Reykjavik and Revelations: A Turn of the Tide?
Author(s): James Schlesinger
Source: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 65, No. 3, America and the World 1986 (1986), pp. 426-446
Published by: Council on Foreign Relations
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James Schlesinger
REYKJAVIKAND REVELATIONS:
A TURN OF THE TIDE?
F
JL* or much of its first six years, the Reagan Administration
has cruised along in its foreign policy in a manner both serene
and enviable. The errors in nuclear policy that had marred
our relations with Europe in President Reagan's first year were
to growing pains. Mistakes
such as the Euro-Siberian
attributed
and the Adminis
gas pipeline controversy with the Europeans
tration's initial hard line toward the People's Republic of China
Even a major
were repaired with little permanent
damage.
our
blunder,
intervention
ill-starred
in Lebanon,
was
termi
our forces extricated with such tactical skill
nated quickly?and
was done (save to our prestige
that little permanent
damage
and influence within the Middle East). Certain other actions?
and our
our support of El Salvador, our move
into Grenada
attack
on
at
controversial
Libya?however
the
outset,
turned
out to be generally
successful and much of the initial criticism
died away.
the Soviet Union was passing through a time of
Meanwhile
in a world still significantly
International
troubles.
dynamics
a large extent a kind of counterpoint
between
to
reflect
bipolar
the
Union.
States and the Soviet
the United
Consequently,
one superpower
tends to vary inversely
position and prestige of
with the gains or losses of the other. At least until the accession
the Soviet Union
of General
Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev,
to deal with itsmany
unable
and
luck
bad
appeared plagued by
internal and external problems. President Reagan had had the
to come into office as the Soviet Union went
good fortune
to its
crises in a row. In addition
three
succession
through
internal
drift,
the
U.S.S.R.'s
series of blunders?from
Forces)
range Nuclear
policies
were
also
marked
by
the walkouts at the inf (Intermediate
and start
(Strategic Arms Reduction
for Strategic
and International
Center
is Counselor,
James Schlesinger
to
Lehman
Shearson
Senior
Adviser
and
Studies, Georgetown
University,
of
of Defense,
Inc. He has been Secretary
Brothers,
Energy,
Secretary
of Central
and Director
Commission
of the Atomic
Chairman
Energy
Intelligence.
a
REYKJAVIK AND REVELATIONS
427
in Geneva,
the heavy hand and threats
Talks) negotiations
directed against Western
Europe, and the shooting down of a
Korean Air Lines passenger jet. For much of the early 1980s,
therefore, the Soviet Union wore the black hat in international
affairs?and
the United States benefited
correspondingly.
too
of the Soviet
has
been
made
Much,
much,
perhaps
of
offensive
the
the
Soviets
did make
but
1970s,
geopolitical
in
the
East
Middle
and
elsewhere.
And, indeed,
significant gains
a geopolitical
tide had been flowing toward the Soviets, at least
and
since Watergate
since
perhaps
our
earlier
entanglements
in Southeast Asia. Whatever
the 1970s
its origins, throughout
American
institutions had been severely challenged
and the
had
its
One
of
lost
self-confidence.
President
society
Reagan's
greatest
accomplishments
was
his
contribution
to
the
restora
tion of America's
which
resonated
self-confidence,
among
America's allies, who had been troubled by the faltering United
States of the 1970s.
In short, during
the 1980s, the geopolitical
tide that had
in the 1970s was re
been flowing toward the Soviet Union
versed?and
began to flow toward the United States.
In the sixth year of the Administration,
in part reflecting the
more effective
stance of the Soviet Union
under Gorbachev
and in part reflecting
the
law
of
the Admin
averages,
simply
istration's foreign policy was suddenly beset with difficulties.
Even
before
the
of
embarrassments
November?the
revela
tions that our anti-terrorist
policy had been undermined
by
secret sales of arms to Iran and that the
proceeds of those sales
had in part been used to fund the operations
of the anti
in
Sandinista
of a
(in clear defiance
guerrillas
Nicaragua
ban)?our
congressional
foreign policy had been marred by
both a sense of drift and serious blunders.
I shall
here
concentrate
on
two
issues:
East-West
relations,
as affected by the
summit; and White
particularly
Reykjavik
House mishandling
of Third World
security problems, partic
affair. There have been,
ularly as revealed by the Iran/contra
additional
if
however,
problems,
subsidiary ones, that have
further reduced
the Administration's
stature. The dramatic
veto of the South Africa sanctions
override of the President's
bill indicated a misreading
and a mishandling
of congressional
sentiment. The Administration
had fallen too far out of touch
with the congressional mood. The brief
flap over the disinfor
mation program directed against Libya's Muammar
al-Qaddafi
reduced the credibility of the Administration
abroad, but also
428
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
cargo plane over
shooting down of an American
an
crew and an
with
American
Nicaragua
(perhaps inevitable)
survivor (certainly not inevitable) added to the Ad
American
con
ministration's
Finally, the loss of Republican
vulnerability.
in
of
trol of the Senate,
the
President's
light
particularly
for
further difficulties
unprecedented
campaigning,
presaged
the President.
se
The November
revelations
far more
implied something
at home. The
rious
than
the
normal
lame-duck
of
deterioration
an
adminis
a weakened
execu
tration in its final years. They
suggested
on
best
and quite possibly crippled. The
tive?at
the defensive,
luck apparently had run out. The question now
fabled Reagan
is quite simply: Has the tide that had flowed toward the United
States in the early 1980s started to ebb?
n
The
the
summit at Reykjavik
represented
simultaneously
of realistic
culmination
and the collapse (at least temporarily)
hopes for arms control. To say that the summit was ill prepared
in classic understatement.
the entire
is to indulge
Indeed,
at
the
underscored
continuing
validity
Reykjavik
performance
to
not
leaders
should
summits
of the diplomatic
that
go
adage
to.
to negotiate,
but to ratify what has already been agreed
faith in his
The President was led astray by an exaggerated
are indications that the summit's
powers of persuasion. There
too common domestic political
all
the
hasty design reflected
priority:
the
for
quest
an
arms
control
"success"
before
a
it was
election. Not only was the summit ill prepared,
fol
executed
with
proposals
spur-of-the-moment
badly
midterm
quite
lowed
aspects
by
of
spur-of-the-moment
summits.
earlier
It combined
despair.
as
was
as
ill
conceived
It
the worst
the Vienna
since the blowup of
summit of 1961; it had the worst outcome
the Paris summit of 1960; and it rested upon Utopian expec
of 1945.
tations not seen since the Yalta conference
Nonetheless,
the
environment
for
a
serious
arms
control
since the early 1970s. The
agreement was the most favorable
had
been
created by the enhanced
environment
auspicious
States, due to the Strategic
bargaining
position of the United
Defense
Initiative; by Mr. Gorbachev's
strong desire to focus
on improvements
and by the
in the stodgy Soviet economy;
to avoid a technological
Soviet
wish
competition
deep-seated
At long last, the Soviet desire to
in arms with the Americans.
avoid
another
turn
of
the
screw
in the arms
competition
seemed
REYKJAVIK AND REVELATIONS
overcome
to have
their
to
inclination
long-term
429
to extract
try
in such negotiations.
The Soviets were
advantages
to offer sharp reductions
in their bloated
strategic
the
which
forces,
represented
potential for a serious
if the United States had been adequately prepared
agreement,
to exploit it. Yet, finally, it all turned into nothing. Reykjavik
a near disaster from which we were fortunate
to
represented
a
of
It
has
forfeited
the
escape.
major
quite likely
possibility
arms control agreement
term.
for the balance of the Reagan
Perhaps the summit's only useful result is that it has changed
clamor for an arms
what had been the universal European
marginal
prepared
offensive
control
a keen
into
agreement
awareness
European
such
that
agreements might seriously damage their security interests.
to have
At Reykjavik
the American
negotiators
appeared
been little informed either on the exigencies
imposed by West
ern
deterrence
both
debate
regarding
nuclear
disarmament.
able
tion the security
has
the
strategy.
For
of
indispens
a genera
on nuclear
has rested
not
and
the limitations
remain
world
to deter
been
of discussion
and
weapons
deterrence
of the Western
Its goal
decades
several
the possibilities
Nuclear
in Western
ingredient
deterrence.
or on
strategy
only
nuclear
attack
but also massive conventional
assault from the East. Failing to
at the Lisbon conference
in
achieve the force goals outlined
"New
Look"
and
the
of
the Eisenhower
1952
subsequent
the Western
Administration,
its conventional
of
exist
the
solely
that
the proper
It was
Command.
could not match
tations,
conventional
years,
to determine
Air
Strategic
West
inferiority.
Eisenhower
the
strategy
"the Soviet
worked
and until
primarily
unilateral
adequate
counterdeterrent.
came
alliance
Indeed, with
as
forces
moment
taken
to embrace
almost
the trip wire
were
long
as
as axiomatic
the
nuclear
began
to
for unleashing
hordes." Whatever
the Soviets
strategy
stated
that
the
its limi
threat
to develop
was
an
Attitudes began to change in the 1960s with the move toward
flexible
the European
allies had
response. By the mid-1970s
come to accept the importance
for deterrence
of a stalwart
conventional
that capability would not be
capability. Perhaps
sufficient in itself to protect Western
Europe against an all-out
conventional
assault,
but
with
the mutual
reinforcements
pro
vided by the strategic and theater nuclear weapons
(the other
two legs of the nato
a
defense
it could provide
strategy),
nato
comfortable
level of deterrence.
There
doctrine
has
rested for the past decade. Despite
the bitter controversies
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
430
nuclear weapons
regarding new deployments,
alliance together.
that has held the Western
themselves
troversies
an
reflect
unstated
the glue
the con
provide
Indeed,
of
acknowledgment
this critical role.
seems to have reflected
The American
position at Reykjavik
no understanding
of these simple fundamentals.
Indeed, at one
in
the
the
President
had
negotiations
point
accepted Mr. Gor
bachev's proposal
that both sides eliminate all strategic offen
sive arms by 1996. Happily,
the Administration
has now backed
from
this
and
insists
that it repre
away
breathtaking
proposal
sents only a long-term goal. But that impulsive, ifmomentary,
underscores
the casual utopianism
and indifferent
agreement
marked
that
preparation
Reykjavik.
Surely we must be more cautious in casting aside the existing
structure
of Western
alternative
truly
exists.
security
In the
we
before
of
absence
are
assured
the nuclear
that
an
deterrent
the Eurasian continent would be dominated
by that nation with
forces. The President may win
the most powerful conventional
of Catholic Bishops or
plaudits from the National Conference
or
for a Sane Nuclear
Committee
from the National
Policy
even from the left wing of the British Labour Party when he
but
holds out his vision of "a world without nuclear weapons,"
Western
it endangers
cohesion.
Secretary
security
of State George
their
dence
that, given
can create
conventional
and
seriously
Shultz
greater
forces
alliance
his confi
has expressed
economic
superior
weakens
resources,
to those of
the
allies
the Warsaw
the long
such a view simply ignores the psychology,
nato
even
alliance.
With
of
the
the
and
geography
history,
trends
adverse
serious economic
strains,
(sharply
demographic
no draft in
in
and
birth
cohorts,
Germany)
particularly
falling
the United
States, will the allies do in the 1980s what they
were unwilling
to do in the prosperous
1960s and early 1970s?
on so
a hope?
Should we risk Western
flimsy
security
Even if we attribute the aberration of negotiators
consenting
to their being swept
of all strategic weapons
to the elimination
Pact. But
away
by
the
enthusiasm
of
the moment,
what
are
we
to make
to eliminate all ballistic missiles
of the main American
proposal
was put forward not on the spur of the moment
by 1996? It
It appears to
but after some, albeit not very deep, reflection.
of Defense
in the Department
have originated
(under some
in
could never
the
Soviets
that
suspicion of disingenuousness,
accept it and that it would "play well in Peor?a"). The proposal
REYKJAVIK AND REVELATIONS
was included,
in a general way,
without
letter to Mr. Gorbachev
as a
more
long-term
in President
Reagan's July
of timing?
any suggestion
a concrete
than
aspiration
431
For
proposal.
that reason the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not take it very
it was?without
prior consultation
seriously. But at Reykjavik
the allies or the Joint Chiefs?put
forward
with the Congress,
as
a
concrete
to
proposal
be
ten
in
achieved
time.
years'
the President and Secretary Shultz have backed away
Although
it is still supported by some senior
somewhat from this proposal,
in
Administration
officials and remains a part of our proposal
of
Geneva. While,
it lacks the quixotic heedlessness
happily,
of all strategic nuclear weapons,
it raises very
the elimination
serious
and
questions
has
been
to no
subject
serious
analysis.
Indeed, the National Security Decision Directive
calling for the
of ballistic
implications of the elimination
study of the military
missiles was not circulated until several weeks after Reykjavik.
a
For
of
quarter
a
century
intercontinental
(bombers,
launched ballistic missiles)
America's military posture.
statements
of
various
the
of
value
the
triad
nuclear
ballistic missiles
and submarine
has been taken as axiomatic
for
in
reiterated
the
posture
Annually
secretaries
of
the
defense,
value
of
the
triad reflects not only the special features in targeting of each
of the elements of the triad, but the desire to avoid putting all
the principal deterrent
eggs in one basket. As recently as 1983
in accepting
the report of the Scowcroft Com
the President,
embraced
mission,
this
The
concept.
report
out
pointed
that
the triad would complicate
any Soviet attack plan and would
resources
Soviet
that
dissipate
might otherwise be concentrated
a
"Thus
the existence
of several
system:
single deterrent
our
as
to
of
forces
each
function
components
strategic
permits
against
a hedge
the
against possible
others."
ponents
were
would
against
to
The
report
of our strategic
contemplate
lead them
one
component
an
Soviet
went
successes
on
to
forces would
all-out
to reduce
in order
in endangering
"the
say,
force
attack,
the Soviets,
to make
significantly
to attack
different
their
another."
choices
any of
com
if they
which
effectiveness
Space
does
not allow the spelling out of these technical details. Suffice it
to say that at Reykjavik
the Administration
suddenly jettisoned
doctrine
25 years of deterrence
and the President's
prior
embrace of the Scowcroft Commission
warn
report. Without
or its allies, indeed
consultation
with Congress
ing, without
without any prior analysis, the Administration
the
proposed
abandonment
of two of the three traditional
of
the
triad.
legs
432
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Does no one in the Administration
recall the days before
the vulnera
ballistic missiles and the deep concern regarding
our
at
then
of
bomber
bilities
force,
deployed
only 55 Strategic
Air Command
(sac) bases, susceptible to surprise attack? (That
to say, deepened
with the initial Soviet de
concern, needless
of
intercontinental
ballistic
missiles.) The inevitable
ployments
an
then
and now, is the call for
airborne alert of the
result,
on the ground. Does
bomber force to limit its vulnerability
in the Administration
recall the lengthy dispute be
anybody
as the Congress
tween the Congress and President Eisenhower,
on
the Administration
for airborne
pressed additional money
that
all
it
would
lead to was
alert and the President
argued
"worn-out
bomber
bombers"? A hypothetical
force of the
1990s would consist of many fewer bombers than in the 1950s,
located on an even smaller number of main bases.
probably
Can anyone doubt that the concerns of the 1950s about its
vulnerability would rapidly revive?
Soviet air
The ability of such a bomber force to penetrate
and concern. The
defenses would cause similar introspection
that the Soviets
Administration
itself has steadily emphasized
invest far more than we do in "strategic defense." Most ofthat
vast Soviet investment is in air defense.
(By contrast, the United
States, having accepted that Soviet ballistic missiles have essen
a skeletal air defense.)
In
only
tially a free ride, has maintained
the
the 1990s could our bombers be assured of penetrating
hundreds
of radars, thousands of interceptors
(with a look
down,
shoot-down
capability),
and
tens
of
of
thousands
surface
Soviet air defenses?
that will then constitute
to-air missiles
even more
air
defenses
would
the
Soviet
Moreover,
likely be
if we were to "share" our strategic defense
tech
formidable
as
How
the President has promised.
nology with the Soviets,
assured would we feel under those conditions?
that sub
For more
than 20 years we have been confident
were
invulnerable.
ballistic missiles
marine-launched
(slbms)
to dispose of this leg of the triad.
At Reykjavik we proposed
Do we really want to rid ourselves of what we have regarded
as the invulnerable part of our deterrent?and
depend wholly
on air-breathing
vehicles? The Administration
argues that sub
extent
cruise missiles could to a considerable
marine-launched
as we eliminate
some degree of invulnerability,
the
maintain
SLBMs.
which
Do
our
we
seriously
submarines
long range embodied
want
can
to reduce
operate,
in the Trident
radically
the
forgo
the
range
advantages
ballistic missile
at
of
and force
REYKJAVIK AND REVELATIONS
433
our submarines
to operate close to the Soviet Union with all
the inherent increase in vulnerability? Do we want to depend
on the capacity of cruise missiles
to penetrate
substantially
enhanced Soviet air defenses?
the proffered
the bulk of our retaliatory
Under
conditions,
on
rest
force would
located at a small number of
bombers,
to surprise attack. Would we really want
bases and vulnerable
to depend upon a surviving force of cruise missiles going against
that originally
Soviet air defenses?
Surely an administration
came into office stressing "the window
of vulnerability"
for
our strategic forces should appreciate
that under such condi
tions
concern
again
escalate.
about
the
survival
of
our
deterrent
would
once
consider
the budgetary
consequences.
Finally, one must
for manpower
and
Bombers, with their heavy requirements
are
to
be
if
tend
fuel,
quite costly, particularly
they
required
to fly often in airborne alert. As we are procuring and
operating
this deterrent
force of the future, and simultaneously
rebuild
our
a
air
defenses
and
ballistic
missile
defense,
ing
creating
what portion of a relatively fixed defense
budget would be
absorbed? To what extent would our conventional
military
be sacrificed?at
the very moment
capabilities
unavoidably
that the need for further improvements
in conventional
defen
ses is being acknowledged
a
the
At
alliance?
mini
throughout
we
would
it
should await the result of the
mum,
appear that
we press forward with the
ordered
before
belatedly
analyses
to
eliminate
ballistic
missiles.
proposal
One of the anomalies at Reykjavik was the contrasting
treat
ment
ative.
of
the
nuclear
In Western
deterrent
strategy
and
the
the
nuclear
Strategic
deterrent
Defense
Initi
remains
the
ultimate and indispensable
the Presi
reality. Yet at Reykjavik
to negotiate
dent was prepared
it away almost heedlessly.
By
contrast,
the
Strategic
Defense
Initiative
was
treated
and
con
tinues to be treated as if it were already a reality ("the key to
a world without nuclear
instead of a collection
of
weapons")
technical experiments
and distant hopes. The President
pro
posed to deploy sdi in 1996. But by 1996 only a most rudi
based upon kinetic-kill
could be
defense,
vehicles,
mentary
None
the
of
well-advertised
exotic
includ
defenses,
deployed.
and
lasers
could
be
available
until
ing
particle beams,
possibly
well into the 21st century. Thus,
the proposed
early deploy
ment of this
ballistic
missile
defense would occur
rudimentary
in the same year that the possession of ballistic missiles would
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
434
ease the prob
no longer be
permitted. That would, of course,
lem of making
the ballistic missile defense effective.
(There is
limited
ballistic missile threat sufficiently
always a hypothetical
that it can make even a rudimentary
defense effective.)
Even with the threat of ballistic missiles nominally eliminated,
of a rudimentary
the President argues that an early deployment
defense
strategic
cheating.
may
well
wonder
as
is necessary
system
It would
be very
costly
or not
whether
insurance
against
insurance
the
indeed,
resources
Soviet
and one
in such
invested
a rudimentary
defense would not be better invested in other
the stakes would be high, much
military capabilities. However,
at the time of
understood
than
Administration
the
higher
were actually to eliminate ballistic missiles and
we
If
Reykjavik.
return to a retaliatory
lo
force based primarily on bombers
a
on
cated
number
small
of
sac
our
bases,
main
retaliatory
Even if the Soviets were
vulnerable.
force would be extremely
to cheat only to the extent of hiding away a very small number
our
of missiles,
risk.
U.S.
main
force
retaliatory
would
be
placed
at
with
One may be bemused by the President's
preoccupation
to sacrifice our
sdi. At Reykjavik he was prepared apparently
entire
nuclear
strategic
but
armament,
unprepared
to compro
mise on outside-the-laboratory
testing of sdi. One finds it hard
to believe that preserving
the freedom to test sdi is by itself of
to jettison or sal
to determine
whether
sufficient
importance
was
of
system
we must
the Western
vage
rence.
Nonetheless,
the
over
impasse
sdi
that
security
based
on
nuclear
deter
it
the
accept
astonishing
irony:
the embarrassment
saved us from
subse
from which
into completed
agreements
entering
we would have had to withdraw. Thus, sdi may already
quently
of
have
made
an
invaluable
contribution
to Western
not
if somewhat
for the bright,
evanescent,
to us, but rather by preserving
proffered
deterrence
nuclear
from
our
Administration's
security?
future regularly
of
the elements
recklessness
at
we must be permanently
grateful to sdi?
Reykjavik. For that
outcome of the research and
of
still
uncertain
the
irrespective
effort.
development
with sdi, plus Gorbachev's
To be sure, the preoccupation
in failing to seize upon the President's
tactical blunder
accep
tance
of
the
notion
of
total
strategic
nuclear
disarmament,
saved us at Reykjavik. But one should pause and examine what
more than a decade we have sought to
might have been. For
in
control the grossly inflated Soviet offensive
forces, which
REYKJAVIK AND REVELATIONS
435
offered
corporate a major counterforce
capability. Gorbachev
to reduce Soviet strategic offensive forces by 50 percent. If the
offer was genuine?and
that could only be determined
by
extensive negotiations?it
the true goal
might have achieved
of arms control: enhanced
stability in th? military postures of
the two sides. To Gorbachev's
demands
that the
predictable
Missile Treaty
be strengthened
1972 Anti-Ballistic
(can we
on
have
been
his
insistence
this
really
surprised by
point after
all the Soviet statements of the past three years?), we should
have responded by seriously addressing his legitimate concerns
about the scope of SDI testing, rather than pursuing the tack of
all ballistic missiles by 1996, which led the discus
eliminating
sions down the grandiose,
if futile and dangerous,
road toward
total
nuclear
disarmament.
to the events at
What have been the reactions
Reykjavik
since the summit? Reykjavik may have been amarginal electoral
success for the midterm
but it has been a foreign
elections,
relations disaster. On the first point the Administration
seems
to have been quite satisfied by its mastery
of the political
calls
it
control."
White
House
Chief of Staff
technique
"spin
Donald Regan commented:
"We took Reykjavik
and turned
what was really a sour situation into something
that turned out
that says quite simply is that the public
pretty well." What
on
relations
the American
is all-important,
electorate
impact
while
the
substance
of negligible
In
arms
control
and
foreign
are
reaction
importance.
the
however,
Europe,
as the substance
became
of
better
and process
understood.
were
reaction
was
one
of
of the negotiations
The
Europeans,
consternation,
at Reykjavik
needless
to
say,
to discover
that such revolutionary
vastly disturbed
changes in the Western
security system affecting Europe could
be proposed
and negotiated
without
any prior consultation.
But they were perhaps even more disturbed
by the sudden
realization
that
the
American
negotiators
apparently
pro
ceeded at Reykjavik without
the slightest understanding
of the
basis of the system of Western
more
a
At
security.
specific, and
at the
there was exasperation
perhaps lower, level of concern,
casual proposal to eliminate the missiles placed in
Europe after
so much
We
had
travail.
the
made
that
political
argument
missiles in Europe were essential to deterrence
forces
by linking
in Europe
to the
larger American
strategic deterrent. While
one can argue that the Euromissile
issue ismore symbolic and
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
436
still it is hard for us to abandon
than military,
psychological
the initial rationale.
Amid considerable
distress, a hasty round of conferences was
held. Soon British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher,
bearing
a portfolio for all the European allies,
appeared at Camp David
to deliver a reclama on Reykjavik.
set
The outcome,
which
arms
was
was
for
It
control,
priorities
highly
satisfactory.
should be given to major reductions
in
agreed that priority
nuclear
intermediate-range
a
and
forces
reduction
50-percent
in strategic offensive weapons,
and in the context of the elimi
a ban on chemical warfare
nation of conventional
disparities,
in shorter-range
and a reduction
systems within the European
most
theater. Perhaps
the long-standing
strategy of
significant,
was
nato
reconfirmed.
again, as with the earlier rhetoric of sdi replacing
Mrs. Thatcher
(immoral) deterrence,
helped save the Ameri
cans from their own
selection of priorities, while
folly. The
Once
sensible,
was
rather
The
belated.
normal
is to estab
procedure
as the normal proce
lish priorities prior to negotiation?just
dure would be to study the consequences
of eliminating ballistic
such a proposal. The Administration
missiles prior to making
does appear to have backed away from its breathtaking
discus
in a manner
For
sions at Reykjavik
that,
equally breathtaking.
at least, we should be grateful.
the consequences
of Reykjavik
remain serious.
Nonetheless,
allied
Though
face as possible
have
been
governments
on the summit,
beneath
to put
surface
eager
the
as
good
of
a
public
at both the substance
support they remain deeply disturbed
Their confi
of the Reykjavik negotiations.
and the procedure
dence in American
has
been
leadership
significantly weakened.
In the immediate aftermath of the summit some began to cast
around
for
alternative
tion, to provide
has
now
methods,
other
for their security.
diminished,
some
residue
than
American
Although
protec
the initial alarm
remains.
our allies we have gotten
the worst of both possible
of West European
On the one hand, the confidence
in the capacity of American
governments
leadership to protect
in negotiations
has been
interests of the alliance
the general
much
and
On
the
the
other
hand,
publics
seriously damaged.
in
been
the
have
excited
of the press
promise of
Europe
by
With
worlds.
major
arms
control
agreements,
and
particularly
the
elimina
threat directed
tion of the Soviet intermediate-range
against
that the elimina
have
been
Western
Europe. They
persuaded
REYKJAVIK AND REVELATIONS
437
tion of the dreaded SS-20 threat would have taken place had
sdi. While
the
it not been for the American
obstinacy about
in the near term in changing
Soviets will remain unsuccessful
a fertile field
attitudes of governments,
they have been given
to sow in the battle for public opinion.
Perhaps even more important in the long run, the President's
of a world
embrace of the goal, both Utopian and dangerous,
without nuclear weapons will inevitably weaken support for the
upon which the defense of the
strategy of nuclear deterrence
true in Western
to rest. This
is particularly
West
continues
Labour Party
It
seized
the
British
has
been
Europe.
by
already
in the
and by the Social Democratic
Party inWest Germany
true
to
in the
is
elections.
But
it
also
their
run-ups
respective
United States. Once again, as with sdi, the President has been
He has clearly done
in his judgment on deterrence.
destructive
more to weaken deterrence
than did the U.S. Catholic bishops
in their 1983 pastoral letter.
The full effects of Reykjavik will probably never be known,
as the summit has been wholly superseded
in public discussion
arms for Iran and the
by the issues of
illegal funding of the
contras.
and
these
Admittedly,
a greater
have
a serious
constitute
events
latter
on
impact
for
embarrassment
more
appear
the public
dramatic
mind.
do
They
the United
States
and
for a major diplomatic
setback. Never
the potential
provide
is
much
less
their
inherent
than
the
theless,
weight
negotiations
at Reykjavik. They cannot significantly
alter the military bal
ance
or
significantly
Reykjavik
for
weaken
Western
had the potential
suddenly
vitiating
for upsetting
Western
security.
strategy,
military
By
the military
and
contrast,
balance,
for
de
of the Western
alliance. It is a pity that
stroying
the more consequential
shall have been overtaken
by the less
more
was
a
near
if
dramatic.
disaster,
consequential
Reykjavik
and we should learn from it all that we can. Perhaps the best
the cohesion
that
As
can
be
the Duke
the nearest-run
said
about
the
of Wellington
thing
you
summit
is that
remarked
ever
it was
a near
after Waterloo:
disaster.
"It was
saw."
in
The tangled affair that falls under the rubric of the "arms
scandal" has rocked both the government
and the country.
our policies
There has been public confusion
what
regarding
are and a
in
the
President's
really
stunning drop
approval
It
has
weakened
and
the
Administration
may
rating.
cripple
438
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
status normally
at this
far beyond
the lame-duck
occurring
an
not
I
to
in
do
intend
administration.
here
stage
attempt to
the
and
events,
among people
disentangle
precise relationships
the contradictions
and the illegalities;
that is the task of the
and the independent
review committees
counsel.
congressional
I shall instead attempt to examine
the implications for Ameri
sense and the impact upon our
can policy
in the broadest
international position.
to proceed
of events
Whoever
allowed
this combination
his work more destructively.
could not have designed
The
to
of weapons
the
combination
of
the
supplied
regime
Ayatol
lah Ruhollah Khomeini
(on the scale of the American
public's
the ransoming
dislikes, Iran ranks well above the Soviet Union),
of hostages
(not
only
were
arms
ransom
but
traded,
money
was
raised explicitly for that purpose),
and the illegal diversion of
to
contras
whom
funds
the
(for
public sentiment has varied
and hostility) was put together in a pack
between
indifference
in
It was a ticking
and
White House complex.
the
age
planted
and
contrived
time bomb,
close to the
placed
ingeniously
a
was
matter
President.
It
of time before it detonated.
only
The origins
lie well back in the Administration's
reading,
strongly touched by ideology, of recent history. The setbacks
in the 1970s were attributed
that the United States experienced
no
in
power, but simply to the
way to the limits of American
lack of will. The solution was equally simple: American
strength
and
American
cult
failure
of
Be
will.
toughness
to understand
Overcome
determined.
became
the
norm.
real
the
on
restraints
A
all obstacles.
a
widespread
American
power
was
There
ambivalence
about the
and the American
public's deep-seated
use of force, including the disguised use of force.
a basis
In the long run, heroic posturing
is as unsatisfactory
as
in
Some
Adminis
the
is
moral
for foreign policy
posturing.
tration seemed to view Rambo not just as a highly implausible
treatise.
adventure
tale, but rather as a profound
political
were
who
lacked
Administration
policies
shaped by ideologues
American
peo
politics and what the
familiarity with American
were
not
are
to
Covert
accept.
just a
operations
ple
prepared
were
if
Instead
distasteful.
useful
somewhat
tool,
regarded
they
as a noble
instrument,
a
be proud in public?almost
with the restraints placed
policy.
ments
There
was
that Congress
cause?of
righteous
which
one
could
There was frustration
control of foreign
upon presidential
resentment
a crusade.
of
the
had imposed upon
new
oversight
intelligence
require
operations.
439
REYKJAVIK AND REVELATIONS
From its earliest days the Administration
appeared willing to
run roughshod over congressional
and sensibilities
prerogatives
in these
The
matters.
to overthrow
actions
precluded
of the first Boland
violation
cia's
and most particularly
to the second Boland
the
contras.
With
the
the mining
Amendment,
the
cia
at
least
which
Amendment,
in
government
Managua,
led
of Nicaraguan
harbors,
to
off
aid
cutting
military
removed,
ostensibly
respon
came to
Central American
operations
sibility for directing
reside in the White House. The National Security Council staff
was not an "agency" under the Boland Amendment
(or so it
could be protected
could be argued) and staff members
by
Adviser
Robert
executive privilege. Former National
Security
"We cannot break faith with the con
McFarlane
commented,
felt
infer that the Administration
tras," from which one might
in breaking faith with either the Congress or
less constrained
the
law. For
several
years
ant Colonel Oliver North,
and directed operations,
nsc
staff members,
raised money,
all to sustain
notably
Lieuten
intelligence
provided
the contra effort and
morale.
In order
to avoid
of the Central
congressional
oversight
to
of the Boland
and
evade
the
intent
Agency
Intelligence
were
secret
these
Amendment,
operations
effectively placed in
close to the President. A generation's
ad
the White House,
as
to
covert
far from the Presi
monitions
operations
keep all
dent as possible were discarded. The President himself seemed
happy with the situation, ready to discuss the presumably covert
in Central America. The borderline
between overt
operations
and
sometimes
covert,
difficult
to define,
became
oblit
wholly
was the distinction
erated. Also obliterated
between
the per
missible and the impermissible.
The seeds of the secret shift in policy toward Iran were sown
most notably Wil
in 1984 with the kidnapping
of Americans,
liam Buckley, whose abduction aroused the cia. To the call to
extricate
our
hostages
was
added
the persuasive
voice
of
Israel
and the vague longing for a longer-term relationship with Iran.
The massive political victory of the President
in 1984 rein
forced the frequently
encountered
White House
hubris and
a sense of limits to what the President could
further weakened
or what he was permitted
to do. White
House
accomplish
a
set
successes
hubris was reinforced
to
of
from Grenada
by
the Achille Lauro.
The
the
selling of arms to Iran started in 1985 through
440
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
in the belief that such transactions
could
Israelis, apparently
remain secret. By 1986 weapons were being removed directly
from service inventories for shipment to Iran. And then North
and others on the nsc staff, already heady with past triumphs,
the bulk of the proceeds
truly went amok, diverting
through a
in Switzerland
and the West
variety of secret bank accounts
Indies to the illegal support of the contra operation and perhaps
to other beneficiaries,
possibly including sympathetic politicians
in the United
States. The notion that this extensive
network
at
11
of operations,
be kept
least
could
countries,
spanning
secret reflected a touching,
if na?ve, faith in clandestinity.
The consequences
hardly need to be spelled out. The nation
an
is in
is in disarray. Its energies
uproar. The Administration
at least until October
in large degree,
will be directed
1987
will
the
Senate
it
finish
its
toward
(when
says
investigation),
to control the damage.
It has lost control over the
attempting
in the President
national agenda. Public confidence
has been
The
eroded.
remains
whether
the
Adminis
seriously
question
tration can partially recover or whether
it will be permanently
crippled.
in the public's
It should be noted that the principal damage
from the shipment
of arms to the despised
view resulted
ayatollah and the trading of those arms for the hostages. For
far more
the American
this has counted
than the
public,
associated with the diversion of public resources.
"illegalities"
Why?
America
remains a nation with a strong idealistic bent. It
does not believe that it is right to profess one policy, to press
one's allies and others to follow that policy, and then in secret
to do the reverse. The President,
into office,
upon coming
should recognize
asserted
that terrorists
that "retribution
would
be
swift
and
Countless
effective."
voices
have
asserted
that we will "never negotiate with terrorists." The public was
we
urged to believe that this indeed was our policy. And here
an
are
Iran
with
the
hated
suddenly
dealing
ayatollah?with
as the principal example of those
branded by the President
"outlaw
states
. . . run
by
the
strangest
collection
of misfits,
since the advent of the
looney tunes and squalid criminals
Third Reich."1 Worse
than that, here we are paying ransom,
1
Address
address was
to the Annual
Convention
a week or so before
given
the
the Israelis. Apparently
through
shift in policy.
prospective
Bar Association,
of the American
July 8, 1985. The
to the sale of arms
the President
gave oral approval
were
not apprised
of the
President's
speechwriters
441
REYKJAVIK AND REVELATIONS
we would
arms for hostages?something
that we proclaimed
never do and have urged all others to refrain from doing. The
public's shock was unavoidable. The diversion of funds appears
to the public.
far less reprehensible
A president must be true to his image. He is allowed a great
deal of running room so long as he does not break an implicit
social contract with the public: that he is a man who will not
violate the public's deepest convictions, which he has come to
for
President Carter, rated high among presidents
personify.
sum
was
in
his
few
which
rebuked
for
his honesty,
fibs,
sharply
were a fraction of those tolerated
in other presidents. Why?
to the public in 1976
Because the conviction
that he conveyed
was that he would restore goodness
and never
inWashington
lie to the American people. Similarly, no one would ever expect
to the ayatollah
to be sending weapons
in
President Reagan
or
ransom
his
staff
would
for
that
be
raising
exchange
hostages,
the need to stand
money while the Administration
proclaimed
up to terrorists. President Reagan was elected to be strong?
to stand up to the nation's enemies. Trafficking
with terrorists
was not his
was not
It
image.
precisely Standing Tall.
The irony is that the President had both betrayed and been
felled by that cantankerous American
patriotism he had done
so much to foster and had come to
exemplify. The Republican
of
William
South
it sim
Dakota,
governor
Janklow, expressed
are
not
out
want
to
"There
five
there
send
who
ply:
people
arms
to
Iran.
The
only
way
we
want
to
give
them
arms
is
them from the bay of a B-l bomber." Perhaps it was
dropping
best put by a Chicago
"It's like
lawyer and Reagan appointee:
that
had
been
John Wayne
suddenly
learning
secretly
selling
to
and
Indians."
firearms
the
liquor
far too much,
has been made
Much,
by the President's
to the
defenders
of Roosevelt's
trading overage
destroyers
in 1940. It is a misleading
British
This
nation
has
parallel.
moved beyond the Wilsonian
notion of open covenants, openly
arrived at. It accepts, although
it is not happy with, the reality
of secret diplomacy. But secret diplomacy
in this country must
be an extension
of and in spirit with its open diplomacy.
It
cannot be the reverse of what we say
(as in
publicly, especially
the Iranian case) when the secret action is in all-out opposition
to what the American
people want.
Illegalities, which may
excite
the lawyers, although
in terms of public
secondary
the Iran/
response,
certainly do not help. All these marked
contra
affair.
The
public
outcry
was
scarcely
surprising.
442
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
none of this
By contrast,
applies to Roosevelt's
trading of
to
no secret
the
British.
had
Roosevelt
made
overage destroyers
that he wanted the British to survive (and win!). His announced
policy had been: all aid to the Allies, short of war. Nor had he
made much of a secret of his loathing for Hitler's Germany.
That had been clear since his "Quarantine
the Aggressor"
in
1937. Moreover,
his foreign policy goal was one
speech
approved by the American
people. The nation certainly pre
ferred the Allies and disliked the Axis; it just did not want to
become
involved in the war. Finally, though no doubt of lesser
we
importance,
bases
got
precisely
that all admitted
western
were
That
hemisphere.
what
we
valuable
the
for. We
traded
received
for the defense
Iranians
us
conned
on
of the
the
re
lease of the hostages simply added insult to injury.
toward clandestinity.
Finally, there is the national attitude
While
the country has moved well past Henry Stimson's "Gen
it still remains deeply
tlemen do not read each other's mail,"
about
uneasy
clandestine
operations,
those
especially
origina
ting from within the White House. Those who are fascinated
from the time of the White House plumbers
by clandestinity,
to the time of Colonel
North's
have failed to
operations,
held
understand
this deeply
is
public attitude. The public
to
but
when
clandestine
activities,
accept
prepared
only
they
seem clearly required. Wholesale
brings to the
clandestinity
ambivalence.
surface all of the public's deep-seated
to the carrying out
is
fundamental
Adequate
public support
in this society. The
need for any secret
of foreign policy
our open diplomacy
to
consistent
with
and our
be
diplomacy
is
the
American
is
accepted by
people,
publicly expressed goals
manifest.
The
ations?and
to be
need
not
to
give
circumspect
to the
way
about
clandestine
of
impulse
the
oper
"cowboys"?
for retaining public support. Those who advise any
including Mr. Reagan, otherwise do not understand
president,
or the exigencies
for
the spirit of the American
democracy
carrying out foreign policy in this society.
is essential
IV
We
must
now
home
and
abroad.
assess
the
consequences
of
the
arms
scandal
at
In the first place, the President has been dramatically weak
and with
ened. His diminished
credibility, with the Congress
means
to
he
will
that
be able
elites generally,
American
provide
little positive leadership in foreign policy for the balance of his
REYKJAVIK AND REVELATIONS
443
term. His proposals will be greeted with skepticism at best.
his standing with the public can be only partially
Moreover,
in terms of affection
restored?and
then more
than high
his
One
for
of
the
reactions
leadership.
regard
truly astounding
to the arms scandal was reflected
to one
in the response
in a recent New York Times/CBS poll: "Whom do you
question
on foreign
to make
trust more
the right decisions
policy?
Ronald Reagan or Congress?" The public chose Congress over
the President 61 percent to 27 percent. The public may have
its difficulty with the practical
and constitutional
questions
a
on the
but
it
is
involved,
truly stunning judgment
capability
of
the
executive
branch.
the impact on foreign policy may be modest. Congress
is firmly under the control of the moderates.
American
foreign
too stable.
thus
should
remain
quite stable?perhaps
policy
The wilder blades of the Watergate
have been re
Congress
moved or have "matured." There will be little repetition
of
the bizarre attitudes and turbulent debates of the early 1970s.
it is equally clear that Congress
is hard-pressed
to
Nonetheless,
new
initiatives. Thus, American
provide useful
policy over the
next two years will likely turn out to be a holding pattern.
The controversy
the arms scandal has acquired a
regarding
momentum
of its own. It will roll on, even to the point of
public boredom. White House attempts to suggest that Oliver
North "acted alone" or that rogue elephants at the nsc were
out of control will prove
ineffective.
their
First, whatever
were
to
and
Poindexter
North
the
excesses,
clearly
responding
to
vibrations
within
the
House.
White
Second,
policy
suggest
that no one knew what the President's
staff was doing is perhaps
even less reassuring than that this
activity was authorized. The
that
the
President's
staff was out of control is a
"explanation"
rather desperate
alibi; its only utility is to obviate the charge
of complicity
in illegalities. After all, just who was nursing this
would-be Ludendorff
in the basement of the White House?
and
Finally,
perhaps most important: clearly it was the Pres
ident who authorized
the arms for Iran and the trading of arms
for hostages. The rest, including the raising of ransom money
and the illegal diversion
and use of funds, may indeed have
been extracurricular.
But the propitiation
of the ayatollah's
regime (under the guise of working with Iranian moderates)
and the willingness
to ransom hostages?both
in conflict with
our stated
to
be
the
President's
policy?are
acknowledged
are the issues about which the
Those
responsibility.
public is
Yet
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
444
concerned.
recondite
of funds is a rather
the public the diversion
hopes for a Reagan recov
legal point. Consequently
For
as a
than
ery?other
est at best.
grandfather
appear
figure?would
mod
the
abroad
those within
The
consequences
complement
United States. The loss in credibility of American
foreign policy
has been serious. It will be a long time before any American
attempt to obtain backing for an anti-terrorist
policy will be
as more
regarded
a
than
will
pretense?or
as much
elicit
In Europe
the distress over the inept
support as derision.
at Reykjavik was reinforced by
of
Americans
the
performance
had been both weak and deceitful
the belief that the Americans
in
selling
arms
to
Iran
in
and
their
stance
terrorists.
against
do not seriously
these matters
Unlike
however,
Reykjavik,
undermine Western
European
irritating,
security. Confusing,
on Eu
embarrassing
they may be, but they scarcely impinge
vital
rope's
a
As
interests.
that
Reykjavik?was
are
Europeans
response?unlike
irritation.
and
After
all,
schadenfreude
when
the Americans
selves?so
long
as
the
consequence,
it does
not
initial
a mixture
after
not
above
are making
threaten
European
European
of scorn
a
touch
of
fools of them
security.
Europe's initial anger and contempt, however, rapidly turned
States
into deep concern as it became evident that the United
was going
from but
into a serious political
crisis, different
as severe as Watergate.
United
the
It
that
suggested
perhaps
with internal matters for two more
States might be preoccupied
little international
years and that, at best, it could provide
from its
leadership and at worst might be entirely diverted
has
So
the
initial
international
smugness
given
responsibilities.
way
to serious
alarm.
But
Europeans
do
tend
to exaggerate
the
States on its ability to
impact of a political crisis in the United
The separation of powers is regarded
function internationally.
as
bane
of the American
the
system.
political
by foreigners
of the beneficial
is little understanding
There
aspects of the
or of how Congress
to a large extent can
separation of powers
is in
substitute for and provide
stability when the executive
crisis.
for
ismisleading.
American
experience
post-Watergate
There will be no
largely unaffected.
eign policy will proceed
but there will be no drastic changes. But the
innovations,
and political stalemate may
weakness
of
American
perception
as
as
the
be
coming after Reyk
reality?especially
important
in the United States will certainly lead
javik. Loss of confidence
The
REYKJAVIK AND REVELATIONS
to some
by
cohesion
loss of alliance
of
several
and may
lead
to unwise
445
actions
states.
the European
In
The effect in the Middle East may be more far-reaching.
so volatile a region, it would seem hard to increase instability.
But we may just have turned that difficult trick. The govern
ment of Israel has been embarrassed. The governments
of the
moderate
Arab states (excepting Saudi Arabia) are angry and
through
dismayed. The American position has been weakened
was
out the Arab world,
which
Saudi
itself
Arabia,
including
of Iran. Iran's and Khomeini's
involved with the propitiation
(That has not helped the
prestige have both been increased.
as
within
such
moderates,
Iran.) The position of Iraq
they are,
has been weakened?with
all that this implies for control over
Middle Eastern oil. If it has been our purpose to terminate the
it.
Iran-Iraq war, we have succeeded only in lengthening
to
turn
Saudi Arabia has been encouraged
toward Teheran.
Iranian influence in Riyadh has grown. The dismissal of Saudi
Oil Minister Ahmed Zaki Yamani and the movement
of Saudi
across
to
Gulf
Persian
the
assist
their
products
hereditary
to
Arab
witness
their
brother
bear
that.
Within
enemy against
OPEC, Iranian influence has grown; this may be unimportant
in the 1990s.
for now, but potentially highly significant
As the political difficulties
in the Middle East increase, we
be more
should
aware
than
we
are
of
the
accelerating
depen
dence of the United States on the oil fields of the Persian Gulf.
Low oil prices?in
the absence of any effort to sustain the
domestic oil industry?are
taking their toll. American
produc
tion is falling by roughly half a million barrels a day each year.
The rig count is off from its peak by more than 80 percent. By
1990 it appears that we will be importing more than 50 percent
of our oil, over nine million barrels a day. And the decline
in
as
we
U.S. production
will likely accelerate
hit the decline
curve
at
Prudhoe
Bay.
As
we
gradually,
and
more
or
less
increase our dependency
upon the Persian Gulf?
heedlessly,
and all that that implies in terms of reduced
leeway for Amer
ican foreign policy?we
may have additional reasons to regret
this series of actions that has further damaged our credibility
in the Middle East.
v
The Reagan
like
foreign policy record has no monuments
to China, the Egyptian-Israeli
the breakthrough
peace agree
ment
or
an
effective
arms
control
agreement.
Until
now
it has
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
446
been
as "no
characterized
hits,
no
no
runs,
errors"?although
the last phrase must now regrettably
be dropped. The great
of
Ronald
has
been much more psy
Reagan
accomplishment
He
and
has
chological
political.
presided over, and through the
ebullience of his personality
contributed
to, the restoration of
and public confidence
in our insti
American
self-confidence
Abroad
the presidency.
he has presided
tutions, particularly
over a sharp rise inAmerican
prestige (and therefore perceived
a
reinforced
sharp decline in Soviet prestige during
power),
by
its recent
time
of
troubles.
These
were
major
accomplishments,
Public confidence
in
but they are now seriously threatened.
our institutions has been shaken once again. There
are signs
one should not expect
of a return of public cynicism. Although
a return to the mood
of the 1970s, none of this can help
our prestige and
national strength and unity. Internationally
influence have received a serious blow, though perhaps more
from Reykjavik
than from the arms scandal. The great accom
even if it has
plishment of the Reagan years has been reduced,
not been brought
low.
The tide that began with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
and increased in force in the early 1980s has now ceased to
flow toward the United States and has begun to ebb. To what
extent will that benefit the Soviet Union? To what extent will
the tide flow strongly in the Soviet direction? No doubt, the
Soviet Union will benefit. But the Soviet image has been badly
marred by its blunders, by its relative technical backwardness
and
by
its economic
Union fortunately
take full benefit
prestige.
weaknesses.
As
a
consequence,
does not now appear
from the regrettable
the
Soviet
to be in a position
to
setback to America's