Organizational Structure, Authority and Protest:
The Case of Union Organizing in the United States, 1990-2001
Andrew W. Martin, Ohio State University
Robert Michels'famous "iron law of oligarchy" has come under criticism
from scholars that question assumptions regarding the concentration
of power within social movement organizations (SMOs). Despite such
concerns, Michels' broader interests in organizational structure and
power continue to be relevant for analyzing the goals and strategies
of SMOs. The recent revitalization of the American labor movement
presents a unique opportunity to explore these topics within the
context of union organizing efforts. Findings based on the organizing
activities of 70 local unions measured from 1990-2001 indicate that the
distribution of authority has clear effects on the allocation of resources
for organizing, the type of repertoire selected to recruit new members,
and, to a lesser extent, the outcome of the organizing drive. Although
the analysis provides insight into unions today, the conceptualization of
authority and outcomes explored have wider implications for research
on formal organizations.
What accounts for the significant variation in the goals and strategies of social
movement actors? For nearly 100 years the basic principle of Michels' "iron
law of oligarchy," (Michels [1915] 1959) that social movement organizations
(SMOs) tend to become increasingly conservative as power is monopolized by
small leadership cadre, was largely taken for granted by critics of formal SMOs,
particularly labor unions (Lipset, Trow and Coleman 1956; Piven and Cloward
1977). Recent studies, however, have begun to cast doubts on many of the iron
law's central tenants (Ganz 2000; Voss and Sherman 2000). In an alternative first
proposed by ZaId and Ash (1966), scholars have argued that an organization's
future potential for oligarchy is driven by important events in its life cycle.
Stepan-Norris and Zeitlin (2003:56) claim, "...oligarchy in organized labor is no
more imminent than democracy... both are the product of determinant, though
contingent, political struggles among rival workers' factions and parties..."
The complex picture of organizations that has emerged from this empirical
research calls into question the claim that formalized SMOs are necessarily
moribund actors that eschew contentious behavior in favor of stability. Yet this
does not distract from the continued relevance of Michels' broader interest
in organizational structure and power in democratic organizations. Indeed,
The author would like to thank John McCarthy, Glen Firebaugh, Roger Finke, Frank
Baumgartner, Fam Faxton, Mayer Zald and two anonymous reviewers for their helpful
comments. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 2005 American Sociological
Association annual meeting in Fhiladelphia, FA. This research was supported in part
by NSF Doctoral Dissertation Support Grant #SES-0221279. Direct correspondence to
Andrew Martin, 300 Bricker Hall, 190 N. Oval Mall, Ohio State University, Columbus,
OH 43210. F-mail: [email protected].
® The University of North Carolina Press
SocialForces. Volume 85. Number 3. March 2007
1414 • SocialForces Volume85,Number3 • March2007
these topics figure prominently in recent critiques of the iron law of oligarchy.
For example, Stepan-Norris and Zeitlin (2003) argue that it was Communists'
occupation of key positions within CIO unions that increased the voice of the
rank-and-file, while Voss and Sherman (2000) point to the influence of national
unions in revitalizing the organizing agendas of local affiliates. Thus, in spite of
the specific limitations of the iron law, how authority is distributed within SMOs
remains important for examining not only internal dynamics but their shifting
goals and strategies as well.
The recent revitalization of the American labor movement (Clawson 2003;
Fantasia and Voss 2004; Lopez 2004), once considered the embodiment of
oligarchic inertia, is a particularly salient case to analyze organizational structure
and goal attainment. Beginning in the 1990s a growing number of militant unions
such as the Service Employees International Union and the Hotel Employees and
Restaurant Employees International Union (which has recently merged with the
Union of Needletrades, Industrial and Textile Employees to form UNITE-HERE)
began mobilizing thousands of low-wage, often immigrant, service workers
by allocating considerable resources to new forms of organizing based upon
aggressive tactics like street theater and civil disobedience. Although these efforts
have been endorsed by many, including AFL-CIO president John Sweeney, the
departure of the "Change to Win" faction of unions.over perceived shortcomings
in the AFL-CIO's organizing strategy indicates that not all unions are willing to
take the risks necessary to reverse the 50 years of membership decline.
Organizational Structure and Authority
In his analysis of the German Social Democratic Party, Michels asserted that
formalization inevitably leads to the concentration of power by a small leadership
cadre, often at the expense of the organization as a whole. Despite shortcomings
of the iron law, he was one of the first scholars to recognize that organizational
structure has enormous consequences for the functioning of SMOs. Weber's
(1946) broader analysis of bureaucracy details how the rationalization of authority
defines the agency of individuals by the position they occupy in the organizational
hierarchy. Since Weber, scholars have successfully linked the distribution of
authority within organizations to a range of important behaviors (Etzioni 1959;
Lieberson and O'Connor 1972; Meyer 1975).^ The bureaucratization of the social
movement sector has been of interest to many (McCarthy and Zald 1977), yet
beyond Michel's intellectual heirs, there has been surprisingly little effort to
assess the implications of this transformation on the goals, strategies, and
successes of SMOs (see Everett 1992; Gamson 1975; Staggenborg 1988).
Because the broader objective of the current research is to develop a framework
for analyzing authority in SMOs and beyond, the discussion of power in labor
unions is framed in terms of general organizational processes. Building upon
recent critiques of the iron law, I make no assumptions about the tendency of
authority to become concentrated in SMOs, or its effect (conservative or radical)
on organizational behavior. Any discernable patterns that emerge from the
empirical analysis will be considered in the results section. Following Gouldner
(1954), however, it is important to recognize that power is unequally distributed
Organizational Structure, Authority and Protest
within formal organizations, and that there is rarely consensus among members
regarding its goals. Although Gouldner examined worker-management relations
embedded in a for-profit firm, most SMOs are marked by internal conflict as well
(Staggenborg 1988).
Elected Administrative Officials
Perhaps no set of positions has greater authority in democratic organizations
than those held by elected officials. This is particularly true for labor unions,
which, since the passage of the Landrum-Griffin Act in 1959, are required by law
to hold regular elections to select political officers. As a result, previous research
on authority and oligarchy within these organizations has focused on individuals
like the union's president. Although SMOs in other fields do not face similar legal
restrictions, it is reasonable to assume that many have elected offices given a
widespread democratic ethos and dependence on constituents for resources
(McCarthy and Zald 1977).
Professional Staff
While political officers are often perceived as the most influential set of actors
in most voluntary associations, the professional staff that support the technical
functioning of bureaucracies have been able to exert considerable influence in
SMOs, including labor unions (Clark 1992; McCarthy and Zald 1973; Staggenborg
1988). Two of the most thorough accounts of the power wielded by these actors.
Binder's (2002) analysis of challenges to U.S. education curricula and Lipset's
(1968) research on the socialist government of Saskatchewan, detail the ability
of staff to suppress the agenda of political elites when the two clash over
organizational goals. Indicators of staff authority are expected to be particularly
significant in the current research given their growing role in the organizing
activities of local unions (Voss and Sherman 2000).
Parent Organizations
In the United States, virtually all labor organizations have adopted a federated
structure that includes both a parent body and a set of local unions. One
strategy used by national unions to exert control over local affiliates is the
trusteeship, which allows the parent union to remove local officials and install
its own representative, a "trustee," as interim head. Historically a mechanism to
replace leaders suspected of corruption, today a number of progressive unions
such as the SEIU have employed this tactic to take over locals unwilling or
unable to meet specific organizing goals (Voss and Sherman 2000). In addition
to the trusteeship, many national unions disburse financial assets to local
unions, another possible source of leverage. Although little attention has been
paid to the importance of federated structures in SMO populations (though see
Oliver and Furman 1989), it is broadly relevant given McCarthy's (2005) estimate
that about 25 percent of all local social movement groups are affiliated with a
national or regional organization.
1416 • SocialForces Volume85,Numher3 • March2007
Rank and File
In any democratic organization, the authority of constituents cannot be overlooked,
particularly labor unions, where members are often seen as a counterweight to
the oligarchic tendencies of elected officials and staff (Cornfield 1989; Early 1998;
Stepan-Norris and Zeitlin 2003). Yet despite this romantic image of rank-andfile militancy, recent studies have found that these actors often resist activities
like organizing when it draws resources and staff away from services provided
to existing members (Fletcher and Hurd 1998; Voss and Sherman 2000).^ The
current research addresses this apparent contradiction by assessing the role of
rank and file authority in union organizing today.
The Influence of Authority on SMO Dynamics
To examine how the framework of authority described above explains SMO
behaviors, I select three related union organizing activities that have clear parallels
across most social movements. These include the allocation of resources for
organizing, the types of repertoires used to recruit new members, and the ability
of the SMO to achieve its goals. In addition to their broad relevance, the highly
quantifiable nature of these measures represents a shift away from the rather
poorly specified indicators of movement "militancy" that have often plagued
previous research within the iron law tradition.
The resource mobilization perspective, which examines how SMOs secure
widely held resources to support social change efforts (McCarthy and Zald
1977), has been useful for analyzing movement behaviors across diverse social
settings (Cress and Snow 1996; Khawaja 1994). Yet despite these contributions,
Edwards and McCarthy (2003:116) note, "...the simple availability of resources
is not sufficient: coordination and strategic effort is typically required in order to
convert available pools of individually held resources into collective resources
in order that they can help enable collective action." In other words, it is not
the mobilization of resources that makes social change possible but their
disbursement ^or contentious activity. Of course, as recent efforts to categorize
resources have made clear (Cress and Snow 1996; Edwards and McCarthy
2003; McCarthy and Zald 2003), resources come in various forms. Two of the
most important for union organizing (Bronfenbrenner 1997; Jarley and Maranto
1990; Voos 1982) and social movements generally (Oliver and Marwell 1992) are
financial assets and human labor. Because most unions have a limited resource
base, the organization's authority structure should be related to both the amount
and type of resources allocated for organizing.
An SMO's ability to reach its goals depends not only upon the commitment
of resources, but also the use of tactics that increase the likelihood of success
(McAdam 1983). Here repertoire choice, the second outcome of interest, refers
to the selection of a specific repertoire by an SMO from the entire population
that is available. Although innovations in social movement strategies have broad
historical consequences (Tilly 1995), little research exists on how SMOs choose
among various repertoires to advance their goals. Organizing today represents
a unique opportunity to examine this outcome as unions currently have two
Organizational Structure, Authority and Protest • 1417
alternative strategies to select from: the National Labor Relations Board election
and recent efforts that explicitly avoid this government-sanctioned method.^
Despite the lack of systematic research comparing these two forms of
organizing, they clearly represent fundamentally distinct approaches to membership
recruitment. The NLRB certification election was created under the National Labor
Relations Act of 1934, which established a series of predefined tasks that unions
are required to complete during the course of an organizing drive. The union
initiates an election by collecting authorization cards from employees that indicate
support for unionization. After the union secures cards from at least 35 percent of
employees (typically a union will attempt to have a majority sign), they are filed with
the National Labor Relations Board, which oversees a secret ballot election where
all employees are allowed to vote for or against unionization. A simple yes majority
requires the firm and union "bargain in good faith."
Recognizing that firms have exploited the NLRB process to resist unionization
(Dickens 1983; Freeman and Kleiner 1990), a growing number of militant
unions have begun to experiment with an alternative repertoire, often referred
to as the corporate or pressure campaign (Crump 1991; Manheim 2001), to
avoid the NLRB. Although the specific approach varies depending upon the
targeted firm, unions employ a variety of coordinated tactics, including legal
maneuverings, the mobilization of external actors such as religious groups, and
civil disobedience, to force the firm to recognize the union without an election.
Waldinger et al.'s (1998) account of the Justice for Janitor's campaign in Los
Angeles provides a rich description of this repertoire's multi-prong approach.
On its surface, the SEIU's effort to organize office building cleaners appeared to
rest on traditional social movement tactics; workers engaged in protest on and
near their workplace and targeted businesses including restaurants frequented
by owners of cleaning companies. While these actions increased rank-andfile participation, the union also mobilized external support from community
groups, researched the targeted firms to identify specific weaknesses, and
employed legal pressures. Ultimately it was this combination of insider and
outsider tactics that brought contractors to the bargaining table.
In addition to the Justice for Janitors campaigns around the country, other
notable non-NLRB organizing drives include the United Food and Commercial
Workers' unionization of grocery chains (DiLorenzo 1996) and the recent success
of the hotel workers union in Las Vegas (Fantasia and Voss 2004). Despite
the diversity of tactics unions draw upon during the course of the organizing
drive, the underlying objective is the creation of what Lerner (1991) refers to as
a "mini-movement" that uses various sources of leverage, such as threats of
economic sanctions and coalitions with non-labor allies, to confront corporate
power. Because of the scope of conflict is expanded beyond existing firm/union
relations, this repertoire is similar to other forms of protest intended to disrupt
the normal routines of the target (McAdam 1983).
As employed by social movement scholars the concept institutionalization
is useful for drawing a theoretical distinction between the two organizing
strategies. To the extent that institutionalization is systematically employed
to analyze movement repertoires, routinization is the key dimension, where
1418 • SocialForces Volume85,Number3 • March2007
movement activity can be captured on a continuum of highly routinized to
routinization avoidance. Although unions have engaged in certain tactics that
increase the likelihood of a successful NLRB election (see Bronfenbrenner
1997; Bronfenbrenner and Hickey 2004), these actions take place within an
organizing framework created by the state, not the union. The result is a highly
standardized procedure where the union's primary task is always the same: win
a secret ballot election. By avoiding these restrictions, the non-NLRB method
"lacks well-defined rules and requirements" (Perry 1987, R 16) that grant unions
the freedom to construct an organizing drive that is best suited to exploit the
particular vulnerabilities of the targeted firm (Manheim 2001). Schwartz (1976,
pp. 130) identifies a second dimension of institutionalization, "we can distinguish
between [institutional] power that depends on the state and [noninstitutional]
power that rests on sources outside the state." As Piven and Cloward (1977,
pp.147) note, "with the [creation of the NLRB], it was government as much as
the unions that organized workers." In contrast to the NLRB election, which
depends entirely on state authority for legitimacy, organizing outside the NLRB
is not sanctioned as an approved means of organizing. Given these differences,
repertoire selection is now an important dimension of membership recruitment
efforts, creating new opportunities for actors within the union to advance their
particular organizing agenda.
Thus far, the two outcomes discussed, resource disbursements and repertoire
selection, are ultimately a means to achieve a particular goal, in this case
recruiting new members. Despite the growing interest in movement outcomes
(Andrews 2001; McCammon et, al 2001), Giugni (1998) notes that success is
often difficult to quantify, particularly for movements with broad agendas. Even
clear goals, such as a change in state policy, often cannot be attributed solely or
even partially to specific movement actors. An organizing victory, in contrast, is
both a quantifiable outcome and one that does not occur without effort by the
union, as it is unlikely that a rational firm would voluntarily engage in collective
bargaining with its employees (though see Swenson 2002). It is important to
recognize, however, that because success is largely determined by an external
struggle between union and firm, unlike the internal decisions regarding resource
allocation and repertoire selection, the authority structure of unions described
above may have little effect on this outcome. Nevertheless, analyzing organizing
outcomes presents a unique opportunity to determine if an SMO's authority
structure has any relationship to success.
Data and Analysis
Detailed characteristics of labor unions are available from the Office of Labor and
Management Standards, a subagency of the Department of Labor that requires all
unions to file annual disclosure reports. These forms include unique information
on the union's authority structure and resources allocated for organizing.
Although the OLMS provides a sampling frame of every local labor union in
existence today, because organizing, particularly non-NLRB efforts, may occur
relatively infrequently, a large sample would be required to ensure enough events
Organizational Structure, Authority and Protest • 1419
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Important Union Characteristics
Variables
Organizing Resource Allocation
Total Organizing Disbursements (in thousands)'
Size of Organizing Staff
Organizing Outcomes
Annual Rate of Organizing
NLRB Elections
Non-NLRB Organizing
Annuai Victories'
NLRB Elections
Non-NLRB Organizing
Political Administration Authority
Administrative Officer Size'
Administrative Officer Budget (in)'
Proportion of Union Resources Controlled ( > .25)°
Staff Authority
Staff Size'
Staff Budget (in)'
Proportion of Union Resources Controiled ( > .10)'
National Union Authority
Percentage of Operating Budget from National Union'
Union Currently in Trusteeship'
Membership Authority
Percentage of Operating Budget from Membership'
Executive Committee"
Controls
Membership Size'
Age (in 1990)"
Total Disbursements (In)'
Industr/
Manufacturing
Service
State Unionization Rate (in 1995)"
Mean
Standard Deviation
43.276
.928
107.735
2.389
.710
.100
1.574
.984
.390
.080
1.077
.757
7.74
11.04
.19
4.0
2.47
-
3.03
8.98
.22
3.63
4.50
-
3.381
.10
7.708
.30
87.761
.67
29.263
-
3831.130
16.530
1349.360
4628.042
6.990
1611.011
.49
.67
15.14%
5.030
Notes: "Observed annually for each union (N = 812)
''Observed once per union (N = 70)
for Standard data analysis techniques, instead, i follow the logic of analyzing rare
events by limiting the population of unions to those most "at-risk" of organizing"
while simultaneously seeking to ensure a (reasonably) representative sampie of
the iabor movement as a whole.
To achieve both goals, a two-stage strategy was employed to select a sample
of unions. In the first stage, seven national unions that represent a wide range of
industries and had previously been noted for an aggressive organizing agenda
were selected. These unions inciuded; the Communication Workers of America,
the Service Employees internationai, the Hotel and Restaurant Employees, the
United Food and Commercial Workers, the United Auto Workers, the international
1420 • SocialForces Volume85,Number 3 • March2007
Brotherhood of Teamsters and the United Steelworkers of America. Next a random
sample of 10 local unions was drawn from each national union, for a total of 70
organizations. To limit the sample to unions with a high risk of organizing, only
those locals that filed an Li\/l-2 report with the OLMS were selected. This report
is filed by large and relatively resource-rich unions, those with annuai receipts
over $200,000, while unions with fewer receipts file the LM-3 or 4.^ Filing status
is strongly linked to organizing: only about 18 percent of ali unions file the LM-2,
yet I estimate that they conduct approximately 70 percent of ail NLRB elections.^
In addition, only the LM-2 provides detailed information on the organizational
structure of iabor unions. This sampling strategy, although somewhat skewed
towards large, militant unions, does include significant diversity with respect to
age, size and location.
Data on NLRB organizing for each union are available directly from the National
Labor Relations Board. Following the example of prior research on protest
activity (Soule 1997), newspapers from two electronic archives, LEXIS-NEXIS
and NEWSLIBRARY, were searched for traces of organizing by each union that
explicitly sought to avoid the NLRB process. The prominent role of the media in
these organizing efforts (Manheim 2001) reduces the possibility of omissions
often found in media coverage of protest (McCarthy, McPhail and Smith 1996;
Oliver and Maney 2000). In addition, media attention of each campaign began
before an outcome could reasonably be predicted, indicating that success was
not a criterion for coverage.
Outcomes
The three major dependent variables of interest are the amount and type of
resources the union allocates to organizing, the specific organizing repertoire
selected to recruit new members, and the outcome of the organizing drive.
Organizing Resource Allocation includes both financial resources that are
disbursed for organizing and the number of union officers and employees that
have the title of organizer. Repertoire selection is measured by the Annual Rate
of Organizing, the number of new organizing efforts each year by the union.
NLRB elections begin when a union files a petition with the NLRB. Non-NLRB
efforts are initiated when the union first takes any action to organize the workers
of a particular firm outside the NLRB election process. FmaWy, Annual Organizing
Victories are the number of organizing drives underway that were successfully
completed in a particular year. Table 2, which includes the rate and success
of organizing, reveals that although the certification election continues to be
Table 2: Rate and Success of Organizing Among Sample of 70 Unions, 1990-2001
NLRB Election
Non-NLRB Organizing
Total Organizing
Frequency
618
86
Proportion of all
Organizing
.87
.13
704
1.00
Victory
Rate 0/.
55
83
58
Organizational Structure, Authority and Protest • 1421
the preferred method of membership recruitment, non-NLRB organizing has a
substantially higher success rate, a finding that supports those who claim the
NLRB election is a fundamentally flawed model of organizing.
The next set of variables measure the distribution of authority within local
unions. Unless 1 have indicators of the actual behavior of these actors, like the
trusteeship, two variables are employed: 1.) the number of individuals that occupy
a particular position, which signals its importance in the organization, and 2.) the
amount of financial resources that are controlled by the position.
Political Authority
The authority of elected administrative officers^ is captured by three measures: 1.)
Administrative Officer Size, the total number of officers, 2.) Administrative
Officer
Budget, all financial resources (salaries, allowances, disbursements for official
business) of the administrative officers, transformed to a natural log to correct
for skew, and 3.) Proportion of Union Resources Controlled by the Administrative
Officers, the portion of the union's budget directly controlled by these actors. To
identify those locals in which administrative officers manage a significant portion
of the organization's resources, it is recoded as a threshold variable, coded " 1 " if
the administrative officers control more then .25 of the union's budget.
StaffAuthority
Three variables are included for staff authority;^ 1.) Staff Size, 2.) Staff Budget,
which includes all disbursements and salaries to the staff (again, the natural
log is used), and 3.) Proportion of Union Resources Controlled by Staff, the total
proportion of the union's budget controlled by the staff. This threshold variable is
coded " 1 " if the staff control is more than .10 of the union's total budget, which is
lower than the administrative officer threshold because staff typically has access
to fewer resources.
National Union Authority
Two indicators are included to measure the influence of the national union in the
local's affairs. The first. Percentage of Operating Budget from the National Union,
captures how financially dependent the local is on the parent organization. The
second. Trusteeship, is coded " 1 " the year that the local union's leaders were
replaced by a representative of the national union.
Membership Authority
The union's dependence on membership dues for financial resources (Masters
1997) provides one avenue of influence for the rank and file and is measured
here by Percentage of Operating Budget from Membership. Another indicator of
membership authority is the distance between members and elected officials.
Many labor unions have an executive committee that serves as an extra layer
of administration. The dummy variable Executive Committee is coded " 1 " for
unions that have such a structure and is expected to be negatively related to
membership authority.^
1422 • Social Forces Volume 85, Number 3 • March 2007
Control Variables
Two sets of control variables are included. The first measures characteristics of
the union: Membership Size, Age,''° Total Disbursements and Affiiiation, coded
" 1 " if the union is affiliated with a particular national body, "0" if not. Another
set of control variables measures the context within which the union operates,
including Industry, whether the union represented workers in the Manufacturing
or Service sector and State Unionization Rate.
Analytical Strategy
The culmination of this data collection project yields a typical nested data
structure with annual observations of unions nested within the union structure.
A particular challenge when employing conventional Multivariate Repeated
Measures models is the likelihood that individual observations for the same unit
of analysis are highly correlated with one another (Allison 1984). To address this
issue, which can result in serially autocorrelated error structures that produce
misestimated standard errors. Hierarchical Linear Modeling, a generalization of
multiple regression for nested or repeated-measures data (Bryk and Raudenbush
1992) is employed. HLM, which is commonly used to examine individuals nested
in larger contexts (schools, communities), is also well-suited for examining
multiple observations for each unit of analysis (see Bryk and Raudenbush (1987)
for a methodological discussion and Homey, Osgood and Marshall (1995) for a
practical application of this approach). HLM addresses the problem of correlation
among nested observations by partitioning variance into different levels: here
time (Level 1) and local union (Level 2).
This advantage of HLM is that it allows exploration of variation in the dependent
variables both over time and across individual unions. The null models for the
three outcomes indicate that for both resource allocation and repertoire selection
much of the variation (between 60-90 percent) is across unions. Most variation
in success is over time - probably due to the fact that the number of unions
that actually engage in organizing is small, reducing the possibility of significant
across-union variation.
Because both the underlying rate of organizing for both repertoires and the size
of the union's organizing staff are highly skewed, negative binomial regression
is employed to model these outcomes. Organizing budget, although skewed as
well, does not include many zero counts. Instead, this variable is transformed to
a natural log and analyzed with Ordinary Least Squares regression. The indicator
of success, annual victory rate, is also a nonlinear outcome. Binomial regression
is useful for predicting the probability of a successful event, given a specified
number of trials. The basic Binomial sampling model is as follows:
where Y.,, which has a binomial distribution, represents the number of successes
in m.^ trials and the probability of success per trial is 9.,. I am able predict the
probability of a successful outcome, given that the union is currently engaged in
m.^ organizing efforts.
Organizational Structure, Authority and Protest • 1423
Table 3: Union Authority Structure Effects on Annual Disbursements for Organizing, 1990-2001
Variables
Political Authority
Administrative Officer Size
Administrative Officer Budget (In)
Proportion of Union Resources Controlled by Officers ( > .25)
Staff Authority
Staff Size
Staff Budget (In)
Proportion of Union Resources Controlled by Staff ( > .10)
Financial Human (Negative
(In) (OLS)
Binomial)
-.019
(.152)
-.360*
(.205)
-.939
(.927)
-.443**
(.129)
-.476**
(.150)
1.607
(1.052)
.128
(.213)
.115
(.117)
-.325
(.8426)
.514**
(.183)
.065
(.116)
-.218
(.675)
National Union Authority
Percentage of Operating Budget from National Union
Trusteeship"
.018
(.081)
-1.035
(.869)
.130*
(.069)
.977**
(.201)
Membership Authority
Percentage of Operating Budget from Membership
Executive Committee
.079**
.026
(.039)
(.032)
-2.707*
-.067
(1.70)
(1.24)
Notes: *p < .1 **p < .05 ***p < .001 (two-tailed test of significance)'
Numbers in parentheses are standard errors
"Level 1 coefficient-one year lag
Controls include one-year dependent variable lag, number of organizing drives initiated by the
union, membership size (ln), total budget (ln), age, national affiliation, industry, state unionization rate and time. In addition, in Model 2 total staff size is controlled.
Results
The empirical analysis models the effects of the union's authority structure across
a range of union organizing behaviors, from the allocation of resources and the
type of repertoire selected to. the outcome of the organizing drive.
Disbursement of Organizing Resources
Table 3 includes the relationship between authority measures and the amount/
type of resources disbursed for organizing. Beginning first with the union's
political elite, the authority of elected officials has a consistently negative effect
on this outcome. Specifically, an increase in the administrative officers' budget
decreases both types of resources available for organizing, while the number
of elected officers is negatively related to the size of the organizing staff. It is
1424 • Social Forces Volume 85, Number 3 • March 2007
not surprising that elite control over scarce resources reduces the availability of
resources for other activities like organizing, which may limit the union's ability to
successfully recruit new members.
The results also suggest that elected officials, who figure prominently in
most analyses of unions, are not the only actors that determine the amount and
type of resources the union devotes to organizing. The influence of professional
staff is also important, although in the opposite direction of political officers.
Specifically, staff size is positively related to the number of organizers employed
by the union. While it is reasonable to assume that large unions would have both
a large professional and organizing staff, when controlling for the total budget of
the union, which is included in the model, the correlation between staff size and
number of organizers is .14 (not significant). An alternative explanation, based
upon the logic of authority in formal organizations, is that any increase in the
union's organizing staff is risky given the amount of resources they consume.
Professional staff, unlike elected officials who depend upon the rank and file for
support, occupy a more insular position within the organization and therefore
may have greater freedom to add organizers.
In contrast to elected officials and professional staff, the national union is
an external actor, yet it too has an important role in the decisions made by
local unions. The trustee coefficient, lagged one year, indicates that in the year
immediately following such an event, the size of the organizing staff nearly
tripled. Along with the positive financial disbursements coefficient in the same
model, this is powerful evidence that parent unions are actively pressuring
affiliates to increase resources for organizing. While past research has examined
the influence of this actor on the local's organizing budget (Voss and Sherman
2000), these models point to the possibility that organizing staff may be the
primary concern of many national unions.
Finally, the rank and file, more than any other actor in the labor movement, has
been considered central to working class struggles (Bronfenbrenner 1997; Fine
1998). Although the data do not include actual membership participation, in the
financial disbursements model both coefficients are in the predicted direction.
The lack of effect on organizing staff size is consistent with recent evidence that
the rank-and-file, while generally supportive of organizing, are less enthusiastic
when this activity is perceived to reduce staffing levels for services provided to
existing members (Voss and Sherman 2000).
Rate of Organizing
The institutional divergence in organizing strategies provides a unique opportunity to
examine the link between the authority structure of SMOs and repertoire selection.
Table 4 compares the effects of authority on the union's rate of NLRB elections and
non-NLRB organizing. First, measures of administrative officer authority are not
related to NLRB organizing, but significantly reduce organizing activity outside the
NLRB. The threshold dummy is very large because, of the 13 unions that fell above
the threshold, only one engaged in a non-NLRB organizing drive.
This negative relationship may be due at least partially to the resources required
by this new repertoire (Jarley and Maranto 1990). Above it was evident that the
Organizational Structure, Authority and Protest • 1425
Table 4: Union Authority Structure Effects on Annual Rate of Organizing, 1990-2001
Variables
Political Authority
Administrative Officer Size
Administrative Officer Budget (In)
Proportion of Union Resources
Controlled by Officers ( > .25)
StaffAuthority
Staff Size
Staff Budget (In)
Proportion of Union Resources
Controlled by Staff (>.10)
National Union Authority
Percentage of Operating Budget
from National Union
Trusteeship'
NLRB Election Rate
Non-NLRB Rate
.058
(.054)
-.129
(.125)
-.335
(.386)
.249
(.312)
-3.462**
(.973)
-10.382**
(2.810)
-.166**
(.068)
-.044
(061)
-.313
(.276)
.276
(.579)
2.027**
(.710)
3.995**
(1.886)
.040
(.029)
.746*
(.393)
1.718**
(.504)
2.274**
(.851)
Membership Authority
Percentage of Operating Budget
from Membership
Executive Committee
1.209***
.029
(.020)
(.309)
2.437
-1.496**
(1.572)
(.613)
* p < . l **p<.05 ***p < .001 (two-tailed test of significance)
Numbers in parentheses are standard errors
"Level 1 coefficient-one year lag
Controls include lagged rate of organizing (repertoire specific), current number of
alternative organizing drives underway, resources (human and financial) allocated to
organizing, membership size (ln), total budget (ln), age, national affiliation, industry,
state unionization rate and time.
authority of political elites reduced the availability of resources for organizing,
which naturally constrains the union's capacity to engage in more costly forms of
membership recruitment. In addition, financial outlays for organizing can be risky
for locals with limited resources. Recognizing that a failed corporate campaign
could result in a political crisis, as in the case of the famous Hormel strike in the
1980s (Rachleff 1992), elected officials may be cautious about any activity that
could destabilize their position within the organization. Although I am unable to
measure the motivation of political elites, this assertion is consistent with how
authority is structured in SMOs. Taken in conjunction with the results from Table 3,
these findings support those who claim that the power of elected officers tends to
reduce the organization's willingness to engage in more contentious behaviors.
In contrast to political administrators, the union's staff appears to have a
mixed effect on overall organizing activity. Measures of staff authority reduce
1426 • SocialForces Volume85,Number3 • March2007
the frequency of NLRB elections but increase the use of non-NLRB organizing.
This raises the possibility that union staff prefer a less institutionalized approach
to membership recruitment. The insular nature of these actors described above
is one reason why they are able to advocate a relatively costly and possibly
risky form of organizing. In addition, the positive effect of both indicators of
staff budget on non-NLRB organizing may also reflect the fact that this new
repertoire requires considerable coordination on the part of the union. Major
tasks include forming coalitions with other groups, conducting research to
identify vulnerabilities of the targeted firm, and employing traditional protest
tactics (Manheim 2001). A large, well-financed staff facilitates such activities,
thereby increasing the attractiveness of this repertoire. Finally, as evident in
the previous models, professional staff authority is positively related to the
allocation of human resources for organizing, which is particularly important in
non-NLRB campaigns. From both tables 3 and 4, it is clear that staff members
are able to shape organizational behaviors independently of, and indeed in
opposition to, political elites, which is consistent with previous research on the
conflict between political and technical forms of authority.
Turning to the national union, the ability of this actor to dictate the organizing
agenda of its local affiliates appears to include both resource considerations and
actual organizing behaviors. Its positive effect on non-NLRB organizing may be
due in part to the fact that those parent unions most active at the local level, such
as the SEIU, are also the strongest advocates of this new repertoire (Waldinger
et al. 1999). The financial disbursements coefficient, which is significant only
in the non-NLRB model, suggests that monetary assets provided by the parent
organization allow the local to engage in organizing that would otherwise be
too costly. If the non-NLRB repertoire represents a new, more effective model
of organizing, national unions appear to be critical in ensuring that it is widely
adopted at the local level.
Finally, membership authority has a positive effect on the union's organizing
activity, regardless of the repertoire in question. The presence of an executive
committee is negatively related to NLRB elections, while a union's dependence
on membership dues increases the rate of non-NLRB organizing. Although
these measures are rather crude indicators of membership influence, taken in
conjunction with Table 3 it appears that the rank and file continues to play a
generally postive role in the labor movement today.
Organizing Outcomes
Unlike the two previous organizing behaviors, which are largely internal decisions,
the outcome of an organizing drive is the result of a contest between the union
and targeted firm. Organizing success is modeled in Table 5, however, because
it presents a unique opportunity to examine the ability of unions to recruit new
members and is a quantifiable indicator of movement success. As expected,
with a few minor exceptions none of the authority indicators for staff, national
union, and membership were significant in either model. This is not to say,
however, that these actors cannot increase the likelihood of a union victory. The
Organizational Structure, Authority and Protest • 1427
Table 5: Union Authority Structure Effects on Annual Organizing Victory Rate,
1990-2001
Variables
Political Authority
Administrative Officer Size°
Administrative Officer Budget (In)'
Proportion of Union Resources
Controlled by Officers ( > .25)"
Staff Authority
Staff Size'
Staff Budget (In)'
Proportion of Union Resources
Controlled by Staff ( > . 10)°
National Union Authority
Percentage of Operating Budget
from National Union'
Trusteeship"
Membership Authority
Percentage of Operating Budget
from Membership'
Executive Committee'
NLRB Election
Success
Non-NLRB
Success
.016
(.036)
.040
(.090)
.193
(.456)
.125
(.205)
2.49**
(1.031)
7.773
(10.318)
-.039*
(.021)
.007
(.056)
-.006
(.256)
-.027
(.160)
-.403
(.373)
-.866
(.939)
.015
(.016)
.505
(.870)
-.144
(.134)
30.375
(65.753)
-.001
(.004)
.218
(.728)
-.130*
(.068)
-1.885
(12.054)
Disbursements for Organizing
Organizing Staff Size'
.018
.659*
(.044)
(.405)
Organizing Budget (In)'
.017
.373
(.030)
(.236)
* p < . l **p<.05 ***p<.001 (two-tailed test of significance)
Numbers in parentheses are standard errors
"Two year moving average {\,^f,.,,,,,,)
''One year lag
'Level 2 coefficient
Controls include lagged number of victories (repertoire specific), current number of
alternative organizing drives, membership size (In), total budget (In), age, national
affiliation, industry, state unionization rate, and time.
variation in success across the two organizing strategies in Table 2 demonstrates
that repertoire selection is a critical determinant of membership recruitment. In
addition, organizing staff size, and to a lesser extent financial disbursements,
are positively related to success, at least for non-NLRB organizing." Therefore,
1428 • SocialForces Volume85,Number3 • March2007
through resource allocation and repertoire selection these actors are able to at
least partially shape a union's ability to recruit new members.
In contrast to the limited agency of the staff, national union and members,
there is some evidence that elected officials can directly affect the union's rate of
success. The previous models indicated that the concentration of power among
political elites tended to reduce contentious activity. This, however, does not
appear to be the case when examining actual outcomes; the authority of these
actors increases the probability of a non-NLRB organizing victory. Specifically, the
total union disbursements controlled by the elected officials has a strong positive
effect on organizing success outside the NLRB, and the threshold dummy, while
not significant, is sizable as well. Although only one dimension of political authority,
the resources of elected officials are significant after controlling for all other
possible explanations, including organizing staff size, financial disbursements for
organizing, size of union's budget, age and previous organizing success.
Why these actors have a positive effect on non-NLRB organizing is a question
for future research, but it may be at least partially a function of the unique position
that elected officials occupy within the union. As widely recognized representatives
of the organization, individuals like the union president may possess the
legitimacy to accomplish certain tasks critical to non-NLRB organizing, such as
forming coalitions with other groups (Manheim 2001). This explanation raises an
interesting dilemma for the labor movement: those actors best positioned in the
organization to secure a favorable outcome using innovative organizing tactics
face the political fallout if they fail to deliver membership gains. This may be why
some national unions have placed local affiliates in trusteeship to oust reluctant
officials and replace them with administrators willing to experiment with new
methods of membership recruitment. Additionally, this finding is consistent with
the argumentthat internal decisions, liketheallocation of resources for organizing,
are very different from external outcomes, such as securing recognition from the
targeted firm.
Summary and Conclusions
Through a systematic analysis of union organizing today this article expands upon
Michels' original interest in organizational structure, authority and the behavior of
democratic organizations. The findings have a number of important implications
for research on formalized SMOs. First, how authority is structured in local labor
unions is clearly important for some organizing outcomes, particularly the amount
and type of resources allocated for this task and the specific repertoire selected
by the union to increase its membership base. Yet there are limits to the "reach"
of authority; the power of important actors had little direct effect (positive or
negative) on the actual conclusion of the organizing drive. The fact that resource
disbursements and repertoire selection were related to success does indicate
that internal decisions do have broader consequences for movement outcomes.
Beyond a general analysis of organizational structure and authority, the findings
also speak directly to the continued utility of the iron law of oligarchy. Specifically,
there is little evidence that authority becomes concentrated among one position
or set of actors within the organization. Elected officials, staff, the national union
Organizational Structure, Authority and Protest • 1429
and members all were able to exert at least some influence over the organizing
process. Secondly, power held by actors other than the rank and file does not have
wholly negative consequences for the union. Although the authority of elected
officials reduced the amount of resources available for organizing and the use of
the non-NLRB repertoire, the influence of both the staff and parent union clearly
pushed the local in a more militant direction with respect to organizing.
In addition to Michels' formative research, other classic works have examined
the link between formalization and contentious politics. Piven and Cloward's
(1977) account of "Poor People's Movements" has long been offered as a critique
of the bureaucratization of social movement actors. While this is certainly true of
their analysis of the labor movement in the 1930s, they also recognize that some
organizations, such as the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee of the
Civil Rights movement, served a number of important functions. Consistent with
this claim, the findings presented above indicate that certain authority structures,
those with a strong national union presence, for example, can indeed increase
the likelihood of positive movement outcomes.
Gamson's (1975) seminal The Strategy of Social Protest provided the impetus
for the growing interest in movement success. In his research, he sought to
understand how characteristics of "challenging groups" led to acceptance by
opponents and new advantages for the group's constituents. Using a variety of
indicators of bureaucracy, he found that organizational structure does matter;
formalized groups tended to experience the most success in reaching their
goals. While supporting Gamson's basic conclusions, one key contribution of the
current research is that it specifies the mechanisms that link authority structure
to outcomes. Here the distribution of authority has virtually no direct effect
on success, but does account for the type of repertoire used to organize new
members and the allocation of resources for this activity. Given these findings,
future analysis of authority should focus on those outcomes that are most closely
linked to the internal decision-making structure of the organization.
Beyond an analysis of union organizing, the conceptualization of authority
employed here also has implications for research on formal organizations more
broadly. The spread of the bureaucratic organizational form, while contentious in
social movements (Piven and Cloward 1977), is relatively complete in many other
organizational fields, including for-profit firms, government agencies, educational
institutions, and even religious organizations (Presler 1987). Yet there has been
little effort to systematically consider the implications of this trend. Because the
goals and strategies of virtually all formal organizations are often the subject of
internal debate, how authority is structured should be important for understanding
the behaviors of these actors.
Notes
1. As Leach (2005) notes, power can reside outside the formal structure of
organizations. Therefore, it is not the argument that specific individuals are
unimportant. One need only look at Jimmy Hoffa, arguably the most familiar
union boss in the history of the American labor movement or Martin Luther
King, Jr. as examples of charismatic leadership.
1430 • SocialForces Volume85,Number3 • March2007
2. Although proponents of the iron law claim that the motivations of the elected
officials are based purely on self-interest, these leaders may promote an
organizational agenda broader than the narrow goals of the membership. For
example, in his case study of protestant churches. Wood (1981) finds that
clergy were able to develop a social action agenda despite resistance of the
laity. In the labor movement today elected officials such as John Sweeney
voice their support of a more militant labor movement, including increased
efforts to recruit new members.
3. There are two additional tactics available to unions seeking to increase
membership: 1.) organizing public sector employees (Bronfenbrenner and
Juravich 1995), and 2.) neutrality agreements (Eaton and Kriesky 2001), where
the firm grants the union it has a collective bargaining relationship with the
right to represent employees at new locations if a majority indicate a desire to
be represented by the union. Public sector organizing is not included because
of the lack of systematic data on this tactic, while neutrality agreements are
excluded because they are not new organizing efforts, but rather the result
of an existing union/firm relationship.
4.
It is important to note that the unions were not selected on their actual
organizing efforts, only those characteristics that increased their risk of
organizing. In fact, one in seven unions in the sample did not initiate a single
organizing drive during this period. The strategy of drawing a sample of
observations that are considered most at risk for an event is common in
sociology and is employed by Voss and Sherman (2000) in their analysis of
union revitalization.
5. The criterion for selection, the financial assets of the union, is included in the
models as a control variable, which reduces the potential for selection bias
(Winshipand Mare 1992).
6. Unfortunately, there is no census of non-NLRB organizing, so I cannot make
a similar estimate for this repertoire.
7. These officers include the president or chief executive officer, assistant to
the president, all vice-presidents, secretaries, treasurers and other financial
officers, and, if present, members of the union's executive council. Other
union officials whose titles do not explicitly designate them a part of the
administrative structure (such as agents), are not included. Administrative
officers comprise, on average, about 15 percent of the total number of union
officers.
8. Like political officer indicators these measures are limited to the administrative
staff of the union, such as secretaries and administrative assistants, which,
on average, include more than half of all union employees.
9. Unfortunately, collecting valid measure of rank-and-file participation in local
affairs is extremely difficult, witnessed by the rarity of this research and
the use of the case study (Lipset, Trow and Coleman 1956; Stepan-Norris
Organizational Structure, Authority and Protest •1431
and Zeitlin 1996, 2003). Therefore, my analysis is essentially limited to the
influence of members in these unions, and does not directly measure the
democratic ethos of these organizations.
10. Many of the unions (93 percent) were in existence before 1990, the beginning
of this analysis. Therefore, I lack information on their organizational history,
with the exception of their founding date. This limits my ability to assess
how the union's "life-course" affects its organizing activities in the period
analyzed. The alternative, to sample only those unions formed at or after
1990, raises even greater problems due to the "liability of newness" common
in organizations.
11. A possible reason why organizing staff size increases the victory rate of nonNLRB organizing but not NLRB elections is simply because of the significant
amount of coordination among various groups and the technical requirements
of this repertoire. More staff devoted specifically to this activity would make
these tasks easier, increasing the likelihood of a well-run, and ultimately
successful, campaign.
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