Chinese Apprehensions about Revitalization of the U.S.-Japan Alliance
Author(s): Banning Garrett and Bonnie Glaser
Source: Asian Survey, Vol. 37, No. 4 (Apr., 1997), pp. 383-402
Published by: University of California Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2645655
Accessed: 12-08-2014 19:53 UTC
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content
in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship.
For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].
University of California Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Asian Survey.
http://www.jstor.org
This content downloaded from 200.9.3.65 on Tue, 12 Aug 2014 19:53:52 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
CHINESE APPREHENSIONS ABOUT
REVITALIZATION
OF THE U.S.JAPANALLIANCE
BanningGarrett
and BonnieGlaser
Theinteraction
between
ChinaandJapan
as wellas their
relations
withtheUnitedStateswillbe critical
in determining
thefuture
of
theAsia-Pacific
Protracted
or conflict
regionin the21stcentury.
tensions
between
theregion
BeijingandTokyocoulddestabilize
andstrain
U.S. bilateraltieswithoneorbothcountries.
Efforts
bytheUnited
Statestostrengthen
relations
withonepowermaystrain
tieswiththeotherorbetween
thetwo.
Thistriangular
is especially
dynamic
evidentin China'sreaction
to steps
takenbyWashington
torevitalize
andreshape
theU.S.-Japan
allianceforthe
post-Cold
Wareraandin Japan'suneasiness
in Sinoaboutimprovements
American
relations.
The triangular
relationship
amongChina,JapanandtheUnitedStatesis
complicated
byWashington's
tieswithJapan
andChina.Japan
asymmetrical
is a long-standing
andcloseAmerican
allydespitechronic
differences
over
tradeandotherissues. The U.S.-Japan
of theU.S.
allianceis a keystone
in Asiaas wellas Asia-Pacific
strategic
position
andstability.
The
security
UnitedStatesrecently
has soughtto strengthen
and broadenthealliance,
intheU.S. commitment
maintain
Tokyo'sconfidence
toJapan'ssecurity,
and
on regionalsecurity
cooperate
closelywiththeJapanese
issues,including
concerns
mutual
aboutChina'srising
behavior.China
powerandassertive
ontheother
handis a former
withwhichtheU.S. maintained
close
quasi-ally
theSovietUnioninthe1970sand1980s.Since
strategic
cooperation
against
theTiananmen
of1989andthecollapseoftheSovietUnion,China
massacre
hasbecomea nationwhichis "neither
friend
norfoe"oftheUnitedStates.
TheU.S. hasa number
ofchronic
bilateral
withChinaas wellas a
disputes
widerangeofcommon
interests.
Sino-U.S.tieshavebecomemore
Although
Garrett
andBonnieGlaserareWashington-based
Banning
consultants
on Asianaffairs.
? 1997byTheRegents
oftheUniversity
ofCalifornia
383
This content downloaded from 200.9.3.65 on Tue, 12 Aug 2014 19:53:52 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
384
ASIANSURVEY,VOL.XXXVII,NO. 4, APRIL1997
since 1989,theyalso havebecomeincreasingly
complicatedand contentious
important
to theU.S. as Chinahas emergedas a nascentgreatpower. The
at stakein maintaining
U.S. has long-term
strategicand securityinterests
obtaining
Beijing'scooperation
good working
relationswithChina,including
and stability
on key international
issues such as armscontrol,proliferation,
in encouraging
also has a vitalinterest
on theKoreanPeninsula.Washington
betweenTaiwanand themainland.
of thedifferences
peacefulresolution
Fordecades,theU.S.-JapanallianceandthepresenceofAmericanmilitary
wouldsay
forcesin thewesternPacifichavebeenkeyfactors-Washington
in theAsiaand ensuringprosperity
stability
thekeyfactors-underpinning
of America'sstrategic
Pacificregionas well as providingthe cornerstone
deploythattheallianceand forward
positionin theregion.The perception
of Japanese
mentof U.S. forcesis stabilizingand checksthereemergence
militarism
has been sharedby Chinaas well as by nearlyall otherregional
has reflected
a judgment
states. Beijing's acquiescenceto thisarrangement
have beenbestservedby theSecurityTreatyand U.S
thatChineseinterests
military
presencein theregion.
theU.S.-Japan
to redefineand strengthen
Americanand Japaneseefforts
alliance in responseto the changingpost-ColdWar strategicenvironment
experts
officialsas well as think-tank
have led Chinesecivilianand military
however. Alto reevaluatethe Washington-Tokyo
securityarrangement,
thoughboth Americanand Japaneseofficialshave privatelyand publicly
concerned
soughtto reassureBeijing,theChinesehave becomeincreasingly
China. Chinesesuspithattheallianceis aimedat "checking"or containing
intentions
towardChina have
cions aboutAmericanand Japanesestrategic
in bothSino-American
and
beenexacerbated
bygrowingtensionandmistrust
in Japatendencies
relationsas wellas byresurgent
right-wing
Sino-Japanese
nesepolitics.IfChineseleadersconcludethattheU.S. andJapanarecooperof Chinaas a greatand unifiedpower,Beijing
theemergence
atingto thwart
could take a rangeof countermeasures,
includingovertoppositionto the
military
presencein JaU.S.-JapanSecurityTreatyand to theU.S. forward
as well as
pan,thatcouldbe highlydamagingto U.S. and Japaneseinterests
to theentireAsia-Pacificregion. Such stepswouldbe highly
destabilizing
costlyto China,however.Fornow,theChinesearestillin the"waitandsee"
to concludethattheU.S.-Japanalliancehas becomea threat
mode,reluctant
itscourseby voicingtheirconcernsabout
to Chinawhiletrying
to influence
its possibledirection.
This articleexploresChineseperspectives
on, and concernsabout,Japaof the U.S.-Japanalliancecurnese defensepolicies and therevitalization
rentlybeing fleshedout by Washingtonand Tokyo followingthe Joint
issuedbyPresident
Clinton
Declarationon theAllianceand the21stcentury
andPrimeMinisterHashimotoon April17, 1996. The articlealso examines
This content downloaded from 200.9.3.65 on Tue, 12 Aug 2014 19:53:52 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
BANNING
GARRETTANDBONNIEGLASER
385
forthefuture
of Sino-Japanese
relatheimplications
of China's perceptions
tionsand regionalstability.
The Allianceand China's Interests:
NeitherToo Close norToo Distant
analystshave longjudgedthat
MostChineseleaders,officialsand think-tank
of theU.S.-JapanallianceservesChineseinterests.1
on balance,continuation
Theyhave viewedthealliancealong withthepresenceof Americanforces
Chinaby: (1) effecand theU.S. nuclearumbrellaoverJapanas benefiting
the
forregionalhegemony;(2) restraining
tivelycheckingJapan'sambitions
and thuslimiting
Japan'sabilityto prostrength
buildupof Japan'smilitary
otherAsianstatesthatareconcernedabout
ject military
power;(3) reassuring
power;and (4) contributing
China'sgrowingeconomic,politicalandmilitary
theAsia-Pacificregion.
to stability
throughout
as bestservedby a U.S.-JapaneserelaThe Chinesejudge theirinterests
norgrowingtoo strongand
too tenseand unraveling
tionshipthatis neither
andTokyocouldweaken
betweenWashington
expanding.Excessivefriction
of thealliance
overJapanand possiblylead to a rupture
Americaninfluence
and evendevelopment
of nuclear
thatcouldtrigger
Japaneseremilitarization
sentiment
in Japanfollowingthe Sepweapons. The risinganti-American
was
tember1995 rapeof an Okinawanschoolgirlby threeU.S. servicemen
thusworrisometo Beijingeven thoughChineseanalystsexpectedthe two
andtoretainAmerthefalloutfromtheincident
sidesto managesuccessfully
ican forcesin Japan.
poses anotherset of dangersto
Too close a U.S.-Japaneserelationship
and Tokyo,especiallyat a
China. Close cooperationbetweenWashington
in Beijingas placing
of
Sino-American
relations,
is
perceived
time strained
in
in
the
China a weak position
triangleand thusreU.S.-Japanese-Chinese
over
both
United
States. The U.S.
Japanand the
ducingChineseleverage
various
could
collude
to
on
and Japan
issues,suchas milipressureBeijing
trade,and Chineseactiviand armscontrol,humanrights,
tarytransparency
ties in the SouthChina Sea. The worstcase forBeijing would be U.S.to deter
of China,includingmilitary
cooperation,
Japanesejointcontainment
scenariofortheChiaggressivebehaviorby Beijing. The mostworrisome
underthe
nese is theprospectof Americanand Japaneseforcescooperating
on discussionswith
1. The assessmentof Chineseviews in thisreportis based primarily
officialsas well as analystsfromcivilianand military
researchinstitutes
Chinesegovernment
duringfourvisitsto Chinain Fall 1995,Springand Fall 1996,and Winter1996-97. Since the
individualsengagedin thesediscussionsbased on an understanding
thattheywould not be
quotedby name,theirremarksremainanonymous.
This content downloaded from 200.9.3.65 on Tue, 12 Aug 2014 19:53:52 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
386
ASIANSURVEY,VOL.XXXVII,NO. 4, APRIL1997
umbrellaof theU.S.-Japanalliancein responseto use of forceby themainland to preventTaiwanfrombecomingindependent.
Prognosisfor theAlliance:Near-term
RiftUnlikely
tradedisputesintenpost-ColdWarperiodas U.S.-Japanese
In theimmediate
sified,some Chineseanalystspredictedthatwithouttheglue of anti-SovietbetweentheU.S. andJapanwouldspilloverintothesecurity
ism,differences
cohesion
lead to an endof thealliance. The continued
sphereand ultimately
betweentheU.S.
oftheallianceafterseveralyearsofsharpeconomicfriction
and Japanand increasingwillingnessin Tokyo to "say no" to the United
States,however,led mostChineseexpertsto judge theU.S.-Japansecurity
to be fundamentally
strong.Theyconcludedthatalthoughstrugrelationship
gles in the economicsphereof U.S.-Japaneseties would persist,such disputeswould notnecessarilyweakensecurityties betweenWashingtonand
Tokyo.
tie
Most Chineseofficialsand expertsare nowconvincedthatthesecurity
betweentheUnitedStatesand Japanis likelyto remainintactforat least
anotherdecade and perhapslonger. In thisperiod,"Japanwill continueto
andthe
basisfortheU.S.-Japanrelationship,
regardtheallianceas a strategic
U.S. and Japanwill have closercooperationon securityissues,"declareda
ofForeignAffairs
in OctosenioranalystfromtheMinistry
(MFA) privately
to
ber1995. Chineseexpertssee theU.S.-Japansecurity
treaty
as continuing
servebothJapaneseandAmericaninterests.FortheJapanese,theallianceis
protection;
hedgeagainstuncertainty
viewedas necessaryto providemilitary
aboutthe futureof China,Korea, and Russia; and providelegitimacyfor
roleregionally
andglobally.For
Japanto playa biggerpoliticaland security
linkwithJapanis viewed
theUnitedStates,Chineseanalystssay,thesecurity
especiallyon theKoreanPeninsula;
as essentialto maintain
regionalstability,
of independent
curbthedevelopment
Japanesepoliticalpower;hedgeagainst
futurethreatsin theregion,includingfromChina; and sharetheburdenof
military
presencein thewesternPasecurityand U.S. forward
maintaining
cific.
in theirestimatesof thefateof theU.S.-JapanalliChineseexpertsdiffer
of analystsexpectsthealliance beyondthenextdecade or so. A minority
thatthesecurity
forecasts
ance to endurefora prolongedperiod;themajority
willbe terminated
sometimein theearlypartof the21stcentury
relationship
in the
of the U.S.-Japanesesecurityrelationship
despitethe strengthening
nearterm.These analystscite variouspossiblecauses of a rift:
* Tokyowillcometoviewthesecurity
inthepathtoplaying
a
as anobstacle
treaty
from
roleandaskU.S. forces
towithdraw
moreequalpolitical
andsecurity
Japan.
This content downloaded from 200.9.3.65 on Tue, 12 Aug 2014 19:53:52 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
BANNINGGARRETTANDBONNIEGLASER
387
unacceptablein the
* The presenceof Americanforcesin Japanwillbe increasingly
face of risingJapanesenationalism.
@ The UnitedStateswillnotsupport
a largeAmericanpresencein Japanor therestof
Asia indefinitely.
Thereis alreadya tendencytowardisolationismand growing
"Americafirst"sentiment
in theUnitedStates.
* Economicand politicaldiscordbetweentheU.S. and Japanwill eventually
underminethe alliance. Some expertspredictmorebroadlythatconflictsof American
will intensify
and Japanesenationalinterests
and thatJapanwill ultimately
pose a
threatto theUnitedStates.2
FutureDirectionof theAlliance
Chineseconcernaboutthebroadening
scope of theU.S.-Japanallianceimwas replicitin theJointDeclarationon theAllianceforthe21st century3
flectedin the commentsof Chinese ForeignMinistryspokesmanShen
between
Guofang,who said that"we hopethebilateraldefensearrangement
Japanand theUnitedStateswill notgo beyondits bilateralnatureand will
nottouchon anythirdparty."Shenwarnedthat"anyattempt
to have a securityarrangement
goingbeyondits bilateralcharacterwould certainlybe
cause forvigilanceand concernby otherAsian nations."The spokesman
in theDeclarationthat"thetwoleaders
also reactedsharplyto thestatement
of peacefulresolutionof problemsin the region,"
stressedthe importance
sharedAmericanand
which,by implication,
includedTaiwan and reflected
to
exercisesandthreats
JapaneseconcernaboutChina'sMarch1996military
Xu Zhixian
2. China Institute
of Contemporary
International
Relations(CICIR) researcher
has predicted
an "increasingly
intense"rivalry
betweentheU.S. andJapanfordomination
in the
Asia-Pacificregion.Xu describedU.S.-Japanese
relationsas in themidstof a "historic
change,"
and tension.Nevertheless,
Xu forecast
whichis likelyto be characterized
by increasing
conflict
thatJapanwouldmaintain
itspartnership
andcooperative
relationship
withtheU.S. forthetime
beingbecauseit "is stillnotable to contendopenly"withWashington.Xu Zhixian,"Northeast
Asia DevelopsAmidDialogueand Cooperation,"
January
20, 1995,XiandaiGuoji Guanxi,publishedby CICIR and summarized
in FBIS, DR/CHI,April5, 1995. CICIR journalarticlesare
often"sanitized"versionsof reports
written
fortheChineseleadershipandreflect
theInstitute's
analysisratherthanpropaganda.
3. The textof theDeclarationwas printedin FBIS, DR/EAS,April17, 1996. One Chinese
of CICIR's Divisionof JapaneseStudies,contendsthat
analyst,Yang Bojiang,deputydirector
therevisedU.S.-Japanalliancewillbe a "strongshockto thestrategic
balancein theAsia-Pacific
of regionalaffairsthrough
the
region." He assertsthat"theU.S.-Japanpursuitof domination
of
strengthened
bilateralallianceamountsto buildingtheirown securityupon the insecurity
of the
barriersamongnationsand classification
othercountriesthroughcreationof artificial
regionalcountriesintodifferent
categories.Such behaviorclearlyworksagainstreductionof
regionaltensions.""WhyU.S.-JapanJointDeclarationon SecurityAlliance?"Contemporary
International
Relations,6:5 (May 1996),p. 8.
This content downloaded from 200.9.3.65 on Tue, 12 Aug 2014 19:53:52 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
388
ASIANSURVEY,VOL.XXXVII,NO. 4, APRIL1997
use forceto preventTaiwan frombecomingindependent."How to resolve
theTaiwanproblem,"Shen insisted,"is an internal
Chinesematter."4
Implicitreferences
to Chinain theDeclarationhave becomethefocusof
Chinesecommentary
apprehensive
and debate. Chineseanalystsnotedthat
theDeclarationcitedsourcesof persisting
in the
instability
and uncertainty
Asia-Pacificregionthatby implication
involveChina,includingunresolved
of conterritorial
disputes,potentialregionalconflicts,
heavyconcentrations
ventionaland nuclearforces,and proliferation
of weaponsof mass destructionand theirmeansof delivery.Moreover,theDeclaration'sreference
to a
commoncommitment
byWashington
andTokyoto thepursuitof democracy
and humanrightsin the regionhighlighted
U.S. and Japanesedifferences
withBeijingand intensified
concernin Chinathatthetwo allies willjointly
of
stepup pressureon Chinato changeitspoliticalsystem."So consideration
Chinais clearin thejointdeclaration,"
a senioranalystat theChineseAcademyof Social Sciences (CASS) Institute
of JapaneseStudiesand a former
military
attacheto Tokyoasserted."Chinais thenew objectiveof thealliance.'"S OtherChineseexpertscontendthattheallianceis beingredefined
in
parton thebasis of "uncertainty"
aboutChina's future
withtheabsenceof a
commonenemyto bindtogether
theU.S. andJapanfollowing
thedissolution
of theSovietUnion. A seniorChineseanalystinsistedthat"thereis a strategic consensusbetweentheU.S. and Japanthatthemajorsecurity
concernis
uncertainty
aboutChina." If the U.S. is maintaining
its forcepresencein
Japanto "deal withuncertainty
aboutChina,"he asked,then"how can we
believethatyourpolicyis notcontainment?"
The TokyoDeclarationsignalsa potentially
historictransformation
of the
alliance,accordingto Chineseexpertsandofficials,
as thetwocountries'militarycooperation
expandsfromthedefenseof Japanto preparing
to respond
to threats
to security
theregion.Theycontendthatthebroadened
throughout
4. AFP, April18, 1996,FBIS, DRICHI, April18, 1996; SteveMufson,"U.S.-JapanAccord
Fans China's Fears,"Washington
Post,April19, 1996. Chineseanalystssaid privately
in May
1996 thattheChinesegovernment's
responseto theJointDeclarationhad beenmutedbecause
to China was the statement
theDeclaration'sonlyexplicitreference
thatthe two leadershad
forthe stabilityand prosperity
of the regionthat
"emphasizedthatit is extremely
important
China play a positiveand constructive
role,and in thiscontext,stressedthe interestof both
countriesin furthering
cooperationwithChina."
5. This themeis widelyrepresented
in publishedarticles.See, forexample,Japanexpert
Zhou JihuafromtheCASS Institute
of JapaneseStudies,"A New Starting
Pointof Japan-U.S.
MilitaryAlliance,"International
StrategicStudies,no. 2, 1996,pp. 24-29. The journalis publishedbytheChinaInstitute
forInternational
Strategic
Studies,whichis undertheGeneralStaff
Department
of thePeople's LiberationArmy(PLA). Zhou assertsthatundertherevisedU.S.Japanalliance,"Chinais takenas a strategic
opponentin the21stcentury,"
p. 28. Zhou claims
theU.S. sees Chinaas "closingrapidlyto thestatusofa 'superpower',"
and likelyto becomethe
"mostdifficult
competitor"
fortheU.S. to cope within the21stcentury.
This content downloaded from 200.9.3.65 on Tue, 12 Aug 2014 19:53:52 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
BANNING
GARRETTANDBONNIEGLASER
389
scope of U.S.-Japansecuritycooperationwill cover an area thatstretches
fromthe KoreanPeninsulato theBashi ChannelbetweenTaiwan and the
Philippinesand eventuallyto the South China Sea withthe purposeof
aboutthe directionof the U.S."checking"China. Beijing's apprehension
Japanalliance was expressedprivatelyby a seniorofficialfromthe State
of the
Council's ForeignAffairsOffice,who warnedthat"theredefinition
towardthegoal of
alliancewill help Japanin some way to move forward"
military
power. "It is hardto say thatit willpose a
becomingan independent
threatto Chinaor to theAsia-Pacificregion,butwe have to watch,"he said.
"Is it defensive?WhatwillJapan'snewrolebe?"6A seniorJapanspecialist
of the expansionof the scope of the
similarlyquestionedthe implications
alliance,whichhe said wouldincludetheTaiwanStraitand theSouthChina
"who is in the Taiwan Straitand SouthChina
Sea. He asked rhetorically
Sea? China,of course."
of theallianceand theexpansionof its
The originsof thestrengthening
area of operationis tracedby Chineseexpertsto thePentagon's"Reporton
forEast Asia" releasedin February1995 andJapan's"NationalDeStrategy
fenseProgramOutline"(NDPO) issuedin November1995,whicha Chinese
to upholdtheJapan-U.S.securwrote,indicated"an intention
correspondent
itysystemand to expandthe scope of bilateralsecuritycooperation."The
assertedthat"forthefirsttime,the 'Report'viewstheJapancorrespondent
presencein theAsiaU.S. securitysystemas thebasis of theU.S. military
system
Pacificregion,"while"the'Outline'considerstheJapan-U.S.security
an indispensable
condition
forensuring
Japan'ssecurity
andforsafeguarding
in areas surrounding
Japan."7
peace and stability
The TokyoDeclaration'scall forextensionof U.S.-Japanbilateralmilitary
in theFar
beyondthedefenseofJapanto deal with"emergencies
cooperation
concernto theChinese. The U.S.-Japan"Acquisition
East" is of particular
and Cross-Servicing
signed a few days beforethe ClintonAgreement,"
is seen as "signifying
theexpansionof Japan'srear-serHashimotosummit,
thebilateraldefensetreatyas the
6. A Chinesecommentator
suggestedthatby maintaining
in theregion,"theU.S. andJapanhavegiventheimpression
"foundation
ofpeace andprosperity
thattheywill"workhand-in-hand
to dominatetheAsia-Pacific
region."ZhangGuocheng,InterIs Facinga Test,"Renminribao,April23, 1996,
nationalForumcolumn,"Japan'sConstitution
FBIS, DRICHI, April29, 1996. Anotherreporter
suggestedthatthenew directionforthealliance setbytheTokyoDeclarationsendsa "dangerous
intothe
signalthatJapanhas beenbrought
U.S. globalmilitary
withU.S. troops'actions
strategy
and willgradually
strengthen
coordination
in theAsia-Pacificregion."ChenZhijiang,"Japan-U.S.JointDeclarationon Security-A DangerousSignal,"Guangming
ribao,April18, 1996,FBIS, DRICHI, April23, 1996.
7. GangYe, "TheJapan-U.S.Military
AlliancethatIs Cause forConcern,"Xinhua,April18,
1996,FBIS, DRICHI, April19, 1996.
This content downloaded from 200.9.3.65 on Tue, 12 Aug 2014 19:53:52 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
390
ASIANSURVEY,VOL. XXXVI,NO. 4, APRIL1997
vice supportto U.S. troopsto areasoutsideJapan."8Evenmoreworrisome
to
theChineseis thedecisionof thetwocountriesto reviewthe 1978 "Japanwartime
U.S. GuidelinesforDefenseCooperation"
governing
U.S.-Japancoof thealliancesigoperationundertheSecurityTreaty.Thesemodifications
nal thatJapanwouldlikelycooperatemilitarily
withtheUnitedStatesin the
conflictwithChina,accordingto
eventthe U.S. is involvedin a military
in conChineseexperts.TheyforeseepotentialJapanesenaval intervention
junctionwiththe UnitedStates in a South China Sea conflictinvolving
China,forexample.9Of greatest
concernto theChinese,however,is thepossibilitythattheU.S. and Japanwill tacitlyincludeTaiwan withinthe alliance's zone of coverage. Theycalculatethatundertherevisedtermsof the
alliance,Japanis likelyto providelogisticaland intelligence
supportto U.S.
forcesin theeventof U.S. military
in a Mainland-Taiwan
intervention
conflict.
The ChinesethusfearthattheU.S.-Japanalliancewillno longerbe a force
containing
Japanas it has beenin thepast. The director
of a leadingforeign
in Beijingindicatedthathe and otherexpertsare primarily
policyinstitute
worried"abouta stronger
Japanunderless and less controlof the United
States."'0Many Chineseanalystsand commentators
predictthatif theDefenseGuidelinesare modifiedto allow forregionalwartimecooperation,
therewill be new pressurein Japanto acceptthe rightof collectiveselfdefense,whichwouldallow Japaneseforcesto come to thedefenseof allies
underattack. Chineseanalystsprivatelyraise the questionof whetherthe
revisedDefenseGuidelines-to be issuedin Fall 1997-will call forJapanese forcesto cooperatewithU.S. forcesin combatroles. Even a logistics
roleforJapanis viewedas potentially
involvingcombat.A seniorPRC Jaattacheto Tokyocontendedthata logistics
pan expertand former
military
role is not only a significant
contribution
to combatforcesbut could lead
Japaneseforcesintodirectcombat.If a Japaneseshipsupporting
U.S. forces
8. See, forexample,Yu Qing, "WhatIs the Aim of Strengthening
U.S.-JapanSecurity?"
interview
withZhangGuocheng,RenminribaoJapan-based
correspondent,
Renminribao,April
19, 1996,FBIS, DRICHI, April25, 1996.
9. ConcernaboutJapanesemilitary
in the SouthChina Sea was expressedas
intervention
earlyas mid-1994.Unimpededsea routesthrough
theSouthChinaSea have "a greatbearing"
on Japan'snationaleconomysinceJapan"has to ship80% of itsoil importsthrough
theSouth
ChinaSea," whichcouldlead Japanto decideto becomeinvolvedin a conflict
overtheSpratlys.
Japan'snavyalready"is strongenoughto entertheSouthChinaSea." Lin Mu, "The Aviation
Dreamof theChinesePeople,"Shidian,no. 7, July8, 1994,FBIS, DRICHI, August24, 1994.
10. Zhou JihuawarnedthattheApril17, 1996,JointDeclarationon thefutureof theU.S.Japanalliance has "openedthe door forJapanspeedingup the stepsto 'build the forcesin
theJapaneseforcesto be armedwithmoresophisticated
quality'. . . thusfacilitating
equipment
and further
strengthening
theirfighting
capacity.""A New Starting
PointofJapan-U.S.Military
Alliance,"pp. 27-28.
This content downloaded from 200.9.3.65 on Tue, 12 Aug 2014 19:53:52 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
BANNING
GARRETTANDBONNIEGLASER
391
is attacked,
he asked,"howshouldJapanrespond?Shoulditretaliate?"AnotherChineseJapanspecialistsuggestedthatTokyocould face a similardilemmain theeventthatJapanesemilitary
aircraft
wereshotdownattempting
to rescueJapanesecitizensin Taiwanduringa cross-strait
military
conflict.
The analystnotedthattherewas a historical
precedent
forJapanusingsucha
tactictojustifymilitary
intervention.
"AfterWorldWarI, theJapanesegovernmentinvadedShandongunderthe excuse of rescuingits citizens,"the
analystadded.
This enduringsuspicionof Japan'sintentions
underliesChineseconcern
aboutthepossibility
thatJapanwill reviseits Constitution
to allow forthe
rightof collectiveself-defense.
Revisionof thePeace Constitution
wouldbe
seenbytheChineseas a dangerouswatershed
in Japanesepost-World
WarII
history.People's Daily assertedthatthe Peace Constitution,
which renounceswarforeveralongwithJapan'srightto retainarmedforces,"representsa demarcationline," and notedthat"once this demarcationline is
brokenthrough,"
therewill be reasonto worrythatJapanwill movetoward
remilitarization.1
Chineseexpertsmaintainthat"rightist
forces"in JapantheLiberalDemocraticParty(LDP) and Shinshinto-havebeen seekingto
amendJapan'sConstitution
to allow fora broadersecurity
role forTokyo.
Chineseofficialshave expressedsome of theirreservations
abouttheimplicationsof theJointDeclarationand theupcomingreviewof the1978 DefenseGuidelinesdirectly
to boththeU.S. andJapaneseofficialsandpolitical
leaders. ForeignMinisterQian Qichenreportedly
warnedSecretary
of State
WarrenChristopher
whentheymetshortly
aftertheClinton-Hashimoto
summitthata "big problem"wouldbe createdif theTokyoDeclarationmeans
thatJapanwill undertake
forpeace in Asia through
theU.S.responsibility
of
Japansecurityalliance. DeputyChief Staffof the People's Liberation
Army(PLA) Lt. Gen. XiongGuangkaisimilarly
toldan LDP delegationvisitingChinathathe hopedtheSecurityTreatywouldbe limitedto defenseof
in East
Japansinceanyexpansionof itsscopemightcomplicatethesituation
Asia.12
Concernaboutthe meaningand significance
of the revitalization
of the
an underlying
debatein ChinaovertheimplicaU.S.-Japanalliancereflects
tionsforChinaof theallianceand U.S. forward
military
presence.This debateintensified
in responsenotonlyto theTokyoDeclarationbutalso to the
of twoU.S. aircraft
deployment
carrier
battlegroups
offChina's coastduring
11. ZhangGuocheng,International
Forumcolumn,"Japan'sConstitution
Is Facinga Test."
12. Qian's comments
wereparaphrased
byChu Hsing-fu,
"Chinaand theUnitedStatesHave
IncreasedMutualUnderstanding,"
WenWeiPo, April21, 1996,FBIS, DRICHI, April22 1996;
"NHK News,"April22, 1996,FBIS, DRICHI, April23, 1996.
This content downloaded from 200.9.3.65 on Tue, 12 Aug 2014 19:53:52 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
392
ASIANSURVEY,VOL. XXXVII,NO. 4, APRIL1997
exercisesdirectedagainstTaiwan.13 Chinese
Beijing'sMarch1996 military
ofthealliancecan be dividedintothreeschoolsof
viewson thestrengthening
thought.The majorityof officialsand analystsmaintainsthatat least one
theallianceis sharedconcernaboutChina. These offifactorin revitalizing
how farthiswill go in practiceand wantto
cials and analystsare uncertain
withhold
finaljudgmentuntilthenewDefenseGuidelinesare issued. Many
thatJapanand theU.S. could not sucof theseexpertsexpressconfidence
of
a containment
policyin any case. A largeminority
cessfullyimplement
expertsis convincedthattheU.S.-Japanallianceis alreadybeingrefocused
of expertsargues
primarily
to targetand containChina. A small minority
of thealliancebecause
thatChina shouldnotoverreact
to thestrengthening
These analystscontendthat
are likelyto be transitory.
recentdevelopments
is like a pendulumthathas
the U.S.-Japan-China
triangular
relationship
betweenWashington
and Tokyo
swungto one extremeof close cooperation
butthatit will soon startto comebacktowardthemiddleas U.S.-Japanconrelationsimflictsovertradeand otherissuesreemergeand Sino-American
theyinsist,thependulumcouldeven swingtowardclose
prove. Eventually,
Sino-American
relationsat Japan'sexpense.
in Beijingthatrevitalizing
theU.S.-JapanSecurity
Despite apprehension
by
privateas wellas publicstatements
TreatymaydamageChineseinterests,
indicatethatBeijinghas notreachedtheconclusion
theChinesegovernment
ofAmericanforcesin JapanandEast Asia
thattheallianceandthestationing
muchuncertainty
remainsin Beijingabout
pose a threatto China. Although
in redefining
the alliance,a riftin theJapanU.S. and Japaneseintentions
is stillviewedas likelyto be dangerousto
Americansecurityrelationship
China and to regionalstability.
TheaterMissileDefense:An Elementin
Military
Containment?
Beijing'sfearthattheU.S. andJapanmaycooperateto containChinamilitathatJapanwill deploya theater
rilyhas been exacerbatedby thepossibility
missiledefense(TMD) system,whichwouldbe jointlydevelopedwiththe
exacerbatedby theissuingon
13. ChineseconcernabouttheU.S.-Japanalliancewas further
declaration
ForeignMinsignedbyAustralian
jointsecurity
July27, 1996,oftheU.S.-Australia
isterAlexanderDownerand DefenceMinisterIan McLachlanand theirAmericancounterparts,
and Secretaryof DefenseWilliamPerry.A prominent
Secretaryof StateWarrenChristopher
directorand Asia expertnotedthatthejoint declarationwas interpreted
Chineseinstitute
by
of the U.S.-Australiaalliancewiththe aim of restraining
possible
Beijingas a strengthening
aggressiveChinese behaviorin the South China Sea. He added that"you can draw a line
the [Asian] stateswithwhichthe U.S. has alliancesand military
arrangements-they
through
forman arc aroundChina."
This content downloaded from 200.9.3.65 on Tue, 12 Aug 2014 19:53:52 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
BANNING
GARRETTANDBONNIEGLASER
393
in
UnitedStates.14Most Chineseofficialsand analystssee Tokyo's interest
theTMD programas spurredby increasedJapaneseconcernabouta future
priwouldbe intended
threatfromChinaand contendthatTMD deployment
marilyto protectJapanfromChinesemissiles. Japaneseclaimsthatthedevelopmentof TMD would be to defendJapanagainsta NorthKorean
ballisticmissileattackare dismissedby Chineseanalysts,who maintainthat
NorthKoreanballisticmissileshas sharplydithethreatof nuclear-armed
minishedsinceNorthKorea and theUnitedStatesreachedtheOctober1994
U.S.-NorthKorean Agreed Frameworkon haltingPyongyang'snuclear
thecapability
weaponsprogram.Moreover,theyclaimtheNorthhas neither
to attackJapanwithmissiles. "The targetof TMD in the
northeintention
Chinesemissilesand nuclearweapons,notNorthKorea,"
regionis certainly
International
Relations(CICIR)
a seniorChina Instituteof Contemporary
in May 1996.
Americaexpertmaintained
are uncertain
aboutand mayexresearchers
Chineseofficialsand institute
TMD
Nevertheless,
theyare
system.
aggeratethe potentialof a Japanese
by
forcecouldbe neutralized some of
worriedthatChina's nucleardeterrent
the optionsunderconsideration,
especiallyrobustversionsof the groundbased TheaterHigh AltitudeArea Defense (THAAD) systemor the U.S.
maintainthatdeNavy's sea-basedUpperTier system.15Chinesescientists
of an advancedTHAAD systemcould defendagainstnearly80%
ployment
of China's "strategic"
nuclearmissilesand thatit could be upgradedto deChina's
fendagainstthe restof China's nucleararsenal,thusneutralizing
and armscontrolexpertfrom
force.16A nuclearphysicist
nucleardeterrent
in July1996 that
privately
commented
China's nuclearweaponslaboratories
itis "reasonableandunderstandable"
thattheUnitedStateswantsto
in theory
deploy a low-levelmissiledefensesystem.Any ballisticmissiledefense
(BMD) systemis of concernto China,he said, sinceTMD againstconven14. The Chineseapparently
first
raisedtheTMD issue directly
withtheJapanesegovernment
in January1996. Japaneseofficialssaid in Beijingon January
15, 1996,thatChineseofficials
had urgedTokyoto exercisecautionin itsresearchprogram
on defenseagainstballisticmissiles
bilateralsecurity
talksthathadjust been held. Kyodo,January15, 1996,
duringSino-Japanese
FBIS, DRICHI, January16, 1996.
15. This concernwas voicedin February1995 by an unnamedseniorForeignMinistry
official in an interviewwithPatrickTylerof theNew YorkTimes,"China WarnsAgainst'Star
Wars' ShieldforU.S. Forcesin Asia," February18, 1995.
16. See BanningGarrettand BonnieGlaser,"ChinesePerspectiveson NuclearArmsControl,"International
Security,
20:3 (Winter1995/96),p. 73, fn.39. One Chineseballisticmissile
at an international
in early 1996 thatif THAAD can reliably
engineermaintained
conference
engagetargetswithreentry
velocitiesof 5 kn/sec.-correspoonding
to 3,000kmrangemissiles,
whichcomprisenearly80% ofChina's"strategic"
arsenal-thenfroma technicalstandpoint,
the
systemwill have theabilityto intercept
targetstraveling
at 7 km/sec.,
thatis ICBMs, including
thoseof China.
This content downloaded from 200.9.3.65 on Tue, 12 Aug 2014 19:53:52 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
394
ASIANSURVEY,VOL. XXXVII,NO. 4, APRIL1997
missilescould be used to defendTaiwan and
tionallyarmed,shorter-range
defensesystem.Chinasees low-level
couldbe a firststeptowarda strategic
TMD and NMD (nationalmissiledefense),"acTMD "leadingto high-level
cordingto thephysicist."So it is the potentialwe are concernedabout."
Moreover,"iftheU.S. deploysNMD, so mightthennotonlyRussiado so as
well,butalso France,theUK, and even India."17
nullifying
Some Chineseexpertssee a TMD systemin Japanas potentially
againstthe UnitedStatesand thusundermining
China's nucleardeterrent
notedin mid-1996thatChina
stability.A Chinesenuclearphysicist
strategic
had developednuclearweaponsin the 1950s and 1960s to detertheU.S.to retaliate
butrather
bythreatening
to attackU.S. territory
notbythreatening
U.S. bases in thewesternPafora U.S. nuclearattackon Chinaby striking
cific. "We don't need to attackJapanwithnuclearweapons,"the nuclear
weaponsexpertsaid,"butwe needto be able to attackU.S. forcesin Japan
. .. if we needto retaliatewithnuclearweapons." Thus,forChina,thereis
betweenNMD in theUnitedStatesand TMD in Japan
"nota big difference"
Pacific.ButmostChineseexpertsstress
U.S. forcesin thewestern
protecting
the need forChina to be able to retaliateagainstthe U.S. homeland.To
China needsto enaccordingto one Chinesephysicist,
maintaindeterrence,
surethatat least fivenuclearwarheadscan attacktheUnitedStates. Based
whatpercentageof waron thisobjective,he said,thePLA mustdetermine
a U.S. BMD systemand thushow manynuheadswill be able to penetrate
firststrikeby theUnitedStates.
clear weaponsmustsurvivea preemptive
remainsviable in the face of TMD or
To ensurethatChina's deterrent
are advocatingthatChinabe preparedto deNMD, some Chinesescientists
re-entry
vehicles
targeted
independently
aids and multiple,
ploy penetration
to
missiledefenses."It is veryeasy and inexpensive
(MIRVs) to overwhelm
to BMD," a nuclearphysicist
and armscontrolexdevelopcountermeasures
in
privately
commented
pertfromtheChina's nuclearweaponslaboratories
July1996. A fewChinesearmscontrolexpertshaveevenurgedthegovernpromentto reconsider
itscommitment
to endingitsnuclearweaponstesting
gram if Japandecides to proceed withdevelopmentand deploymentof
TMD.18 Chineseexpertsalso are worriedthatJapaneseacquisitionof TMD
17. Some Chinesecommentators
see theTMD proposalas partof a global BMD system
ZhangLiang,forexample,
similarto theSDI programinitiatedby theReaganadministration.
an important
linkin the
arguesthat"thepresentU.S. 'theatermissiledefenseplan' represents
Clintonadministration's
securitystrategy,
whichwill developintoa defensesystemsimilarto
CarriedOut to
the 'StarWars' program.""U.S. 'StarWars' Program-RepeatedAdjustments
EnsureNuclearSupremacy,"
Renminribao,July15, 1996,FBIS, DRICHI, 96-150.
18. See Liu Huaqiu, "Evaluationand Analysisof China's NuclearArmsControlPolicy,"
Xiandai Junshi,November11, 1995, FBIS, DRICHI, December22, 1995, citedby RobertS.
Ross, "Managinga ChangingRelationship:China'sJapanPolicyin the1990s,"paperprepared
for"StrategicPartner
and . . . or Peer Competitor?"
U.S. ArmyWar College AnnualStrategy
This content downloaded from 200.9.3.65 on Tue, 12 Aug 2014 19:53:52 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
BANNINGGARRETrANDBONNIEGLASER
395
incapability,
to enhanceJapan'smilitary
wouldbe partof a largerstrategy
Japan'sdefensive
forces.Theycontendthatupgrading
cludingitsoffensive
ofnuclearweaponsandassertthatTokyo's
systemscouldlead to deployment
satellite-launch
vehicles-and thusits ICBM
space technology-including
of TMD withtheUnited
capabilitywill be advancedbyjoint development
theseanalystswarn,it may
States. Once Japanhas a missiledefensesystem,
decide to developand deployan offensivenuclearweaponscapabilitythat
shield. "If a countrywithnuclear
would be backed by a TMD protective
weaponshas a spear and thengets a shield,you can imaginewhatwould
happen,"an unnamedMFA officialtold the New YorkTimesin February
1995.19The Chineseare also concernedthatJapaneseTMD could be used
armedChinesemissiles.Theyforeseethepossibility
againstconventionally
thata Japanesesea-mobileTMD systemcouldbe deployedto shieldTaiwan
fromChineseballisticmissiles."So in thatcase," a PLA analystcommented,
to Taiwan,it can just sell it to
"theU.S. doesn'thave to sell TMD directly
Japanand Japancan use it [to protectTaiwan] in a crisisin the Taiwan
Strait."
New ConcernsaboutJapaneseMilitaryPower
Many Chinesemilitaryand civiliananalystsand officialsexpressconcern
that
thatwithintheallianceJapanis breakingoutof thepoliticalconstraints
Forces(SDF)
limitedtherolesand capabilitiesof theJapaneseSelf-Defense
in thepast. TheseexpertsassertthattheJapanesearebuildinga moreextenOne analystconsive military
capabilitythanis necessaryforself-defense.20
the
of theJapaneseSDF, particularly
tendedthat"thesteadyreinforcement
balance"and"producenew
navalandairSDF, willchangetheAsianmilitary
few
in theregion.21
WithChina'sgrowingpowerandconfidence,
instability"
Conference,
CarlisleBarracks,April23-25, 1996. Liu is thedirectorof thearmscontrolprogramin theCommissionon Scienceand Technologyin theNationalDefense(COSTIND). An
unconfirmed
reportin theJapanesepressin May 1996 claimedthatin responseto theU.S.-led
TMD projectfortheregionand especiallytheprospectof Taiwan developingits own missile
capabilityagainstthemainlandas wellas acquiringTMD fromtheU.S., theChineseleadership
had decidedto begindevelopment
ofa ChineseTMD system.MasaurSoma,"Sourceon DevelopingMultistageAirDefenseSystem,"SankeiShimbun,
May 30, 1996,FBIS, DR/EAS,June3,
1996.
19. "ChinaWarnsAgainst'StarWars' Shield."
20. Deputydirector
oftheCICIR Northeast
AsianStudiesDivision,Yang Bojiang,wrotethat
"it is evidentthatJapanis alreadyon theroad to becominga high-tech
conventional
military
power. Such a buildup,"Yang added,"willproducea significant
impacton thestrategic
balance
of powerin theAsia-Pacific
region,""OkinawanIncidentComplicatesU.S.-JapanTies,"Beijing
Review,December11-17, 1995,p. 11.
21. Chen Lineng,"The JapaneseSelf-DefenseForcesAre MarchingTowardthe21st Century,"Guoji Zhanwang,February8, 1996,FBIS, DRICHI, May 1, 1996.
This content downloaded from 200.9.3.65 on Tue, 12 Aug 2014 19:53:52 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
396
ASIANSURVEY,VOL.XXXVII,NO. 4, APRIL1997
Chinesemaintain
thatChinaitselffacesan increasedthreatof Japanesemilitaryattackwithconventional
forces.Ratheranalystsportray
thenear-term
dangeras Japanexpandingitssecurity
rolebeyonddefenseof Japaneseterritoryto undertake
responsibility
forsecurity
throughout
theregionas a junior
to theUnitedStates. In thelongrun,theyworryabouta farstronger
partner
fromitsconstraining
tieswiththeUnitedStates. An official
Japancutadrift
fromtheStateCouncil's ForeignAffairsOfficewarnedthat"redefinition
of
thealliancewillhelpJapanin somewayto moveforward"
towardthegoal of
becomingan independent
military
power.
ChineseanalystscontendthatTokyois trying
to windomesticsupportand
international
acceptanceof Japaneseforcesplayinga military
role in maintainingregionalsecurity.A key stepin thisprocess,accordingto Chinese
in U.N. peacekeepingoperations
experts,was Japan'sdecisionto participate
(PKOs). Undertheguiseofbowingto U.S. pressureto contribute
to internationalpeacekeepingand globalsecurity
missions,Chinesespecialistsassert,
Japanis enhancing
itsmilitary
itspowerprojection
power,including
forces.22
Chineseexpertsalso maintain
thatinvolvement
in PKO enablesJapanto use
the dispatchof peacekeepingforcesto areas outsideAsia as a steptoward
greaterparticipation
in maintaining
securitywithinthe region. Most ominous,in the view of Chineseanalysts,is theredefinition
of Japan'sthreat
environment
to focuson China's growingeconomicand military
powerand
on potentialconflicts
involvingChina. Chineseexpertsand officialsare especiallyconcernedthatuncertainty
about growingChinese economicand
military
poweris becomingtheprimary
rationaleforenhancing
Japanesemilitarycapabilitiesas well as updatingthe U.S.-Japanalliance to permitinin regionalsecurity
creasedJapaneseinvolvement
affairs.The strengthening
of theU.S.-Japanallianceis also seen as encouraging
militarist
right-wing,
tendencieswithinJapanthathave favoreda moreconfrontational
Japanese
approachto relationswithChina.
Some Chineseofficialsand analystshave also become moreconcerned
about the possibilitythatJapancould decide to develop nuclearweapons.
Althoughthemajority
of Chineseofficialsand analystsholdsthata decision
bytheJapaneseto "go nuclear"undercurrent
domesticandinternational
conditionsis highlyunlikely,
someexpertswarnthatJapan'snuclearpotentialis
like a swordof Damocles hangingover the strategic
environment.
Should
Japandecide to abandonits non-nuclear
policy,the minority
contends,it
couldexploititstechnological
capabilityto emergeas a nuclearpowervirtu22. Yang Xuejun,a researcher
at theChineseSocietyforStrategy
andManagement
Research,
assertedthatthepassageof the 1992 PKO bill by theJapaneseDiet markeda turningpoint
in
Japan'slong-term
strategy
to becomea "worldmilitary
power." "China's Focus and Strategy
TowardJapanin RecentYears" [JinNianLai ZhongguoFangmianGuanzhude RibenZhongda
WentiJiqiDuice], unpublished
paper,Fall 1995.
This content downloaded from 200.9.3.65 on Tue, 12 Aug 2014 19:53:52 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
BANNINGGARRETTANDBONNIEGLASER
397
condially overnight.These expertsworrythatdomesticand international
a Japanesedecision to become a
tions could change quickly,triggering
nuclearpower. They suggestthatthe Japanesecould conclude thatthe
"Chinathreat"warranted
deployinga nucleararsenal,especiallyifJapanlost
confidence
in theU.S. nuclearumbrella.23
Thereis also growingconcernthat
therevisedalliancecouldbecomean umbrellaforJapandevelopingnuclear
weapons. A leadingJapanexpertfromCICIR notedthatmanyAmericans
say theU.S.-Japanallianceis "thecorkin thebottle,"but"Japanis developing its own high-tech
conventional
weapons"and "I am suspiciousabout
whether
Japanwill developnuclearweapons." In thatcase, he added,"the
U.S. is nota cork,butan egg shell."
PerceivedChanges inJapanese Attitudes
TowardChina
in BeijingabouttheU.S.-Japanallianceand
Anothercause of apprehension
thefuture
of Sino-Japanese
relationsis themarkedincreasein politicalsupunthinkable
portin Tokyoforpreviously
stepsby theJapanesegovernment
thatare inimicalto Chineseinterests.This shiftis a resultin partof Japan's
of a multiparty
electoralsystemthathas politicizedJapanese
development
policytowardkeyissuesin Sino-Japanese
relations,
includingTaiwan,territorialdisputesand Chinesemilitary
The freezingof Japan's
modernization.
grantaid in 1995 in responseto China'scontinued
nucleartesting,
forexample, signaleda new willingnessby Tokyo to exertpressureon Beijing on
modernizasecuritymatterswiththeobjectiveof slowingChina's military
tion. The Japanesegovernment's
toleranceof the construction
of a lighthouse on the disputedDiaoyu/Senkaku
Islands by a Japaneseright-wing
groupwas perceivedby Beijingas anotherworrisome
signof thechanging
officialattitude
towardChinain Japan.Of paramount
concernto theChinese
is growingpoliticalbackingin Japanforcloserties withTaiwan,including
Lee Teng-huito visitTokyo,despitethecertainty
allowingTaiwanPresident
it wouldhave a negativeimpacton Sino-Japanese
relations.
Chineseexpertsand officialsrecognizethatJapaneseattitudes
are changandthatChinais viewedinJapanwithfargreater
ingfundamentally
wariness
23. Accordingto Kyodo,an internalChinesegovernment
reportthatwas circulatedamong
minister-level
cadresoftheParty,government
and military
assertedthatJapan'scurrent
military
threatsfromChina and North
buildupis theresultof Tokyo's concernoverpotentialmilitary
Korea and thatsuch a buildupcould eventuallylead to a Japanesenuclearweaponsprogram.
The Chinese documentreportedly
maintained
thatJapanbelievesthatalthoughthe U.S. has
extendedits security
umbrellato Tokyo,it is stilldifficult
to containeffectively
theuse of nuclearweaponsin theregionand thatthus"in thefuture,
Japancannotcompletely
dependon the
U.S nuclearumbrellaand as a pretextto protectitselffromnuclearattack,it may begin to
developits own nuclearforce,"Kyodo,July1, 1995, FBIS, DRICHI, July3, 1995.
This content downloaded from 200.9.3.65 on Tue, 12 Aug 2014 19:53:52 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
398
ASIANSURVEY,VOL. XXXVII,NO. 4, APRIL1997
are aware thatChina's growingecothanin thepast. Chineseresearchers
territorial
claims,and its military
nomicstrength,
its assertionof maritime
concerns
maneuversin theTaiwan Straitin 1995 and 1996 have heightened
modernization
programand China's longin JapanaboutthePLA's military
explainJapan's
termstrategic
intentions.Chineseofficialsand researchers
a consequenceofChina'srapideconomic
changingviewofChinaas partially
in Japanas well as of Tokyo's
development
at a timeof economicstagnation
searchfora new enemyin thepost-ColdWar era. "The Japaneseused to
view China as weak so Japandid notfeel a threatfromChina,"an MFA
now."
officialcommentedprivately,
addingthatthe situationis "different
towardChinain Japanareno longer
The officialalso suggestedthatattitudes
guidedby the "sense of guilttowardChina" thatJapanesefeltwhentheir
memoriesof WorldWarTwo werefresh.In addition,
Chineseanalystspoint
to thegenerational
changein theJapaneseleadershipas weakeningsupport
relations.A CASS researcher
forgood Sino-Japanese
lamentedthatthenew
in Japandoes not"knowand understand
Chinaas well as theold
generation
generation."
Of greatestconcernto theChineseis whattheyperceiveas thegrowing
of Japan'srightwing,whoseinfluence,
theymaintain,
powerand influence
oftheU.S.-Japanallianceandgrowing
has beenboostedbythestrengthening
in Japan.A prominent
anti-China
sentiment
ChineseJapanspecialistmaintainedin January1997 thattheJapaneserightwingwas behindtheTaiwan
of Taiwanand themainlobbyin theDiet and sought"to use theseparation
antilandto increaseJapan'ssecurity
rolein theregion."These right-wing,
influential
withtheJapanese
China,and pro-Taiwanforcesare increasingly
he contended,
moderates,
includingPrimeMinisterHashimoto.
TheAllianceand ManagingRelationswithChina
A judgmentby BeijingthattheUnitedStatesand Japanare reorienting
the
allianceto containChina could lead theChineseto oppose theU.S.-Japan
forcesin thewestSecurityTreatyand theforward
presenceof U.S. military
ern Pacific. Since theU.S. and Japanare notlikelyto stateexplicitlythat
to evaltheyseekto containChina,theChinesemaylookforotherindicators
uate whetherthe alliance is movingin an unfavorable
direction,
including
to deteror respondto the
U.S-Japanjointmilitary
planningand cooperation
use offorcebyChina,possiblyagainstTaiwan,or in a contingency
involving
ortheDiaoyu/Senkaku
thealliancecouldbe
theSpratlys
Islands. In addition,
if Beijingconcludedthatit was not
judged as no longerin China's interest
thebuildupof Japanesemilitary
powerbutratherwas enabling
restraining
military
capability.
Tokyoto establishthebasis foran independent
A key factorin Beijing's assessmentof thefutureevolutionof theU.S.towardChina
intentions
Japanalliancewill be its estimateof U.S. strategic
This content downloaded from 200.9.3.65 on Tue, 12 Aug 2014 19:53:52 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
BANNINGGARRETTANDBONNIEGLASER
399
relations.Chinesesuspicionsthatthealliand thefutureof Sino-American
to containChinais in largeparta consequenceof the
ance is beingredirected
in relationsbetweenBeijingand Washington
and Chinesemisdeterioration
in Sinointentions
towardChina. A suddendownturn
trustof U.S. strategic
is seekingto
AmericantiescoulddeepenBeijing'ssuspicionthatWashington
coalitionto thwart
pull Japanand theU.S.-Japanallianceintoan anti-China
a significant
improvement
China's emergenceas a greatpower.Conversely,
in Sino-American
relationswouldprobablyease Chineseconcernsaboutthe
theU.S-Japanalliand Tokyoto strengthen
current
efforts
by Washington
ance.
Japannorthe
MostChineseofficialsandresearchers
recognizethatneither
towardChinaand
strategy
to pursuinga containment
U.S. is yetcommitted
can stillbe averted.Moreover,Beijing
are hopefulthatsucha development
to
willremainreluctant
to concludethattheU.S. andJapanarecollaborating
thwartChina's emergenceas a greatpower. Chineseleadersrecognizethat
theywould
shouldtheyjudge theallianceto be inimicalto China's interests,
thatwould
a majorshiftin Chinesepolicyand strategy
have to undertake
prospectsformaintainincludingdiminished
have far-reaching
implications,
the rapid-pacedecoforcontinuing
ing a favorablestrategicenvironment
voicingof its objectionsto
program.China's current
nomicmodernization
of theallianceappearaimedat influencing
theprocessto
thestrengthening
limitthescope of theexpansionof Japan'sregionalsecurityrole and thus
head offstepsby Japanand theU.S. againstwhichBeijing wouldhave to
in notconcludingthattheU.S. and
reactmorestrongly.Beijing's interest
Japanare seekingto retardthegrowthof Chinesepowerand therealitythat
to a containment
strategy
protheUnitedStatesandJapanarenotcommitted
and Tokyoto avoid finding
themselves
vide an opportunity
forWashington
in an increasingly
withBeijing. Reassurance
relationship
confrontational
measuresby the U.S. and Japanaimed at easing Beijing's suspicionsand
in theaffairsof theregioncould
China's positiveinvolvement
encouraging
enhanceprospectsforChineseacceptanceof closerU.S.-Japaneseregional
securitycooperationas called forin theJointDeclaration.
SinoConclusion:MoreConflictual
Japanese RelationsLikely
of theU.S.-Japanalliance-espeChineseconcernsabouttherevitalization
of Japan's
cially expansionof the scope of the alliance and enhancement
role-are likelyto exacerbatetensionsin China's tieswith
regionalsecurity
Japanas well as withtheUnitedStates. AlthoughChinaand Japansharea
interestin avertingconflictand maintaining
good
fundamental,
long-term
trendin Sino-Japanese
political,economicand securityties,the long-term
The tenrelationsmaybe towardincreasedstrainsand greateruncertainty.
This content downloaded from 200.9.3.65 on Tue, 12 Aug 2014 19:53:52 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
400
ASIANSURVEY,VOL. XXXVII,NO. 4, APRIL1997
sionbetweenBeijingand Tokyoin 1996 overthedisputedislandscalled the
Diaoyutaiby Chinaand theSenkakusby Japanmaybe a harbinger
of more
of a moretroubledrelationship
conflictsto come. Thereare manyportents
betweenChina and Japanthatis further
complicatedby Chineseconcerns
abouttheU.S.-Japanalliance,including:
The shifting
balanceof powerbetweenChina and Japanis creatinga moreequal
withtheCold
andbalancedcompetition
betweenthetwohistorical
rivalsin contrast
War era. This equalizationof poweras Chinagainseconomicstrength
and Japan
playsa biggerpoliticaland military
rolecouldintensify
Sino-Japanese
competition
in relationsbetweenBeijingand Tokyoand
and rivalry,
leadingto greaterfriction
in seekingto maintaingood relathechallengefacedby Washington
exacerbating
tionswithbothcountries.In thelongterm,thebalanceof poweris likelyto shift
and
decisivelyin China's favor,and thismayheighten
Japan'ssenseof insecurity
vulnerability
and increaseTokyo's dependenceon the U.S.-Japanalliance in its
securitystrategy.
* Sino-Japanese
relationsare likelyto be plaguedby deep mistrust
of each other's
intentions
thatdoes not significantly
diminishand could worsen,fueledby rising
nationalism
in bothChinaand Japan.The failureof Japanto fullyaccountforits
WorldWarII crimesin theeyesof theChinesewillcontinueto fuelanti-Japanese,
nationalist
in China(and Taiwanand Hong Kong)-as demonstrated
sentiment
by
theDiaoyu-SenkakuIslandsdispute--andaggravatesuspicionsaboutJapan'sintentionstowardChina. The Japanese,on theotherhand,are likelyto be increasinglysuspiciousof China's long-term
strategic
intentions
in theregionas China's
economyexpandsand Beijingdevelopsa blue-water
naval capability.
* Taiwan will be a dangerousflashpointin Sino-Japanese
relations.Ties between
Tokyo and Beijingcould experienceseriouspoliticaltensionsif Japanwere perceived by China to be supporting
Taiwan's independence
throughsteps such as
allowingLee Teng-huito visitJapanor promoting
Taiwan's international
profile.
* A military
confrontation
betweenTaiwanandthemainlandwouldpose perhapsthe
greatestforeseeablethreatto Sino-Japanese
relationsas well as to theU.S.-Japan
alliance. A decisionby the UnitedStatesto intervenein the conflictmilitarily
wouldforceTokyoto choosewhether
to stayoutof theconflict
altogether,
including denialof U.S. forcesaccess to facilitiesin Japan,thussparkinga crisisin the
theUnitedStatesmilitarily,
whichwouldlikelycreatea deep
alliance,or to support
and enduringcrisisin Sino-Japanese
relations.If theUnitedStatesdid notintervene to halta Chineseattackon Taiwan,theU.S.-Japanalliancecould stillface a
crisissincetheU.S. wouldlikelybe discredited
as a security
in theeyes
guarantor
ofEast Asiannations,including
Japan.Thiscouldlead to theerosionifnottheend
of the allianceand promptJapanto considerotherstrategicand militaryalternaconventional
tives,includinga rapidbuildupof an independent
military
capability
and deployment
of a nucleardeterrent
forcethatwouldalso greatlyexacerbatetensionswithChina.
* The U.S.-Japanalliancecould becomea seriouspointof contention
in Sino-Japanese and Sino-American
relationsin thefuture.Beijing's tacitacceptanceof the
U.S.-Japanallianceis notimmutable.China'sdeep suspicionsaboutJapan'sinten-
This content downloaded from 200.9.3.65 on Tue, 12 Aug 2014 19:53:52 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
BANNINGGARRETTANDBONNIEGLASER 401
to revisetheU.S.-Japanallitionshave been exacerbatedby U.S.-Japaneseefforts
ance. Beijingis fearfulthatTokyowill colludewiththeUnitedStatesto counter
overTaiwanand
ofitssovereignty
theriseofChinesepowerandBeijing'sassertion
andSpratlyislands. If theChinesejudge thattheU.S.
overtheDiaoyutailSenkakus
and Japanare cooperatingto containChina,theycould concludethatAmerican
China's intermilitary
presencein theregionand theU.S.-Japanalliancethreaten
on Japanplayests. Beijingcould also judge thattheallianceis easingconstraints
thathad led
ing a regionalsecurityrole and buildingup its military-constraints
in thefirstplace. In
relationship
Beijingto tacitlysupporttheU.S.-Japansecurity
eithercase, China could tacitlyor even activelycome to oppose the alliance. A
to drivea wedgebetweenthe
hostileChineseposturecouldincludepoliticalefforts
theU.S.-Japanallianceand forcea withdrawal
UnitedStatesandJapan,undermine
of AmericanforcesfromthewesternPacificas well as an acceleratedbuildupof
Chinesemilitary
power. Some Chineseofficialsand senioranalystsare privately
suggestingthatChina may seek to persuaderegionalstatesthroughthe ASEAN
concept"fortheregionthatcalls
RegionalForum(ARF) to supporta "newsecurity
for"equal security"
forall statesandeschewsalliancesas "relicsof theCold War"
at theexpenseof thenon-allied.Mitigating
thatenhancealliedcountries'security
of theU.S.-Japanalliancewill requiremore
Chineseparanoiaaboutrevitalization
intenseand sustainedU.S. andJapanesedialoguewithChinato ensurethatBeijing
behindthechangesin the U.S.of themotivations
has an accurateunderstanding
rolemaybe
Japanallianceandthespecificextentto whichJapan'sregionalsecurity
in Beijingin January
complainedprivately
expanded.Chineseanalystsandofficials
in thealliancerevitalization
process.
1997 thattherewas "a lack of transparency"
by seniorU.S. officialsin meetingswiththeirChiTheyalso indicatedthatefforts
in strengthenaboutAmericanintentions
to providereassurances
nese counterparts
ing theU.S.-Japanalliancehad noteased Chineseconcerns.
The prospectof Japandevelopingand deployingadvancedTMD could become a
relationsandtheU.S.-Japanalliance. Beisourceof newtensionsin Sino-Japanese
strategy
jing could concludethata U.S.-JapaneseTMD was partof a containment
force
ofChina'snucleardeterrent
theviability
aimedat Chinaandthatitthreatened
in East Asia. Such an assessment
as well as Beijing'sabilityto protectitsinterests
on Japannotto go aheadwithTMD and
couldlead theChineseto increasepressure
as well
countermeasures
to takepoliticalandmilitary
damagingto regionalsecurity
couldview itself
interests.The Japanesegovernment
as U.S. andJapanesesecurity
underpressurefrom
facinga no-windilemma:failureto go aheadwiththeprogram
as an ally
China could createdoubtsin theUnitedStatesaboutJapan'sreliability
and thusseverelydamagethealliance;TMD deployment
by theJapanesegovernand produceunwantedtensionswith
mentcould be politicallycostlydomestically
of the United
Beijing. Similarconcernscould arisein Japanaboutthereliability
in Japan
decideto rejectTMD deployment
StatesshouldWashington
unilaterally
missiledefenseon thefragileSinodue to concernaboutnegativeimpactoftheater
Americanrelationship.In eithercase, theresultcould be deepenedpoliticaldivisionswithinJapanon theissue as well as a weakeningof theAmericanpositionin
East Asia.
This content downloaded from 200.9.3.65 on Tue, 12 Aug 2014 19:53:52 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
402 ASIANSURVEY,VOL.XXXVII,NO.4, APRIL1997
intheearlypartofthe21stcentury
Regionalstability
andprosperity
will
likelydependmoreon relations
amongChina,JapanandtheUnitedStates
roleoftheU.S. thanonanyother
andtheregional
factors
multilatincluding
eralsecurity
in relations
arrangements.
Sharpdeterioration
between
anyof
thesethreepowerswouldlikelyaffect
theothertwobilateral
relationships
andcouldcreatea crisisofconfidence
inregional
Effective
mansecurity.
ofthethree
ontheother
agement
relationships,
thatmost
hand,shouldensure
threats
to regional
stability
canbe contained.
This"management"
problem
willbe exacerbated
bythefactthatmanyofthemajorsourcesofinstability
involveoneormoreofthethree
thepossibility
powers,
including
ofconflict
in theTaiwanStrait,
Korea,theSpratlys,
andtheDiaoyu/Senkaku
Islands.
Thecritical
roleoftheUnitedStatesanditssecurity
withJarelationship
pan in Sino-Japanese
relations
thecontinuing
underscores
of
importance
American
regionalleadership
and a forward
military
presenceto Japan,
Chinaandother
EastAsianstates.A majorchallenge
fortheU.S. leadership
willbe toassuageBeijing'sconcern
thatWashington
andTokyoarecollaboratingto retard
theemergence
of a powerful
Chinawhilesimultaneously
strengthening
theU.S.-Japan
allianceandreassuring
JapanabouttheU.S.
long-term
commitment
toitssecurity.
IftheU.S. is successful
inthiseffort,
theChinesecouldconclude
thattheallianceandAmerican
military
presence
inthewestern
Pacificnotonlycontinue
tocontribute
toregional
stability
and
thebuildup
restrain
ofJapanese
military
powerbutalso serveChina'sinterestsbyreassuring
Asia-Pacific
statesthatarenervous
aboutrisingChinese
power.In addition,
regional
statescouldbecomemoreconfident
thatWashwillremain
ington
committed
toa leadership
roleintheregion
andcaneffectively
managethehighly
complex,
multifaceted
andpotentially
destabilizing
tiesamongJapan,
ChinaandtheUnitedStates.If theU.S. fails-through
ineptleadership
or declining
commitment
underisolationist
pressures-the
stability
andprosperity
oftheAsia-Pacific
region
couldbeplacedinjeopardy
at thedawnofthenextmillennium.
This content downloaded from 200.9.3.65 on Tue, 12 Aug 2014 19:53:52 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions