NCT CBRNe USA 2016
May 31st- June 2nd, 2016 – Washington DC(USA)
THE DEVELOPMENT OF ASYMMETRIC RN THREATS WORLDWIDE
Guillermo Velarde*–José Manuel Perlado†– Natividad Carpintero-Santamaría‡
Institute of Nuclear Fusion (IFN) –Polytechnic University of Madrid (Spain)
ABSTRACT
In 2008 the European Union Council adopted the New Lines for Action in Combating the
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and their Delivery Systems. Main objectives of
this strategy are to take measures to combat intangible transfers of know-how, and to intensify
efforts to combat proliferation financing, among others. The policy of some countries that
want to develop nuclear weapons is worrisome, as they begin to sign the Non Proliferation
Treaty (NPT).
But the full scope of nuclear threat encompasses not merely nuclear proliferation. The
transnational nature of nuclear and radiological terrorism threat is a matter of great concern.
Although the acquisition of weapon-grade uranium is a challenging task for a terrorist
organization and the probability that a terrorist group could make an improvised nuclear
device or crude nuclear bomb is very small, a real threat includes that a terrorist group, either
acting independently or acting as part of a bigger organization, could explode a radiological
dispersion device or dirty bomb. According to the 2014 Annual Report of CNS Global
Incidents and Trafficking Database, in the last two years 325 incidents of illicit trafficking of
radioactive materials have occurred in 38 different countries.
Preventing illicit trafficking in radioactive materials is of paramount importance due to the
possibility that they could be transported by people who might enter clandestinely into
Western countries. As reported by the European Agency for the Management of Operational
Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union (Frontex),
during the first, second and third quarter of 2015, 2,585 clandestine entries were detected at
EU border crossing points.
Nuclear proliferation and radiological terrorism are unequivocally threats worldwide.
Reinforcing the multilateral non-proliferation regime and combating the asymmetric threat
posed by radiological terrorism are main issues where international collaboration plays a key
role in the globalized context of international security.
Key words: Nuclear proliferation; radiological terrorism; nuclear security; scientific
responsibility; dual-use knowledge; Manifesto of Madrid; international cooperation.
*
General of Division of the Air Force - Professor Chair of Nuclear Physics (Emeritus) - President IFN –
[email protected]
†
Professor Chair of Nuclear Physics - Director (CEO) IFN – [email protected]
‡
Full Professor of Energy Security - General Secretary IFN – [email protected]
Telephone number : ++ 34 91 3363108
1
NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
The European Security Strategy adopted in December 2003 identified proliferation of
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) as the second greatest threat to the European Union
(EU) security. Five years later, the Report on the Implementation of the European Security
Strategy (2008) identified proliferation of WMD as the first global challenge and key threat.
Nuclear proliferation can be defined as the development and fabrication of nuclear weapons
by Non-Nuclear Weapons States (NNWS) that have signed or not the Non Proliferation
Treaty. This proliferation can be achieved by several means: know-how and the access to
technology to construct nuclear weapons and access to materials from which a nuclear
weapon can be built.
In order to control production, development and stockpiling of nuclear weapons, the Treaty
on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was enacted in 1970. The Non
Proliferation Treaty had as main objective to inhibit the development of nuclear weapons, and
two of its main principles are both the gradual disarmament of the Nuclear Weapons States
(NWS) and the right of Non-Nuclear Weapons States (NNWS) to use nuclear technology for
peaceful purposes. However the Treaty proved to be insufficient to verify member’s
commitments.
Although 190 countries have joined the NPT, it has been observed that party members,
evading their commitment, could not declare other nuclear facilities devoted to nuclear
weapons development. After the Gulf War, it was discovered that Iraq, a NPT country had
been able to hide the development of a vast nuclear weapons program that was not detected
until 1991. Iraqi facilities for uranium enrichment were discovered at Al-Furat (an
ultracentrifuge assembly plant), Al-Tarmiya and Ash-Sharkat (with calutrons and
ultracentrifuge uranium enrichment). The discovery of the Iraqi nuclear weapons program led
to a more pragmatic reform of the nuclear safeguards system as established by the IAEA and
an Additional Protocol for the NPT entered into force on May 15, 1997 to prevent this kind of
NPT failures. The Additional Protocol allows IAEA’s inspectors to inspect and to establish
control systems, not only at previously declared facilities by state members, but also at those
facilities that IAEA’s inspectors consider related to nuclear energy.
The Islamic Republic of Iran’s nuclear program has been a cause of concern during decades
and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) nuclear weapons development
despite sanctions and economic troubles, is presently a major international security concern.
Iran signed the NPT in 1968 and ratified it in 1970 which allowed the country to develop
nuclear energy for civilian purposes. After the 1980-1988 war with Iraq, the development of a
nuclear program, together with acquisition and development of missiles, became a
preferential defensive line of the Tehran government. The proximity to Iranian territory of
five nuclear powers (China, Russia, Pakistan, Israel and India) was another reason for Tehran
government to boost its nuclear program.
In 2002 US satellites detected at Natanz the construction of a gigantic bunker of about 30 m
depth with reinforced concrete 3 m thickness walls to house a new centrifuge plant, whose
technology and components were probably supplied by the Khan Network. Iran pointed out
that this plant was to produce low-enriched uranium for the production of electricity. In
2
February 2003 president Mohammad Khatami announced the existence of the Natanz plant
and invited International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors to visit the facilities. On
September 12, 2003 the IAEA Board of Governors gave an ultimatum to Iran to prove that its
nuclear program was for peaceful purposes. In November 2003 Iran reported to IAEA
General Director Mohammed El-Baradei its decision to suspend its activities on uranium
enrichment and reprocessing of waste fuel by signing and implementing voluntarily the
Additional Protocol. In 2009 Iran declared that they were building in Fordow, near the Holy
City of Qom, an ultracentrifuge facility carved in the mountains.
The evolution of events led the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to adopt several
resolutions (1696, 1737, 1747, 1803 and 1835) requesting the Iranian government the
suspension of enrichment activities. Resolution 1737 was unanimously taken by UN member
countries, calling for the completion without delay of uranium enrichment activities and
research projects in heavy water reactors. The resolution also included the freezing of
financial assets of individuals and entities linked to the nuclear program. United Nations also
appealed to the imposition of restrictions on trade with Iran in products, technology,
equipment, etc that could be used in these activities or in the development of delivery systems
for nuclear weapons. Iran described the UN resolution 1737 as “unlawful, unnecessary and
unjustifiable action against the peaceful nuclear program of the Islamic Republic of Iran” and
considered this resolution outside the framework of the responsibilities of the Council’s
Charter. (Security Council toughens sanctions against Iran, adds arms embargo, with
unanimous adoption of Resolution 1747 (2007).
Finally, in 2015 a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was agreed by UNSC –
China, France, Russia, United Kingdom and the United States, plus Germany and the
European Union. With the signing of this deal, Iran agreed to eliminate the number of
ultracentrifuges to 5060 IR-1 for the next ten years and will have to implement its
commitments under the JCPOA. (Resolution 2231 adopted by the Security Council at its
7488th meeting). At present, 18 nuclear facilities and 9 locations outside facilities are under
IAEA safeguards. An Online Enrichment Monitor (OLEM) has been installed in Natanz to
calculate that the enrichment level is kept up to 3.6% as committed.
On September 2, 2015, the Lebanese journal al-Mayadeen published an interview with Iran’s
Defense Brigadier General Hossein Dehqanin that said that Tehran will not allow
international inspections of any sites beyond the requirements of the NPT, possibly implying
that military sites will not be allowed to be inspected. (Defense Minister: Iran Will Not Allow
Inspections beyond NPT. En.alalam.ir/news/1734936).
The case of the Democratic Popular Republic of Korea (DPRK) is different from Iran. DPKR
nuclear policy has become a paradigm for successful development of nuclear weapons under
the scope of ambiguity and opacity in its international relations.
The DPRK entered the NPT on December 12, 1985. In September 1991 president George H.
Bush announced that the United Nations would withdraw its nuclear weapons from South
Korea. North Korea and South Korea signed then a Joint Declaration in the Denuclearization
of the Korean Peninsula. In 1992 the DPRK signed the NPT Safeguards Agreement but in
1993 announced its intention to withdrawing from the NPT. After years of tensions,
agreements and disagreements with the IAEA and the United Nations on North Korean
nuclear program, Pyongyang authorities notified the country’s NPT withdrawal on January
10, 2003.
3
On October 9, 2006, DPRK carried out its first nuclear test with a yield of less than 1 kiloton.
The test showed that North Korea had solved the complex plutonium metallurgy and the low
yield of less than 1 kiloton was probably due to the failure of the explosive lenses that did not
achieve a spherical implosion wave.
Following this test, the United Nations adopted Resolution 1718 imposing sanctions against
North Korea that was not backed by China and Russia. So far, the UNSC have adopted
several sanctions against North Korean nuclear program: Resolutions 1695, 1718, 1874, 1887,
2087, 2094 and 2270. (UN Security Council Resolutions on North Korea. Fact Sheets &
Briefs).
On May 25, 2009, the DPRK conducted its second nuclear test with a yield of about 3.5
kilotons.
On February 12, 2013 the DPRK conducted its third nuclear test with a yield of up 8 to 12
kilotons. From then on, North Korean big effort has been focused on miniaturizing plutonium
atom bombs that could fit in a nuclear missile head or to use it as a primary stage of a
thermonuclear bomb. (Velarde, 2014).
On January 6, 2016, the Pyongyang government announced it successfully conducted its first
hydrogen bomb test. Seismographs detected a yield of about 15 kilotons. Probably they were
testing a miniaturized nuclear bomb, either as a nuclear weapon alone or as the primary stage
of a thermonuclear bomb without achieving the deuterium-tritium (DT) fusion temperature of
up 50 to 100 million degrees.
North Korea has a high level of indigenous technology and manufactures short and mediumrange missiles with very competitive prices. The testing of its nuclear explosions enables the
country to manufacture, in a near future, nuclear missiles.
COUNTERING NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
A country that has a plant to enrich uranium to a 4% used in commercial reactors for the
production of electric power is able to obtain highly enriched uranium (HEU) up to 90%, used
in atom bombs. Once HEU has been obtained to more than 90%, the making of an atom bomb
by the gun method requires a technology available to developing countries.
If a country has a nuclear reactor (heavy-water or graphite reactor) of about 10 to 100 MW,
which energy dissipates into the atmosphere without producing electrical energy (plutonium
reactor), this country is able to produce highly enriched plutonium (HEP) to more than 94%
used in nuclear bombs. Once that the enriched plutonium to more than 94% is available, the
making of an atom bomb by the implosion method requires a very high technology.
The problem of nuclear proliferation could be solved by establishing reinforced safeguards
such as the Additional Protocol INFCIRC/540 which provides safeguards for the entire fuel
cycle from uranium mining to plutonium reprocessing. These reinforced safeguards would
prevent nuclear weapons development in return for significant financial help, supply of
agricultural surpluses, oil, nuclear power plants for the production of electricity, etc.
4
According to IAEA, presently there are 444 nuclear power reactors in operation and 64 more
under construction, of which two-thirds are in Asia. This considerable amount of nuclear
power reactors worldwide require a specific control in nuclear technologies transfers of
equipment and know-how. To prevent Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) proliferation
and their means of delivery, a number of export control regimes have been established,
namely, Australia Group; Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR); Nuclear Suppliers
Group (NSG); Wassenaar Arrangement and Zangeer Committee.
In Spain, dual use exports especially those products related to defense material transfers at
global, intercommunity and individual levels are subjected to a comprehensive control under
the Regulatory Inter-Ministerial Board of Foreign Trade on Defense and Dual-Use Material
(JIMDDU) created in 1993 and the Special Register of Foreign Trade Operators in Defense
and Dual-Use Material. These governmental instruments work in compliance with the
European Union (EU) Regulation (EC) Nº 428/2009 which establishes that under the EU
regime, the export of dual-use items may not leave the EU customs territory without an export
authorization.
With respect to possible clandestine export of items in connection with chemical, biological,
radiological and nuclear (CBRN) weapons or ballistic missile programs, the EU Regulation
includes a “catch-all clause” and restrictive measures. These restrictive measures are being
applied to trade of dual-use items with DPRK, Iran and Syria. (The EU Dual Use Export
Control Regime. European Commission).
NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGICAL TERRORISM
The post-Cold War period, which lasted for ten years, was disrupted with the devastating
terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001. Since this time, a strategic
terrorist aggression has gradually given rise to a concern about the plausibility that a terrorist
group could perpetrate an attack using WMD agents or materials.
Motivations for terrorists to perpetrate a WMD attack have been analysed in several studies
and most of them share the opinion that groups with absolutist interpretation of religion match
up with the profile of those that might seek mass casualties. Organizations or sects based on
apocalyptic mysticism are also plausible WMD perpetrators as occurred with the sarin gas
attack in Tokyo subway carried out by Aum Shirinkyo in 1995. As Alexander (2010) points
out ‘it is conceivable that a highly motivated and desperate terrorist group with technological
and financial assets will attempt to improve its bargaining leverage by resorting to mass
destructive violence.’
Nuclear terrorism poses one of the most significant concerns in the struggle against terrorism.
Although the acquisition of weapons-usable fissile material is a challenging task for a terrorist
organization and the probability that a terrorist group could make an improvised nuclear
device or crude nuclear bomb is small, a main concern comes from the potentiality that a
terrorist group, either acting independently or acting as part of a bigger organization, could
detonate a radiological dispersion device (RDD), commonly known as dirty bomb.
The potential use by a terrorist group of a Radiological Dispersion Device (RDD) or dirty
bomb is a contemplated contingency in the 21st century. A real threat includes that a terrorist
group, either acting independently or acting as part of a bigger organization, could detonate a
5
radiological dispersion device or dirty bomb. Dirty bombs are easily made, with a
combination of chemical explosives (such as gunpowder, dynamite, semtex, or C-4) and the
kind of radioactive material (ampoule, vial or depot) that is commonly found in nuclear
medicine units at some hospitals, industries, food sterilization facilities and biochemical
research centers. Both the efficiency of the dirty bomb and its radioactive contamination level
would depend on the chemical explosive used and the radiological toxicity of the material.
The higher the destruction capacity of the chemical explosive, the more effective the
scattering of the radioactive material will be. Nuclear forensics are being developed to analyse
the attribution of radioactive materials to find out clues to their original source. This scientific
area is of great importance if we take into account the number of radioactive materials that
can be found in the black market trade. (Carpintero Santamaría, 2012, 2014).
The health effects of an RDD explosion may vary significantly according to particle energy,
and whether alpha, beta and gamma particles are inhaled, ingested or skin-absorbed although
in general terms the number of casualties are of an order of magnitude of the caused by the
chemical explosive blast. The activity of the radioactive source is another variable as well as
the shape of the terrain, population density, local wind conditions, etc. The explosion of an
RDD could contaminate water supply, food and other consumer articles. RDD effects would
depend on the radioisotopes used. (Velarde, 2008).
Figure 1.- Radiological emergency field exercise. UME-GIETMA and Guardia Civil CBRN
Unit (Spain)
The toxicity of radioisotopes has been divided by the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) into five different categories, from most to least toxic effects. Category 1 includes
radioisotopes used in food sterilization, hospital materials, teletherapy (e.g., Co60 and Cs137)
and thermoelectric generators (e.g., Sr90 and Pu238). Category 2 includes radioisotopes used
for industrial gammagraphy and brachytherapy (e.g., Co60 and Ir192). Categories 3 to 5
include radioisotopes used in nuclear and biology laboratories, radioisotopes used in positron
emission tomography (PET) and radioisotopes used as tracing molecules (e.g., C11, F18).
(IAEA Categorization of Radioactive Sources).
6
Figure 2.- Radiological emergency field exercise. UME-GIETMA and Guardia Civil CBRN
Unit (Spain)
The explosion of a dirty bomb would be mainly focused on causing chaos and panic. The
residents’ panic, overreaction and level of shock would be the same regardless of the amount
or type of radioactive material dispersed. Individuals perceive radiation as an intangible
threat which increases their degree of anxiety.
The widespread of social, psychogenic and psychological impact of such weapons, together
with the very high decontamination cost make them an attractive option to certain types of
groups seeking to make a powerful media impact. It is somewhat worrying that such bombs
could be used by splinter terrorist cells acting on their own. (Carpintero-Santamaría, 2015).
At present, several countries are implementing and adopting security and strategic measures
to combat the radiological threat with the application of different measures. Spain is a main
partner in international cooperation to combat radiological terrorism and is steadily improving
its capacities to counteract this threat. In November 2015, the Emergency Military Unit
(UME) with its Intervention Group for Technological and Environmental Emergencies
(GIETMA) planned three radiological emergency response exercises in collaboration with
Law Enforcement Guardia Civil CBRN Unit. Other institutions involved in radiological
emergency response participated also (Figures 1 and 2). The three-day field exercises with
exercise debriefing on third day were based on scenarios involving the loss of radioactive
sources, Cs-137, Co-60 and Tc-90 and provide the possibility to test full response capabilities
by means of tactical and technical procedures. The exercises were very useful to assess test
performance and procedures; to find out new emergency strategies and especially for the
learning of important lessons to approach more efficiently the radiological threat.
7
NUCLEAR SECURITY AND SCIENTIFIC RESPONSIBILITY
Taking into consideration worldwide expansion of inertial confinement fusion energy
research, scientific community has a responsibility to avoid nuclear proliferation. Taking this
principle in mind and in order to collaborate to the peaceful applications of nuclear science
and technology a good deal of scientists’ responsibility is focused on seeking peace and
security in the complex global nuclear order. One main step to nuclear non-proliferation was
taken in 1988 with the signing of the Madrid Manifesto (Figure 3).
Throughout the decade of the 1960s scientists from the USSR, the United States, France and
Spain (at the Spanish Atomic Energy Commission, JEN) began to work in inertial
confinement nuclear fusion (ICF) to produce electricity as future massive energy source for
civil applications. In their research they used, with profound technical modifications, the
Ulam-Teller method employed in the design of thermonuclear bombs. Scientists in Japan,
and later in Germany and Italy worked as well in ICF.
Figure 3.- Madrid Manifesto
Institute of Nuclear Fusion
http://www.denim.upm.es/index.php/es/about/history
8
In 1988 the European Conference on Laser Interaction with the Matter (ECLIM) was held in
Madrid (Spain), organized by the Institute of Nuclear Fusion (DENIM/IFN). During this
conference, Professor Guillermo Velarde, Director of DENIM/IFN, and Chairman of the
ECLIM, together with Dr Erik Storm from Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL)
proposed to all the scientists participating in the ECLIM to sign the Madrid Manifesto in
which declassification of information related to ICF was requested in order to work in energy
production for civil applications that did not imply nuclear proliferation. About 130 scientists
from main nuclear centres around the world signed the Manifesto (Velarde and CarpinteroSantamaría, 2007, p. 194).
In 1992 the United States government proceed to declassify a big deal of ICF research,
reinforcing with this policy international engagement in the non-proliferation regime. The
declassification of ICF works prevented that secrecy aspects of this research could impede the
exchange of ideas and limited open international cooperation. The International Herald
Tribune published: “The US government that battled for decades to keep the workings of the
hydrogen bomb secret is beginning to declassify some of the most sensitive aspects of its
design and to let American scientists publish them in scientific literature. The reason for this
reversal is not internal policy, the end of Cold War, or the collapse of the Soviet Union as
military threat. Rather the reason is foreign competition. Scientists in Japan, Germany, Spain,
and Italy, striving to harness the power of tiny, repeated hydrogen-bomb-like blasts for the
generation of electrical energy have openly published the “secrets” (Broad, W.J. (1992)
Edward Teller, known as the father of the hydrogen bomb and a pioneer in the application of
inertial fusion for the production of electricity, considered the Madrid Manifesto as an
important step in the ICF’s declassification works. In 1997, Edward Teller said to Guillermo
Velarde: “Sir, you have perhaps done more than anyone in ICF to promote this important
direction” (Hora and Miley, 2005, p. 65).
The Manifesto of Madrid is a paradigm of scientific responsibility because it shows how
methods developed for the production of weapons can be used with profound technical
changes for peaceful purposes such as the production of electricity from nuclear fusion.
A misuse of inertial fusion energy (IFE), as happens with some nuclear fission reactors, can
lead to nuclear proliferation. The development of calculation codes to project IFE using
indirect targets could be used in the optimization of thermonuclear bombs. Research at the
Institute of Nuclear Fusion of the Polytechnical University of Madrid is a clear example of
how it is possible to be incardinated in the frontier of research in IFE using a responsible
frame of civil applications and development, knowing the clear frontiers to avoid nuclear
proliferation. Our research is devoted to the non-proliferation and security research;
development of IFE calculation code and simulation of plasmas in the high energy density
regime during IFE process and conception and use of XUV and X-rays sources; safety and
radiation protection of nuclear installations in general and fusion systems, in particular;
thermomechanical response of materials under radiation; advanced reactors from G-IV to
thorium cycle; design of spallation neutron sources; atomic physics; materials under extreme
conditions (nanostructured materials such as nano-W, DLC, HDC); modelling and
experiments in new ideas of advanced optical systems and nanoplasmonic applications; and
handling of the critical tritium cycle. In some of these areas it is certainly possible a dual use
of knowledge but a clear understanding of the ethics and principles that govern our university
makes that possible (Perlado 1997, 2016).
9
NUCLEAR SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
Nuclear proliferation, nuclear terrorism and radiological terrorism are ultimate asymmetric
threats worldwide. The non-proliferation regime needs to be gradually reinforced, as the
number of nuclear weapons in the world is high. This involves an enormous amount of fissile
material stockpiles which pose a constant challenge in their safety and security control
especially in areas close to unstable political countries.
Nuclear security entails a multidisciplinary approach with regulatory frameworks, technical
development and a task force of human and economic resources to be applied in nuclear
facilities and industry. But nuclear security also requires a multidisciplinary countering
strategy together with a broad international cooperation in order to achieve efficient
prevention, early detection and response.
Although in the last 10 years nuclear security has been substantially improved, to carry out an
efficient control of radioactive materials is not an easy task since millions of shipments are
transported around the world annually for use in medical diagnosis and treatment, agriculture,
advanced research, etc. Surveillance of illegal trafficking, smuggling and underground
markets for radioactive materials has led to the launching of several initiatives to
strengthening international cooperation which includes multifaceted measures and strategies
such as physically securing radioactive materials, implementing technical methods for
radionuclide identification and providing assistance programs to countries that lack the
necessary technical capabilities.
The US government has established a comprehensive line of bilateral and multilateral
agreements worldwide to counteract the risk of nuclear and radiological terrorism, being main
initiatives: The Megaports Initiative; the Container Security Initiative (CSI); the Global
Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) to upgrade security measures to be applied worldwide at
sites with inadequate protection of radioactive materials. Spain participates, among in the
Megaports Initiative. Spanish ports have a strategic position in the context of world maritime
trade transport and are a powerful logistic platform that connects Europe with the rest of the
other continents. According to Spanish port authorities, from January to April 2016,
1.235.369 standard containers (TEUs, twenty-foot equivalent units), passed in transit through
the major Spanish ports of Valencia, Bahía de Algeciras and Barcelona (Estadística Mensual,
2016). These ports are among the first hundred ports worldwide and among the top 21
European ports in volume of container traffic.
The European Union has adopted several strategies to enhance nuclear and radiological
security both at intercommunity and international level. In 2003 the EU Strategy against
proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction; in 2006, the Instrument of Stability, CBRN
risk mitigation component; in 2008 the New Lines for Action by the European Union in
Combating the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and their Delivery Systems and
in 2009 EU CBRN Action Plan and the review of the EU Dual Use Regulation 428/2009.
Main aspects are to take measures to combat intangible transfers of knowledge and knowhow, and to intensify efforts to combat proliferation financing, among others.
During the period 1993-2014, a total of 2,734 confirmed incidents were reported to the IAEA
Illicit Trafficking Database (ITDB, 2015). Preventing illicit trafficking of radioactive
materials is of paramount importance due to the possibility that they might enter illegally into
10
Western countries. According to the European Agency for the Management of Operational
Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union (Frontex)
during the first, second, third and fourth quarter of 2015, 3,642 clandestine entries were
detected at EU border crossing points (FRAN Quarterly, 2015).
In 2006 the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism was launched. Presently it is a
voluntary international partnership of 86 nations, being Spain one of them, and five official
observers: IAEA, EU, INTERPOL, UNODC and UNICRI. International Law Enforcement
Agencies such INTERPOL established the Geiger Program and Operation Fail Safe on
collating and analyzing information on illicit trafficking and other unauthorized activities.
Nuclear Security Summits that have been held in Washington (2010); Seoul (2012); The
Hague (2014) and Washington DC (2016) have brought significant achievements in nuclear
security worldwide. According to the White House Fact Sheet, removals or confirmed the
down blending of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium from more than 50 facilities
in 30 countries have been completed; 20 countries have committed themselves to increase
cooperation in counter nuclear smuggling and 36 partner countries will implement nuclear
security practices, among other issues.
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