The Cuban Missile Crisis at 5o
Lessons for U.S. Foreign Policy Today
Grabam Allison
Fifry years ago, the Cuban missile crisis
brought the world to the brink of nuclear
disaster. During the standoff, U.S.
PresidentJohn F. Kennedy thought the
chance of escalation to war was "between
r in 3 and even," and what we have learned
in later decades has done nothing to
lengthen those odds. We now know,
for example, that in addition to nucleararmed ballistic missiies, the Soviet Union
had deployed roo tactical nuclear weapons
to Cuba, and the local Soviet commander
there could have launched these weapons
without additional codes or commands
from Moscow. The U.S. air strike and
invasion that werc scheduled for the third
week of the confrontation would likely
have triggered a nuclear response against
American ships and troops, and perhaps
even Miami. The resulting war might have
led to the deaths of roo n-rilfion Americans
and over roo million Russians.
The main story line of the crisis is
familiar. In October 1962, a U.S. spy plane
caught the Soviet Union attcmpting ro
sneak nuclear-tipped missiles into Cuba,
9o miles offthe United States' coast.
Kennedy determined at the outset that
this could not stand. After a week of secret
deliberations with his most trusted advisers,
he announced the discovery to the world
and imoosed a naval blockade on further
shipments of armaments to Cuba. The
blockade prevented additional materiel
from coming in but did nothing to stop the
Soviets from operationalizing the missiles
already there. And a tense second week
fbllowed during which Kennedy and Soviet
Premier Nikita Khrushchev stood "eyeball
to eyeball," neither side backing down.
Saturday, October 27,was the day of
decision. Thanks to secret tapes Kennedy
made of the deliberations, we can be flies
on the wall, listening to the members of
the oresident's ad hoc Executive Commit-
t..
of th. National Security Council, or
ExComm, debate choices they knew could
lead to nuclear Armageddon. At the last
minute, the crisis was resolved without war,
as Khrushchev accepted a final U.S. offer
pledging not to invade Cuba in exchange
for the withdrawal of the Soviet missiles.
nauau Alr-I soN is Professor of Government and Director of the Belfer
Center for Science and International Allairs at Harvard University's Kennedy
School of Goverrlment.
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slrowtlowrr irr which tlrc Ll.S. Prcsitlelrt
will bc fbrccd",to choose befween ordering a rrrilitar_1, attack and acquiescrng tcr
a nuclear-armed lran.
Those were, in essence, the two options
Kennedy's advisers gave him on the final
Saturdav: attilck or accept Soviet nuclear
missiles in Cuba. But Ker"rnedy rejected
both. Instead of choosing berween them,
he.crafted an imaginative alternative with
threc components: a public deal in which
the United States pledged not to invade
Cuba if the Soviet Union withdrew its
missiles, a private ultimatum threatening
to attack Cuba within z4 hours unless
Khrushchev accepted that offer, and a
sccrct sweetener thnt promiscd tl'rc
withdrawal of U.S. missiles fiom Turkey
within si-x months after the crisis was
resolved. The sweetener was kept so
secret that even most members of the
ExComm deliberating with Kennedy
on the final evening were in the dark,
unaware that during the dinner break,
the president had sent his brother
Bobby to deliver this message to the
Soviet ambassador.
lrrl
the art of errriching uraniunr antl building
bonrh covertl\'. The best hope for a
rr
Kennedyesque third option roday is a
eombinltion olt agreed-on constraints on
Irans nuciezu activrtics that would iengthen
the fuse on the der.'elopment of a bornb,
transfarencv meas\lres th:rt wortld maximize rhe likelih,rod o[discovering anv
cheating, unarnbiguous (perhaps secretly
communicated) threats of a re gimechanging attack should the agreement be
violated, and a pledge not to attack otherwise. Such a combination would keep
Iran as far away from a bomb as possible
for as long as possible.
The Israeli factor makes the Iranian
nuclear situation an cven murc complex
challenge for American policymakers than
the Cuban missiie crisis was. In 1962, only
two players were allowed at the main table.
Cuban Prime Minister Fidel Castro sought
to become'ihe third, and had he succeeded,
the crisis would havc become significantly
more dangerous. (When Khrushchev
announced the withdrawal of the missiles,
for example, Castro sent him a blistering
message urging him to fire those already
FOREIGN AFFAI RS'
I/ohme ot Na..t
Every president since Kennedy has
tried to learn from what happened in that
confrontation. Ironically, half a cenrury
later, with the Soviet Union itself only a
distant memory, the lessons of the crisis
for current policy have never been greirter.
Today, it can help U.S. policvniakers
understand what to do-and what not to
do-about lran, North Korea, China, and
presidential decision-making in general'
WHAT WOULD KENNEDY DO?
The current confrontation bctween the
United States and Iran is likc a Cuban
missile crisis in slow motion. Events are
moving, seemingly inexorirbly, toward a
showdown in which the U.S. president
will be fbrced to choose between ordering l militlrv att,re k and acquiese ing to
a nuclear-armed Iran.
Those were, in essence, the tlvo options
Kennedy's advisers gave him on the fina1
Saturday: attack or accept Soviet nuclcar
missiles in Cuba. But Kennedy rcjected
both. Instead of choosing between them,
he.crafted an imaginative alternative with
threc componcnts: a public de'41 in which
the United States pledged not to invade
Cuba if the Soviet Union withdrew its
missiles, a private ultimatum threatening
to attack Cuba within z4 hours unless
Khrushchev accepted that ofl-er, and a
secret slveetener that promised the
withdrawal of U.S. missiles from Turkey
within six months after the crisis was
resolved. The sweetener was kept str
secret that even most members of the
ExComm deliberating with Kennedy
on the final evening were in the dark,
unaware that durir.rg the dinner break,
the president had sent his brother
Bobby to deliver this message to the
Soviet ambassador.
[r, ]
Looking at the choice between acquiescence and air strikes today,
both
are
unattractive. An Iranian bomb couid
trigger a cascade of proliferation, making
more likely a devastating conflict in one
of the world's most economically and
strategic'ally critical regions. A preventive
air strike could delay Iran's nuclear prog-
identified sites but could not erase
and skills ingrained in
knowledge
the
many Iranian heads. The truth is that any
outcome that stops short of Iran having a
nuclear bomb will still leave it with the
ability to acqtiire one down the road' since
Iran has already crossed the most significant "redline" of proliferation: n-rastering
the art of enriching uranium and building
ir bomb covertly. The best hope for a
Kennedyesque third option today is a
combinltion oiagreed-on constraints oll
Iran's nuclear activities that would lengtrhen
the fuse on the developmcnt of a bomb,
transparency measures that would ma-rimize the likelihood ,'f discc,vering any
cheating, unambiguous (perhaps secretly
ress at
communicated) threats of a regimechanging attack should the agreement be
violated, and a pledge not to aftack otherwise. Such a combination would kcep
Iran as far away from a bomb as possible
for as long as possible.
The Israeli factor makes the Iranian
nuclear siruation an even more complex
challenge for American policymakers than
the Cuban missile crisis was. In 1962, only
two olavers were allowed at the main table.
Cuban Prime Minister Fidel Castro sought
to become'ihe third, and had he succeeded,
the crisis would have become significantly
more dangerous. (When Khrushchev
announced the withdrawal of the missiles,
for example, Castro sent him a blistering
message urging him to fire those already
FOREIGN AFFAI RS'
I/olume qt No.
I
Banbs in the hacklurd.-the map oJ'Cuba thatJohn F Kennerly
annotated on October t6, t96z, ott displa1, ot bis pre:itlentia/ Iibrary
in Cuba.) But preciselv bccause the White
House rccognized that the Cubans could
bccome a u,ild card, it cut tl.rem out of the
grrme. Kcnnedv inforn'red the Krernlin
that it would be held :rccountrrble for anl'
ilmxik aqtin\l the I Initcd Strrtc, cmrnating
fiom Cuba, howevcr it started. His first
public announcement srrid, "It sha1l be
the policy of this Nation to regard anv
nuclear n.rissilc launched frorn Cubzr against
any nation in the Western Hentisphere
its an attack by the Soviet Union on the
United States, requiring
a
full retaliatory
response upon the Sovict Union.,'
Toclali the rhrear ofan Jsraeli air strike
strerrsthcns U.S. President Barack Obama,s
hand in squeezing Iran to persuade it to
tnake concessions. But the possibility that
lsrael n"risht acruaily carry out a unilateral
air strike without U.S. approval must make
FOREIGN AFFAI RS
July,/Au.sust zotz
Ir:]
GrahamAllison
Washington ncrvous,
sinee it mrkc, thc
nl".1 hardcr to mirnage
. Should
:i'j)domcstic siruation
rnc
in Isr:rel rccluce the
t.rt- an in dcpcndent
lsracli .r rreck,
i|!,,n":.d
U'5. pt,licymakers
will not be unhrrppy.
CARROTS GO BETTER
WITH STICKS
l::::l:.q
with.inte[igence
rwing Soviet
Kcnnedy eonrionred
sh,
I::l'':'n.9lbr.
]ll,t*].,, Union publicll. rnd dem,rnded
recognizing th,u a
lll'lt'ln9trwal.
controntation
riskq(-l
w1r. Responding
to North Korea's
provocatiorrs ovcr the
ri
f.ir,
conrrasr, U.S. pre,idenrs
hrve
loudly brrt carric.l
a small stick.
Ho.o:n
I
nls ls one reason the
Crrban crisis wes
not repeated whereas
the North Korean
ones
have beer_r, repeirtedly.
ng Khrushchev. Kenrredy
,,.rll^ltlli".ti
rctrons that
:J"*.":
ttrrc rtsj(
he knew would incrersc
not onl.y oFconventronirl
wrrr but
nuclear war. Hc raised
the U.S.
1i::,tt alcrr
sratrr\ ro DEFcoN 2, .rware
:1".,.11
that
this would loosen
control ovcr the
nrrclear
Soviet domination of the city and using
nuclertr wcrlf on5 to try t() save it.
During almost two dozcn face-offs
with North Korca ove r thc past three
decades, meanwhile, U.S. and South
Korean policymakers have shied away
from such risks, dernonstrating that they
,rrc deterred bv North Korea's threat to
destroy Seoul in a second Korean war.
North Korean letrclers have taken advantage of this t'e ar to develop an effective
stratesy tbr blackmail. It begins with irr.r
extrerl]e provocation, blatantly crossing
a redline that the Unitcd States has set
out, along with a thrclt that anv resPonse
will lead to a "sca of fire." After tensitlns
hirve risen, a third parry usuallv China,
steps in to proPose tl.rat
"a11
sides" step
back and cool down' Soon thereafter,
side payments to North Korea lre made
by Sor.rth Korea orJapan or the United
States, lcadinp! to a resumPtion of talks.
Alter rnonths of neqotiations, Pvongyang
rgrcc) to accent stilI more payments in
wcapons and ine rcrse
::,,1:.T':
rhat acrions hy other indi_
]lli.iT.tn.:'9
rnuurrls,could
triggcr r crscade bevond his
F"'.*"mipl..
,j^r;i
refurn fbr promises to abrrndon its nuclear
program. Some motrths after that, North
Korea violates the agreement, Washinrton
Seoul express shock, and they vow
*i,f-r"
r urKrsJr prJots
^^r. ntrclcar bomb: and
loadcd activc
never to be duped again. And then, aftcr
and ldvaneed t.
an rlcrt status in whith
a decent inten'al, the cyclc starts once more'
piltits cotrld hrvc choscn
Ifthe worst consequence ofthis charade
r. rrrkc
#':::1
,,r ,".rvto\cow! and
dr,,p
a bomb.
f_,,,
wcre sirnplv the frustration of being bested
thoughr ir nccessarv
rrr in.r.or. by one of the poorest' most isolated states
l'"i.dy ol
war in rhe short iun
on enrth, then the repeated Kore'an crises
in order
ll.,t't*.
w uccrease them ove
r thc longer term.
would be a sideshow. But for decades, U.S'
thinkirg n(,r ()nly abolut
Crrbe
presidents have declared a nuclear-armed
ilbout the ncxt confrontarion,
North Kotca to be "intolerable" and
,::,, 1,to
t""yta most likely c()nrc ()vcr
"unacceptable." They have repeatedly
We5r
Hll;.n
ucnrn, a fres qnL_lxye
insitic the East
warned Pyongyang that it cannot export
pulp., srrre. Streccss in C.uhrr nuclear weapons or technokrgv without
:..Iun
woLtld emboldcn
Khrushchcv to resolvc the fhcing the "gravest conscquences'" In zoo6,
Dcrlin s,tfuation on
his own tcrms, t.ore inq for example, President Georgc W. Bush
Ke nncdy to (.ho()sc
bcrween acccpting
stated that "the transfer ofnuclear weapons
f":i"J
L::i:
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FoREIGN AFFAI RS . Volume ot No. t
The Cuban Missile Crisis at 1o
or materi:ll by North Korea to statc or
nonstatc errtities would be considercd a
grave threat to the ljnited States, and
North Korea u'ou1d bc held fullv accounrable fbr the cousequetrces." North Korea
then proceecled to sel1 Syria a plutoniumproducine reactor tl-rat, had Israel not
iestroycd it, u'ould bv now havo Produced
enough plutonium for Svria's first nuclear
bomb. \Vlsl-rington's resPonse was to
ignore the incident and resurne taiks
thrce weeks lirter.
One lesst,n of the Cuban missile crisis
is that ifvou are not prepared to risk
\vilr, even nuclear war, an adroit advcrsary
cltn qct \.ou to back d.,wrr in suc(c:\i\.e
confrontations. Ifyou do have redlines
that rvould lcad to war il crosscd, then
you have to communicate thcm crediblv
in yout adversarv ,rnd back thern up or
risk having your threats dismissed. North
Korea's s';rle of a ttuclear bornb to terrorists
lrfro thcr-r used it irgainst an American
target would trigge r a devastating Anerie,tn rctrlilti.rn. But lf ter so many previous
redlines have been crossed with irnpuniry
can one be cor-rfident that such a message
has been reccived clearly and convincinglr'?
Could North Korea's new leader, Kin-r
Jong Ur.r, rtnd his advisers irnagine that
thcl.could sct awav with it?
THE RULES
A similer dvnartric r-nay have cmergcd
in the U.S. economic relirtionship rvith
China. The Republican presidential
car.rdidate Nllitt Romnev has annouuced
that "on day one of rny prcsidency I will
designate lChina] a currencv nanipr.rlator
and take appropriatc counteractiorl." The
response fron-r the political and economic
estabiishrlent has bcen a nearlv unanimous
rcjectiol-r of such statements as reckless
rhetoric that risks a catastroPhic trade
war. But it there arc no cir.umstances
in which Washington is willing to risk a
trade cor.rfrontation with China, why
would China's leaders not simPly take a
page from North Korea's playbook? Why
ihould they not continue, in Romney's
words, "plaving the United States like a
fiddle and smiling all the way to the bank"
by undervaluing their currenclr, subsidizing
domestic producers, Protecting their own
markets, and stcnling intellecrual proPertv
through cybertheft?
Economics and security are separate
rcalms, but lessons learned in one can be
carried over into the other. The defining
geopolitical challenge ofthe next half
cennrry
will be managing the relationship
between the Unitcd States as a rulinpl
supcrfowcr and China as a rising one.
Aralyzing the causes ofthe Peloponnesian
War more than two millennia ago, the
Greck historian Thucvdides argued that
"the growth of the power of Athens, and
the alarm which this inspired in Sparta,
made war inevitable." During the Cuban
missile crisis, Kennedv judged that
Khrushchev's adventurism violated what
Kennedy called the "rules of the precarious
status quo" in relations befween two nuclear
superpowers. These rules had evolved
during previous crises, and the resolution
of the standoff in Cuba helped restore and
reinforce them, allowing the Cold War to
end with a whin-rper rather than a bang'
The United States and China will have
to develop their own rules of the road in
order to escape Thucvdides' trap. These
will need to accommodate both parties'
core interests, threading a path benveen
conflict and appeasement. Overreacting
to perceived threats would be a mistake,
but so would ignoring or prtperittg over
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Ju/1/Augusr zotz
I'sl
Graham Allison
unacceptable misbehavior in the hope
that it will not recur. In 1996, after some
byTaipei that Beijing consideredorovocative. China launched a series of
missiles overTliwan, prompting the United
States to send two aircraft carrier battle
groups into harm's way. The eventual result
*as a clearer understanding ol both sides'
redlines on the Taiwan issue and a calmer
region. The relationship may need additional such clarifring moments in order
to manage a precarious transition as China's
steps
continued economic rise and new statlls are
reflected in expanded military capabilities
and a more robust foreign Posture'
DO PROCESS
A final lesson the crisis teaches has to do
not with policy but with process. Unless
the commander in chief has sufficient time
and privacy to understand a situation,
examine the evidence, explore various
options, and reflect before choosing among
them, poor decisions are likely. ln 1962,
one ofthe first questions Kennedy asked
on being told of the missile discoverywas'
How long until this leaks? McGeorge
when he found the administration's
deliberations over its Afghanistan policy
playing out in public, removing much-of
his flexibility to select or even consider
unconventional options. This experience
led him to demand a new national security
decision-making process led by a new
national security adviser. One of the fiuits
of the revised approach was a much more
tightly controlled flow of information' made
possible by an unprecedented narrowing
of th. inn.. decision-making circle. This
allowed discussions over how to handle the
discovery of Osama bin Laden's whereabouts to play out slowly and sensibly, with
the seriest story in Washington kept entirely
secret for five months, until the adminis-
tration itselfrevealed it after the raid on
bin Laden's Abbottabad comPound'
It has been said that history does not
repeat itself, but it does sometimes rhyme'
Five decades later, the Cuban missile crisis
stands not just as a pivotal moment ill
the history of the Cold War but also as a
zuide for how to defuse conflicts' manage
geat-power relationships, and make sound
Jecisions about foreign policy in genera-l.@
Bundy, his national security adviser,
thought it would be a week at most. Acting
on that advice, the president took sk days
in secret to deliberate, changing his mind
more than once along the way. As he noted
afterward, if he had been forced to make
a decision in the first 48 hours, he would
have chosen the air strike rather than the
naval blockade-something that could
have led to nuclear war.
In today's Washington, Kennedy's week
ofsecret deliberations would be regarded
as a
relic of a bygone era. The half-life
hot secret is measured not even in
davs but in hours. Obama learned this
painfully during his first year in office'
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FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Volume 9t No. 4