a parent cannot exist without a
child, or a teacher does not exist without students to teach. In this case, however, the
interestis the role-set of individuals who hold “counter” identities to the “normative”
identity, that is comparing people who are married with those who are single, or parents
with those who are not parents. A counter-normative identity is an identity that may not
be socially expected or socially desirable. In some cases, the person may hold a counternormative identity by choice and in others may wish to exit that identity to occupy the
3
normative identity. It is important to note that while holding this type of identity may or
may not create the experience of stigma for individuals, this work is not focusing on
stigma. The current work is interested solely in comparing identity theory processes for
individuals who hold counter-normative role-identities in relationship to those who hold
the reciprocal normative role-identities.
Explored here are the identity processes of three groups of identities: religious
affiliation, relationship status, and parental status. These role-sets are each broken into
three separate identities with differing levels of normative definition. For example,
religious identification is broken into those who identify with a specific religion, and selfreport that they are religious; those who identify with a specific religion, but self-report
as being non-religious; and those who do not affiliate with a specific religion, the
category that is termed “Nones” in the current literature (i.e. Kosmin and Keyser 2009).
The main goal of this work is to establish whether differences exist between identities
with different levels of normative definition. Data from a nationally representative webbased survey is used to explore differences that may exist between the groups. This work
is designed to test identity theory processes with a set of identities that has yet to be
explored.
The next section of this paper provides an overview of identity theory and details
the work supporting the model examined here. The paper then discusses the identities
analyzed and the hypotheses of the current work. Next, the measures are discussed in
4
detailed, followed by the results. The paper concludes with a summary of the major
findings, limitations, and a discussion of possible directions for future work.
CHAPTER 2
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Identity Theory
Identity theory emerges from the work of George Herbert Mead. Mead was
interested in the relationship between the “self” and society. Mead pointed out that, on
the one hand, society must shape self because we are born into a society that exists before
we do. On the other hand, Mead (1934) posits that self shapes society in a slow
methodical process. Stryker (1980) takes Mead’s ideas and incorporates them into what
he terms “structural symbolic interactionism.” Within the context of structural symbolic
interactionism lies identity theory (Stryker 1968). Stryker’s main interest for identity
theory is to explain what factors lead to an individual internalizing a role as a part of their
self. Stryker (1980) argues that an individual’s location in the social structure impacts the
availability of roles to choose from. The idea of choice is important here, social structure
may limit the possibilities for which identities are available to an individual but it rarely
presents only one option (Stryker and Serpe 1983; Serpe 1987; Serpe and Stryker 1987,
5
6
1993, 2011; Stets and Serpe 2013). The focus of identity theory is on role identities
(Stryker 2008; Burke and Stets 2009; Serpe and Stryker 2011; Stets and Serpe 2013),
which refers to social positions that include shared meanings and expectations for how
the individual should behave which become internalized as part of an individual’s self
(Stryker 1980). Many interactions with others in our everyday lives are based on role
identities. An example of this would be a teacher. When an individual takes on the role of
teacher they are expected to act in a certain way. They are to enter their classroom at a
specified time, they should be prepared for their class, they are to impart knowledge to
their students, etc. Students have expectations that teachers will display a specific set of
behaviors and teachers have expectations that students will be behave in particular
manner as well. Importantly, these are “shared expectations” which organize our
interactions (Styker 1980; Serpe and Stryker 2011).
Although identity theory focuses on the relationship between identities and social
structure, this relationship is difficult to examine empirically. Instead, the main interest
for identity theory scholars has been establishing what predicts which identity, of those
already internalized, an individual will activate. Stryker (1968) suggests that individual’s
identities are organized into a salience hierarchy. Identity salience refers to the likelihood
or probability that an identity will be invoked across situations. Each identity an
individual holds has a specific level of salience, thus the hierarchical nature. The higher
an identity’s salience, the more likely an individual is to activate that identity across
different situations and contexts. The relative salience of one identity is, in turn, predicted
by the individual’s level of commitment to that identity. Commitment is broken down
7
into two types, affective and interactional. Affective commitment reflects the amount of
emotional attachment an individual has to a specific identity based on their relationships
with others as a result of occupying the role-identity. This concept is designed to measure
the personal connections an individual has within a specific identity. Interactional
commitment reflects the extensiveness of social relationships connected to a specific
role-identity that an individual holds (Stryker 1980). Commitment conceptually
represents social structure and reflects the social attachment and social network one has
in regard to a specific role-identity. Higher levels of either type of commitment for a
specific role-identity are predictive of higher levels of salience for that role-identity.
Originally the outcome of some identity work was “time in role” which is a
measure of how much time an individual spends in a specific identity (Stryker and Serpe
1982). The basic theoretical model of identity theory, then, is that affective and
interactional commitment are related to each other, both predict salience, which, in turn,
predicts the enactment of the role-identity. This is the most basic formulation of identity
theory, other concepts have since been shown to have explanatory power in this model as
well.
The foremost of these additional concepts is prominence (McCall and Simmons
1978).1 Prominence is a term that has been adopted recently as a more precise
1
The term “prominence” is consciously chosen instead of “psychology centrality” or “importance.”
Persons’ subjective sense of the import of an identity appears in the self literature with the language of
“psychological centrality” (Rosenberg, 1979), sometimes abbreviated to just “centrality” as well as
appearing as simply “importance.” While there are subtle differences in meaning among the three concepts
(prominence, centrality, importance), their common thrust is to emphasize the significance of persons’
subjective responses to themselves. We choose to use “prominence” as a surrogate for this commonality
because it is developed by McCall and Simmons (1978) in the same theoretical context, symbolic
interactionism, from which Identity Theory derives.
8
measurement in terms of the location of an identity within the self-concept (McCall and
Simmons 1978; Serpe and Stryker 2011; Stets and Serpe 2013). Past research has referred
to this concept as “psychological centrality” (Rosenberg 1979; Stryker and Serpe 1994).
Prominence in identity theory literature is defined as the location of the specific identity
in the individual’s self-concept (Stryker and Serpe 1994; Serpe and Stryker 2011).
Identity prominence, conceptually, is constructed as a hierarchy locating the role-identity
within the individual’s self-concept. Identity prominence, theoretically like identity
salience, is predicted by both types of commitment and impacts role enactment. It is
important to note one specific theoretical difference between prominence and salience.
Prominence implies some level of awareness that is not necessarily present in salience
(Stryker and Serpe 1994). Further, an identity can have high levels of salience without an
individual actually realizing that they are activating one identity over another. For an
identity to have a high level of prominence, however, an individual has to be consciously
aware of the identity, as well as what that identity means to them. For example,
individuals constantly find themselves in a number of situations. On the one hand, they
may, based on their definition of the various situations (Goffman 1959), enact the same
identity in a majority of those situations giving that identity high salience. This does not,
however, necessarily mean they actively chose that identity over others. On the other
hand, this identity may also be central to who that person is, giving that same identity
high prominence. In order for an individual to realize that one of their identities is central
to who they are, they must consciously be aware of that identity.
9
The relationship between identity salience and identity prominence was examined
by Stryker and Serpe in 1994. The main goal of this work was to establish whether
salience or prominence would prove to be a better predictor of an individual’s role
enactment. In this work, the causal relationship between salience and prominence is not
specified; they are simply allowed to correlate. The results of this study demonstrate that
both prominence and salience are important and the magnitude of this importance varies
by role-identity. The authors conclude and recommend that, when possible, both salience
and prominence should be used in future research on identities. More recent work in
identity theory has posited a causal ordering of prominence and salience (Nuttbrock and
Freudinger 1991; Brenner 2011, 2012). Expanding on Stryker and Serpe (1994), Brenner,
Serpe and Stryker (Unpublished Manuscript) use a longitudinal panel sample of minority
college science students to empirically investigate the causal ordering of prominence and
salience. This research demonstrates that prominence is likely causally prior to salience
and not simply correlated with it.
In order to advance the goal of identity theory, establishing the relationship
between self and society, the operationalization of social structure has been refined by
identity theorists. Stryker et al (2005) and Merolla, et al (2012) separate social structure
into three parts: large, intermediate, and proximate. Large social structure refers to
structures that have normally been considered macro, such as gender or race.
Intermediate social structure involves “more localized networks (e.g., neighborhoods,
schools, associations)” (Merolla et al. 2012:152), and proximate social structures are
much closer to the individual level, things like family or athletic teams. Proximate social
10
structures represent social structure because they contextualize the environment in which
an individual enacts a specific role identity (Serpe and Stryker 2011; Stets and Serpe
2013). All three types of social structure are seen as linked to one another, and all may
have an impact on the identity processes. According to Merolla et al. (2012), however,
proximate social structure is the most important for the identity process examined here.
Proximate social structure is essentially referring to how heterogeneous or
homogenous an individual’s immediate context is. As the number of people an individual
interacts with who hold similar identities and meanings for those identities increases, the
more homogenous that individual’s proximate social structure becomes. Merolla et al
(2012) use a longitudinal dataset to establish whether proximate social structure
(mentoring, science experiences, etc.) is a predictor of maintaining a science identity in a
sample of college students studying science, technology, engineering, or mathematics
(STEM). The results indicate that participation in a proximate social structure is a strong
predictor of maintaining an identity and a desire to stay in the role of scientist. For
example, as an individual’s proximate social structure in STEM becomes more
homogenous, and provides environmental opportunities to participate in science, they
will be much more likely to stay in that role. This work suggests that proximate social
structure is predictive of commitment in the identity theory model. Proximate social
structure does not replace commitment in the model because they are separate concepts.
Commitment represents the personal relationships an individual has with others who are
like them, while proximate social structure represents how many of the other people the
individual interacts with on a daily basis are like them.
11
Proximate social structure may also be predictive of a third concept that has had
limited discussion in identity theory: identity cognition. Identity cognition refers to an
individual’s thinking and planning about an identity (Serpe 1991). In his 1991 work,
Serpe tests whether identity cognition impacts identity salience. Serpe posits that the
more an individual thinks about a specific role-identity, or plans for activities involving
that role-identity, the greater the salience of the role-identity and, theoretically, the more
likely they are to enact that identity in various situations. Serpe (1991) finds support for
identity cognition as a predictor of identity salience. As a predictor of salience, identity
cognition acts similarly to affective and interactional commitment in the identity process.
Following a structural identity theoretic formulation, the more an individual is
embedded in a proximate social structure that supports their identity, the higher their
levels of commitment and cognition. Higher commitment and cognition, in turn,
increases both the salience and prominence of that identity. Building on the more recent
research of the causal relationship between prominence and salience, the higher the level
of prominence for a specific role-identity the higher the level of salience will be for that
identity.
In the proposed work, the outcome to be explored is role-specific self-concept:
both esteem and authenticity. Self-esteem, in general, has had a long history within
research on self/identity (Owens and Serpe 2003). In a majority of the work involving
self-esteem the concept has been used in a global form. Global self-esteem refers to a
self-evaluation of how “good” or “bad” an individual feels about their self in general
(Owens and Serpe 2003). Self-esteem can also be measured role-specifically. Role-
12
specific self-esteem refers to an individual’s self-evaluation of how “good” or “bad” they
feel about their self in a specific role (Rosenberg et al. 1995). Self-esteem can be
conceptualized as either a product or force in social interaction (Rosenberg 1979).
According to Rosenberg et al. (1995), global self-esteem is more associated with
psychological well-being, while role-specific self-esteem is more related to an
individual’s role-specific behavior. This tie to behavior allows for role-specific selfesteem to be a viable outcome in the identity process for both prominence and salience.
Self-esteem can be broken down into multiple types of self-evaluations. Most
often, self-esteem is broken down into two subcomponents: self-worth and self-efficacy
(Gecas and Schwalbe 1983). Self-worth refers to how much an individual feels accepted
and valued, while self-efficacy refers to how competent or capable an individual feels
(Gecas and Schwalbe 1983). Both self-worth and self-efficacy can be measured in either
global or role-specific forms. Efficacy and worth based self-esteem have been the major
two components of self-esteem since their conceptualization. A third component of selfesteem exists but has rarely been used in previous work. This component is authenticity
(Erickson, 1995). The concept of authenticity is defined as the experience of being true to
one’s self (Vannini 2008). Authenticity has roots in some early theorizing about selfevaluations. For example, Turner (1976) refers to individual’s feelings of being able to be
their “true self” as an important aspect of self-evaluations. Gecas (1986) takes the
concept of an individual’s “true self” and describes it as an authenticity motive. Gecas
(1986) suggests that a desire to feel authentic is one factor that motivates how individuals
13
behave. As a motivating force, authenticity can be seen as closely related to the other
components of self-esteem (Gecas 1986).
Self-esteem can, therefore, be broken into three different components, self-worth,
self-efficacy and authenticity, which all have been linked to identity theory (Burke and
Stets 2009; Serpe and Stryker 2011; Stets and Serpe 2013). Self-esteem can also be
discussed in terms of a global or a role-specific self-evaluation. The work proposed here
uses the respondents’ role-specific self-worth as well as their role-specific authenticity2
as outcomes of the identity process. The role-specific self-evaluations are purposefully
chosen here based on the interest of individuals’ experiences with specific identities.
None of the current work examines normative or counter-normative identities in general,
only specifically. Authenticity is of particular interest in the current work for two reasons.
First, the concept has had limited exploration in the past. This work incorporates the
concept into the structural identity theory’s process. Second, the concept is of particular
importance for those individuals who claim a counter-normative identity. Individuals
who claim these types of identity live in a society where they are not the norm. In
general, as will be outlined next, society does not hold particularly positive views about
the identities under investigation here. This potentially means that individuals feel they
must withhold their counter-normative identity in order to fit in (i.e. Long, Yarrison, and
Rowland In Press). This type of behavior will likely have a direct impact on these
individuals experience of authenticity.
2
The data available for the proposed work does not include a measure of role-specific self-efficacy.
14
Normative vs. Counter-Normative Identities
The focus of this research is to establish whether differences in the identity
process exist between individuals with normative and counter-normative identities. There
are three sets of identities under investigation in the proposed work: relationship status,
parental status, and religious affiliation. These identity sets were chosen because they are
all components of virtually everyone’s daily life. Importantly, we must define what
characteristics or contexts make an identity counter-normative. At the most basic
definition, a counter-normative identity is simply one that society in general does not see
as being what an individual is “supposed” to be or become. To distinguish normative and
counter-normative identities, however, a discussion of the construction and meaning
associated with each set of identities is necessary. The literature regarding these three
groupings of identities will be discussed next.
Religious Affiliation
The United States is characterized as a highly religious country (Putnam and
Campbell 2011). Religion, for many, is a very salient identity. Research has shown, for
example that revealing a religious identity to others of a similar faith, acts as a source of
social solidarity (Warner 1993). According to the 2008 American Religious Identification
Survey, only 15% of the nation does not identify with a religious affiliation (Kosmin and
Keyser 2009). In addition to being the minority, non-religious individuals are often
viewed negatively by society as a whole. For example, in a nationally representative
15
survey, Americans report that atheists are the least likely to share their vision of America
(Edgell, Gerteis, and Hartmann 2006). In other work, over 50% of respondents who were
active in a non-religious club or organization report “that being a nonbeliever had
produced difficulty with relatives and friends” (Hunsberger and Altemeyer 2006). Many
other studies have found empirical evidence that claiming a non-religious identity in
American society today increases the chances of being viewed negatively by others
around you (Cragun et al 2012; D'Andrea and Sprenger 2007; Ehrlich and Van Tubergen
1971; Harper 2007; and Jenks 1986). Based on these previous works, claiming a nonreligious identity is considered to be counter-normative by most in American society and
often comes with negative social, psychological, and emotional consequences.
The data for this research allows the sample to be classified into three groups
based on respondents’ answers to two questions. Respondents are asked to identify if they
have a religious affiliation and if they consider themselves to be religious or nonreligious. The religious affiliation question includes the categories of atheist, agnostic,
and no religious affiliation. Much of the previous work investigating the experiences of
the non-religious has been based on those who have traditionally been labeled as
“Nones.” This group, according to Kosmin and Keyser for example, refers to anyone who
answers the open-ended question “What is your religion, if any?” with “None, No
religion, Humanistic, Ethical Culture, Agnostic, Atheist, Secular” or “Don’t Know”
(2009:2,23). Because much of the work on the non-religious involves individuals who
would normally be considered as Nones, those who self-report as non-religious are split
into two groups. This split creates three groups within the data whose identity processes
16
can be compared. The first group is those who self-identify as religious, the normative
identity. The second group is those who would be considered Nones, and includes those
who self-identify as non-religious and whose religious preference falls into one of the
above categories. The third group, then, is anyone who identifies as non-religious, but
who identify a religious affiliation that does not fall into one of the “None” categories.
The second and third groups may be different in their experiences of negative feedback
from others about their religious views. Those who are normally considered Nones are
explicitly non-religious and according to previous literature potentially experience many
negative outcomes because of their views. The third group, those who report a specific
religious affiliation, but self-report as being non-religious, are between those who are
religious and those who are clearly “not religious.” If asked about their religious
preference, these individuals are able to name a specific religion or church, which may
act as a buffer for the negative reactions of others since they are not explicitly making a
claim of having “no religion” even if they do not see themselves as “religious.”
Relationship Status
In the United States the percentage of individuals who get married at some point
in their life is at least 90% (Connidis 2001). Along with this fact comes what has been
termed the Ideology of Marriage and Family (DePaulo and Morris 2005). This ideology
includes the idea that having a committed sexual partnership is the only important
relationship humans need, and individuals who do not have this type of relationship are
17
somehow worse off than those who do (DePaulo and Morris 2005). This ideology, the
authors argue, is virtually uncontested and largely ingrained in the American psyche.
Marriage is what individuals are supposed to do as part of their life, and family should
trump all other forms of human connection (DePaulo and Morris 2005).
The domination of marriage (or at least serious relationships) as a normative
aspect of American life suggests that the antithesis of being married (i.e. being single)
constitutes a counter-normative identity. Evidence of the counter-normative status of
being single can be found in meanings associated with the identity (DePaulo and Morris
2006), experimental manipulation (DePaulo, Sinclair, and Morris 2007), and even legal
ramifications for discrimination (DePaulo and Morris 2006). For example, DePaulo and
Morris (2006) discuss the fact that only 27 states offer some form of protection from
marital status discrimination. In that same work, the authors ask 1,000 undergraduates to
describe what characteristics they thought of as being connected to individuals who are
married and who are single. When thinking about individuals who are married,
respondents were more likely to use words like “mature, stable, honest, happy, kind, and
loving” (DePaul and Morris 2006:251). When thinking about individuals who were
single, respondents used words like “immature, insecure, self-centered, unhappy, lonely,
and ugly” (DePaul and Morris 2006:251). More direct evidence of discrimination against
individuals who are single is shown in an experimental design. DePaulo, Sinclair, and
Morris (2007) report an experiment in which undergraduate students, as well as rental
agents, had to pick between potential tenants. These potential tenants were designed to be
similar on all substantive areas, but included some who were married and others who
18
were single. The participants continuously chose the married individuals over their single
counterparts and even explicitly stated that the potential tenant’s marital status played a
role in their decision. The work discussed above demonstrates that not being married
comes with negative evaluations from the general population in the United States.
In this research, relationship status is broken into three categories: those who self
report as single, those who self-report as married, and those who self-report that they are
in a “committed relationship.” According to much of the work cited above (i.e. DePaulo
and Morris 2005) “serious coupling” can be considered to be similar to marriage. Most of
the stigmatization and/or discrimination faced by those who are not married is explicitly
geared toward those who are not in a serious relationship. The proposed work does not
consider those who are not married, but in a serious relationship as a counter-normative
identity. The groups are made to explore any differences that may exist between those in
a serious, committed relationship, and those who are legally married. While it is clearly
different from being married, the status of being in committed relationship may hold all
the same social benefits. The counter-normative identity of interest here is held by those
are explicitly single and do not have a partner of any kind.
Parental Identity
Family remains integral to Americans’ conception of what a normal life is. As
noted above, the norm in society is to be married or to be in a committed relationship and
those who are not often experience some level of negative views, stigma, and/or
19
discrimination. Along with the norm of marriage comes the norm of becoming parents.
Individuals, according to American society, should have a desire to be married and to
have children (Veevers 1973). There are, however, individuals who consciously choose
to never have children: the voluntarily childless. Again, choice is important to point out
here. The voluntarily childless does not include individuals who physically cannot have
children, because those individuals are not voluntarily choosing to not have children. The
only individuals included as voluntarily childless are those who have (or had) the ability
to have children but chose not to, and have no plans to become parents. Individuals who
are voluntarily childless clearly hold a counter-normative identity. American society and
values dictate that individuals should want to have children at some point in their life. In
addition to obviously being a counter-normative identity because this group breaks the
norm of family, previous research has included the voluntarily childless as stigmatized
and/or as deviant (i.e. Veevers 1972, 1980; Miall 1994; Mueller and Yoder 1999; Lisle
1999; Park 2002). Within the childless respondents, there are those who hope or plan to
have a child in the future. This group, as childless, is clearly non-normative, but in a
context where they desire to be normative and as such may experience their childlessness
differently from those who are voluntarily childless.
This research classifies the parental identity into three different groups. The first
is simply those who are parents. Parent represents the normative group. The other two
groups include individuals who do not have children. The second group is comprised of
those respondents who are voluntarily childless. Respondents who reported that they did
not have children were asked “Do you ever plan to have children?” with those answering
20
“No” classified as voluntarily childless. Respondents answering “Yes” are classified as
temporarily childless. The temporarily childless are separated because they may differ in
identity processes than either parents or the voluntarily childless. Being able to say that
they plan to have children in the future may buffer them from the negative evaluations
placed on those who do not have children. At the same time, however, they do not yet
have children and may still experience some of those negative evaluations.
Hypotheses
The research focuses on whether differences exist in the identity processes of
individuals who hold normative and counter-normative identities. The work is grounded
in the theoretical and empirical work of identity theory. Identity theory, however, has not
made any specific predictions about these processes in individuals with counternormative identities. This research aims to test the identity process that has been
previously established for normative identities and, therefore, the following hypotheses
are presented based on identity theoretic considerations.
For identity theory, social structure plays a paramount role in the identity process.
Previous work has shown that proximate social structure is predictive of one’s
commitment to an identity (Merolla et al. 2012). Thus:
H1: As individuals’ proximate social structures become more homogenous for an
identity, both interactional and affective commitment to that identity will increase.
21
In addition to commitment, proximate social structure should have a predictive effect on
identity cognition. Identity cognition is a concept that theoretically resides at the same
level as commitment (Serpe 1991). Thus:
H2: As an individual’s proximate social structure become more homogenous for
an identity, identity cognition (thinking and planning) for that identity will
increase.
According to the basic model of identity theory, commitment impacts identity salience
(i.e. Stryker and Serpe 1983). Thus:
H3: Both types of commitment (affective and interactional) will have positive
relationships with identity salience.
In addition to impacting identity salience, commitment has been shown to be predictive
of identity prominence (i.e. Stryker and Serpe 1994). Thus:
H4: Both types of commitment (affective and interactional) will have positive
relationships with identity prominence.
According to Serpe (1991), identity cognition fits into the identity process in the same
place that commitment does. Therefore, identity cognition is predictive of both identity
salience and identity prominence such that:
H5: Identity cognition will have a positive relationship with identity salience and
identity prominence.
22
Identity prominence and identity salience have been shown to be related (Stryker and
Serpe 1994), and more recently the direction of this effect has been established (Brenner,
Serpe, and Stryker Unpublished Manuscript), such that prominence precedes salience.
Based on this work:
H6: Identity prominence will be positively related to identity salience.
According to identity theory, as an individual’s levels of identity salience and identity
prominence increase, so to should levels of self-esteem (Burke and Stets, 2009; Cast and
Burke 2002; Owens and Serpe 2003; Serpe and Stryker 2011; Stets and Serpe 2013).
Thus:
H7: Identity salience will have a positive relationship with both role-specific selfworth and role-specific authenticity.
H8: Identity prominence will have a positive relationship with both role-specific
self-worth and role-specific authenticity.
CHAPTER 3
METHODS
Analytic Strategy
The model tested in this work is based on previous work in identity theory. The
model can be seen in Figure 1 below. Three separate models are analyzed using structural
equation modeling (SEM), one for each identity grouping. In order to compare the three
identities within each model a groups SEM is used. This allows for each effect to be
tested for differences between the three groups. The analysis focuses on whether any
differences exist between the groups in the predictions that identity theory provides as
specified in the hypotheses
Figure 1: Proposed Theoretical Model
23
24
Data
The data are from “Exploring Counter-Normative Identities” a web-based survey.
The sample was provided by Survey Sampling International (SSI). SSI uses a dynamic
sampling platform called Dynamix. The sample involved a nationally representative,
probability based web-panel of U.S. adults. The panel is developed by recruiting
participants using traditional random-digit-dialing techniques as well as techniques to
include households with only cell-phones. This process produces a nationally
representative sample equivalent to traditional RDD telephone samples (Braunsberger et
al 2007; Yeager et al 2011). Once an individual agrees to participate in SSI’s panels, they
are contacted via email when a survey is available for them to participate in. After
agreeing to participate in this survey, respondents were randomly selected into one of
four identity groupings (relationship status, religious affiliation, parental status, and work
status). Three of these four identity groups are used in this research (the “work” identity
group is not included in this research). After being selected into one of the identity
groupings the respondents were asked a screener question regarding their specific identity
within that group. The reason for the random selection is so the majority of the survey
can be specific to that individual’s identity. Each respondent’s answer to the screener
question establishes the wording of the identity specific questions that follow. Of the
6,534 individuals who began this survey 3,522 completed the entire survey and 4,224
completed the role-specific portion of the survey, giving response rates of .54 and .64
respectively.
25
Measurement
This research examines data for respondents who were randomly selected in the
relationship, religious, or parental identities. For the religious group the respondents were
asked “What is your religious preference?” and given a number of answers to choose
from. The individuals selected into the religion identity group were also asked “Do you
consider yourself religious or non-religious?” As discussed above this allows for the
separation into three groups with differing levels of non-religion: religious individuals,
non-religious individuals, and Nones. For the relationship identity group respondents
were asked “Which of the following best describes your current relationship status?” with
potential answer choices of: “Married,” “Divorced, not currently in a relationship,”
“Divorced, currently in a relationship,” “In a committed relationship,” “Widowed,” and
“Single (not in a relationship), never married.” For this research those who answered
“Married” are placed into the “married” identity, those who answered either “In a
committed relationship” or “Divorced, currently in a relationship” are placed in the “in a
relationship” identity, and those who answered “Single (not in a relationship), never
married” are in the single identity. Respondents who were selected into the parental
identity group were asked two questions: “Which of the following best describes you?”
with “I have at least one child by birth, marriage, or adoption” and “I do not have a child”
as response options and later in the survey were asked “Do you ever plan to have children
in the future?” This allows for the identity grouping to be broken into three identities, as
discussed previously. Each respondent’s answer to the screener questions was then used
throughout the survey in order to make the questions specific to their identity. For
26
example, if a respondent was randomly selected into the religious identity, and answered
that they considered themselves to be non-religious, the questions that they saw would be
worded to ask them specifically about themselves as someone who is non-religious.
Dependent variables. The proposed model includes two of the three
subcomponents of role-specific self-esteem: self-worth and authenticity. Role-specific
self-worth is a scale consisting of four items with possible response categories: strongly
disagree, disagree, agree, and strongly agree. These items are adapted from the
Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (Rosenberg 1965). The items included in this scale are:
“I feel that I am a person of worth, at least on an equal basis with others who are
[insert identity].”
“On the whole, I am satisfied with myself as someone who is [insert identity].”
“I am able to do things as well as most other people who are [insert identity].”
“As someone who is [insert identity] I feel that I have a number of good
qualities.”
These four items scale well together with a standardized Cronbach’s alpha of .854 in the
religion identity, .835 in the relationship identity, and .859 in the parent identity. The
scale was created by adding all of the items together and dividing by the total number of
items. The items are coded so that a higher score reflects higher levels of role-specific
self-worth.
Role-specific authenticity is measured with a scale of 7 items with possible
response categories: “strongly agree,” “agree,” “disagree,” and “strongly disagree.” Three
of the items are worded in a way that suggests the individual feels like they can be
themself and four are worded oppositely. The instructions before this section ask the
27
respondent to continue to think about their identity (Parent or childless; religious or nonreligious; married, in a relationship, or single) and to “Please choose whether you
strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree with the statement in terms of
yourself as someone who is [insert identity].” The seven items include:
“I feel that most people don’t know the “real” me.”
“I find I can almost always be myself.”
“I feel people expect me to be different than I really am.”
“I think most people accept who I really am.”
“I just wish I were more able to be myself.”
“I feel the way in which I generally act reflects the “real” me.”
“I often do not feel that I am myself.”
The items are all coded in so that a higher score represents feeling more authentic. These
items also scale well together with a standardized Cronbach’s Alpha of .818 in the
religion identity, .838 in the relationship identity, and .825 in the parent identity. The
scale was created by adding all of the items together and dividing by the number of items
in the scale.
Independent Variables. Proximate social structure is conceptualized as the degree
of homogeneity the respondent experiences in everyday life. The greater the
homogeneity: the greater the proximal social structure. Proximal social structure is
measured with a scale of four items asking the respondent how many of the people they
interact with hold the same identity (parent or childless; married, in a relationship, or
single, religious or non-religious) as them. This scale includes the following items:
28
“How many of your close friends (people that you know and can count on
if you need them) are [insert identity]?”
“How many of your friends (people you know and do things with) are
[insert identity]?”
“How many of the people that you grew up with do you think are [insert
identity]?”
“How many of the people in your neighborhood do you think are [insert
identity]?”
Each item has the following response options: Almost none, Less than half, About
half, More than half, or Almost all. These are coded in such a way that a higher
score indicates a more similar proximate social structure. The scale was created
by adding all of the items together and dividing by the total number of items. The
items scale well together with a Standardized Cronbach’s alpha of .859 in the
religion identity, .891 in the relationship identity and .871 in the parent identity.
Interactional commitment is measured with a scale of three items. The first item
asks respondents “How often do you do things with people who are [insert identity]?”
with the following response categories: Never, Seldom, Once a month, Less than once a
week, Once a week, Several times a week, and Daily. The second item in this scale asks
respondents “In an average week, how many hours do you spend doing things with
people who are [insert identity]?” The third item used in this scale asks “Of the money
you do not need for rent, food, clothing and other essentials how much do you spend on
things you do with people who are [insert identity]? Things like, going to the movies and
gifts?” The possible answer choices for this item include “Almost none,” “Less than
half,” “About half,” “More than half,” and “Almost all.” The three items have different
29
metrics, so all three items were normalized, then added together and divided by the total
number of items to form the scale. The coding for this scale is such that a higher score
reflects a higher level of interactional commitment. This scale has a Cronbach’s alpha of
.643 in the religion identity, .620 in the relationship identity, and .643 in the parent
identity.
Affective commitment is measured with a scale of four items. A short set of
instructions before these items asks the respondents to think about others who they know
who are [like them]. The first item then asks respondents “If you were not able to see
them, how much would you miss the people you know who are [insert identity].” Answer
choices for this item include “Miss them not at all,” “Miss them a little,” “Miss them
somewhat,” and “Miss them a great deal.” The second items asks the respondents “How
close (in personal and emotional terms) are you to the people you know who are [insert
identity]” and has possible answers of “Not close at all,” “Not very close,” “Somewhat
close, and “Very close.” The third item asks “How important to you are the people you
know who are [insert identity]?” with choices of “Not important at all,” “Not very
important,” “Somewhat important,” and “Very important.” Lastly, a reverse coded item is
used: “I often feel unhappy after I do things with others who are [insert identity]. This
item has responses of “Strongly disagree,” “Disagree,” “Agree,” and “Strongly agree.”
These items are all coded such that a higher score represents a higher level of affective
commitment. Next, all four items were added together and then divided by the number of
items. This scale has a standardized Cronbach’s alpha of .578 in the religion identity,
.653 in the relationship identity, and .645 in the parent identity.
30
Identity cognition is a scale composed of five items. These items asked
respondents how often they thought about their role-specific identity in a variety of
settings including: a) when viewing or reading something in the media, b) when meeting
new people for the first time, c) when at a social event or during social activities, d) when
at work or work related activities, and e) in general. All of these items had possible
responses ranging from 0 (almost never) to 10 (almost always). Identity cognition was
coded with a higher score on this scale reflecting a higher level of identity cognition. The
scale was created by adding all of the items together and dividing by the number of items
in the scale. These items also scale well with a Cronbach’s alpha of .965 in the religion
identity, .943 in the relationship identity and .959 in the parent identity.
Salience is measured with five items that have possible responses ranging from 1
(almost certainly would not) to 4 (almost certainly would). All items ask respondents to
think about meeting someone for the first time: a) a person of the same sex, b) a person of
the opposite sex, c) a friend of a close friend, d) a friend of a family member, or e) a
stranger. Each item then asks respondents “How certain is it that you would tell this
person that you are [insert identity]?” The coding of these items allow for an increased
score to reflect an increased level of salience. To create the scale all items were added
together and divided by the total number of items. These items scale well together with a
Cronbach’s alpha of .971 in the religion identity, .934 in the relationship identity, and
.935 in the parent identity.
Prominence is measured in similarly to salience, with five items. The items again
31
ask respondents to think about meeting someone for the first time: a) a person of the same
sex, b) a person of the opposite sex, c) a friend of a close friend, d) a friend of a family
member, or e) a stranger. The prominence items are operationalized following McCall
and Simons (1978) to address the conscious self-concept aspect of each identity.
Respondents were asked for each of the social interaction contexts: “How important is it
to you that this person knows that you are [insert identity]?” These items also scale well
together with a Cronbach’s alpha of .969 in the religion identity, .951 in the relationship
identity, and .948 in the parent identity.
Control Variables. This work incorporates four control variables in all three
models. The first, education, is measured by asking respondents “Which of the following
best describes your education?” Respondents are given the following options: “Less than
high school, High school graduate, Some college or technical school, College graduate,
Graduate or professional degree.” Respondents age is also controlled for using the
question “What is your age?” and having respondents type in a number. Income is
controlled for by using the respondent’s household income. This variable is measured
with the following item:
Below are some income categories. Please choose the category that best describes
the total annual income of the household. Please include your personal income,
as well as the income of others living in the household.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
Less than $14,999
Between $15,000 and $24,999
Between $25,000 and $34,999
Between $35,000 and $44,999
Between $45,000 and $59,999
Between $60,000 and $74,999
32
7. Between $75,000 and $99,999
8. Between $100,000 and $149,999
9. Above $150,000
The last control variable used in the model is the respondent’s gender, which is measured
by asking the respondent “What is your gender?” with “Male” and “Female” as choices.
CHAPTER 4
RESULTS
Tables 1 through 3 below provide the descriptive statistics for each identity in
each of the three groups. Tables 3 through 6, also below, provide the zero-order
correlations, means, and standard deviations for the three identity groups. The results of
the structural equation model analysis are shown in tables 7 through 9, including the
unstandardized estimates and standard errors for each path in the model. This section will
first outline the fit of the proposed model for each of the three identity groups. Following
the discussion of fit will be a report of the results from each SEM model, including
whether each result supports the corresponding hypotheses above.
33
34
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics For Religion Identity Set
N
Mean
Religious
Independent Variables
Proximate Social Structure
359
3.40
Interactional Commitment
403
-.090
Affective Commitment
441
2.91
Cognition
477
5.61
Prominence
436
2.31
Salience
426
2.59
.902
.686
.543
2.79
.920
.920
1-5
-1-4
1-4
0-10
1-4
1-4
Dependent Variables
Role-Specific Self-Worth
Role-Specific Authenticity
440
412
3.48
2.99
.467
.545
1-4
1-4
Nones
Independent Variables
Proximate Social Structure
Interactional Commitment
Affective Commitment
Cognition
Prominence
Salience
85
115
132
154
139
132
2.84
.191
2.79
2.09
1.51
2.12
.924
.835
.625
2.60
.673
.982
1-5
-1-4
1-4
0-10
1-4
1-4
Dependent Variables
Role-Specific Self-Esteem
Role-Specific Authenticity
146
131
3.74
3.02
.444
.571
1-4
1-4
Non-Religious
Independent Variables
Proximate Social Structure
Interactional Commitment
Affective Commitment
Cognition
Prominence
Salience
75
116
121
134
123
112
3.24
.12
2.77
1.79
1.50
1.97
.947
.783
.598
2.29
.700
.889
1-5
-1-4
1-4
0-10
1-4
1-4
Dependent Variables
Role-Specific Self-Esteem
Role-Specific Authenticity
129
106
3.66
3.05
.494
.687
1-4
1-4
SD
Range
35
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics For Relationship Status Identity Set
N
Mean
SD
Married
Independent Variables
Proximate Social Structure
335
3.97
.766
Interactional Commitment
365
.027
.735
Affective Commitment
366
2.75
.566
Cognition
394
5.65
2.85
Prominence
368
2.42
.925
Salience
319
.701
.701
Range
1-5
-1-4
1-4
0-10
1-4
1-4
Dependent Variables
Role-Specific Self-Worth
Role-Specific Authenticity
383
348
3.55
3.02
.514
.610
1-4
1-4
In a Committed Relationship
Independent Variables
Proximate Social Structure
Interactional Commitment
Affective Commitment
Cognition
Prominence
Salience
84
104
101
112
100
97
3.76
.086
2.94
5.72
2.44
2.99
.894
.733
.512
2.67
.902
.882
1-5
-1-4
1-4
0-10
1-4
1-4
Dependent Variables
Role-Specific Self-Esteem
Role-Specific Authenticity
107
95
3.45
2.88
.515
.562
1-4
1-4
Single
Independent Variables
Proximate Social Structure
Interactional Commitment
Affective Commitment
Cognition
Prominence
Salience
138
182
170
188
172
159
2.92
.081
2.69
4.79
2.06
2.79
.999
.708
.675
2.87
.842
.851
1-5
-1-4
1-4
0-10
1-4
1-4
Dependent Variables
Role-Specific Self-Esteem
Role-Specific Authenticity
180
158
3.44
2.79
.552
.606
1-4
1-4
36
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics For Parental Status Identity Set
N
Mean
Parents
Independent Variables
Proximate Social Structure
411
4.07
Interactional Commitment
438
.044
Affective Commitment
431
2.81
Cognition
470
6.48
Prominence
427
2.52
Salience
398
3.25
.711
.773
.592
2.59
.885
.689
1-5
-1-4
1-4
0-10
1-4
1-4
Dependent Variables
Role-Specific Self-Worth
Role-Specific Authenticity
455
411
3.55
3.02
.485
.892
1-4
1-4
Temporarily Childless
Independent Variables
Proximate Social Structure
Interactional Commitment
Affective Commitment
Cognition
Prominence
Salience
104
110
112
118
109
101
3.09
.253
2.96
3.84
2.09
3.00
.876
.731
.561
2.98
.841
.846
1-5
-1-4
1-4
0-10
1-4
1-4
Dependent Variables
Role-Specific Self-Esteem
Role-Specific Authenticity
114
99
3.74
3.02
.524
.639
1-4
1-4
Voluntarily Childless
Independent Variables
Proximate Social Structure
Interactional Commitment
Affective Commitment
Cognition
Prominence
Salience
150
180
179
199
183
166
2.57
.702
2.75
2.43
1.74
2.75
.994
.702
.637
2.84
.805
1.00
1-5
-1-4
1-4
0-10
1-4
1-4
Dependent Variables
Role-Specific Self-Esteem
Role-Specific Authenticity
185
167
3.69
3.05
.496
.581
1-4
1-4
SD
Range
37
Table 4:
Zero-Order Correlations, Means, and Standard Deviations for Religious Identity Set
Proximate Int_Commit Aff_Commit Cognition Prominence Salience
Proximate
Int_Commit
Aff_Commit
.376
**
.449
**
1
.460
**
1
.115
.202
*
.119
Prominence
.172
.183
.103
RSSE
Authenticity
1
Cognition
Salience
RSSE
.461
**
.062
.001
*
1
.635
**
.264
**
1
**
1
-.142
-.112
.075
1
**
*
.003
.203
*
1
.441
.156
-.003
.202
-.196
-.075
-.145
Mean
2.84
.191
2.79
2.09
1.51
2.12
3.74
3.02
SD
.924
.835
.625
2.60
.673
.982
.444
.571
Authenticity
-.394
-.233
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
Table 5:
Zero-Order Correlations, Means, and Standard Deviations for Parent Identity Set
Proximate Int_Commit Aff_Commit Cognition Prominence Salience
Proximate
Int_Commit
Aff_Commit
Cognition
Prominence
Salience
RSSE
Authenticity
1
.387
**
.254
**
.424
**
.396
**
.236
**
1
.375
**
.175
**
.268
**
.200
**
1
.191
**
.349
**
1
.616
**
.142
**
.359
**
.125
**
-.058
.033
**
**
-.002
1
.512
**
RSSE
.105
*
.050
Authenticity
.042
-.058
-.052
Mean
3.56
.004
2.82
5.06
2.26
SD
1.03
.766
.602
3.24
.921
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
-.156
-.141
1
.104
**
1
**
1
3.09
3.57
2.95
.829
.499
.605
.448
38
Table 6:
Zero-Order Correlations, Means, and Standard Deviations for Parent Identity Set
Proximate Int_Commit Aff_Commit Cognition Prominence Salience
Proximate
Int_Commit
Aff_Commit
Cognition
Prominence
Salience
RSSE
RSSE
Authenticity
1
.403
**
.346
**
.317
**
.372
**
.355
**
.176
**
1
.464
**
.254
**
.322
**
.210
**
.124
**
.022
-.043
.013
**
*
.053
1
.332
**
.393
**
.192
**
1
.626
**
.364
**
1
.553
**
Authenticity
.061
-.012
-.054
Mean
3.54
-.004
2.74
5.10
2.24
SD
1.04
.740
.914
2.98
.910
-.202
-.101
1
.094
*
1
**
1
3.03
3.53
2.96
.830
.52
.606
.497
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
In general, the three models fit the data adequately. The main three fit statistics
reported here are the chi-square values along with degrees of freedom, the Comparative
Fit Index (CFI), and the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA). In
general, a well-fitting model will have a non-significant chi-sqaure, a CFI above .90, and
an RMSEA below .10. As can be seen at the bottom of table 7, when using the religion
group, the chi-square is 81.46 with 38 degrees of freedom. While this value is significant,
the chi-square is impacted strongly by sample size. As sample size increases the chance
of finding a significant result increases. Thus, we must also check other measures of fit.
For the religion group, CFI = .974 and RMSEA = .039. Both of these measures of fit
meet the accepted levels and show support for the fit of the model. Similarly, when the
model is estimated for the relationship identity group, a high value is found for chi-square
(χ2 = 151.13, df = 39), while both other measure of fit meet the acceptable values (CFI =
39
.923 and RMSEA = .065). This pattern remains when estimating the model for the
parental identity group (χ2 = 114.46, df = 41; CFI = .945; RMSEA = .048). These results
suggest that the proposed model adequately fits the data for all three identity groups.
Results for Religious Identity
The results from the analysis of the religion identity group can be seen in Table 7
below. The results are shown in such a way that allow for easy comparison of the direct
paths across the three identities involved. Those paths that are shown in bold in the table
are those that were found to have no statistical difference between the groups. This was
found to be true across all three identities in some cases, and across only two of the
identities in other cases.
The effects from proximate social structure to interactional commitment as well
as to affective commitment, for example, are constrained to be equal across all three
identities (b=.37, p<.001 and b=.25, p<.001 respectively). These effects are both in the
positive direction such that as an individual’s proximate social structure becomes more
homogenous, their commitment to that identity becomes stronger. These results support
the first hypothesis. In contrast to the first two effects, the effect from proximate social
structure to cognition is significantly different for all three groups. The effect works in
the hypothesized manner for the normative religious identity (b=1.38, p<.001) but is not
significant for either of the counter-normative identities. This result shows support for the
40
hypothesis only for those individuals who hold the normative identity of being religious.
This pattern remains similar for the effects of commitment on prominence and salience.
The effect of interactional commitment on salience is positive and significant for the
normative religious identity (b=.11 p <.05), but is non-significant for both the counternormative non-religious identities. Affective commitment does not significantly predict
salience for any of the three identities. These results provide little support for the third
hypothesis. Both types of commitment do, however, have significant positive
relationships (interactional: b=.15, p <.01; affective: b= .20, p<.01) with prominence for
the normative religious identity, but are not significant predictors of prominence for
either of the counter-normative non-religious identities. These results show support for
the fourth hypothesis, but only for the normative identity. The fifth hypothesis states that
cognition will have a positive effect on both identity salience and identity prominence.
One half of this hypothesis is supported by the results. A positive relationship does exist
between cognition and prominence for all three identities. The effect is positive and
significant in all three cases, but is not significantly different for those individuals who
are religious and those who are non-religious (b=.20, p<.001). The nones show the
positive effect as well, it is, however, weaker for them than the other two identities
(b=.17, p<.001).
The sixth hypothesis is supported by the data for the religious identity group. All
three identities show a significant positive relationship between prominence and salience.
This effect does not significantly differ between the three identities (b=.65, p<.001).
Hypothesis seven states that salience will have positive relationships with both role-
41
specific self-worth and role-specific authenticity. This hypothesis is only supported for
those individuals in the non-religious identity with a significant positive relationship from
salience to role-specific self-worth (b=.14 p<.05) and from salience to role-specific
authenticity (b=.16, p<.05). The effect is not significant for those individuals who hold
the religious identity or the None identity. The eighth hypothesis, however, is not
supported for the religion identity group. In fact, the results suggest that an opposite
effect may be present. The hypothesized effect is that prominence will be positively
related to role-specific self-worth and authenticity. Neither of these effects is significant
for those individuals who hold the normative religious identity. The effect from
prominence to role-specific self-worth is only significant for those who are non-religious,
but it is in the negative direction (b=-.20, p<.01). In addition, the effect from prominence
to authenticity is significant and negative for both the non-religious and the nones. This
effect also does not significantly differ between these two groups (b=-.25, p<.001). This
effect suggests that for those who hold one of the counter-normative non-religious
identities, as the prominence of their identity increases, they experience less authenticity
with regard to that identity.
42
Table 7: Unstandardized Coeficients (with Standard Errors) for Religious Individuals, Non-religious Individuals, and Nones
Sex
Age
Income
Education
PSS
Int Commit Aff Commit
R NR N
R NR N
R NR N R NR N
R NR N R NR N R NR N
.05 .36 .04 .00 .00 .00 -.01 .09 -.03 .04 -.19 .07
Proximate Social Structure
.09 .24 .21 .003 .008 .007 .003 .06 .05 .06 .13 .11
Interactional Commitment
Affective Commitment
Cognition
Prominence
Salience
-.13a -.05 -.26 .00 -.01b -.01 .05c .04
.06 .13 .15 .002 .004 .005 .01 .03
.09
.05
.07 -.01 .00 -.01 .02
.11 .002 .003 .003 .01
b
-.27 -.52 -.45 -.02 .04
.24 .40 .41 .01 .01
-.35 -.18 .00 .00
.15 .16 .002 .01
.16
.05
b
.26
.13
a
-.02 -.07 -.01 -.05 .02 -.09
.06 .04 .04 .03 .08 .08
.07 .01 .00 .003 .01
.07 .001 .003 .002 .01
a
c
c
-.04 .01 .01 .01 .04
.09 .002 .004 .003 .01
.25 .25
.02 .02
c
-.08 .03 -.14 -.03 .03 1.38 -.23 .08
.09 .09 .13 .22 .22 .14 .26 .27
b
.14
.09
Salience
R NR N
c
-.04 .02
.01 .06
.00
.01
c
.02 -.03 .05 -.01 .25
.02 .03 .05 .06 .02
.00 .00 .01 .00 -.02 -.04 -.02 -.03 .01 -.01
.09 .002 .004 .003 .06 .03 .02 .03 .06 .05
a
.00
.06
c
.02
.02
b
Prominence
R NR N
.06 .001 .09 .00 .37c .37c .37c
.03 .03 .07 .08 .03 .03 .03
a
-.01 .05
.06 .11
Role-Specific Self-Esteem .08
.04
Authenticity
c
.16
.10
Cognition
R NR N
b
b
b
c
c
c
.15 .06 .06 .20 .18 .04 .20 .20 .17
.05 .08 .07 .06 .11 .09 .01 .01 .02
a
c
c
.11 .08 .00 -.09 .00 .04 .05 -.02 -.02 .65 .65
.05 .12 .12 .06 .15 .15 .01 .03 .03 .04 .04
c
.65
.04
c
.05
.02
a
.02 .03 .01 .02
.02 .02 .05 .04
.06 -.20 -.11 .06 .14 .07
.04 .06 .06 .04 .06 .04
.07
.03
a
.02 -.01 -.01 -.02
.02 .03 .07 .05
-.08 -.25 -.25 .06 .16 .13
.05 .06 .06 .03 .08 .05
χ2 = 81.47, df = 38, pvalue = .000, CFI = .974, RMSEA = .039
b
c
a
c
a
43
Results for Relationship Status
Table 8 below displays the results from the analysis of the relationship identity
group. In the relationship data the first hypothesis receives full support. The effects from
proximate social structure to interactional commitment and affective commitment are
positive, significant, and not different between the three groups (b=.33, p<.001 and
b=.28, p<.001 respectively). The relationship between proximate social structure and
cognition also supports hypothesis two. For all three identities, proximate social structure
is a significant predictor of cognition (b=.72, p<.001), such that as an individual’s
proximate social structure becomes more homogenous, they think and plan more about
their identity. The third hypothesis, that both types of commitment will be positively
related to salience, receives little support in the relationship identity group. There are
only two significant effects out of the six possible. The first is a positive relationship
between interactional commitment and salience for those individuals who are single
(b=.21, p<.05) but the second is a negative relationship between affective commitment
and salience for those individuals who are currently in a relationship (b=-.40, p<.01).
The fourth hypothesis states that both types of commitment will be positively
related to prominence. For the relationship identity group, this receives some support.
Interactional commitment has a significant positive relationship with prominence, but
only for those who are currently in a relationship (b=.26, p<.05). Affective commitment
on the other hand is significantly related to prominence for all three identities. The
relationship is not significantly different for those who are married and those who are
44
currently in a relationship (b=.19, p<.01), but is significantly higher for those who are
single (b=.38, p<.001). Hypothesis five states that cognition will have a positive
relationship with both salience and prominence. The relationship identity set shows
support for the relationship between cognition and prominence, but not between
cognition and salience. Cognition has a significant positive relationship with prominence
for all three identities. This relationship does not differ significantly for any of the three
identities (b=.16, p<.001). The sixth hypothesis is also supported in the relationship
identity group. The relationship is positive and significant for all three identities. Those
who are married and those who are single do not significantly differ from each other
(b=.35, p<.001) but those who are currently in a relationship show this effect more
strongly (b=.71, p<.001). Again, hypotheses seven and eight receive little support for the
relationship identity group. Salience is only a significant predictor of role-specific selfworth, and only for those who are married (b=.11, p<.05), and is not a significant
predictor of authenticity for any identity. Prominence is not a significant predictor of selfworth for any group and is only a significant predictor of authenticity for those who are
single, and this effect is opposite of the hypothesized direction (b=-.20, p<.01).
45
Table 8: Unstandardized Coeficients (with Standard Errors) for Married Individuals, Individuals In a Commited Relationship, and Single Individuals
Sex
Age
Income
Education
PSS
Int Commit
Aff Commit
Cognition
M
IR
S
M
IR
S
M IR S
M IR
S
M IR
S
M IR
S
M IR
S
M IR
S
a
a
Proximate Social Structure -.23 .15
.09
.24
c.
Interactional Commitment -.06 -.53
.08
c
c
b
-.41 .01 .01 .02 .03
.17 .003 .007 .006 .02
.16
c
.14
.10
-.01 -.01 -.006 .01
.003 .004 .003 .02
c
a
.11 -.02 -.01 .12
.05 .04 .05 .11
-.00 .05
.03 .02
a
b
c
.33
.03
c
.33
.03
c
c
.28
.03
c
.28
.03
c
c
.72
.13
c
.72
.13
c
.08
.04
-.11 .00
.07 .08
.33
.03
.02
.03
-.04 -.01 .28
.05 .06 .03
.20
.06
.005 .06
.12 .09
Cognition
.27
.30
-.18
.56
-.10 -.05 -.07 -.05 .04
.40 .01 .02 .01 .08
Prominence
.12
.08
-.04
.18
-27
.10
-.01 -.002 .002 -.01 .01 -.006 -.03 -.21 -.01
.003 .005 .004 .02 .04 .02 .04 .08 .05
.10
.06
.26
.11
.10
.12
.01b .004 .01a -.004 .004 -.04 -.06 -.10 -.09
.002 .004 .005 .02 .03 .03 .04 .07 .08
.03
.05
.09
.10
.20a .08
.07 .16
Role-Specific Self-Esteem .06
.05
Authenticity
.19
.12
.15a .29
.07 .40
c
a
b
c
-.01 -.04 -.29 .41
.12 .09 .15 .26
b
-.06 .006b .001 .003 .02
.08 .002 .003 .003 .01
.03
.22
b
.04 -.006 .00
.03 .02 .03
-.05 .01c .004 .005 .04a .04 .01
.09 .002 .004 .003 .02 .03 .02
χ2 = 143.92, df = 39, pvalue = .000, CFI = .929 RMSEA = .061
M
Salience
IR
S
.07
.11
Affective Commitment
Salience
-.01 -.003 -.01 .004 .02 .02
.002 .003 .003 .02 .02 .02
Prominence
M IR
S
.003 .02
.06 .04
-.04 -.002 -.02
.03 .07 .05
.72
.13
a
.03
.09
b
.19
.07
b
.19
.07
c
.38
.09
.16
.01
.21a -.10 -.40b .07
.10 .07 .13 .11
.03
.02
c
.16
.01
c
.16
.01
-.004 .04
.03 .02
c
.35c .71c .35c
.04 .09 .04
.04
.04
.09
.08
-.10 .11a .05
.06 .05 .09
-.01 -.08 -.20b .11
.04 .09 .06 .06
.11
.10
.04
.06
-.03
.06
46
Results for Parental Identity
Shown below in Table 9 are the estimates for the proposed model and the parental
status identity group. Hypothesis one again is supported by these results. For all three
identities, as an individual’s proximate social structure becomes more homogenous, they
report higher levels of both interactional commitment (b=.30, p<.001) and affective
commitment (b=.23, p<.001). Hypothesis two does not receive full support for this
identity group. The effect from proximate social structure to cognition is positive and
significant, but only for parents (b=.55, p<.01). The parental identity group shows no
support for hypothesis three. None of the six possible effects from either interactional or
affective commitment are significantly related to salience. Hypothesis four receives some
support from this identity group. Interactional commitment is only significantly related to
prominence for parents (b=.11, p<.05), but affective commitment has a significant
positive relationship to prominence for all three identities (b=.31, p<.001).
Hypothesis five states that cognition will have a positive relationship with both
prominence and salience. This hypothesis receives partial support for the parent identity
group. Cognition has a significant positive relationship with prominence for all three
identities in the group. This relationship is not significantly different for those individuals
who are parents, and those who are classified as temporarily childless (b=.15, p<.001)
and is only slightly weaker for those who are voluntarily childless (b=.10, p<.001). The
parental identity group also shows support for hypothesis six. For all three identities, the
relationship between prominence and salience is significant and positive (b=.42, p<.001).
47
Hypothesis seven states that identity salience will have a positive relationship with both
role-specific self-worth and authenticity. With regard to self-worth, this effect is only
significant for the voluntarily childless (b=.10, p<.01). The effect is significant, however,
for both the voluntarily and temporary childless with regard to authenticity (b=.12,
p<.01). The eighth hypothesis makes the same prediction about the relationship between
prominence and self-worth and prominence and authenticity. This hypothesis receives no
support. Prominence is not a significant predictor of self-worth for any of the three
identities and is negatively related to authenticity for the temporarily and voluntarily
childless (b=-.17, p<.001). The relationship again, suggests that, for these two counternormative groups, an increase in prominence is related to a decrease in feelings of
authenticity.
48
Table 9: Unstandardized Coeficients (with Standard Errors) for Parents, Temporary Childless, and Voluntarily Childless
Sex
Age
Income
Education
PSS
Int Commit
P
TC VC P
TC VC P
TC VC P
TC VC P
TC VC P
TC VC
Proximate Social Structure -.07 .04
.08
.21
.04
.16
b
b
c
.01 .00 -.03 .00
.003 .007 .006 .02
c
Interactional Commitment -.20 -.26 -.13 -.01 -.01 .00
.07
.15
.10
Affective Commitment
.02
.06
.07
.11
.19
.10
Cognition
.57
.23
a
Prominence
Salience
a
Role-Specific Self-Esteem .11
Authenticity
c
-.01 -.01 .003 .00
.002 .003 .003 .01
c
b
b
-.45 -.58 -.06 -.04 -.05 .02
.41 .38 .008 .01 .02 .06
-.01 .00
.07 .09
.02
.06
a
.04
.002 .005 .003 .02
c
b
.00 .00
.002 .01
.00 .00
.006 .01
a
-.03 -.06 .06
.05 .04 .05
.07
.11
.15
.09
.06
.03
.01
.02
.05
.04
.00
.08
.05
.05
.30
.03
c
.30
.03
c
.30
.03
.02
.02
.01
.02
-.01 -.01 .02
.13 .06 .05
.23
.03
c
.23
.03
c
.23
.03
.03
.09
.03
.09
.00
.13
-.20 .55
.21 .17
b
.05
.33
.03
.22
b
-.03 -.01 .00 -.05 -.02 -.02 -.02 -.04 -.01 .10
.10 .002 .003 .02 .02 .02 .004 .04 .05 .05
-.18 .04
.16 .15
-.01 .06
.04 .03
-.04 -.09 -.15
.03 .08 .08
.02
.02
.02
.02
.01
.03
.01a .01c .01c .05c .02
.002 .003 .02 .01 .02
.03
.02
-.03 -.02 .04
.03 .05 .04
.24c .004b .003 .006a .02
.07 .002 .002 .003 .01
.05
.07
.07
.10
.06
-.04 .08
.09 .08
χ2 = 104.52, df = 41, pvalue = .000, CFI = .952, RMSEA = .044
.02
.04
-.01
.04
Aff Commit
P
TC VC
P
Cognition
TC VC
Prominence
P
TC VC
P
Salience
TC VC
c
c
.37
.25
a
c
.31
.05
c
.31
.05
c
c
.15
.01
c
.11
.05
.12
.09
.02
.08
.31
.05
.15
.01
.07
.04
.07
.11
.18
.12
-.09 -.16 -.07 .03b .03
.06 .15 .13 .01 .03
c
.10
.02
-.04 .42c .42c .42c
.03 .04 .04 .04
.07
.04
.10b
.04
.05
.04
-.11 -.02 .06
.06 .05 .04
.01
.04
-.17c -.17c -.04 .12b .12b
.05 .05 .05 .04 .04
CHAPTER 5
DISCUSSION
The results above show some distinct patterns, as well as some differences
between the identity groups examined. This section of the paper will synthesize the
findings from all three identities within each identity group for each hypothesis. The first
hypothesis, that as proximate social structure becomes more homogenous, commitment to
that identity will increase, receives full support. In each of the models this effect is
significant and positive for all three identities. Also, within each model the effect is not
significantly different for any of the three identities. The results for the second hypothesis
receive support for one identity group, but not the others. The hypothesized effect from
proximate social structure to identity cognition is supported for all three identities in the
relationship identity group. In the other two identity groups, however, the effect is only
present for the normative group (those who are religious and those who are parents). This
is the first indication of differences between the normative and counter-normative
identity process. The third hypothesis is that both affective and interactional commitment
will have positive relationships to identity salience. The hypothesized effect from
interactional commitment to salience in general is not supported. There is only a
significant positive relationship for two of the nine identities examined (religious
individuals and single individuals). In addition the hypothesized effect from affective
49
50
commitment to salience receives no support. The path is only significant in one case (for
those who are currently in a relationship) but it is not in the hypothesized direction. The
results for the third hypothesis are not consistent with the predictions of identity theory.
The fourth hypothesis makes a similar prediction to the third for the effect from
commitment to identity prominence. The effect from interactional commitment to
prominence is not consistently significant. The hypothesized effect from affective
commitment to prominence receives more support. In the relationship and parental status
identity groups, the effect is positive and significant for all three identities. For the
religion identity group the effect is only significant for those who hold the normative
religious identity. This relationship is an example of different identities working in
different ways in the identity process. The fifth hypothesis states that identity cognition
will have a positive relationship with salience and prominence. This hypothesis is
supported for the effect on prominence, but receives less support for salience. In two of
the three identity groups (religion and parental status) the effect is supported, but only for
those who hold the normative identity (religious or parent). The previous work in identity
theory has only examined these normative identities. Again, this is some support that
counter-normative identities may not follow the same identity process that normative
identities do. The predicted relationship between cognition and prominence, however,
receives support from both the normative and counter-normative identities. The effect is
positive and significant, as predicted, in all three identities within all three of the groups.
51
The results for hypothesis five show more support for identity theory’s assertion
that identity salience and identity prominence need to be treated as separate and should
always be included in an identity model (i.e. Stryker and Serpe 1994). The direct effect
from prominence to salience that is predicted in the sixth hypothesis receives strong
support. For all three identities in all three identity groups the effect is positive and
significant. These results support the current work that has developed the relationship
between prominence and salience into a direct effect (Brenner, Serpe, and Stryker
Unpublished Manuscript). Hypothesis seven states that identity salience will be positively
related to role-specific self-worth and role-specific authenticity. This hypothesis is best
broken down by the effect from salience to self-worth and from salience to authenticity.
The hypothesized effect from salience to self-worth receives little support, only being
significant for one of the identities in each group. The second effect, from salience to
authenticity receives slightly better support, especially in the parental status identity
group. Both of the counter-normative, childless identities show the hypothesized effect.
The eighth hypothesis makes the same prediction about the effect from prominence to
self-worth and authenticity. The results from this study show no support for the
hypothesis. In fact, when one of these effects is significant it is a negative relationship.
The relationship from prominence to self-worth is significant for one of the nine
identities (those individuals who are non-religious) with a negative relationship. The
effect from prominence to authenticity is significant for more of the identities,
exclusively the counter-normative identities. The significant negative effect is present for
both of the counter-normative identities in the religion identity group (non-religious and
52
nones), both in the parental status group (Temporarily and voluntarily childless), as well
as the counter-normative identity in the relationship status group (single). This
relationship tells us that for those individuals who hold a counter-normative identity, as
the identity becomes more central to who they are, they experience less authenticity. This
is likely due to the fact that individuals who hold a counter-normative identity may be
less willing and/or able to bring up their identity and therefore may be less able to feel
like they are being true to themselves. This suggestion is supported by the fact that t-tests
show that those in the counter-normative identities report a significantly lower average
level of identity salience.
CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
The main goal of this work was to begin to explore what has been termed here counternormative identities. The first step to this exploration was to test the model that has been
proposed and validated previously in identity theory. There is no previous literature
regarding any type of counter-normative identity and the identity process, and therefore,
the hypotheses for this work were consistent with what identity theory has shown for
normative identities. In general, based on the results presented here, it seems that
differences do exist between those individuals who claim a normative and counternormative identity. While many of the relationships predicted by identity theory receive
equal support in this study, some show clear patterns of difference. For example, the
relationship between commitment and salience receives stronger support for the
normative identities examined than the counter-normative. In addition, the hypothesized
relationship between prominence and salience to self-worth and authenticity receive
virtually no support, and even show opposite effects for the counter-normative identities.
Consistent with previous identity theory work (i.e. Stryker and Serpe 1983, Serpe 1987),
a number of differences exist between the three groups of identities. For example,
proximate social structure is a significant predictor of cognition for all three identities in
53
54
the relationship status group, but only for the normative identities in the religion identity
group and the parental status group.
While this research presents some valuable information, there are a few
limitations. The first is the measurement of salience. As noted by Brenner (2011) it is
inherently difficult to measure identity salience in its true form in a survey format. While
salience theoretically does not require an actor’s awareness, asking questions about it
forces the salience of an identity to the forefront of a respondent’s consciousness. This
can confound the actual salience of an identity with the prominence of that identity (Ervin
and Stryker 2001; Stryker and Burke 2000). The respondent ends up inferring that they
enact that identity in relation to how important it is to them. This may be one reason that
the relationship between prominence and salience remains strong across all of the
identities in this research.
Additionally, because both of these constructs are measured in the aggregate
form, some of the context may be missing. In other words, the measures of salience and
prominence cover a number of different contextual situations of meeting someone for the
first time. This means that in one of the specific relationships individuals may have a
lower level of prominence, salience, or both. Once the measure is aggregated, however, it
is possible that this specific situation will be washed out.
A second issue also comes from the nature of the survey. Each of these identities
is measured and discussed as if it exists in a vacuum, which we know is not the case. The
self is not composed of a single identity; many exist as was originally explicated by
55
James (1892). In addition, not just a single identity is activated at any given moment, nor
do the identity processes for one identity happen without input from other identities. This
is a limitation of the survey format, only one identity can be asked about at a given time.
The third most critical limitation is that the model examined here is likely
incomplete. There are a number of concepts that identity theory makes predictions about
that were not examined. Concepts like choice or satisfaction would likely be important to
the relationships examined in this work. For example, if an individual who holds a
counter-normative identity perceives that they had no choice but to claim that identity,
the identity processes may be affected.
Future work on counter-normative identities should take these issues into
consideration. The issue with the measurement of salience may not be something that can
be addressed, because it is simply the nature of the concept. The issue of context,
however, is something that can likely be addressed with the current data, and will be in
the future. In addition, future work should look to incorporate other concepts within
identity theory that may be of particular relevance for those who hold a counternormative identity.
The main contribution of this work to identity theory is to provide some
preliminary support that counter-normative identities work in the identity model
differently than the normative identities that have previously been explored. These types
of identities are present in the general population and warrant more exploration. While
some individuals may experience these counter-normative identities as stigmatizing,
56
some may not. This makes the identity process an important aspect that will enhance our
understanding of these types of identities. Future work must examine these identities with
more scrutiny. More of the identity theory concepts may be of relevance for the
comparison of normative and counter-normative identities. If differences are consistently
found, a model that is specific to counter-normative identities may need to be developed.
The best method to further explore these counter-normative identities is to collect more
data. Specifically, data that takes into account the context where specific components of
the identity model (i.e. the relationship between prominence and salience) are occurring
as well as longitudinal data focusing on the identity processes of those individuals with
counter-normative identities. These identities have had virtually no exploration in past
work on identity theory, but the findings from this work show the processes may differ
for counter-normative identities. This fact suggests that identity theory should examine
more closely identities that may not follow the theoretical model that has been developed
for normative identities.
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