Measuring and Mapping Cultures:
25 Years of Comparative Value Surveys
International Studies in Sociology
and Social Anthropology
Editors
Tukumbi Lumumba-Kasongo
Rubin Patterson
Masamichi Sasaki
VOLUME 104
Measuring and Mapping Cultures:
25 Years of Comparative
Value Surveys
Edited by
Yilmaz Esmer and Thorleif Pettersson
LEIDEN • BOSTON
2007
Originally published as Volume 5 no. 2–3 (2006) of Brill’s journal ‘Comparative Sociology’
Coverphoto © World Values Survey (http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org)
This book is printed on acid-free paper.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
A C.I.P. record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.
International Colloquium on Gregory of Nyssa (10th : 2004 : Olomouc,
Czech Republic)
Gregory of Nyssa : Contra Eunomium II : an English version with
supporting studies : proceedings of the 10th International Colloquium on Gregory
of Nyssa (Olomouc, September 15–18, 2004) / edited by Lenka Karfíková . . .
[et al.] with the assistance of Vít Hu“ek and Ladislav Chvátal.
p. cm. — (Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae, ISSN 0920-623X ; v. 82)
English, French, and German.
Contra Eunomium II translated from the Greek by Stuart George Hall.
Includes bibliographical references and indexes.
ISBN-13: 978-90-04-15518-3
ISBN-10: 90-04-15518-X (hardback : alk. paper) 1. Gregory, of Nyssa, Saint,
ca. 335-ca. 394—Congresses. 2. Eunomius, Bp. of Cyzicus, ca. 335-ca. 394—
Congresses. 3. Eunomianism—Congresses. 4. Church history—Primitive and
early church, ca. 30-600—Congresses. I. Karfíková, Lenka. II. Hall, Stuart
George. III. Gregory, of Nyssa, Saint, ca. 335-ca. 394. Contra Eunomium.
ISSN
0074-8684
ISBN-10: 90 04 15820 0
ISBN-13: 978 90 04 15820 7
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Contents
Introduction ......................................................................................
Esmer, Yilmaz; Pettersson, Thorleif
1
Mapping Global Values ..................................................................
Inglehart, Ronald
11
A Theory of Cultural Value Orientations: Explication and
Applications ..................................................................................
Schwartz, Shalom H.
Globalization, “McDonaldization” and Values: Quo Vadis? ......
Esmer, Yilmaz
33
79
Individualization in Europe and America: Connecting
Religious and Moral Values ......................................................
Nevitte, Neil; Cochrane, Christopher
99
Religion in Contemporary Society: Eroded by Human
Well-being, Supported by Cultural Diversity ............................
Pettersson, Thorleif
127
Democratization in the Human Development Perspective ..........
Welzel, Christian
155
Index ................................................................................................
187
This volume, commemorating the 25th anniversary of values surveys, is
dedicated to Dan Brändström, Director of the Bank of Sweden Tercentenary Foundation, an enthusiastic believer in values research and a
staunch supporter of the academic study of values. The World Values
Survey project is deeply indebted to Dan for his relentless efforts to make
available comparative survey data on values to the wider social science
community and policy makers around the globe.
Dan Brändström
Introduction
Yilmaz Esmer and Thorleif Pettersson
The study of human values has a long and distinguished tradition. The
importance of the citizens’ mindset for various spheres of social life has
been recognized by thinkers going all the way to Ancient Greece. Indeed,
Plato is well known for establishing a one-to-one correspondence between
the types of constitutions and the orientations of the individuals’ minds.
According to him, states were shaped by the character of their citizens.
Aristotle, on the other hand, likened the rulers of a society to flute players. It was the people who actually made the flute. Thus, at the end of
the day, the determining factor – the independent variable, if you willwas the character, the nature, the mindset of the citizenry.
From Ibn-i Khaldun, to Montesquieu, Tocqueville and Weber, to
name but a few, many great classical thinkers emphasized the importance of cultural values, if we are to use the contemporary terminology,
for understanding and explaining social structure, institutions, and change.
Despite this highly eminent tradition of over two millennia, the empirical study of the collective mindset is an extremely recent phenomenon.
In fact, large scale comparative values studies involving a variety of cultures have a history of few decades only. Almond and Verba’s The Civic
Culture and Alex Inkeles’ Becoming Modern are roughly half a century old
and both included only a handful of societies. The Eurobarometer, a
remarkable project indeed, was envisaged and implemented by the
Commission of the European Communities in the early 1970s. Although
currently replicated in different parts of the globe such as Latin America,
Africa and East Asia, at the time of its inception it was very much a
“European project.” Nevertheless, we owe a great debt to the Eurobarometer both for taking the bold step in the right direction and for
the invaluable European time series data it has made available to all
those interested.
However, we believe it would not be inaccurate or unfair to say that
1981 is the actual year of birth of the empirical study of cultural values
2 • Yilmaz Esmer and Thorleif Pettersson
on a global scale. European and World Values surveys were born in
that year thanks to the laudable efforts of such visionaries as JacquesRene Rabier, Ruud de Moor, Jan Kerkhofs and, shortly thereafter,
Ronald Inglehart. Today, as we celebrate the 25th anniversary of values
surveys, we gratefully acknowledge our indebtedness to them and to their
collaborators.
The number of countries included in the first values survey was modest by today’s standards and the project comprised mainly nations of the
industrialized West. Even then, however, such diverse societies as the
United States, Mexico, South Africa, Japan, S. Korea, Argentina, Australia,
in addition to Western Europe, were surveyed. Today, looking back 25
years, one realizes that data collected in this first round is a treasure
beyond description for those interested in cultural change and in the
mapping of cultural values. One only wishes, egotistically, that more
societies could have been part of that first round. Fortunately, it took
less than a decade for this wish to come true. The second round of
Values Surveys carried out around 1990 comprised no less than 43 societies from every corner of the globe and all major cultural traditions.
In the following rounds, the total number of countries that participated
in one or more of the surveys exceeded 80.
At the time of this writing, World Values Survey researchers, who
now form a truly global network of social scientists, are busy in all continents collecting data for the fifth round of World Values Surveys.
Consequently, the academic community as well as policy makers will
shortly have access to data on a very broad range of values at five points
in time covering a time span of one quarter of a century, We, as the
editors of this special issue of Comparative Sociology, believe this is
indeed cause for celebration.
A much welcome development in the field has been the coming into
existence of a number of additional international surveys. The International
Social Survey Program which started in the 1980s now covers a wide
range of countries. The European Social Survey is the most recent project (it was first fielded in 2002) and covers around 25 European countries. It has a well-deserved reputation for its uncompromisingly rigorous
methodological standards. Both the ISSP and the ESS contain core questionnaires which are repeated in every round and, in addition, rotating
modules on important topics. Then, as already mentioned, there are
regional or continental barometers which can be regarded as the offsprings
of the Eurobarometer. In addition to the general ones, there are a number of international survey programs on more specific topics such as religion or electoral behavior. Nevertheless, the World Values Survey continues
to be the largest and most comprehensive survey project with the widest
geographical coverage.
Introduction • 3
The core assumption of values studies is that culture matters. Since
values, which are the basic orientations or principles that guide attitudes
and behavior, are central to any culture, it follows that values matter as
well. Values are intrinsically interesting and have been shown to be
closely related to formal structures. Just to give one example, values pertaining to tolerance, individual freedom and interpersonal trust are all
highly correlated with the existence or non-existence of democratic institutions. But values are also very useful for the mapping of cultures.
Cultural classifications and cultural maps of the world depend on values and are either drawn by using data from values surveys (e.g. Inglehart)
or – if they are a priori theoretical constructs – (e.g. Schwartz) need data
from these surveys to be validated. Either way, it is necessary to delineate basic value dimensions. Two of the best known and most frequently
cited schemes for classifying and mapping basic value dimensions in the
literature belong to Ronald Inglehart and Shalom Schwartz. Both authors
have contributed articles to this volume summarizing and updating their
respective theories.
In his contribution to this issue, Ronald Inglehart expounds on his
two-dimensional map of global values based on data collected from
World/European Values Surveys since 1981. Inglehart and his collaborators (see, for example, Inglehart and Baker, 2000; Inglehart and Welzel,
2005) have argued that although values and beliefs vary in a great many
different ways, they can be adequately summarized in two basic dimensions: the traditional/secular-rational dimension and the survival/selfexpression dimension. Inglehart’s global values map places all societies
on these two dimensions. Data show that societies occupy meaningful
and predictable positions on this map forming “cultural zones.” Two
factors seem to have a profound effect on a given society’s position on
the map. First, whether a society is predominantly agrarian, industrialized or postindustrialized makes a difference in its value system. Second,
the cultural tradition of the society, that is history, seems to have a deep
impact on the configuration of values. Inglehart observes that “gradual”
but nevertheless “major cultural changes are occurring, and that a society’s religious tradition, colonial history, and other major historical factors, give rise to distinctive cultural traditions that continue to influence
a society’s value system despite forces of modernization.” Although
Inglehart emphasizes that modernization is not a linear process, nevertheless he predicts that economic development and welfare will give rise
to self-expression values and that these in turn will support and enhance
democratic institutions.
Shalom Schwartz takes a different approach in that his cultural orientations are theoretically derived. As explained in his article in this issue
as well as his earlier writings (see, for example, Schwarz 1994a; 1994b,
4 • Yilmaz Esmer and Thorleif Pettersson
2003; 2004) Schwartz takes as his starting point the specification of “a
coherent, integrated system of relations among the orientations” and then
moves on to test this theoretical model. Very briefly, Schwartz’ theory
is based upon “seven cultural value orientations that form three cultural
value dimensions.” These orientations and dimensions are explained in
Schwartz’ article in this issue and therefore will not be repeated here.
However, another major difference between the Inglehart and Schwartz
models is worth noting: Inglehart’s dimensions are orthogonal while
Schwartz’ theory depicts a circular configuration of value orientations
and distinguishes between close and distant orientations.
It is interesting and reassuring that, despite their differing methodologies and entirely independent data sources, Inglehart’s two dimensions are closely related to two corresponding Schwartz dimensions.
However, Schwartz notes that his third dimension, mastery/harmony,
“taps a different aspect of culture” and that this is to be expected since
it is the only dimension that is “not strongly related to socio-economic
development.” Both Inglehart’s and Schwartz’ articles include cultural
maps of the world (Figures 1 and 4, respectively) reflecting, of course,
their approaches and their data. Those interested in the classification
and charting of cultures will find great comfort in Schwartz’ conclusion
that “The most striking finding when comparing the mapping of national
cultures in the research based on the Hofstede, Inglehart, and Schwartz
approaches is that they identify such similar cultures around the world.
[. . .] This is amazing, considering how different the approaches are.”
This is not only amazing but at the same time extremely significant. It
is a forceful refutation of the skeptical viewpoint that cultures cannot be
measured.
The article by Yilmaz Esmer is an attempt to trace value change during the longest time period that data from the values surveys will allow,
that is, from 1981 to 2001. Two decades is a rather short span for the
study of cultural change. As indicated by Schwartz in his article in this
volume, cultural change is slow and cultural value orientations are “relatively stable.” However, the last two decades of the 20th century are a
period of intense political and economic changes and turmoil. It is reasonable to assume that such far reaching changes should have had some
impact on values as well. Esmer finds some evidence of change in his
sample of some 20 countries but these are not “sweeping” by any stretch
of the imagination. More interestingly, Esmer fails to find any confirmation
of a value convergence. He concludes that cultural values are robust and
resilient. Contrary to what is often assumed, the strong winds of globalization have according to Esmer’s analyses not yet been able to sweep
away cultural diversity. At least for his limited sample, he observes that
Introduction • 5
values are as dispersed as ever and that “McDonaldization” has not
reached beyond the surface.
While Esmer tries to trace change and possible convergence in a broad
range of values between 1981 and 2001, Neil Nevitte and Christopher
Cochrane, in their article entitled “Keeping it together: individualization
and changing moral values” focus on the process of individualization
during the same period of time. It is commonly assumed that modernization and particularly economic advances accelerate the move towards
individualization (Ester, Halman and de Moor, 1993). Inglehart emphasizes
the role of the “postmodern shift” in freeing the individual both from
religious controls (mainly a consequence of the transition from the agrarian
to the industrial society) and from state authority (mainly a consequence
of the transition from industrialism to post-industrialism) (Inglehart, 1997).
Nevitte and Cochrane write that “at the core, the concept of individualization is about the declining salience of traditional norm-generating
institutions in the lives of people in post-industrial societies,” and investigate “one central aspect of individualization, namely, the connection
between religiosity and moral values.” Their article tests a number of
hypotheses regarding this relationship using factor analysis, correlation
and regression techniques. One of the most significant conclusions is the
reaffirmation of “American exceptionalism.” The publics of all countries
in their sample have become more permissive, in varying degrees, during the last two decades of the 20th century. However, although the association between religion and moral values has generally become weaker
in Europe, no such change is observed in North America. To the contrary, “Among North Americans, and particularly Americans, by contrast the connection between religious and moral outlooks actually becomes
significantly stronger over the same time period.” One explanation that
the authors offer for this difference is the much greater levels of associational involvement in North America compared to Europe.
There is no doubt that religion and religiosity are at the core of cultural values. So much so that, according to Huntington “Of all the objective elements which define civilizations, however, the most important
usually is religion” (1998:42). Indeed, “religion is a central defining characteristic of civilizations” (1998:47). One frequently asked question in
this respect is whether, as an overall trend, the world is secularizing (see,
for example, Norris and Inglehart, 2004) or it is in fact de-secularizing
(see, for example, Berger, 1999). Thorleif Pettersson tests the predictions
of the two major competing theories in this field: the widely known and
acclaimed secularization theory which predicts a negative correlation
between socio-economic development and religiosity; and the so-called
“supply side theories of religion” which view religious diversity as the
6 • Yilmaz Esmer and Thorleif Pettersson
key independent variable. Using the economic market metaphor, the latter predict a positive correlation with religious diversity and the level of
religiosity in a given community. This relationship is expected to hold
true regardless of the degree of modernization. Analyzing data from
about 50,000 respondents in 37 predominantly Christian countries,
Pettersson finds support for both modernization and supply side theories. In what must be the largest scale test of these theories, the author
concludes that both theories bear some truth and that it would be too
simplistic to view modernization as a universal factor behind religious
decline.
The last article in the volume by Christian Welzel elaborates the
author’s theory of democratization as an “institutional component of a
broader process of human development.” According to the UNDP, the
publisher of the annual World Human Development Reports, “The real
objective of development is to increase people’s development choices”
(UNDP, 1991:13). Subsequently, in the 2002 Human Development Report,
it was declared that “for politics and political institutions to promote
human development and safeguard the freedom and dignity of all people,
democracy must widen and deepen” (UNDP, 2002:1). Welzel argues that
“rising emancipative ideals” are the force behind the process of human
development – a process that empowers people with ever-widening choices.
The all-important conclusion that Welzel reaches is that democracy is
not a regime or an “achievement” that is reserved exclusively for some
cultures. This conclusion has far reaching implications and is a clear
refutation of the contention that some cultures are simply unable to
develop a democratic culture. It is important to note that Welzel is very
explicit in accepting the crucial importance of democratic values while
recognizing that all cultures have the potential to develop these values.
This volume, then, brings together six original articles around the
theme of mapping and measuring of cultural values and tracing change
in a number of important value dimensions. The first two papers by
Inglehart and by Schwartz draw up two different but nevertheless complementary approaches to the delineation of major value dimensions.
Both authors offer cultural maps of the world indicating the positions of
national cultures. The paper by Esmer that follows these two frameworks for the study of cultural values presents a general overview of
value change/stability between 1981 and 2001 and tests the convergence
of values hypothesis. The subsequent articles by Nevitte and Cochrane,
Pettersson and Welzel tackle three important processes: individualization,
secularization and democratization. They all make generous use of the
World/European Values Survey data.
The volume is yet another and very modest demonstration that the
Introduction • 7
data collected by the Values Surveys is a treasure that has been and
will continue to be widely used. Thanks to these data, many social science theories have for the first time been tested on world wide data.
Thus, in a sense, data from these surveys gave new life to Tocqueville,
Durkheim, Marx, Weber and many others. It is now possible, to a large
extent, to confirm or disconfirm the many claims of the modernization
theory (perhaps the most enduring and the most widely cited theory in
the social sciences) and its variants using data from values surveys. Until
recently, this was something that social scientists could only dream about.
Data collected from values surveys are invaluable for policy makers
as well. Indeed, such global organizations as the United Nations and the
World Bank, among others, have recognized the great importance of
values data for practitioners of economic and social development, educational reforms, democratization, marketing, etc. to name but a few
areas that have made extensive use of the results obtained by values
researchers.
We would like to introduce this special issue of Comparative Sociology
with these comments on the value surveys by Romano Prodi, the Prime
Minister of Italy and the former President of the European Commission:
“The growing globalization of the world makes it increasingly important
to understand [. . .] cultural diversity. People with widely varying beliefs
and values can live together and work together productively, but for this
to happen, it is crucial to understand and appreciate their distinctive
worldviews. [. . .] These surveys represent a major step in that direction.
They provide data from representative samples of the publics of societies containing 85 percent of the world’s population and covering the
full range of variation, from the richest countries on earth to some of
the poorest, and examining societies that were historically shaped by a
wide variety of religions, political and cultural traditions.”1
Acknowledgements
The WVS/EVS surveys have been made possible by a large network of
scholars and survey researchers around the globe. We owe each and every
one of them a large debt of gratitude. On the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the values surveys, it is our great pleasure to acknowledge their
contributions to the creation of the WVS/EVS dataset. They are:
1
Foreword by Romano Prodi to Inglehart, R. et al., eds., 2004. Human Beliefs and
Values. Mexico: Siglo XXI editors.
8 • Yilmaz Esmer and Thorleif Pettersson
Anthony M. Abela, Abdel-Hamid Abdel-Latif, Q. K. Ahmad, Rasa Alishauskene, Helmut Anheier, W. A. Arts, Jose Arocena, Soo Young Auh,
Taghi Azadarmaki, Ljiljana Bacevic, Olga Balakireva, Josip Balobn,
Miguel Basanez, Elena Bashkirova, Abdallah Bedaida, Jorge Benitez,
Jaak Billiet, Antoine Bilodeau, Alan Black, Sheila Bluhm, Rahma Bourquia,
Ammar Boukhedir, Fares al Braizat, Pierre Brechon, Pavel Campeanu,
Augustin Canzani, Marita Carballo, Henrique Carlos de O. de Castro,
Pi-Chao Chen, Pradeep Chhibber, Mark F. Chingono, Hei-yuan Chiu,
Margit Cleveland, Russell Dalton, Andrew P. Davidson, Juan DíezMedrano, Juan Diez-Nicolas, Herman de Dijn, Karel Dobbelaere, Peter
J. D. Drenth, Javier Elzo, Zsolt Enyedi, P. Estgen, T. Fahey, Nadjematul
Faizah, Georgy Fotev, James Georgas, C. Geppaart, Renzo Gubert,
Linda Luz Guerrero, Peter Gundelach, Jacques Hagenaars, Pham Minh
Hac, Loek Halman, Mustafa Hamarneh, Sang-Jin Han, Stephen Harding,
Mari Harris, Bernadette C. Hayes, Camilo Herrera, Virginia Hodgkinson,
Nadirsyah Hosen, Muhamad Nadratuzzaman Hosen, Kenji Iijima, Ronald
Inglehart, Ljubov Ishimova, Wolfgang Jagodzinski, Aleksandra JasinskaKania, Fridrik Jonsson, Stanislovas Juknevicius, Edward Kakonge, Mebs
Kanji, Jan Kerkhofs, Johann Kinghorn, Hans-Dieter Klingemann, Hennie
Kotze, Zuzana Kusa, Marta Lagos, Bernhard C. Lategan, M. Legrand,
Carlos Lemoine, Noah Lewin-Epstein, Ola Listhaug, Jin-yun Liu, Ruud
Luijkx, Brina Malnar, Mahar Mangahas, Mario Marinov, Carlos Matheus,
Robert B. Mattes, Gustavo Mendez, Rafael Mendizabal, Shen Mingming,
Felipe Miranda, Mansoor Moaddel, Temirlan Tilekovich Moldogaziev,
Jose Molina, Manjit Monga, Alejandro Moreno, Gaspar K. Munishi,
Neil Nevitte, Pham Thanh Nghi, Pippa Norris, Sakari Nurmela, Elone
Nwabuzor, Dragomir Pantic, Rafael Pardo, Juhani Pehkonen, Pradeep
Peiris, Paul Perry, Gevork Pogosian, Bi Puranen, Ladislav Rabusic, Andrei
Raichev, Anu Rentel, Angel Rivera-Ortiz, Isabel Vega Robles, Catalina
Romero, David Rotman, Andrus Saar, Rajab Sattarov,Tan Ern Ser,
Sandeep Shastri, Renata Siemienska, Maria Silvestre, John Sudarsky, Toru
Takahashi, Farooq Tanwir, Jean-Francois Tchernia, Kareem Tejumola,
Larissa Titarenko, Gabor Toka, Miklos Tomka, Alfredo Torres, Niko Tos,
Jorge Vala, Andrei Vardomatskii, Malina Voicu, Alan Webster, Friedrich
Welsch, Christian Welzel, Manuel Villaverde Cabral, Bogdan Voicu,
Seiko Yamazaki, Birol Yeshilada, Ephraim Yuchtman-Yaar, Josefina Zaiter,
Brigita Zepa, Ignacio Zuasnabar, P. Zulehner.
The value surveys are indebted to these scholars and many organizations
that have made generous contributions to our project. Among our many
friends, however, Professor Dan Brändström, Director of the Bank of
Sweden Tercentenary Foundation, deserves a special mention for his invaluable support, assistance, and advice. This volume is dedicated to him.
Introduction • 9
References
Berger, Peter L., ed.
1999
The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics.
Grand Rapids, Mi. and Cambridge: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co.
Ester, Peter, Loek Halman and Ruud de Moor, eds.
1993
The Individualizing Society: Value Value Change in Europe and North America. Tilburg:
Tilburg University Press.
Huntington, Samuel P.
1998
The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order. London:
Touchstone Books.
Inglehart, Ronald
1997
Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic and Political Change in 43
Societies. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Inglehart, Ronald and Wayne Baker
2000
“Modernization, Cultural Change and the Persistence of Traditional Values.”
American Sociological Review (February): 19-51.
Inglehart, Ronald and Christian Welzel
2005
Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy. New York and Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Norris, Pippa and Ronald Inglehart
2004
Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Schwartz, Shalom H.
1994a
“Are There Universal Aspects in the Content and Structure of Values?”
Journal of Social Issues 50: 19-45.
1994b
“Beyond Individualism and Collectivism: New Cultural Dimensions of Values,”
pp. 85-119 in Individualism and Collectivism: Theory, Method and Applications,
edited by U. Kim et al. Newbury Park, CA.: Sage.
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“A Proposal for Measuring Value Orientations Across Nations,” ch. 7 in
Questionnaire Development Report of the European Social Survey.
2004
“Mapping and Interpreting Cultural Differences Around the World,” in
Comparing Cultures: Dimensions of Culture in a Comparative Perspective, edited by
H. Vinken, J. Soeters and P. Ester. Leiden: Brill.
UNDP
1991
Human Development Report 1991. New York and Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
2002
Human Development Report 2002. New York and Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Mapping Global Values
Ronald Inglehart
Abstract
Modernization goes through two main phases, each of which
brings distinctive changes in people’s worldviews. The Industrial Revolution was linked with a shift from traditional to
secular-rational values, bringing bureaucratization, centralization, standardization and the secularization of authority. In the
post-industrial phase of modernization, a shift from survival
values to self-expression values, brings increasing emancipation
from both religious and secular-rational authority. Rising mass
emphasis on self-expression values makes democracy increasingly likely to emerge.
Although the desire for freedom is a universal human aspiration, it does not take top priority when people grow up with
the feeling that survival is uncertain. But when survival seems
secure, increasing emphasis on self-expression values makes the
emergence of democracy increasingly likely where it does not
yet exist, and makes democracy increasingly effective where it
already exists.
Introduction
The world now contains nearly 200 independent countries, and the beliefs
and values of their publics differ greatly, in thousands of different ways.
Yet, among the many dimensions of cross-cultural variation, two are
particularly important. Each dimension reflects one of the two waves of
economic development that have transformed the world economically,
socially and politically in modern times: the transition from agrarian
society to industrial society that emerged two hundred years ago and is
now transforming China, India, Indonesia and many other countries;
and the transition from industrial society to the post-industrial or knowledge society that began to emerge fifty years ago and is now reshaping
12 • Ronald Inglehart
the socioeconomic systems of the U.S., Canada, Western Europe, Japan,
Australia and other economically advanced societies.
These processes of economic and technological change have given rise
to two key dimensions of cross-cultural variation: (1) a Traditional/SecularRational dimension that reflects the contrast between the relatively religious and traditional values that generally prevail in agrarian societies,
and the relatively secular, bureaucratic and rational values that generally
prevail in urban, industrialized societies; and (2) a Survival/Self-expression
dimension that also taps a wide range of beliefs and values, reflecting
an inter-generational shift from an emphasis on economic and physical
security above all, towards increasing emphasis on self-expression, subjective well-being, and quality of life concerns.
These dimensions are robust aspects of cross-cultural variation, and they
make it possible to map the position of any society on a two-dimensional
map that reflects their relative positions at any given time. But gradual
shifts are occurring along these dimensions, transforming many aspects
of society. One of the most important of these changes is the fact that
the shift toward increasing emphasis on Self-expression values makes
democratic political institutions increasingly likely to emerge and flourish.
Our analysis is based on a body of survey evidence that represents
85 percent of the world’s population. Data from four waves of the Values
Surveys, carried out from 1981 to 2001, indicate that major cultural
changes are occurring, and that a society’s religious tradition, colonial
history, and other major historical factors, give rise to distinctive cultural traditions that continue to influence a society’s value system despite
the forces of modernization.
Modernization and Cultural Change
In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, modernization theorists
from Karl Marx to Max Weber analyzed the emerging industrial society
and tried to predict its future. Their analyses of cultural change emphasized the rise of rationality and the decline of religion, and they assumed
that these developments would continue in linear fashion, with the future
being a continuation of the same trends that were occurring during the
19th century. From today’s perspective, it is clear that modernization is
more complex than these early views anticipated. The numbers of industrial workers ceased growing decades ago in economically advanced societies, and virtually no one any longer expects a proletarian revolution.
Moreover, it is increasingly evident that religion has not vanished as predicted. Furthermore, it is apparent that modernization can not be equated
with Westernization, as early analyses assumed. Non-Western societies
in East Asia have surpassed their Western role models in key aspects of
Mapping Global Values • 13
modernization such as rates of economic growth and high life expectancy,
and few observers today attribute moral superiority to the West.
Although, today, few people accept the original Marxist version of
modernization theory, one of its core concepts still seems valid: the insight
that, once industrialization begins, it produces pervasive social and cultural consequences, from rising educational levels to changing gender
roles.
This article maps cross-cultural variation using data from the World
Values Surveys and European Values Surveys, which have measured the
beliefs and values of most of the world’s people. These surveys offer an
unprecedentedly rich source of insight into the relationships between economic development and social and political change. They show that,
even during the relatively brief time since the first wave of the Values
Surveys was carried out in 1981, substantial changes have occurred in
the values and beliefs of the publics of these societies. These changes
are closely linked with the economic changes experienced by a given
society. As we will demonstrate, economic development is associated with
predictable changes away from absolute norms and values, toward a syndrome of increasingly rational, tolerant, trusting, and post-industrial values.
But we find evidence of both massive cultural change and the persistence
of traditional values.
Throughout most of history, survival has been uncertain for most people. But the remarkable economic growth of the era following World
War II, together with the rise of the welfare state, brought fundamentally new conditions in advanced industrial societies. The postwar birth
cohorts of these countries grew up under conditions of prosperity that
were unprecedented in human history, and the welfare state reinforced
the feeling that survival was secure, producing an intergenerational value
change that is gradually transforming the politics and cultural norms of
advanced industrial societies. The best documented aspect of this change
is the shift from Materialist to Postmaterialist priorities. A massive body of
evidence gathered from 1970 to the present demonstrates that an intergenerational shift from Materialist to Postmaterialist priorities is transforming the behavior and goals of the people of advanced industrial
societies (Inglehart, 1997; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005). But recent research
demonstrates that this trend is only one aspect of an even broader cultural shift from Survival values to Self-expression values.
Economic development and cultural change move in two major phases,
each of which gives rise to a major dimension of cross-national value
differences. Factor analysis of national-level data from the 43 societies
studied in the 1990 World Values Survey found that two main dimensions
accounted for well over half of the cross-national variance in more than
a score of variables tapping basic values across a wide range of domains,
14 • Ronald Inglehart
ranging from politics to economic life and sexual behavior (Inglehart,
1997). These dimensions of cross-cultural variation are robust; when the
1990-1991 factor analysis was replicated with the data from the 19951998 surveys, the same two dimensions of cross-cultural variation emerged –
even though the new analysis was based on 23 additional countries
not included in the earlier study (Inglehart and Baker, 2000). The same
two dimensions also emerged in analysis of data from the 2000-2001
surveys – although numerous additional countries were again added to
the pool, including eight predominantly Islamic societies – a cultural
region that had been relatively neglected in previous surveys (Inglehart
and Welzel, 2005). Each dimension taps a major axis of cross-cultural
variation involving many different values. Table 1 shows the results of
this most recent set of analyses, based on data from more than 70 societies, aggregated to the national level. Although each of the two main
dimensions is linked closely with scores of values, for technical reasons,
our indices were constructed by using only five key indicators for each
of the two dimensions.
Table 1
Two Dimensions of Cross-Cultural Variation
First Factor (46%)
TRADITIONAL VALUES emphasize the following:
God is very important in respondent’s life
It is more important for a child to learn obedience and religious faith than
independence and determination [Autonomy index]
Abortion is never justifiable
Respondent has strong sense of national prideRespondent favors more respect for authority
Factor
Loadings
.91
.88
.82
.81
.73
(SECULAR-RATIONAL VALUES emphasize the opposite)
Second Factor (25%)
SURVIVAL VALUES emphasize the following:
R. gives priority to economic and physical security over self expression and
quality of life [4-item Materialist/Postmaterialist Values Index]
Respondent describes self as not very happy
Homosexuality is never justifiable
R. has not and would not sign a petition
You have to be very careful about trusting people
.87
.81
.77
.74
.46
(SELF-EXPRESSION VALUES emphasize the opposite)
The original polarities vary; the above statements show how each item relates to the given
factor.
Source: World Values Survey data from more than 200 surveys carried out in four waves in
78 societies.
(Factors = 2, varimax rotation, listwise deletion)
Mapping Global Values • 15
Human values are structured in a surprisingly coherent way: the two
dimensions explain fully 71 percent of the cross-cultural variation among
these ten items. More impressive still is the fact that each of these two
dimensions taps a broad range of other attitudes, extending over a number of seemingly diverse domains. Table 2 shows the correlations of 24
additional variables that are relatively strongly linked with the first dimension, showing correlations above the .40 level.
Table 2
Correlates of Traditional vs. Secular-rational Values
TRADITIONAL values emphasize the following:
Correlation
with Traditional/
Secular Rational Values
Religion is very important in respondent’s life
Respondent believes in Heaven
One of respondent’s main goals in life has been to make his/her
parents proud
Respondent believes in Hell
Respondent attends church regularly
Respondent has a great deal of confidence in the country’s churches
Respondent gets comfort and strength from religion
Respondent describes self as “a religious person”
Euthanasia is never justifiable
Work is very important in respondent’s life
There should be stricter limits on selling foreign goods here
Suicide is never justifiable
Parents’ duty is to do their best for their children even at the expense
of their own well-being
Respondent seldom or never discusses politics
Respondent places self on Right side of a Left-Right scale
Divorce is never justifiable
There are absolutely clear guidelines about good and evil
Expressing one’s own preferences clearly is more important than
understanding others’ preferences
My country’s environmental problems can be solved without any
international agreements to handle them
If a woman earns more money than her husband, it’s almost certain to
cause problems
One must always love and respect one’s parents regardless of their behavior
Family is very important in respondent’s life
Relatively favorable to having the army rule the country
R. favors having a relatively large number of children
.89
.88
.81
.76
.75
.72
.71
.66
.65
.63
.61
.60
.57
.57
.57
.56
.56
.56
.53
.49
.45
.43
.41
.40
(SECULAR-RATIONAL values emphasize the opposite)
The number in the right hand column shows how strongly each variable is correlated with
the Traditional/Secular-rational Values Index. The original polarities vary; the above statements show how each item relates to the Traditional/Secular-rational values index.
Source: Nation-level data from 65 societies surveyed in the 1990 and 1996 World Values
Surveys.
16 • Ronald Inglehart
The Traditional/Secular-Rational dimension reflects the contrast between
the relatively religious and traditional values that generally prevail in
agrarian societies, and the relatively secular, bureaucratic and rational
values that generally prevail in urban, industrialized societies. Traditional
societies emphasize the importance of religion, deference to authority,
parent-child ties and two-parent traditional families, and absolute moral
standards; they reject divorce, abortion, euthanasia, and suicide, and tend
to be patriotic and nationalistic. In contrast, societies with secular-rational
values display the opposite preferences on all of these topics.
Table 3 shows 31 additional variables that are closely linked with the
Survival/Self-expression’ dimension, which also taps a wide range of beliefs
and values. A central component involves the polarization between
Materialist and Postmaterialist values that reflects an intergenerational
shift from an emphasis on economic and physical security above all,
towards increasing emphasis on self-expression, subjective well-being, and
quality of life concerns. Societies that rank high on Survival values tend
to emphasize materialist orientations and traditional gender roles; they
are relatively intolerant of foreigners, gays and lesbians and other outgroups, show relatively low levels of subjective well-being, rank relatively
low on interpersonal trust, and emphasize hard work, rather than imagination or tolerance, as important things to teach a child. Societies that
emphasize Self-Expression values, display the opposite preferences on all
these topics.
These two dimensions are remarkably robust. If we compare the results
from the two most recent waves of the Values Surveys, we find a .92
correlation between the positions of given countries on the Traditional/
Secular-rational values dimension from one wave of the surveys to the
next. With the Survival/Self-expression dimension, the positions of given
countries are even more stable: their positions in the earlier wave show
a .95 correlation with their positions five years later. Although major
changes are occurring along these dimensions, the relative positions of
given countries are highly stable. If one compares the map based on
the 1990 surveys with the map based on the 1995 surveys or the 2000
surveys, they initially seem to be the same map, showing given clusters
of countries (such as Protestant Europe, the English-speaking countries,
the Latin American societies, the Confucian societies) in the same relative position – although each successive wave of surveys was not only
carried out roughly five years later than the previous one, but included
many countries not covered in previous surveys.
Figure 1 shows a two-dimensional cultural map on which the value
systems of 80 societies are depicted, using the most recent data available for each country (mostly from the 2000 wave but in some cases
Mapping Global Values • 17
Table 3
Correlates of Survival vs. Self-expression Values
SURVIVAL values emphasize the following:
Correlation with Survival/
Self-expression Values
Men make better political leaders than women
Respondent is dissatisfied with financial situation of his/her household
A woman has to have children in order to be fulfilled
R. rejects foreigners, homosexuals and people with AIDS as neighbors
R. favors more emphasis on the development of technology
R. has not recycled things to protect the environment
R. has not attended a meeting or signed a petition to protect the
environment
When seeking a job, a good income and safe job are more important
than a feeling of accomplishment and working with people you like
R. is relatively favorable to state ownership of business and industry
A child needs a home with both a father and mother to grow up happily
R. does not describe own health as very good
One must always love and respect one’s parents regardless of their behavior
When jobs are scarce, men have more right to a job than women
Prostitution is never justifiable
Government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is
provided for
R. does not have much free choice or control over his/her life
A university education is more important for a boy than for a girl
R. does not favor less emphasis on money and material possessions
R. rejects people with criminal records as neighbors
R. rejects heavy drinkers as neighbors
Hard work is one of the most important things to teach a child
Imagination is not one of the most important things to teach a child
Tolerance and respect for others are not the most important things to
teach a child
Scientific discoveries will help, rather than harm, humanity
Leisure is not very important in life
Friends are not very important in life
Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament
and elections would be a good form of government
R. has not and would not take part in a boycott
Government ownership of business and industry should be increased
Democracy is not necessarily the best form of government
R. opposes sending economic aid to poorer countries
.86
.83
.83
.81
.78
.78
.75
.74
.74
.73
.73
.71
.69
.69
.68
.67
.67
.66
.66
.65
.64
.62
.62
.60
.60
.58
.56
.56
.55
.45
.42
(SELF-EXPRESSION values emphasize the opposite)
The number in the right hand column shows how strongly each variable is correlated with
the Survival/Self-Expression Values Index. The original polarities vary; the above statements
show how each item relates to the Traditional/Secular-rational values index.
Source: nation-level data from 65 societies surveyed in the 1990 and 1996 World Values
Surveys.
18 • Ronald Inglehart
Secular-Rational values
Figure 1
Cultural Map of the World in 2000
2.0
nfu
1.5
Co
Bulgaria
1.0
Russia
S. Korea
Montenegro
Latvia
Albania Serbia
0.5
Moldova
Slovenia
Taiwan
nis
mmu
E x - C o Bosnia
Georgia
Azerbaijan
Armenia
t
Switzerland
Luxem
bourg
Iceland
Belgium
Israel
Austria
Great
Italy
Britain
Croatia
New Zealand
Spain
Catholic Europe
India
South
Asia
Denmark
Netherlands
France
Uruguay
Poland
Romania
Sweden
Norway
West
Germany
Finland
Greece
Slovakia
Hungary
Macedonia
0
English
speaking
Canada
Australia
N. Ireland
U.S.A.
Vietnam
Turkey
Portugal
Ireland
Indonesia
Chile Argentina
Philippines
Bangladesh
Dominican
Iran
Peru
Republic
Pakistan South
Brazil Latin America
Africa
Jordan
Mexico
Uganda Nigeria
Zimbabwe
Algeria Egypt
Venezuela
Tanzania
Morocco
Colombia
Puerto
Afr ic a
Rico
El Salvador
-1.0
Traditional values
Czech
Lith
uania
Protestant
Europe
East
Germany
China
Estonia
Ukraine Belarus
-0.5
Japan
n
cia
-1.5
-2.0
-2
-1.5
Survival values
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
Self Expression values
from the 1995 wave). The vertical dimension represents the Traditional/
Secular-rational dimension, and the horizontal dimension reflects the
Survival/Self-expression values dimension. Both dimensions are strongly
linked with economic development, with the value systems of rich countries differing systematically from those of poor countries. Thus, Germany,
France, Britain, Italy, Japan, Sweden, the U.S. and all other societies
with a 1995 annual per capita GNP over $15,000 rank relatively high
on both dimensions: without exception, they fall in a broad zone near
the upper right-hand corner.
Conversely, every one of the societies with per capita GNPs below
$2,000 falls into a cluster at the lower left of the map; India, Bangladesh,
Pakistan, Nigeria, Zimbabwe, Morocco, Brazil and Peru all fall into this
economic zone, which cuts across the African, South Asian, ex-Communist,
and Orthodox cultural zones. The remaining societies fall into interme-
Mapping Global Values • 19
diate cultural-economic zones. Economic development seems to pull societies in a common direction regardless of their cultural heritage.
Economic Development Interacts with a Society’s
Cultural Heritage
Nevertheless, two centuries after the industrial revolution began, distinctive cultural zones persist. Different societies follow different trajectories,
even when they are subjected to the same forces of economic development,
because situation-specific factors, such as a society’s cultural heritage, also
shape how a particular society develops. Huntington (1996) has emphasized the role of religion in shaping the world’s eight major civilizations:
Western Christianity, Orthodox, Islam, Confucian, Japanese, Hindu,
African, and Latin American. Despite the forces of modernization, these
zones were shaped by religious traditions that are still powerful today.
Economic development is strongly associated with both dimensions of
cultural change. But a society’s cultural heritage also plays a role. Thus,
all eleven Latin American societies fall into a coherent cluster, showing
relatively similar values: they rank high on traditional religious values,
but are characterized by stronger emphasis on Self-expression values than
their economic levels would predict. Economic factors are important, but
they are only part of the story; such factors as their common Iberian
colonial heritage seem to have left an impact that persists centuries later.
Similarly, despite their wide geographic dispersion, the English-speaking
countries constitute a compact cultural zone. In the same way, the historically Roman Catholic societies of Western Europe (e.g., Italy, Portugal,
Spain, France, Belgium and Austria) display relatively traditional values
when compared with Confucian or ex-Communist societies with the same
proportion of industrial workers. And, virtually all of the historically
Protestant societies (e.g., West Germany, Denmark, Norway, Sweden,
Finland and Iceland) rank higher on both the traditional-secular rational dimension and the survival/self-expression dimension than do the
historically Roman Catholic societies. All four of the Confucian-influenced
societies (China, Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan) have relatively secular values, constituting a Confucian cultural zone, despite substantial
differences in wealth. As Huntington claimed, the Orthodox societies
constitute another distinct cultural zone.
A society’s religious and colonial heritage seem to have had an enduring impact on the contemporary value systems of the 80 societies. But
a society’s culture reflects its entire historical heritage. A central historical
event of the twentieth century was the rise and fall of a Communist
empire that once ruled one-third of the world’s population. Communism
20 • Ronald Inglehart
left a clear imprint on the value systems of those who lived under it.
East Germany remains culturally close to West Germany despite four
decades of Communist rule, but its value system has been drawn toward
the Communist zone. And, although China is a member of the Confucian
zone, it also falls within a broad Communist-influenced zone. Similarly,
Azerbaijan, though part of an Islamic cluster, also falls within the Communist superzone that dominated it for decades. Changes in GNP and
occupational structure have important influences on prevailing world
views, but traditional cultural influences persist.
The ex-communist societies of Central and Eastern Europe all fall into
the upper left-hand quadrant of our cultural map, ranking high on the
Traditional/secular-rational dimension (toward the secular pole), but low
on the Survival/self expression dimension (falling near the survivaloriented pole). A broken line encircles all of the societies that have experienced Communist rule, and, although they overlap with several different
cultural traditions, they form a reasonably coherent group. Although by
no means the poorest countries in the world, many Central and Eastern
Europe societies have recently experienced the collapse of Communism,
shattering their economic, political and social systems and bringing a
pervasive sense of insecurity. Thus, Russia, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Romania
and Moldova rank lowest of any countries on earth on the Survival/Selfexpression dimension, exhibiting lower levels of subjective well-being than
much poorer countries such as India, Bangladesh, Zimbabwe, Uganda
and Pakistan. People who have experienced stable poverty throughout
their lives tend to emphasize survival values, but those who have experienced the collapse of their social system (and may, as in Russia, currently have living standards and life expectancies far below where they
were 15 years ago) experience a sense of unpredictability and insecurity
that leads them to emphasize Survival values even more heavily than
those who are accustomed to an even lower standard of living.
Not surprisingly, Communist rule seems conducive to the emergence
of a relatively secular-rational culture: the ex-Communist countries in
general, and those that were members of the Soviet Union in particular
(and thus experienced communist rule for seven decades, rather then
merely four decades), rank higher on secular-rational values than noncommunist countries. And, to an equally striking extent, ex-communist
countries in general, and former Soviet countries in particular, tend to
emphasize survival values far more heavily than societies that have not
experienced communist rule.
Thus, as Inglehart and Baker (2000) demonstrate with multiple regression analysis, even when we control for level of economic development
and other factors, a history of Communist rule continues to account for
a significant share of the cross-cultural variance in basic values (with
Mapping Global Values • 21
seven decades of Communist rule having more impact than four decades).
But, by comparison with societies historically shaped by a Roman Catholic
or Protestant cultural tradition, an Orthodox tradition seems to reduce
emphasis on Self-expression values.
A society’s position on the Survival/Self-expression values dimension
has important political implications; as we will see, it is strongly linked
with its level of democracy.
Individualism, Autonomy and Self-expression Values
As Tables 1, 2 and 3 demonstrated, the two main dimensions of crosscultural variation tap a wide range of beliefs and attitudes. But their
ramifications go farther still; the Survival/Self-expression values dimension taps a concept of major interest to psychologists, although they refer
to it as individualism.
The broad distinction between individualism and collectivism is a central theme in psychological research on cross-cultural differences. Hofstede
(1980) defined individualism as a focus on rights above duties, a concern
for oneself and immediate family, an emphasis on personal autonomy
and self-fulfillment, and a basing of identity on one’s personal accomplishments. Hofstede developed a survey instrument that measured individualism/collectivism among IBM employees in more than 40 societies.
More recently, individualism has been measured cross-nationally by
Triandis (1989, 2001, and 2003). Schwartz (1992, 1994, and 2003) measured the related concept of autonomy/embeddedness among students
and teachers in scores of countries. As we will demonstrate, individualismcollectivism as measured by Hofstede and Triandis, and autonomy/
embeddness as measured by Schwartz, seem to tap the same dimension
of cross-cultural variation as Survival/Self-expression values; they all
reflect the extent to which a given society emphasizes autonomous human
choice.
Individualism/collectivism, autonomy/embeddedness and survival/
self-expression values are all linked with the process of human development,
which moves toward diminishing constraints on human choice (Inglehart
and Welzel, 2005). Self-expression values are defined in very similar terms
to Hofstede’s emphasis on personal autonomy and self-fulfillment as core
elements of individualism. Similarly, Schwartz’s emphasis on intellectual
autonomy and affective autonomy captures core elements of self-expression
values. All of these variables reflect a common theme: an emphasis on free
choice.
The core principle of collectivism is that groups bind and mutually
obligate individuals. In collectivist societies, social units have a common
fate and common goals; the personal is simply a component of the social,
22 • Ronald Inglehart
making the in-group crucial. Collectivism implies that group membership is a central aspect of identity, and sacrificing individual goals for
the common good is strongly emphasized. Collectivism further implies
that fulfillment comes from carrying out externally defined obligations,
making people focus on meeting others’ expectations. Accordingly, emotional self-restraint is valued to ensure harmony, even at the cost of one’s
own happiness. In collectivist societies, social context is prominent in
people’s perceptions and causal reasoning, and meaning is contextualized. Finally, collectivism implies that important group memberships are
seen as fixed facts of life, toward which people have no choice; they
must accommodate. Boundaries between in-groups and outgroups are
stable, relatively impermeable, and important; exchanges are based on
mutual obligations and patriarchal ties.
Today, empirical measures of individualism, autonomy and self-expression values are available from many societies, and it turns out that they
all tap a common dimension of cross-cultural variation, reflecting an
emphasis on autonomous human choice. The mean national scores on
these three variables show are closely correlated, with an average strength
of r = .66. As Table 4 demonstrates, factor analysis of the mean national
scores from many countries reveals that individualism, autonomy and
self-expression values all tap a single underlying dimension, which accounts
for fully 78 percent of the cross- national variance.
High levels of individualism go with high levels of autonomy and high
levels of self-expression values. Hofstede’s, Schwartz’s, Triandis’ and
Inglehart’s measures all tap cross-cultural variation in a common aspect
of human psychology: the drive toward broader human choice. As the
Values Surveys demonstrate, they also measure something that extends
far beyond whether given cultures have an individualistic or collective
outlook. Societies that rank high on self-expression tend to emphasize
individual autonomy and the quality of life, rather than economic and
Table 4
Self-expression Values and Individualism and Autonomy Scales tap a
common dimension
The Individualism/Autonomy/Self-expression Dimension:
emphasis on autonomous choice
(Principal Component Analysis)
Inglehart, Survival vs. Self-expression values
Hofstede, Individualism vs. Collectivism rankings
Schwartz, Autonomy vs. Embeddedness, (mean of student/teacher samples)
Variance
explained
78%
.91
.87
.87
Mapping Global Values • 23
physical security. Their publics have relatively low levels of confidence
in technology and scientific discoveries as the solution to human problems, and they are relatively likely to act to protect the environment.
These societies also rank relatively high on gender equality, tolerance of
gays, lesbians, foreigners and other outgroups; they show relatively high
levels of subjective well-being, and interpersonal trust, and they emphasize imagination and tolerance, as important things to teach a child.
But individualism, autonomy and self-expression are not static characteristics of societies. They change with the course of socioeconomic
development. As we have seen, socioeconomic development brings rising levels of existential security (especially in its post-industrial phase),
which leads to an increasing emphasis on individualism, autonomy and
self-expression. Birch and Cobb (1981) view this process as reflecting an
evolutionary trend towards the “liberation of life.” Inglehart and Welzel
(2005) describe it as a process of human development in which the most
distinctively human ability – the ability to make autonomous choices,
instead of following biologically and socially predetermined behavior –
becomes an increasingly central feature of modern societies. As we will
see, this syndrome of individualism, autonomy, and self-expression is conducive to the emergence and survival of democratic institutions.
The common dimension underlying individualism, autonomy and selfexpression is remarkably robust. It emerges even when one uses different
measurement approaches, different types of samples, and different time
periods. Hofstede found it in the late 1960s and early 1970s, when analyzing the values of a cross-national sample of IBM employees. Schwartz
measured it in surveys of students and teachers carried out from 1988
to 2002; and Inglehart first found it in an analysis of representative
national samples of the publics of 43 societies surveyed in 1989-91, with
the same dimension emerging in successive cross-national surveys in 1995
and in 2000. This dimension seems to be an enduring feature of crosscultural variation, to such an extent that one might almost conclude that
it is difficult to avoid finding it if one measures the basic values of a
broad range of societies.
Individualism, Autonomy and Self-expression as
Evolving Phenomena
Most cultural-psychological theories have treated the individualismcollectivism polarity as a static attribute of given cultures, overlooking
the possibility that individualist and collectivist orientations reflect a society’s socioeconomic conditions at a given time. Our theory holds that
the extent to which Self-expression values (or individualism) prevail over
24 • Ronald Inglehart
Survival values (or collectivism) reflects a society’s level of development;
as external constraints on human choice recede, people (and societies)
place increasing emphasis on self-expression values or individualism. This
pattern is not culture-specific. It is universal.
The most fundamental external constraint on human choice is the
extent to which physical survival is secure or insecure. Throughout most
of history, survival has been precarious for most people. Most children
did not survive to adulthood, and malnutrition and associated diseases
were the leading cause of death. This is remote from the experience of
Western publics today, but existential insecurity is still the dominant reality in most of the world. Under such conditions, Survival values take
top priority. Survival is such a fundamental goal that, if it seems uncertain, one’s entire life strategy is shaped by that fact. Low levels of socioeconomic development not only impose material constraints on people’s
choices; they also are linked with low levels of education and information. This intellectual poverty imposes cognitive constraints on people’s
choices. Finally, in the absence of the welfare state, strong group obligations are the only form of social insurance, imposing social constraints
on people’s choices.
In recent history, a growing number of societies have attained unprecedented levels of economic development. Diminishing material, cognitive
and social constraints on human choice are bringing a shift from emphasis on Survival values to emphasis on Self-expression values, and from
a collective focus to an individual one.
People’s sense of human autonomy becomes stronger as objective existential constraints on human choice recede. As will be seen, this has
important societal consequences. Mass emphasis on human choice tends
to favor the political system that provides the widest room for choice:
democracy.
Economic Development and Cultural Change
Because our two main dimensions of cross-cultural variation – Traditional/
Secular-rational values and Survival/Self-expression values – are linked
with economic development, we find pervasive differences between the
worldviews of people in rich and poor societies. Moreover, time series
evidence shows that, with economic development, societies tend to move
from the values prevailing in low-income societies toward greater emphasis on secular-rational and self-expression values (Inglehart and Baker,
2000; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005).
These changes largely reflect a process of intergenerational value
change. Throughout advanced industrial societies, the young emphasize
Mapping Global Values • 25
self-expression values and secular-rational values more strongly than the
old. Cohort analysis indicates that the distinctive values of younger cohorts
are stable characteristics that persist as they age. Consequently, as younger
birth cohorts replace older ones in the adult population, the society’s
prevailing values change in a roughly predictable direction.
The unprecedented level of economic development during the past
several decades, coupled with the emergence of the welfare state in
advanced societies, means that an increasing share of the population has
grown up taking survival for granted. Thus, priorities have shifted from
an overwhelming emphasis on economic and physical security toward
an increasing emphasis on subjective well-being, self-expression and quality of life. Inglehart and Welzel (2005) demonstrate that orientations have
shifted from Traditional toward Secular-rational values, and from Survival
values toward Self-expression values in almost all advanced industrial
societies that have experienced economic growth.
The Societal Impact of Changing Values
Evidence from the Values Surveys demonstrates that people’s orientations concerning religion, politics, gender roles, work motivations, and
sexual norms are evolving, – along with their attitudes toward childrearing, their tolerance of foreigners, gays and lesbians, and their attitudes toward science and technology (Inglehart and Norris, 2003; Inglehart
and Welzel, 2005). Figure 2 provides one example, showing the percentage of respondents saying that homosexuality is “Never” justifiable.
The respondents were shown a ten-point scale, on which point 1 means
that homosexuality is never justifiable, and point 10 means that it is
always justifiable, with the eight intermediate points indicating intermediate positions. As this figure demonstrates, in 1981 about half of those
surveyed in five Western countries took the extreme negative position,
placing themselves at point 1 on the scale (the publics of developing
countries being even less tolerant of homosexuality).
However, attitudes changed substantially in subsequent years. By the
2000 survey, only about 25 percent of the West Europeans, and 32 percent of the Americans took this position. Although attitudes toward homosexuality show a .86 stability correlation across the two most recent waves
of the WVS, sizeable changes are occurring; most countries were changing, but their relative positions remained surprisingly stable, reflecting
an underlying component of continuity within given generations. Thus,
change is occurring largely through intergenerational population replacement. The cumulative effect of changing attitudes in this field has led to
recent societal-level changes, such as the legalization of same-sex marriages
26 • Ronald Inglehart
Figure 2
Changes in the percentage saying that homosexuality is never justifiable,
in Britain, France, Germany Italy, and the U.S., from 1981 to 2000
70
60
50
1981
1990
1995
2000
40
30
20
10
0
W. Europe
U.S.
in some countries and certain cities in the U.S. This, in turn, mobilized
a strong reaction by people with traditional values and referenda seeking to ban same-sex marriage, giving rise to widespread belief that the
U.S. public in general is becoming increasingly hostile to gays and lesbians; the opposite is true.
The basic values of individuals are changing, and these changes have
a major impact on a wide range of important societal-level phenomena.
They are reshaping the extent to which given societies have objective
gender equality in political, social and economic life, as well as human
fertility rates, the role of religion, legislation concerning the rights of gays
and lesbians, and environmental protection laws. Changing individuallevel values also seem to have a major influence on the extent to which
a society has good governance, and the emergence and flourishing of
democratic institutions.
Self-expression Values and Democracy
A society’s position on the survival/self-expression index is strongly correlated with its level of democracy, as indicated by its scores on the
Freedom House ratings of political rights and civil liberties. This relationship is remarkably powerful, and it is clearly not a methodological
artifact, since the two variables are measured at different levels and come
from entirely different sources. Virtually all of the societies that rank
high on Survival/Self-expression values are stable democracies. Virtually
all of the societies that rank low on this dimension have authoritarian
Mapping Global Values • 27
governments. We find a correlation of .83 between survival/self-expression
values and democracy; this is significant at a very high level, and seems
to reflect a causal linkage (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005, articles 7 and 8).
The Freedom House measures are limited by the fact that they only
measure the extent to which civil and political liberties are institutionalized, which does not necessarily reflect the extent to which these liberties are actually respected by political elites. Some very important recent
literature has emphasized the importance of the distinction between formal democracy and genuine liberal democracy (Ottaway, 2003; O’Donnell,
Vargas Cullel and Iazzetta [eds.], 2004). In order to tap the latter, we
need a measure of “effective democracy” which reflects not only the
extent to which formal civil and political liberties are institutionalized,
but also measures the extent to which these liberties are actually practiced, thus indicating how much free choice people really have in their
lives. To construct such an index of effective democracy, we multiply
the Freedom House measures of civil and political rights by the World
Bank’s anti-corruption scores (Kaufman, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2003),
which we see as an indicator of “elite integrity,” or the extent to which
state power actually follows legal norms (see Inglehart and Welzel, 2005
for a more detailed discussion of this index). When we examine the linkage between this measure of genuine democracy and mass self-expression values, we find an amazingly strong correlation of r = .90 across
73 nations. This reflects a powerful cross-level linkage, connecting mass
values that emphasize free choice, and the extent to which societal institutions actually provide free choice.
Figure 3 depicts the relationship between this index of effective democracy and mass self-expression values. The extent to which self-expression
values are present in a society explains over 80 percent of the crossnational variance in the extent to which liberal democracy is actually
practiced. These findings suggest that the importance of the linkage
between individual-level values and democratic institutions has been
underestimated. Mass preferences play a crucial role in the emergence
of genuine democracy (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005).
The linkage between mass self-expression values and democratic institutions is remarkably strong and consistent, having only a few outliers:
such countries as China, Iran and Vietnam show lower levels of democracy than their publics’ values would predict. These countries have authoritarian regimes that are under growing societal pressure to liberalize, and
we expect that they will liberalize within the next 15 to 20 years.
Authoritarian rulers of some Asian societies have argued that the distinctive “Asian values” of these societies make them unsuitable for democracy (Lee and Zakaria, 1994; Thompson, 2000). But, in fact, the position
28 • Ronald Inglehart
Figure 3
Self-expression values and Effective Democracy.
From Inglehart and Welzel, 2005
HIGH 105
Finland
100
95
Level of Effective Democracy (2000-2002)
Sweden
Iceland
Netherld.
Switzerld. Canada
90
Austria
85
Norway
U.S.A.
Australia
G.B.
Ireland
Germany (E.)
Germany (W.)
80
75
Portugal
70
Spain
France
Japan
Chile
Belgium
65
Slovenia
Israel
60
Taiwan
55
Uruguay
Estonia
Italy
Hungary
South Africa
Czech R.
Slovakia
Poland
50
45
South Korea
40
Lithuania
Latvia
35
Bulgaria
Croatia
Dominican R.
30
India
Peru Brazil
El Salvad.
Romania
25
20
Philippines
Argentina
Jordan
Moldova
Albania
15
Bangladesh
Georgia
Algeria
Tanzania Pakistan
10
5
LOW
New Zeald.
Denmark
Zimbabwe
0
5
10
Azerbaij
15
Mexico
Turkey
Yugoslavia Venezuela
r = .90***
Nigeria Egypt
Indonesia
China Belarus
Uganda
Iran
<
Russia
Vietnam
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
Percent Emphasizing Self-expression Values (mid 1990s)
60
65
70
+
of most Asian countries on Figure 5 is about what their level of socioeconomic development would predict. Japan ranks with the established
Western democracies, both on the self-expression values dimension, and
on its level of democracy. The positions of Taiwan and South Korea
on both dimensions is similar to those of other relatively new democracies such as Hungary or Poland. The publics of Confucian societies
are more supportive of democracy than is generally believed.
Which comes first – a democratic political culture or democratic institutions? The extent to which people emphasize self-expression values is
closely linked with the flourishing of democratic institutions. But what
causes what?
I have argued that economic development interacts with a society’s
cultural heritage, so that high levels of development (linked with the rise
of the knowledge society) bring growing emphasis on Self-expression values, which produce strong mass demands for liberalization and democratic institutions. The reverse interpretation would be that democratic
Mapping Global Values • 29
institutions give rise to the self-expression values that are so closely linked
with them. In other words, democracy makes people healthy, happy,
non-sexist, tolerant and trusting, and instills Post-materialist values. This
interpretation is appealing, and, if it were true, it would provide a powerful argument for democracy, implying that we have a quick fix for
most of the world’s problems: adopt democratic institutions and live happily ever after.
Unfortunately, the experience of the Soviet Union’s successor states
does not support this interpretation. Since their dramatic move toward
democracy in 1991, they have not become healthier, happier, more trusting, more tolerant or more Postmaterialist: most of them have moved
in exactly the opposite direction. The fact that their people are living
in economic and physical insecurity seems to have more impact than
the fact that their leaders are chosen by reasonably free elections.
Moreover, the World Values Survey demonstrate that growing emphasis
on self-expression values emerged through a process of inter-generational
change within the authoritarian communist regimes; democratic regimes
do not necessarily produce self-expression values, and self-expression
values can emerge even within authoritarian regimes if they produce rising levels of existential security.
Democratic institutions do not automatically produce a culture that
emphasizes self-expression values. Instead, it seems that economic development gradually leads to social and cultural changes that make democratic institutions more likely to survive and flourish. That would help
explain why mass democracy did not emerge until a relatively recent
point in history, and why, even now, it is most likely to be found in
economically more developed countries – in particular, those that emphasize self-expression values over survival values.
During the past few decades, most industrialized societies have moved
toward increasing emphasis on Self-expression values, in an intergenerational cultural shift linked with economic development. In the long run,
the process of intergenerational population replacement tends to make
these values more widespread. The flourishing of democratic institutions
is also contingent on economic development and political stability, but,
other things being equal, the inter-generational shift toward increasing
emphasis on Self-expression values produces growing mass pressures in
favor of democracy.
Conclusion
Modernization is not linear. It goes through various phases, each of
which brings distinctive changes in people’s worldviews. The Industrial
30 • Ronald Inglehart
Revolution was linked with a shift from traditional to secular-rational
values, bringing the secularization of authority. In the post-industrial
phase of modernization, another cultural change becomes dominant:
a shift from survival values to self-expression values, which brings increasing emancipation from authority. Rising self-expression values makes
democracy increasingly likely to emerge – indeed, beyond a certain point
it becomes increasingly difficult to avoid democratization.
Cross-cultural variation is surprisingly coherent, and a wide range of
attitudes (reflecting people’s beliefs and values in such different life domains
as the family, work, religion, environment, politics and sexual behavior)
reflect just two major underlying dimensions: one that taps the polarization between traditional values and secular-rational values, and a second
dimension that taps the polarization between survival values and self-expression
values. The world’s societies cluster into relatively homogenous cultural
zones, reflecting their historical heritage, and these cultural zones persist robustly over time.
Although the desire for freedom is a universal human aspiration, it
does not take top priority when people grow up with the feeling that
survival is uncertain. But, when survival seems secure, increasing emphasis on self-expression values makes the emergence of democracy increasingly likely where it does not yet exist, and makes democracy increasingly
effective where it already exists. Conversely, adopting democratic institutions does not automatically make self-expression values people’s top priority. These values emerge when socioeconomic development gives rise
to a subjective sense of existential security. This can occur under either
democratic or authoritarian institutions, and, when it does, it generates
mass demands for democracy.
We find that when socioeconomic development reaches the post-industrial phase, it produces a rising emphasis on “self-expression values.”
These values give high priority to the civil and political liberties that are
central to democracy, so the cultural shift from emphasis on Survival
values to Self-expression values is inherently conducive to democracy.
The powerful correlation shown in Figure 3 reflects a causal process in
which economic development gives rise to increasing emphasis on selfexpression values, which in turn lead to the emergence and flourishing
of democratic institutions. Demonstrating that the rise of self-expression
values is conducive to democracy, rather than the other way around,
requires a complex empirical analysis that I will not present here since
it appears in Inglehart and Welzel (2005).
Analysis of data from scores of societies reveals two major dimensions
of cross-cultural variation: a Traditional/Secular-Rational values dimen-
Mapping Global Values • 31
sion and a Survival/Self-expression values dimension. These dimensions
are deep-rooted aspects of cross-cultural variation, and they make it possible to map the position of any society on a two-dimensional map that
reflects their relative positions. Despite their relative stability, gradual
shifts are occurring along these dimensions, and they are transforming
many aspects of society. One particularly important change stems from
the fact that the shift from Survival values toward Self-expression values, makes democratic political institutions increasingly likely to emerge
and flourish.
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A Theory of Cultural
Value Orientations:
Explication and Applications
Shalom H. Schwartz1
Abstract
This article presents a theory of seven cultural value orientations that form three cultural value dimensions. This theory
permits more finely tuned characterization of cultures than
other theories. It is distinctive in deriving the cultural orientations from a priori theorizing. It also specifies a coherent,
integrated system of relations among the orientations, postulating that they are interdependent rather than orthogonal.
Analyses of data from 73 countries, using two different instruments, validate the 7 cultural orientations and the structure of
interrelations among them. Conceptual and empirical comparisons of these orientations with Inglehart’s two dimensions
clarify similarities and differences. Using the cultural orientations, I generate a worldwide empirical mapping of 76 national
cultures that identifies 7 transnational cultural groupings: West
European, English-speaking, Latin American, East European,
South Asian, Confucian influenced, and African and Middle
Eastern. I briefly discuss distinctive cultural characteristics of
these groupings. I then examine examples of socioeconomic,
political, and demographic factors that give rise to national
differences on the cultural value dimensions, factors that are
themselves reciprocally influenced by culture. Finally, I examine consequences of prevailing cultural value orientations for
1
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem. This research was supported by Israel Science
Foundation Grant No. 921/02-1.
34 • Shalom H. Schwartz
attitudes and behavior (e.g., conventional morality, opposition
to immigration, political activism) and argue that culture mediates the effects of major social structural variables on them.
A Theory of Cultural Value Orientations:
Explication and Applications
Recent years have seen the emergence of several theories and instruments for mapping and comparing national cultures. Interestingly, the
main theories have emerged from different disciplines. Hofstede developed his theory of work values (e.g., 1980, 2001) to make sense of data
gathered for purposes of management by IBM. The four and later five
dimensions he derived to compare country cultures have been widely
applied in the fields of business and management. Inglehart developed
his theory of materialism-postmaterialism (e.g., 1977, 1990), which he
later refined to include two dimensions (e.g., 1997, Inglehart & Baker,
2000), in order to address issues in political science and sociology about
the effects of modernization. My own theory emerged later than these
two (Schwartz, 1994b, 1999, 2004) out of my studies of individual
differences in value priorities and their effects on attitudes and behavior, a sub-field of social psychology.
This article presents my theory of seven cultural value orientations
that form three cultural value dimensions. At the cost of greater complexity than the other theories, this theory permits more finely tuned
characterization of cultures. To validate the theory, I present analyses
of data from 73 countries, using two different instruments. Conceptual
and empirical comparisons of the cultural value orientations with Inglehart’s
two dimensions clarify their similarities and differences. Using the seven
validated cultural orientations, I generate a worldwide map of national
cultures that identifies distinctive cultural regions. The article then addresses
the question of the antecedents that give rise to national differences on
the cultural value dimensions. Finally, it examines some consequences
of prevailing cultural value orientations on attitudes and behavior within
countries.
The approach presented here is distinctive in deriving the seven cultural orientations from a priori theorizing and then testing the fit of these
orientations to empirical data. Moreover, the a priori theorizing specified
a coherent, integrated system of relations among the orientations, which
was then tested.
Cultural Orientations – Basic Assumptions
I view culture as the rich complex of meanings, beliefs, practices, symbols,
norms, and values prevalent among people in a society. The prevailing
A Theory of Cultural Value Orientations: Explication and Applications • 35
value emphases in a society may be the most central feature of culture
(Hofstede, 1980; Inglehart, 1977; Schwartz, 1999; Weber, 1958; Williams,
1958). These value emphases express shared conceptions of what is good
and desirable in the culture, the cultural ideals.
Cultural value emphases shape and justify individual and group beliefs,
actions, and goals. Institutional arrangements and policies, norms, and
everyday practices express underlying cultural value emphases in societies. For example, a cultural value emphasis on success and ambition
may be reflected in and promote highly competitive economic systems,
confrontational legal systems, and child-rearing practices that pressure
children to achieve.
The preference element in cultural value orientations – values as ideals –
promotes coherence among the various aspects of culture. Because prevailing cultural value orientations represent ideals, aspects of culture that
are incompatible with them are likely to generate tension and to elicit
criticism and pressure to change. In a society whose cultural value orientations emphasize collective responsibility, for example, a firm that
fires long-term employees in the interests of profitability is likely to elicit
widespread criticism and pressure to change policies. Of course, cultures
are not fully coherent. In addition to a dominant culture, subgroups
within societies espouse conflicting value emphases. The dominant cultural orientation changes in response to shifting power relations among
these subgroups.
But change is slow. Another important feature of cultural value orientations is that they are relatively stable (Hofstede, 2001; Schwartz,
Bardi & Bianchi, 2000). Some researchers argue that elements of culture persist over hundreds of years (e.g., Kohn & Schooler, 1983; Putnam,
1993). Yet, cultural value orientations do change gradually. Societal adaptation to epidemics, technological advances, increasing wealth, contact
with other cultures, and other exogenous factors leads to changes in cultural value emphases.
Culture joins with social structure, history, demography, and ecology
in complex reciprocal relations that influence every aspect of how we
live. But culture is difficult to measure. To reveal the cultural orientations in a society, we could look at the themes of children’s stories, at
the systems of law, at the ways economic exchange is organized, or at
socialization practices. These indirect indexes of underlying orientations
in the prevailing culture each describe a narrow aspect of the culture.
When researchers try to identify culture by studying the literature of a
society or its legal, economic, family, or governance systems, what they
seek, implicitly or explicitly, are underlying value emphases (Weber, 1958;
Williams, 1968). Therefore, studying value emphases directly is an especially efficient way to capture and characterize cultures.
36 • Shalom H. Schwartz
A Theory of Cultural Value Orientations
Cultural value orientations evolve as societies confront basic issues or
problems in regulating human activity. People must recognize these problems, plan responses to them, and motivate one another to cope with
them. The ways that societies respond to these basic issues or problems
can be used to identify dimensions on which cultures may differ from
one another. The cultural value orientations at the poles of these dimensions are Weberian ideal-types. I derived value dimensions for comparing cultures by considering three of the critical issues that confront all
societies.
The first issue is the nature of the relation or the boundaries between
the person and the group: To what extent are people autonomous vs.
embedded in their groups? I label the polar locations on this cultural
dimension autonomy versus embeddedness. In autonomy cultures,
people are viewed as autonomous, bounded entities. They should cultivate and express their own preferences, feelings, ideas, and abilities, and
find meaning in their own uniqueness. There are two types of autonomy: Intellectual autonomy encourages individuals to pursue their own
ideas and intellectual directions independently. Examples of important
values in such cultures include broadmindedness, curiosity, and creativity. Affective autonomy encourages individuals to pursue affectively
positive experience for themselves. Important values include pleasure,
exciting life, and varied life.
In cultures with an emphasis on embeddedness, people are viewed
as entities embedded in the collectivity. Meaning in life comes largely
through social relationships, through identifying with the group, participating in its shared way of life, and striving toward its shared goals.
Embedded cultures emphasize maintaining the status quo and restraining actions that might disrupt in-group solidarity or the traditional order.
Important values in such cultures are social order, respect for tradition,
security, obedience, and wisdom.
The second societal problem is to guarantee that people behave in a
responsible manner that preserves the social fabric. That is, people must
engage in the productive work necessary to maintain society rather than
compete destructively or withhold their efforts. People must be induced
to consider the welfare of others, to coordinate with them, and thereby
manage their unavoidable interdependencies. The polar solution labeled
cultural egalitarianism seeks to induce people to recognize one another
as moral equals who share basic interests as human beings. People are
socialized to internalize a commitment to cooperate and to feel concern
for everyone’s welfare. They are expected to act for the benefit of others
A Theory of Cultural Value Orientations: Explication and Applications • 37
as a matter of choice. Important values in such cultures include equality, social justice, responsibility, help, and honesty.
The polar alternative labeled cultural hierarchy relies on hierarchical systems of ascribed roles to insure responsible, productive behavior.
It defines the unequal distribution of power, roles, and resources as legitimate. People are socialized to take the hierarchical distribution of roles
for granted and to comply with the obligations and rules attached to
their roles. Values like social power, authority, humility, and wealth are
highly important in hierarchical cultures.
The third societal problem is to regulate how people manage their
relations to the natural and social world. The cultural response to this
problem labeled harmony emphasizes fitting into the world as it is, trying to understand and appreciate rather than to change, direct, or to
exploit. Important values in harmony cultures include world at peace,
unity with nature, and protecting the environment. Mastery is the polar
cultural response to this problem. It encourages active self-assertion in
order to master, direct, and change the natural and social environment
to attain group or personal goals. Values such as ambition, success, daring, and competence are especially important in mastery cultures.
In sum, the theory specifies three bipolar dimensions of culture that
represent alternative resolutions to each of three problems that confront
all societies: embeddedness versus autonomy, hierarchy versus egalitarianism, and mastery versus harmony (see Figure 1). A societal
emphasis on the cultural type at one pole of a dimension typically accompanies a de-emphasis on the polar type, with which it tends to conflict.
Thus, as we will see below, American culture tends to emphasize mastery and affective autonomy and to give little emphasis to harmony. And
the culture in Singapore emphasizes hierarchy but not egalitarianism and
intellectual autonomy.
The cultural value orientations are also interrelated based on compatibility among them. That is, because certain orientations share assumptions, it is easier to affirm and act on them simultaneously in a culture.
For example, egalitarianism and intellectual autonomy share the assumption that people can and should take individual responsibility for their
actions and make decisions based on their own personal understanding
of situations. And high egalitarianism and intellectual autonomy usually
appear together, as in Western Europe. Embeddedness and hierarchy
share the assumption that a person’s roles in and obligations to collectivities are more important than her unique ideas and aspirations. And
embeddedness and hierarchy are both high in the Southeast Asian cultures I have studied.
38 • Shalom H. Schwartz
Figure 1
Cultural Dimensions: Prototypical Structure
HARMONY
Unity With Nature
World at Peace
EGALITARIANISM
Social Justice
Equality
EMBEDDEDNESS
Social Order, Obedience
Respect for Tradition
INTELLECTUAL
AUTONOMY
HIERARCHY
Broadmindedness
Curiosity
Authority
Humble
AFFECTIVE
AUTONOMY
MASTERY
Ambition
Daring
Pleasure
The shared and opposing assumptions inherent in cultural values yield
a coherent circular structure of relations among them. The structure
reflects the cultural orientations that are compatible (adjacent in the circle) or incompatible (distant around the circle). This view of cultural
dimensions as forming an integrated, non-orthogonal system, distinguishes
my approach from others. Hofstede (1980, 2001) conceptualized his
dimensions as independent. He assessed them as orthogonal factors.
Inglehart (1997) derived his orthogonal dimensions empirically from a
factor analysis of nation-level correlations among numerous attitudes and
beliefs.
Measuring Cultural Value Orientations
I assume that the average value priorities of societal members point to
the underlying cultural emphases to which they are exposed (Schwartz,
2004). Like Hofstede (2001) and Inglehart (1997), I therefore infer the
cultural value orientations that characterize societies by averaging the
A Theory of Cultural Value Orientations: Explication and Applications • 39
value priorities of individuals in matched samples from each society. My
measurement of value priorities differs from that prevalent in survey
research, however. I focus on basic values. Consensus regarding how to
conceptualize basic values has emerged gradually since the 1950’s. It
includes six main features (explicated more fully in Schwartz, 2005a):
(1) Values are beliefs that are linked inextricably to affect.
(2) Values refer to desirable goals that motivate action.
(3) Values transcend specific actions and situations (e.g., obedience and honesty are values that are relevant at work or in school,
in sports, business, and politics, with family, friends, or strangers).
This feature distinguishes values from narrower concepts like norms
and attitudes that usually refer to specific actions, objects, or situations.
(4) Values serve as standards or criteria that guide the selection
or evaluation of actions, policies, people, and events.
(5) Values are ordered by importance relative to one another to
form a system of priorities. This hierarchical feature also distinguishes
values from norms and attitudes.
(6) The relative importance of values guides action. The tradeoff
among relevant, competing values is what guides attitudes and behaviors (Schwartz, 1992, 1996; Tetlock, 1986).
Implicitly, most survey researchers hold conceptions of values close to
this one. Unlike the method I adopt below, however, many of the value
items used in survey research are inconsistent with some of these features. The items often refer to specific situations or domains. They do
not measure ‘basic’ values in the sense of values that are relevant across
virtually all situations. This affects value priorities. Consider the item
‘giving people more say in important government decisions’. Support for
or opposition to the current government influences the importance respondents attribute to this goal (Israeli data from 1999). The meaning of
such items depends on the interaction between people’s ‘basic’ values
and the context and domain in which the items are measured.
Researchers often combine responses to items from a number of specific
domains in order to infer underlying, trans-situational values (e.g., materialism). But, because situation-specific items are sensitive to prevailing
socio-political conditions, the choice of items may still substantially
influence both group and individual-level priorities (e.g., Clarke, et al.,
1999).
Contrary to features 5 and 6, many survey items do not measure values in terms of importance. Instead, they present attitude or opinion
statements and employ agree-disagree, approve-disapprove, or other evaluative response scales. The researcher may then try to infer indirectly
the importance of the values presumed to underlie these attitudes or
40 • Shalom H. Schwartz
opinions. But multiple values may underlie any given attitude or opinion. Hence, it is hazardous to infer basic value priorities from responses
to specific attitude and opinion items. In order to discover basic values
with this approach, one must ask numerous questions across many domains
of content. One then searches for underlying consistencies of response
that may or may not be present. Such an approach requires many items
and may not discern clear sets of basic value priorities.
Inglehart adopted this approach in deriving his two updated dimensions of culture. He describes the tradition/secular-rational dimension,
for example, as centrally concerned with orientations toward authority
(Inglehart & Baker, 2000). He bases this on five items that load together
in a factor analysis (importance of God, importance of obedience and
religious faith for children, justifiability of abortion, sense of national
pride, and attitude toward respect for authority). The secular/rational
pole of this orientation is not measured directly. It is inferred from
responses that reject these five items. The two items that load most
strongly on this factor both concern religion. The broader meaning of
this dimension is inferred from the correlations of the five-item index
with various beliefs and attitudes. The meaning of such dimensions,
derived by inference from correlations among diverse items rather than
clearly defined and operationalized a priori, is necessarily loose.
To operationalize the value priorities of individuals, in one set of studies, I used the Schwartz Value Survey that includes 56 or 57 value items
(SVS: Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz & Boehnke, 2004). These abstract items
(e.g., social justice, humility, creativity, social order, pleasure, ambition)
are each followed in parenthesis by a phrase that further specifies their
meaning. Respondents rate the importance of each “as a guiding principle in MY life.” Respondents from cultural groups on every inhabited
continent have completed the survey, anonymously, in their native language (N > 75,000).2 This survey is intended to include all the motivationally distinct values likely to be recognized across cultures, a claim
for which there is growing evidence (Schwartz, 2005a).
Values whose meanings differ across cultures should not be used in
cross-cultural comparison. Otherwise, group differences might reflect the
fact that different concepts are measured in each group. Separate multidimensional scaling analyses of the value items within each of 66 countries established that 45 of the items have reasonably equivalent meanings
in each country (Schwartz, 1994a, 1999; Fontaine, et al., 2005). To test
2
I am indebted to over 100 collaborators for their aid in gathering the data.
A Theory of Cultural Value Orientations: Explication and Applications • 41
the theory, I specified in advance a set of three to eight value items
expected to represent each of the seven cultural orientations.
Data from representative national samples in 20 countries, gathered
as part of the European Social Survey (2002-3), provided a second test
of the theory. This survey includes a 21-items short version of the Portrait
Values Questionnaire (PVQ: Schwartz, et al., 2001; Schwartz, 2003,
2005b, 2006) designed to measure basic individual values. Each portrait
describes a person’s goals, aspirations, or wishes that point implicitly to
the importance of a value. For example, “Thinking up new ideas and
being creative is important to her. She likes to do things in her own
original way.” Regarding each portrait, respondents answer: “How much
like you is this person?” Respondents’ own values are inferred from their
self-reported similarity to people described implicitly in terms of particular values. Within-country analyses in each country confirmed reasonable meaning equivalence across countries for all 21 items. To test the
theory, I specified in advance items expected to represent the cultural
orientations.
Empirical Evaluation of the Theory of Cultural
Value Orientations
A first assessment of the validity of the seven cultural value orientations
and the relations among them used SVS data gathered in 1988-2000.
Participants were 80 samples of schoolteachers (k-12) from 58 national
groups and 115 samples of college students from 64 national groups,
together constituting 67 nations and 70 different cultural groups. Samples
from ethnically heterogeneous nations came from the dominant, majority group. Most samples included between 180 and 280 respondents.
For each sample, we computed the mean ratings of the 45 value items
and then correlated items across samples. This treats the sample as the
unit of analysis. The sample level correlations are statistically independent of the correlations across individuals within any sample. Thus, the
analyses are at the sample (country) or culture level, not the individual
level. Correlations between the sample means were used in a multidimensional scaling analysis (Borg & Lingoes, 1987; Guttman, 1968) to
assess the presence of the seven cultural orientations and the relations
among them.
The 2-dimensional projection in Figure 2 portrays the pattern of intercorrelations among values, based on the sample means. Each value item
is represented by a point such that the more positive the correlation
between any pair of value items the closer they are in the space, and
the less positive their correlation the more distant. Comparing Figure 2
42 • Shalom H. Schwartz
with Figure 1 reveals that the observed content and structure of cultural
value orientations fully support the theorized content and structure. This
analysis clearly discriminates the seven orientations: The value items
selected a priori to represent each value orientation are located within
a unique wedge-shaped region of the space.3 Equally important, the
regions representing each orientation form the integrated cultural system
postulated by the theory: They emanate from the center of the circle,
follow the expected order around the circle, and form the poles of the
three broad cultural dimensions.
The second assessment of the theory of cultural value orientations
used the 21-item PVQ data from the representative national samples of
the ESS. To obtain a sufficient number of samples for a reliable
Multidimensional Scaling Analysis, we split the 20 countries into 52 cultural groups, each with a minimum of 40 respondents.4 We computed
group means for each item and correlated the items across the groups.
Figure 3 presents the two dimensional projection of relations among the
items. The observed content and structure of cultural value orientations
in this figure again support the theorized content and structure fully.
Because the ESS value scale has few items and was not designed to
measure cultural orientations, only three or fewer items represent each
orientation (except embeddedness with six). Nonetheless, there are seven
distinguishable regions representing the seven orientations. The regions
follow the expected order around the circle and form the three polar
cultural dimensions.
The score for each cultural value orientation in a country is the mean
importance rating of the value items that represent it. Prior to computing these scores, we centered each individual respondent’s ratings of the
value items on his/her mean rating of all of the items. This controls for
individual as well as group biases in use of the response scales.5 In order
to increase the reliability of country scores based on the SVS data, I
combined the means of the teacher and student samples in the 52 countries in which both types of samples were available. In 21 countries, only
either teacher or student data were available. For these countries, I
estimated the missing sample means based on regression coefficients
3
One item, ‘accepting my portion in life,’ emerged in the egalitarianism region rather
than in the expected harmony region which is adjacent. Its correlations with other items
also failed to support an interpretation as a harmony value. We therefore dropped it
from the analyses.
4
My thanks to Ariel Knafo for deriving these ethnic group samples.
5
Schwartz (1992; 2006) further explains how to perform the scale use correction and
why it is necessary.
*CURIOUS
INTELLECTUAL
AUTONOMY
*LOYAL
*SOCIAL
JUSTICE
HELPFUL*
AFFECTIVE
AUTONOMY
ENJOYING*LIFE
VARIED
LIFE*
*WORLD OF
BEAUTY
MASTERY
*DARING
INFLUENTIAL*
SOCIAL*RECOGNITION
CHOOSING
OWN GOALS*
*INDEPEDENT
*AUTHORITY
*SOCIAL POWER
*WEALTH
HIERARCHY
OBEDIENT*
*MODERATE
POLITENESS* *HONOR ELDERS NATIONAL
*SECURITY
CLEAN*
*SELF
*FAMILY
DEVOUT* DISCIPLINE
SECURITY
*WISDOM
*PROTECT MY
PUBLIC IMAGE RECIPROCATION
*OF FAVORS
*HUMBLE
*SOCIAL ORDER
EMBEDDEDNESS
*RESPECT TRADITION
*FORGIVING
*CAPABLE
SUCCESSFUL*
AMBITIOUS*
*WORLD
AT PEACE
PLEASURE*
EXCITING
LIFE
*CREATIVITY
*BROADMINDEDNESS
*FREEDOM
*EQUALITY
RESPONSIBLE*
HONEST*
EGALITARIANISM
ACCEPT MY PORTION IN LIFE*
*PROTECT ENVIRONMENT
*UNITY WITH NATURE
HARMONY
Figure 2
Cultural Level MDS-195 Samples, 70 Cultural Groups (Coefficient Alienation .18)
A Theory of Cultural Value Orientations: Explication and Applications • 43
follow
rules
7
HIERARCHY
tradition
20
wealth 2
successful
13
4
show
abilities
8
understand
listen
loyal 18
devoted
fun
21 pleasure
new 6
experiences
AFFECTIVE
AUTONOMY
10
good time
spoil self
free, own
INTELLECTUAL 11decisions
AUTONOMY
creative 1
original
EGALITARIANISM
help
others
12
equality
3 for all
HARMONY
risk 15
excitement
MASTERY
tell 17
others
state
protect
behave
14
properly
16
5
secure
surroundings
EMBEDDEDNESS
inconspicuous
modest 9
care for 19
nature
Figure 3
Cultural Level MDS-52 Cultural Groups from ESS (coefficient alienation .14)
44 • Shalom H. Schwartz
A Theory of Cultural Value Orientations: Explication and Applications • 45
generated by regressing student and teacher means from the 52 countries where both were available on one another.
For a lower-bound estimate of the adequacy of the combined teacherand student-based SVS scores for measuring cultural differences among
societies, I correlated them with the scores based on 25 representative
national or sub-national samples from the ESS. I refer to this as a ‘lowerbound’ estimate because of a set of methodological factors that would
weaken any associations: The ESS scores are each based on very few
items, as noted above, the ESS data were gathered an average of seven
years later, the ESS and SVS methods of measurement differ greatly
and, most important, the ESS countries come only from Europe plus
Israel, thereby substantially restricting the range of scores on the cultural orientations. The observed Pearson correlations ranged from .45
(mastery) to .80 (intellectual autonomy), mean .63. In light of the methodological problems that weaken these correlations, this finding provides
considerable support for the adequacy of the combined teacher- and student-based SVS scores for capturing cultural differences among whole
societies
Contrasting the Inglehart and Schwartz Dimensions
Based on the European and World Value Surveys, Inglehart (e.g., Inglehart
& Baker, 2000) extended his earlier work on materialism and post-materialism to propose two value dimensions on which to compare national
cultures, tradition vs. secular-rational and survival vs. self-expression. This
section discusses conceptual and empirical relations between these dimensions and the cultural orientations presented above.
Inglehart derived scores on the two dimensions for 72 countries, 63
of which overlap with the countries I have studied with the SVS.
Correlations between the Inglehart and Schwartz dimensions across these
countries provide an empirical basis for assessing their similarities and
differences. To further assess relations among the Inglehart and Schwartz
dimensions, I used the scores on my dimensions derived from the PVQ21
in the ESS countries. I computed separate scores for East and West
Germany because Inglehart has separate scores for these regions. These
21 groups vary less than the 63 countries in the SVS-based analyses
both culturally and socially. Should both sets of analyses yield similar
results, despite diverse samples and different methods, we can have
confidence in their robustness.
The tradition/secular-rational dimension centrally concerns orientations toward authority. It contrasts societies in which religion, nation,
and family are highly important with those in which they are not so
important. In traditional societies, children’s first duty is to their parents
46 • Shalom H. Schwartz
and parents are expected to sacrifice themselves for their children. Male
dominance is the norm, absolute standards of morality prevail, and
national pride is high. “Societies with secular-rational values have the
opposite preferences on all of these topics” (Inglehart & Baker, 2000,
p. 25). The five-item index used to measure this dimension correlates
highly with these beliefs and attitudes. The two items that load most
strongly on the factor, however, both concern religious belief.
This dimension overlaps conceptually with my autonomy/embeddedness dimension. Both concern the degree to which the individual is submerged in all-encompassing structures of tight mutual obligations. Inglehart’s
description implies that, in traditional societies, people’s ties to their religious, national, and family groups are the source of meaning in their
lives – a core aspect of embeddedness. The weakening of encompassing
structures and of absolute standards in secular-rational societies frees individuals to think, do, and feel more independently – a core aspect of
autonomy.
Now consider correlations between the dimensions across 63 countries
with the SVS measure of my dimensions and, in parentheses, across the
21 ESS countries with the PVQ21 measure. The tradition/secular-rational dimension correlates .60 (.51) with intellectual autonomy, .53 (.38)
with affective autonomy, -.57 (-.33) with embeddedness, and .60 (.41)
with the autonomy/embeddedness dimension. As the pairs of correlations indicate, both sets of analyses yield similar pictures.
For a more in-depth examination, I elaborate on the 63-country analysis. The autonomy/embeddedness dimension shares considerable variance (36%) with the tradition/ secular-rational dimension, but they array
nations somewhat differently. For example, East Germany ranks in the
top 10% of nations on both dimensions and Zimbabwe in the bottom
15%. But Bulgaria, China, and Estonia rank in the top 10% on tradition/
secular-rational but the bottom third on autonomy/embeddedness.
The centrality of religion in the Inglehart index may explain this
difference in country locations on the two dimensions. Their high secularrational rankings may be due to a breakdown of religious faith and
absolute standards of traditional morality during decades of communist
rule. The autonomy/embeddedness dimension gives less weight to religious faith. It focuses more on how legitimate it is for individuals to cultivate unique ways of thinking, acting, and feeling vs. submerging the
self in an encompassing collectivity. The culture in Bulgaria, China, and
Estonia may have become quite secular. At the same time, the low scores
on autonomy/embeddedness suggest that the culture still stresses finding
meaning through ties to the in-group. The two dimensions apparently
capture different aspects of the culture in these countries.
A Theory of Cultural Value Orientations: Explication and Applications • 47
The tradition/secular-rational dimension also has some conceptual
overlap with the egalitarianism/hierarchy dimension. Both concern deference to authority. The emphasis on national pride in traditional societies also expresses a hierarchical orientation, and the preference for
male dominance is compatible with hierarchy and opposed to egalitarianism. The overlap is limited, however, because the Inglehart dimension does not relate to the primary focus of egalitarianism/hierarchy.
Both egalitarianism and hierarchy seek to preserve the social fabric by
promoting responsible behavior that considers the welfare of others. They
differ in grounding such behavior in voluntary choice based on internalized commitments (egalitarianism) or in conformity to the obligations
and expectations of ascribed roles (hierarchy). The empirical associations
reflect little overlap. The tradition/secular-rational dimension correlated
-.00 (.22) with egalitarianism, -.32 (-.21) with hierarchy, and .22 (.25)
with the egalitarianism/hierarchy dimension.
Unexpectedly, given no obvious conceptual overlap, the tradition/secular-rational dimension correlated somewhat positively with the harmony/mastery dimension (.36/.34). Thus, more secular-rational societies
are also societies that tend more to emphasize fitting into the natural
and social world as it is, trying to understand and appreciate rather than
to change or to exploit. The nations with cultures especially high on
both harmony and secular-rational orientations are all in Western Europe.
These nations have well-to-do, educated, and involved publics. Such
publics responded to two devastating wars and to severe ecological crises
by developing rationally-based relations of harmony among themselves
and with the environment.
Inglehart’s second dimension, survival/self-expression, contrasts societies in which people primarily focus on economic and physical security
(survival) with societies in which security is high and quality-of-life issues
are central (self-expression). In the latter, many people are well educated
and work in the services. This demands of them more freedom of judgment, innovation, and autonomous decision-making and equips them
with relevant communication and information-processing skills. Trust,
tolerance, subjective well-being, political activism, and concern for the
environment are high. At the survival pole, people feel threatened by
and are intolerant of those who are different (e.g., ethnically or in sexual preference) or who seek cultural change (e.g., women’s movements).
At the self-expression pole, difference and change are accepted and even
seen as enriching, and out-groups are increasingly seen as meriting equal
rights.
This dimension also overlaps with the autonomy/embeddedness dimension. They both concern the degree to which individuals should be
48 • Shalom H. Schwartz
encouraged to express their uniqueness and independence in thought,
action, and feelings. Empirically, they are substantially associated. Survival/self-expression correlated -.66 (-.65) with embeddedness, .55 (.40)
with affective autonomy, .57 (.65) with intellectual autonomy, and .64
(.63) with the autonomy/embeddedness dimension, with which it shares
41% of its variance. These two dimensions array nations quite similarly.
For example, Sweden and Denmark rank very high on both dimensions
and Uganda and Zimbabwe rank very low. But there are differences. Both
Ghana and West Germany are moderate on survival/self-expression, but
Ghana is very low on autonomy/embeddedness and West Germany
very high.
The egalitarianism/hierarchy dimension also overlaps conceptually with
survival/self-expression. The latter pits trust, tolerance, and support for
the equal rights of out-groups against low trust, intolerance, and rejection of out-groups as threatening. This closely parallels some aspects of
high vs. low egalitarianism. Political activism and opposition to change
in accepted roles also conflict with hierarchy, though these elements are
less critical. The empirical correlations support these inferences. Survival/
self-expression correlated .72 (.63) with egalitarianism, -.41 (-.25) with
hierarchy, and .59 (.50) with the egalitarianism/hierarchy dimension with
which it shares 35% of its variance.
Sweden and Norway are very high on both dimensions and Bulgaria
is very low on both. But many nations do not exhibit consistent ranks
on the two cultural dimensions. Japan is very low on egalitarianism (vs.
hierarchy) but moderately high on self-expression (vs. survival), for example. My dimension emphasizes the idea that Japanese culture organizes
relations of interdependency in role-based hierarchical terms. The Inglehart
dimension may reflect the consequences for culture of Japanese society’s
wealth, high level of education, and advanced service economy. Thus,
these two dimensions capture different, not necessarily contradictory,
aspects of culture.
The contrasting feelings of interpersonal threat vs. trust and the focus
on material security vs. environmental protection of the survival/selfexpression dimension parallel a low vs. high harmony orientation.
Empirically, however, there is no association either with harmony or
with the harmony/mastery dimension. Harmony emphasizes fitting into
and accepting the social and natural environments rather than changing or using them. Self-expression implies a more activist orientation to
people and nature. This may explain the lack of association.
In sum, there is substantial overlap between Inglehart’s tradition/
secular-rational dimension and my autonomy/embeddedness dimension
and between Inglehart’s survival/self-expression dimension and both my
A Theory of Cultural Value Orientations: Explication and Applications • 49
autonomy/embeddedness and egalitarianism/hierarchy dimensions. Given
the differences in the way the dimensions were derived, in the scales
used to measure them, and in the nature of the samples studied, this
overlap is striking. It strongly supports the idea that these dimensions
capture real, robust aspects of cultural difference.
On the other hand, some nations exhibit substantially divergent rankings on the overlapping dimensions. This makes clear that each dimension also captures unique aspects of culture. Thus, for example, the level
of conventional religious commitment in a country appears to influence
tradition/secular-rational scores crucially but have much less impact on
autonomy/embeddedness scores. In contrast, the cultural emphasis on
extended in-group bonds vs. pursuit of individual uniqueness appears to
influence autonomy-embeddedness scores more than tradition/secular
rational-scores. Moreover, my harmony/mastery dimension apparently
taps aspects of culture not measured by the Inglehart dimensions, as evidenced by its low correlations with them. As we will see, harmony/mastery is the only cultural dimension not strongly related to socio-economic
development.
Countries as a Cultural Unit
Almost all large, comparative, cross-cultural studies treat countries as
their cultural unit. Countries are rarely homogeneous societies with a
unified culture. Inferences about national culture may depend on which
subgroups are studied. The research on my cultural dimensions with the
SVS used country scores from teacher and student samples rather than
representative national samples. This makes it especially important to
establish that scores derived from different types of samples order countries in the same way on the dimensions. If a meaningful general culture impacts upon varied groups within countries, the order of countries
on cultural dimensions should be quite similar whether we measure culture using one type of subsample from the dominant group or another.
The same countries should score higher and the same countries lower
on each cultural orientation whether the set of samples consists, for example, of older or of younger respondents. I assessed consistency in the relative scores of countries on the seven cultural orientations measured with
the SVS, using three types of subsamples.
I first assessed whether younger and older subcultures yield similar
relative national scores. I split the teacher samples into those 37 years
or younger and those older. There were 55 countries with at least 33
respondents in each age group. The relative national scores, based on
these two subgroups, were very similar. Correlations ranged from .96
50 • Shalom H. Schwartz
for embeddedness to .78 for mastery (mean .91). I also compared national
scores using male vs. female student subgroups across 64 countries. This
yielded similar results: Correlations ranged from .96 for embeddedness
to .82 for egalitarianism (mean .90). Finally, I compared national scores
based on the teacher vs. the student samples across 53 countries. Correlations ranged from .90 for egalitarianism to .57 for mastery (mean
.81). Although still substantial, the somewhat weaker correlations in this
last comparison reflect the fact that the samples differed in both age and
occupation. This suggests that closely matching the characteristics of the
samples from each country is critical when comparing national cultural
orientations.
These data demonstrate that the similarity of cultural value orientations within countries, when viewed against the background of cultural
distance between countries, is considerable. Taken together, the findings
support the view that countries are meaningful cultural units. In comparing national cultures, however, it is important to insure that the samples from different countries are matched on critical characteristics (e.g.,
all teacher samples, all student samples, or all properly drawn national
samples).
Cultural Distinctiveness of World Regions
Both theoretical arguments and empirical analyses suggest that there are
culturally distinct world regions (Hofstede, 2001; Huntington, 1993;
Inglehart, 1997; Schwartz, 1999). This section examines the locations in
cultural space of 76 cultural groups based on the combined teacher and
student samples (73 countries, with Israel split into Arabs and Jews,
Germany into East and West, and Canada into Anglo and French-speaking national groups). For this purpose, I first standardized the mean
importance of all seven cultural orientations within each group. Each
group profile therefore reflects the relative importance of each cultural
orientation within a national group. Unlike Inglehart’s mapping of national
cultures on two orthogonal variables (his dimensions), I map them simultaneously on seven variables (my cultural orientations). Mapping locations of the national groups on the seven orientations in a two dimensional
space necessarily entails some imprecision. The richness gained in describing cultures largely compensates for the loss of precision because the
degree of imprecision is limited (see below).
The ‘co-plot’ multidimensional scaling technique (Goldreich & Raveh,
1993) maps the cultural distances between groups. It computes a matrix
of profile differences between all pairs of groups by summing the absolute
differences between the groups on each of the seven value orientations.
From this matrix it generates a two-dimensional spatial representation
A Theory of Cultural Value Orientations: Explication and Applications • 51
of the similarities and differences among groups (see Figure 4). It then
calculates vectors (optimal regression lines) in the MDS space that show
the direction of increasing scores for each of the seven orientations. In
Figure 4, I drew the full vector for embeddedness from lower left to
upper right and short arrows to indicate the angles of the vectors for
the other orientations. These other vectors also extend through the center of gravity of the figure, just above Romania.
The correlation between the actual scores of the cultural groups on
an orientation and their locations along the vector that represents the
orientation appear in parentheses. The substantial magnitude of these
correlations (range .75 to .98) indicates that the locations of most samples provide quite an accurate picture. This is because countries usually
exhibit a profile that reflects the coherence of the theoretical structure
of cultural dimensions. If the culture of a country emphasizes one polar
value orientation, it typically deemphasizes the opposing polar orientation. Moreover, the relative importance of adjacent cultural orientations
is usually similar too. For example, Italian culture, compared to all the
others, is very high both in egalitarianism and in the adjacent harmony
orientation but very low in the opposing hierarchy and adjacent mastery orientations. Chinese culture shows the reverse profile.6
Locations of nations along these vectors relative to one another reveal,
graphically, the specific ways in which national cultures resemble or differ
from one another. For example, the farther a nation toward the upper
right, the greater the cultural emphasis on embeddedness relative to other
nations and the farther toward the lower left, the less the cultural emphasis on embeddedness. To locate a nation on a cultural orientation, draw
a perpendicular line from the position of the nation to the vector for
that orientation. Perpendiculars drawn to the embeddedness vector in
Figure 4 show that this orientation is especially emphasized in Yemen,
less so in Macedonia, and very little in East Germany.
Consider two examples of how Figure 4 represents the cultural profile
of a country on all seven cultural orientations. Culture in Sweden (upper
left) strongly emphasizes harmony, intellectual autonomy, and egalitarianism and moderately emphasizes affective autonomy. The cultural
emphasis on embeddedness is low, and it is very low for mastery and
6
Japan presents a striking exception. Seven samples from around Japan reveal an
unusual combination of cultural elements. The culture strongly emphasizes hierarchy and
harmony but not embeddedness, which is adjacent to them, and it strongly emphasizes
intellectual autonomy but not the adjacent egalitarianism. Thus, the location of Japan
in the co-plot is necessarily misleading. This unusual combination would not surprise
many scholars of Japanese culture (e.g., Benedict, 1974; Matsumoto, 2002). It points to
a culture in tension and transition.
SPAIN
NORWAY
FINLAND
ITALY
INTELLECTUAL
AUTONOMY (.93)
MEXICO
ROMANIA
POLAND
INDONESIA
SINGAPORE
CANADA
ENG
AFFECTIVE
AUTONOMY (.92)
NEW UK
ZEALAND
ISRAEL
JEWS
JAPAN
MASTERY (.88)
USA
THAILAND
HIERARCHY
(.87)
ZIMBABWE
CHINA
INDIA
JORDAN
IRAN
UGANDA
NAMIBIA
NEPAL
GHANA
NIGERIA
SENEGAL
EMBEDDEDNESS (.98)
S AFRICA
YEMEN
S KOREA
VENEZUELA
ARGENTINA
YUGO- TURKEY MACEDONIA
ISRAEL
BRAZIL SLAVIA
RUSSIA PERU ARABS
COSTA
BULGARIA
RICA
UKRAINE TAIWAN
AUSTRALIA
CROATIA
HONG KONG
IRELAND
CHILE
HUNGARY
SLOVAKIA
GEORGIA
FIJI
BOSNIA HZ
PHILIPPINES
ESTONIA
CYPRUS BOLIVIA
Gr
MALAYSIA
LATVIA
CZECH REP
SLOVENIA
PORTUGAL
NETHERLANDS
GREECE
FRANCE
BELGIUM
SWEDEN
GERMANY DENMARK
AUSTRIA
W
CANADA
GERMANY E
FR
SWITZERLAND FR
EGALITARIANISM (.75)
HARMONY (.79)
ETHIOPIA
EGYPT CAMEROON
Figure 4
Co-Plot Map of 76 National Groups on Seven Cultural Orientations (coefficient alienation .11)
52 • Shalom H. Schwartz
A Theory of Cultural Value Orientations: Explication and Applications • 53
hierarchy. In contrast, in Zimbabwe (lower right), mastery, embeddedness, and hierarchy are highly emphasized, affective autonomy moderately emphasized, and egalitarianism, intellectual autonomy, and harmony
receive little cultural emphasis.
The spatial map of the 76 national cultures reveals seven transnational cultural groupings: West European countries (clear circles) to the
far left, English-speaking countries in the lower left center (dark circles),
Latin American countries in the center (shaded circles), East European
countries in the upper center and to the left of Latin America (lightly
shaded circles), South Asian countries (shaded circles) in a band to the
right, Confucian influenced countries below them to the right (clear circles), and African and Middle Eastern countries (dark circles) to the far
right and above. Only nine cultures are located outside of their expected
region. Four of these are from the culturally diverse Middle East (Turkey,
Greek Cyprus, Israel Arabs, Israel Jews)
The regions show striking parallels with the zones Huntington (1993)
suggested and those Hofstede (1980) and Inglehart and Baker (2000)
found. Schwartz and Ros (1995) and Schwartz and Bardi (1997) provide initial explanations for the emergence of the English-speaking, West
European, and East European cultural profiles. Most regions reflect some
geographical proximity. Hence, some of the cultural similarity within
regions is doubtless due to diffusion of values, norms, practices, and institutions across national borders (Naroll, 1973). But shared histories, language, religion, level of development, and other factors also play a part.
To illustrate the sensitivity of the cultural orientations to such factors,
consider the cultures that are not located in their expected regions.
French Canadian culture is apparently closer to West European and
particularly French culture than to English speaking Canadian culture,
reflecting its historic and linguistic roots. East German culture is close
to West German rather than part of the East European region. This
probably reflects continued cultural ties from the pre-communist era.
Turkish culture is higher on egalitarianism and autonomy and lower on
hierarchy and embeddedness than its Middle Eastern Muslim neighbors
are. This probably reflects its secular democracy, long history of East
European influence, and recent struggles to join the West. Greek Cypriot
culture is relatively high in embeddedness and low in autonomy. This
may reflect its history of over 1000 years of rule by the Byzantine and
Ottoman Empires and its Eastern Orthodox religion. Israeli Jewish culture
is close to the English-speaking cultures and distant from the surrounding
Middle East to which its Arab culture is close. Europeans founded Israel
and it has strong political and economic links to the USA. Among the
Latin American countries, the populations of Bolivia and Peru were least
54 • Shalom H. Schwartz
exposed to European culture and economically least developed. This
probably explains why their cultures are much higher in hierarchy and
embeddedness than those of their neighbors. For Japan, see footnote 5.
Next, let us examine the cultural orientations that characterize each
distinct cultural region. I base these characterizations on the actual cultural orientation scores because, as noted above, locations on seven variables in two dimensions cannot be perfect. Nonetheless, the locations
of regions on the vectors in Figure 4 are quite accurate and highly
informative.
West Europe. Corresponding to its location on the left of Figure 4, West
European culture emphasizes intellectual autonomy, egalitarianism, and
harmony more than any other region. It is the lowest region on hierarchy and embeddedness. This profile holds even after controlling for
national wealth (GDP per capita in 1985). Thus, though West Europe’s
high economic level may influence its culture, other factors are apparently critical. This cultural profile is fitting for a region of democratic,
welfare states where concern for the environment is especially high (cf.
Ester, Halman, & Seuren, 1994).
Although when compared with other world regions, West European
countries share a broad culture, there is substantial cultural variation
within the region too. Consider two examples. Greek culture is the least
typical of Western Europe – higher on mastery and lower on intellectual autonomy and egalitarianism than the others are. French and Swiss
French cultures display a relatively high hierarchy orientation for Western
Europe, together with the usual high affective and intellectual autonomy.
They apparently retain a somewhat hierarchical orientation despite their
emphasis on autonomy. Detailed analysis of such variations is beyond
the scope of this article, but cultural differences within regions are
meaningful.
English-Speaking. The culture of the English-speaking region is especially
high in affective autonomy and mastery and low in harmony and embeddedness, compared with the rest of the world. It is average in intellectual autonomy, hierarchy, and egalitarianism. The culture in America
differs from that in other English-speaking countries by emphasizing mastery and hierarchy more and intellectual autonomy, harmony, and egalitarianism less. This profile points to a cultural orientation that encourages
an assertive, pragmatic, entrepreneurial, and even exploitative orientation to the social and natural environment. With the exception of the
USA, this region is particularly homogeneous.
Cultural Differences in the ‘West’. There is a widespread view of Western
culture as individualist. Hence, the differences within the West that the
more complex conception of cultural orientations reveals deserve more
A Theory of Cultural Value Orientations: Explication and Applications • 55
detailed explication (see Schwartz & Ross, 1995). Comparisons of 22
West European samples with six United States samples show large and
significant differences on six of the seven culture orientations. Egalitarianism,
intellectual autonomy, and harmony are higher in Western Europe; mastery, hierarchy, and embeddedness are higher in the United States. Using
the term “individualist” to describe either of these cultures distorts the
picture these analyses reveal.
Cultural orientations in Western Europe are individualist in one sense:
They emphasize intellectual and affective autonomy and de-emphasize
hierarchy and embeddedness relative to other cultures in most of the
world. But West European priorities contradict conventional views of
individualism in another sense: They emphasize egalitarianism and harmony and de-emphasize mastery. That is, this culture calls for selfless
concern for the welfare of others and fitting into the natural and social
world rather than striving to change it through assertive action. This
runs directly counter to what individualism is usually understood to mean.
Cultural emphases in the United States show a different but equally
complex pattern: The individualistic aspect of American value orientations is the emphasis on affective autonomy and mastery at the expense
of harmony. This combination may be the source of the stereotypical
view of American culture as justifying and encouraging egotistic selfadvancement. But this is not prototypical individualism because intellectual autonomy is relatively unimportant. Moreover, both hierarchy
and embeddedness, the orientations central to collectivism, are high compared with Western Europe. This fits the emphasis on religion, conservative family values, and punitiveness toward deviance in America. The
empirical profile is compatible with in-depth analyses of American culture (Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swidler, & Tipton, 1986; Etzioni, 1993).
Confucian. The Confucian-influenced region also exhibits a pragmatic,
entrepreneurial orientation. However, this orientation combines a heavy
emphasis on hierarchy and mastery with a rejection of egalitarianism
and harmony as compared with other regions. This region emphasizes
embeddedness more than all the European and American cultures. This
cultural profile is consonant with many analyses of Confucian culture
(e.g., Bond, 1996). Within-region differences are small except for Japan,
which is substantially higher on harmony and intellectual autonomy and
lower on embeddedness and hierarchy.
Africa and the Middle East.7 The cultural groups from sub-Saharan and
North Africa and the Muslim Middle East form a broad region that
7
I exclude Cyprus, Israeli Jews, and Turkey, which were discussed above.
56 • Shalom H. Schwartz
does not break down into clear sub-regions. These cultures are especially
high in embeddedness and low in affective and intellectual autonomy.
Thus, they emphasize finding meaning in life largely through social relationships and protecting group solidarity and the traditional order rather
than cultivating individual uniqueness. This fits well with the conclusions
of studies of the Middle East (e.g., Lewis, 2003) and sub-Saharan Africa
(e.g., Gyekye, 1997). There is a great deal of variation within the region
on all but embeddedness, egalitarianism, and intellectual autonomy.
South Asia. The culture in the South Asian region is particularly high
in hierarchy and embeddedness and low in autonomy and egalitarianism. This points to an emphasis on fulfilling one’s obligations in a hierarchical system – obeying expectations from those in roles of greater
status or authority and expecting humility and obedience from those in
inferior roles. As in Africa, here social relationships rather than autonomous
pursuits are expected to give meaning to life. With the exception of
India’s especially high rating on mastery, all the groups are culturally
quite homogenous. The variety of dominant religions (Hinduism, Roman
Catholicism, Islam, Buddhism, Methodist Protestantism) in this region
does not produce cultural heterogeneity on the basic orientations.
East Europe. The East European cultures are low in embeddedness and
hierarchy compared with Africa, Asia, and the Middle East, but higher
in these cultural orientations than Western Europe and the Americas.
Although the East European cultural groups do form a region in the
spatial projection, the cultures in this region vary substantially on hierarchy, mastery, and harmony. A closer look at the map reveals that the
Baltic and East-Central states form a sub-region toward the top center
and the Balkan and more Eastern states form a sub-region to their right
and below.8 The former are higher in harmony, intellectual autonomy, and
egalitarianism and lower in mastery and hierarchy than the Balkan and
more Eastern states. The Baltic and East-Central states have stronger
historical and trade links to Western Europe, were less penetrated by
totalitarian communist rule, and threw it off earlier. This may help
account for why their profile is closer to that of Western Europe. In an
earlier paper, my colleagues and I inferred from the profile of the EastCentral states that their population had largely rejected both the rhetoric
and the social organization of communist regimes, while insisting on
their intellectual independence (Schwartz & Bardi, 1997; Schwartz, Bardi,
& Bianchi, 2000).9
8
Georgia and Bosnia-Herzegovina are exceptions that require further study.
The finding that East European countries that experienced more invasive communist rule were lower in harmony and higher in mastery undermines our earlier inter9
A Theory of Cultural Value Orientations: Explication and Applications • 57
Latin America. Finally, the culture of the Latin American region is close
to the worldwide average in all seven orientations. Moreover, excepting
Bolivia and Peru, whose populations have been least exposed to European
culture, this region is particularly homogeneous culturally. Some researchers
describe Latin American culture as collectivist (e.g., Hofstede, 2001;
Triandis, 1995). Compared with Western Europe, this seems to be so.
Latin America is higher in hierarchy and embeddedness, presumably the
main components of collectivism, and lower in intellectual autonomy,
presumably the main component of individualism. The opposite is the
case, however, when we compare Latin America to Africa and the Middle
East, South Asia, and Confucian-influenced cultures. This example highlights the importance of the frame of comparison. The culture of a group
may look different when viewed in a worldwide perspective than when
inferred from narrower comparisons.
Relations of Culture to Socioeconomic, Political, and
Demographic Characteristics
Having seen that national cultural groups and regions of the world differ
systematically on the cultural dimensions, two critical questions arise.
How do these cultural differences arise? And do they matter? Socioeconomic, political, and demographic factors all impact on culture and,
I will argue, are themselves reciprocally influenced by culture. I present
analyses for one key variable representing each of these factors – socioeconomic development, level of democracy, and household/family size.
Welzel, Inglehart, and Klingemann (2003) traced a causal sequence
among socioeconomic development, values, and democratization. They
argued that socioeconomic development increases individual resources
and thereby gives people the means to make choices. Utilizing these
means, people cultivate their presumed inherent human desire for choice,
giving rise to “mass emancipative values.” Pursuit of these values leads
to democratization – institutionalizing freedom rights that provide the
legal guarantee of choice. Using a measure of emancipative values drawn
from the World and European Value Surveys, Welzel, et al. present
analyses showing that values indeed mediate the relationship between
socioeconomic development and democratization. Their causal argument
contradicts views that values impact on socioeconomic development or
that democratization influences values. I next examine how well this
argument holds when we employ different measures of values and a set
of 72 countries, 15 of which do not overlap those they studied.
pretation of the high harmony scores as reflecting adaptation to life in totalitarian regimes
by avoiding trouble and refraining from taking initiatives.
58 • Shalom H. Schwartz
In order to simplify the empirical presentations, I will use the three
polar value dimensions formed by the seven cultural orientations rather
than the separate orientations. Two of the cultural value dimensions
express what Welzel et al. call emancipative values – the dimensions of
autonomy versus embeddedness values and of egalitarianism vs. hierarchy values. The first dimension emphasizes autonomous choice and cultivation of individuals’ unique ideas and preferences rather than following
and preserving traditional and externally imposed ideas and preferences.
The second dimension emphasizes voluntary regulation of behavior based
on equality rather than regulation of behavior through submission to
role expectations built into existing hierarchies.
Socioeconomic Development and Democratization
The top panel of Table 1 presents correlations across 73 countries between
four indexes of socioeconomic development and scores on the three value
dimensions. The latter are computed by subtracting the score for the
second pole from the first (e.g. harmony minus mastery). The values
data are largely from the mid-90’s.10 The correlations portray associations with development about 10 and two years earlier, concurrently,
and almost 10 years later. The second panel of Table 1 presents correlations with democratization scores from Freedom House (higher scores
signify greater civil liberties and political rights) about 10 years earlier,
concurrently, and seven years later (Freedom House, various years). As
expected, all correlations with the autonomy and egalitarianism dimensions are substantial, whereas those with the harmony vs. mastery dimension are low.
To assess causal relations, I carried out a path analysis in which earlier indexes of democratization predict later indexes and in which development might affect democratization either directly or through values.
Following Welzel, et al., I measured development with the Vanhanen
(1997) ‘index of power resources’ for 1993. This index includes measures of material and intellectual resources and the complexity of the
occupational system. This makes it better than a pure economic index
for measuring individual resources. Because the 1995 index of democratization is included in Figure 5a to predict the 2002 index, paths from
other predictors signify effects on change in the level of democratization.
Figure 5a reveals that cultural emphases on autonomy and on egalitar10
Combining values data from somewhat different points in time poses little problem
because value change at the national level on these dimensions is very slow (see Schwartz,
Bardi, & Bianchi, 2000).
A Theory of Cultural Value Orientations: Explication and Applications • 59
Table 1
Correlations of Cultural Value Dimensions with Socioeconomic Development
Democratization, and Household Size
N
Autonomy
minus
Embeddedness
Egalitarianism
minus
Hierarchy
Harmony
minus
Mastery
Socioeconomic Development
1985 GDPpc
1995 GDPpc
1993 Index of Power Resources
2004 GNIpc
73
73
72
73
.58**
.73**
.78**
.75**
.42**
.46**
.58**
.53**
.27*
.19
.14
.20
Democratization
1985 Freedom House Index
1995 Freedom House Index
2002 Freedom House Index
73
73
73
.58**
.71**
.70**
.46**
.52**
.57**
.03
.36**
.38**
Household Size
1985 Average Family Size
2001 Average Household Size
73
73
-.70**
-.75**
-.61**
-.36**
-.41**
-.32**
**p<.01, *p<.05, 2-tailed
Notes: GDPpc=Gross Domestic Product per Capita, from the World Bank; GNIpc=Gross National
Income per Capita, from the World Bank; Average Household/Family Size=from the Encyclopaedia
Britannica Almanac
ianism values both predict increases in democratization. Earlier development affects these cultural values and they, in turn, fully mediate the
effects of development on increasing democratization. Democratization
in 1985 does not predict later cultural values over and above the effects
of development.
The path analysis clearly supports the Welzel, et al. causal argument.
For them, development influences values which, in turn, influence change
in democracy levels. Here, development influences change in democracy
levels only insofar as it affects autonomy and egalitarian values, not
directly. Support for this causal sequence derives from a different set of
cultural values than those studied by Welzel, et al. and from a somewhat different set of countries and of years. The current analysis further demonstrates that the prior level of democracy has no impact on
cultural values, once development is controlled. However, this analysis
does not test whether cultural values have a reciprocal influence on
socioeconomic development. The path analysis in Figure 5b addresses
this issue.
Because no Vanhanen index of individual resources is available for
the years after 1993, I chose the latest, best, available index of socioeconomic development for this analysis – gross national income per capita
.59**
.78**
.69**
Values 1995:
Egalitarianism vs.
Hierarchy
Values 1995:
Autonomy vs.
Embeddedness
Democracy 1995
.16**
.18**
.64**
Democracy 2002
R2 = .75
.59**
Values 1995:
Egalitarianism vs.
Hierarchy
Values 1995:
Autonomy vs.
Embeddedness
Notes: Broken arrows indicate nonsignificant paths. ** p<.01, * p<.05.
Individual Resources
1993
.78**
.69**
Democracy 1995
.73**
.20**
Gross National
Income per capita
2004
R2 = .78
Figure 5b
Causal model predicting change in socioeconomic level with democracy and cultural values across 73 countries
Notes: Broken arrows indicate nonsignificant paths. ** p<.01, * p<.05.
Individual Resources
1993
Democracy 1985
Figure 5a
Causal model predicting change in democracy with socioeconomic level and cultural values across 73 countries
60 • Shalom H. Schwartz
A Theory of Cultural Value Orientations: Explication and Applications • 61
in 2004. Figure 5b reveals that neither democracy nor egalitarianism
values in 1995 predict change in socioeconomic development from 1993
to 2004. However, autonomy values significantly predict the change.
Thus, this dimension of cultural values reciprocally influences socioeconomic development. I cannot estimate the relative strength of these reciprocal influences because we lack earlier measures of the cultural values.
Nonetheless, with the caveat that the earlier and later measures of socioeconomic development differed, this analysis provides evidence that contradicts the Welzel, et al. unidirectional view of relations between values
and development.
Family/Household Size
The demographic characteristic I examine is average family/household
size in a country. Researchers have largely overlooked the importance
of this variable as a determinant and consequence of culture. The third
panel in Table 1 reports the correlations of the cultural value dimensions with average family size in 1985 and with average household size
in 2001.11 The negative correlations indicate that the larger the average
family or household, the greater the cultural emphasis on embeddedness, hierarchy, and mastery values.
At the country level, cultural value orientations relate strongly to family
size. The size of people’s own family, however, does not relate to their
own personal values. How does this happen? The key is societal norms
for managing family relations. Societal norms reflect what is required
and possible in order for the typical family to function smoothly. These
norms reflect the prototypical size and composition of households. They
specify how to organize families, raise children, and regulate interaction.
Families largely conform to these norms, so variation in the size of particular families has less impact on its members.
How might family/household size influence culture? Where the typical household is large, it is crucial for behavior to be predictable. This
requires high levels of social control from above. Emphasizing obedience
to authority, conformity to norms, and fulfilling role obligations unquestioningly is functional. If family members view themselves as inseparable parts of a family collectivity and identify with its interests, even large
families can run smoothly. These family practices and norms foster cultural embeddedness and hierarchy in the society. Large families are
incompatible with cultural autonomy and egalitarianism. The demands
11
Data are from the Encyclopaedia Britannica Almanac. The date (1985, 2001) is
the median of about a 5 year period for which the data were reported.
62 • Shalom H. Schwartz
of coordination in large families preclude treating each member as a
unique individual with equal rights. They discourage permitting each
family member to make decisions autonomously and to pursue his or
her own ideas, interests, and desires. A greater need for pragmatic problem solving in larger families may account for the somewhat stronger
emphasis on mastery values.
The preceding explains the possible causal influence of family/household size on cultural value orientations. The influence of cultural values
on family/household size is also likely to contribute to the correlations.
Autonomy values, in particular, encourage having few children so that
each can develop his or her unique abilities and interests. Autonomy
and egalitarianism values encourage and justify women’s pursuit of meaningful non-family roles. This too reduces the number of children. Embeddedness values promote commitment to the in-group. They sanctify group
continuity and, hence, having many children to promote it. Autonomy
values sanctify individual choice. They justify weighing children against
alternative paths for achieving personal meaning in life, such as careers.
The path analysis in Figure 6 examines possible causal relations among
culture, average household/family size, and socioeconomic level. For
many countries, I found no statistics for average household size that
antedated the mid-90’s measurement of culture or for average family
size that post-dated this period. Examination of concurrent measures of
average household and family size for 60 countries around 1983 reveals
that they correlated highly (.87).12 I therefore used household and family size as proxies for one another in the analysis.
Starting on the left in Figure 6, we see that greater socioeconomic
resources (Individual Resources 1980) lead to smaller families (Family
Size 1985), but family size does not appear to affect change in socioeconomic level (Individual Resources 1993). Next, the figure reveals a
substantial influence of family size on all three cultural value dimensions,
over and above the direct effects of socioeconomic resources. Larger
families in a country induce less cultural emphasis on harmony, egalitarianism, and autonomy values, whereas greater socioeconomic resources
lead to more emphasis on autonomy and egalitarianism but do not affect
harmony vs. mastery. Moreover, family size apparently mediates some
of the effect of socioeconomic resources on cultural values (indirect paths
from Individual Resources 1980 through Family Size 1985).13 Clearly,
family size is important in the development of culture.
12
Household size data are from Kurian (1984) and family size data from the Encyclopaedia
Britannica Almanac 1985.
13
Direct paths from Individual Resources 1980 to the three cultural dimensions are
left out of the figure to avoid clutter. None is significant.
Individual Resources
1993
-.36**
.33**
-.41**
.56**
-.42**
Values 1995:
Autonomy vs.
Embeddedness
Values 1995:
Egalitarianism vs.
Hierarchy
Values 1995:
Harmony vs.
Mastery
Notes: Broken arrows indicate nonsignificant paths. ** p<.01, * p<.05.
.97**
Individual
Resources 1980
-.60**
Family Size 1985
-.44**
.31**
-.15**
.60**
Household Size
2001
R2 = .73
Figure 6
Causal model predicting change in average household/family size with socioeconomic level and cultural values across 73 countries
A Theory of Cultural Value Orientations: Explication and Applications • 63
64 • Shalom H. Schwartz
The right half of Figure 6 reveals that all three cultural value dimensions predict change in household size. Moreover, two dimensions, egalitarianism vs. hierarchy and autonomy vs. embeddedness, fully mediate
relations of socioeconomic resources to change in household size. Thus,
increasing socioeconomic level appears to promote a drop in the size of
households only insofar as it leads to change in cultural values. The
three cultural value dimensions also partially mediate effects of earlier
family size on later household size. To the extent that smaller families
and rising resources increase autonomy values, they promote a decrease
in household size. To the extent that smaller families increase harmony
values, they also promote decreasing household size, though this effect
is weak.
The above findings parallel the zero-order correlations; but the path
from egalitarianism to household size reverses the correlation. Although
smaller families promote a cultural emphasis on egalitarianism vs. hierarchy values, a cultural emphasis on egalitarianism values contributes to
maintaining larger households over time. In other words, an emphasis
on hierarchy values promotes a reduction in household size. This effect
holds even when the other two value dimensions are not included as
predictors.
One speculative interpretation is that both formal and informal normative influence on families is greater in societies whose culture emphasizes hierarchy values. If governments seek to raise productivity through
increasing women’s participation in the workforce, they are likely to generate societal norms that oppose large families. Such norms may reduce
family size more effectively in cultures high in hierarchy. Congruent with
this interpretation, the greatest reductions in household size have occurred
in China, with its formal anti-natalist policies, and in the East Asian
“Tigers” which have rapidly moved toward market economies and whose
culture is highly hierarchical.
Consequences of Cultural Value Orientations
Finally, we consider some consequences of national differences in the
cultural value orientations. We examine how culture relates to women’s
position in society, to a selection of social attitudes held by societal members, and to important social behaviors.
Women’s Equality
The equality of women and their opportunities for autonomous decisionmaking is one domain in which cultural orientations are likely to influence
A Theory of Cultural Value Orientations: Explication and Applications • 65
practices. Women should have greater independence to develop their
own capabilities and follow their own preferences if the culture emphasizes autonomy rather than embeddedness. Similarly, cultures that emphasize egalitarian rather than hierarchical, role-based regulation of
interdependence and work are likely to promote greater equality. A cultural preference for harmonious relations in contrast to assertive mastery might also enhance women’s equality, because women around the
world value benevolence more and power less than men (Schwartz &
Rubel, 2005).
Women’s equality and autonomy are greater in wealthier and more
economically developed countries (e.g., Apodaca, 1998). Doubtless, some
of this association is direct. Material and intellectual resources free individuals – men and especially women – from some of their dependence
on the support of their families, enabling them to strike out on their
own and to demand more equal opportunities. However, the prevailing
cultural orientations may mediate the impact of increased individual
resources that accompanies national wealth. Cultural orientations may
legitimize and facilitate but also delegitimize and inhibit the pursuit of
equality. This can occur through informal or formal sanctions experienced in everyday interaction and through encounters with the structures, practices, and regulations of societal institutions that are grounded
in and justified by the cultural orientations.
To assess possible mediation by culture, I first correlated both individual
resources and the cultural value dimensions with several indicators of
women’s equality. I then examined relations of individual resources with
these indicators, controlling the effects of culture. This reveals whether
cultural mediation substantially shrinks the association with resources.
Ratings of women’s equality in 69 countries in four domains – social,
health, education, and employment – in 1988 (Population Crisis Committee,
1988) served as one set of indicators. The Vanhanen country scores for
power resources in 1993 indexed availability of resources to individuals.
The data on the cultural dimensions and resources post-date the equality data by five to six years on average. However, this should have little effect on the associations: The cultural orientations demonstrate
considerable stability (Schwartz, Bardi, & Bianchi, 2000), and analyses
using gross domestic product per capita in 1985 to index country wealth
yielded essentially the same results.
The top panel of Table 2 shows the correlations of the three cultural
value dimensions and individual resources with the five indicators of
women’s equality. All three cultural dimensions as well as individual
resources correlate significantly with the overall average and with most
sub-categories of equality. Autonomy vs. embeddedness has the strongest
66 • Shalom H. Schwartz
associations, followed by individual resources, egalitarianism vs. hierarchy, and harmony vs. mastery. All correlations are in the expected direction. The last row of the panel reveals the effect of introducing the three
cultural value dimensions as mediators. Clearly supporting cultural mediation, the variance in the overall index of women’s equality accounted
for by individual resources shrinks 80%, when culture is controlled.
Interestingly, though culture mediates resource effects in all four domains,
mediation is smallest (50% reduction) for employment equality, the domain
most directly concerned with producing wealth.
The bottom panel of Table 2 examines cultural mediation of two
other indicators of women’s equality and autonomy, the percent of ministerial positions filled by women in national parliaments in 1994-98
(United Nations Women Watch, 1999) and the percent of married women
aged 19-45 who used any method of contraception in 1990-97 (United
Nations Population Division, 1998). Cultural value dimensions and individual resources correlated substantially with both indicators, as expected.
The more socio-economically developed the country and the more its
culture emphasized autonomy, egalitarianism, and harmony values, the
more political equality and sexual autonomy women enjoyed. Culture
partially mediated the relation of resources to women’s attainment of
ministerial positions, reducing the variance explained by 70%. It fully
mediated the relation of resources to contraception use, reducing the
variance explained by 97%. Here too, the main mediator was the cultural emphasis on autonomy vs. embeddedness values.
Social Attitudes
To examine relations of cultural value emphases to the social attitudes
of societal members, I drew on data from the 2000 wave of the World
Value Survey (Inglehart, et al., 2004). Table 3 presents correlations of
the cultural value dimensions with selected attitudes concerning qualities
important for children to learn, conventional morality, competition, and
tolerance for out-group members. It also presents correlations of these
variables with indexes of country levels of wealth and democratization
from the same period. To assess the extent to which cultural values
mediate effects of wealth and democracy on attitudes, it presents partial
correlations controlling the cultural values in parentheses.
People in countries with cultures high in embeddedness and low in
autonomy choose obedience and hard work, but reject imagination, as
especially important for children. The chosen qualities promote conforming and contributing to the group in traditional ways, the rejected
quality would threaten tradition by generating potentially disruptive, orig-
A Theory of Cultural Value Orientations: Explication and Applications • 67
Table 2
Culture and Women’s Equality: Correlations and Mediation of the Effects of
Country Wealth
Women’s Equality in 1988
Autonomy vs.
Embeddedness
Egalitarianism vs.
Hierarchy
Harmony vs.
Mastery
Individual Resources
1993
Individual Resources
1995 controlling culture
N
Social
Health Educational
66
.58**
.76**
.70**
.42**
.73**
66
.31*
.39**
.45**
.13
.39**
66
.35**
.23
.18
.25*
.31**
65
.48**
.66**
.67**
.50**
.68**
65
.09
.21
.27*
.35**
.30*
N % Ministers who are N
Women 1994-98
Autonomy vs.
70
Embeddedness
Egalitarianism vs.
70
Hierarchy
Harmony vs.
70
Mastery
Individual Resources
70
1993
Individual Resources
70
1995 controlling culture
Employment Average
% Married Women 19-45 who
use Contraception 1990-97
.51**
53
.76**
.54**
53
.26*
.26*
53
.11
.63**
52
.64**
.34**
52
.20
**p<.01, *p<.05, 2-tailed.
inal ideas. Countries whose culture emphasizes hierarchy and mastery
also view hard work – critical to insure fulfilling role obligations faithfully and struggling persistently to master reality – as especially important. Obedience does not relate significantly to the egalitarianism/hierarchy
dimension, but it does go with a cultural hierarchy orientation as one
might expect. Only harmony/mastery, but neither national culture, nor
wealth, nor democracy predicts the importance of unselfishness. A mastery orientation may legitimize selfishness because it justifies self-assertion in order to get ahead.
People in countries whose culture emphasizes embeddedness, hierarchy, and mastery consider unconditional respect for parents and religion
more important and they more strongly oppose behavior that threatens
traditional family and sexual mores compared to people in countries
57
59
59
60
60
52
55
55
% who agree that:
Must respect parents regardless
of qualities & faults
Religion very important in life
Homosexuality never justifiable
Abortion never justifiable
Divorce never justifiable
Competition is good
% who say would not like as neighbor:
Immigrants/foreign workers
People with a criminal record
-.56**
-.43**
-.77**
-.71**
-.75**
-.58**
-.63**
-.21
-.52**
-.53**
.48**
.03
Autonomy vs.
Embeddedness
-.45**
-.44**
-.57**
-.32*
-.63**
-.36**
-.50**
-.32*
-.14
-.57**
.24
-.05
Egalitarianism vs.
Hierarchy
-.23
-.30*
-.40**
-.42**
-.39**
-.41**
-.42**
-.29*
-.21
-.27*
-.04
-.30*
Harmony vs.
Mastery
-.43**
-.21
-.64**
-.57**
-.79**
-.48**
-.49**
-.40**
-.45**
-.41**
.29*
-.05
(.00)
(.27)
(-.11)
(-.13)
(-.48**)
(-.06)
(.04)
(-.30*)
(-.17)A
(-.05)
(-.05)
(-.04)
Democracy 1995
Freedom House
Correlations in parentheses are controlled for country scores on the three cultural value dimensions. **p<.01, *p<.05, 2-tailed.
58
58
58
58
% who select as an especially desirable
quality for children to learn
Obedience
Hard Work
Imagination
Unselfishness
A
N
Social Attitude
(-.32*)
(.01)
(.41**)
(.07)
(.08)
(.05)
(-.10)
(-.37**)
(.33*)
(.11)
-.40** (.08)
-.57** (-.39**)
-.71**
-.48**
-.75**
-.38**
-.46**
-.14
-.41**
-.62**
.56**
.11
Economic Level
GDPpc 1995
Table 3
Cultural Values and Social Attitudes: Correlations and Mediation of Democracy and Economic Level Effects by Culture (Partialed)
68 • Shalom H. Schwartz
A Theory of Cultural Value Orientations: Explication and Applications • 69
where autonomy, egalitarianism, and harmony values prevail. These
findings are congruent with the fact that the two attitudes express conformity to expectations of authorities and extended kin-groups but thwart
innovative, unconventional behavior that expresses individual preferences,
and they reject new realities. People are more likely to view competition as good if they live in countries with cultures that emphasize hierarchy and mastery. Both these cultural orientations justify the differential
distribution of resources to which competition is directed, whereas their
opposing poles, egalitarianism and harmony, call for cooperative regulation of interdependence.
Readiness to accept immigrants, foreign workers, or people with criminal records as neighbors is lower in cultures that emphasize embeddedness and hierarchy as opposed to autonomy and egalitarianism. In
such cultures, people are more likely to fear exposure to values, beliefs,
norms, practices, traditions, etc., that differ from their own. Such exposure challenges and endangers the values, beliefs, etc. they cherish and
might undermine the established hierarchical structure of roles they
assume to be necessary for the smooth functioning of their society. A
cultural emphasis on harmony values, which encourages tolerance, also
correlates with acceptance of those with criminal records significantly
and of immigrants weakly.
Table 3 indicates that national level of democracy correlates significantly
with 10 of the 12 social attitudes, as does national economic level. Does
culture mediate these associations? I take a reduction of at least 60% in
the variance that a structural variable explains to indicate substantial
mediation. Using this criterion, the partial correlations in Table 3 reveal
that culture substantially mediates the effects of each structural variable for
nine of the 10 attitudes it predicts. Culture does not mediate the tendency
to approve of competition more where democracy is lower, and it shrinks
by only 47% the association of lower national wealth with rejection of
neighbors who have a criminal record. These findings suggest that social
structural variables may affect individuals’ attitudes largely through their
effects on the cultural orientations that prevail in the society.14
14
Although less plausible, one might suggest that cultural orientations influence individuals’ attitudes largely through their effects on the social structural variables. Applying
the same criterion of a reduction of at least 60% in the explained variance, this time
partialing culture on the structural variables, reveals that democracy and economic level
substantially mediate the effects of autonomy vs. embeddedness for only two of the 10
attitudes it predicts, of egalitarianism vs. hierarchy for four of the nine attitudes it predicts, and of harmony vs. mastery for none of the nine attitudes it predicts (partial correlations available from the author).
70 • Shalom H. Schwartz
Attitudes and Behavior in the European Social Survey
Thus far, we have examined relations of cultural orientations to the attitudes and behavior of societal members using culture scores based on
the SVS. As discussed above, the human values items in the European
Social Survey (ESS) also provide scores for these orientations. These
scores are based on few items and the heterogeneity and number of
countries in the ESS data set is limited. However, studying relations of
the cultural value orientations to attitudes and behavior in the representative national samples of the ESS can shed light on the robustness
of the cultural value theory.
Here, I examine relations of the cultural value orientations to one
attitude (opposition to immigration) and two types of behavior (membership in voluntary organizations and political activism). I also present
relations of social structural variables to the attitude and behaviors and
assess the extent to which culture mediates these relations. In Schwartz
(2006), I present more elaborate analyses of the relations of culture to
these and other attitudes and behavior, using hierarchical linear modeling to take both individual level (e.g., age, education, personal values)
and country level variables into account simultaneously.
Table 4 presents correlations with the seven cultural orientations, with
measures of country wealth (gross domestic product per capita in 1999)
and average annual inflation between 1990 and 1999 from the ESS
macro-data file, and with average household size in 2001. The index of
democracy varies insufficiently across these countries to merit inclusion.
Three ESS items measured opposition to accepting ‘other’ immigrants –
those of a different race/ethnic group, from poorer European, and poorer
non-European countries. A summary index of these items revealed great
variation in levels of opposition across countries.15 Column 1 in Table
4 reveals that opposition to ‘other’ immigrants correlates negatively with
intellectual autonomy, egalitarianism, and country economic level, and
positively with inflation and household size. The two cultural orientations emphasize openness to and tolerance for what is new and different
as well as treating others as moral equals. As such, they encourage acceptance of immigrants and militate against opposing them. To assess mediation of structural effects by culture, I partialed on these two cultural
orientations. The partial correlations in parentheses suggest full mediation of structural effects.
15
I included only the 15 West European countries in this analysis, because immigration to East Europe and to Israel has different meanings.
A Theory of Cultural Value Orientations: Explication and Applications • 71
Table 4
Correlations of Cultural Value Orientations with Selected Attitudes and Behavior
across European Social Survey Countries and Mediation of Structural Effects
Cultural Value Orientation
Opposition to
‘Other’ Immigrants
N
Embeddedness
Intellectual Autonomy
Affective Autonomy
Hierarchy
Egalitarianism
Harmony
Mastery
GDPpc 1999
Inflation 1990-99
Household Size 2001
Political
Activism
15
Membership
in Voluntary
Organizations
18
.49
-.63*
-.33
.33
-.68**
-.23
.19
-.56* (.12)A
.69** (.12)
.45 (-.04)
-.76**
.79**
.42
-.26
.60**
.06
.07
.54* (.31)
-.56* (-.06)
-.73** (-.39)
-.63**
.84**
.40
-.48*
.78**
.17
-.18
.53* (.39)
-.68** (-.19)
-.68** (-.20)
20
** p<.01, * p<.05, 2-tailed.
Notes: ACorrelation partialed for intellectual autonomy and egalitarianism cultural orientations.
Consider next membership in voluntary organizations, a core aspect
of social capital (e.g., Putnam, 2000). The number of memberships in
12 types of organizations (e.g., sports, humanitarian, labor, religious)
indexed this variable in the ESS. Column 2 of Table 4 reports correlations with membership. Three cultural orientations and all three structural variables predicted country differences. Greater intellectual autonomy,
egalitarianism, and country wealth go with joining voluntary organizations. Cultural embeddedness, higher inflation, and larger households
accompany lower membership.
Intellectual autonomy and egalitarianism both entail a cultural view
of individuals as independent actors with rights and responsibilities to
express these interests through voluntary action. This would encourage
joining voluntary organizations. In contrast, cultural embeddedness may
discourage unnecessary involvement with people outside the broad ingroup; it emphasizes loyalty and devotion to the in-group instead. Such
a cultural atmosphere would not support membership in voluntary groups
in the wider society. After partialing on intellectual autonomy and egalitarianism, the variance explained by GDPpc, by inflation, and by household size all shrink by at least 60%, suggesting substantial mediation by
culture.
As a final example, consider political activism. This was measured as
the number of politically relevant, legal acts that respondents reported
performing in the 12 past months out of nine (e.g., contacting a politician,
72 • Shalom H. Schwartz
participating in a public demonstration, boycotting a product). Intellectual
autonomy and egalitarianism predicted greater political activism (column
3 of Table 4), whereas the opposing cultural orientations, embeddedness
and hierarchy predicted less activism. Political activism necessitates taking initiatives, expressing views that may oppose conventional practices
or expectations, often promoting causes that go beyond in-group selfinterest (e.g., protecting the weak or the environment). Such action fits
a cultural atmosphere that encourages autonomous thought, individual
responsibility, and cooperative work, but it violates a cultural atmosphere
focused on preserving the status quo and the authoritative social order.
All three structural variables also correlated significantly with political
activism. The cultural orientations of intellectual autonomy and egalitarianism mediated the strong negative effects of inflation and large
households on political activism, but not the enhancing effect of country wealth. The three sets of findings in Table 4 suggest, with only one
exception, that country wealth, inflation, and household size influence
these important attitudes and behaviors largely through their influence
on the prevailing cultural value orientations.16
The findings with the ESS data together with those reported earlier
for combined teacher and student samples across many nations demonstrate that the cultural orientations have robust effects even when measured with different instruments, in different types of samples, and across
a wide variety of countries. It is often more convenient to work with
the three cultural dimensions, as reported in Tables 1-3. However, the
correlations of the single cultural orientations in Table 4 show that doing
so may sometimes obscure meaningful information. The orientations that
constitute the poles of each dimension correlate in opposing directions
in almost every case, but the strength of the correlations can vary considerably. For all three examples in Table 4, egalitarianism has much
stronger correlations than hierarchy, its opposing pole. Moreover, the
correlations of intellectual autonomy are much stronger than those of
affective autonomy, the orientation with which it combines to form the
autonomy pole of the autonomy/embeddedness dimension. These patterns doubtless reflect the particular topics of study. It is therefore worthwhile, in each case, to examine whether combining cultural orientations
to form dimensions loses important information.
16
Here too, one might speculate that the two cultural orientations influence individuals’
attitudes and behavior largely through their effects on the social structural variables.
Controlling for all three structural variables, the variance explained by the two key cultural values shrinks substantially in five of the six cases. However, the partial correlations
for egalitarianism and intellectual autonomy are larger than those for the structural variables in 15 of 18 comparisons (2 values × 3 structural variables × 3 dependent variables).
A Theory of Cultural Value Orientations: Explication and Applications • 73
Conclusions
This article presented a theory of seven cultural value orientations that
form three cultural value dimensions. Although it is more complex than
other dimensional theories of cultural variation, this theory permits more
finely tuned characterizations of cultures. Analyses of data from 73 countries using one instrument and from 20 countries using another demonstrate the validity of the seven cultural orientations. Equally important,
the analyses showed that these orientations form an integrated circular
structure that captures their theorized compatibilities and oppositions.
This yields three broad dimensions (Figure 1).
The analyses demonstrated that all three cultural dimensions contribute
uniquely to the explanation of important social phenomena. The autonomy/embeddedness and egalitarianism/hierarchy dimensions often showed
a similar pattern of positive or negative associations. This reflects the
positions of their component orientations, as adjacent or opposed, in the
circular structure of cultural orientations. The harmony/mastery dimension exhibited a different pattern of associations. It correlated least strongly
with indicators of socio-economic development. Its correlations with the
attitudes and behavior studied here were also weaker, perhaps because
this article focused on variables related to development. On the other
hand, measurement of harmony and mastery may be problematic. The
aspects of culture that the harmony/mastery dimension captures may be
especially distinctive. It added a unique element to our understanding
of attitudes toward unselfishness and competition.
The most striking finding when comparing the mapping of national
cultures in the research based on the Hofstede, Inglehart, and Schwartz
approaches is that they identify such similar cultural regions around the
world. At least two of the three approaches, and usually all three, identify African, Confucian, East-Central European (ex-communist), EnglishSpeaking, Latin American, South Asian, and West European regions.
This is amazing, considering how different the approaches are. They
differ in their basic cultural constructs, in their methods of measurement
(work values and attitudes; beliefs, preferences, and judgments on a range
of topics; abstract values or profiles reflecting individuals’ important goals),
in the types of samples studied (IBM employees, representative national
samples, teachers, students), and in their data-gathering periods (from
the late ’60s into the 21st century).
The emergence of similar cultural regions across approaches affirms
the reality of the systematic cultural value differences these approaches
tap. The location of similar sets of countries in these regions in the
Inglehart and Schwartz mappings also affirms the meaningfulness of
countries as cultural units. The substantially similar ordering of countries
74 • Shalom H. Schwartz
on cultural orientations or dimensions, when different sub-samples (e.g.,
age or gender samples) are used to map countries in both the Schwartz
and Inglehart analyses, further supports the idea of national cultures.
Nonetheless, it is important to investigate other cultural units, such as
ethnic groups, in future research. The research reported here, that used
52 ethnic subgroups from the ESS data as the unit of analysis, demonstrated that discrimination of the seven cultural orientations holds at the
ethnic group level and not only at the country level. This enables us to
ask questions about cultural differences and similarities among ethnic
groups, to compare the impact of nation with that of ethnicity, and to
assess the effects of immigration to new countries on the culture of ethnic
groups.
The analyses revealed substantial empirical overlap between Inglehart’s
tradition/secular-rational dimension and my autonomy/embeddedness
dimension and between Inglehart’s survival/self-expression dimension and
both my autonomy/embeddedness and egalitarianism/hierarchy dimensions. Nonetheless, several countries exhibited substantially divergent rankings on each of these overlapping dimensions. Each dimension apparently
captures some aspects of culture not captured by the others. For example,
the level of conventional religious commitment apparently influences tradition/secular-rational scores strongly but has much less impact on autonomy/embeddedness scores. In contrast, autonomy-embeddedness scores
apparently reflect the cultural emphasis on extended in-group bonds vs.
pursuit of individual uniqueness more than tradition/secular rationalscores do. This difference between the cultural dimensions accounts for
the divergent rankings of ex-communist countries on the two dimensions.
The conceptual and empirical differences between the Schwartz and
Inglehart dimensions can be exploited by using them together to derive
deeper understandings of particular national cultures. Doing so may also
contribute to our understanding of what each dimension and cultural
orientation actually taps. We do not yet know what the optimal number of dimensions and orientations is for characterizing and broadly comparing cultures. Nor do we know which dimensions and orientations will
be most fruitful. The findings from research using the approach presented here and the World Value Survey suggest, however, that studying basic values is a desirable path to follow. Values are particularly
significant dimensions for comparing cultures because they affect so many
different aspects of life. But other dimensions of cultural difference may
also be important.
The critical value dimensions are unlikely to be orthogonal. They
evolve as preferences for resolving basic issues in managing life in society.
It is not logical that preferences for resolving one issue are independent
A Theory of Cultural Value Orientations: Explication and Applications • 75
of those for other issues. Cultures that encourage autonomy in individual/
group relations are unlikely to prefer hierarchy for managing human
interdependence. Though they are not opposites, autonomy and hierarchy rarely appear together because they presume conflicting views of
human nature. Of course, we can derive orthogonal dimensions from
data. But in doing so we miss the pull toward coherence in national
cultures.
To conclude, I quote an earlier summary of the points on which the
approach to cultural dimensions presented here differs from others
(Schwartz, 2004, p. 73): “(a) It derived the cultural orientations from a
priori theorizing rather than post hoc examination of data. (b) It designated
a priori the value items that serve as markers for each orientation. (c)
It used as measures only items tested for cross-cultural equivalence of
meaning. (d) It included a set of items demonstrated to cover the range
of values recognized cross-culturally, a step toward ensuring relative comprehensiveness of cultural value dimensions. (e) It specified how the cultural orientations are organized into a coherent system of related dimensions
and verified this organization, rather than assuming that orthogonal
dimensions best capture cultural reality. (f ) It brought empirical evidence
that the order of national cultures on each of the orientations is robust
across different types of samples from each of a large number of nations
around the world [and using different instruments]. These distinctive features increase the promise of this approach for future research.”
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Globalization, “McDonaldization”
and Values: Quo Vadis?
Yilmaz Esmer
Abstract
It is frequently asserted that the ongoing process that is commonly referred to as globalization should bring about widespread changes in values. Furthermore, it is hypothesized that
the unparalleled increases in the flow of capital, goods, services
and information coupled with the revolutionary developments
in information and communication technologies should result
in a convergence of values.
This paper is attempt to assess the direction and the magnitude of value change between 1981, when the first WVS/EVS
surveys were conducted, and 2001, the last year for which
data are available. Data from some 20 countries are analyzed
to follow possible changes in values. Furthermore, the paper
offers a test of the convergence hypothesis by examining the
standard deviations and the coefficients of variation of a wideranging list of values.
The conclusion is that cultural value change has been rather
limited during this period at least for this sample of countries.
Among the dimensions studied, marriage, family and gender
relations seem to be the area of most significant change. On
the other hand, we have found almost no evidence for even
a slow convergence of values.
During the two and a half decades following the first round of values
surveys in 1981, the world has witnessed profound changes in political,
economic and social spheres and ever accelerating technological advances.
If the well-known Chinese curse, “may you live in interesting times” was
ever to refer to a specific time period in human history, the last couple
of decades of the 20th century would certainly be a strong candidate.
80 • Yilmaz Esmer
The major developments of this era are only too familiar to repeat here.
We like to recall historical periods by certain keywords to refer to its
major characteristics. And it would perhaps be an understatement to say
that the most popular keyword to characterize the last 25 years of world
history is “globalization.” The term, according to Anthony Giddens, “has
come from nowhere to be everywhere in a period of just a decade.”
(quoted in Dervis 2005:3) A casual Google search at the time of this
writing turned out no less than 110 million entries for “globalization –
definition.”
Globalization is customarily defined as an unparalleled increase in the
flow of capital, goods, services, and information. Less mentioned are
increased political, legal and cultural exchanges which are assumed to
bring about convergence in these spheres. However, at least to this
author, the most dazzling developments took place in information and
communication technologies. Many products and services that seem to
be integral and indispensable parts of our lives either became widespread
or even came into existence during this era. Younger generations cannot even imagine a life without portable computers, mobile telephones,
the internet, MP3 players and so goes on the list. Yet those in their 50s
today will remember the days when such gadgets and services were too
wild even for the fantasies of writers of science fiction. The impact of
these technological developments on both the speed and the volume of
communication and information exchange has been mind boggling.
It was around the middle of the last century when social scientists
were measuring postal mail and telephone traffic as indicators of social
integration. In two seminal works, Nationalism and Social Communication
(Deutsch 1962) and The Nerves of Government (Deutsch 1966) Karl Deutsch
was drawing attention to the central role of communication in government and international relations. Likening it to the nerve system of an
organism, Deutsch stressed the significance of communication as well as
the movement of goods and services in drawing up civilizational and
cultural boundaries. “Several societies might be connected to each other
by a larger interchange of goods and services than with any other societies. In this case we might say that they form a sort of great society,
something parallel in some respects to what is sometimes called a civilization, but not identical with it.” Furthermore, communication is an
important element in forming the “common set of stable, habitual preferences” that defines a culture. “In so far as a common culture facilitates communication, it forms a community” (Deutsch 1962:88; emphases
original).
The “interchange of goods and services” as well as capital among
countries today is not even comparable to what existed in the 1950s.
Globalization, “McDonaldization” and Values: Quo Vadis? • 81
Capital markets are highly integrated around the globe and huge sums
can travel between countries instantly, sometimes opening the door for
serious financial crises. Movies and books circle the world in a few seconds. Tens or even hundreds of millions visit the same websites, watch
the same news channels, and even laugh at the same jokes that are circulated on the internet. They watch the same movies and enjoy the
same fast food. McDonald serves “more customers daily than there are
people in Greece, Ireland, and Switzerland together” (Barber 1996:23).
According to the Universal Postal Union (www.upu.int), as of October
2005, people around the world send 16 million international postal items
and 1.2 billion domestic postal items a day. Compared to the e-mail
traffic, however, these figures look rather unimpressive. Again as of
October 2005, there were 1.2 billion active e-mail accounts and 686
million e-mail users in the world. The number of e-mail messages per day
were estimated to be around 141 billion (figures are from www.radicati.
com). Telecommunication statistics published by the International Telecommunication Union, an agency of the U.N., are equally, if not more,
remarkable. In 1991, there were 546 million main telephone lines and
only 16 million mobile cellular subscribers in the world. By the end of
2004, while the number of main lines more than doubled to 1,207 million, the number of mobile subscribers reached 1,758 million. The number of internet users increased almost two-hundredfold, from 4.4 to 863
million. Despite the astounding rise in internet communications, globalization had an effect on more conventional modes of telecommunication as well. For instance, again between 1991 and 2004, international
telephone traffic minutes increased from 38 billion to 145 billion (www.
itu.org).
As critics point out, there is no doubt that globalization has not yet
reached large populations in the third world who are, for all intents and
purposes, outside the “global loop.” However, it is equally true that at
the end of the 20th century, more people than ever in the history of
mankind were involved in the international exchange of goods, services
and cultural products and were engaged in intense communication. As
put by Stiglitz (2002:4) “Globalization has reduced the sense of isolation
felt in much of the developing world and has given many people in the
developing countries access to knowledge well beyond the reach of even
the wealthiest in any country a century ago. The antiglobalization protests
themselves are a result of this connectedness.”
So profound were the developments in international communication
during the last 15 to 20 years. On the other hand, the changes in the
global political and economic scene were extraordinary as well, to say
the least. At the beginning of the decade of the 1980s, when the first
82 • Yilmaz Esmer
European and World Values Surveys were carried out, the European
Union had nine member states. By 1995, that number rose to 15 and
on January 1, 2002, twelve of the 15 members took a gigantic step
towards economic integration and adopted a common currency. Two
years later, in 2004, the EU accepted 10 more countries for full membership and four additional ones are at the doorsteps. Although the
process is by no means complete and although nation-states are still the
main centers of political decision-making, Europe today is more united
and integrated than it has ever been in its history.
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the Communist system represented yet another momentous step towards political and economic integration. Although this was not “the end of history,” it nevertheless brought
an end to the Cold War and the bipolarity in international relations
that the world had gotten so used to. Most of the formerly Communist
Eastern Europe and some former Soviet republics acceded to the EU.
Markets opened up. Exchanges at all levels and in all spheres between
the former East and the West intensified. Indeed, “there is a profound
sense of globalism brought about by tourism, by world sport, world news,
McDonaldization, AIDS, human rights and so on” (Turner 1994:9).
In view of these radical changes and technological developments, a
legitimate question to ask is what happened to cultural values. First, did
the values change significantly and if so what was the magnitude and
direction of the change? Second, is the world really “McDonaldizing?”
(Ritzer 2000). In other words, can one meaningfully talk about a convergence of values. If values are dependent on or even simply related
to economic, political and technological structures, convergence of values would be a very plausible hypothesis. In fact, cultural convergence
of sorts is a very widely held assumption. Berger (2002:2) agrees with
the common wisdom: “What everyone assumes is not always wrong.
There is indeed an emerging global culture, and it is heavily American
in origin and content. It is not the only game in town [. . .] but it is
the biggest game going and it will likely stay that way for the foreseeable future.”
Inkeles (1998) while recognizing the existence of strong local resistances here and there, nevertheless, makes a strong case for convergence.
He distinguishes between two areas of convergence. First, there is convergence at the institutional level. All nations adopt similar institutional
patterns. But more important for our present purposes, “the second realm
of convergence involves the movement of national populations away from
whatever had been their diverse indigenous cultural patterns and toward
the adoption of attitudes, values and modes of daily behavior that constitute the elements of a more or less common world culture. In this
Globalization, “McDonaldization” and Values: Quo Vadis? • 83
process, almost every aspect of life is influenced, and in many instances
profoundly changed” (Inkeles 1998:xiv). Inkeles (1998:xvii) goes further
to argue that “the transformative power of modern institutions is so great
that the response of the people to them will be very much alike regardless
of the population’s cultural starting point or the larger socioeconomic
context in which they are located.” This is a powerful statement indeed
and one with which Taylor (2001), among others, disagrees. In Taylor’s
view, modernization is not an acultural process as argued by many.
Forces of modernization interact with local cultural values and may proceed along different paths. Hence, alternative or multiple modernities.
Convergence or not, the widely acknowledged assumption is that modernization and globalization will inevitably bring about significant changes
in values. Change may be unilinear as many classical and some contemporary modernization theorists predicted or it may be more culture
dependent (Taylor 2001) and will not necessarily follow a predetermined
path (Inglehart 1997; Inglehart and Welzel 2005).
If we assume value change to be propelled by the powerful forces of
modernization and globalization, we are faced with a number of important and interesting questions. First, which values are most likely to
change and how fast? Second, which societies will be more prone and
which will be more resistant to change? Third, should we expect value
change in a whole society or in certain segments of it, such as the better
educated, the younger, the well-off, etc.? Fourth, assuming change, will
it be change along parallel paths or do we observe a convergence (at
least a move towards convergence) of values? At the other extreme, is
it even possible that, despite such cultural standardization on the surface, some cultural values are diverging rather than converging?
It is often stated that advanced societies are characterized by a value
shift towards individualization (Ester, Halman and de Moor 1993). So
much so that, individualization lies at the core of all value change brought
about by modernization (Inkeles 1998). Inglehart argues that this move
toward individualization, already visible during the process of industrialization, becomes even more pronounced and more free of state authority in the postindustrialized society (Inglehart 1997).
Religion is a major area of expected change. It is thought that increased
secularization is itself highly related to individualization. Individualization,
after all, means a weakening of social and state controls on the individual and religion, in one form or another, has been the main vehicle
of social control in all societies. That modernization (that is, an emphasis
on rational thinking and the scientific method) will bring about secularization is a core idea of the Enlightenment. The secularization process
is thought to have accelerated particularly in Western Europe in the
84 • Yilmaz Esmer
post-World War II era, but persistently high levels of religiosity in the
United States is still in want of a satisfactory explanation. Another possible exception is the Islamic world which, to many, is becoming, if anything, not less but rather more religious. Therefore, many argue that
the predictions of secularization theory simply did not materialize (Berger
1999). Nevertheless, there is good reason, both theoretical and empirical, to think that we have been heading towards a more secularized
world on the whole despite strong resistance and sporadic reversals (Norris
and Inglehart 2004). Clearly, religion is one major area for observing
change.
Family is as universal an institution as one can find. It exists in some
form or another in every society and people everywhere always have
and still do attach great importance to the family (Esmer 2004). Emphasizing the centrality of marriage and family relations in every society,
Inkeles (1998:xvii) writes that “if marriage and family patterns can be
shown to converge, then it might be argued that no other institution
can hope to escape the pressures for the adoption of new modes of interpersonal relationship. We do indeed find much evidence of profound
change and of resultant convergence in the way in which marriages are
arranged in residence patterns, in fertility rates and in many other matters.” The expected direction of change is a move away from arranged
marriages, extended families and large numbers of children. Divorce
becomes more and more commonplace and acceptable. Premarital sex
ceases to be a taboo. In fact, the very logic of a legal marriage is questioned and consensual unions may be preferred over civil or church
marriages.
Very much related to changes in marriage and family relations are
the status of women and gender relations. Industrialization opened the
way for female employment. Postindustrialization made it possible for
women to pursue careers in areas traditionally in the exclusive domain
of men such as politics, banking, sciences, etc. Along with these developments, values changed as well. Gender equity, as least in theory, gained
wider acceptance. Female employment became much more widespread
and, more importantly, gained widespread approval. As a natural consequence of these changes, women in postindustrialized societies demand
more sexual freedoms and equality with men in the bedroom. Helped
by the advances in birth control methods, virginity and chastity are
expected to lose their status as core values in large segments of postindustrial societies.
The postmaterialist citizen is expected to be more tolerant of differences.
Minorities are not to be discriminated against and differences in sexual
orientations are to be accepted. Tolerance, of course, is a central demo-
Globalization, “McDonaldization” and Values: Quo Vadis? • 85
cratic value as well and globalization is expected to bring about a pronounced shift towards democratic values such as tolerance, participation,
free speech, rule of law, etc.
While political values become more democratic, economic values are
to favor market over state regulation or intervention. Competition, entrepreneurship, meritocracy are to become dominant values. This is only
natural if free movement of goods, services and finance capital (but
certainly not labor) is a fundamental and defining characteristic of
globalization.
Globalization should also cause a decrease in nationalism and nationalistic sentiments. If national borders mean less and less both economically and culturally, it follows that nationalism as a value must lose
ground. The eventual expectation would be a global citizen with global
values – however one defines the latter.
In short, the cultural consequences of modernization which can be
summed up as a decrease in the importance of religion, traditional family and nationalism are assumed to continue and even intensify. To this
list, one could add the dominant political and economic/business values
that we have briefly mentioned above. Finally, standardization of all cultural forms, or “McDonaldization” would reign.
Are these developments, which make eminent sense from a certain
theoretical viewpoint, indeed taking place? Or are the local forces putting
up strong and successful resistance to the winds of globalization? Inglehart
and Baker (2000) – while arguing that economic development has a
powerful impact on cultural values – nevertheless think that both of the
above statements are true. In other words, while there is evidence of
significant and large scale cultural change, cultural traditions do persist
in many places. Is beauty, then, in the eye of the beholder? To some
extent this must be true – you will probably find change if you look for
change and vice versa. It is also true that the answer to the question
mostly depends on where you look. Take religiosity, for example. If your
focus is Northern and Western Europe, you find strong confirmation of
secularization theory. If you turn your eyes to the United States – an
equally modernized, wealthy and postindustrial society – you will observe
exactly the opposite. Which one is the exception? And how about the
less developed, less advanced corners of the globe? How does one even
begin to explain the resurgence of fundamentalist Islam?
It seems like both modernization theorists and culturalists are right to
some extent. And perhaps it would be misleading to assume that a
single answer valid for all societies or even only for a subset of societies
exists. Nevertheless, it is hard to resist the temptation to detect the overall direction of the winds of change.
86 • Yilmaz Esmer
Convergence is yet another issue and perhaps the key concept to test
whether culture is a dependent or an independent variable. If, despite
all the developments that we have very briefly summarized above, there
is still no observable convergence of values, it will be difficult if not
impossible to argue that cultural values simply follow and reflect political, economic and technological changes. Inglehart and Baker (2000:49),
after examining data from 65 societies, conclude that “Economic development tends to push societies in a common direction, but rather than
converging, they seem to move on parallel trajectories shaped by their
cultural heritages. We doubt that the forces of modernization will produce a homogenized world culture in the foreseeable future.” Put differently,
modernization (economic and technological development, industrialization, mass education, etc.) does exert an influence on values in a predicted direction, but the magnitude and occasionally even the direction
of the influence will depend on cultural heritage – a concept which, for
the most part, can be translated as “religious traditions.”1 Taken to its
logical extreme, this line of reasoning leads to the conclusion that religious tradition is the single most important factor in explaining cultural
change. In other words, forces of modernization will have different effects
even on secularized populations depending on their past religious traditions or heritage.
Szakolczai and Fustos (1998) emphasize the significance of axial belief
systems in structuring value systems. Thus, they concur with Inglehart
and Baker about the importance of, for example, Catholic and Protestant
traditions as axial moments. One remembers the widely told story about
the survey researcher asking a respondent her religion. When given the
answer “I am an atheist” the interviewer probes further: “I understand;
but are you a Catholic atheist or a Protestant atheist?” Research seems
to confirm that being a Catholic atheist or a Protestant atheist – or
Jewish or Muslim atheist, for that matter – does make a difference. If
that is the case, and if such “axial moments” have long-lasting effects,
then the cultural convergence predicted by the broad range of scholars
who see structure and communication as major independent variables is
a long way off.
Adding an important dimension to the convergence-divergence debate,
Diez-Nicolas (2002) argues that a convergence of values will take place
among the elite much sooner than the masses and he has developed a
social position scale to test his hypothesis. He finds that those at the top
of the scale do indeed exhibit a convergence of values.
1
Inglehart and Baker (2000) do mention factors other than religion that define a society’s cultural heritage. For instance, experience of living under Communism is one such
factor.
Globalization, “McDonaldization” and Values: Quo Vadis? • 87
The minimum necessary requirement to answer the questions that we
have posed is the availability of a measure of cultural change. But defining
and measuring cultural change is not a simple task, to say the least. The
concept is multi-dimensional in the true sense of the word and both the
magnitude and the direction of change are different for different dimensions as well as for different societies. Thus for each society, one can
think of a matrix of value dimensions and the velocity of change. If one
wanted, one could further divide the matrix into different age, education,
income, etc. groups.
There have been well-known attempts to reduce the number of value
dimensions and to trace change along these limited numbers of dimensions which can explain a significant proportion of the total variance in
all measured values. The updated versions of two of the most notable
contributions in the literature to the mapping of global values are included
in this volume (see the articles by Inglehart and by Schwartz) where the
authors explain their schemes in detail.
In this article, I have a much more modest aim. I will select few theoretically significant value clusters that have been listed above to try to
see if and how they have changed since 1981. In addition variances
between the two points in time will be compared in order to assess
whether or not one can meaningfully talk about a convergence of values.
Data and Analysis
European and World Values Surveys enable us to trace cultural change
in some 20 countries in the two decades between 1981 and 2001.
Admittedly, this is a limited number of cases for a conclusive analysis.
However, the list of countries for which comparative data are available
for 1981 and for two decades later includes societies from all continents
and at varying levels of economic development (Table 1). Of course, 20
years may be too short a period of time to see the full effects of the
political, economic and technological developments of the era, but this
is the longest time span that our data will allow.
The following analysis looks at data both at the individual and country levels. At the individual level, overall means and variances for 1981
and 20012 surveys are compared. The former, of course, will show us
the degree and the direction of change. A decrease in variances, on the
other hand, will point out to a convergence. Data for the individual
level analyses are weighted so that the sample sizes of countries are
2
Actually, these surveys have been conducted between 1999 and 2001 with the exception of Australia where the most recent survey is dated 1996.
88 • Yilmaz Esmer
Table 1
Countries Included in the 20-Year Comparison
GDP/Cap 1980
Argentina
Australia
Belgium
Canada
Denmark
Finland
France
W. Germany/Germany
Great Britain+N. Ireland
Hungary
Iceland
Ireland
Italy
Japan
S. Korea
Mexico
Netherlands
S. Africa
Spain
Sweden
USA
GDP/Cap 1998
8,245
14,334
14,467
16,176
15,227
12,948
15,103
14,113
12,928
n.a.
9,219
20,390
19,442
20,559
22,123
18,324
19,558
17,799
18,714
6,780
8,541
13,153
13,429
4,114
6,289
14,700
4,390
9,492
14,936
18,577
18,183
17,759
20,431
13,317
6,655
20,224
3,858
14,227
18,685
27,331
Source: Maddison, Angus. 2001. The World Economy: A Millennial Perspective. Paris:
OECD.
equalized. At the country level, we compare the variances of country
means at the beginning and the end of the two decades. Again, a decrease
in these variances would indicate that, on the average, the countries in
question are getting closer with respect to the particular value. It is not
impossible for the comparison of variances at these two levels to yield
different results. To clarify the point by way of a more familiar example, income distribution of individuals in a given country may deteriorate but at the same time regional mean incomes may get closer to the
overall mean.
It is sometimes asserted that, when the means of the two measurements (in our case the means for 1981 and 2001 surveys) are significantly
different, the coefficient of variation V (where V is equal to the standard deviation divided by the mean) is a better measure of dispersion
since it corrects the standard deviation for the size of the mean. It can
Globalization, “McDonaldization” and Values: Quo Vadis? • 89
be shown that the maximum value that V can attain is equal to the
square root of N-1. Thus a comparison of the ratio of V to the maximum possible value of V is an indicator of convergence or divergence.
Our analyses take into account the changes in both the standard deviations and the coefficients of variation.
Before reporting the results, we should warn that statistical significance
levels should be regarded with great caution. It is clear that with tens
of thousands of observations, even infinitesimal differences at the individual level will be statistically significant. On the other hand, with a
maximum of 21 observations at the country level, it will be very difficult
to obtain statistical significance. Finally, it should be noted that not every
country in Table 1 is included in every analysis due to the fact that
some questions have not been asked in some countries.
We now turn our attention to the results of the analyses, starting with
religiosity.
a. Religiosity
Secularization theory has a clear and universal prediction with respect
to the relationship between modernization and the level of religiosity:
higher levels of economic welfare and higher levels of secular education
with its emphasis on the scientific method will bring about a noticeable
decrease in the importance of religion. On the other hand, critics of secularization theories draw our attention to the positive correlation between
religious diversity and the level of religiosity (for a detailed analysis of
these approaches see Pettersson in this issue; see also Esmer and Pettersson,
forthcoming).
Needless to say, religiosity itself is a multi-dimensional concept and
the researcher is faced with the task of selecting the appropriate indicators for operationalizing each dimension of religiosity. At the very minimum, a distinction is made between faith and practice. Considering data
limitations, I will use two measures of religiosity in the following analyses:
a. “Importance of God in one’s life scale” which runs from 1 to 10 with
higher values indicating more importance of God in respondent’s life.
The scale has been used in all values surveys since 1981 and has
proved to be a valid and reliable measure.
b. An additive scale (RELSCALE) consisting of six dichotomous (0 and 1)
questions. These are:
i. Religion is an important value for children to learn
ii. Attendance at religious services (once a week or more vs. less
frequently)
90 • Yilmaz Esmer
iii. Respondent defines himself/herself as a religious person vs. not
religious or atheist
iv. Belief in life after death
v. Belief in hell
vi. Belief in heaven
The six variables that make up the RELSCALE all have high item to
scale correlations with a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.82 for 1981 (16,009
observations) and 0.81 for 2001 (19,081) observations.3 The scale has a
minimum value of 0 (not religious at all) and a maximum value of 6
(very religious).
The mean importance of God score for individuals in 1981 was 6.19
with a standard deviation of 3.20. In 2001, this score was 6.20 with a
standard deviation of 3.25. Although the difference between the two
means is significant at the 0.01 level for reasons mentioned above, it is
obvious that there was no change in the importance of God during this
time period. On the other hand, the standard deviation increased very
slightly, ruling out progress towards convergence.
The mean for the six-item religiosity scale, again at the individual
level, decreased from 3.76 to 3.50 from 1981 to 2001. Unlike the importance of God and in line with the predictions of secularization theory,
we observe an overall decline in religiosity during the period of our
analysis. Interestingly enough, the standard deviation of the scale increased
also (2.25 in 1981 and 2.29 in 2001) disconfirming the convergence
hypothesis.
Table 2 reports the standard deviations of the country means giving
us an idea about the overall dispersion when countries are the units of
analysis. Confirming the individual level analysis, we observe that the
variances of both variables, let alone decrease, have increased between
1981 and 2001. As the last two columns in Table 2 indicate, this finding
is confirmed when the standard deviation is replaced by the coefficient
of variation as our measure of dispersion.
These data lead us to conclude that we do not observe a convergence
of religious values during the last two decades of the 20th century for
the countries analyzed. To the contrary, a slight decrease in religiosity
overall is, if anything, accompanied by divergence.
3
Reliability scores are calculated from weighted data while the number of observations refer to the actual (unweighted) number of cases.
Globalization, “McDonaldization” and Values: Quo Vadis? • 91
Table 2
Standard Deviations and Coefficients of Variation: 1981 and 2001
(Means or Proportions of Countries)
Standard
Deviation
Levene’s
Test
Coefficient of
variation (V)
V/Vmax
1981
2001
F
Sig.
1981
2001
1981
2001
Importance of God
1.46
(20)
1.63
(21)
0.44
0.51
0.236
0.262
0.054
0.059
Six-item religiosity
scale
1.16
(19)
1.18
(20)
0.00
1.00
0.314
0.342
0.074
0.078
Proportion most
people can be trusted
10.87
(21)
15.44
(21)
1.05
0.31
0.285
0.422
0.064
0.094
Proportion saying
“marriage is outdated”
5.17
(21)
7.21
(21)
1.07
0.31
0.296
0.355
0.066
0.079
Mean justifiability
of divorce
0.85
(21)
0.96
(21)
0.73
0.40
0.177
0.166
0.040
0.037
Mean justifiability
of abortion
1.00
(21)
1.28
(21)
0.88
0.35
0.256
0.281
0.057
0.063
Mean ideal number
of children
0.40
(20)
0.19
(9)
2.63
0.62
0.147
0.072
0.034
0.025
Proportion not wanting
neighbor of diff. race
4.96
(20)
8.06
(19)
2.96
0.09
0.603
0.758
0.139
0.179
Proportion choosing
respect & tolerance as
important for children
11.63
(20)
7.73
(21)
3.32
0.08
0.233
0.098
0.053
0.022
Justifiability of
homosexuality
1.01
(21)
1.56
(21)
2.07
0.16
0.325
0.312
0.073
0.070
Proportion who have
signed a petition
16.73
(20)
22.01
(21)
0.88
0.35
0.417
0.406
0.096
0.091
Proportion willing to
fight for country
18.34
(21)
16.53
(13)
0.33
0.57
0.281
0.263
0.063
0.076
Proportion very proud
of nationality
16.91
(21)
20.91
(21)
1.05
0.31
0.351
0.418
0.078
0.093
Mean life satisfaction
scale
0.74
(20)
0.74
(21)
0.06
0.81
0.101
0.101
0.023
0.023
92 • Yilmaz Esmer
b. Interpersonal Trust
Interpersonal trust, an important component of social capital, is closely
related both to economic development and democratization. Since the
period we are analyzing has witnessed both economic development and
considerable democratization, we should expect to observe an increase
in the overall levels of interpersonal trust and a convergence of societies
with respect to this value.
In 1981, the proportion of those who stated that “most people can
be trusted” was 38.3 percent. At the end of the twenty-year period, the
figure stood at 36.4%. The difference is small enough to be ignored,
but it is apparent that interpersonal trust did not increase despite the
institutional and structural changes that took place. Aggregated proportions are very similar. On the other hand, the standard deviation of
country proportions increased substantially from 10.87 to 15.44, indicating that although the overall trust levels did not change much, the
dispersion around the mean became larger. Similarly, V/Vmax values
given in Table 2 increased during the period of analysis disconfirming
any expectations of convergence.
c. Marriage and Family
As already mentioned, according to Inkeles, marriage and family relations are so central that if we are to look for change anywhere we had
better start with the family. We use the following four indicators to follow the changes in this core institution:
–
–
–
–
Proportion of
Position on a
Position on a
Ideal number
those stating that ‘marriage is an outdated institution.’
10-point ‘justifiability of divorce’ scale.
10-point ‘justifiability of abortion’ scale.
of children
In 1981, 17.4 percent of the persons interviewed (weighted to equalize
the Ns for all countries) agreed with the statement that marriage is an
outdated institution. In 2001, the proportion was up to 20.5 percent.
This is not a very substantial increase but needs to be noted nevertheless. However, the standard deviation, once again, increased considerably from 5.17 to 7.21. By the same token, the V/Vmax value increased
from 0.066 to 0.079. The slight shift away from traditional marriage did
not take place at an even pace. Once more, measures of dispersion point
out to divergence rather than convergence.
Parallel to the increase in the proportion of those who believe that
traditional marriage is an outdated institution, there is a marked rise in
Globalization, “McDonaldization” and Values: Quo Vadis? • 93
the acceptance of divorce. On the “justifiability of divorce scale” where
higher scores indicate greater acceptance, the mean increased from 4.82
to 5.82 while the standard deviation remained essentially the same (2.92
in 1981 vs. 2.95 in 2001). Equal variances but higher means for this
variable are indicative of a parallel change rather than convergence or
divergence. The standard deviation of country means, on the other hand,
did increase from 0.85 to 0.96 while the V/Vmax values were essentially unchanged (0.040 vs. 0.037). In short, the attitudes towards divorce
became considerably more favorable without exhibiting a converging or
a diverging pattern.
WVS/EVS questionnaires included a scale, same as the divorce scale,
to tap attitudes about abortion. In agreement with our expectations, like
the divorce score, the mean “justifiability of abortion” score also increased
from 3.92 to 4.52. There was also a slight increase in standard deviation from 2.95 to 3.09. On the other hand, the rise in variance at the
aggregate level is much more marked and this increase in dispersion is
confirmed by the coefficients of variation.
Finally, we compare the means, variances and the coefficients of variance of the answers given to the question about the ideal number of
children. Although an excellent indicator, this question was asked only
in nine countries in 2001. Therefore, the findings about this variable
should be regarded as extremely tentative. Nevertheless, we observe a
slight decrease in the mean ideal number of children and a very slight
increase in variance at the individual level. Although at the macro level,
a marked decrease in variance and a much less decrease in V/Vmax
values are observed, it is not wise to reach even a tentative conclusion
based on nine observations only.
d. Tolerance
It is interesting to see if, as a result of the spread of democratic regimes,
expansion of individual freedoms, growing emphasis on human rights,
highlighting of anti-discriminatory measures and various campaigns in
the 1980s and 1990s, populations in general have become more tolerant and respectful of differences.
We use two indicators to trace the changes in tolerance levels: a. proportion of those who do not want a neighbor of a different race, and
b. whether or not respondents have chosen respect for others and tolerance as a desirable child quality.
At least judging by this subset of countries and using the “want/not
want neighbor of a different race” question as an indicator of tolerance,
we observe that individuals have become less and not more tolerant.
94 • Yilmaz Esmer
The proportion of those who are not happy with a neighbor of a different
race rose from 8.2 percent in 1981 to 11.0 percent in 2001. This is a
significant, and perhaps alarming, increase indeed. One slight consolation
could be the big increase in standard deviations at the macro level (4.96
in 1981 to 8.06 in 2001). At least the move towards racial intolerance is
not uniform as confirmed by the coefficients of variation as well.
The second indicator of tolerance is the proportion of those who
choose tolerance and respect for others as a desirable child quality. Unlike
racial intolerance, we observe a significant increase towards more tolerance with this indicator. Indeed, the proportion of those who chose
respect and tolerance as a desirable child quality jumped from around
one half (49.9 percent) to almost four-fifths (78.8 percent). This is a
remarkable ascent indeed. Furthermore, the standard deviations and the
coefficients of variation at the aggregate level also point to a convergence. In fact, so far, this is the first indicator in the analysis which can
lend support to the convergence hypothesis. (Table 2).
e. Tolerance for Homosexuality
Acceptance of or at least greater tolerance for different sexual orientations and of more sexual freedom is seen as a fundamental component
of the so-called self-expression values (Inglehart 1997; Inglehart and
Welzel 2005). Almost all Western democracies have taken legal measures in the last couple of decades to end various kinds of discrimination against homosexuals. Some have gone all the way to accepting
homosexual marriages and granting gay/lesbian couples the same rights
as heterosexual couples. Needless to say, the situation is quite different
in traditional and particularly in Islamic societies. However, our sample
does not include any predominantly Muslim societies and only a couple
developing countries. Therefore, in our subset of countries, we can expect
to observe increased acceptance of homosexuality. This indeed is the
case. In 1981, mean “justifiability of homosexuality” score was 3.12 on
a scale of 1 to 10. Thus, to a great extent, homosexuality was regarded
as unjustifiable and unacceptable. In 2001, the mean rose to 5.07. This
is certainly a significant shift in values although still far from a high
degree of acceptance. At the individual level, the variance for this scale
has increased during the 20-year period. The same is true for the aggregate level data as well (1.01 in 1981 and 1.56 in 2001). The increases
in variances both at the micro and the macro levels while the V/Vmax
ratios remaining essentially the same indicate that the change in the
attitudes towards homosexuality is, at least yet, not in the direction of
convergence.
Globalization, “McDonaldization” and Values: Quo Vadis? • 95
f. Participation and Efficacy
Citizens of postindustrial countries engage in various modes of political
participation and feel that they can make a difference. They take part
in a range of campaigns around issues, they demonstrate, they boycott
goods and they strike. They form and join voluntary organizations. Within
the limits of this chapter, we test change and convergence hypotheses
with respect to participation with one indicator: actually having signed
a petition to demand some action by the authorities.
In 1981, 40.8 percent of the citizens of our sample of countries indicated that they had signed a petition. In 2001, this figure was 52.4 percent. This is an increase in the expected direction. However, macro level
variances (comparison of both standard deviations and coefficients of
variation), once again, point to a divergence rather than convergence.
g. Nationalism
Is globalization the antidote of nationalism or is it a process that, perhaps paradoxically, reinforces nationalism? Both arguments are plausible and have their proponents. Nevertheless, at least theoretically, all the
familiar developments that we referred to at the beginning of this chapter should generate less and not more nationalistic feelings. It is hard to
envision McDonaldization to foster nationalism unless it is thought to
encourage reactive thoughts and wake up dormant values.
WVS/EV questionnaires include two interesting questions to tap nationalism. They are: how proud the respondent is of his/her nationality; and
whether or not the respondent would be willing to fight for his/her
country.
In 1981, 66.2 percent of the respondents indicated that they would
be willing to fight for their country. In 2001, the proportion was slightly
lower at 63.3 percent. At the macro level the variance in 2001 is also
slightly lower but, as confirmed by the increase in V/Vmax proportions
from 1981 to 2001, this is mostly due to the significantly lower number
of observations (N = 13) in 2001. Otherwise, we again observe divergence rather than convergence.
With respect to our second indicator of nationalist sentiments, almost
no change occurred in the proportion of those who are very proud of
their nationalities (48.5 percent in 1981 and 49.4 percent in 2001). On the
other hand, the standard deviation of country level proportions increased
from 16.91 to 20.91 and the V/Vmax ratio from 0.078 to 0.093.
It seems like the level of nationalistic sentiments have remained much
the same during this period while the variance has increased slightly.
96 • Yilmaz Esmer
h. Life Satisfaction
Finally, we look at the life satisfaction levels of individuals in 1981 and
2001. In both surveys, respondents were asked to place themselves on
a ten-point life satisfaction scale. Interestingly enough, the mean score
is exactly the same (7.32) for the two points in time and the standard
deviations are almost equal (2.07 vs. 2.13) as well. It seems like all the
radical and revolutionary changes that took place in the course of the
two decades made people (at least the populations of the countries that
are in our sample) neither less, nor more satisfied with their lives.
Furthermore, the distribution for this question remained unchanged as
well both at the individual and the macro levels. Apparently, of all the
values we have analyzed, life satisfaction has been the most stable, with
respect to both central tendency and dispersion during the last two
decades of the last century.
Conclusion
The 1980s and the 1990s have been an era of rapid and intense technological, political and economic change. Revolutionary innovations in
information and communication technologies connected individuals in all
parts of the globe in an unprecedented manner. The internet provided
not only an invaluable source of information with its billions of pages
available online, but it also became a forum for voicing opinions on virtually every conceivable subject and issue. For the first time in history,
no financial means are needed to reach out and potentially persuade
millions. New technologies have been changing the way business is conducted in a profound way. It is often argued that, as a result of these
developments, a standardized world culture is emerging or, as some like
to declare, the world is being “McDonaldized.”
Globalization can be good or bad depending on one’s viewpoint. More
specifically, it can be good for some and not so good for others. But
there is no question that globalization is advancing at an incredible speed.
The political developments of the period have not been less impressive. A system that ruled over a third of the world as well as its ideological foundations collapsed. Almost overnight, totalitarian states took
steps to convert themselves to democracy. Likewise, and again almost
overnight, centrally planned economies of the Eastern bloc became market economies.
Few social scientists would argue that such sweeping changes will not
produce and accelerate cultural change. After all, if such far reaching,
intense, and pervasive transformations do not change cultural values,
what will?
Globalization, “McDonaldization” and Values: Quo Vadis? • 97
A second, and equally common, expectation is that we have been
experiencing a convergence of values. After all, without convergence,
McDonaldization is a hollow concept.
In this article, we attempted a modest test of both assumptions – change
and convergence – in a number of cultural spheres. We used data from
the 1981 and the 1999-2001 rounds of European and World Values
Surveys. Although this choice severely limited the size of our sample, we
wanted to use the longest time period data would allow. Indeed, even
20 years is a short period of time to fully observe cultural change. When
data from the 2005-2006 surveys become available, it will be possible to
increase both the number and the diversity of countries substantially.
With data from around 20 countries, mostly from the industrialized
world, we conclude that cultural value change has been rather limited
and mass values are not converging.
It seems marriage and family relations are one area of, albeit limited,
change. If Inkeles is right, change in this sphere should be followed by
change of values in a variety of areas. But we certainly have not been able
to find any evidence to substantiate Inkeles’ convergence thesis. However,
a number of considerations prevent us from making a conclusive statement. First, both the direction and the speed of change will be different
in different societies. Local cultures will no doubt play an important role
here (Taylor 2001; Ester, Halman, de Moor 1993). Second, short term
divergence or non-convergence does not necessarily rule out long term
convergence (Ester, Halman, de Moor 1993). As noted, 20 years may
not be a sufficiently long period for the process of cultural change to
unveil. Third, convergence may start at the elite level (Diez-Nicolas,
2002) and then spread to the masses with a lag. Fourth, generational
replacement may be the main vehicle of value change (Inglehart 1997).
With all these caveats, we have found evidence of limited cultural
change and almost no evidence of convergence between 1981 and 2001.
We may further speculate that, if convergence is infrequent – almost
non-existent – in our sample of mostly advanced, industrialized countries, it is much less likely to be observed in less developed societies.
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Individualization in Europe and
America: Connecting Religious and
Moral Values
Neil Nevitte1 and Christopher Cochrane1
Abstract
After reviewing the major variations in how individualization
is interpreted and explained, this article turns to the World
Values Survey (WVS) data to empirically investigate one central
aspect of individualization, namely, the connection between
religiosity and moral values. That analysis demonstrates, first,
that rates of decline in levels of religiosity in most advanced
industrial states have been quite modest. The rate of change
in moral outlooks, by contrast, has been much more striking.
Those two core findings, we argue, draw attention to the
question of what explains these cross-national and cross-time
variations. The remainder of the article empirically explores a
variety of plausible explanations. The results of that analysis
reveal not only significant variations between European and North
American publics, but also that associational behavior plays a
significant role in gearing the dynamics of individualization.
I. Introduction
Studies of human values must at some point hitch themselves to a theory of “belief systems.” As Williams (1968) put it, “it is the rare and
limiting case if and when a person’s behavior is guided over a considerable
period of time by one and only one value . . . More often particular acts
or sequences of acts are steered by multiple and changing clusters of values”
1
University of Toronto.
100 • Neil Nevitte and Christopher Cochrane
(287: emphasis added). Examining discrete value dimensions can certainly answer questions about whether, say, support for free enterprise
has gone up or down over time. But if people rarely make decisions
based on a single value, then the theme of value change might be more
productively explored from the vantage point of whether, and how, “clusters” of values change with the passage of time. The primary focus of
this article is on two sets of values, religiosity and morality, that are
often taken as significant dimensions of value change as states experience the transition from industrialism to post-industrialism (Apter, 1965;
Bell, 1973; Huntington, 1974; Inglehart, 1977).
The investigation empirically tests hypotheses that are informed by
the theory of “individualization.” Individualization refers to the decoupling of human values from such traditional value-generating institutions
as family, work, politics and religion (Weber, 1958; Rokeach, 1973;
McClosky & Zaller, 1984; Baker, 2005). “With the multiplication of life
chances and opportunities,” Weber (1978) wrote of modern society in
the early twentieth century, “the individual becomes less and less content with being bound to rigid and undifferentiated forms of life prescribed by the group. Increasingly he desires to shape his life as an
individual and to enjoy the fruits of his own abilities and labour as he
himself wishes” (375). An observable implication of this theory is that
individuals in advanced industrial states are taking fewer and fewer cues
from religion in formulating their core moral values (Halman and de
Moor, 1993). This hypothesis is tested using evidence from the World
Values Survey (WVS).
The core finding is that the results are uneven: there are systematic
and sustained variations between North American and European publics.
The connection between religiosity and moral outlooks has weakened
substantially in every European country for which we have data. The
opposite pattern emerged in North America. The final part of the analysis investigates compelling explanations for these different patterns.
II. Conceptualizing Individualization
Different scholars use the term individualization to capture different concepts, while others label the same concepts with different terminology.
According to Beck (2002), “one can hardly think of a word heavier with
misunderstanding than ‘individualization’ has proven to have in the
English speaking countries” (xxi). Some scholars, like Beck, approach the
topic of individualization from a normative perspective (Lasch, 1979),
while others adopt a more empirically grounded approach (Inglehart,
1977; Halman and de Moor, 1993; Halman and Petterson, 1995). That
Individualization in Europe and America • 101
said, both perspectives nonetheless emphasize different aspects of a common underlying theme. At its core, individualization refers to the declining salience of traditional value-generating institutions in the lives of
people in post-industrial societies.
The first variant of individualization might be labeled “postmodern
individualization” or what Beck (2002) calls “individualization” in the
“social scientific sense” (xxi). Drawing on the canons of sociology, Beck
defines individualization as a process of “high-level socialization” in highly
differentiated societies. Communal integration is contingent on individuals recognizing their “self-insufficiency” and “the fundamental incompleteness of the self.” As Beck put it, “. . . human mutuality and community
rests no longer on solidly established traditions, but rather, on a paradoxical collectively of reciprocal individualization” (xix). Citizens must
choose their way through a myriad of complex incentives and pressures
because the guidance from traditional social institutions and the certainties arising out of traditional social structures are longer in place
(Beck, 2002).
The declining importance of traditional social institutions is not, however, a direct path to individual freedom. Rather it is associated with
the highly problematic and “precarious” freedoms of what Beck calls the
“do-it yourself biography”:
. . . certainties have fragmented into questions which are now spinning around
in people’s heads. But it is more than that. Social action needs routines in
which to be enacted. One can say that our thoughts and actions are shaped,
at the deepest level, by something of which we are hardly or not at all
aware . . . it is precisely this level of pre-conscious ‘collective habitualizations,’
of matters taken for granted, that is breaking down into a cloud of possibilities to be thought about and negotiated. The deep layer of foreclosed
decisions is being forced up into the level of decision making (6).
These “precarious freedoms” overload the decision-making capacities of
individuals as people struggle to navigate modern social environments
replete with impossibly complex arrays of institutional incentives and
constraints (Beck, 2002):2 “. . . God nature and the social system are being
progressively replaced, in greater and lesser steps, by the individual –
confused, astray, helpless and at a loss. With the abolition of the old
2
Beck (2001) argues that what he means by “individualization” is an entirely different
concept than “individuation,” the term that Inglehart employs. Even so, both Beck and
Inglehart use their respective terms to encompass the retreating influence of traditional
social institutions on the lives of individuals.
102 • Neil Nevitte and Christopher Cochrane
coordinates a question arises that has been decried and acclaimed, derided,
pronounced sacred, guilty and dead: the question of the individual” (8).
A second set of more empirically oriented conceptualizations of individualization resemble what Flanagan and Lee call “postmodernist libertarians” (Flanagan and Lee, 2003:267). In an account that resonates
with Huntington’s (1974) conjectures about the shape of post-industrial
politics, Flanagan and Lee depict a growing class of educated and affluent
citizens whose underlying value set is premised on a broad conception
of autonomy: an autonomy that extends well beyond a mere freedom
from government interference to encompass a broader range of limitations on individual choice. “Although they are more tolerant of a plurality of different kinds of ethnic groups and lifestyles,” Flanagan and
Lee point out, “they are also more dissatisfied with their personal lives
and substantially more distrustful of virtually all social and political institutions. Not only is their loyalty to major social and political institutions
eroding but also their willingness to make sacrifices for other individuals, groups, or even their nation” (Flanagan and Lee, 2003:267).
There is conceptual overlap between this interpretation and Inglehart’s
(1977) emphasis on “postmaterialism” or what Nevitte (1996) calls the
“decline of deference”. All of these accounts emphasize a growing resistance to constraints on individual choice and a decreasing adherence to
traditional social and political institutions. Traditional family structures
have given way to conscious decisions about whether and when to marry
and have children, and religions have lost their hold on the moral values of their own adherents. Central to this variant of the individualization hypothesis is that “. . . values, beliefs, attitudes and behaviors are
increasingly based on personal choice and are less dependent on tradition and social institutions” (Halman and de Moor, 1993:72). That transformation is consistent with Inglehart’s (1997) observations concerning
“the postmodern shift away from both religious and state authority” (87).
The unifying theme is that individuals are guided less by traditional institutions than they once were, and thus the necessity of individual decisionmaking has expanded.
The remainder of this article tests the theory of individualization in
two steps. First, we propose an operational definition of individualization. We then turn to an empirical examination of cross-national and
cross-time survey data on value change in post-industrial Western countries. The empirical question to be explored is whether religion is losing its hold on the moral outlooks of citizens in Western countries. The
central concern is not just the question of whether religion itself is losing ground in modern societies (secularization). Rather the question is
whether people are becoming increasingly inclined to exhibit autonomy,
Individualization in Europe and America • 103
individualization, when it comes to making decisions about important
moral questions. Are they becoming more or less inclined to take their
moral cues from religion?
III. Measuring Value Change in Empirical Perspective
One of Converse’s (1964) seminal observations is that “belief systems
have never surrendered easily to empirical study or quantification. Indeed,
they have often served as primary exhibits for the doctrine that what is
important to study cannot be measured and that what can be measured
is not important to study.” (206) But Converse (1964) also cautioned that
“. . . no intellectual position is likely to become obsolete quite so rapidly
as one that takes current empirical capabilities as the limit of the possible in a more absolute sense” (206). Indeed, current research into patterns of human values benefits from an accumulation of systematic public
opinion survey data, not the least of these are the broadly comparative
data from the World Values Survey (WVS).
If values are the primal elements of human culture, and individual
human beings are the beakers in which elemental compounding occurs,
then direct, individual-level survey evidence of human values is a promising focal point for studies of individualization. The World Values Survey
data come from nationally representative random samples of publics surveyed in 21 countries in 1981-1983 (N = 28 764), 43 countries in 19901993 (N = 59 169), 45 countries in 1995-1997 (N = 78 574), and 67
countries in 1999-2002 (N = 96 296). Many of the survey items from
the 1981 wave of the survey are asked in precisely the same way in
each of the successive waves and in each of the participating countries.
To maximize the breadth and reliability of the longitudinal analysis,
attention is focused only on those advanced industrial states for which
there are data from at least three time-points beginning in 1981. The
questionnaires used in each of these countries were screened to isolate
those variables that met two important criteria for inclusion: first, identical question wording and, second, identical response categories across
countries and time-points. This strategy yields 63 variables for analysis
across 15 countries: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Iceland,
Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom,
United States and West Germany (See Appendix A).
To identify underlying structures in the responses to the 63 survey
items that met these criteria for inclusion, the data from each of the 15
countries and four time-points were pooled and subjected to exploratory
factor analysis (Principal Components). There are nine survey items which
load heavily on the single component that we label “religiosity.” These
104 • Neil Nevitte and Christopher Cochrane
items include questions about the importance of God and religion in the
lives of respondents, whether respondents get comfort and strength from
religion, beliefs in God, heaven, an after-life and hell. Measures of church
attendance rates and confidence in the churches also load onto this “religiosity” dimension (see Appendix C for question wording and variable
coding). Together, these items provide both a highly reliable and broad
measure of religiosity (Cronbach’s Alpha = .910).3
Moral outlooks are captured by questions which ask about the justifiability
of homosexuality, abortion, divorce, suicide and euthanasia. Responses
to these questions comprise a highly reliable scale of moral traditionalism/
permissiveness (Cronbach’s Alpha = .813). The underlying component
captures the extent to which individuals are willing to tolerate deviation
from precisely those kinds of moral values that have been at the core
of traditional religious teachings. By focusing on the connection between
religious and moral outlooks, our goal is to examine the influence of
one the most powerful and traditional social institutions on precisely
those moral values within its traditional sphere of influence. Given that
these indicators are reliable, the analysis proceeds to test empirically the
proposition that value change is occurring in the direction of “. . . free
personal choices, which make human relations less bound by tradition,
less prescribed by social norms and less enforced by social control”
(Akker, Halman, de Moor, 1993:100).
IV. Value Change and Individualization:
Evidence from the World Values Survey
Figure 1 highlights the trends in religiosity for each of the countries in
our analysis as well as the weighted trend lines for Europe and North
America.4 As the figure illustrates, the aggregate trends for Europe and
3
There is, of course, a conceptual distinction between institutional and spiritual dimensions of religiosity. But factor analysis and subsequent reliability checks within each country show that there is no statistical justification for treating these dimensions separately.
The scale clearly measures a single component and is highly reliable in every country
for which we have data.
4
Because the focus is on trends, lines of best fit are plotted through the values for
those countries for which there are at least three time-points of data beginning in 1981.
And because the samples are nationally representative, the trend lines for Europe and
North America are weighted to capture population differences between the countries
within each region:
5(Population of X1..n ÷ m Population of Selected European | North American Countries * Y1...n)
N
This weighting procedure ensures that the countries within Europe and North America
affect the aggregate means to their relative share of the population.
Individualization in Europe and America • 105
North America are relatively stable; there has been a marginal decline
in levels of religiosity between 1981 and 2000. On the whole, Europeans
and North Americans were almost as religious in 2000 as they were in
1981.
A more detailed probing of these data, however, shows that this aggregate stability masks significant within country variations, particularly in
Europe. Among European publics, levels of religiosity declined in seven
countries, they were stable in two countries, and they increased in four
countries (substantially so in three of them). Finns, Danes and Swedes
turned out to be somewhat more religious in 2000 than 1981, while
their counterparts in Norway became noticeably less religious over the
same period. Indeed, Finns and Icelanders exhibit higher levels of religiosity in 2000 than the European average, whereas Swedes consistently
remain among the least religious respondents. Scandinavians tend to be
less religious than the European average, but the within group differences
turn out to be larger than the difference between Scandinavia and the
rest of Europe.
Spain, France, Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands seem to be
on similar trajectories. Each of these countries experienced a significant
decline in levels of religiosity. Britain followed the same general pattern
even though the rate change was considerably less pronounced. These
shared trajectories seem to point to a general pattern when it comes to
religiosity in Europe, although this pattern is not replicated either in
Scandinavian countries or in the highly religious and Catholic countries
of Italy and Ireland. There is what might be called a core European
trajectory, but there are important exceptions to that trajectory.
What about North America? According to the WVS data, North
Americans are substantially more religious than their European counterparts. Although both Canadians and Americans became somewhat
less religious between 1981 and 2000, the United States remained the
most religious country in our analysis and Canadians in 2000 were well
above the European average. Indeed, Italy and Ireland are the only
European countries to exhibit higher levels of religiosity than Canada.
Similar cross-national variations in the pace and direction of securalization have been reported by other researchers (Halman and Petterson,
1995). The more surprising finding perhaps is the evidence of the relative stability in levels of religiosity between 1981 and 2000. Levels of
religiosity have declined, but they are not plummeting and nor are they
down everywhere.
High religiosity
Britain
W. Germany
Belgium
Italy
Spain
Iceland
Canada
Ireland
.280
.380
Sweden
Denmark
France
Netherlands
.480 Finland Norway
.580
.680
.780
1980
Source: World Values Survey, 1981-2000
Low religiosity
United States
1990
2000
Figure 1
Religiosity (Trend Lines), 1981-2000
North America
Europe
2010 (projection)
W.Germany Norway
Netherlands
Belgium
France
Sweden
Denmark
Spain
Britain
Iceland
Finland
Canada
Italy
Ireland
United States
106 • Neil Nevitte and Christopher Cochrane
Individualization in Europe and America • 107
Given the historical leadership of organized religion in providing guidance on the moral issues of the day, it is reasonable to speculate that
levels of religiosity might well shape orientations towards other such value
dimensions as “moral outlooks.” The empirical implication is that national
changes in moral outlooks will simply track the changing levels of religiosity in each country; traditional moral outlooks would follow the same
pattern as the levels of religiosity depicted in Figure 1.
The data in Figure 2 summarize the shift in levels of moral permissiveness for the same set of countries over the same period. There is
evidence of a clear pattern but a straightforward interpretation provides
no clear support for the hypothesis that moral outlooks are simply a byproduct of religiosity: publics in every country except one (Denmark)
became progressively more permissive in their moral outlooks between
1981 and 2000.5
The pattern in both Europe and North America is toward substantial increases in levels of moral permissiveness. American and European
publics became more tolerant of abortion, divorce, euthanasia, suicide
and especially homosexuality. Italy and Ireland are outliers on one end;
publics in both of these highly religious Catholic countries remained relatively traditional in their moral outlooks. The Netherlands and Sweden
stand as outliers on the other end. Swedes, the most secular public in
Figure 1, experienced substantial increases in levels of moral permissiveness between 1981 and 2000 (Figure 2).
There is also evidence of distinct clusters of countries in Figure 2.
The largest cluster occupies the higher end of the mid-range in Figure
2: Denmark, France, Iceland, Norway, Spain, Finland, Canada and
Belgium. These countries are moving to roughly the same place when
it comes to levels of moral permissiveness. Britain, Germany and the
United States cluster on the lower end of the mid-range. Despite their
substantial differences in levels of religiosity, the moral values trajectories of this set of publics are nonetheless converging.
The evidence of a consistent pattern of changing moral values presents an empirical challenge to the simple intuition that changing moral
outlooks are simply a by-product of secularization, or vice versa. If levels of religiosity have been relatively stable over these two decades and
if there has been substantial variability between countries, then what
accounts for the uniform and substantial rise in moral permissiveness
over the same period and in the same publics?
5
Denmark is the only exception. Because it is the lone exception to the trend, we
include Denmark even though we only have Danish data on moral permissiveness for
1981 and 2000.
Permissive
Finland
Sweden
France
Netherlands
Denmark
.180
Ireland
Iceland
Britain W. Germany
Canada
Norway
.280
Italy
Belgium
United States
Spain
.380
.480
.580
1980
Source: World Values Survey, 1981-2000
Traditional
.680
1990
2000
Figure 2
Moral Permissiveness (Trend Lines), 1981-2000
2010 (projection)
Ireland
Italy
United States
W. Germany
Britain
Europe
North America
Denmark
France Iceland
Norway
Spain
Finland
Canada
Belgium
Netherlands
Sweden
108 • Neil Nevitte and Christopher Cochrane
Individualization in Europe and America • 109
One obvious candidate explanation, of course, is the individualization
hypothesis. According to the individualization hypothesis, aggregate stability
and cross-national variability in religiosity might co-exist alongside evidence of substantial and across-the-board changes in moral outlooks
because citizens are deferring less to religious authority when formulating their moral outlooks. In effect, religiosity and moral outlooks are
coming increasingly decoupled. The observable implication of that line
of argument is that there will be a declining correlation between the
religiosity and the moral outlooks of citizens.
The data presented in Figure 3 track the across-time shifts in the
strength of the correlation (Pearson’s r) between religiosity and moral
permissiveness among publics in Europe and North America. The results
are somewhat mixed. On the one hand, the strength of the relationship
between religiosity and moral values has clearly weakened throughout
Europe. Intriguingly, the correlation between religiosity and moral permissiveness has declined in each and every one of the European countries for which we have data. The hold of religiosity on the moral values
of Danes, Fins and Germans has changed the most, but slightly weaker
versions of the same pattern are evident in all of the other European
countries as well. Among North Americans, and particularly Americans,
the pattern is completely different: the connection between religious and
moral outlooks has actually become significantly stronger over the same
time period. These North American data suggest an important caveat
to the argument that individualization is a consequence of features that
postindustrial countries share in common. The European findings are
consistent with the individualization hypothesis; the North American
findings clearly are not.
The correlation between religious and moral outlooks strengthened in
North America and weakened in Europe as the gap in moral outlooks
between religious and secular citizens widened in North America and
shrank in Europe. Despite across-the-board increases in moral permissiveness in North America, opinions about controversial moral issues
were more polarized along the religious/secular cleavage in 2000 than
they were in 1981. In sum, these findings are consistent with the interpretation that religion is losing its hold on the moral values of Europeans.
At the same time, however, the values divide between religious and secular Americans has widened considerably.
These comparative data appear to suggest that the straightforward
intuition concerning the linkages between religiosity and moral outlooks
needs to be reconsidered. Changing moral outlooks, clearly, are a consequence of far more than simply declining levels of religiosity. Religiosity
has not declined in every country, yet publics have become uniformly
Stronger Association
(Pearson’s R)
.200
.250
.300
.350
.400
.450
.500
.550
.600
1980
1990
2000
2010 (projection)
Figure 3
Correlations of Religiosity and Moral Outlooks (Trend Lines), 1981-2000
Source: World Values Survey, 1981-2000
Weaker Association
.650
110 • Neil Nevitte and Christopher Cochrane
Individualization in Europe and America • 111
more permissive in their moral outlooks. These findings prompt a deeper
investigation of the connection between religiosity and morality. The question
that needs to be explained is why religiosity serves to insulate its adherents from wider national trends towards moral permissiveness much more
effectively in some countries than in others?
V. Group Involvement and Individualization: Findings
Nearly a century ago, Durkheim (1947) claimed that a “. . . society cannot make its influence felt unless it is in action, and it is not in action
unless the individuals who compose it are assembled together and act
in common. It is by common action that it takes consciousness of itself
and realizes its position; it is before all else an active cooperation” (418).
Durkheim’s observation certainly resonates with contemporary perspectives on the cultural implications of interactions between individuals
(Coleman, 1988; Putnam, 2000; Baker, 2005). Debates about the causes,
implications, or even the “decline of social capital” remain contentious
(Hall, 1999). Nonetheless, a substantial body of empirical evidence suggests that people who spend their time interacting with others develop
different social outlooks than those who do not (Putnam, 2000). A variety of theorists have argued that “social networks” and community involvement generate feelings of communal belonging and provide individuals
with important avenues of social, emotional and even financial support
(Durkheim, 1947; Coleman, 1988; Putnam, 2000). The clear implication
is that there is a connection between levels of associational involvement
and individualization. That connection can be explored by asking: does
active association in group-life serve to reinforce the hold of traditional
social institutions over the outlooks of individuals in advanced industrial
societies?
One possible explanation for different rates and directions of change
in the connection between religious and moral outlooks might be that
there are cross-national variations in how effectively religious institutions
facilitate active interactions between like-minded individuals. Religionbased associational involvement is an example of what Putnam (2000)
called “bonding social capital” (3). According to Putnam (2000), “some
forms of social capital are, by choice or necessity, inward looking and
tend to reinforce exclusive identities and homogenous groups” (22).
Interactions between comparatively like-minded individuals are precisely
the type of mechanism by which norms and values are inculcated and
reinforced (Durkheim, 1947; Hunter, 1991; Putnam, 2000; Baker, 2005).
It is certainly plausible to suppose that moral values are reinforced, and
more resistant to change, when people are surrounded by others who
112 • Neil Nevitte and Christopher Cochrane
share the same viewpoints on controversial moral issues. Active associational involvement in religious organizations, according to this perspective, may serve as a bulwark against broader trends towards value change
in the country as a whole.
This hypothesis can be tested empirically with a simple multivariate
analysis. The dependent variable in this OLS model is the rate of change
(slope) in individualization which can be operationalized at each time
point, and for each country, as the Product Moment Correlation (r) of
the relationship between religiosity and moral permissiveness. The independent variable in the model is the percentage of religious respondents
(religiosity > .75/1) who indicated that they were actively involved as
unpaid volunteers in a church or religious organization. If active associational involvement in religious organizations shelters participants from
broader trends towards moral permissiveness, then we would expect the
connection between religious and moral outlooks to be stronger in those
countries where religious people are actively engaged in associational life.
Before proceeding directly to that test, however, it is useful to consider the structure of the model more generally to explicitly identify how
it can address some potentially important objections. One possibility is
that declining associational involvement is but one aspect of the broader
phenomenon of individualization. If individualization entails both a retreat
from associational life and a decoupling of religious and moral values,
then levels of associational activity would co-vary with the individualization of moral values because both capture different aspects of essentially the same process. The key explanatory variable, in other words,
may not be truly “independent” of the dependent variable.
A second issue to consider concerns the problem of establishing the
direction of causality. As people’s moral outlooks diverge from the value
sets stressed in their churches, the consensus on moral values among
parishioners may break down and reduce the incentives for these people to interact with one another in associational groups. The gist of this
account is that norms of reciprocity cause associational involvement,
rather than the other way around. People join groups because they trust
and like each other; they do not trust and like each other because they
happen to join the same groups (Putnam, 2000; Newton, 2001).
Another possibility is that the individualization of moral values is simply a by-product of secularization. As religiosity declines, so too perhaps
does the connection between religious and moral outlooks. This possibility can be taken into account in the model by introducing controls
for changing levels of religiosity.
Finally, there is the problem of over-determination to consider (Przeworski
and Teune, 1970). There are reasons to suppose that levels of associa-
Individualization in Europe and America • 113
tional involvement may differ in Europe and North America. But there
are many features other than levels of associational involvement that distinguish Europeans from North Americans. The threat, therefore, is that
the model will “over-determine” the explanatory power of associational
involvement.
Each of these conceptual concerns inform the specification of the
regression model. First, the potential endogeneity problem can be addressed
by predicting the slope of individualization between 1981 and 2000 with
the level of associational involvement in 1981. This strategy strengthens
the causal inference by establishing that the influence of associational
involvement is temporally prior to individualization. Associational involvement predicts future levels of individualization.
Second, the possibility that associational involvement is an effect of
individualization can be taken into account by introducing controls for
the rate and direction of change in the associational involvement of religious people. If declining associational involvement is a by-product of
the same broader phenomena that results in a de-coupling of religious
and moral values, then the rate of change in associational involvement
should be a powerful predictor of across-time changes in individualization.
Third, the reverse causality argument can be addressed by controlling for the rate of change in moral permissiveness. Controlling for the
rate of change in moral permissiveness makes it possible to gauge the
predictive power of associational involvement independent of the effects of
changing levels of moral permissiveness. If individualization is a consequence of changing moral outlooks, then introducing a measure of changing moral outlooks to the model should reduce the magnitude of the
regression coefficient for religious association.
Fourth, by controlling for changing levels of religiosity, the model rules
out the possibility that the relationship between active involvement by
religious people and the individualization of moral values is endogenous
to a broader phenomenon of secularization. Secularization is an important phenomenon in its own right, but it is conceptually distinct from
the phenomenon of individualization. Recall that individualization is concerned with the connection between religious and moral values, and not
the absolute levels, or rates of change, in religious or moral outlooks.
Finally, the potential problem of over-determination is dealt with in
two simple steps. The first step introduces controls in the main regression
model for a country’s location in Europe and North America. The second
step entails running a background analysis that applies only to the European countries in the analysis. If Europeans and North Americans diverge
in terms of individualization, then individualization may well correlate
with any other variables on which Europeans and North Americans
114 • Neil Nevitte and Christopher Cochrane
differ. A more persuasive case can be made in these regards if the
relationship between the independent (associational involvement of religious people) and dependent (individualization of moral and religious
outlooks) variables extends beyond the differences between Europe and
North America.
Table 1 summarizes the results of the overall analysis. The results in
the first bloc of the model show that the differences between Europe
and North America (summarized in Figure 3) are indeed statistically
significant. The strength of the relationship between religiosity and moral
outlooks declined more in Europe than in North America.
The second bloc of the model introduces the level of active associational involvement among religious people in 1981. According to these
data, the associational involvement of religious people in 1981 is a powerful predictor of the rate of individualization between 1981 and 2000.6
Indeed, the relationship is so strong the differences between Europe and
North America disappear when active associational involvement is taken
into account. Indeed, the analysis shows that if religious people in Europe
were as actively involved in associational groups as their counterparts in
North America, the connection between religiosity and moral outlooks
in Europe would have increased, rather than decreased.
The third bloc of the model introduces controls for the rates of change
in associational involvement, religiosity and moral permissiveness. Here,
the data indicate that only one of these variables, the changing levels of
associational involvement, has an independent effect on the individualization of moral and religious values.7 Moreover, notice that the introduction of these variables has no effect on the predictive power of the
level of associational involvement among religious people in 1981.
These findings provide supporting evidence for the contention that
active associational involvement among religious people offsets the broader
6
To test the possibility that associational involvement in 1981 is a proxy for levels
of involvement in 2000, we tested the predictive power of the involvement of religious
people at both time points. Levels of associational involvement in 2000 do not have an
independent effect on the rate of change in individualization between 1981 and 2000.
As with any causal relationship, the relevant levels of the explanatory variable (associational involvement of religious people) are temporally prior to the observed effect in the
dependent variable (changing rates of individualization).
7
This opens up the possibility that levels of associational involvement are at least
somewhat a part – rather than exclusively a cause – of individualization. But this finding
is not sufficiently strong to rule out our central contention that the effects of associational involvement are causally and temporally prior to the process of individualization.
Indeed, associational involvement in 1981 more powerfully predicts the individualization
of moral values in 2000 than does the level of associational involvement in 2000.
Individualization in Europe and America • 115
Table 1
Predictors of Individualization, 1981-2000 (OLS Regression)
Bloc 1
b (SE)
Europe
Active in 1981
Active Slope (81-00)
Religiosity Slope (81-00)
Moral Permissiveness Slope (81-00)
Constant
R-Squared
Adjusted R-Squared
–.067(.026)***
.020(.024)
.341
.290
Bloc 2
b (SE)
.041 (.050)
.007 (.003)***
–.138(.069)**
.556
.481
Bloc 3
b (SE)
.068(.051)
.007(.003)***
.016(.009)*
.246(.279)
.438(.301)
–.189(.065)***
.763
.631
**** p < .01 *** p < .05 ** p < .10 * p < .15
Source: World Values Survey, 1981-2000
societal trends toward a decoupling of moral and religious values. In
those countries where religious people are actively involved as volunteers
in church or religious organizations, the individualization of moral values has either not occurred at all, or has proceeded at a much slower
pace than in those countries where religious people are not actively
involved as volunteers.8 Significantly, this finding is not simply a proxy
for different levels of active religiosity or for differences between Europe
and North America. Church attendance in Ireland, for instance, is far
higher than it is in the United States. And it is far higher in Italy than
in Canada. But the clear evidence is that while individualization of moral
values has occurred in both Ireland and Italy, no such pattern is evident in the United States or Canada. Active associational involvement
in religious groups turns out to be about four and six times higher in
both Canada and the United States, respectively, than in either Italy or
Ireland. Moreover, these statistically significant results emerge, and operate in the same direction and with about the same magnitude, when
the same analysis is applied only to the European countries. The implication is clear: active associational involvement in voluntary religious
organizations serves as a counterweight to the individualization of religious and moral values in a far more profound way than either passive
spirituality or even such habitual, but generally non-interactive, forms of
involvement as church attendance.
8
This aggregate level finding persists at the individual level as well. The correlation
between religious and moral outlooks is higher among those who are actively involved
as volunteers than among those who are not.
116 • Neil Nevitte and Christopher Cochrane
There are strong theoretical arguments that led us to conjecture about
the existence of precisely this type of a relationship. Not the least of
these arguments is that people who actively associate with like minded
individuals are more inclined to maintain the values of the group than
those who do not (Durkheim, 1947; Putnam, 2000; Baker, 2005). For
this reason, it comes as no surprise to discover that levels of associational involvement in 1981 turns out to be a powerful predictor of the
extent to which the relationship between religious and moral outlooks
changed between 1981 and 2000.
VI. Concluding Discussion
There are at least two important political implications that follow from
these findings. First, the rising level of moral permissiveness in the United
States is mainly attributable to value change among a particular subset
of Americans. Secular Americans experienced very substantial changes
in their moral outlooks over the course of the last two decades of the
Twenty-first Century. There were truly remarkable increases in levels of
permissiveness. Second, a clear consequence of this pattern of value
change is that secular and religious American became far more distinctive
in their moral outlooks in 2000 than they were in 1981. Societies are
more divided when the disagreements between people overlap than when
they do not. Whatever the consensus Americans experienced in their
moral values in 1981, that consensus had all but disappeared by 2000.
The North American data also suggest that religion was a more powerful cleavage in 2000 than it was in 1981, and that moral issues are
becoming more, rather than less, divisive in both Canada and the United
States. The obvious paradox is that as secularization and moral permissiveness increase in the United States, the salience of religious and moral
outlooks as a dividing line in American society also increases.
Unlike North America, the European trends point to a growing convergence in moral outlooks between religious and secular Europeans;
religion commands less of a hold over the moral outlooks of religious
Europeans. Compared to the polarization of North American publics,
the moral outlooks of religious Europeans are more alike those of their
secular European counterparts. There is clearly substantial empirical support for the individualization hypothesis in Europe. From Finland to
Italy, European publics are all moving in the same direction when it
comes to how they connect their religious and their moral outlooks.
The findings here also provide considerable support for the contention
that active associational involvement with like minded individuals has a
significant impact on the dynamics of individualization over the past 20
Individualization in Europe and America • 117
years. The focus of this particular analysis is confined to the linkages
between religious and moral values. But the findings clearly raise a
broader possibility, namely, that the dynamics of individualization in
such other value domains as the family, or the work place, may be
geared similarly by such associational factors as family structures or rates
of unionization.
The findings also suggest that it may be fruitful to revisit our focus
on religiosity and moral outlooks. One possibility to explore is that secularism may well turn out to be more akin to religiosity than to the
absence of religiosity. The fact that secular and religious Americans are
far more likely than Europeans to participate in the associational life of
their country might explain both the slower rate of moral permissiveness among religious Americans and the hyper secularism of non-religious Americans. Some evidence seems to support this conjecture. In
1981, secular Europeans were far more permissive in their moral outlooks than secular Americans. By 2000, however, that pattern had completely reversed. The implication is that associational involvement reinforces
the moral outlooks of secular people in much the same way it does for
their religious counterparts (Hunter, 1991). That conclusion gives an
entirely new meaning to Beck’s (2001) aphorism that “. . . human mutuality and community rests . . . on a paradoxical collectively of reciprocal
individualization” (xix). It may turn out that books on “individualism”,
“individuation” and “individualization” belong on the same shelf at the
library after all.
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120 • Neil Nevitte and Christopher Cochrane
Appendix A: Countries, Waves and Sample Sizes
1981-1983
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
France
Britain
Germany (West)
Italy
Netherlands
Denmark
Belgium
Spain
Ireland
United States
Canada
Norway
Sweden
Iceland
Finland
Total
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
2
1
1
200
231
305
348
221
182
145
303
217
325
254
246
954
927
1 003
23 736
1990-1991
1
1
2
2
1
1
2
4
1
1
1
1
1
1995-1997
002
484
101
018
017
030
792
147
000
839
730
239
047
702
588
–
1 093
1 017
–
–
–
–
1 211
–
1 542
–
1 127
1 009
–
987
19 861
7 897
1999-2001
1
1
2
2
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
615
000
036
000
003
023
912
409
012
200
931
–
1 015
968
1 038
20 002
23.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
16.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
V196: Importance of God
V197: Strength from Religion
V191: Believe in God
V195: Believe in Heaven
V186: Importance of Religion
V185: Church Attendance
V192: Believe in After-Life
V147: Confidence in:
The Churches
V194: Believe in Hell
V91: Job: Use Initiative
V94: Job: Responsible Job
V93: Job: Achieve Something
V96: Job: Meets Abilities
V95: Job: Interesting
V89: Job: Respected
by People
V136: Attend Lawful
Demonstrations
V137: Join Unofficial Strikes
V135: Join Boycotts
V138: Occupy Buildings
V134: Sign Petition
V155: Confidence: Parliament
V156: Confidence: The
Civil Service
V149: Confidence: The Press
–.717
–.709
–.660
–.567
.026
.057
–.027
.085
–.063
.094
–.034
.164
.054
.008
–.015
–.101
–.159
–.071
–.114
–.006
.059
.119
–.012
.036
–.745
–.042
–.096
.001
–.094
.007
–.097
.074
–.003
.723
.654
.616
.573
.525
.483
.640
–.025
–.007
.077
.056
–.010
.089
–.080
.059
.094
.039
.105
.040
–.056
.095
–.018
.018
–.009
–.023
–.003
.051
.043
.007
.601
.014
–.047
–.002
–.039
.745
.717
–.008
.002
–.017
.036
–.012
–.001
–.009
.051
–.019
.052
–.003
.036
.008
.060
–.001
.243
.016
.113
–.022
.148
–.083
–.039
–.034
–.034
.038
–.029
.058
–.073
–.061
.012
–.063
.066
–.057
–.060
.010
–.088
–.059
.007
–.034
–.002
–.056
–.186
–.059
–.157
.043
.065
–.146
.189
–.066
.055
–.042
–.071
–.071
.032
–.157
.120
.054
.158
.056
.253
.038
.210
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
Job Traits: Political Institutional
Civil
Moral
Fulfillment Protest
Confidence Permissiveness Permissiveness
–.868
.804
.778
.769
.757
.700
.706
.687
1.
Religiosity
Appendix B: Rotated Factor Analysis (PCF)
–.003
–.023
.023
–.052
.078
.049
.054
–.010
–.052
.034
.066
.052
–.037
.051
–.018
–.045
.022
.015
.025
.036
.033
.001
.047
–.022
.019
–.060
.018
–.085
–.017
–.009
–.082
–.010
.004
.048
–.012
.015
–.022
.057
.001
.003
–.004
–.004
.009
–.012
–.042
.029
–.072
–.064
.029
–.041
.083
.062
.008
.025
–.065
–.059
–.146
–.057
–.192
–.177
–.316
.025
.003
–.020
–.058
.009
.013
.009
.012
7.
8.
9.
Subjective Neighbors: Job Traits:
Well-Being Minorities Economic
–.109
–.029
.075
–.205
.218
.032
.087
–.047
.125
–.018
.061
.139
–.087
.131
–.138
.008
–.040
.030
.119
.002
–.069
.013
.120
10.
Military
Nationalism
.048
–.014
–.125
–.027
–.172
.032
.048
–.209
–.041
.019
–.071
.115
–.097
.067
–.049
.076
.090
–.162
.142
.026
–.103
.054
11.
Family
Life
Individualization in Europe and America • 121
24. V151: Confidence:
Labor/Trade Unions
25. V152: Confidence: The Police
26. V204: Justifiable: Illegal
Govt. Benefits
27. V207: Justifiable:
Accepting Bribe
28. V206: Justifiable: Cheat
on Taxes
29. V211: Justifiable: Divorce
30. V210: Justifiable: Abortion
31. V212: Justifiable: Euthanasia
32. V208: Justifiable:
Homosexuality
33. V213: Justifiable: Suicide
34. V81: Life Satisfaction
35. V11: Happiness
36. V82: Freedom & Control
37. V69: Neighbors:
Different Race
38. V73: Neighbors: Immigrants
39. V90: Job: Good Hours
40. V92: Job: Generous Holidays
41. V87: Job: Not too
much Pressure
42. V86: Job: Good Pay
43. V88: Good Job Security
Appendix B (cont.)
–.114
.037
.047
.029
–.003
–.009
–.022
–.002
–.066
–.031
–.033
.002
–.076
.009
.019
.102
.190
.220
.040
.104
.137
.075
.077
.169
.244
.347
.259
.174
.206
–.060
.038
–.051
.000
–.016
.046
.007
.040
–.003
.056
–.024
.025
.041
–.015
–.007
.034
.099
–.024
.004
.040
.042
.115
.110
.074
.170
.072
–.028
.153
.069
–.204
–.039
.021
–.029
–.004
.018
.015
.008
–.054
.039
–.049
–.004
.053
.016
.080
–.003
.115
.028
.569
.006
.600
.105
–.064
.013
.007
.044
–.064
–.186
.077
.002
–.030
.020
–.027
–.057
–.098
–.014
–.683
–.698
–.093
–.720
–.039
–.006
.038
.028
.007
.032
.022
.587
–.035
.025
.067
.033
.766
.735
.687
.683
.123
.130
.062
.033
–.024
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
Job Traits: Political Institutional
Civil
Moral
Fulfillment Protest
Confidence Permissiveness Permissiveness
–.017
1.
Religiosity
–.020
–.051
–.015
.033
.008
–.046
.063
–.828
.774
–.639
–.026
.027
.013
–.018
–.030
.007
.042
.102
.046
.019
.010
.020
.861
.027
.086
.065
–.024
.017
–.014
.039
.863
.050
.009
–.045
.117
–.047
–.029
–.015
.010
–.040
–.564
–.533
–.039
–.723
–.664
–.571
–.064
–.007
.002
.000
–.040
.018
–.007
–.016
–.030
–.003
.014
.045
.017
–.134
7.
8.
9.
Subjective Neighbors: Job Traits:
Well-Being Minorities Economic
.192
.335
.011
–.018
–.149
–.174
.139
–.008
–.003
–.092
–.004
–.021
–.032
–.060
.160
.010
.008
.304
.063
–.044
10.
Military
Nationalism
.039
.039
.022
–.035
–.010
–.003
.108
.011
–.006
.082
.030
.077
.008
.000
.120
.018
–.055
–.057
–.020
.013
11.
Family
Life
122 • Neil Nevitte and Christopher Cochrane
–.003
–.023
.027
.038
7.36
.910
Eigenvalue:
Alpha:
3.34
.731
.081
.009
.007
.237
44. V126: Fight in War
45. V148: Confidence: The
Armed Forces
46. V109: Child Needs
Mother & Father
47. V110: Women Need Children
2.72
.764
.071
.055
–.025
.152
2.45
.708
.016
.019
.122
.394
1.86
.579
.095
.005
–.047
–.004
1.66
.813
.109
.188
.033
.114
1.50
.556
–.126
.008
.049
.035
1.38
.703
.080
.038
.002
.068
1.22
.672
.021
–.001
.078
.025
1.20
.408
–.079
.005
.624
.514
1.10
.365
.668
.663
–.061
–.090
Individualization in Europe and America • 123
124 • Neil Nevitte and Christopher Cochrane
Appendix C: Question Wording, Variable Coding and
Scale Construction
I. Religiosity (Scale) = ([v196/9]+v197
+v191+v195+[v186/4]+[v185/6]+v192+[v147/3]+v194)/9
1. V196 HOW IMPORTANT IS GOD IN YOUR LIFE
How important is God in your life? Please use this scale to indicate – 10 means
very important and 1 means not at all important.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
(0)9 Not at all
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9) Very
2. V197 COMFORT AND STRENGTH FROM RELIGION
Do you find that you get comfort and strength from religion?
0 No
1 Yes
3. V191 BELIEVE IN GOD
Which, if any, of the following do you believe in? Believe in God.
0 No
1 Yes
4. V195 BELIEVE IN HEAVEN
Which, if any, of the following do you believe in? Believe in heaven.
0 No
1 Yes
5. V186 RELIGION IMPORTANT
For each of the following aspects, indicate how important it is in your life:
religion.
1
2
3
4
9
(3)
(2)
(1)
(0)
Very important
Rather important
Not very important
Not at all important
Values in parentheses represent variable re-coding where different from the original.
Individualization in Europe and America • 125
6. V185 HOW OFTEN DO YOU ATTEND RELIGIOUS SERVICES
Apart from weddings, funerals and christenings, about how often do you attend
religious services these days?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
(6)
(5)
(4)
(3)
(3)
(2)
(1)
(0)
More than once a week
Once a week
Once month
Only on special holy days/Christmas/Easter days
Other specific holy days
Once a year
Less often
Never practically never
7. V192 BELIEVE IN LIFE AFTER DEATH
Which, if any, of the following do you believe in? Believe in life after death.
0 No
1 Yes
8. V147 CONFIDENCE: CHURCHES
I am going to name a number of organisations. For each one, could you tell
me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence,
quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all? The churches.
1
2
3
4
(3)
(2)
(1)
(0)
A great deal
Quite a lot
Not very much
None at all
9. V194 BELIEVE IN HELL
Which, if any, of the following do you believe in? Believe in hell.
0 No
1 Yes
II. Work Motivations (Scale): A. Fulfillment =
(V91+V94+V93+V96+V95+V89)
B. Comfort = (V90+V92+V87+V86+
Here are some more aspects of a job that people say are important. Please look
at them and tell me which ones you personally think are important in a job.
Mentioned 1 | Not Mentioned 2 (0)
Personal Fulfillment:
10. V91 An opportunity to use initiative
11. V94 A responsible job
12. V93 A job in which you feel you achieve something
13. V96 A job that meets one’s abilities
14. V95 A job that is interesting
15. V89 A job respected by people in general
126 • Neil Nevitte and Christopher Cochrane
Economic Comfort:
39. V90 Good hours
40. V92 Generous holidays
41. V87 Not too much pressure
42. V86 Good pay
43. V88 Good job security
III. Protest Potential (Scale) = (v136+v137+v135+v138+v134)/5
Now I’d like you to look at this card. I’m going to read out some different
forms of political action that people can take, and I’d like you to tell me, for
each one, whether you have actually done any of these things, whether you
might do it or would never under any circumstances, do it:
Have Done 1 | Might Do 2(1) | Would Never 3(0)
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
V136
V137
V135
V138
V134
Attending lawful demonstrations
Joining unofficial strikes
Joining in boycotts
Occupying buildings or factories
Signing a petition
IV. Moral Permissiveness (Scale) = (v211+v210+v212+v208+v213)/5
Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it can
always be justified, never be justified, or something in between:
1(0)
Never
Justifiable
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
V211
V210
V212
V208
V213
2(1) 3(2) 4(3) 5(4) 6(5) 7(6) 8(7) 9(8)
10(9)
Always
Justifiable
Divorce
Abortion
Euthanasia
Homosexuality
Suicide
V. Technical Notes
• Data are weighted using standard national weights.
• There are only two time-points of data (1981 & 2000) for moral permissiveness in Denmark. There are at least three time-points of data beginning in 1981 for the other countries in Figures 1, 2 and 3.
Religion in Contemporary Society:
Eroded by Human Well-being,
Supported by Cultural Diversity
Thorleif Pettersson1
Abstract
Most versions of secularization theory expect advanced modernity to weaken religion. In contrast, this chapter argues that
two different dimensions of contemporary society affect religion in opposite ways. Rising levels of human security and
well-being are assumed to drive towards religious decline, while
growing cultural diversity is assumed to push towards religious
growth. These two hypotheses are simultaneously investigated,
using world wide data for 50 000 respondents from 37 countries with a predominantly Christian heritage. As dependent
variables, two dimensions of religious involvement which relate
to two core aspects of secularization theory are analyzed:
church-oriented religious involvement and preferences for a
religious impact on politics. The findings from three different
analytical strategies demonstrate that each of the two religious
orientations is positively related to the cultural diversity, and
also that each of them is negatively related to human security
and well-being. Furthermore, the results also indicate that the
religious changes which took place between 1981 and 1999/2000
are negatively related to human well-being and security, and
positively to cultural diversity. Thus, a set of comprehensive
analyses of one and the same set of world wide data indicate
that human security and cultural diversity affect religious
1
Uppsala University
128 • Thorleif Pettersson
involvement in opposite ways. It seems too simplistic, therefore, to view modernization as a universal cause of religious
decline.
Modernization as a General Cause of Secularization?
Most versions of secularization theory attempt to explain religious decline
as an effect of modernization, and economic development, functional
and structural differentiation, urbanization, industrialization and rising
education are all said to weaken religion. Even if the different modernization processes need not be of equal importance, they are said to have
led to a society where religion has become one subsystem among other
subsystems to the point where religion has lost much of its former overarching relevance for both individuals and society. As a result of modernization, secular institutions are said to have become increasingly
independent and autonomous in relation to religion, religious institutions
to have become increasingly affected by secular norms and patterns, and
individual world-views and value systems to have become increasingly
emancipated from religious authorities.
Comparative analyses give strong empirical support to the claim that
modernization erodes religious involvement. For instance, national averages for the subjective importance which people attach to God correlate
substantively negative with each of three standard measures of modernization (Esmer & Pettersson 2006; cf. Inglehart & Norris 2004: 14). The
religious decline is also known to be especially apparent in Western
Europe, one of the most economically developed regions in the world
(Casanova 1994; Acquaviva 1979). But at the same time, the advanced
countries in Western Europe are also known to diverge considerably in
religious matters. Religious participation is substantively higher in the
Southern Catholic parts when compared to the Northern Protestant.
These intra-European differences demonstrate that the level of religious
involvement in a country is also affected by factors other than modernization and economic development. A similar conclusion can be made
from the relationships between the levels of religious involvement and
the various measures of modernization, which were mentioned above.
Even if the reported correlations (often ranging around –.60) demonstrate a substantial effect of modernization, they also give room for other
factors which are not directly related to economic development and modernization in a narrow sense. Obviously, such a complex social phenomena as the strength of contemporary religion cannot be explained
by only one single factor.
Even if most secularization theorists agree that structural and functional differentiation have reduced religion’s influence on public life, there
Religion in Contemporary Society • 129
is considerable disagreement about the impact of this development at
other social levels. Some assume that the differentiation between religious and secular institutions has led to a privatized religion which has
remained relevant to personal and private matters. Religion is assumed
to have been transformed and to have become increasingly assigned to
the home – family life, love, and intimacy – and to have become a matter of individual and private taste (see e.g. Turner 1991, 2000). Such a
privatized religion does not concern itself with public and political matters, and secularization in this sense does not necessarily call for a decline
in individual religiosity. It is only the societal effects of religion which
have ceased.
The many different views on secularization suggest that one should
not speak of the secularization theory. Instead, it has been emphasized
that the “secularization paradigm” includes several competing understandings of what secularization is and which modernization processes it
is driven by (Gorski 2000: 141). In order to investigate some of the
different approaches to secularization, this chapter will investigate the
specific effects of two different dimensions of modernization. The first
concerns the effects of rising levels of existential security and human
well-being. The second concerns the effects of growing levels of cultural
diversity. In this analysis, these two dimensions of modernization are
assumed to have opposite effects on religion.
Religion and Existential Security
It is regularly claimed that economic development brings improved wellbeing and human security. It is also frequently claimed that lack of
human security and well-being brings higher levels of religious involvement, with religion being interpreted as a compensator for poor and
difficult conditions of life. In short, religion has been explained as a
response to human deprivation. Karl Marx’ classical verdict that “religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world,
and the soul of soulless conditions” is one of the most well-known expressions of this line of thought. This view is also part of Christian teachings: “Come unto me, all ye that labour and are heavy laden, and I
will give you rest” (Matt 11: 28-30).
In the early 1960s, sociologists Charles Glock and Rodney Stark forwarded an extensive theory on how different forms of human deprivation gave rise to different kinds of religious involvement (Glock 1964;
Glock & Stark 1965). Economic deprivation was said to lead to sect
activities, social deprivation to church involvement, health deprivation to
healing movements, ethical deprivation to reform movements, and psychic
deprivation to religious cults. Recently, political scientists Pippa Norris
130 • Thorleif Pettersson
and Ronald Inglehart have presented new cross-cultural support for the
assumption that religious involvement is driven by existential insecurity.
All other factors being equal, they claim that “the experiences of growing up
in less secure societies will heighten the importance of religious values, while conversely experience from more secure conditions will lessen it” (Norris & Inglehart
2004: 18; italics in the original). Their main thesis is that religion reduces
insecurity, and that the need for such a reduction is more pressing under
conditions of insecurity and deprivation. This mechanism is said to operate at both the societal and the individual level, although the effect at
the societal level is assumed to be the most important.
Analyzing data from some 80 different societies, Norris and Inglehart
demonstrated that the levels of people’s religious involvement “could,
indeed, be predicted with considerable accuracy from a society’s level of
economic development and other indicators of human development”
(Norris & Inglehart 2003: 220). The most crucial variables for the explanation of why some countries scored low on religious involvement were
those that had an obvious impact on people’s experiences of existential
security. However, increasing human security and the decline of religious involvement need not necessarily mean that people loose interest
in spiritual issues in a more general sense. To the contrary, it has also
been claimed that “spiritual concerns will always be part of the human
condition” (Inglehart 1997: 80). In secure circumstances (that is in the
economically well advanced and wealthy societies) people are still assumed
to try improving their quality of life with, for instance, the satisfaction
of their spiritual needs. “The need for meaning becomes more salient
at high levels of existential security so that, even in rich countries, although
church attendance is declining, spiritual concerns more broadly are not
disappearing” (Norris & Inglehart 2004: 75). As empirical evidence for
this, it is demonstrated that those who report being concerned about the
meaning of life have increased at the same time as more traditional
forms of religious involvement have decreased. Whether such spiritual
concerns in the broad sense should be theoretically associated with religion in the same way as church attendance and adherence to traditional
church dogmas is, however, a debated issue. Even if spiritual concerns
in the broad sense can be viewed as religion from a functional point of
view, it is less obvious that they should be regarded as religion in the
same substantive way as for instance belief in a transcendent God.
Disregarding whether spiritual concerns in the broad sense should be
regarded as religion or not, the fact remains that economic growth and
increased human security appear to weaken religion. At the same time,
it should also however also be noted that the advanced economic and
technological developments in contemporary society are said to led to a
Religion in Contemporary Society • 131
so-called risk society where “the threats produced so far on the path of
industrial society begin to predominate” (Beck 1994: 6; cf. Beck 1992).
The growing risks from nuclear power and atomic bombs, global warming caused by the intense use of oil and petrol for transportation, chemical toxic wastes, biotechnical manipulations and so forth are said to
have a negative impact on people’s perception of human security. In
fact, the mixture of increased well-being and the emerging new risks
which characterize today’s society has been assumed to bring new forms
of religious sensibility and spiritual endeavors (Giddens 1991: 207). In a
similar way, advanced modernization is said to undermine “all the old
certainties”. This would make people more eager to accept religious
worldviews which can restore certainty (Berger 1999).
In summary, modernization and socio-economic development are generally assumed to raise human security and well-being and thereby to
erode religious involvement. In contrast, others have emphasized that
new developments towards growing uncertainties in the contemporary
risk society have increased human insecurity, and that this would be
accompanied by a growing sensibility for religious values and beliefs.
Thus, advanced economic development may not be such an indisputable
path to declining religion as the secularization paradigm assumes; there
are reasons to question advanced modernity as an inevitable cause of
secularization and general religious decline. It has even been concluded
that it is time “to carry the secularization doctrine to the graveyard of
failed theories, and there to whisper ‘Requiescat in pace’” (Stark & Finke
2000: 79).
Religion and Cultural Diversity
The so-called religious supply side or market theory is an interesting
alternative to the secularization paradigm. This theory denies that people’s religious demands are negatively affected by economic development
and refutes that modernization causes inevitable religious declines. Instead,
the religious market theory intends to “explain religious variation by
looking at the supply of religion” (Finke & Stark 2003: 100; italics in the
original). The basic assumption of this approach is that religious participation depends on the quality of the religious supply. The religious supply is in turn assumed to depend on the degree of pluralism among
churches and denominations and/or the degree of regulation of the religious economy. The higher the religious pluralism and the lower the
regulation of religious economies, the better the quality of the supply
and the higher the religious participation (for a review, see e.g. Chaves
& Gorski 2001). Some relate the positive impact of religious pluralism
132 • Thorleif Pettersson
to competition between the actors in the religious economy. The more
competition they face, the more likely they would be to adapt their products to the demands of the “consumers” in order to maintain or increase
their market shares. Such market adaptation is said to result in a rich
and diversified supply of religious “goods” and thus to increase the likelihood that consumers can find religious services well adapted to their
preferences. Another assumption is that religious participation will be
lower the more regulated the religious sector is. The explanation is that
regulation limits competition and that it thereby decreases the quality of
the religious supply. Therefore, regulation of religious markets is assumed
to lead to lower levels of religious participation.
However, a recent review of the research on the effects of religious
pluralism concluded that it would be more fruitful to search for the specific
conditions under which religious pluralism has an impact on the vitality
of the religious economy than to search for a general and invariantly
positive relationship between religious pluralism and religious participation. Such a general relationship has indeed been difficult to demonstrate (Chaves & Gorski 2001: 278f ). It has been especially difficult to
demonstrate such a positive relationship when investigating religious
involvement and religious pluralism at the country level. The explanation might be that the religious supply would primarily have an effect
when the local religious markets are small enough to give the potential
participants a genuine choice (Stark & Finke 2000: 219). It is only when
the potential participants in a religious service can choose between
different kinds of services within a reasonable traveling distance that the
diversity in the religious supply would have an impact. And yet, because
of a lack of local data, studies of the impact of religious pluralism have
often investigated religious participation at the national level and disregarded the local dimension. For this reason, cross-country analyses of
the effects of religious pluralism may have obscured the effects of religious pluralism which would be primarily visible at the local levels.
Another advantage of local analyses of religious pluralism is that they
minimize the influences of other factors which may contaminate the
results from cross-country analyses. These reasons may explain why analyses of religious pluralism in comparatively small local religious economies
have been able to demonstrate the expected positive relationships between
religious pluralism and religious participation, while cross-country analyses have not (Hamberg & Pettersson 1994, 1997; Pettersson 2001;
Pettersson & Hamberg 1997). However, it should also be noted that
local analyses of religious pluralism have not invariantly demonstrated
the expected positive effects (Olson 2002: 151). Therefore, whether reli-
Religion in Contemporary Society • 133
gious pluralism engenders increasing participation or not might also
depend on some other factors.
As an example of such a factor, a recent analysis has suggested that
the positive impact of a diversified religious supply is moderated by the
degree of heterogeneity in people’s religious demands and worldviews
(Hamberg & Pettersson 2002). The analysis argued that where there is
real diversity in religious demands and worldviews, religious participation will be higher the more pluralistic the religious supply. However,
where there is little diversity of religious demands and worldviews, a pluralistic religious supply would have less impact on religious participation.
In such a case, there would be fewer potential consumers of the
differentiated supply. Therefore, rather than being a universal factor leading to increased religious participation, pluralism in the religious supply
would mainly give increased religious participation where there is sufficient
heterogeneity in peoples’ religious beliefs and worldviews.
In this regard, it is of special interest to note that contemporary society is often said to be culturally diversified (Crook et al. 1992: 221f ),
marked by considerable diversity in people’s religious worldviews and
also by a great number of different kinds of religious organizations.
Advanced modernity is said to give rise to a kind of consumerist orientation towards ready-made lifestyles and to dissolve unified cultural
traditions into differentiated segments. The political realm has witnessed
a shift from economic to socio-cultural concerns and advanced modernity
is said to foster multiple and cross-cutting identities which are situated
in a number of “imagined communities”, where membership is a matter
of taste and choice. In individualized contemporary society, people are
said to make their own decisions, “rather than simply living up to the
expectations of community or fulfilling obligations to someone else”
(Wuthnow 1991: 12), and individual identity is assumed to be increasingly
open, reflective, differentiated, and individuated (cf. Berger et al. 1973).
In contemporary society, there are few compulsory obligations and people are assumed to be increasingly free to choose the convictions, beliefs,
and practices they like (Giddens 1991: 84). There is also a growing number of market oriented suppliers of ready-made world views which offer
an increasing number of options to choose from. The new electronic
information technology is an important device for the marketing of such
ideological alternatives. Thus, the emergence of a whole range of smallgroup, non-class political practices-micropolitics is a prominent characteristic of today’s world (Thomson 1992: 235). In this way, contemporary
society is associated with increasing influences for personal choices from
a growing pool of equally permissible and feasible options. And as a
134 • Thorleif Pettersson
consequence, ideological memberships have become more pluralistic and
fragmented. When growing numbers of people, with different value priorities, choose freely from an enlarged pool of ideological options, the
probability that they will choose differently increases. In situations where
individuals have more options for their daily lives, personal beliefs and
values will increasingly replace shared norms as influences on the choices
people make (Berry 1994: 83).
In this sense, one of the hallmarks of individualized contemporary
society is cultural diversity, both with regard to individual world views
and to ideology-based associations and communities. The recent extension
of the religious market theory which was discussed above concluded that it is precisely the combination of these two dimensions of cultural diversity which would drive
towards higher levels of religious participation. Since contemporary society is
characterized by these two features of cultural diversity, it can therefore
be expected to promote increased religious involvement. Where, ceteris
paribus, secularization theories would assume the advanced welfare societies to be associated with increased security and therefore with lower
levels of religious involvement, the extension of the religious market theory which is forwarded in this analysis would assume the culturally
diversified contemporary society to be associated with comparatively
higher levels. Thus, two different dimensions of contemporary society
can be assumed to push in opposite directions with regard to the role
of religion. This is the basic assumption which is investigated in this
chapter.
The assumption of increased religious participation in the culturally
diversified contemporary society is not a new one. It has been argued
that a return to religion is required in order to solve post-modernity’s
growing emphasis on self-interest and its negative impact on morality
(Bell 1976: 171; for a fuller discussion, see O’Neill, 1988; cf. Berger
1999). It has also been suggested that secularization is primarily related
to the industrialization phase of modernization, but not to the subsequent developments into the advanced knowledge and service society.
During the latter developments, previous secularization processes are said
to be counterbalanced by growing concerns for the meaning and purpose of life (Inglehart & Baker 2000: 49; compare also the above discussion of secularization theory). But, even if the assumption that cultural
diversity fosters increased levels of religious involvement is not new, the
theoretical foundation for this claim, which is forwarded here, differs
from the theoretical underpinnings of the earlier assumptions in this
regard. In this chapter, the assumption is based on a recent extension
of the religious market theory.
Religion in Contemporary Society • 135
In order to clarify the concept of cultural diversity, a theoretical model
for allocentrism and idiocentrism can be of help (Triandis 1994). The
model is partly based on a typology for four elementary forms of social
relations (Fiske 1991). Communal sharing is a relationship in which people
are merged so that the boundaries of individual selves are indistinct,
while authority ranking is a transitive asymmetrical relationship of inequality. Equality matching is an egalitarian relationship among peers who are
distinct but coequal individuals, while the relationship of market pricing is
mediated by market values (Fiske 1991: 13f ). These four distinct types
of social relations are said to be fundamental in the sense that they build
the most basic grammar for social relations and general in the sense that
they give order to most forms of social interaction, thought and affect.
They are further said to be elementary in the sense that they are basic
constituents for all social forms of a higher order and to be universal in
the sense that they form the basis for social relations in all cultures.
These four types of social relations can therefore be used as a basis for
cross-cultural analyses of social relations. They can also be used as a
basis for the analysis of cultural diversity. The model for allocentrism
and idiocentrism holds that the four types of relationships are differently
sampled in different societies. Allocentric types (communal sharing and
authority ranking) are more often sampled in collectivist countries while
idiocentric types (equality matching and market pricing) are more often
sampled in individualist countries. In an allocentric and collectivist context, groups tend to be the basic unit for social perception, while in an
idiocentric and individualist context, the individual is the basic unit. For
instance, it would be idiocentric to attribute individual success to people’s own ability, but allocentric to attribute it to the help of others. It
would be idiocentric to appreciate achievement for self-glory, while it
would be allocentric to appreciate it for the groups’ sake. In idiocentric
societies, personal goals have primacy over in-group goals, while the
opposite would be the case in allocentric societies. Comparisons of how
attributes like these are chosen in different societies would therefore indicate the degrees to which the cultures of these societies can be characterized as either allocentric/collective or as idiocentric/individualistic.
Based on the claim that individualism fosters cultural diversity, idiocentric attributes can then be seen as indicators of a diversified culture.
In addition to the impact of cultural diversity and human security,
the levels of religious involvement are also known to differ between
different religious traditions. For instance, religious participation is known
to be higher in Catholic and Orthodox contexts than in Protestant. The
levels of religious involvement are also known to depend on a number
136 • Thorleif Pettersson
of micro-level factors. It has frequently been showed that the younger
and better educated, the males, those who are single without children,
and those who live in urbanized areas tend to be less interested in religious matters (see e.g. Argyle & Beit-Hallahmi 1975; Inglehart 1997;
Pettersson 1994). In this investigation, these factors are mainly introduced in order to control for the impact of factors which might be
related to the key factors of cultural diversity and human security.
In summary, then, this investigation assumes that cultural diversity
with pluralism among ideology based small-scale communities together
with heterogeneity in people’s world views is a cause of growing religious involvement. In contrast, advancements in human security and
well-being are assumed to cause declining levels of religious involvement.
These are the two main macro-level hypotheses which will be simultaneously investigated in this analysis. In addition, people’s religious involvement is also assumed to depend on a number of micro-level factors such
as age, gender, education, etc. In the subsequent part of this chapter,
these macro- and micro level hypotheses will be analyzed, using a comprehensive set of data from some 50 000 respondents and 37 countries
with a predominantly Christian heritage.
Data and Measures
Data: This investigation is primarily built on data from the European
Values Study (EVS)/World Values Survey (WVS) wave from 1999/2000.
For further information on the EVS/WVS projects, see e.g. Harding
et al., 1986; Ester et al., 1994; Inglehart, 1990, 1997; Halman 2001;
Inglehart and Baker, 2000; Inglehart et al. 2004; see also the EVS and
WVS websites: http://evs.kub.nl and www.worldvaluessurvey.org. The
empirical analyses are based on the data from 37 countries being mainly
influenced by Christianity in their religious traditions. This selection is
made in order to limit the investigation to concern at least, in principle, similar dimensions of religious involvement. The 37 countries and
their respective sample sizes are as follows: Argentina (ARE) 1 280,
Austria (AUT) 1 552, Belarus (BLR) 1 000, Belgium (BEL) 1 912, Bulgaria
(BGR) 1 000, Canada (CAN) 1 931, Chile (CHL) 1 200, Croatia (HRV)
1 003, Czech Republic (CZE) 1 908, Denmark (DNK) 1 023, Estonia
(EST) 1 005, Finland (FIN) 1 038, France (FRA) 1 616, Germany (DEU)
2 036, Greece (GRC) 1 142, Hungary (HUN) 1 000, Iceland (ISL) 968,
Ireland (IRL) 1 012, Italy (ITA) 2 000, Latvia (LVA) 1 013, Lithuania
(LTU) 1 018, Luxembourg (LUX) 1 211, Malta (MLT) 1 002, Mexico
(MEX) 1 535, Netherlands (NLD) 1 003, Philippines (PHL) 1 200, Poland
(POL) 1 095, Portugal (PRT) 1 000, Romania (ROM) 1 146, Russia
Religion in Contemporary Society • 137
(RUS) 2 500, Slovakia (SVK) 1 331, Slovenia (SVN) 1 006, South Africa
(ZAF) 3 000, Spain (ESP) 1 200, Sweden (SWE) 1 015, Ukraine (UKR)
1 195 and United States (US) 1 200. Unfortunately, due to missing data
for some key variables, a few countries with a Christian cultural heritage which participated in the 1999/2000 wave can not be included in
this analysis.
Dependent variables: Church-oriented religious involvement and the relationship
between religion and politics. For reasons of space, this analysis will consider
only two dimensions of religious involvement. The first is a broad dimension of a church oriented religious involvement, while the second covers people’s preferences for a religious impact on politics. Referring to
the introductory theoretical discussion, these two dimensions relate to
two of the main aspects of secularization, namely the level of religious
involvement, and the degree of differentiation between religion and secular society. The church-oriented religious involvement is measured by five
items/indicators. These are, a) one item on how often the respondent
attends religious services, b) one indicator for church attachment which
taps confidence in one’s church together with opinions on whether this
gives adequate answers to moral problems, family problems, spiritual
problems, and social problems, c) one indicator for the importance of
God, d) one indicator for eschatological beliefs in life after death, heaven
and hell, and e) one indicator for religious devotions, which taps personal prayer and whether one gets support from one’s religion or not.
Views on the relationship between religion and politics are measured by two
items. These tap the degree to which one rejects that a) religious leaders should not influence how people vote in elections, and b) that religious leaders should not influence government decisions (for a discussion
of the validity of these two items for this purpose, see Halman & Pettersson
2002a, Norris & Inglehart 2004). It should be noted that people’s views
on the relationship between religion and politics only indicates whether
they prefer a differentiation between religion and politics. Thus, it is
important to keep in mind the distinction between the actual level of
differentiation between religion and politics in a society, and the micro
level compartmentalization with regard to whether or not people prefer
a separation between religion and politics (cf. Dobbelaere 2002: 169f )
Table 1 shows the results from an explanatory factor analysis of a
two-dimensional factor structure for these 7 items/indicators. The results
demonstrate that the items/indicators are related as expected to the two
theoretical dimensions of religious involvement. It should also be noted
that a component analysis of the aggregated items/indicators demonstrate
the same two-dimensional factor structure. The factor scores from either
the individual level or the national aggregated level religious indicators
138 • Thorleif Pettersson
Table 1
Results from an explanatory factor analysis of a two-dimensional model for
7 indicators for religious involvement. EVS/WVS data from 37 countries with
a predominantly Christian cultural heritage
can therefore be used to measure the two dimensions of religious
involvement.
Independent micro-level variables for social background: As micro-level control
variables, five indicators for individual level social background will be
used. These relate to age, gender, education, family status (having children) and life satisfaction (see the above theoretical discussion on this).
Education is measured by a question which asked the age at which the
respondents finished/will finish his or her education. Admittedly, this is
a crude measure of the degree of education. However, more nuanced
measures, taking each country’s specific education system into account,
would infringe on cross-country comparability.
Measures for cultural diversity and human well-being and security: The key
research issue of this analysis is to investigate how the two dimensions
of religious involvement are related to the macro-level factors of cultural
diversity and human security. Considering the available data, it is a
difficult task to measure the levels of cultural diversity. This analysis
relies in a tentative manner on three macro-level indicators for this pur-
Religion in Contemporary Society • 139
pose. These tap the degree of cultural idiocentrism, the degree of pluralism among social movements and voluntary associations, and the size
of the information technology sector. The introductory theoretical discussion pointed to these three dimensions as especially interesting for the
analysis of cultural diversity.
The measure of cultural idiocentrism is obtained as factor scores from
five aggregated indicators of idiocentric orientations (cf. the above discussion on this). These indicators tap a) views on whether there are general rules for what is right and wrong, true or false, or whether this
always depends on the situation, b) appreciation of independence and
respect for others as a personal quality, c) the experience of free choice
and control in one’s life, d) the opinion that it is important to be able
to take initiatives in one’s job, and e) how many different social movements and organizations, except religious organizations, one is active
member of. These 5 indicators can all be seen as indicators of an idiocentric orientation (cf. Triandis 1994: Table 3.1). It should also be noted
that the indicators are positively correlated to each other and that they
are related to one and the same latent factor. This has been forwarded
as a criterion for their use in cross-cultural analyses (Triandis 1994: 46).
Obviously, other indicators of idiocentrism might be preferred, but these
five items are the best available in the EVS/WVS data set. The indicator of organizational pluralism taps the degree of pluralism with regard
to active memberships in a number of voluntary organizations and social
movements. This measure is based on the well-known Herfindahl index.
The more evenly spread the memberships across a given number of
different movements, the higher the level of organizational pluralism.
Finally, the measure for the size of the information technology taps the
national number of Internet connections per capita. This measure is
obtained from the statistics which are reported by the World Bank.
The results of a principal component analysis of the three indicators
for cultural diversity demonstrate that they all relate to one and the
same latent dimension. The first component explains about 65 percent
of the total variance in the three indicators. The mean correlation between
the three indicators is .45. The country factor scores for this dimension
can, therefore, tentatively be used as a measure for the national levels
of cultural diversity.
In order to measure the degree of human security and well-being, a
somewhat modified version of the so-called Human Well-being Index
(HWI) will be used (Prescott-Allen 2001). The modified measure covers
four components of human security. These are health and population
(life expectancy at birth and fertility rate), wealth (average of household
140 • Thorleif Pettersson
and national wealth), community (two indices for, respectively, freedom
and governance and peace and order), and equity (average of household and gender equity). The equity index is only included in the human
well-being index if it decreases the average of the three first-mentioned
components. This prevents the well-being index from offsetting poor performance in the other three components of well-being (Prescott-Allen
2001: 152). The four components of human well-being are all positively
correlated. The HWI measure has been showed to correlate positively
with several other measures of standard of living (Prescott-Allen 2001).
This demonstrates the validity of the index as a relevant measure of
human security and standard of living.
Results
Country differences in the independent and dependent variables: It should first be
noted that there is a significant positive correlation between the measures for human well-being and cultural diversity (r = .65, p < .01).
Even if this correlation does not reach the magnitude where multicollinearity becomes a serious problem (Edlund 1997: 84-100), checks
for this are called for when both of these measures are used as independent variables in multiple regression analyses. A scatterplot of the
index for human well-being and the measure for cultural diversity shows
that societies which score comparatively low on human well-being and
high on cultural diversity are largely missing among the 37 countries
which are chosen for this study. Thus, roughly one fourth of the scatterplot is empty. However, an investigation of the relationship between
cultural fractionalism and standard of living has argued that there are
no binding mechanisms which would prevent countries from falling in
this part of the scatterplot (Pettersson & Esmer 2005). To the contrary,
it has even been suggested that cultural fractionalism may actually lead
to lower levels of economic development and standard of living (Alesina
et al. 2003).
As expected from the factor analyses of the two dimensions of religious involvement, the correlation between the church-oriented religious
involvement and the preferences for a religious impact on politics is considerably smaller, both at the individual and the aggregated levels. The
relationship at the latter level is demonstrated by Figure 1, which shows
a scatterplot of the country means for the factor scores for the two religious dimensions. Especially the U.S., South Africa, and Mexico score
high on both dimensions, in contrast to France, Denmark, Belgium,
Bulgaria, Luxemburg, and Austria, which score comparatively low on
both. Sweden, the Netherlands, Finland, Spain, and Russia score low
on the church-oriented religious involvement, but comparatively high on
Religion in Contemporary Society • 141
Figure 1
Church-oriented religion and preferences for a religious impact on politics in
37 countries.
preferences for a religious impact on politics, while Poland, Malta, Croatia,
Romania, and the Philippines show the opposite pattern, with high scores
on church-oriented religion and comparatively low scores on the preferences for a religious impact on politics.
Religious involvement, human security and cultural diversity: As already emphasized, the main research question of this investigation concerns the ways
in which people’s church-oriented religious involvement and their
preferences for a religious impact on politics, respectively, are related to
the levels of human security and cultural diversity in the countries where
they live. In order to investigate this, one multiple regression analysis
for each of the two dependent variables will be used as a first test. In
these two analyses, only macro-level data will be considered. In order
to control for the impact of Catholicism and Orthodoxy on the levels
of religious involvement, each county’s scores for the percentage of
adherents to these two traditions will be introduced as control variables.
Thus, Protestantism is used as the reference category. The results from
142 • Thorleif Pettersson
Table 2
Results from two multiple regression analyses with church-oriented religious
involvement and preferences for a religious impact on politics as dependent
variables. Aggregated data for 37 countries with a predominant Christian culture.
Entries are unstandardized multiple regression coefficients
Church-oriented
religious
involvement
Constant
Human security
Cultural diversity
Catholic tradition
Orthodox tradition
Multiple R
1.27
–.03
.26
1.11
.60
.75
***
***
**
***
***
Preferences for a
religious impact
on politics
.70
–.01
.12
–.12
–.18
.55
***
**
*
*
*** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05.
the multiple regression analyses are presented in Table 2. The multiple
regression coefficients demonstrate that cultural diversity is positively
related to each of the two dimensions of religious involvement, while
human security and well-being is negatively related. Detailed analyses of
the possible effects of multicollinearity between the measures for human
well-being and cultural diversity have demonstrated these to be negligible. In summary, therefore, it can be concluded that two multiple regression analyses of aggregated data have supported each of the two main
hypotheses which are forwarded in this investigation.
In a second set of analyses, only micro-level data are analyzed. In
these analyses, the national levels of human well-being and cultural diversity have been transformed into individual context variables. Thus, each
respondent from a given country has been assigned the national scores
for human well-being and cultural diversity. As measures of religious
involvement, the factor scores from the factor analysis of the individual
level indicators for religious involvement have been used. The analyses
of the individual level data have been performed as a comparative analysis of three different regression models. The first model includes only
the individual level background data as predictors of the two dimensions
of religious involvement. In accordance with the introductory theoretical discussion, the relevant background variables include age, gender,
education, family status (having children or not) and life satisfaction. The
second regression model includes the individual level background data
together with dummy variables for being Catholic or Orthodox (being
a Protestant is used as reference category) as independent variables. In
Religion in Contemporary Society • 143
the third model, the context variables for human security and cultural
diversity are included as predictors for religious involvement. The results
for these regression models are reported in Tables 3 and 4.
The results from the regression analyses show the same pattern as the
analyses of the aggregated level data. Human well-being appears to be
negatively related to each of the two dimensions of religious involvement,
while cultural diversity is positively related. The regression analyses
demonstrate that these relationships are independent of the impacts of
individual background data, including which religious tradition one belongs
to. It should also be noted that the two dimensions of religious involvement appear to be somewhat differently related to the individual level
background variables. In the case of church-oriented religious involvement,
the background variables seem to work quite as expected (see model 3).
Old age, female gender, and full family status (having children) are positively related to religious involvement, while education appears to have
a negative impact. It should also be noted that subjective life satisfaction is positively related to church-oriented religious involvement, and
not negatively, which the hypothesis of the negative impact of existential
insecurity might be interpreted to suggest. However, if one considers that
this hypothesis assumes that the role of religion is to ease the burdens
Table 3
Results for three models of multiple regression analyses. Dependent variable:
Church oriented religious involvement. Entries are unstandardized multiple
regression coefficients. Data from 37 countries with a predominant Christian
culture. Number of respondents: 39.200
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
–.56
.00
.30
.10
–.03
.02
–.96
–.01
.26
.10
–.01
.02
.97
.01
.27
.05
–.02
.04
Social background
Constant
Old age
Female gender
Have children
More education
Life satisfaction
Religious denomination
Catholic
Orthodox
Security, Cultural diversity
Human Well-being Index
Cultural Diversity
Multiple R
Change Multiple R Square
*** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05.
***
n.s.
***
***
***
***
***
*
***
***
***
***
.70 ***
.58 ***
.26 ***
.42 ***
.11 ***
***
***
***
***
***
***
.83 ***
.58 ***
–.04
.31
.56
.14
***
***
***
***
144 • Thorleif Pettersson
Table 4
Results for three models of multiple regression analyses. Dependent variable:
Preferences of a religious impact on politics. Entries are unstandardized multiple regression coefficients. Data from 37 countries with a predominant Christian
culture. Number of respondents: 39.200
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
–.11
–.01
.06
.03
.00
.00
–.12
–.01
.06
.03
.00
.00
.65
.01
.06
.01
–.01
.00
Social background
Constant
Old age
Female gender
Have children
More education
Life satisfaction
Religious tradition
Catholic
Orthodox
Security, Cultural diversity
Human Well-being Index
Cultural Diversity
Multiple R
Change Multiple R Square
**
**
***
***
n.s
n.s
***
**
***
***
n.s
n.s
.02 n.s
.03 n.s
.05 ***
.05 ***
.00 n.s
***
n.s.
***
*
*
n.s
.08 ***
.08 ***
–.01
.17
.15
.02
***
***
***
***
*** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05.
of existential insecurity, the positive regression coefficient can be interpreted
as saying that religious involvement has really fulfilled this role. Put in
theoretical terms, a proper individual level analysis of the hypothesis on
religion as a compensator for human insecurity call for a comparison of
people’s well-being, both before and after they have developed a religious commitment. However, longitudinal data which would allow such
an analysis are difficult to find. With regard to the preferences for a
religious impact on politics, Table 4 demonstrates that both age and
subjective life satisfaction are insignificant as predictor variables.
Both of the two analyses which have been described so far are in a
way flawed. The analyses of the macro-level data ignored the effects of
individual level factors, while the analyses of the micro-level data violate the assumption of independence of the disaggregated macro-level
observations. Thus, both aggregating and disaggregating are related to
different kinds of error (Bryk et al. 1992: XIV). In order to take these
errors into account, the results from two analyses which combine microand macro-level data will be presented next. The multi-level analyses
are based on the HLM program which enables the estimation of the
simultaneous effects of both micro- and macro level independent vari-
Religion in Contemporary Society • 145
Table 5
Results from two multi-level hierarchical linear regressions of micro- and macrolevel factors affecting people’s church-oriented religious involvement and their
preferences for a religious impact on politics. Entries are unstandardized multilevel regression coefficients. 1999-2000 EVS/WVS data for 39.200 respondents
from 37 countries.
Church-oriented religious Preferences for a religious
involvement, degrees of impact on politics, degrees
freedom, p-value
of freedom, p-value
Micro-level factors:
Age
Gender
Education
Have children
Life satisfaction
Macro-level factors
Human well-being
Cultural diversity
Catholic tradition
Orthodox tradition
.01,
.32,
–.02,
.03,
.04,
df
df
df
df
df
36,
36,
36,
36,
36,
p
p
p
p
p
<
<
<
<
<
.001
.001
.001
.001
.001
.00,
.06,
–.01,
.02,
.00,
df
df
df
df
df
36,
36,
36,
36,
36,
n.s.
p < .001
n.s.
p < .01
n.s.
–.03,
.26,
1.26,
.89,
df
df
df
df
32,
32,
32,
32,
p
p
p
p
<
<
<
<
.001
.01
.001
.01
–.01,
.16,
–.18,
–.25,
df
df
df
df
32,
32,
32,
24,
p < .01
p < .001
n.s.
n.s.
ables on the two individual level religious orientations (see e.g. Raudenbush
& Bryk, 2002; Hox, 1995). The results are presented in Table 5.
The hierarchical multi-level regression analyses demonstrate the same
patterns as the previous analyses. Thus, even after allowing for the various micro-level characteristics, there is still a significant impact of human
security and cultural diversity on each of the two dimensions of religious
involvement. The levels of human security and well-being are negatively
related to the two religious dimensions, while the levels of cultural diversity are positively related. With regard to the individual level predictors,
the results are also quite in accordance with the findings from the previous analyses. In summary, therefore, it can be concluded that the three
sets of regression analyses which are reported in this investigation have
yielded rather similar results. This underlines the robustness of the findings.
Each of the three sets of analyses has confirmed that human well-being
and security is negatively related to religious involvement and that cultural diversity is positively related.
Religious change between 1981 and 1999/2000: In order to investigate in
more detail the religious changes which have taken place, Table 6 presents the results for the 16 countries which participated both in the 1981
and 1999/2000 waves of the value studies. Since the items which were
146 • Thorleif Pettersson
Table 6
Mean scores for church-oriented religion in 1981 and 1999/2000 among 16
countries with a predominantly Christian cultural heritage.
Year
Country:
Mexico
Ireland
United States
South Africa
Argentine
Canada
Italy
Spain
Iceland
Hungary
Belgium
The Netherlands
Finland
France
Denmark
Sweden
Difference
1981
1999/2000
107.4
107.2
106.0
105.6
102.0
101.8
100.0
99.3
98.0
98.0
97.3
95.3
93.5
93.2
92.5
91.8
108.5
103.3
106.0
107.5
102.7
100.0
102.5
96.9
97.7
94.4
94.4
93.9
96.9
92.8
93.1
92.7
Increase, p < .001
Decrease, p < .001
No difference
Increase, p < .001
No difference
Decrease, p < .001
Increase, p < .001
Decrease, p < .001
No difference
Decrease, p < .001
Decrease, p < .001
Decrease, p < .05
Increase, p < .001
No difference
No difference
Increase, p < .05
used to study people’s preferences for a religious impact on politics were
not included in the 1981 questionnaire, results for this dimension can
not be reported. The scores which are reported in Table 6 are based
on the same kind of factor scores which were described in relation to
Table 1. In order to facilitate the interpretation of the results, the factor scores obtained from a factor analysis of the entire data set of 5
indicators have been transformed to have a mean value of 100 and a
standard deviation of 10. In Table 6, the countries are ranked from
highest to lowest as at the beginning of the period under study in 1981.
The findings demonstrate that the religious changes which took place
between 1981 and 1999/2000 did not follow one and the same pattern
in each of the 16 countries. There was a religious decline in 6 countries, a religious increase in 5 countries and religious stability in 5 countries. This diversified pattern of religious change undoubtedly warns
against any easy and general assumption of a general linear religious
decline in contemporary society. Looking at the diversified results for
religious change, it is not easy to detect any systematic pattern. Increases
are found in countries with both the highest levels of religious involvement (Mexico, Italy) and the lowest (Finland, Sweden), and the same
Religion in Contemporary Society • 147
can be noted for the countries which show decreases. Furthermore, the
pattern of increases and decreases seems to be unrelated to the CatholicProtestant divide. Both increases and decreases are found among the
Catholic countries, and the same goes for Protestant countries. However,
and rather relevant to this investigation, one interesting tendency, although
weak, can be detected if one takes a closer look at both the size and
the direction of the religious changes. If one calculates the differences
between 1999/2000 and 1981, a positive value indicates a religious
increase, and a negative value a decrease. The partial correlation between
the level of human security at the end of the period under study and
the changes in religious involvement, and allowing for the level of cultural diversity shows itself to be negative (–.41), while the corresponding partial correlation for cultural diversity shows to be positive (.28).
Even if none of these two coefficients is statistically significant, this pattern nevertheless coincides with the previous findings of a differential
impact of human security and cultural diversity. The result also indicates that detailed longitudinal analyses would be an interesting alternative to the cross-sectional analyses which have been reported in this
chapter. In this regard, it should furthermore be noted that the pattern
for religious decreases and increases is also discernible in some preliminary analyses of parts of the WVS data from the 2005/2006 wave.
Therefore, detailed analyses of the complete set of data from this wave
will be of great interest in relation to the two main hypotheses on religious change which have been set out in this analysis.
Conclusions
This investigation started from the assumption that religion is eroded by
human security and fostered by cultural diversity. Thus, two different
dimensions of advanced modernity are assumed to affect religion in opposite ways. In addition (and in this analysis mainly introduced as a kind
of control variables), the levels of people’s religious involvement are also
assumed to be related to the kind of Christian tradition to which they
belong, and also to their socio-economic background. In comparison to
Protestantism, both Catholicism and Orthodoxy are assumed to be related
to higher levels of religious involvement. Social background such as old
age, female gender, full family status (having children) and low education are also assumed to drive people towards higher levels of religious
involvement. As dependent variables for the two main hypotheses, two
dimensions of religious involvement have been investigated. The first is
a general church-oriented religiosity, while the second concerns people’s
preferences for a religious impact on politics. These two dimensions have
been selected since they relate to two core aspects of secularization theory.
148 • Thorleif Pettersson
The hypothesis of a differential impact of human well-being and cultural
diversity has been tested on a comprehensive set of data from 37 countries
with a predominantly Christian cultural heritage. These countries were
chosen in order to obtain comparable measures of religious involvement.
The empirical results supported each of the two macro-level theoretical
hypotheses, and it is difficult to conclude from the detailed results of the
regression analyses that one of them is able to explain more of the variance in religious involvement than the other. Accordingly, the two theoretical perspectives which assume religion to be differently affected by
two different dimensions of modernization appear to have roughly the
same explanatory power. These results demonstrate that in analyses of
religious change, one should not treat modernization as one homogeneous factor which would have one, and only one, impact on religion.
Instead, different dimensions of modern society seem to be associated
with different kinds of religious change. Thus, with two well-known statements in mind, the results neither recommend the immediate burial of
the secularization theory (cf. Stark and Finke 2000: 79), nor call for a
deadly strike at the religious supply side theory (cf. Bruce 1999: 2).
The conclusion that human well-being and cultural diversity have
opposite effects on religious involvement is based on an analytical strategy which allowed that these two factors were investigated simultaneously, using one and the same comprehensive set of empirical data. In
contrast, previous conclusions on the merits of the two different theoretical perspectives on the relation between religion and modernization
have too seldom been based on such a comparative analytical strategy.
It would undoubtedly be of great interest to find data which would allow
even more detailed analyses of the effects of a possible developmental
sequence between advances in human security and cultural diversity
respectively. Thus, one would expect advanced social progress to yield
lower levels of religious participation together with higher levels of cultural pluralism, which in turn would lead to higher levels of religious
involvement (cf. Halman & Pettersson 2002b). However, the analysis
which is reported in this chapter has mostly relied on cross-sectional
data. Needless to say, analyses of such data analyses do not give strong
support for theoretical assumptions on developments over time. Therefore,
it was of considerable interest to find that the analysis of religious changes
during the previous two decades indicated a similar pattern as the crosssectional analyses. Even if the results were not statistically significant, the
analysis of the religious changes that had taken place between 1981 and
1999/2000 indicated that human security was related to religious declines
and cultural diversity to religious increases. Furthermore, the analysis of
the longitudinal data clearly demonstrated that one should be very cau-
Religion in Contemporary Society • 149
tious in assuming any universal linear religious decline in contemporary
society. Instead, the results indicated that religious increases were as frequent as religious decreases, and that in addition several countries showed
no changes at all.
It should also be noted that the data analyzed in this chapter hardly
demonstrate that people have widespread preferences for religious leaders to be potent actors in the political realm. Rather, in spite of the systematic country differences in this regard, the data suggest that in most
countries comparatively large portions of the mass publics appear to
remain skeptic towards a religious influence on politics and public matters (cf. Halman & Pettersson 2002a). This conclusion is also supported
by another set of data, the so called RAMP project, which asked people
in Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Great Britain, Hungary, Ireland, The
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal and Sweden, respectively, whether
the main religions should have an influence on politics or not. These
data showed that large majorities were of the opinion that they should
not (Halman & Pettersson 2002b). These results are of special interest
in relation to recent claims that the contemporary religions refuse the
marginal and privatized role which theories of secularization and modernization have reserved for them (Casanova 1994). Even if cultural diversity seems to breed a positive understanding for such a role, the data
analyzed in this paper can hardly be said to demonstrate that ordinary
people by and large are ready to accept a religious influence on politics.
Obviously, the analyses presented in this investigation need critical
examination. In particular, the indicator for cultural diversity calls for
further development, preferably based on data which would allow a
broader coverage of different dimensions of macro-level culture. At the
same time, a valid indicator for the degree of heterogeneity in people’s
world-views and religious preferences should preferably be based on individual level data. In order to establish a macro-level measure of cultural
diversity from such data, the theoretical model for idiocentric and allocentric perceptions of society seems promising. Thus, to equate cultural
diversity with idiocentric outlooks in combination with heterogeneous
small-group, non-class political practices-micropolitics might be a fruitful research avenue to follow. With regard to the two dependent variables which have been analyzed in this investigation, the indicator for
church-oriented religious involvement appears straightforward and unproblematic. Even so, it might prove interesting to continue this kind of investigation for other dimensions of religious involvement as well, not least
for dimensions which are less church oriented since such more open,
non-organized forms of religious involvement are often said to be on the
increase. Better measures for such dimensions of religious involvement
150 • Thorleif Pettersson
might well cast further light on the processes which are discussed in this
analysis.
Finally, it must be emphasized that the level of religious participation
in a given country is likely to depend on a number of factors which are
not investigated in chapter. For instance, country specific developments
in church history, country specific relationships between religion and
nationalism, country specific relations between religion and different social
and ethnic strata, country specific relationships between religion and the
political party system, etc., may all effect the levels of church involvement and people’s views on the relationship between religion and politics. Therefore, the country differences demonstrated in this analysis may
also depend on factors which have not been investigated or controlled
for. Even so, the systematic relationships which have been demonstrated
between human security, cultural diversity, and religious involvement,
still deserve attention. These systematic relationships were found in a
comprehensive set of data, including some 50 000 respondents from 37
countries with different Christian traditions and different levels of cultural pluralism and social progress. Furthermore, these relationships are
also highly relevant with regard to both secularization theory and the
religious market theory, two key perspectives in contemporary religious
studies. In summary, it can therefore be concluded that both the research
strategy which has been developed in this investigation and the empirical results which have been found have contributed to a deepened understanding of the intriguing relations between human well-being, cultural
diversity and religious change.
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Democratization in the Human
Development Perspective
Christian Welzel1
Abstract
This article describes a model that considers the emergence
and florescence of democracies as something embedded in a
more encompassing evolutionary process. Democratization in
this light is the institutional component of a broader process
of human development that promotes people empowerment
on various fronts. In this process increasing individual resources
give rise to emancipative values that in turn release democratizing social pressures.
Introduction
This article describes a model that considers the emergence and florescence
of democracies as something embedded in a more encompassing evolutionary process. Democratization, in this light, is the institutional component of a broader process of human development. Sen (1999) introduced
the term human development. The basic idea of the concept, the enhancement of human choice, has been further elaborated by Welzel (2002) in
an attempt to bring emancipative values into the concept. Welzel, Inglehart
and Klingemann (2003) illustrated the empirical validity of this approach,
while Inglehart and Welzel (2005) illuminated its wider implications. This
article summarizes the human development approach and its view on
democracy.
The concept of human development proposed by Welzel integrates
economic, cultural, and institutional changes into one theme: the social
1
International University Bremen.
156 • Christian Welzel
practice of human choice; that is, the extent to which people pursue
self-chosen preferences in shaping their daily activities and lives in general. The human development of societies advances to the extent to
which human choice becomes a practiced standard in the respective society. How much this is the case can be measured in three aspects of
social reality, as I will show.
Human Development and Human Nature
Analogous to psychology, where human development means the maturation of a person’s ability to set one’s own preferences and to actualize
oneself (Chirkov, Ryan, Kim and Kaplan 2003), the human development of whole societies means progress towards conditions that enable,
stimulate, and entitle people to shape their lives based on their own
choices. Thus, the human development of entire societies is equivalent
to the empowerment of their people in pursuing intrinsic choices.
From the viewpoint of self-determination theory (Deci and Ryan 2000;
Ryan and Deci 2000), a development that features self-generated choices
deserves the attribute “human” because the potential to make autonomous
choices, to follow intrinsic motivations, and to express and direct oneself, is the most distinctive property of the human species; people’s potential to self-actualization constitutes the “human” potential inherent in
any society. Societies do not differ in this human potential. They differ
in the social conditions that enable, stimulate, and entitle people to
develop and realize their human potential. The concept of human development intends to measure exactly these differences in the “human”
condition of societies. It assumes constancy in people’s human potential,
but variation in the social conditions that allow this potential to unfold.
A cultural relativist might object that there can be no universally
acceptable definition of human development because the understanding
of what is human differs from one culture to the next. In particular, a
relativist might argue that my concept’s focus on pursuing self-chosen
preferences reflects a typically Western fixation on individualism that is
entirely alien, and thus unacceptable, to non-Western cultures. I agree
that notions of what is “human” can differ on the grounds of culture,
but taking the position of cultural relativism to its extreme would mean
that there is no ground for a common notion of humanity whatsoever.
In the end, this position can only be upheld if one denies an undeniable fact: that the potential to reason, judge, and choose is a universally
human potential. To argue otherwise would be the same as stating that
the potential to reason, judge, and choose is uniquely Western and does
not apply to people having grown up under the imprint of Confucian,
Democratization in the Human Development Perspective • 157
Islamic or other non-Western traditions. This is an obviously absurd
position as it divides humankind into different species on the basis of
cultural differences. Hence, I insist that the potential to make autonomous
judgments and to pursue self-chosen preferences is universally human,
not culture-specific. What differs on the grounds of culture is how much
room is given to the human potential for choice; the potential itself,
however, is culturally invariant.
To pursue self-chosen priorities is not only a universal potential of the
human species. It is also a universal human desire, reflected in higher
life satisfaction when given room to realize it. This position is supported
by ample evidence from cross-cultural psychology showing that people
whose activities are driven by intrinsic motivations (which means they
act according to self-chosen preferences), have increased feelings of
fulfillment, subjective well-being, and general life satisfaction, irrespective
of diversity in cultural backgrounds. “Autonomy”, “agency” and “selfactualization” are universal psychological needs that diminish life satisfaction when unsatisfied (Ryan and Deci 2001). Even people in “collectivist”
cultures systematically report lower levels of life satisfaction when they
feel they have little choice in determining how their life turns out.
Evidence from the World Values Surveys illustrates the universality of
the connection between perceived freedom of choice and life satisfaction. Thus, the individual-level linkage between life satisfaction and
people’s perception of choice is present throughout all cultural zones.2
Figure 1 presents the correlation between these two survey questions
across 74 nations in nine distinct cultural regions. The correlations are
consistently positive. There is nothing uniquely Western in the fact that
more freedom of choice tends to create higher levels of life satisfaction.
Unquestionably, philosophers from Plato to Hobbes to Elias saw a
quintessential characteristic of culture in its taming function; that is, its
tendency to constrain people’s striving for autonomy, self-direction, and
choice by instilling in them ideals of social conformity. However, this
taming function is by no means invariant. Instead, as Inglehart and
Welzel (2005) show, cultures are much more “successful” in taming people’s strive for self-direction under pressing existential conditions. Existential
pressures make people mentally more prepared to accept the priority of
group discipline and authority over individual autonomy and choice. It
is a systematic finding that conformity values tend to dominate in societies
2
The analyses underlying Figure 1 are based on data from the World Values Surveys.
Information on the full set of nations in the World Values Survey is available from the
project website (www.worldvaluessurvey.org).
158 • Christian Welzel
Figure 1
Life Satisfaction and the Perception of Choice and Autonomy
Source: Inglehart and Welzel (2005:140).
with more pressing existential conditions, whereas emancipative values
that emphasize human self-expression tend to prevail in societies with
more comfortable and permissive existential conditions (Welzel et al. 2003;
Inglehart and Welzel 2005). As I will argue, how pressing or permissive
existential conditions are is not only a matter of material wealth; it is
also a matter of education levels and social networking opportunities.
Centering the concept of human development on self-generated choices
is equivalent to defining human development as “people empowerment,”
where people empowerment means diminishing constraints on people’s
potential to direct their lives themselves. People empowerment, in this
sense, is a matter of the social conditions in which people live. As depicted
in Table 1, these conditions are relevant in three aspects: economic, cultural, and institutional. Thus, people empowerment involves at least three
things. First, people must be enabled to pursue self-chosen preferences.
This is a matter of their socioeconomic conditions, which do or do not
Democratization in the Human Development Perspective • 159
Table 1
The Human Development of Societies
Human development
...
SOCIOECONOMIC
Dimension
. . . takes place when:
growing
rising
expanding
Civic Resources Emancipative Values Democratic Liberties
extend people’s action enhance people’s action
widen people’s action
repertoires
motivations
rights
. . . determines:
. . . enlarges people’s:
. . . means in short:
CULTURAL
Dimension
INSTITUTIONAL
Dimension
T h e e x t e n t t o w h i c h p e o p l e a r e
a b l e
w i l l i n g
a l l o w e d
t o p u r s u e
s e l f - c h o s e n
p r i o r i t i e s
Capabilities
of
Aspirations
Entitlements
for
to
S E L F - D I R E C T I O N
P e o p l e E m p o w e r m e n t
(diminishing constraints on intrinsic human choice)
Source: Adapted from Welzel (2002:46).
give people the means needed to pursue self-chosen preferences. Second,
people must feel encouraged to pursue self-chosen preferences, making them
feel free from pressures to group conformity. This is a matter of people’s
cultural environment, which does or does not support the values stimulating people to pursue their own choices in life. Third, people must be
allowed to pursue their own choices in both private and public affairs.
This is a matter of people’s institutional context, which does or does not
give them rights entitling them to make autonomous choices. Thus,
people empowerment operates on the level of people’s capabilities, motivations, and entitlements to set their own goals in life and pursue self-chosen
priorities.
Empowerment through Capabilities: The Role of
Civic Resources
People’s capabilities to pursue self-chosen activities depend critically on
available resources that people can access and use according to their
choice. There are three types of resources involved: (1) material means,
(2) intellectual skills, and (3) networking opportunities. Each of these types
of resource increases people’s action repertoire in manifold ways. The
expanded action repertoire also includes “civic” actions that people undertake jointly with others, which is noteworthy as such civic actions are
the quintessential means to hold decision makers responsible for what
people want out of life. Because of their common potential for civic
160 • Christian Welzel
action, I summarize people’s material, intellectual, and social resources
under the term “civic resources.”
Modernization is linked with an increase in material, intellectual, and
social resources. Through technology-driven productivity growth, economic development increases and diversifies people’s supply of goods and
services and raises their financial incomes, making them able to invest
the time, money, and equipment needed for many activities, both private and civic. All these kinds of material resources make people meanswise more capable.
Furthermore, modernization is linked with rising levels of education,
more easily available information, and a mobilization of human intellect by its tendency to widen knowledge-intensive economic and cultural
activities. All this increases people’s intellectual skills, making them cognitively more capable to invent and undertake human activities.
Finally, modernization tends to produce denser, more diversified, and
more widely networked populations, offering people a greater variety of
possible connections to other people. More networking opportunities
lower people’s existential dependence on strong, but few, in-group ties,
allowing individuals to choose between diverse affiliations to other people, groups of people, or voluntary associations (Granovetter 1973).
Networking opportunities empower people connection-wise, making them
socially more capable to initiate and join activities with others.
To obtain a summary indicator of civic resources combining material, intellectual, and social resources, I use Vanhanen’s (1997) index of
“power resources.” This index combines the level and distribution of (1)
material resources (share of family farms in the agrarian sector weighed
for this sector’s contribution to GDP, combined with estimates of the
deconcentration of non-agrarian economic resources), (2) intellectual
resources (literacy rate combined with tertiary enrollment ratios), and (3)
a measure of social complexity (estimates of occupational differentiation
combined with urbanization rates). I suppose the latter to indicate the
diversity and electivity in people’s social connections.
All in all, modernization increases and diversifies people’s civic resources,
including their material means, intellectual skills, and social opportunities. This makes people more capable to follow their own preferences
and pursue self-chosen activities. Human development will be off base
without the enabling effect of civic resources.3
3
The index yields values of maximum 100. For more details see the Internet Appendix
to Inglehart and Welzel (2005) at “http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/publications/
humandevelopment.html,” under “Variables” (#08).
Democratization in the Human Development Perspective • 161
Empowerment through Motivations: The Role of
Emancipative Values
People empowerment has a mentality component as well. To become a
widespread practice in social life, human choice needs not only people
who are able to pursue self-chosen activities, but also people who are
willing to do so. This is a matter of motivations, which are most powerful if they are intrinsic, based on internalized values and ideals.
People internalize value orientations mostly through the subconscious
mechanisms of socialization. Socialization allows cultures to reproduce
themselves, passing on the values that are constitutive for their identity
from one generation to the next. Value systems that place emphasis on
collective conformity, and thus discourage people to pursue self-chosen
preferences, can and do survive, even though these value systems systematically produce lower life satisfaction. The striving for self-direction
is innate to human nature, but this does not mean that it cannot be
discouraged by a culture’s prevailing value system and mental climate.
Conformist value systems place collective discipline over individual
autonomy. Doing so, they discourage any activity that would set an individual too much apart from its related group. By contrast, emancipative
values emphasize human self-expression; they encourage people to pursue self-chosen preferences, even if this diminishes group conformity.
Actually, group conformity is not seen as a value in itself when emancipative ideals gain momentum. Quite the contrary, the opposite of group
conformity – human diversity – becomes increasingly seen as an enrichment of social experience. Again, these insights are well anchored in
cross-cultural psychology, which has long emphasized the difference
between “collectivist” and “individualist” cultures (Hofstede 2001; Triandis
1995; Markus, Kitayama and Heiman 1996; Schwartz 2003).
I prefer the term “emancipative” to “individualist” because “individualism” is too easily confused with selfishness and egoism, obscuring the
fact that individualism goes more easily together with humanism than
do collectivism/conformism (which usually combine in-group favoritism
with out-group discrimination). In fact, emancipative values mean a universal appreciation of human autonomy in general, including other people’s
autonomy, leading to greater tolerance of non-conformity. Emancipative
values involve a universal notion of human freedom in general, rather
than a selfish emphasis on one’s own freedom alone. Also, emancipative values are not anti-collective in the sense that they withhold people
from initiating and joining civic actions with other people. On the contrary, emancipative values actually encourage people to initiate and join
various new types of contentious but peaceful civic activities that keep
162 • Christian Welzel
Figure 2
Raw Measures of Democracy and Measures of Honest Democracy
power holders responsive to the public. These activities have an inherently elite-challenging nature (Welzel, Inglehart and Deutsch 2005).
Emancipative values are not a constant cultural trait of societies.
Instead, societies move towards more emancipative values when existential conditions become more permissive, giving the human strive for
choice more room. This happens even in societies in which conformist
values have a long tradition. Today, we observe a generational shift to
emancipative values in all affluent post-industrial societies, including
Confucian societies such as Japan and South Korea. The value change
towards more emancipative ideals is observed in all societies in which
sustained economic development provides the civic resources needed to
diminish objective constraints on people’s intrinsic life choices.
Emancipative values become more widespread only where existential
pressures on human autonomy recede. We do not yet observe pronounced
generational differences in emancipative values in China and Vietnam,
where the civic resources nurturing these values are still in short supply
for huge parts of the population (which, in the case of China, will change
in the foreseeable future if economic growth continues as it has done in
the last twenty years). By the same token, generational differences in
emphasis on emancipative ideals did emerge in Taiwan and South Korea,
two countries that have been on a growth path for a much longer time
than China and Vietnam, and which, precisely for this reason, have
Democratization in the Human Development Perspective • 163
more widespread civic resources. Thus, cultural traditions are not like
an immutable genetic heritage that makes societies immune to the emancipatory effects of growing civic resources.
Based on World Values Surveys data, I use an index of emancipative
values involving questions that tap civil and political freedom, political
expression, and a valuation of human diversity, other people and subjective well-being. Taken together, these values share a common emphasis on the ideal of a human being who is free in life choices and equal
in this freedom. The particular components of the emancipative values
syndrome include (factor loadings on common dimension in brackets):4
– a valuation of civil and political freedom, reflected in liberty aspirations (.87);
– a valuation of political expression, reflected in participation in petitions (.84);
– a valuation of non-conformity, reflected in an acceptance of homosexuality (.78);
– a valuation of the life one lives, reflected in general life satisfaction
(.82);
– a valuation of people in general, reflected in interpersonal trust (.61).
Rising emancipative ideals are the central cultural force in the process
of human development, motivating people to set their own priorities,
define their preferred way of living, pursue self-chosen activities, and join
forces with others to struggle for the rights to do so. Human development will be incomplete in the absence of the motivating effect of emancipative values.
Empowerment through Entitlements: The Role of
Democratic Liberties
Human empowerment not only requires people to be capable and willing to pursue self-chosen preferences. People must also be allowed to do
so. This is a matter of rights, as only rights can entitle people to pursue
their own choices. In complex modern societies, freedom of choice has
4
The index is created in such a way that it can be interpreted as the percentage of
people emphasizing emancipative values. For additional information on measurement
and scaling details, see the Internet Appendix to Inglehart and Welzel (2005) at
http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/publications/humandevelopment.html, under “Variables”
(#49).
164 • Christian Welzel
both an inward-directed and an outward-directed aspect. Inward freedom
(“negative” freedom) protects individuals from interventions into their
private decision-making freedom in such areas as the choice of occupation, residence, partner, religious beliefs, leisure time activities or sexual
orientation. The shielding aspect of inward freedom is guaranteed by
specifically civil rights.
However, civil rights do not suffice to provide freedom of choice in
societies in which major aspects of people’s daily lives are subject to
political regulations. Hence, entitling people to influence political matters that affect their lives requires rights as well. In this case, we talk
about political rights. Like civil rights, political rights are individual rights
in the sense that their practice is left to individuals, not groups. Political
rights include the right to associate with others, to found interest associations or political parties, the right to initiate and join public actions
such as boycotts, petitions or demonstrations, the right to sue officials,
the right to access administrative information, and the right to vote in
elections and referenda. These rights safeguard outward freedom (“positive” freedom), which does not shield people inwardly from the state; it
gives them opportunities to reach outward in influencing and direct state
activities (Rose 1995). Inward freedom and outward freedom become
manifest in civil and political rights. Taken together, these rights constitute democratic liberties, that is, liberties for the people.
To make democratic liberties practicable, these liberties must not only
be legally codified in the form of rights; elites must also be so honest
as to supply these liberties in ways that do not corrupt them (Finer 1999;
Rose 2001). Thus, honest governance (i.e., the absence of corrupt governance) interacts with the legal supply of democratic liberties to produce uncorrupted or honest democracy. Uncorrupted governance is an important
supply-side condition to make given democratic liberties practicable for
the people. The sheer legal codification of democratic liberties does not
guarantee people any real freedom if power holders are not committed
to the principles of honest government. Hence, my concern is with honest
democracy, not with raw measures of democracy that ignore fundamental
aspects of the quality of democracy.
By definition, corruption means a dishonest use of public power for
private benefit (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2005). Such abuse of
power does not only involve violations of formal procedures. More practically, corrupt or dishonest government means financial expropriation
of the public and blocking popular control over state power. Thus, corrupt government tends to undermine citizens’ rights, and in extreme
cases comes close to disenfranchizing the electorate, even if democratic
liberties remain formally untouched. The simple truth is that democracy
Democratization in the Human Development Perspective • 165
cannot take effect in rogue states in which the use of public power is
corrupted and serves the unchecked rent-seeking interests of office holders.
One can even say that each additional unit of corrupt government is
one step further towards disempowering ordinary people. Since the
empowerment of people is at the heart of democracy, absence of corrupt government, or honest governance, is a condition in the supply of
democratic liberties that is critically relevant to the extent to which
democracy can take effect. This justifies a qualification of the honesty
of democracy using indicators of corrupt government or its absence.
I measure honest democracy by specifying the interaction between
democratic liberties and honest (i.e., uncorrupt) governance, multiplying
percentage scores of democracy with fractions from 0 to 1.0 for honest
governance (with 1.0 being the maximum honesty score):
Democratic Liberties *
(percentages
Honest Governance
weights from 0 to 1.0
=
=
Honest Democracy
weighed percentages)
Democratic Liberties: civil and political rights scores from Freedom House
(inverted scores added and maximum equated with 100).
Honest Governance: control of corruption scores from the World Bank’s Good
Governance indicators (normalized).5
The index of honest democracy has certain noteworthy properties. Because
I use measures of honest governance as a weighting factor that varies
between 0 (for the most corrupt country) and 1.0 (for the least corrupt
country), high scores in honesty cannot compensate for low scores in
democracy. Even a maximum honesty score of 1.0 cannot do more than
maintain a given raw level of democracy. Put differently, a democracy
score can only be downgraded, not upgraded, by a favorable honesty
score.
Because honest democracy is democracy with an additional qualification,
democratic liberties are necessary, but not sufficient, to produce it. Honest
governance, too, is needed to produce honest democracy. In that sense,
honest democracy is a more demanding measure than democracy without this qualification, which is exactly the intention behind making the
qualification.
Consider the example of Singapore. It has a low democracy score and
a high honesty score because the city-state is known for its restrictions
5
For a detailed description of these measures, see the website http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/publications/humandevelopment.html under “Variables” (#21).
166 • Christian Welzel
on democratic liberties as well as its uncorrupt government practices.
But, as Figure 2 illustrates, Singapore’s favorable honesty score cannot
compensate for its low democracy score, so the city-state’s score in honest democracy is as low as its raw score in democracy (even somewhat
lower because there is no perfectly honest governance). Thus, a country can show a low score in honest democracy for two different reasons:
either its democracy score is low, or its honesty score is low. This property of the index is fully intentional: whether citizens cannot practice
democratic liberties because these liberties are not instituted, or whether
they are hindered to practice them because dishonest government renders these liberties impracticable, is entirely irrelevant to the fact that
citizens in both cases are not in the situation to practice their liberties.
This is exactly what is crucial for honest democracy. Conversely, a society must achieve both a high democracy score and a high honesty score
to achieve a high score in honest democracy.
As Figure 2 shows, Singapore reaches the 33rd percentile in its raw
democracy score, as compared to the 10th percentile for China. This
reflects that civil and political liberties in Singapore are not as rigidly
restricted as they are in China, for which reason Singapore is rated by
Freedom House as “partly free” and China as “not free.” On the other
hand, Singapore is rated only partly free, not entirely free, because it
imposes considerable restrictions on democratic liberties. Still, because
of its very high honesty score, its low raw score for democracy is translated almost undiminished into its score for honest democracy. Nevertheless,
Singapore’s score for honest democracy remains low because a low
democracy score cannot be compensated.
Bolivia, on the other hand, ranks much higher in raw democracy than
Singapore. This is perfectly appropriate as Bolivia indeed has much wider
democratic liberties than Singapore. Yet, a very low score in honest governance dramatically downgrades the score for honest democracy, rendering Bolivia’s democratic liberties largely irrelevant. The reality behind
this is very well reflected in all five indicators of “good governance” provided by the World Bank. For example, political violence, terror, and
patronage are so pervasive in Bolivia that the liberties the constitution
assigns to its citizens are hardly practicable. To be sure, Bolivia has institutionalized much wider democratic liberties than Singapore, for which
reason Bolivia ranks much higher in raw democracy (and rightly so).
But the Singaporeans’ fewer liberties are less corrupted by dishonest governance practices than the Bolivians’ wider liberties. In the end, Bolivia’s
score in honest democracy falls even below the low score of Singapore.
These differences in honest democracy are highly indicative of the citizens
“real” liberties.
Democratization in the Human Development Perspective • 167
Figure 3
The Triangular Nexus of Human Development
Democratic
Liberties
.88
.95
Civic
Resources
.97
.89
HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT
.88
.96
Emancipative
Values
Note:
Numbers on bidirectional arrows are correlation coefficients (r). Numbers on one-directional
arrows are factor loadings on common underlying dimension. N = 74.
Uncorrupted democratic liberties operate on the level of entitlements,
empowering people legally to pursue self-chosen activities. From this perspective, democracy is the institutional setting most suited to the human
potential for choice and self-direction. Hence, the significance of democratization lies in the fact that it contributes the institutional component
to human development. It is thus one of three major contributions to
human development and should be considered in this broader context.
Human development will be incomplete without the entitling effect of democratic liberties.
The Triangular Nexus
Conceptually, civic resources, emancipative values, and democratic liberties
belong together as each of these components makes a distinctive contribution to a common underlying theme: human empowerment. But these
three components are not only logically linked. Empirically, too, these
components are closely tied to each other. In fact, civic resources, emancipative values, and democratic liberties converge in a robust and coherent dimension, which a factor analysis clearly demonstrates. As Figure
3 depicts, across a global sample of 74 nations for which measures of
all three variables are available, there is a 92-percent overlapping variance
between national levels of civic resources, emancipative values, and democratic liberties, with each of the three components showing a .96 loading
on their common underlying factor, human development (to see which
74 nations exactly are included in this analysis, see Figure 4 or 5 below).
168 • Christian Welzel
How do the linkages between the three components of human development operate? I argue that emancipative values gain momentum in
societies to the extent to which societal constraints on people’s intrinsic
choices recede, which happens when growing civic resources make people materially, cognitively, and socially more capable to pursue selfchosen activities. Increasing capabilities of action nurture a basic sense
of human agency. This leads people to question unlimited authority,
makes them receptive to the idea of civil and political liberties, and
finally makes them ready to struggle for the rights that effectively guarantee these liberties.
Evidence in History
The human development nexus between civic resources, emancipative
ideals, and democratic liberties is evident throughout history. Even though
democratic liberties have never been granted in a fully inclusive form
in pre-industrial times, it nevertheless holds true that whenever these liberties became effective for at least significant parts of the population it
happened because these parts of the population disposed of the civic
resources enabling them to struggle for civil and political liberties, and
because they have been inspired by the emancipative ideals motivating
them to struggle for these liberties. Because rulers give away part of their
powers by granting liberties to considerable parts of the public, they
have not usually been very keen to do this, unless the public had the
means and the will to enforce these liberties, which is only the case
when civic resources and emancipative ideals are relatively widespread.
The history of pre-industrial societies is full of hunger revolts in which
exploited peasants spontaneously rebelled from time to time against the
most pressing hardship. In none of these revolts, however, did people
come up with a program to implement civil and political rights that
empower the people. The entire idea of rights, be it property rights or
voting rights, was alien to exploited peasant populations in despotic agrarian empires from Eastern Europe to the Middle East to India to China.
Instead, the idea of civil and political rights was born in free farmer
societies in ancient Athens and the Roman Republic; it was re-invented
by free farmer societies and merchant republics in late medieval Europe,
most notably in Northern Italy, the Lowlands, Switzerland, Iceland,
England and Scandinavia, and expanded to establish early limited forms
of democracy in the era of pre-industrial capitalism through the liberal
revolutions in Northwestern Europe and its offshoots in Northern America
and Oceania, enacting principles such as “no taxation without representation” (Dahl 1973; McNeill 1990; Finer 1999).
Democratization in the Human Development Perspective • 169
Without question, the liberal revolutions established only limited versions of democracy, none of which qualifies as a democracy under contemporary standards, for the entitlement to civil and political liberties
was far from being fully inclusive. But the first and foremost step was
made with the very definition of these liberties, committing governments
for the first time since classical Athens to the well-being of the people,
even if the people were not yet defined comprehensively. It is significant
that the implementation of democratic liberties, however limited, has
been pioneered by capitalist freeholder societies whose members experienced
a significant degree of existential autonomy. Such autonomy nurtures a
basic sense of human agency, making people more critical towards unlimited and uncontrolled authority, more receptive to the idea of civil and
political rights and more ready to struggle for them in case they are in
short supply. These popular struggles characterize social movements from
the liberal revolutions of the 17th and 18th centuries to the people
demonstrations of the Third Wave in the late 20th century. These popular struggles are at the very heart of democratization.
Achieving democratization by popular struggles is only possible if
people have the means and will to enforce democratic liberties on their
rulers. Again, this is only the case when civic resources and emancipative ideals are relatively widespread among the people.
People-Driven and Non-People-Driven Democratization
Of course, it is perfectly possible that rulers install democratic liberties
even if most of the population is neither capable nor willing to enforce
these liberties. This can happen for various reasons. There can be the
rare case of benevolent rulers who unaffectedly install democratic liberties. Commitments of this kind are most likely rooted in historical bonds
to a model country of democracy, bonds that make rulers feel obligated
to democratic norms. The adoption of democracy at the start of India’s
national independence in 1947 might be the most obvious case in point.
Alternatively, rulers might enact democratic liberties because they have
learnt from disastrous recent experiences with non-democratic forms of
government, so that democracy appears to be the only viable alternative left; democratization in Germany, Austria, Italy and Japan after
World War II might partly fall into that category. “Enlightened democratization” in that sense is the only case in which honest democracy is
the outcome even if there is little effective pressure by the population
to realize honest democracy. However, this case is as rare as the species
of benevolent dictators.
A second, more likely possibility that rulers will install democracy in
170 • Christian Welzel
the absence of population pressures is when these rulers are depending
on the will of external powers that are strongly pressing for democratization. This case of “external democratization” is typical of post-war
democracies such as West Germany, Austria, Italy, and Japan after World
War II. The overriding power of the U.S. left these countries’ post-war
leaders no other viable option than democracy. The U.S.-led attempts
to install democracy in post-war Afghanistan and Iraq fall into the same
category of externally guided democratization.
A third and increasingly widespread possibility that rulers will install
democracy without being pressed to do so by their own population is
when rulers believe that they can effectively corrupt democratic liberties
in practice, and when the pretense of democracy seems to be a useful
means to open the doors to the international community, especially donor
organizations. This case of “opportunistic democratization” has become
more likely since the Washington Consensus, after which Western credits have been tied to conditions of “good governance.”
Enlightened democratization, external democratization, and opportunistic democratization are all cases of democratization in which the
elites install democratic liberties even though they are not forced to do
so by popular pressures. This is so because the population in these cases
has neither the means making it capable, nor the motivations making it
willing, to launch democratization pressure. If this is so, the population
also has little of the means and will to practice given democratic liberties effectively. The most likely result of this is corrupted democracy
because, in a population largely incapable and discouraged to enforce
democratic liberties, the rent-seeking interests of power holders can unfold
largely unchecked. Thus, corrupted democracy is most likely in the
absence of the enabling and motivating aspects of human development
on the side of the people. In fact, there are indications that various
forms of corrupted democracy are going to replace open dictatorship as
the modal type of regime when the enabling and motivating aspects of
human development have not yet reached the people. By the same token,
the emergence of honest democracy is an elite-side step in human development that is closely tied to the enabling and motivating steps on the
side of the people.
If growing civic resources make people more capable, and rising emancipative values make them more willing to practice democratic liberties,
it becomes increasingly likely that these people initiate and join social
movements that demand and struggle for greater and less corrupted
democratic liberties. In a democracy, this will result in social pressures
to widen already existing liberties or to reduce abusing practices of them.
In an authoritarian system, such liberation movements challenge the
Democratization in the Human Development Perspective • 171
whole political regime itself because the enactment of civil and political
liberties puts an end to authoritarian rule. This makes liberation movements a risky adventure. Authoritarian elites may decide at any point
to terminate such a movement by force, as happened in 1989 in China.
But suppression is not an unlimited option. Quite the contrary, confronted with a public whose members are capable and motivated to initiate and join widespread mass actions, the coercive option is likely to
fail. Democracy movements can only be suppressed by military means
if they are concentrated on a few places and limited to isolated groups
of the population. Such was the case when members of the thin student
population initiated pro-democracy demonstrations in Tiananmen Square
in the summer of 1989. However, when mass demonstrations spread all
over the country, involving various groups of the population, as was true
in the GDR, Czechoslovakia and the Baltic states, military suppression
becomes almost impossible. This is not to say that coercive regimes cannot survive when they have lost the support of the population. The sad
truth is that they can – but only as long as the population does not dispose of the resources that enable it, and is not inspired by the ideals
that stimulate it to launch a mass liberation movement. Once, however,
civic resources and emancipative ideals become widespread, no coercive
regime can survive for long time (except when it is externally supported
by a non-democratic empire).
Experiencing Autonomy
Economic development helps give rise to emancipative values because it
provides a basic sense of human agency, on the basis of which emancipative goals enter the realm of the possible. This is so because economic development increases individually accessible resources, including
material means, intellectual skills, and social opportunities, all of which
widen people’s action repertoire, giving them a sense of autonomy and
agency. Sometimes, however, economic development can be suspiciously
one-sided, as is the case in oil-exporting countries, which are super-rich,
but otherwise very traditional.
Oil-exporting economies do not nurture the sense of autonomy that
gives rise to emancipative values in post-industrial knowledge economies.
This is an important illustration of the fact that sheer material wealth
alone does little to provide a sense of human autonomy, unless it is
accompanied by high levels of education (which make people intellectually more autonomous) and highly elective patterns of connectivity
(which make them socially more autonomous). The activities needed to
sustain a rent-seeking economy require little intellectual skills and little
172 • Christian Welzel
electivity in people’s social networks. A rent-seeking economy can become
rich while keeping people on a low level of skills and locked in closelyknit social groups. This emphasizes that the nature of a society’s prevailing economic activities plays a decisive role in determining whether
higher cognitive skills and more elective social connections are favored.
Only in combination with these factors does economic development nurture a basic sense of human autonomy.
If major economic activities require individual creativity and initiative,
they nurture a sense of individual competence, mastery, and autonomy.
If they involve rather standardized routine work, they undermine this
sense of agency. Thus, Nolan and Lenski (1999) provide evidence that
people in hunter-gatherer societies had more individualistic values than
people who grew up in the “labor-repressive” agrarian empires. On the
scale of emancipative values, hunter-gatherer societies would probably
score higher than agrarian empires. It is no coincidence that huntergatherer societies have been relatively democratic, whereas the hallmark
of agrarian empires was despotism (Ember, Ember and Russett 1997).
By contrast, whenever civil and political liberties have been institutionalized in pre-industrial times, it was in free farmer societies or free
merchant republics in which private property on land and free access
to markets gave people some degree of existential autonomy, even if
they were not affluent. These societies have neither been rich, nor have
their people been existentially secure by current standards; nevertheless,
it was in exactly these societies that the philosophies of Humanism and
Enlightenment established an emancipative ethos. Again, it is no coincidence that free farmer and merchant societies in Western Europe and
Northern America were the cradle of modern liberal democracy. The
meritocratic middle classes in these societies have been the strongest proponents of the civil and political liberties that define democracy until
today.
Industrialization did not strengthen this emancipative ethos, and the
working class was not the most powerful social force in pushing for
democracy, contrary to what Rueschemeyer et al. (1992) suggest. The
working class demanded a welfare state and universal suffrage, but often
enough at the expense of civil and political liberties. Quite frequently,
the working class helped in voting fascist, communist, and populist parties into office. Once in power, these parties restricted civil and political liberties or nullified them altogether. In any case, the working class
did not place special emphasis on civil and political liberties, in line with
what Lipset (1959) once described as “working class authoritarianism.”
Thus, the rise and expansion of the working class did not bring or
strengthen emancipative ideals.
Democratization in the Human Development Perspective • 173
The daily work performed by the typical blue-collar worker of the
industrial age was standardized manual routines, nothing that nurtures
human creativity and independent thinking. The Fordist organization of
economic and social life in industrial societies, with their gigantic factories,
huge bureaucracies, uniform social classes and prefixed role models, has
been rigidly standardized. People hardly experienced themselves as autonomous individuals in this standardized world. Even though the mechanical worldview of the industrial age gave rise to secular-rational values,
it did not support emancipative values to the same extent. Uncoupled
from emancipative values, the secular-rational worldview was perfectly
compatible with communist, fascist and other forms of totalitarian ideologies. Although it is true that industrialization brought universal suffrage
and mass involvement into politics, mass political involvement was as
often realized in authoritarian forms as it was in democratic forms.
The post-industrial age brings another turn as the rise of knowledgeintensive economies changes the nature of economic activities. Tasks in
knowledge-intensive professions become more cognition-based and involve
more intellectual creativity, which offers a wider scope for individual
judgment and thinking. The change in the nature of economic activities goes along with more flexible ways in which the whole society is
organized, de-standardizing social classes, social roles, career patterns and
life courses, making group affiliations, role models and biographies a
more elective matter of people’s own choices. Individualization (Beck
2002) in that sense does not mean the destruction or reduction of people’s connectivity, but more individual freedom to connect and disconnect as they choose, making social networks more diverse, flexible,
modular, and elective. This individualization trend nourishes a sense of
autonomy and life control and an emancipative ethos that brings social
pressures to widen and deepen civil and political rights and equal opportunities, including consumer rights, women’s rights, children’s rights, the
rights of gays and lesbians, freedom of information rights, as well as
increasing pressures on elites to govern transparently, accountably, and
responsively. Rising emancipative values are the central motivational
force in this process, helping to make societies ever more people-centered.
Table 2 summarizes these arguments.
Raw Democracy and Honest Democracy
Their common focus on intrinsic human choice intertwines civic resources,
emancipative values, and democratic liberties to a remarkable extent. To
illustrate this point, Figure 4 displays the relationship between the spread
of civic resources and emancipative values among national populations,
174 • Christian Welzel
Table 2
Democratization as an Outcome of Human Development Process
S O C I O E C O N O M I C D E V E L O P M E N T
‡
‡
‡
Productivity growth and
Rising levels of education Growing social diversification
the welfare state increase and increasingly knowledgewidens people’s networking
people’s available means.
intensive work widen
opportunities.
people’s cognitive skills.
‡
‡
‡
People become materially
more autonomous.
People become intellectually
more autonomous.
People become socially
more autonomous.
‡
‡
‡
Diminishing constraints on autonomous choice nurture a basic sense of human
self-direction, making people more receptive to the idea of civil and political
freedom as a matter of rights.
‡
R I S I N G E M A N C I P A T I V E V A L U E S
in non-democracies
in democracies
‡
‡
‡
‡
growing
growing
growing
growing
number of
mass support number of number of
civil and
for civil and
liberal
equal
political rights political rights reformers opportunity
activists
movements among elites
activists
‡
‡
‡
‡
‡
growing
increasingly
mass support responsive
for equal
and honest
opportunity
elites
movements
‡
‡
‡
Formal adoption of democratic liberties Increasingly uncorrupted democratic liberties
‡
‡
DEMOCRATIZATION or PEOPLE EMPOWERMENT
both measured in the early 1990s and mid 1990s respectively.6 Knowing
how widespread civic resources are in a society, we can explain 80 percent of the cross-national variance in emancipative values.
6
A dating of the exact year of the measurement is not possible as the measures vary
by four to five years from country to country. On average, the year of measurement is
1993 for both civic resources and emancipative values.
Democratization in the Human Development Perspective • 175
Figure 4
Civic Resources and Emancipative Values
Figure 5 displays the relationship between the spread of emancipative
values in the early 1990s and varying degrees of honest democracy7 in
2002-04. Knowing how widespread emancipative values are in a population, we can explain 79 percent of the cross-national variation in the
presence of honest democracy.
To the effective practice of democracy, honest democracy is a much
more meaningful measure than democracy without this additional
qualification. From this perspective, it is noteworthy that my measure of
7
Our measure of honest democracy combines the formal presence of civil and political rights and the elites’ respect of honest governance (“elite integrity”) in such a way
that high scores in elite integrity cannot do more than simply reproduce a given level
of civil and political rights (measured in percentiles of the possible maximum), whereas
low scores in elite integrity can seriously downgrade a given level of civil and political
rights. For measurement details, see the Internet Appendix to Inglehart and Welzel (2005)
at http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/publications/humandevelopment.html, under
“Variables” (#21).
176 • Christian Welzel
Figure 5
Emancipative Values and Democratic Liberties
honest democracy is much more closely associated with emancipative
mass values than are standard measures of democracy which do not take
honest governance into account. After all, this is perfectly logical in the
human development perspective: the liberating social forces that can
release effective social pressures on elites to respect democratic liberties
are only present to the extent to which a public disposes of the resources
enabling it, and to the extent to which it is inspired by the ideals motivating it to struggle for democratic liberties.
Effect Thresholds
The links between societal levels of civic resources and emancipative values, and between emancipative values and democratic liberties, are systematic and linear. Yet, even strongly linear relationships such as these
are not perfectly deterministic. Nations are not positioned on a straight
line. Rather, they are scattered along distinct but relatively broad corridors (i.e., confidence intervals), as depicted by the left and right dotted boundaries in Figures 4 and 5.
Democratization in the Human Development Perspective • 177
These corridors reflect thresholds in the effects of resources on values
and of values on liberties, implying that not every one-unit increase in
civic resources is reflected in a corresponding increase in emancipative
values, and that not every one-unit increase in emancipative values is
reflected in a corresponding increase in democratic liberties. The size of
the increase in civic resources needed to make corresponding increases
in emancipative values very likely (say to 95 percent likely), as well as
the size of the increase in emancipative values required to make corresponding increases in democratic liberties very likely, is relatively large.
Generally speaking, we deal with the increase in an independent variable X needed to yield a corresponding increase in a dependent variable Y, which I call the “effect threshold” of X on Y. In the present
case, the size of the effect threshold is depicted by the horizontal widths
of the corridors, demarcated by the dotted lines in Figures 4 and 5.
Since relationships in the social and political world are never strictly
deterministic, the existence of effect thresholds is what we usually expect.
Consider Figure 4 again. If one starts moving from any point at the
left boundary to the right, that is, along increasing civic resources, it is
not very likely that the next society one encounters scores higher in
emancipative values than the previous one, unless one’s move exceeds a
horizontal distance as large as the width of the whole corridor. Exceeding
this distance, it becomes almost certain that the next society with more
widespread civic resources than the previous one also has more widespread emancipative values than the previous one. The same applies to
Figure 5. As one moves from less to more widespread emancipative values, starting at any point on the left boundary of the corridor, the next
society is not very likely to have wider democratic liberties than the previous one—as long as one’s move does not cross the right boundary of
the corridor. But, if one crosses this boundary, it is virtually guaranteed
that the next society with more widespread emancipative values than the
previous one also has wider democratic liberties.
The effect thresholds are rather large—so large indeed that the effects
become fully apparent only when taking the entire global variation into
account. In contrast, most geographical regions are internally so coherent that the variation among their nations hardly overcomes the threshold of the effects of resources on values and of values on liberties. This
is noteworthy as it clarifies that the linkages constituting human development can be easily overlooked from too narrow a perspective.
The human development nexus becomes fully apparent only when
large-scale variation of a global scope is taken into account. As a consequence, the nexus is not very evident at the individual level within
nations. For example, the individual-level link between civic resources
178 • Christian Welzel
and emancipative values is, in general, relatively weak and, in some
national samples, even insignificant. Pooled across all national samples,
however, the individual-level link between civic resources and emancipative values is highly significant, with civic resources showing a .22
beta-effect on emancipative values, which is considerably strong given
the large random error in individual-level mass data.8 Thus, the effect
becomes apparent only if the large-scale variation between nations is
taken into account.
This is very indicative of the nature of the effect of civic resources
on emancipative values. The fact that this effect is weak, and sometimes
even invisible, among individuals within the same nation shows that individuals do not internalize stronger emancipative ideals because they command more civic resources than most other individuals in their society.
Instead, individuals internalize stronger emancipative ideals when the
general level of civic resources is high; that is, when not only they themselves, but when most individuals in their nation, dispose of many civic
resources. This is obvious from the fact that civic resources do show a
relatively strong individual-level effect on emancipative values in the
pooled dataset when the full between-nation variation is taken into
account. Accordingly, the national average of civic resources determines
an individual’s emancipative values more than this individual’s own civic
resources. This implies that the effect of resources on values is mostly
contextual or ecological by nature.9
It is for this reason that the same relation between civic resources and
emancipative values is even stronger at the aggregate level when one
uses national averages of civic resources and emancipative values (in this
case there is an effect of beta = .89). By aggregating individual-level
data to the nation level, one reduces the existing variance solely to its
between-nation component. As we have seen, this component of the variance is more significant than the variation among individuals within
nations, which is indeed largely contaminated with random measurement error. Aggregation eliminates random measurement error at the
individual level because negative and positive deviations from a given
mean cancel each other out when averaging them. Hence, the pooled
8
To calculate this effect, a variable combining an individual’s level of formal education (measured on a nine-point ordinal scale from no education to university-level education) and its income level (measured in national currency deciles of available household
income) has been constructed. For the magnitude of the effect it doesn’t matter if one
uses an additive or multiplicative combination of education and income.
9
Welzel (2003) has shown this using more sophisticated multi-level models.
Democratization in the Human Development Perspective • 179
individual-level relation between civic resources and emancipative values
is much weaker than the aggregate-level relation between the same two
variables. This, however, does not invalidate the aggregate-level relation.
It only shows how much random noise there is on the individual level.
Intrinsic and Instrumental Support for Democracy
The societal-level relation between emancipative values and democratic
liberties does not have an individual-level equivalent. Democratic liberties are a system property that does not vary at the individual level.
However, one might suppose that the effect of emancipative values on
democratic liberties exists because, and only because, widespread emancipative values produce mass support for democracy. Thus, aggregate
measures of explicit support for democracy should have an even more
direct effect on democratic liberties than have emancipative values.
Surprising as it may seem, this is not the case.
When one calculates the percentage of people in a country who express
strong support for democracy,10 this variable explains only 32 percent of
the variation in democratic liberties over 74 nations in the World Values
Survey. By contrast, the national levels of emancipative values explain
79 percent of the variation in democratic liberties, even though none of
the components of these values refers explicitly to democracy itself. Adding
explicit support of democracy to emancipative values as an explanatory
factor increases the explained variance by only five percent, with explicit
democratic support showing a much weaker and less significant effect
10
Following Klingemann (1999), I create an “autocracy-democracy preference” index
as follows: I first sum up the extent to which a respondent endorses the statements,
“Having a democratic political system” (V166 in WVS III-IV) and “Democracy may
have problems but it’s better than any other form of government” (V172). Approval of
these statements can be expressed in four categories: “very good” (recoded 3), “fairly
good” (recoded 2), “fairly bad” (coded 1) and “very bad” (coded 0) for the former statement, and “agree strongly” (coded 3), “agree” (coded 2), “disagree” (coded 1) and “disagree strongly” (coded 0) for the latter. Thus, support for these statements adds up to
produce a scale from 0 to 6, with 6 representing the highest support for democracy. In
the second step, I sum up people’s agreement that “Having a strong leader who does
not have to bother with parliament and elections” (V164) and “Having the army rule”
(V165) would be a good way to run this country. This also creates a 0-to-6 scale, measuring support for authoritarian forms of government. I then subtract support for authoritarian rule from support for democracy, yielding an index from –6 (maximum support
for autocracy) to +6 (maximum support for democracy). Finally, I calculate for each
sample the percentage scoring at least +4 on this –6 to +6 index, classifying those
respondents as “strong” overt supporters of democracy.
180 • Christian Welzel
than emancipative values.11 Hence, the effect of emancipative values on
democratic liberties does not operate by producing more people who
express overt support of democracy.
This is all the more noteworthy as I use an elaborated indicator of
support for democracy that balances people’s support of democracy
against their support of authoritarian alternatives to democracy, such as
military rule. This indicator measures net support for democracy, which
is not inflated by people who react favorably on the term democracy
without rejecting other political systems. This finding directs attention to
the relationship between emancipative values and support for democracy. Should these two variables not be strongly related because democracy is the natural system preferred by people who emphasize human
emancipation?
Indeed, there is a positive relationship between emancipative values
and support for democracy. At the aggregate-level, percentages of
people holding emancipative values correlate at .53 with percentages
expressing strong overt support for democracy (N = 71). Pooled across
all samples, the individuals’ emphasis on emancipative values correlates
with their support for democracy at .26. These correlations are highly
significant and point in the expected direction. But they are weaker than
one might suspect. Why is this the case?
As Welzel (2006) demonstrates, the relation between emancipative values and support for democracy exists at the societal level because societies having relatively large numbers of people who emphasize emancipative
values (that is, above 45%) always produce a majority of people who
explicitly support democracy. Thus, relatively widespread emancipative
values are a sufficient condition to produce majorities of overt democrats. What weakens the relation, however, is that it does not hold in the
reverse direction. Among societies with low proportions of people emphasizing emancipative values, the proportion of overt supporters of democracy is not necessarily low. Among societies with low levels of emancipative
values, one can find a wide range of overt support for democracy from
a low of almost zero percent in Vietnam, to a high of roughly 80 percent in Bangladesh. Hence, emancipative values are a sufficient, but not
a necessary, condition for producing majorities of overt supporters of
democracy.
Why this is so becomes obvious when one examines the attitudinal
predictors of support for democracy at the individual level. Emancipative
11
More precise regression results are found in Welzel and Inglehart (forthcoming).
Democratization in the Human Development Perspective • 181
values are a significant individual-level predictor of overt support for
democracy because emancipation minded people have an intrinsic tendency to endorse the civil and political liberties that define democracy.
People who support democracy on the basis of emancipative values support it because of its inherent liberating qualities, not as a means to
other ends. This is what I call “intrinsic” support. Yet, many people
with weak emancipative orientations also support democracy, but for
other reasons. This is obvious from the fact that how good people think
democracies are at maintaining order and managing a prospering economy is an even better predictor of support of democracy than are emancipative values. This sort of support is detached from an intrinsic valuation
of democracy’s inherent qualities. It derives from performance expectations. Thus, democracy is valued as a means to other ends, not an end
in itself. This is what I call “instrumental” support.
The distinction between intrinsic and instrumental support is of critical importance. It helps explain why emancipative values are a much
more powerful predictor of democratic liberties than is overt support for
democracy. Even the most sophisticated measures of overt support for
democracy are highly inflated by instrumental support motives. Only to
a lesser extent do they measure intrinsic support for democracy. This
makes it necessary to split the overt supporters of democracy into intrinsic supporters (i.e., those placing relatively strong emphasis on emancipative values) and instrumental supporters (i.e., those placing relatively
little emphasis on emancipative values).
Figure 6 partitions the overall democratic support into its intrinsic and
instrumental components.12 This partition yields highly interesting results.
Obviously, overall support of democracy does not differentiate the world
very much any more; it has spread around the globe, showing high levels even in Sub-Saharan Africa. But intrinsic support continues to
differentiate the world; it has not diffused into all corners of the planet.
12
Respondents scoring high in support for democracy (4 or higher in the autocracydemocracy preference index described in fn. 9 above) have been divided into (a) those
having above-average emancipative values (i.e., scoring above the overall mean in individual-level emancipative values) and (b) those having below-average emancipative values.
Group (a) has been classified as intrinsic supporters of democracy, group (b) as instrumental supporters. For each sample, the percentage of both groups has been calculated.
Finally, a percentage difference index has been created by subtracting instrumental from
intrinsic supporters. For further details on instrumental and intrinsic support of democracy, see the Internet Appendix to Inglehart and Welzel (2005) at http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/publications/humandevelopment.html, under “Variables” (#58–60).
182 • Christian Welzel
Figure 6
Partitioning Support for Democracy into its Instrumental and Intrinsic Components
Instead, intrinsic support for democracy is an exclusive property of regions
that are far advanced in human development.
To extend this logic one step further, Figure 7 shows how strongly
the composition of support of democracy across cultural regions is related
to the level of honest democracy. The extent to which intrinsic supporters exceed instrumental supporters places a cultural zone higher in
the level of honest democracy. This finding is a highly valid simplification
of the same relation among the much larger number of single nations
because the few cultural zones in Figure 7 capture fully 85 percent of
the entire cross-national variation in democratic liberties and intrinsic
versus instrumental support for democracy.
These findings confirm the emphasis that human development theory
places on the theme of emancipation. Support for democracy is relevant
to real democratic liberties only insofar as it is tied to emancipative
ideals. Honest democracy, at least, is essentially an emancipative achievement, which makes it a central aspect of human development.
Democratization in the Human Development Perspective • 183
Figure 7
Honest Democracy and Intrinsic vs. Instrumental Support for Democracy
Conclusion
This article has described democratization as an integral part of a broader
process of human development that empowers people. Rising emancipative ideals provide the driving motivational force in this process, and
they are not simply a given or absent heritage of cultural tradition. They
emerge systematically in the wake of major socioeconomic transformations, all of which have in common that they diminish societal constraints on people’s life choices. Societal constraints on human choice
recede when growing civic resources make people materially, intellectually, and socially more independent, nurturing a fundamental sense of
autonomy and agency that makes people receptive to emancipative ideals,
including the idea that having civil and political freedom is a most natural right for people to have, and is worthwhile to struggle for.
Just as the socioeconomic transformations nurturing emancipative ideals
can happen in both democratic and non-democratic systems, emancipative ideals, too, can emerge in democratic as well as non-democratic
184 • Christian Welzel
systems. Thus, there are two ideal-typical pathways through which these
ideals promote democratic progress, that is, people empowerment. If
emancipative ideals emerge in a non-democracy, the conditions of mobilizing a democracy movement improve because more people have the
intrinsic motivation to struggle for democratic liberties. Also, the probability that parts of the younger elite cohorts will be affected by a societal value change to more emancipative ideals increases, making it more
likely that a camp of liberal reformers splits off. All this increases the
likelihood of adopting democratic liberties where they are not yet in
place.
On the other hand, democratic liberties can have been in place for
quite some time, such that emancipative ideals become more pronounced
in an already democratic setting. In this case, these values fuel various
social movement activities, many of which have in common that they
struggle for better specified or practiced democratic liberties. These movements are proponents of many of the transformations that Cain, Dalton
and Scarrow (2004) portray as a third transformation of democracy,
making existing democracies more people-centered. Together, the adoption of democratic liberties where they did not yet exist, and the enrichment of these liberties by more honest practices where they already do
exist, constitute democratic progress. Both tracks of progress are an integral part of a broader process of human development in which rising
emancipative values provide the central motivational force in fueling people empowerment.
These insights have positive and negative implications. The positive
implication is that honest democracy is not an exclusive achievement
available only to specific cultures. Instead, it is an integral part of a
broader process of human development, and so it can take root everywhere where human development advances. The negative implication is
that it indeed needs the development of both people’s means and mentalities to anchor honest democracy in a society. True, democratic liberties can be adopted in any society, fully irrespective of people’s means
and mentalities, but honest democracy which people are able and willing to practice is not. When people lack the abilities and willingness to
do so, corrupt democracy is the most likely outcome. Unfortunately, corrupt democracy disempowers people almost as much as open dictatorship. In order to favor honest democracy, one must increase people’s
capabilities and motivation to take their lives into their own hands. This
means to enhance the spread of civic resources and emancipative values. How this is done is a different question, but the key to flourishing
democracy lies in these resources and values. Honest democracy is simply
not possible without a supportive social environment.
Democratization in the Human Development Perspective • 185
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Index
Abortion 16, 40, 91, 92, 93, 104, 107
Acquaviva, S. 128, 150
Active Associational Involvement 112,
114, 115, 116
Affective Autonomy 21, 37, 46, 48, 51,
53, 54, 55, 72
Africa 1, 56, 57
South Africa 2, 88, 137, 140, 146
Saharan Africa 56
Sub-Saharan Africa 55, 56, 181
North Africa 55
AIDS 17, 82
Akker, P. 104, 117
Alesina, A. 144, 150
Allerbeck, Klaus 117
Allocentrism 135
Almond, Gabriel 1, 185
American 5, 25, 82, 109, 113, 116
American Culture 37, 55
American Exceptionalism 5
American Value Orientations 55
Latin American 16, 19, 33, 53, 57, 73
North American 5, 99, 100, 104,
105, 107, 109
Religious American 116, 117
Secular American 116, 117
American Exceptionalism 5
Ancient Greece 1
Anti-Corruption Scores 27
Apodaca, C. 65, 75
Apter, David E. 100, 117, 118
Argentina 2, 88, 136
Argyle, M. 136, 150
Aristotle 1
Asia
East Asia 1, 12, 64
East Asian Tigers 64
Southeast Asian Cultures 37
Associational Group 112, 114
Associational Involvement 5, 111, 112,
113, 114, 115, 116, 117
Australia 2, 12, 87, 88
Austria 19, 136, 139, 169, 170
Authority 11, 14, 16, 30, 37, 40, 45,
47, 56, 61, 135, 157, 168, 169
State Authority 5, 83,102
Secular-Rational Authority 11
Religious Authority 109
Authority Ranking 135
Autonomy—Embeddedness 21, 46, 47,
48, 49, 72, 73, 74
Axial Belief Systems 86
Axial Moments 86
Baker, Wayne 3, 9, 14, 20, 24, 31, 34,
40, 45, 46, 53, 76, 85, 86, 98, 100,
111, 116, 117, 134, 136, 152
Baltic 56, 171
Barber, Benjamin R. 81, 96
Bardi, A. 35, 53, 56, 58, 65, 77
Bauer-Kaase, P. 75
Beck, Ulrich 100, 101, 117, 118, 131,
150, 173, 185
Beck-Gernsheim, Elisabeth 118, 185
Beit-Hallahmi, B. 136, 150
Belarus 136
Belgium 19, 88, 103, 105, 107, 120,
136, 140, 146, 149
Belief System 86, 99, 103
Bell, Daniel 100, 118, 134, 150
Bellah, R. 55, 75
Benedict, R. 51, 75
Berger, Peter L. 5, 9, 82, 84, 97, 118,
131, 133, 134, 150
Berry, J. 134, 151
Bianchi, G. 35, 56, 58, 65, 77
Birch, Charles 23, 31
Boehnke, K. 40, 78
Bolivia 53, 53, 166
Bonding Social Capital 111
Borg, I. 41, 75
Bosnia-Herzegovina 56
Brazil 18, 77
Britain 18, 26, 88, 105, 107, 120, 149
Bruce, S 148, 151
Bryk, A. 144, 145, 152
Buddhism 56
Bulgaria 20, 46, 48, 136, 140
Burgess, S. 78
Byzantine 53
Canada 12, 50, 88, 103, 105, 107, 115,
116, 120, 136, 146
Casanova, J. 128, 149, 151
Catholic 19, 86, 105, 107, 128, 135,
141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 147
Catholic Atheist 86
Central European 73
188 • Index
Change
Cultural Change 2, 3, 4, 9, 12, 13,
19, 29, 30, 47, 85, 86, 87, 96, 97
Economic Change 4, 13, 96
Intergenerational Value Change 13,
24
Value Change 4, 6, 9, 13, 24, 58,
79, 83, 97, 100, 102, 104, 112, 116,
162, 184
Religious Change 127, 145, 146, 147,
148, 150
Chaves, G. 131, 132, 151
Chile 136
China 11, 19, 20, 27, 46, 64, 162, 166,
168, 171
Chinese Culture 51
Chinese Curse 79
Christian 6, 19, 127, 129, 136, 137,
138, 142, 143, 144, 146, 147, 148,
150
Classical Thinkers 1
Cobb, John B. Jr. 23, 31
Cold War 82
Coleman, James S. 111, 118
Collective Mindset 1
Collectivism 21, 22, 23, 24, 55, 57, 161
Collectivist Societies 21, 22
Commission of the European
Communities 1
Communal Sharing 135
Community Involvement 111
Confucian 16, 19, 20, 28, 33, 53, 55,
57, 73, 156, 162
Convergence 4, 5, 79, 80, 82, 83, 84,
86, 87, 89, 90, 92, 93, 94, 95, 97, 116
Convergence of Values 6, 79, 82, 83,
86, 87, 97
Convergence-Divergence Debate 86
Converse, Philip E. 103, 118
Croatia 136, 141
Cronbach’s Alpha 90, 104
Cullel, Vargas 27, 31
Culture
Cultural Diversity 4, 7, 127, 129,
134, 135, 136, 138, 139, 140, 141,
142, 143, 145, 147, 148, 149, 150
Cultural Maps of the World 3, 4, 6,
16, 20
Cultural Tradition 2, 3, 7, 12, 20,
21, 85, 133, 163, 183
Cultural Value Dimension 4, 33, 34,
58, 61, 62, 64, 65, 66, 68, 73, 75
Cultural Value Orientation 4, 33, 34,
35, 36, 37, 38, 41, 42, 50, 61, 62,
64, 70, 72, 73
Cultural Zones 3, 18, 19, 30, 157,
182
Cultural Grouping 33, 53
Cultural Heritage 19, 28, 86, 137,
146, 148
Cultural Orientation 3, 33, 34, 35, 38,
41, 42, 45, 49, 50, 51, 53, 54, 56, 58,
64, 65, 69, 70, 71, 72, 74, 75
Cyprus 53, 55
Czech Republic 136
De Moor, Ruud 2, 5, 9, 76, 83, 97, 98,
100, 102, 104, 117, 118, 151
Decline of Deference 102
Democratization 6, 7, 30, 57, 58, 59,
66, 92, 167, 169, 170, 183
Democratic Institutions 3, 23, 26, 27,
28, 29, 30
Denmark 19, 48, 88, 103, 107, 120,
126, 136, 140, 146, 149
Dervis, Kemal 80, 98
Deutsch, Karl W. 80, 98
Divorce 16, 91, 92, 93, 104, 107
Dobbelaere, Karel 8, 137, 151
Durkheim, Emile 7, 111, 116
East European 33, 53, 56
East-Central European 73
Eastern Bloc 96
Economy
Economic and Physical Security 12,
14, 16, 25, 47
Economic Development 3, 4, 5, 11,
13, 18, 19, 20, 23, 24, 25, 28, 29,
30, 49, 57, 58, 59, 61, 73, 85, 87,
92, 128, 129, 130, 131, 140, 160,
162, 171, 172
Economic Growth 13, 25, 130, 162
Edlund, P. O. 140, 151
Education 7, 13, 17, 24, 28, 36, 38, 48,
65, 70, 86, 87, 89, 142, 143, 144, 147,
158, 160, 171, 174, 178
Egalitarianism 36, 37, 42, 47, 48, 50,
51, 53, 54, 55, 56, 58, 61, 62, 64, 66,
67, 69, 70, 71, 72
Egalitarianism/Hierarchy Dimension
47, 48, 49, 67, 73, 74
Elite Integrity 27, 175
Embeddedness 36, 37, 42, 46, 48, 50,
51, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 61, 64, 65,
66, 67, 69, 71, 72
Encyclopedia Britannica Almanac 59,
61, 62, 75
End of History 82
Endogeneity Problem 113
Enlightenment 83, 172
Equality Matching 135
Esmer, Yilmaz 1, 4, 5, 6, 79, 84, 98,
128, 140, 151
Index • 189
Ester, Peter 5, 9, 32, 76, 77, 83, 97,
98, 118, 136, 151
Estonia 46, 136
Etzioni, A. 55, 76
EU 46, 136
Eurobarometer 1, 2
Europe 5, 20, 45, 82, 99, 104, 105,
107, 109, 113, 114, 115
Eastern Europe 8, 20, 37, 70, 82,
168
East-Central Europe 73
European Project 1
European Social Study 136
European Social Survey 9, 13, 41,
45, 57, 77, 82, 87, 97
European Values Survey 2, 3, 6
Euthanasia 16, 104, 107
Ex-Communist 18, 19, 20, 73, 74
Existential Security 23, 29, 30, 129, 130
Factor Analysis 5, 14, 22, 38, 40, 103,
104, 137, 138, 142, 146, 167
Fertility Rates 26, 84
Finke, R. 131, 132, 148, 151, 153
Finland 19, 88, 103, 107, 116, 120,
136, 140, 146, 149
Fiske, A. P. 135, 151
Flanagan, Scott C. 102, 118
Fogarty, M. 152
Fontaine, J. R. J. 40, 76
Formal Democracy 27
France 18, 19, 26, 88, 103, 105, 107,
120, 136, 140, 146
Freedom House 26, 27, 58, 59, 68, 76,
165, 166
Fundamentalist Islam 85
Fustos, Laszio 86, 98
Gender 13, 23, 26, 74, 79, 84, 136,
138, 140, 142, 143, 144, 147
Gender Roles 13, 16, 25
Germany 18, 26, 105, 107, 109, 130,
169
West Germany 19, 20, 45, 48, 50,
103, 170
East Germany 20, 45, 46, 50, 51
Giddens, Anthony 80, 131, 133, 150,
151
Globalization 4, 7, 79, 80, 81, 83, 85,
95, 96
Glock, Charles 129
Goldreich, Y. 50, 76
Gorski, R. 129, 131, 132, 151
Great Britain 88, 149
Greece 81, 136
Greek Cyprus 53
Gyekye, K. 56, 76
Halman, Loek 5, 8, 9, 54, 76, 83, 97,
98, 100, 102, 104, 105, 117, 118, 136,
137, 148, 149, 151, 152
Hamberg, E. 132, 133, 152
Harmony/Mastery 47, 48, 49, 67, 73
Harris, M. 8, 78
Health 17, 29, 65, 129, 139
Hierarchy 37, 47, 48, 51, 53, 54, 55,
56, 57, 58, 61, 64, 67, 69, 72, 75
Cultural Hierarchy 37, 67
Hindu 19
Hinduism 56
Historical Heritage 19, 30
History 1, 3, 13, 20, 24, 29, 35, 53, 81,
82, 96, 168
Colonial History 3, 12
Human History 13, 79
Church History 150
World History 80
Hofstede, Geert 4, 21, 22, 23, 31, 32,
34, 35, 38, 50, 53, 57, 73, 76, 161,
185
Hox, J. 145, 152
Human Choice 21, 22, 24, 155, 156,
159, 161, 173, 183
Human Development 6, 21, 23, 130,
155, 156, 158, 163, 167, 168, 170,
176, 177, 182, 183, 184
Human Development Report 6
Human Security 127, 129, 130, 131,
135, 136, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142,
143, 145, 147, 148, 150
Human Well-Being 127, 129, 138, 140,
142, 145, 148, 150
Human Well-Being Index 139, 140,
143, 144
Hungary 28, 88, 136, 146, 149
Hunter, James Davison 111, 117, 118
Huntington, Samuel P. 5, 9, 19, 31, 50,
53, 76, 97, 100, 102, 118, 185
Iazzetta, Miguel 27, 31
IBM 21, 23, 34, 73
Ibn-I Khaldun 1
Iceland 19, 88, 103, 105, 107, 120,
136, 146, 168
India 11, 18, 20, 56, 168
Indonesia 11
Industrial Revolution 11, 19
Inglehart 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 13,
14, 16, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 27, 30,
31, 33, 34, 35, 38, 40, 45, 46, 47, 48,
49, 50, 53, 57, 66, 73, 74, 76, 78, 83,
84, 85, 86, 87, 94, 97, 98, 100, 101,
102, 117, 118, 119, 128, 130, 134,
136, 137, 152, 153, 155, 157, 158,
160, 162, 163, 175, 180, 181, 185, 186
190 • Index
Inkeles, Alex 1, 82, 83, 84, 92, 97, 98
International Social Survey Program 2
Iran 27, 28
Ireland 81, 88, 103, 105, 107, 115,
120, 136, 146, 149
Islam 14, 19, 20, 56, 84, 85, 94
Israel 45, 50, 53, 70
Israel Arabs 53
Israel Jews 53, 55
International Social Survey Program 2
Italian Culture 51
Italy 7, 18, 19, 26, 88, 103, 105, 107,
115, 116, 120, 136, 146, 168, 169,
170
Idiocentrism 135, 139
Imagined Communities 133
Importance of Obedience 40
Individual Autonomy 22, 157, 161
Individual Freedom 3, 93, 101, 173
Individualism 21, 22, 23, 24, 55, 56,
57, 117, 135, 161
Individualization 5, 6, 100, 83, 99, 100,
101, 102, 103, 109, 111, 112, 113,
114, 115, 116, 117
Industrial Revolution 19
Industrialism 5, 100
Intellectual Autonomy 21, 37, 45, 46,
48, 51, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 70, 71, 72
Intergenerational Shift 13, 16
Intergenerational Value Change 13, 24
Interpersonal Trust 3, 16, 23, 92, 163
Japan 2, 12, 18, 19, 28, 48, 51, 54, 55,
88, 162, 169, 170
Kasse, M. 75, 117, 119
Kaufman, Daniel 27, 31, 164
Kellner, H. 150
Kerkhofs, Jan 2, 8
Klingemann, Hans-Dieter 8, 57, 78,
153, 155, 179
Knafo, Ariel 42
Knowledge Society 11, 28
Kohn, M. L. 35, 76
Kornberg, A. 75
Kraay, Aart 27, 31, 164
Kurian, G. T. 62, 76
Large Scale Comparative Values
Studies 1
Lasch, Christopher 100, 119
Latvia 136
Lee, Aie-Rie 102, 118
Lee, Kuan Yew 27, 31
Lehmann, A. 78
Lenski, Gerhard 172, 186
Liberal Democracy 27, 172
Life Expectancy 13, 139
Life Satisfaction 91, 96, 138, 142, 143,
144, 157, 161, 163
Lingoes, J. C. 41, 75
Lithuania 2
Luxembourg 136
Macedonia 51
Maddison, Angus 88
Madsen, R. 55, 75
Malta 136, 141
Marriage 79, 84, 91, 92
Same-Sex Marriages 25, 26
Traditional Marriage 92
Homosexual Marriages 94, 97
Marx, Karl 7, 12, 129
Mass Emancipative Values 57
Mastery 37, 45, 50, 51, 53, 54, 55, 56,
58, 61, 62, 65, 66, 67, 69, 172
Mastery/Harmony 4
Mastruzzi, Massimo 27, 31, 164
Matsumoto, D. 32, 51
Mcclosky, Herbert 100, 119
McDonaldization 5, 79, 82, 85, 95, 97
McNeill, William 168, 186
Melech, G.
Methodist Protestantism 56
Mexico 2, 88, 136, 140, 146
Middle East 57, 168
Middle Eastern 33, 53, 55, 56
Mindset 1
Modernization 3, 5, 6, 7, 11, 12, 13,
19, 30, 34, 83, 85, 86, 89, 128, 129,
131, 134, 148, 149, 160
Modernization Theory 7, 13
Montesquieu 1
Moors, G. 151
Moral Outlooks 5, 99, 100, 102, 104,
107, 109, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115,
116, 117
Moral Traditionalism/Permissiveness
104
Multidimensional Scaling 40, 41, 50
Multiple Regression 20, 140, 141, 142,
143, 144
National Culture 4, 6, 33, 34, 45, 49,
50, 51, 53, 67, 73, 74, 75
National Pride 14, 40, 46, 47
Nationalism 85, 95, 150
Nationalistic Sentiments 85, 95
Netherlands 88, 103, 105, 107, 120,
136, 140, 146, 149
Nevitte, Neil 5, 6, 8, 99, 102, 119
Newton, Kenneth 112, 119
Nigeria 18
Nolan, Patrick 172, 186
Index • 191
Non-Western 12, 156, 157
Norris, Pippa 5, 8, 9, 25, 31, 84, 98,
128, 129, 130, 137
Northwestern Europe 168
Norway 19, 48, 103, 105, 107, 120,
149
O’Donnell, Guillermo 27, 31
OLS Model 112
Olson, D. 132, 152
O’Neill, J. 134, 152
Orthodox 18, 19, 21, 53, 135, 141,
142, 143, 144, 145, 147
Ottaway, Marina 27, 31
Ottoman Empires 53
Pakistan 18, 20
Peru 18, 53, 57
Pettersson, Thorleif 1, 5, 6, 89, 98,
127, 128, 132, 133, 136, 137, 140,
148, 149, 150, 151, 152
Philippines 136, 141
Phillips, D. 152
Plato 1, 157
Poland 128, 136, 141, 14
Political Activism 34, 46, 70, 71, 72
Political Elites 27
Political Stability 29
Population Crisis Committee 65, 77, 78
Portrait Values Questionnaire 41
Portugal 19, 28, 52, 136, 149
Postindustrial Society 85
Post-Industrialism 5, 100
Post-Industrial Value 13
Postmaterialist 29, 84
Post-Modernity 134
Postmodern Individualization 101
Postmodern Shift 5, 102
Postmodernist Libertarians 102
Prescott-Allen 139, 140
Prodi, Romano 7
Product Moment Correlation 112
Protestant 16, 19, 21, 86, 128, 135,
142, 147
Protestantism 56, 141
Przeworski, Adam 112, 119
Putnam, Robert 35, 71, 77, 111, 112,
116, 119
PVQ 41, 42, 45, 46
Quality of Life 12, 14, 16, 22, 25, 47,
130
Rabier, Jacques-Rene 2
Raudenbush, S. 145, 152
Raveh, A. 50, 76
Regression Model 113, 142, 143
Religion 2, 5, 7, 12, 15, 16, 19, 25, 26,
30, 40, 45, 46, 53, 55, 56, 67, 83, 84,
85, 86, 89, 100, 102, 103, 104, 107,
109, 116, 124, 127, 128, 129, 130,
131, 134, 137, 141, 143, 144, 146,
147, 148, 149, 150
Religiosity 5, 6, 84, 85, 89, 90, 91,
99, 100, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107,
109, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 117,
129, 147
Religious Authority 109
Religious Decline 6, 127, 128, 131,
146, 148, 149
Religious Diversity 5, 6, 89
Religious Impact on Politics 127, 137,
140, 141, 142, 144, 145, 146, 147
Religious Involvement 127, 128, 129,
130, 131, 132, 134, 135, 136, 137,
138, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145,
146, 147, 148, 149
Religious Market 131, 132, 134, 150
Religious Market Theory 131, 134,
150
Religious Orientations 127, 145
Religious Participation 131, 132, 133,
134, 135, 148, 150
Religious Pluralism 131, 132
Religious Tradition 3, 12, 19, 86,
135, 136, 143
Religious/Secular Cleavage 109
Ritzer, George 82, 98
Rokeach, M. 100, 119
Roman Catholic 19, 21, 56
Romania 20, 51, 136, 141
Ros, M. 53, 55, 78
Rose, Richard 164, 186
Rubel, T. 65, 78
Rueschemeyer, Dietrich 172, 186
Russia 20, 136, 140
Ryan, Richard M. 156, 157, 185, 186
Schooler, C. 35, 76
Schwartz Value Survey 40
Schwartz, Shalom H. 3, 4, 6, 9, 21, 22,
23, 32, 33, 34, 35, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42,
45, 50, 53, 55, 56, 65, 70, 73, 74, 75,
77, 78, 87
Secularization 6, 11, 30, 83, 102, 107,
112, 113, 116, 129, 131, 134, 137,
149
Secularization Paradigm 129, 131
Secularization Theorist 128
Secularization Theory 5, 84, 85, 89,
90, 127, 128, 129, 134, 147, 148,
150
Secular-Rational Values 11, 16, 20,
25, 30, 46, 173
192 • Index
Self-Expression 12, 16, 19, 22, 23, 25,
26, 45, 47, 48, 158, 161
Self-Expression Values 3, 11, 21, 22,
24, 25, 27, 28, 29, 30, 94
Survival/Self-Expression Dimension
19, 48, 74, 47
Sen, Amartya 155, 186
Seuren, B. 54, 76
Sexual Norm 25
Social Network 111, 158, 172, 173
Social Outlook 111
Socio-Economic Development 4, 5, 23,
24, 28, 30, 49, 57, 58, 59, 61, 73,
131
South Korea 2, 19, 28, 88, 162
Soviet Union 20, 29, 82
Spain 19, 88, 103, 105, 107, 120, 137,
140, 146
Star, R. 151
Stark, Rodney 129, 131, 132, 148, 153
State 1, 5, 27, 29, 164, 165, 44, 83,
85, 100
City State 165, 166
Member States 82
Nation State 82
Totalitarian States 96
Industrial States 99, 100, 103
State Authority 5, 83, 102
Stiglitz, Joseph E. 81, 98
Subjective Well-Being 12, 16, 20, 23,
25, 47, 157, 163
Suicide 16, 104, 107
Sullivan, W. 55, 75
Supply-Side Theories of Religion 5
Sweden 18, 19, 48, 51, 88, 103, 107,
120, 137, 140, 146, 149
Swidler, A. 55, 75
Szakolczai, Arpad 86, 98
Taiwan 19, 28, 162
Taylor, Charles 83, 97, 98
Tetlock, P. E. 39, 78
Teune, Henry 112, 119
Theory of Materialism 34
Thompson, John B. 27, 32
Thomson, K. 133, 153
Tipton, S. M. 55, 75
Tocqueville, A. 1, 7
Tolerance 3, 16, 23, 47, 48, 66, 69, 70,
85, 91, 93, 94, 161
Tolerance of Foreigners 25
Tolerance of Gays and Lesbians 23
Tradition
Traditional Social Institution 101,
104, 111
Traditional/Secular-Rational
Dimension 3, 12, 16, 18, 20
Traditional/Secular-Rational Values
Index 15, 17
Triandis, Harry C. 21, 22, 32, 57, 77,
78, 139, 161, 186
Turkey 53, 55
Turner, Bryan S. 82, 98, 129, 153
Uganda 20, 48
Ukraine 20, 137
UNDP 6, 9
United Nations 7, 66
United Nations Population Division 66,
78
United States 2, 12, 18, 26, 53, 54, 55,
84, 85, 103, 105, 107, 115, 116, 120,
137, 140, 146, 170
Universal Postal Union 81
Urbanization 16, 128
Values 39, 40, 41, 42, 45, 65, 75, 85,
88, 89, 90, 92, 99, 100, 102, 112, 117,
145, 146, 147, 161
Cross-National Value Differences 13
Cultural Value Theory 70
Moral Values 5, 99, 100, 102, 104,
107, 109, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115,
116, 117
Traditional Value-Generating
Institutions 100, 101
Traditional Values 12, 13, 14, 15, 16,
18, 19, 26, 30
Two-Dimensional Map of Global
Values 3
Value Change 4, 6, 13, 24, 58, 79,
83, 97, 100, 102, 103, 104, 112,
116, 162, 184
Value Clusters 87
Value Convergence 4
Value Differences 73
Value Dimensions 3, 4, 6, 33, 34, 36,
58, 59, 61, 62, 64, 65, 66, 68, 73,
74, 75, 87, 100, 107
Value Emphases 35, 66
Value Orientations 4, 33, 34, 35, 36,
37, 38, 41, 42, 47, 50, 51, 55, 59,
61, 62, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 161
Value Priorities 34, 38, 39, 40, 134
Value Shift 83
Value System 3, 12, 16, 18, 19, 20,
86, 128, 161
Vanhanen, Tatu 58, 59, 65, 160, 186
Verba, Sidney 1, 185
Vietnam 27, 162, 180
Weber, Max 1, 7, 12, 32, 35, 36, 78,
100, 119
Welfare 3, 36, 47, 55, 89, 134
Index • 193
Welfare State 13, 24, 25, 54, 172, 174
Welzel, Christian 3, 6, 8, 9, 13, 14, 21,
23, 24, 25, 27, 30, 31, 57, 58, 59, 61,
78, 83, 94, 98, 153
Western Europe 2, 12, 19, 26, 54, 56,
83, 85, 128, 172
Westernization 12
Williams, Robin M. 35, 78, 99, 119
Work Motivations 25, 125
World Bank 7, 27, 139, 165, 166
World Human Development Reports 6
World Values Survey 25, 29, 79, 82,
93, 95, 97, 99, 100, 103, 104, 136,
139, 147
World War II 13, 84, 169, 170
Wuthnow, R. 133, 153
Yemen 51
Zakaria, Fareed 27, 31
Zaller, John 100, 119
Zimbabwe 18, 20, 46, 48, 53