Terrorism and Crime: Their
Similarities, Differences, and
Lessons Learned
Laura Dugan
University of Maryland
Department of Criminology and Criminal
Justice &
The National Consortium for the Study of
Terrorism and Response to Terrorism (START)
Some of this research was supported by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
Science and Technology Directorate’s Office of University Programs through START. Any
opinions, findings, conclusions or recommendations presented here are solely the authors’
and are not representative of DHS or the United States Government.
Both are Bad Bad Things
If we can leverage what we understand
about crime and controlling crime while
allowing for departures due to their
differences, criminologists could
contribute to the reduction of global
terrorism.
LaFree and Dugan
Book Chapter in DeFlem 2004
 Marks a point in time when
criminologists needed to be prodded to
study terrorism.
 Predates most terrorism-related
research in major criminological
journals.
 Was published eight years ago.
 This presentation will use that chapter as a
departure point, updating it along the way.
Conceptual Similarities & Differences
Similarities
 Cross disciplinary
boundaries
 Social constructions
 Definitional ambiguity
 Perpetrator
demographics
 Undermine social trust
Differences
 Terrorism is not a
specific offense.
 Terrorism crosses
jurisdictional
boundaries.
 Terrorists seek public
recognition.
 Terrorists operate
toward a broader goal.
 “altruists”
 Terrorists innovate.
A Closer Look Reveals that Terrorism is
Conceptually Similar to Specific Crimes
 Organizational Structure
 Organized crime, Gang activity,
Corporate crime
 Sustained Program of Violence
 Organized crime, Gang activity, Serial
murder
 Victim Selection
 Mixture of targeted versus convenient
 Personal versus impersonal
Corporate Crime & Terrorism
(Dugan & Gibbs 2008)
Comparing Corporations to the Terrorist Organization
 Very different at first glance
 Corporation are legal entities, terrorist organizations are
illegal by definition.
 YET, each strives to survive in a highly
competitive environment.
 Corporations pursue profit.
 Terrorist orgs recruit and maintain strong membership.
 Both have become decentralized over time.
 That decentralization hinders detection & prosecution.
Corporate Crime & Terrorism
(cont.)
Implications for Crime Control
 Structural complexity diffuses
responsibility & obstructs intelligence.
 Both rely on constituency approval.
Recommendations
 Interorganizational task forces
 Encourage whistle-blowing
 Focus on prevention
Data Similarities & Differences
“All science begins with counting things...”
Crime Data Sources
 Official
 Victimization
 Self-report
Terrorism Data Sources
 Open source media
reports




GTD
RAND (RAND-MIPT)
ITERATE
Other regional/type
specific
Key Methodological Differences
Strategies must accommodate
 Terrorists innovate.
 Causality moves in both directions.
 Terrorists mostly operate in dynamic
groups.
Spatial & Temporal Patterns of
Terrorist Attacks by ETA
Takes advantage of
this difference by
exploiting the
dependence of
attacks by the
same organization
to inform our
understanding of
hierarchical and
contagion diffusion.
Key Methodological Similarities







Analysis of distributions and trends
Geographic mapping
Time series
Series hazard modeling
Causal analysis
Life-course analysis
Network analysis
Applying Trajectory Analysis to the
Terrorist Organization
60
Frequency of Attacks
50
40
3.6%
30
9.2%
20
9.3%
10
11.1%
41.1%
25.4%
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36
Years Since Birth
Avg HF PERS
Avg HF DECL
Avg MF PERS
Avg MF DES
Avg LF PERS
Avg LF DES
Pred HF PERS
Pred HF DECL
Pred MF PERS
Pred MF DES
Pred LF PERS
Pred LF DES
Applying Network Analysis to the
Terrorist Organization
al-Qaeda
Organization
in the Land of the
Two Rivers
Moro Islamic Liberation Front
(MILF)
Jamatul Mujahedin
Bangladesh
Mujahideen Shura
Council
al-Fatah
Palestinian/Lebanese
Jemaah
Islamiya (JI)
Iraqi Jihadist
Abu Sayyaf
Group
Bangladesh
PIJ
Ansar al-Islam
PRA
Taliban
PULO
Hizbul Mujahideen
(HM)
PFLP
Asbat al-Ansar
Mexican
Marxists
Hezbollah
Ansar al-Sunnah
Army
HAMAS
Lashkar-I-Omar al-Qaeda
European Anarchist
Takfir wa Hijra
Harakat ul-Mudjahidin
(HuM)
UVF
LVF
Lashkar-e-Taiba
(LeT)
Jaish-e-Mohammad
(JeM)
Corsican Separatist
Ulster Loyalist
Pakistani/Kashmiri
Latin American
Marxist
FLNC
RHD
al-Qaeda Central
Armed Islamic
Group
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi EIJ
(LeJ)
GAI
Movsar Baryayev
Gang
Riyad us-Saliheyn
Martyrs' Brigade
Venezuelan Marxist
Tupamaro Revolutionary
Movement Jan. 23
CPN-M
Himalayan Maoist
Informal Anarchist
Federation
Iraqi Shia
CPI-M
Chechens
PWG
Mahdi
Army
Anarchist +
Black Star
Southeast
Group of Carlo Giuliani
Asian
Marxist
ELN
International
Solidarity
FARC
New People’s
Army (NPA)
Anti-Indian Ethnonationalist
NDFB
ETA
RO-N17
Anti-Globalization
DHKP-C
KYKL
ULFA
Greek Marxist +
Right-Wing
Latin American
AUC
GRAPO
PKK
Islamic Great
Eastern Raiders
Front
Turkish/Central Asian
NSCN-IM
IRA
European Ethnonationalist
European Marxist
Applying These Ideas to Help
Control Terrorism
Drawing on Criminological Theory and
Methods
Typical Application of Rational
Choice Theory on Violent Behavior
E(uterror) = p U(y-F) + (1-p) U(y)
where p = perceived probability of punishment
y = anticipated benefits of perpetration; and
F = perceived penalty of the act
Lesson: Raise the costs of perpetration through
increased certainty and severity so that the utility of
perpetration falls below the benefit of the act. In other
words: DETERRENCE
Deterrence Findings on
Terrorism
 Sometimes works
 High risk of backlash
 Labeling theory
 Legitimacy
Northern Ireland Study
(LaFree, Dugan, and Korte 2009)
Terrorist Attacks by Republicans
250
Frequency
200
150
100
50
Falls Curfew
Internment
Criminalization
Loughall
Incident
92
19
91
19
90
19
89
19
88
19
87
19
86
19
85
19
84
19
83
19
82
19
81
19
80
19
79
19
78
19
19
19
19
19
Operation
Motorman
77
76
75
74
73
19
72
19
71
19
70
19
19
69
0
Gibraltar
Incident
Northern Ireland Results
2
1.872
1.8
1.598
1.6
1.417
1.4
1.2
1.000
1
Internment
0.8
Criminalization
Falls Curfew
Operation
Motorman
0.6
0.543
0.4
Gibralter
Other Results
 Metal Detectors reduce hijackings… but
increase other forms of hostage taking
situations (Enders and Sandler 1993)
 US bombings in Afghanistan increased
Osama bin Laden’s popularity in the region
(Malvesti 2002)

Israel’s
bombings
Lesson:
If raising
the costsinofLebanon
one type ofreduced
terrorism just
immediate
attacks,
but
increased
leads
to switchingrocket
to another
tactic with
lower
costs, why
international
support
Hezbollah
not raise the
benefits for
of nonterrorism.
(Eppright 1997)
 One of our student projects show that the
2004 FACE act seemed to reduce abortion
clinic violence by making it more
punishable.
How do We Raise the Benefits of
Living a Crime-Free Life?
 Rehabilitation versus punishment
 Weed and seed
 Early intervention programs
 Nurse Home Visitations
 Problem oriented policing
Raising the Benefits of Abstaining
from Terrorism
E(unonterror) = q U(x+G) + (1-q) U(x)
where q = perceived probability of
rewards from abstention
x = value of current situation; and
G = anticipated rewards of abstention
Ways to Raise the Benefits of
Abstention from Terrorism
 Establishment of Basque Autonomous
Communities in Spanish Constitution
 Turkish opening of educational and
health facilities to Kurdish population
 Undoing previous restrictions (e.g.,
lifting curfews)
 Releasing prisoners
Dugan and Young Policy Proposal
for ASC on US Extremism
Target the same group of
disenfranchised persons to participate in
the policy process, making them active
stakeholders and reducing their
vulnerability to radical rhetoric.
Vulnerable
Persons
Government
What Others Have Done to Raise the
Benefits of Abstaining from Terrorism
Moving Beyond Deterrence: The
Effectiveness of Raising the
Expected Utility of Abstaining from
Terrorism in Israel (ASR, 2012)
Laura Dugan, Criminologist
&
Erica Chenoweth, Political Scientist
Data: Part of Larger DHS-Funded
Research
 Government Actions in a Terrorist
Environment (GATE)
 Contains a full range of government
actions toward non-state actors—
from fully conciliatory to excessively
repressive
 Israel, Turkey, Lebanon, Egypt, and
Algeria
3- Tiered Data Collection
Strategy
1.
2.
Literature Search
Textual Analysis by Augmented Replacement
Instructions (TABARI)




Searches lead sentences of news sources based on
complex dictionary that specifies subject, verb, and
object (actor-action-target), using CAMEO codes
Filters observations into a database
Keeps all action by state actors against sub-state
actors
Auto code in SAS according to assigned action
3. Human validation of auto coding
Dimensions of Countering
Terrorism
TARGET
ACTION
Discriminate
Repressive
Conciliatory
ACTOR TYPE
Justice
Politician
Police
Military
Indiscriminate
M/NM
Material
Nonmaterial
Conciliatory-Repressive Scale
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
Accommodation
Conciliatory action
Conciliatory statement or intention
Neutral or ambiguous
Verbal conflict
Physical conflict
Extreme repression (intent to kill)
Data Example: Israel
Discriminate material conciliatory action (2)
by judiciary
7-9-1987: West Bank Palestinian
leader Faisal Husseini was
released today after three
months in Israeli jails and vowed
to fight on against Israel's
occupation of Arab areas held
since the 1967 Middle East war.
Data Example: Israel
Indiscriminate immaterial verbal conflict (5)
by judiciary
3/30/1988: Israel's Supreme
Court rejected a petition of the
Foreign Press Association (FPA)
on Wednesday to open the
occupied West Bank and Gaza
Strip immediately for news
coverage.
Data Example: Israel
Indiscriminate material extreme repression (7)
by military
2/17/1988: Israeli troops shot
dead a Palestinian and wounded
several others on Wednesday
during violent anti-Israeli
demonstrations in the occupied
West Bank, hospital officials
said.
Actions Captured by TABARI
Accommodation/Full Concessions
Verbal Conflict
Withdrew from town
Signed peace accord
Handed town to Palestinians
Make pessimistic comment
Dismissed
Blame for attack
Deny responsibility
Threaten military force
Conciliatory Action
Met to discuss
Released
Lifted curfew
Pulled out
Investigate abuse
Conciliatory Statement or Intensions
Expressed optimism
Agreed to hold talks
Praised Palestinians
Expressed desire to cooperate
Admitted mistake
Neutral or Ambiguous
Infighting over
Failed to reach agreement
Host a visit
Appealed for third party assistance
Investigating
Physical Conflict
Demolished
Barred
Sealed off
Imposed Curfew
Arrested
Extreme Repression (deaths)
Shot dead
Fired missiles
Clashed with
Raided
Helicopter attack
GATE-Israel
 Sample
 243,448 Reuters news articles from June 1, 1987 to
December 31, 2004
 Over 10,000 preliminary observations
 Result: 6,070 cleaned actions
 Flexible levels of aggregation
 Tactics vs. campaigns
 Daily, weekly, monthly, annual
 Relative comparisons of conciliatory, repressive, and
mixed measures
 Actors and targets
 Principals and agents
Current Project
 Aggregate actions to the month
 Partition by conciliatory (1, 2, 3) or
repressive (5, 6, 7)
 Partition by target is discriminate or
indiscriminate
Targets of Punishment and
Rewards in Israel
Punishment
Repressive Actions
Specific
General
Rewards
Conciliatory Actions
Discriminate repression
directed toward the guilty
(direct deterrence)
Discriminate conciliation
directed toward the guilty
(direct benefits of
abstention)
Indiscriminate repression
directed toward the
Palestinians in general
(indirect deterrence)
Indiscriminate conciliation
directed toward the
Palestinians in general
(indirect benefits of
abstention)
Tactical Regimes of the IsraeliPalestinian Conflict
The First Intifada (1987-1993)
 Started as nonviolent
 Dominated by secular nationalists
 Hamas became active near the end
The Oslo Lull (1993-2000)
 Negotiators established Palestinian Authority
 Palestinians recognized 1967 borders
 Neither side held to agreement
The Second Intifada (2000-2004)
 Violent from the beginning
 Dominated by religious groups
 Known for deadly suicide attacks
Figure 1. Quarterly Repressive and Conciliatory Actions by Israel and Palestinian
Terrorist Attacks
200
80
Conciliatory Actions
180
160
Second Intifada
Repressive Actions
70
Palestinian Terrorist Attacks
Number of Israeli Actions
140
First Intifada
Oslo Lull
50
120
100
40
80
30
60
20
40
10
20
0
0
Quarter, Beginning in Third Quarter 1987 and Ending in the Fourth Quarter 2004
Number of Palestian Attacks
60
Hypotheses: guided by
E(uterror)<E(unonterror)
1. Any Israeli action leads to fewer Palestinian
attacks.
2. Conciliatory actions lead to fewer Palestinian
attacks.
3. Repressive actions lead to fewer Palestinian
attacks.
4. Indiscriminate repressive actions lead to more
Palestinian attacks
5. Indiscriminate conciliatory actions lead to the
biggest decrease in Palestinian attacks
Examining the Relationship
Between Actions and Terrorism
Attacks Against
Israelis
(Current Month)
We first test the relationship
parametrically (Negative
Binomial) and then examine
it non-parametrically (GAM).
Together and separately for
each of the tactical regimes
Results for All Actions for Entire
Period
GAM 3 df smooth for allla
1.61374
NS
-.360915
1
121
Lagged all actions
Conciliatory and Repressive
Actions—Entire Period
b. Repressive Actions
a. Conciliatory Actions
GAM 3 df smooth for reprla
GAM 3 df smooth for concla
1.57031
.142908
NS
0/quadratic
-.171465
-1.04907
0
27
Lagged Conciliatory acts
1
80
Lagged Repressive Acts
a. Conciliatory-Discriminate
b. Conciliatory-Indiscriminate
GAM 3 df smooth for cdisla
GAM 3 df smooth for cindla
.376635
.165583
0/quadratic
NS
-.691987
-1.48244
0
8
0
Lagged Conciliatory Discriminate
26
Lagged Conciliatory Indiscrimina
GAM 3 df smooth for rindla
GAM 3 df smooth for rdisla
.6765
1.21061
NS
NS
-.212605
-.356292
0
32
Lagged Repressive Discriminate
c. Repressive-Discriminate
0
48
Lagged Repressive Indiscriminate
d. Repressive-Indiscriminate
Results by Tactical Regime
a. All Months
Conciliatory Actions
b. First Intifada
GAM 3 df smooth for concla
GAM 3 df smooth for concla
.752482
.142908
0/quadratic
+/quadratic
-1.00882
-1.04907
0
0
27
13
Lagged Conciliatory acts
Lagged Conciliatory acts
GAM 3 df smooth for concla
GAM 3 df smooth for concla
.378618
.59527
+/quadratic
linear
-1.89564
-2.39703
0
27
Lagged Conciliatory acts
c. Oslo Lull
1
26
Lagged Conciliatory acts
d. Second Intifada
Repressive Actions
a. All Months
b. First Intifada
GAM 3 df smooth for reprla
GAM 3 df smooth for reprla
.591733
1.57031
NS
NS
-.378483
-.171465
1
1
80
31
Lagged Repressive Acts
Lagged Repressive Acts
GAM 3 df smooth for reprla
GAM 3 df smooth for reprla
1.07254
1.59288
+
linear
NS
-.768185
-.766279
1
35
Lagged Repressive Acts
c. Oslo Lull
7
80
Lagged Repressive Acts
d. Second Intifada
a. All Months
Conciliatory-Discriminate
GAM 3 df smooth for cdisla
b. First Intifada
GAM 3 df smooth for cdisla
.376635
.369726
+/quadratic
NS
-.691987
-.696348
0
8
0
Lagged Conciliatory Discriminate
GAM 3 df smooth for cdisla
GAM 3 df smooth for cdisla
.631996
5
Lagged Conciliatory Discriminate
.23344
NS
NS
-.91429
-.680878
0
8
Lagged Conciliatory Discriminate
c. Oslo Lull
0
5
Lagged Conciliatory Discriminate
d. Second Intifada
a. All Months
Conciliatory-Indiscriminate
b. First Intifada
GAM 3 df smooth for cindla
GAM 3 df smooth for cindla
.586609
.165583
0/quadratic
NS
-1.48244
-.629806
0
26
0
Lagged Conciliatory Indiscrimina
10
Lagged Conciliatory Indiscrimina
GAM 3 df smooth for cindla
GAM 3 df smooth for cindla
.638318
.375812
+/quadratic
linear
-2.4676
-2.00882
0
24
Lagged Conciliatory Indiscrimina
c. Oslo Lull
0
26
Lagged Conciliatory Indiscrimina
d. Second Intifada
a. All Months
Repressive-Discriminate
b. First Intifada
GAM 3 df smooth for rdisla
GAM 3 df smooth for rdisla
1.07024
1.21061
NS
NS
-.356292
-.527211
0
32
0
Lagged Repressive Discriminate
13
Lagged Repressive Discriminate
GAM 3 df smooth for rdisla
GAM 3 df smooth for rdisla
.318519
1.3249
NS
+/quadratic
-2.45229
-.504824
0
10
Lagged Repressive Discriminate
c. Oslo Lull
1
32
Lagged Repressive Discriminate
d. Second Intifada
a. All Months
Repressive-Indiscriminate
GAM 3 df smooth for rindla
b. First Intifada
GAM 3 df smooth for rindla
.6765
.840002
NS
NS
-.212605
-.801232
0
48
1
Lagged Repressive Indiscriminate
25
Lagged Repressive Indiscriminate
GAM 3 df smooth for rindla
GAM 3 df smooth for rindla
1.66116
.82789
+
linear
NS
-.995514
-.541126
0
30
Lagged Repressive Indiscriminate
c. Oslo Lull
4
48
Lagged Repressive Indiscriminate
d. Second Intifada
Summary Findings
Supported Hypotheses
2-Concilatory actions lead
to fewer Palestinian
attacks
4-Indiscriminate
repressive actions lead to
more Palestinian attacks
5-Indiscriminate
conciliatory actions lead
to a larger decrease in
Palestinian attacks
Unsupported Hypotheses
1-Any Israeli action leads
to fewer Palestinian
attacks
3-Repressive actions lead
to fewer Palestinian
attacks
Conclusions from this Project
 Tactical regime matters
 Overall findings are driven by the Second Intifada
 Repression only seems to matter during the Oslo Lull
(i.e., time of peace)
 Discriminate-Conciliation during the First Intifada
seems to lead to more attacks
 Indiscriminate actions matter more
 Especially during the Second Intifada
 Conciliation should be a serious policy alternative
 Especially when directed toward terrorists’
constituency
 Conciliation should be sustained (0/- quadratics)
By the Way
 Preliminary findings show the same
results for Algeria, Egypt, and Turkey.
 This is a BIG deal because they are
not all democracies.
Bigger Conclusions from
Presentation
 Criminological concepts, theory, and methods
can help us start to understand terrorism.
 But we must be flexible enough to
incorporate the differences into our theory,
methods, and data collection efforts.
 And we must work well with others, because
terrorism is a big big problem that needs
ideas from many people with different
perspectives.
 AND, LOOK at the research to help with
decision-making.