Issue 4
How Successful was British
foreign policy in containing fascist
aggression between 1935-1938?
The Big Picture
Britain did avoid becoming involved in a major
European war at this time. On the other hand,
critics of British policy have argued that all
Britain did was encourage Hitler to demand more
and more. Britain participated in the breaking of
the Versailles Treaty and the Naval Treaty.
Self-interest dominated British policy over
Abyssinia and, in Spain, Britain was prepared to
see a democratically elected government be
overthrown by a fascist dictator. Finally, Britain
did nothing to protect Austria from Nazi
takeover but realists argued what could Britain
have done?
Aims of British Policy when
dealing with Fascist aggression
• To avoid war
• To seek ways of removing grievances
• To use negotiation to reduce
international tension
• To protect the Empire
• To try as far as possible to work within
the League of Nations
• To seek ways to promote disarmament
Abysinnia (K)
• Self Interest or Collective Security
- should it stand by rules of League and protect
Abyssinia or was it more important to keep Italy ‘on
side’ as ally against Hitler
• Hoare-Laval Plan
- intention was to ‘buy off’ Italy with offer of
territory in northeast Africa on condition Italy
stopped its war.
- was Italy being rewarded for its aggression?
Can Britain claim any success in
its handling of the crisis? (A)
Put simply – No!
League shown to be weak
Abyssinia was not saved
Italy continued its attack until Abyssinia was defeated
Britain and France shown to unreliable and deceitful when the
Hoare-Laval plan was leaked
• Balance of power shifted against Britain
• Hitler was encouraged
• Mussolini and Hitler drifted closer together and finally Britain
now had an enemy in the Mediterranean . Future dealings with
Hitler would need to consider the possibility of conflict with
Italy at the same time.
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German Rearmament and the
Anglo-German Naval Treaty (K)
• Opinion divided:
- ‘Germany moving down path of war again’ v what
could we do about it? Hitler made a case to justify
rearmament whilst terms of Treaty seen as too
harsh/open to change
• The Agreement, June 1935
- ToV severely cut size of German navy.
New treaty
accepted Germany should have up to 1/3 size of
British navy and be allowed to build submarines.
Could Britain claim the Naval Treaty
was a success for its policy? (A)
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Arguably Britain encouraged
further German rearmament
Belief that Germany would
rebuild anyway so agreement
would help improve relations
ToV too harsh anyway, right
time to revise some of the
harsher terms
Through negotiation and
revision of ToV, Britain hoped
Nazi Germany would have no
reason to be angered/feel
cornered
New agreement allowed Britain
to ‘keep an eye’ on German
rearmament and could plan how
best to deal with it
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However, agreement confused
British public – Stresa Front
had condemned German military
build up 2 months prior
Showed Hitler could push
Britain to revise Versailles and
get away with it. Open to other
challenges?
By summer 1935, Hitler much
stronger than was at beginning
of year
France got scared and made
treaty with Russia, Britain
furious. France angered by
naval deal – allies within Stresa
Front now divided with Italy
now an enemy
Britain and the Rhineland
Crisis (K)
• Broke Locarno Treaty – imp as Germany signed
voluntarily
• Britain did nothing
- Hitler claimed he was justified
- Anger over French-Russian alliance
- Public opinion – Versailles too harsh
- remilitarisation was not serious threat
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Not a problem!
Eden weakened Britain’s position
British action would lose more than it gained
Other concerns
Could Britain claim the Rhineland
crisis was handled successfully? (A)
• In the short term - Britain made the best of a difficult
situation
• Claimed war had been avoided and a grievance from the Peace
settlement had been sorted
• British government caught ‘off guard’ by much smarter Hitler –
appeared as if Hitler had taken gamble and weak democracies
had let him away with it!
• Once again Hitler had learned a lesson about political
manipulation and the willingness of Britain to appease.
• Longer term – Rhineland crisis sparked off a chain of events
that linked Britain to France and Eastern Europe, and eventually
the Czech crisis of 1938
Britain and the Spanish Civil War
(K)
• Non-intervention
• Another step in the development of
appeasement
• Not popular with
communists/socialists/members of
Labour party.
• International brigades
Could Non-Intervention be called
a success? (A)
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Success in one way – major European war not sparked off by Spanish
Civil War
On other hand, Britain faced difficulties as a result of non-intervention
Britain discredited as defender of democracy: rebels being treated
same as legally elected government
Britain made sure LoN did not take steps to help the Republic
Faced very loud criticism at home from Labour Party who disagreed
strongly with policy
Britain & France paralysed internationally. Both appeared to lack the
resolve or resources to offer support to legitimate Spanish
government
Confidence of Italy and Germany boosted
USSR felt unsupported, started to think about their own future – MaziSoviet Agreement, August 1939
British public still felt effects of war even though had no part in it
Yet, selfishly, most quite happy as long as not on their doorstep
Britain and the Anschluss,
March 1938 (K)
• Britain not surprised by Anschluss
• Did nothing despite the terms of the ToV
• Opinion divided
- Austria not a British problem, too far away etc vs
Hitler was a bully who wouldn’t stop, appeasement just
encouraged Hitler’s aggression
Was British policy over Anschluss
a success? (A)
• In terms of resisting Fascist aggression and preparing for
future, appeasement over Anschluss weakened Britain’s position
• Britain had for a long time been aware of Hitler’s ambitions in
Eastern Europe – Lebensraum
• Appeasement was making it very easy for Hitler to move
eastwards and seize more land in his move towards Lebensraum
• As a result of British inaction, no small European country had
any belief that Britain or France could or would really help them
• Appeasement was seen as a policy to benefit Britain only and
help no-one else