WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2011
BACKGROUND CASE STUDY
MALI AND ITS SAHELIAN NEIGHBORS
Scott Straus1
University of Wisconsin, Madison
July 2011 (Final revisions received)
The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the author.
They do not necessarily represent the views of the World Development Report 2011 team, the World
Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the
governments they represent
1
The case study is founded upon secondary research; a mission to Mali from 2/7/10-2/20/10 that included
Director Sarah Cliffe, Lead Specialist Stephen Ndegwa, and Lead Author Scott Straus; input from Malian
researchers Bakary Traoré and Almamy Sylla; and assistance from the Malian World Bank Office. The lead author
would like to thank the World Bank’s Mali Country Team and the following peer reviewers for their comments on
earlier drafts: Aurelien Kruse and Chris Lovelace (World Bank), Roland Marchal (Sciences Po), and Abdi I. Samatar
(University of Minnesota).
Mali and Its Sahelian Neighbors
I. Introduction
The nine Sahelian countries (Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Chad, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau,
Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Senegal) are among the poorest in the world, with poverty rates of
over 50%, and most are seriously conflict-prone. Among these, Mali (the focus of this study) and
its immediate neighbors have faced enduring conflicts since independence; these have often been
induced or exacerbated by responses to extreme climatic conditions (e.g. droughts of the 1970s),
institutional instability following political transitions (particularly during the 1990s), and
enduring difficulties in assuring delivery of basic governance functions (including territorial,
protection, human and food security and core social services).
The study focuses on Mali, explaining the nature of conflicts and conflict threats in a
regional context. The study identifies and examines three main sources of conflict and insecurity
in Mali‟s post-independence period: 1) transborder criminal and terrorist armed activity linked to
the history of armed conflict in the Northern regions; 2) historical Tuareg/Arab insurgencies
from the 1960s to the late 2000s; and 3) local-level, resource-related conflicts tied to contrasting
livelihood systems (especially water and pasture access and management). The study situates the
sources of insecurity within the framework developed in the WDR Concept Note, including
discussions of stresses, capabilities, and expectations; the role of cross-border and global
dynamics; the evolution and change of forms of violence; the role of leadership; and other
aspects outlined in the Concept Note. The case study also examines some ways in which
conflicts have been attempted to be resolved.
Overall, Mali is a case that well illustrates the connections between development and
conflict as well as the causal factors and dynamics described in the WDR. During a field-based
mission, a range of government, non-governmental, and diplomatic actors strongly affirmed an
essential relationship between insecurity and development, arguing that the two are empirically
inseparable in the Malian context. Moreover, the contemporary insecurity in Northern Mali is an
apt and timely example of the complex, adaptive, inter-connected, and cross-border nature of
violence; the dynamics of insecurity in the North both in the contemporary period and over time
are linked to weak state capability and difficult terrain as well as to chronic development
challenges tied to a lightly-populated, poorly integrated space. At the same time, Mali is a
compelling case that demonstrates how, when coupled with political will, social capital
constitutes an important reserve for conflict mediation, even if formal institutional capability is
weak. The resolution of armed conflict in the mid-1990s, which drew on Mali‟s reserve of social
capital, is a good example of political leadership, the role of non-state actors, and the value of
consensus in the peacemaking process. Mali‟s low-level local resource-related conflicts
throughout the country illustrate the challenges of managing the commons in conditions of
environmental scarcity and vulnerability combined with population growth and limited state
capability. Finally, during a field visit, the WDR mission team heard numerous claims of
quotidian frustrations tied directly to high expectations, disillusionment with state institutions,
and limited economic opportunities, all of which constitute an important challenge for future
governance. All this takes place in a country with a strong democratic record in which two
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nonviolent democratic transfers of power have taken place during the past 19 years. Mali was
also an early and effective decentralizing state in Africa. In short, Mali‟s national democratic
conviction and practice have been exemplary, as has the country‟s record of non-violent
solutions to various sources of conflict—in particular for a poor country in a largely nondemocratic regional neighborhood full of enduring armed conflicts. Nonetheless, Mali is faced
with a series of security, development, and governance challenges that remain profound and
potential sources of future conflict.
II. Three Domains of Conflict and Insecurity: A Descriptive Summary
As noted in the introduction, the case study identifies three central domains of conflict
and insecurity in Mali, each of which has analogs in other countries in the Sahel or is connected
directly to conflicts in neighboring countries.
First is the contemporary multi-faceted insecurity in the three Northern regions of Mali
(Timbuktu, Gao, and Kidal), hereafter “the North.” The insecurity is a confluence of external and
internal factors, including a) transnational terrorist activity led by Al Qaeda in the Land of the
Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) that uses European kidnapping as a main tactic; b) transnational
trafficking of illicit goods, principally drugs and weapons but also people; and c) the presence of
armed Malian actors linked to banditry and to the history of a series of armed rebellions in the
region. The external/transnational factors intersect with local grievances, due primarily to the
region‟s poverty, isolation, and vulnerability, as well as to a large geographic, lightly-populated
territory that is difficult to govern and control.
The three sources of insecurity might be thought of as overlapping networks shaped by
opportunistic alliances between the various armed actors. That said, any empirical connection
between the different sources of insecurity requires substantiation and cannot be assumed. For
example, judging from the results of a field mission in February 2010 there is public suspicion in
Bamako that armed Tuareg actors collaborate with members of the al Qaeda organization or with
drug traffickers. This perception is part of what a recent report called a “growing gulf of
incomprehension” between the north and other parts of the country (USAID 2009: iv). However,
based on currently available evidence, there is no clear evidence of a military alliance between
local insurgents and AQIM (Filiu 2010b: 9). Tuareg actors and AQIM militants do not share an
ideological agenda (USAID 2009). Moreover, Malian actors are not the main illicit traffickers,
who originate in other countries. At the same time, some Northern Malian actors supply
information and vital resources, provide transport, or occasionally participate in kidnapping
actions. The motivation of these Malian collaborators is primarily opportunistic, not ideological.
In interviews, Malian political and military analysts argued that the prospect of making
significant income through illicit and criminal activity distorts local incentives, creating the
conditions for opportunistic alliances between traffickers and/or kidnappers, on the one hand,
and Malian actors on the other. Despite important investment in the North by the Malian state
since the 1990s, several analysts described the near dominance of an illicit economy in the
North. Countering these overlapping sources of insecurity will not be easy. The current
insecurity in the North has a transnational “Sahel-Saharan” dimension and its resolution will
require sustained sub-regional, transnational cooperation. There is also need for economic and
infrastructural integration between Northern Mali and Southern Mali as a long-term development
solution to the contemporary insecurity.
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Second is past insurgencies, led by Tuareg (and to a lesser extent by Arab) rebels and
also centered in the North. There are three main periods of insurgency in Mali‟s postcolonial
history—a) in the mid-1960s shortly after independence, as well as in 1968; both insurgencies
triggered violent repression by the state; b) in the early and mid-1990s, in which the state
initially responded with violence but ultimately chose a path of mediation and non-violent
resolution; and c) the period from 2006 to 2009 when a series of small-scale revolts also were
initiated, which were met with an accommodationist strategy on the part of the state. The 1990s
rebellion, which was the largest and most well-known of the insurgencies, is the focus in the
discussion below. The causes of that rebellion resonate strongly with the dynamics described in
the Concept Note; the insurgency is a classic conflict between a marginalized, resource poor,
ethnically distinct region and a state with weak capability in a vast zone that is geographically
difficult to control. Moreover, the peaceful resolution of the 1990s insurgency constitutes an
important and largely successful example of mediation, inclusion, state-civil society interaction,
and political leadership.
Third is a set of “local,” sub-national conflicts, generally around access to and
management of natural resources. The local conflicts include disputes between sedentary farmers
and mobile herders (as well as between sedentary herder-farmers and mobile herders); intra- and
inter-village rival claims to land ownership and usage; access to water; access to fishing rights;
and the rights to exploit natural resources, such as wood. Tensions over access to resources are
quotidian and ubiquitous in the country. Some disputes are handled peacefully through informal
arbitration and negotiation; others engender more profound conflict resolution mechanisms; and
still others result in violent, murderous inter-communal attacks. Most attacks do not rise to the
level of large-scale (more than 20 deaths), but the potential for local resource-based grievances
to escalate exists. During field visits to rural areas south and north of the capital Bamako3 the
WDR mission team heard evidence of innovative, bottom-up compacts that sought to regulate
access to and conflict over natural resources and which are described below. Overall, disputes
over access to local resources constitute an enduring challenge for Mali, given some structural
constraints, including a growing population, scarce resources in arid and Sahelian environments,
limited state capability in terms of financial and human resources, climatic variability, and the
availability of few non-farm/non-pasture economic opportunities in rural areas. But in assessing
the risk of such disputes materializing into violent conflict, it is essential to avoid any crude
deterministic relationship between poverty and resource scarcity, on the one hand, and conflict,
on the other. Where tensions exist and lead to violent conflict, there are usually specific
problems of management, leadership (or its absence), local politics, and local history that come
into play.
III. Case Study Background and Context
Contemporary Northern Mali: The contemporary insecurity in Northern Mali is a
confluence of three main sources: 1) illicit trafficking; 2) global and regional terror networks;
3
To Ouéléssebougou and Jitumu Sanakoro Communes, Koulikoro region; to Sio Commune, Mopti Region; and to
Dandougou-Fakala Commune, Segou Region.
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and 3) armed actors connected indirectly or directly to the legacy of armed insurgencies in the
region. The three sources of insecurity are interlinked. Northern Mali is a vast and lightly
populated territory, constituting about two-thirds of the overall territory of the Malian state and
about 9% of the population (most of which lives within immediate proximity of the Niger River).
The area is historically one that depends on transborder flows of goods and people, in particular
with Algeria, Niger, and Mauritania. The area is also one with limited infrastructural, economic,
and governance integration with the southern regions of Mali, where the centralized Malian state
is headquartered.
The precise origins of the illicit trafficking are difficult to determine. The most consistent
narrative supplied by Malian experts is that beginning in the early 1990s when the Tuareg/Arab
insurgencies began, the region witnessed a large influx of weapons. These weapons flowed from
other armed conflicts in the region (from Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Chad, in particular) as well
as from a general increase in light weapons trafficking in the 1990s. During the 1990s insurgency
period, some armed actors seized upon the insecurity to use their weapons to engage in banditry
as well as illegal trafficking. After the insurgency ended, many weapons remained in circulation.
By most accounts, the illicit commercial trade began with cigarettes—to avoid paying duty and
taxes—with the general flow from Sub-Saharan Africa through Mali to Northern Africa and
Europe. The drug flow began with cannabis, hashish, and most recently cocaine. A recent
UNODC report on illicit trafficking in West Africa identified oil, cocaine, cannabis, cigarettes,
weapons, toxic waste, people, counterfeit medicines, and other natural resources as part of the
illegal trade in and through West Africa. The largest trades were in oil and cocaine, estimated at
$1 billion or more per annum (UNODC 2009) in the sub-region, including Mali. A report from
the International Peace Institute similarly identified West Africa as a “major hub” in the global
drug economy (IPI 2009). Both reports argue that historical trade and trafficking routes, deep
poverty, weak governance, and unemployed youth are key risk factors for the trade. These
themes resonate with the interview evidence collected during the field visit to Mali, though again
no deterministic link between poverty and unemployment, on the one hand, and illicit trade, on
the other, should be assumed, given that the former are widespread in the country and the latter is
not.
The terrorist organization in Northern Mali is Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (or Al
Qaeda in the Land of the Islamic Maghreb--AQIM). AQIM was formerly the Algeria-based
Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), which was an offshoot of the GIA in that
country, and thus AQIM should be seen as part of a long line of Algerian jihadi groups (Filiu
2009). Algerian militants still dominate the organization (Filiu 2010a). However, AQIM declares
itself to be the representative of Al Qaeda in the Sahel and Maghreb, formally announcing the
affiliation in January 2007 (though it should be noted that terrorist organizations in Tunisia,
Libya, and Morocco maintain their independence from AQIM [Filiu 2009]). GSPC also supplied
fighters to the Al Qaeda affiliate in Iraq. In short, the organization has national (primarily
Algerian), regional (AQIM operates in multiple states in the region), and global dimensions. By
most accounts, AQIM is now based in Northern Mali, having faced increasingly effective stateled resistance in Algeria and having found the Sahelian, lightly governed dessert area in Mali
more amenable as a territorial base. The presence of armed actors tied to the Tuareg rebellion
and the presence of an illicit economy were also most likely magnets to Northern Mali as well.
But the state was quite weakin the north (USAID 2009), and there already were large areas
where criminal and armed networks operated outside the reach of the state. There appear to be
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two main AQIM factions, both now based in Mali, totaling several hundred fighters. (The
mission heard estimates of between 150 to 400 committed AQIM militants.)
In terms of tactics, the main success that AQIM has had in recent years is through
European hostage taking. What happens to the hostages in Mali varies. AQIM has executed two
European hostages, one in 2009 and the other in 2010; it has released others in exchange for
prisoner releases and/or money, including a high profile case of a French hostage who was
released in Mali in February 2010; several Europeans remain in custody. AQIM has also led
attacks, including suicide bombings, on Mauritanian, Malian, and Algerian military and political
targets. As for Mali, an important attack occurred in June 2009 when AQIM succeeded in
assassinating a senior Malian intelligence figure in Timbuktu, in seeming retaliation for an early
raid on AQIM positions by the Malian army (Filiu 2009b: 6). AQIM is also involved with the
narcotics trade (Baldor 2010). Indeed, one expert assessment found that AQIM‟s criminal
activities define the organization and are crucial for its survival (Filiu 2010b: 9).
Mali‟s interaction with AQIM is multi-faceted. One line of argumentation strongly
distinguishes Mali from AQIM, seeing the latter‟s presence on Malian soil as an imposition and
as a spillover from Algeria with precious few local roots. Many Malian and international
observers argue that Malian Islam has little resonance with the Salafist, integrationist, and
political Islam that AQIM espouses (see Pringle 2006; Stern 2008; USAID 2009: 17). In
interviews in Bamako, Tuareg political leaders argued emphatically that Tuaregs have little
ideological commonalities with the Salafists. These leaders disavowed any relations with AQIM,
echoing similar claims by Tuaregs in Niger. The claims resonate with findings in other studies
(Filiu 2010b). Another line of argumentation is cautionary about how much political and military
attention to devote to AQIM. Some critics argue that the terrorist threat is inflated for
instrumental purposes in Mali (Keenan 2004a,b); others argue that too much external
counterterrorism activity could create a backlash against the Malian state and in favor of AQIM
(ICG 2005). But it must be recognized that AQIM‟s presence on Malian soil is real, and AQIM
through hostage taking has caused disruptions to development projects, diplomatic relations, and
the tourism industry.4 A 2010 U.S. assessment found AQIM‟s strength and potential to be
growing (Baldor 2010). In short, the Malian state has an inherent interest in uprooting the AQIM
presence in the northern parts of the country.
The Tuareg Insurgencies: Across multiple time periods, Northern-based Tuareg and Arab
insurgents have challenged the authority of the central state. Tuareg actors revolted during
French colonial rule on multiple occasions, as did other populations in Mali. Tuareg insurgents
similarly rebelled again after political independence in the 1960s. Each of these episodes was
met with repression. The 1960s counter-insurgencies were especially harsh, and the Tuareg
grievances articulated at that time were not addressed after the repression. A number of Tuaregs
fled Mali following the repression of the 1960s (and later after droughts in the 1970s and 1980s).
A second major round of insurgency began in 1990 and lasted through 1995. After a period of
formal peace, a series of small rebellions began in 2006 and officially ended in 2009. Thus, we
can speak of three periods of Tuareg insurgencies in the post-independence period (the 1960s,
the 1990s, and the late 2000s). Of these, the largest and that which receives the most attention in
4
A 2011 Malian government study found that the threat of AQIM attacks had cost 50 billion CFA and 8000 lost
jobs in the previous two years (see Reuters, “Al Qaeda Threat Hits Mali Tourism,” August 1, 2011.
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the conflict literature is the 1990s rebellion and its resolution; that period is the focus of the
discussion below.
Tuareg is an identity marker that refers to a people that share a language and, to a degree,
political and cultural history. Tuaregs reside in five African states (Mali, Niger, Algeria, Libya,
and Burkina Faso), with the greatest concentrations in Mali and Niger. Tuaregs are principally
nomadic pastoralists who maintain a distinct identity vis-à-vis the population of southern Mali,
which is dominant in political, demographic, and economic terms in Mali (and Niger). Tuaregs
comprise less than 10% of the Malian population, but they, along with Arabs and Maurs who
also were instrumental in the 1960s and 1990s rebellions, dominate the far northern region of the
country (Humphreys and ag Mohamed 2005: 267). That said, it is important to note that the
Tuareg are internally sub-divided across regions as well as by lineage and by hierarchical status.
The regional and internal status cleavages within Tuareg society are critical, and in contemporary
Mali observers frequently note important differences between Timbuktu, Gao, and Kidal-based
Tuaregs—indeed, the insurgencies of the late 2000s were all based around Kidal.
There is a broad consensus that a mix of grievances and opportunity drove the rebellions,
in particular in the 1990s (Ag Mohamed et al 1995; Lode 1997; Poulton and Youssouf 1998). In
post-independence Mali prior to 1990, Tuaregs lacked any significant political representation in
the national government, national army, in the national civil service and throughout the
education sector (Humphreys and Ag Mohamed 2005; Lode 1997). Moreover, the colonial state
and the post-independence state until the 1990s in Mali favored sedentarization and agriculture
over the nomadic pastoralism that the Tuaregs and northern Arabs practiced (Abdalla 2009,
Humphreys and Ag Mohamed 2005; Krings 2005. In the colonial and post-independence states,
the general favoritism toward sedentary farming practices shrunk the pastoral space available,
including some of the best pasturage land, leading to greater vulnerability of the Tuareg herders
(Abdalla 2009, Krings 2005) The northern region also received fewer resources in terms of
official development assistance, education funds, and other measures of public goods provision
during the first three decades of post-independent rule. In an important study, Macartan
Humphreys and Habaye ag Mohamed conclude that the northern regions were in “exceptionally
poor condition” relative to other regions before the 1990s (Humphreys and ag Mohamed 2005:
274). Before 1990, many Tuaregs expressed a feeling of identity-based discrimination, namely
that Southern-based governments did not respect their identity as pastoralists or as Tuaregs and
practiced a form of reverse discrimination. That is, as one former southern army colonel attested,
southern groups demeaned Tuaregs, in part in response to Tuareg‟s self-perceived superiority
and pre-colonial history of slave running in southern areas (Keita 1998). In short, while some
short-term factors precipitated the conflict (see below), the underlying long-term factors driving
the 1990s insurgency were group- and region-specific exclusion, deprivation, and discrimination.
The Tuareg were a minority who maintained a distinct identity, vis-à-vis southern populations,
and who fared poorly in the French colonial and post-independence states until the 1990s. The
case is a good example, in the language of the Concept Note, of horizontal inequality.
That said, inequalities in Mali cannot be reduced to a simple North-South or Tuareg/nonTuareg divide (USAID 2009). Poverty is widespread in the country. In terms of absolute poverty
levels, the main axis of disparity is between center and periphery, whereby Bamako has
considerably lower poverty rates than the rest of the country. Judging from data from the United
Nations Development Program, absolute poverty in the late 1980s in northern Mali was on par
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with other regions in Mali (USAID 2009: 13). Since the late 1980s, in part due to investment by
the state, donors, and NGOs after the insurgencies, northern regions have some of the fastest
rates of poverty alleviation (USAID 2009: 13). Nonetheless, the state maintains a very weak
presence in the north, especially outside the main cities, and there continues to exist a strong
perception in the north of neglect by the south (USAID 2009). In short, as with the other types of
violence discussed in this working paper, poverty, inequality, and lack of economic opportunities
are interrelated facilitating conditions for violence, but they do not uniquely explain where, why,
when, or how violence occurs.
Several short-term situational environmental, regional, and political factors precipitated
the outbreak of violence in the 1990s. In particular, the repression of the 1960s revolts led some
Tuaregs to flee the country. Sustained droughts in the 1970s and 1980s (1969-1973 and 19811984) led to migration of other Tuaregs from northern Mali into Algeria and Libya. The effects
of the droughts should be seen in the context of general prior policies toward the North, which
left Tuaregs and other Northern groups with fewer opportunities to respond to rainfall variation.
In Libya, General Qaddafi incorporated Tuaregs into the Islamic Legion and into the regular
army, and Tuaregs in turn fought in wars in multiple countries in the Middle East and
Afghanistan. The deployments in particular afforded Tuaregs a certain level of military
experience. The situation in Libya would take a turn in the mid to late 1980s, with the
contraction of oil prices as well as Libya‟s battlefield losses in Chad. Libya in turn
decommissioned Tuaregs from the armed forces; civilian Tuaregs also were retrenched from key
economic sectors, namely the petroleum sector. These various factors (environmental, regional,
and political) prompted Tuareg insurgents to attack a government post in June 1990 under the
banner of the Mouvement Populaire de Libération de l‟Azawad (MPLA). Claiming to fight for
an independent state and political rights for Northern Malians, MPLA fighters initially succeeded
in gaining and holding some territory.
On the opportunity side, in addition to the regional dynamics in Libya described above,
the insurgency persisted in part because of state weakness and geographical remoteness. The
Northern regions were and remain remote with limited state penetration, in particular outside the
main towns. Given the size of the territory, the lack of infrastructural development, the porous
borders, and the desert conditions, the Northern regions are and were difficult to control and
survey from a military/tactical perspective. These conditions in turn facilitated the survival of the
rebel organizations in the 1990s, as they favor the survival of criminal and terrorist networks in
contemporary Mali. State weakness also prompted civilians to form anti-insurgent self-defense
units and in some cases discipline among soldiers was poor, both contributing to the dynamics of
the conflict.
In addition to the structural and political (grievance) conditions that facilitated violence,
it is crucial to consider the conflict dynamics after the rebellion began—the actions of rebels,
government forces, and civilian groups that had escalating or sustaining effects on the trajectory
of violence. On the one hand, the initial government response was heavy-handed. Under the
leadership of the then-embattled General Moussa Traoré, who was operating a significantly
financially weakened state and faced a significant domestic democratic opposition, the counterinsurgency campaign targeted civilians as well as combatants (Poulton and ag Youssouf 1998:
56). The brutality of the counter-insurgency operations in turn alienated Tuaregs and northerners,
prompting more popular support for the insurgency and more recruits (Lode 1997; Poulton and
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ag Youssouf 1998). The switch to violent counter-insurgency signaled a shift in policy from
President Traoré, who had in earlier phases sought to integrate Tuareg traditional authorities into
the second Republic and again turned to them for mediation assistance (ag Mohamed et al. 1995:
10). But it became clear in this period that there was an internal split between traditional
authorities and younger, angrier Tuaregs (Poulton and ag Youssouf 1998: 57; ag Mohamed et al
1995: 10).
The initial phase of conflict would be followed by significant gains in peace negotiations.
In 1991, the two sides signed the first of several agreements, the Accords of Tamanrasset, with
mediation from Algeria (which worried about a domestic Tuareg insurgency). The Accords
called for a series of security, decentralization, and special development provisions for the North,
including a promise of 47.3% of development funds for the north (ag Mohamed et al. 1995: 13).
The Accords faced a number of obstacles. Having been conducted in secret and then having
appeared to have offered significant concession, the Accords were met with disapproval from
public opinion in the south; sedentarists in the north had been left out of the negotiating process
and worried about their fate; and soldiers on both sides found reason to fault the agreement (ag
Mohamed et al 1995: 13; Lode 1997: 413; Pouton and ag Youssouf 1998: 60). Moreover, in this
period, the main rebel group factionalized into four organizations. Three splinter groups
disavowed the Accords, including two Tuareg groups claiming to fight for independence as did
the Front Islamique et Arabe de l‟Azawad (FIAA), which claimed to fight on behalf of Arabs.
The continued fighting precipitated new cycles of violence, including attacks on Tuareg civilians
by army soldiers.
In this period and separately from the rebellion, Mali was experiencing a significant
political transition. In March 1991, the Traoré government was overthrown in a military coup,
followed by the initiation of a National Conference to craft a new democratic constitution (Wing
2008). During this period, the government, insurgent, and Algerian leaders set up a series of
meetings to resolve the civil war (Ag Mohamed et al 1995; Lode 1997). These resulted in the socalled National Pact, which was signed in 1992. The National Pact recognized and sought to
redress Northern marginalization. The agreement called for the cantonment, disarmament, and
integration of insurgents into the national armed forces and police; incorporation of former rebels
into the civil administration; a special development fund for the North; repatriation of refugees;
and elimination of certain northern military posts, among other provisions.
The final phase of violence followed the signing of the National Pact. Three dimensions
to the conflict drove its escalation. First, the implementation of the Accord was slow (in part
because of political changes in Bamako); second, some insurgents or armed actors claiming to be
insurgents resorted to banditry and some insurgents fought amongst themselves, with lack of
apparent discipline and lack of top-down control among the insurgents; and third, sedentary
farming groups in the North, especially the Songhoi who were not a central part of the
negotiation and peace process and who were worried both about their own livelihoods in the
midst of conflict and about Tuareg domination in a post-war arrangement, formed a militia called
the Mouvement Patriotique Ganda Koy (Ganda Koy) (Ag Mohamed et al 1995; Lode 1997;
Poulton and ag Youssouf 1998).. Fighting between Ganda Koye and insurgents as well as attacks
on civilians ensued. The period is generally recognized as one of the most violent, including
combatant-on-combatant fighting, but also greater lawlessness, intra-rebel fighting, and
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intercommunal conflict. In January 1994, the FCFA was also devalued by 50%, triggering
student strikes, and adding other sources of stress.
The violence and violent conflict ended in 1995 for a mix of reasons. First, there was
general and genuine political will on the part of the Malian state and military to resolve the
problems giving rise to the insurgency. That political will is evident from the earliest
negotiations in 1991, but continued through the 1990s and was pronounced in 1994 and 1995
(Ag Mohamed et al 1995; Lode 1997; Poulton and ag Youssouf 1998). Second, the peace
agreement itself was comprehensive and addressed many of the key grievances on the part of the
Tuareg (including security, political representation, economic development, and cultural
recognition). While some Tuaregs wanted full political independence or fought for other reasons,
many Tuareg political and social elites were pleased with the settlement terms and pushed to end
the conflict. Moreover, for both sets of actors (government and insurgent) there was exhaustion
from fighting. Third, the new democratic government in Bamako empowered younger, more
culturally sensitive officers who sought to work with, rather than fight, Tuaregs. These officers
also initiated a series of workshops within the military, at least according to one military insider
(Keita 1998). Fourth, in the 1994 and 1995 period, local community-based actors initiated
dialogue amongst themselves (in particular, between pastoralists and farmers in the Northern
region) to resolve differences and to end the fighting (Lode 1997; Poulton and Youssouf 1998).
These were called “regional concertations” (Lode 1997; Wing 2008). Fifth, significant
international funds were supplied to make good on peace agreements (Poulton and Youssouf
1998). Finally, in 1995 the most hardline insurgent groups that refused the terms of the peace
settlement were militarily defeated. In 1996, a “flame of peace” ceremony was held, in which
weapons were burned, and that ceremony marked the end of the conflict. In short, a political
emphasis on a negotiated solution, a comprehensive agreement, personnel, multi-track and
funded peace initiatives, including local-level talks, as well as final victories contributed to the
ending of the conflict.
Peace in the north lasted until 2006 when a Tuareg rebel organization under the banner of
Democratic Alliance of 23rd May for Change launched an assault on a military post in northern
Mali. The central grievances that the insurgents articulated were that the terms of the National
Pact had not been properly implemented, in particular that Tuaregs in the army faced
discrimination and had not been adequately promoted. Behind those grievances were lingering
feelings of discrimination and a general perception that the government had not lived up to its
commitments (USAID 2009: 6). The government response to the 2006 rebellion was
conciliatory; an agreement was signed in July 2006. However, in 2007 a break-away faction led
by Ibrahim Bahanga struck. In 2008, the insurgents changed their name to the Tuareg Alliance of
North Mali for Change (ATNMC). The low-intensity fighting ended in 2009 after international
mediation from Algeria. The rebellion is now officially concluded, and several Malian analysts
and Tuareg leaders in Bamako confirmed that direct fighting between government and insurgent
forces is no longer present—but they said a future flare-up was certainly possible.
Local Natural Resource Conflicts: Across Mali, there is significant pressure on key
resources that are essential to the main livelihood activities in rural areas—farming, herding,
fishing, and firewood harvesting. The pressure on the rural natural resources is a background
condition for different forms of conflict that materialize in specific locations for a complex mix
of reasons, including improper resource management, lack of mediation and leadership, local
9
politics, and local history. Disputes over access to key resources remain a constant source of
insecurity in the country, especially in rural areas and they deserve recognition in any analysis of
insecurity and conflict in the region. The main disputes identified in the case study are 1) over
access to high-quality land for pasturage or farming, including conflicts between sedentary
herders and sedentary farmers as well as between herders practicing transhumance and sedentary
communities; 2) over damage to resources, such as when animals destroy crops or cropland or
farmers degrade pasturage areas—this is commonly an issue when transhumance pastoralists
move their animals and come into contact with sedentary farmers who want to protect their crops
from livestock damage, but it also happens between sedentary herders and sedentary farmers; 3)
over access to and use of water, including conflicts between farmers and herders but also
between farmers in different locations (for example, rice farmers downstream of another rice
farming community worry about water flow interruptions from overuse and damming); 4) over
access to fishing rights, including conflicts over who has the authority to fish in particular places;
over the rental or sale of rural property; 5) over ownership of land, including who has the right to
sell or lease valuable land; and 6) over access to and management of woodland areas—in
particular over who has access to firewood, how much and which kind of wood can be cut, and
for what purpose wood can be cut (see also Bagayoko 2009; Beeler 2005).
The rural natural resource disputes are endemic in the country. They are particularly
acute in areas where there is intense pressure on shared highly valued space, such as the Niger
Delta floodplain areas in the Mopti region where farmers, herders, and fishermen all cohabit and
utilize the same general territory for essential economic activities. Rain-fed areas, however, are
hardly immune to these multiple forms of local conflicts. In most cases, the disputes do not rise
to violent, lethal confrontations, but in some cases they do result to beatings and even murder.
National-level data on the frequency and severity of local level violent conflicts do not readily
exist, but in interviews experts in this domain estimated that there are at least several dozen
deaths every year. There is anecdotal evidence of some violent incidences reaching 30 or 40
deaths. Some conflicts divide along ethnic cleavage lines, but others do not—the principal source
of conflict concerns access to the key livelihood resources. While local-level cycles of violence
over access to livelihood resources in Mali have not reached the levels seen in other countries,
the long-term challenge of managing and mitigating the potential for violence remains serious
and represent a quotidian source of insecurity in rural areas.
Several structural conditions underlie and shape the local-level resource conflicts in Mali
and the Sahelian region more generally. First is an ecologically harsh zone, especially in the
Sahel, which is marked by unstable climatic conditions, irregular rainfall patterns, and drought
(de Bruijn and van Dijk 2003). Water and high-quality farmland and pasturage are scarce and
precious resources. Second is demography, in particular Mali‟s rapidly growing population
(estimated at 3.6% growth per annum), which creates new pressure on the scarce resources.
Third is limited non-farm, non-herding economic opportunity in rural areas combined with a
high incidence of poverty. Nationally, herding and sedentary farming (and fishing) are the
dominant economic activities for most Malians. In rural areas, by one count the poverty rate is
79% (GPRSF 2009: 15) Fourth is the degradation of rural natural resources over time, tied in
part to growing demographic pressure as well as pressure to create sources of family revenue.
Finally, a number of interviewees and some literature argue environmental and climatic changes
(in particular precipitation fluctuations over time, as well as desertification, some of which may
10
be related to climate change) contribute to the degradation of resources as well as to increased
pressure on the high-quality resources that exist.
However, while environment, demography, poverty, and natural resource quality are
structural conditions that underlie and shape disputes, many conflict resolution practitioners and
scholars who closely study local resource conflicts in the Sahel argue that other factors determine
when, why, and how disputes over access to resources materialize into specific instances of
physical violence. In particular, such observers resist reducing the conflicts to one of
“environmental scarcity” or to demographic pressures alone (Turner 2004). Chief among the
intervening or precipitating factors are the management of public and private spaces (in
particular whether there are properly designated transhumance routes or adequate fencing to
avoid crop destruction), the mediation of low-level non-violent disputes where they occur,
complex historical political and social relationships between groups in communities, access to
land tenure, and not the least the actions of national and local political actors who may
instrumentalize resource disputes for electoral or other reasons (Turner 2004). A similar
argument about not reducing the occurrence of conflict to environmental scarcity applies to the
Tuareg insurgencies. While climatic changes and drought were short-term precipitators of the
1990 insurgency, for example (Maiga 2007), the causes of the conflict cannot be reduced to such
changes (Benjaminsen 2008).
The management of the various forms of local resource conflicts is diverse, reflecting in
some ways the decentralized local governance structures in the country. The most common
method is for customary village authorities to manage disputes within their villages or for
communal officials to manage disputes between villages or when village authorities cannot
resolve a conflict. If communal level authorities fail to find a remedy and solution, the conflict
often moves to the courts, which many local-level actors argued in interviews was a sub-optimal
outcome. In many locations, communal and village authorities with civil society assistance
created “peace committees” composed of leaders from different segments of the local
community. In a number of locations, local actors also agreed to Conventions that theoretically
regulate access to and usage of the key natural resources or that designated farming or herding
zones and calendars and pathways for pastoral transhumance. Often these Conventions grew out
of peace committees, as well as from development projects focused on conflict resolution, but in
some cases the Conventions emerged from more informal meetings between local stakeholders.
A number of local-level actors argued in interviews that, while not foolproof, the existence of
inter-village peace committees and resource conventions eased tensions when disputes arose or
clarified usage rules, thereby reducing the probability of violent conflicts arising from disputes.
Nonetheless, the pressure on scarce natural resources remains great and a flashpoint for future
conflict in Mali and other Sahel states.
IV. WDR Themes of Stress, Capability, and Expectations
By and large, the tri-partite framework that the Concept Note develops for analyzing
conflict and development resonated with the case study findings.
Stresses: Internal Sources
With regard to the current insecurity in the north, many observers interviewed during the
mission to Mali argued that poverty, lack of economic opportunity, physical/economic isolation,
11
and environmental vulnerability that is recurrent in the Sahel-Saharan region were critical
sources of stress. Weapons also circulated in the region after the end of the 1990s rebellion and
as spillover from other conflicts in the West/Central Africa region. The availability of weapons
in turn contributed to the presence of armed groups and insecurity, which in turn facilitated illicit
traffic. The North is also vulnerable to climatic changes, and the absence of rainfall, and the
mission learned of growing humanitarian concern about drought in the contemporary period.
With regard to the historical conflicts in the North, regional isolation, marginalization,
exclusion, perceived and real discrimination, past repression, as well as drought and its
ineffective management all were important stressors that contributed to the onset and dynamics
of the 1990s rebellion. Unmet expectations following the end of the 1990s war also played a role
in engendering the 2000s conflict, at least according to one former rebel and current Member of
Parliament.
With regard to local resource-related conflicts, a lack of economic opportunities
especially in rural areas; environmental vulnerability due to rainfall patterns, soil quality, and
general fragility of the Sahelian space; a growing population; degradation of the natural
resources from overuse and pressure; and endemic poverty all put stress on the rural commons,
leading in many locations to daily tensions and in some locations to violent confrontation. But,
as noted above, there are often complex reasons why conflict breaks out in particular places that
undermine a simple association between population pressure and resource scarcity, on the one
hand, and conflict, on the other.
With regard to the country as a whole as it faces potential for conflict in the future, many
of the same themes emerge—in particular, poverty and the absence of economic opportunity, as
well a youth bulge in the population. In addition, as a landlocked country and food importing
country, Mali is vulnerable to commodity price shocks (Joseph and Wodon 2008). A number of
consumer goods are also expensive to import, all creating conditions for unmet expectations. In
interviews, a range of Malians spoke of corruption, deteriorating governance, and a general lack
of confidence in formal institutions; these are sources of dissatisfaction, and if left unaddressed
they pose a threat to future stability.
Stresses: External sources
In the contemporary North, the porous and lightly governed areas of the North have
contributed to an influx of external actors, notably AQIM members, drug traffickers, and gunrunners. There is also spillover from conflicts in neighboring countries. The core AQIM
members in Mali are Algerian and who originally were in the Algeria-based GSPC. Many
experts in interviews argued that weapons traffic and circulation in Northern Mali can be traced
to the presence of armed conflicts in the sub-region, including not only Algeria, but also Chad,
Libya, Mauritania, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Côte d‟Ivoire.
With regard to the Tuareg insurgencies, many of the rebels who attacked in the 1990s
crossed into Mali from Libya, where they had trained in the Islamic Legion and had fought in
wars in the Middle East. They or their families had left Mali initially because of the 1960s
repression or because of drought conditions in the 1970s and 1980s. That said, today‟s insecurity
in the North is more embedded in transnational dynamics than the conflict in the 1990s.
12
With regard to Mali in general, in terms of risks for the future, global information flows
and integration inflate expectations and create stress, as discussed below. Climate change is
another concern for Mali and the Sahelian regions, which remain vulnerable to changes in
rainfall precipitation patterns. Another important source of external stress has been the political
paralysis and civil war in Côte d‟Ivoire, which ended in April 2011. More than two million
Malians live in Côte d‟Ivoire, and many Malians had sent home remittances prior to the Ivoirian
crisis. While those remittances still flowed, there is evidence of shrinking remittance revenue.
Capability
Mali is an arresting example of a place where social capital for conflict resolution
remains high, and indeed has been quite present in different levels of state-led mediation, while
formal state capability remains low. One of the most consistent themes in field interviews across
a range of actors concerned the quality and capability of the state, which most saw as
fundamental to managing and resolving a host of problems in Mali linked to security and
development. This theme emerges clearly in other studies (e.g. USAID 2009).
On the social capital side, informants consistently emphasized the importance of informal
mechanisms of dispute resolution rooted in Malian culture and history. Malian cultural
frameworks value dialogue, consensus, and compact-making. Numerous observers of Mali and
much of the academic literature on Mali emphasizes the importance of Malian political culture
and social capital as providing a critical reservoir for peace making (Lode 1997; Poulton and
Youssouf 1998; Pringle 2006; Wing 2008). Mali has a number of mechanisms, including
“cousinage” or “joking relationships” that create cross-ethnic ties (Konaté 1999; Dunning and
Harrison 2009). These relationships are rooted in Mali‟s history of empires, dating to the 11th
century, and in which many Malians express considerable pride.
Evidence of the value placed on dialogue and mediation is found at all levels, from local
conflicts, to inter-communal dialogue during the 1990s Tuareg rebellions, as well as high-level
strategies of moderation during the 1990s and the present (Wing 2008). Indeed, the effectiveness
of Mali‟s social capital reserve on reducing or mediating conflict is most effective when it is
incorporated into formal governance processes. Even if there is widespread recognition of the
importance of this culture source of conflict resolution, some Malian and international observers
argued in interviews that the cultural references are weakening in contemporary Malian society
and that informal mechanisms cannot substitute for governance or the creation of greater
economic opportunity. In other words, social capital is important for limiting and managing
conflict, but it alone is not sufficient for solving the sources of conflict.
While social capital remains high in Mali, the military and administrative capacity of the
state is weak. The relative absence of a formal state presence is especially apparent in the North,
which is a very large territory (600,000 square kms) with a small population. The area is
demonstrably challenging to govern, and the infrastructure in the North remains quite limited.
Mali has an active decentralization program, one that was linked both to the advent of
democratization in the early 1990s as well as to the resolution of the 1990s Tuareg rebellion. A
number of civil society actors, as well as local and national officials, expressed confidence in
decentralization that could lead to greater proximity of the state to society and to generating
improved legitimacy for the state. However, a number of experts and civil society actors
13
expressed reservations about the current decentralization system, arguing that the resources to
govern remained limited and the state still remained aloof from the population.
Expectations
The role of expectations as they relate to security and development surfaced in two main
forms. First, a number of informants recognized that unmet expectations—when there is a gap
between expectations and the capability to meet them—is an important source of stress and
frustration, leading to friction and potentially conflict. The main sources of expectations
discussed in the interviews during the field Mission were: democratization, decentralization,
globalization, and a peace dividend. Mali has registered significant democratic gains since the
early 1990s, and the country is appropriately recognized as a successful case of
democratization—with four elections since the overthrow of dictatorship in 1991 and two
peaceful handovers of power. Yet many observers argued that democratization created
expectations of a new era of prosperity, which has not been met. Mali was similarly one of the
early decentralizing African states, a pioneer, yet decentralization has also engendered
disappointments. Globalization—or more specifically the flow of information—creates
consumer expectations that are very difficult to meet in a poor state with relatively few sources
of employment. Finally, unmet expectations from the 1990s peace agreement, in particular in the
1990s in the North, played a role in some Tuaregs and Arabs taking up arms in the 2000s or
engaging in illicit activities.
The second main expectations theme that emerged in the interviews addressed the
question of reasonable expectations on the part of the state and of donors. Northern Mali, for
example, is a very large territory where formal state presence has been weak for a long period
and where trafficking has historically been integral to the economic system. The various
problems of the North are resistant to simple, off-the-shelf solutions. As one Malian expert said,
“There is no magic recipe.” Mali remains one of the poorest states in the world, and both citizens
and donors should be sanguine about what is possible in the state. A final point: a Malian civil
society actor argued emphatically that almost all the supply and demand for illicit drugs remain
external to Mali. The expectation for remedying the problem should not fall disproportionately
on Mali‟s shoulders, given its limited resources and given that the supply and demand are
external to the country.
V. Other Themes in the WDR Concept Note
Cross-Border Dimensions of Conflict
The cross-border dimensions of the contemporary insecurity are clear. Mali borders seven
countries, and the Northern regions have porous borders with the surrounding countries. AQIM
originated as an Algerian Salafist organization. Most of the products that are trafficked in the
North are produced and consumed outside of Mali. The weakly governed desert space of the
North means that armed groups can move across borders if one state launches an offensive.
There is widespread recognition that any solution to the terrorist and trafficking sources of
insecurity will require a regional solution. A long-term solution to historical Tuareg grievances
will also likely require some coordination with neighboring states, including Algeria, Niger, and
Libya, which each have sizable Tuareg populations. In 2010 and 2011, the states most affected
by the trafficking and terrorist activity—Mali, Niger, Mauritania, and Algeria—have held a
14
series of meetings to coordinate their actions. These have included high-level meetings in Mali
and Algeria. In coordinating these meetings, Mali has taken a leading role. Mali and Mauritania
have also engaged in joint military operations.
While such regional cooperation is promising, a lingering obstacle for sustained bilateral
or multilateral cooperation is that the Sahel-Saharan region also falls geographically between
regional organizations. ECOWAS is primarily composed of Sub-Saharan states, while the Arab
Maghreb Union is composed of North African states and which remains effectively defunct.
Even if many recognize the need for a regional solution, several civil society
representatives and political actors argue that the cross-border nature of the problem should not
deter the Malian state from acting against armed groups in the North. Several interviewees
expressed a concern that the state was not doing enough to confront the roots of the problem.
Allegations of a lack of political will are difficult to verify, but they are widely articulated in
interviews, thereby indicating a lack of trust in how national authorities are confronting the
sources of insecurity. To be fair, Malian authorities are caught in a bind. On the one hand, they
face significant constraints on their ability to confront the Al Qaeda/trafficking problem—the
problem is clearly regional in nature; the Malian state lacks sufficient resources to combat the
militants and traffickers in a vast, geographically challenging terrority; and the state risks
overplaying its hand by using indiscriminate military force. On the other hand, they face
domestic, regional, and international pressure to demonstrate that they are cracking down on the
sources of insecurity, and indeed given that the insecurity is taking an evident toll on the tourism
industry and on development projects, confronting the problem is in the interest of the state.
Evolution and Interaction of Violence
There are a number of ways in which the dynamics of violence have changed over time
and in which they intersect. There also different points of view on the question. A number of
actors insist that the different periods and forms of violence be distinguished from each other.
For example, several Northern-based actors, including a former rebel, emphasized that the
historical Tuareg insurgencies were fundamentally about political grievances and demands. They
distinguished between these largely internal political movements, and those such as Al Qaeda
that have a stronger criminal, Jihadist, and international dimension. Similarly, the growing traffic
in drugs is quite different in form from the insurgencies, according to these informants. The
contemporary insecurity is thus different in form (more transnational and criminal now than
before) from earlier periods of insecurity and fighting.
At the same time, there are clearly connections between different episodes and cycles of
conflict, as well as between different forms of violence in each period. First, while each had
specific triggers and specific incarnations, the repeated episodes of Northern-based insurgency
(1960s, 1990s, 2000s, as well in the colonial period) are a good example of what the Concept
Note describes as “cycles of violence.” Second, in terms of connections between different
episodes, the structural conditions facilitating insecurity and insurgency in the North are constant
across time, and they constitute an enduring opportunity for conflict, illicit trafficking, and in the
contemporary period for terrorist bases. The northern region is a large geographical space that is
lightly governed with light population density, and the area that has only limited infrastructural
and economic integration with the south. In short, there are structural, underlying conditions that
favor the implantation of armed groups and are consistent across time. Third, in terms of the
15
evolution of violence, during the 1990s rebellion a number of armed actors emerged who
engaged in banditry; after the war ended, despite the integration of former combatants and a
symbolic burning of weapons in a Flame of Peace ceremony, many weapons remained in
circulation. In the 1990s, there also formed a militia against the Tuareg and Arab rebels. Their
weapons remained afterwards. In short, despite peace, the onset of armed conflict increased the
demand and circulation for weapons, and many weapons remained in place after the formal end
to the conflict. The presence of those weapons in turn facilitated illicit trafficking, first of
cigarettes (to avoid levies and taxes), then of hashish and cannabis, and currently of cocaine. In
its evaluation of security concerns in the North, the UNDP also connects the rebellion to the
formation of an illicit economy (UNDP 2007). Finally, there is a vicious circle between lack of
economic opportunities, insecurity, the presence of armed groups, and an illicit economy. Lack
of formal economic opportunities creates incentives for illicit economic activity, and illicit
economic activity requires weapons. It would seem that this interaction flows in multiple causal
directions; empirically, it is difficult—based on currently available data and information—to see
where the causal chain begins. However, it seems clear that there is an interaction between
insecurity and development, as well as between different forms of violence and insecurity.
Leadership
A number of Malian observers readily agree that political leadership is vital for
successful management of conflict. The 1990s period, in particular, can be seen as an example of
successful mediation, in part due to leadership on several levels. The 1990s armed conflict took
place in a general climate of destabilization, in which there was a 1991 coup d‟etat that ousted a
military dictatorship, followed by a national conference, followed by a democratic election and
new government. The rebellion itself began in 1990 and there were multiple phases of fighting,
including a very tense period in 1994 (as described above). Throughout this period, former
President Alpha Konaré opted for a principal strategy of mediation and negotiation. That strategy
centered on intercommunal dialogue, as well as on local-level leadership among heads of
different communities. Three principal dynamics underpinned the strategy of conciliation in the
1990s—the importance of Malian culture, which emphasizes dialogue, dispute resolution, and
consensus; the importance of a general democratic conviction in the period on the part of
political leaders; and the importance of national and local-level leadership. One actor involved in
the negotiations emphasized that local community-level authorities (and their leadership) were
absolutely critical in building peace, and that the wisdom of the Konaré regime was to support
the local-level process of conflict mediation. The peaceful resolution of the 1990s conflict thus
constitutes a qualified success, even if some informants argued that the implementation of the
terms of the accord were lacking and a source of the rebellion in the 2000s. The importance of
the leadership of mediators in tense moments of conflict is also a point that should not be
forgotten.
For the contemporary insecurity in the North, a number of stakeholders interviewed for
the study argued that national authorities should be more active in demonstrating leadership.
That said, the Malian state‟s response to the Tuareg political demands in the mid to late 2000s
emphasized political, rather than military, responses, and in so doing demonstrated leadership.
Leadership will be critical to developing and maintaining a regional response to the crisis.
Finally, local-level leadership can be essential to managing and mediating tense disputes over
access to local resources, so that they do not escalate into violent confrontations.
16
VI. Mediation, Peace-Building, and Conflict Resolution
Short-Term Confidence and Peace-Building
Short-term peace-building has primarily occurred in relation to resolving the Tuareg/Arab
insurgencies and the local resource conflicts. The criminal/terror/bandit networks sources of
insecurity remain unresolved. With regard to the insurgencies, the consistent government
decision was to opt for a negotiated, political solution rather than a military solution (Ag
Mohamed et al 1995; Lode 1997, 1998; Poulton and Youssouff 1998; Wing 2008). The terms of
the peace agreements also addressed the expressed grievances, including the need for greater
development funds dedicated to the north, political decentralization that allowed for local Tuareg
and Arab representation, incorporation of former rebels into the army, and political incorporation
in Bamako. The government military forces also withdrew to a series of military posts, rather
than maintaining a strong military presence through the Northern areas. In addition, the
importance of specific individuals who served as mediators—individuals who commanded
respect, who had “cousinage” relationships with armed actors, who were former professors, or
who were married into families with ties in the north also were important, according to actors
involved in the negotiations. In other words, the characteristics of specific individual mediators
and negotiators mattered.
Several former government officials interviewed for the case study also emphasized the
democratic conviction at the time shared by Amadou Toumani Touré who took power in the
1991 coup, as well as by Alpha Konaré who became the first elected president in the democracy
period and by many other high-ranking officials in this period. These former officials
emphasized that the then Malian political leadership saw the Tuareg insurgency as part of a
general dissatisfaction with the authoritarian policies of former regimes; hence, they saw the
conflict not in terms of irresolvable differences but rather as two sides of the same effort to
create a better and more inclusive political system in the country. Finally, Mali initiated a
cantonment and demobilization process. The demobilization process culminated in the 1996
Flame of Peace exercise, which, while symbolic, marked an official end to the conflict. In the
academic literature and in interviews, these actions and attitudes were among the most crucial for
building short-term confidence on the government side.
In addition, one should note that the short-term measures took place in a normative
cultural environment in Mali that emphasizes dialogue, consensus, interethnic cooperation, and
pact-making. The academic literature strongly emphasizes the importance of Malian political
culture for both successful democratization but also for peace making and dispute resolution
(Konaté 1999; Poulton and Youssouf 1998; Wing 2008). Many interviewees—especially former
officials directly involved with the mediation process—argued that the cultural emphasis on
tolerance, dialogue, and consensus strongly aided the mediation process. It should also be noted
that the rebels made demands that could be met: they asked for greater development funds,
political inclusion and decentralization, military incorporation and changes to surveillance,
among other demands.
As for issues that had the opposite effect, namely of having an escalating effect on the
conflict and creating lack of trust, three issues surface most consistently in relation to the 1990s
rebellion. First, in the peace negotiations in 1990, 1991, and 1992, sedentary populations from
the north, in particular the Songhoi, were not included. Having felt excluded and having suffered
17
in some cases from insurgent attacks, sedentary actors took up arms to protect themselves,
leading to an escalation of violence in 1994 and 1995 in particular. Second, internal divisions
among Tuareg and Arab groups in the early 1990s led to factionalism and rivalry among them,
which created a more complicated conflict and eroded trust on multiple sides of the conflict.
Some Tuareg armed actors also participated in banditry, which, even if political leaders claimed
the banditry was independent of the rebellion, undermined the peace-making process and led to
private arming. Third, the slow implementation of the agreements signed in 1991 and 1992 led to
frustration on the part of Tuareg and Arab insurgents, prompting greater arming and an erosion
of confidence on multiple sides.
With regard to local resource disputes, three main issues surfaced in the research for the
case study, although the diversity of situations should be remembered. First is the importance of
“peace committees” composed of representatives from different activity sectors (fishing,
farming, herding, and so forth), local traditional authorities, and communal (or in some cases
prefectural) authorities. When disputes occurred, the existence of peace committees facilitated
dialogue across disputing parties, as well as the ability to calm agitated actors, according to
officials. Many involved in local mediation efforts stressed the importance of articulating
grievances and mutual respect when seeking to calm tensions. Second is the neutral involvement
of state officials who could serve as honest brokers in disputers—and by contrast where one
party felt that the local state authorities favored one side in a dispute resolution that in turn
escalated conflict and decreased confidence. Third is the importance of clearly designated rules
for blocking off, for example, pasturage and farming zones, for creating transhumance corridors
and calendars, for establishing fishing access and zones, and for regulating the number of dams
allowed over a length of space. Most often the rules were encapsulated in a local Convention that
would be translated into the relevant local languages and that reflected a negotiated consensus in
the community. Among local actors, there was a widespread claim that when disputes over
access to local resources entered the formal court system trust was substantially eroded; many
rural Malians interviewed for the case study expressed doubt in the neutrality of the judicial
system and they felt that they had lost control over the dispute.
Medium- and Long-Term Confidence and Peace-Building
When discussing long-term solutions to the full range of conflict and insecurity, the two
most consistent themes were the importance of reinforcing state capacity and improving
economic conditions, i.e. creating opportunities for employment and reducing poverty. When
considering potential future challenges, many observers argued that an effective and capable
state that is proximate to, and integrated with, the population is fundamental. A number of
Malians used the occasion of the 50th anniversary of Malian independence to argue that the
Malian state needs to be better adapted to local conditions, whether in the North or outside, and a
process of adaptation, creating an effective presence, and ownership remains one of the great
challenges for Mali in the future. Mali‟s poverty remains endemic, and there are evidently
relatively few salaried job opportunities outside the capital and the government sector, i.e. in
rural areas. Even in Bamako, job opportunities remain weak.
Decentralization emerged as an important theme in the discussion about state capability.
The idea of decentralization enjoys widespread support in Mali, a country that was an early
decentralizer in Sub-Saharan Africa. Decentalization has the potential to ground the state in
local realities, create proximity between officials and local populations, and ultimately increase
18
accountability and authority of the state. That said, there exist reservations about the actual
practice of decentralization. During the field mission, actors at both national and local levels of
authority noted the absence of adequate resources; budgetary support remains highly centralized.
Moreover, local and sub-national government institutions need greater human capacity, in terms
of training. Several well-placed Malians argued that donors should provide funds directly to local
entities, bypassing the central state. Some also argued that the local-level state institutions
remained poorly integrated with traditional authorities. Finally, a number of interviewees noted
how the decentralization processes, in which new administrative units were created and for
which representatives were popularly elected, engendered new forms of occasionally violent
conflict. In short, the consensus view was that Mali‟s pioneering decentralization process could
and should be central to dispute resolution and to developing an effective presence of the state;
yet the current practice was incomplete and in some cases engendered disputes. One stakeholder
referred to the decentralization program as decentralizing governing responsibilities but without
the necessary resources and capacity to govern.
With regard to the situation in the North, a recurring theme is economic and
infrastructural integration between the Northern region with southern Mali, on the one hand, and
neighboring countries, on the other. In interviews with a range of actors, infrastructural
development, in particular a paved road network that would reach Kidal (which has been the
center of the most recent rebellions), emerged as the single most important need. Many senior
Malian officials and non-governmental actors, including Prime Minister Modibo Sidibé in an
interview, claimed that a road network would have a dramatic effect on reducing insecurity.
Others stressed the importance of providing greater access to water, in particular by creating a
greater network of wells for both people and livestock, as well as improving education
opportunities. The Prime Minister argued that a northern military post, which was destroyed in
the 2006 revolt, should be rebuilt. Two documents serve as focal points for these development
efforts. The first is the Algiers Accord, which is the agreement signaling the end of the 20062009 revolts; the agreement calls for changes in development (infrastructure, water, and
education); self-management of security affairs (notably the formation of a special security unit
dominated by Tuaregs); and special political status for Kidal. The second is a 10-Year
Development Plan for the Regions of Northern Mali (PDDRN), which envisages a series of
development projects focused on food security, natural resource protection, infrastructure and
commercial development, and access to social services, among other areas.
The central long-term solutions to local conflict over resources are two-fold. First is
creating alternative livelihood and economic opportunities. Second is developing state capability
to manage disputes. With regard to dispute resolution, the most commonly articulated principle,
as voiced both by local government officials and NGO representatives working in the area,
concerns community initiative, dialogue, and participation. There is common recognition that
solutions imposed from above do not last. As described above, the most common local-level
solutions are creating “peace committees” as well as natural resource Conventions that regulated
access to and usage of local resources. Several local-level actors noted with caution that the key
to the success of such pact-making was its level of participation. For example, the creation of a
herding zone or a transhumance pathway depends on the input of herders; should they not be
consulted, the designated zone or pathway might not be attractive and could lead to a diminution
of the herd, thereby engendering conflict. Another consistent theme in rural field visits was the
19
importance of human capacity training in conflict mediation, with which organizations such as
CARE, Helvetes, and other NGOs have engaged.
Regional and International Assistance
Given the trans-border nature of the problem of illicit trafficking and terrorist sources of
insecurity in the North, there is need for a regional solution. Malian political actors from the
North and in Bamako argue that Mali is not at the origin of the illicit economy or terrorist
problems. They also argue that if Mali were to mobilize against the traffickers or Al Qaeda
militants, the latter groups would shift to another country, only to return to Mali. The SahelSaharan space is largely porous, without clear national borders, and long histories of exchange
and trade across formal country units. Thus, almost universally interviewees emphasized the
need for a “Sahel-Saharan” regional solution. However, despite recent gains in developing a
regional approach, how different states will overcome their differences and sustain a unified
policy remains to be seen. As noted above, the Sahel falls between two regional organizations,
ECOWAS and the Arab Maghreb Union, the latter being effectively defunct since the 1990s
(Mortimer 1999).. Any long-term regional solution will likely have to be crafted and sustained
outside existing regional organizations, which creates another layer of obstacles
On the international side, the United States and the European Union have engaged the
countries of the region, including Mali, in counter-terrorism activities. The emphasis is on
enhancing military and administrative capacity. The U.S. in particular has been active in training
and supplying Malian military units in counter-terrorism, first through the Pan-Sahel Initiative
and now through the Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Initiative. The TSCI has provided $100
million of funding per annum, starting in 2005. The program engages Mali, Mauritania, Chad,
and Niger—the original four countries in the Pan Sahel Initiative—as well as Morocco, Algeria,
Tunisia, Senegal, and Nigeria. In addition to training and supplies, the program dedicates
resources for development and emphasizes regional cooperation. The European Union similarly
considers the region strategically important, and the EU is now working to increase the sovereign
effectiveness—increasing their capacity and legitimacy—of the Sahelian states (Charles 2010).
Yet bilateral and multilateral actors also are aware of the many challenges of developing an
appropriate strategy, one that accounts both for the nature of the illicit-terrorist threat in a vast
territory and for the limitations of existing capability.
With regard to resolving local conflicts over natural resources, the communal, village,
and NGO actors associated with dispute mediation emphasized the importance of donor
assistance with logistics and capacity building. The process of mediation and constructing
Conventions in some cases required multiple meetings in a communal space that could be quite
large. Donor assistance, several argued, in helping to bring people together and helping to train
local government or customary authorities was seen as critical. However, all local actors stressed
that external support cannot create the local will to resolve conflicts, but rather only serve to
reinforce it.
20
VII. Future Challenges
A last theme that emerged across a number of interviews with different actors, but chiefly
among diplomats, opposition leaders, and civil society actors, is a deep and longer-term concern
about the ability of the contemporary Malian state to manage the society and economy. The main
thread of critique is that Mali remains a very poor country, with a high population growth rate,
and limited financial and sometimes human resources to manage a number of complex actors.
Many actors cited a slow deterioration of the quality of governance, and many expressed low
trust in state institutions and perceived corruption at various levels of government. There are a
range of concerns that surfaced in these conversations, in addition to corruption, from access to
food, the quality of education, the access and quality of health care, the availability of jobs,
security, to access to water and electricity. Yet based on the mission visit and supplementary
interviews there appears to be an erosion of trust in institutions and governance, and a perception
of corruption and state ineffectiveness. In short, the study finds evidence that Mali‟s model of
consensus, democracy, and accommodation is being weakened. Of course, any state with limited
resources and high poverty rates faces a gap between social expectations and its capacity to meet
those expectations.
At the extreme, there is a remote risk of destabilization and radicalization. Even though
Al Qaeda‟s religious agenda is not a good fit with Malian Islam and culture, some Malians
articulated a fear that unmet expectations could pave the way for greater embrace of more radical
and religious approaches to society and politics, leading to greater insecurity. Similarly, a general
malaise—the disaffection and quiet disillusionment—could unravel the Malian model of
democratization and decentralization in the face of deep demands on the part of the population
and the state‟s inability, willful or not, to meet them. While remote, these possibilities constitute
a diffuse but nonetheless important concern for future stability. That concern should be balanced
by noting Mali‟s strong record on democratization and its consistent embrace of dialogue,
mediation, and accommodation when confronted with national and local conflict.
21
22
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