On the Principle of Mercantilism by Adam Smith
(excerpt from The Wealth of Nations)
That wealth consists in money, or in gold and silver, is a popular notion which
naturally arises from the double function of money as the instrument of
commerce, and as the measure of value. In consequence of its being the
instrument of commerce, when we have money we can more readily obtain
whatever else we have occasion for, than by means of any other commodity. The
great affair, we always find, is to get money. When th at is obtained, there is no
difficulty in making any subsequent purchase. In consequence of its being the
measure of value, we estimate that of all other commodities by the quantity of
money which they will exchange for. W e say of a rich man that he is wor th a great
deal, and of a poor man that he is worth very little money. A frugal man, or a man
eager to be rich, is said to love money; and a careless, a generous, or a profuse
man, is said to be indifferent about it. To grow rich is to get money; and wealt h
and money, in short, are, in common language, considered as in every respect
synonymous.
It is not because wealth consists more essentially in money than in goods, that
the merchant finds it generally more easy to buy goods with money, than to buy
money with goods; but because money is the known and established instrument of
commerce, for which every thing is readily given in exchange, but which is not
always with equal readiness to be got in exchange for everything. The greater
part of goods besides are more perishable than money, and he may frequently
sustain a much greater loss by keeping them. W hen his goods are upon hand too,
he is more liable to such demands for money as he may not be able to answer,
than when he has got their price in his coffers. Over and above all this, his profit
arises more directly from selling than from buying. and he is upon all these
accounts generally much more anxious to exchange his goods for money, than his
money for goods. But though a particular merchant, with abundanc e of goods in
his warehouse, may sometimes be ruined by not being able to sell them in time, a
nation or country is not liable to the same accident. The whole capital of a
merchant frequently consists in perishable goods destined for purchasing money.
But it is but a very small part of the annual produce of the land and labour of a
country which can ever be destined for purchasing gold and silver from their
neighbours. The far greater part is circulated and consumed among themselves;
and even of the surplus which is sent abroad, the greater part is generally
destined for the purchase of other foreign goods. Though gold and silver,
therefore, could not be had in exchange for the goods destined to purchase them,
the nation would not be ruined. It might, indeed , suffer some loss and
inconveniency, and be forced upon some of those expedients which are necessary
for supplying the place of money. The annual produce of its land and labour,
however, would be the same, or very nearly the same, as usual, because the
same, or very nearly the same consumable capital would be employed in
maintaining it. And though goods do not always draw money so readily as money
draws goods, in the long-run they draw it more necessarily than even it draws
them. Goods can serve many other purposes besides purchasing money, but
money can serve no other purpose besides purchasing goods. Money, therefore,
necessarily runs after goods, but goods do not always or necessarily run after
money. The man who buys, does not always mean to sell again, but frequently to
use or to consume; whereas he who sells, always means to buy again. The one
may frequently have done the whole, but the other can never have done more
than the one-half of his business. It is not for its own sake that men desire
money, but for the sake of what they can purchase with it.
From Adam Smith, An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the W ealth of
Nations, Edwin Cannan, ed.
Charles de Montesquieu: The Spirit of the Laws 1748, Excerpts
Montesquieu, [Charles de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu
(1689-1755)], was an influential French enlightenment political
thinker. His Spirit of the Laws is his best known work. It is in
this work that he explains his theory of separation of powers
and checks and balances, ideas which powerfully influenced the
American constitution.
In every government there are three sorts of power; the legislative; the
executive, in respect to things dependent on the law of nations; and the
executive, in regard to things that depend on the civil law.
By virtue of the first, the prince or magistrate enacts temporary or perpetual
laws, and amends or abrogates those that have been already enacted. By the
second, he makes peace or war, sends or receives embassies; establishes the
public security, and provides against invasions. By the third, he punishes
criminals, or determines the disputes that arise between individuals. The latter we
shall call the judiciary power, and the other simply the executive power of the
state.
The political liberty of the subject is a tranquility of mind, arising from the
opinion each person has of his safety. In order to have this liberty, it is requisite
the government be so constituted as one man need not be afraid of` another.
When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or in
the same body of magistrates, there can be no liberty; because apprehensions
may anse, lest the same monarch or senate shou ld enact tyrannical laws, to
execute them in a tyrannical manner.
Again, there is no liberty, if the power of judging be not separated from the
legislative and executive powers. W ere it joined with the legislative, the life and
liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control, for the judge would
then be the legislator. W ere it joined to the executive power, the judge might
behave with all the violence of an oppressor.
There would be an end of every thing were the same man, or the same body,
whether of the nobles or of the people to exercise those three powers that of
enacting laws, that of executing the public resolutions, and that of judging the
crimes or differences of individuals.
Most kingdoms in Europe enjoy a moderate government, because the prince, who
is invested with the two first powers, leaves the third to his subjects. In Turkey,
where these three powers are united in the sultan's person the subjects groan
under the weight of a most frightful oppression.
In the republics of Italy, where these three powers are united, there is less liberty
than in our monarchies. Hence their government is obliged to have recourse to as
violent methods for its support, as even that of the Turks witness the state
inquisitors, and the lion's mouth into which every informer may at all hours throw
his written accusations.
What a situation must the poor subject be in, under those republics! The same
body of magistrates are possessed, as executors of the laws, of the whole power
they have given themselves in quality of legislators. They may plunder the state
by their general determinations; and as they have likewise the judiciary power in
their hands, every private citizen may be ruined by their particular decisions.
The whole power is here united in one bo dy; and though there is no external pomp
that indicates a despotic sway, yet the people feel the effects of it every
moment.
Hence it is that many of the princes of Europe, whose aim has been leveled at
arbitrary power, have constantly set out with uniting in their own persons, all the
branches of magistracy, and all the great offices of state.
From Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, translated by Thomas Nugent,
(London: J. Nourse, 1777)
Edited by Jennifer Brainard c. 2000-2003
What is the Enlightenment? (Was ist Äufklarung?)
Immanuel Kant, 1784, Excerpts
Immanuel Kant, 1724-1804, was a German philosopher, and was most well
known for his work in metaphysics. He is responsible for the use of the
word "enlightenment" to describe this age of reason, though the
expression "age of enlightenment" didn't catch on until later. He also
coined the motto of the enlightenment, "sapere aude" dare to think.
Enlightenment is man's release from his self-incurred tutelage. Tutelage is man's
inability to make use of his understanding without direction from another. Selfincurred is this tutelage when its cause lies not in lack of reason but in lack of
resolution and courage to use it without direction from another. Sapere aude!
[Dare to think!] "Have courage to use your own reason!"- that is the motto of
enlightenment. Laziness and cowardice are the reasons why so great a portion of
mankind, after nature has long since discharged them from external direction
(naturaliter maiorennes), nevertheless remains under lifelong tutelage, and why it
is so easy for others to set themselves up as their guardians. It is so easy not to
be of age. If I have a book which understan ds for me, a pastor who has a
conscience for me, a physician who decides my diet, and so forth, I need not
trouble myself. I need not think, if I can only pay - others will easily undertake the
irksome work for me. That the step to competence is held to be very dangerous
by the far greater portion of mankind (and by the entire fair sex) - quite apart
from its being arduous is seen to by those guardians who have so kindly assumed
superintendence over them. After the guardians have first made their domestic
cattle dumb and have made sure that these placid creatures will not dare take a
single step without the harness of the cart to which they are tethered, the
guardians then show them the danger which threatens if they try to go alone.
Actually, however, this danger is not so great, for by falling a few times they
would finally learn to walk alone. But an example of this failure makes them timid
and ordinarily frightens them away from all further trials. For any single individual
to work himself out of the life under tutelage which has become almost his nature
is very difficult. He has come to be fond of his state, and he is for the present
really incapable of making use of his reason, for no one has ever let him try it out.
Statutes and formulas, those mechanical tools of the rational employment or
rather misemployment of his natural gifts, are the fetters of an everlasting
tutelage. W hoever throws them off makes only an uncertain leap over the
narrowest ditch because he is not accustomed to that kind of free motion.
Therefore, there are few who have succeeded by their own exercise of mind both
in freeing themselves from incompetence and in achieving a steady pace. But
that the public should enlighten itself is more possible; indeed, if only freedom is
granted enlightenment is almost sure to follow. For there will always be some
independent thinkers, even among the established guardians of the great masses,
who, after throwing off the yoke of tutelage from their own shoulders, will
disseminate the spirit of the rational appreciation of both their own worth and
every man's vocation for thinking for himself. . . . For this enlightenment,
however, nothing is required but freedom, and indeed the most harmless among
all the things to which this term can properly be applied. It is the freedom to
make public use of one's reason at every point. But I hear on all sides, "Do not
argue!" The Officer says: "Do not argue but drill!" The tax collector: "Do not
argue but pay!" The cleric: "Do not argue but believe!" Only one prince in the
world [Frederick the Great of Prussia] says, "Argue as much as you will, and about
what you will, but obey!" Everywhere there is restriction on freedom. . . . If we
are asked , "Do we now live in an enlightened age?" the answer is, "No ," but we
do live in an age of enlightenment. As things now stand, much is lacking which
prevents men from being, or easily becoming, capable of correctly using their own
reason in religious matters with assurance and free from outside direction. But on
the other hand, we have clear indications that the field has now been opened
wherein men may freely dea1 with these things and that the obstacles to general
enlightenment or the release from self-imposed tutelage are gradually being
reduced. In this respect, this is the age of enlightenment, or the century of
Frederick.
Edited by Jennifer Brainard, c. 2000-2003
Jean-Jacques Rousseau: The Social Contract, 1762, Excerpts
Rousseau, 1712-1778, was a French philosopher and author, who
wrote in the later enlightenment period. He differed from the earlier
enlightenment thinkers in focusing on the passionate side of man's
nature and rejecting the worship of pure reason. Always a misfit, he
saw civilization as corrupting. His views on the nature of man, and
the ideal form of government heavily influenced the French
revolutionaries. With such powerful words as "Man is born free and
everywhere is in chains" he inspired the upheaval of French society.
Of the Social Compact
I suppose men to have reached the point at which the obstacles in the way of
their preservation in the state of nature show their power of resistance to be
greater than the resources at the disposal of each individual for his maintenance
in that state. That primitive condition can then subsist no longer; and the human
race would perish unless it changed its manner of existence.
But, as men cannot engender new forces, but only unite and direct existing ones,
they have no other means of preserving themselves than the formation, by
aggregation, of a sum of forces great enough to overcome the resistance. These
they have to bring into play by means of a single motive power, and cause to act
in concert.
This sum of forces can arise only where several persons come together: but, as
the force and liberty of each man are the chief instruments of his selfpreservation, how can he pledge them without harming his own interests, and
neglecting the care he owes to himself? This difficulty, in its bearing on my
present subject, may be stated in the following terms:
"The problem is to find a form of association which will defend and protect with
the whole common force the person and goods of each associate, and in which
each, while uniting himself with all, may still obey himself alone, and remain as
free as before." This is the fundamental problem of which the Social
Contract provides the solution.
The clauses of this contract are so determined by the nature of the act that the
slightest modification would make them vain and ineffective; so that, although
they have perhaps never been formally set forth, they are everywhere the same
and everywhere tacitly admitted and recognized, until, on the violation of the
social compact, each regains his original rights and resumes his natural liberty,
while losing the conventional liberty in favor of which he renounced it.
These clauses, properly understood, may be reduced to one — the total alienation
of each associate, together with all his rights, to the whole community; for, in the
first place, as each gives himself absolutely, the conditions are the same for all;
and, this being so, no one has any interest in making them burdensome to others.
Moreover, the alienation being without reserve, the union is as perfect as it can
be, and no associate has anything more to demand: for, if the individuals retained
certain rights, as there would be no common superior to decide between them and
the public, each, being on one point his own judge, would ask to be so on all; the
state of nature would thus continue, and the association would necessarily
become inoperative or tyrannical.
Finally, each man, in giving himself to all, gives himself to nobody; and as there is
no associate over whom he does not acquire the same right as he yields others
over himself, he gains an equivalent for everything he loses, and an increase of
force for the preservation of what he has.
If then we discard from the social compact what is not of its essence, we shall
find that it reduces itself to the following terms:
"Each of us puts his person and all his power in common under the supreme
direction of the general will, and, in our corporate capacity, we receive each
member as an indivisible part of the whole."
At once, in place of the individual personality of each contracting party, this act
of association creates a moral and collective body, composed of as many
members as the assembly contains votes, an d receiving from this act its unity, its
common identity, its life and its will. This public person, so formed by the union
of all other persons formerly took the name of city , and now takes that
of Republic or body politic ; it is called by its members State when
passive. Sovereign when active, and Power when compared with others like
itself. Those who are associated in it take collectively the name of people , and
severally are called citizens , as sharing in the sovereign power, and subjects , as
being under the laws of the State. But these terms are often confused and taken
one for another: it is enough to know how to distinguish them when they are
being used with precision.
The Sovereign
This formula shows us that the act of association comprises a mutual undertaking
between the public and the individuals, and that each individual, in making a
contract, as we may say, with himself, is bound in a double capacity; as a member
of the Sovereign he is bound to the individuals, and as a member of the State to
the Sovereign. But the maxim of civil right, that no one is bound by undertakings
made to himself, does not apply in this case; for there is a great difference
between incurring an obligation to yourself and incurring one to a whole of which
you form a part.
Attention must further be called to the fact that public deliberation, while
competent to bind all the subjects to the Sovereign, because of the two different
capacities in which each of them may be regarded, cannot, for the opposite
reason, bind the Sovereign to itself; and that it is consequently against the nature
of the body politic for the Sovereign to impose on itself a law which it cannot
infringe. Being able to regard itself in only one capacity, it is in the position of an
individual who makes a contract with himself; and this makes it clear that there
neither is nor can be any kind of fundamental law binding on the body of the
people — not even the social contract itself. This does not mean that the body
politic cannot enter into undertakings with others, provided the contract is not
infringed by them; for in relation to what is external to it, it becomes a simple
being, an individual.
But the body politic or the Sovereign, drawing its being wholly from the sanctity
of the contract, can never bind itself, even to an outsider, to do anything
derogatory to the original act, for instance, to alienate any part of itself, or to
submit to another Sovereign. Violation of the act by which it exists would be self annihilation; and that which is itself nothing can create nothing.
As soon as this multitude is so united in one body, it is impossible to offend
against one of the members without attacking the body, and still more to offend
against the body without the members resenting it. Duty and interest therefore
equally oblige the two contracting parties to give each other help; and the same
men should seek to combine, in their double capacity, all the advantages
dependent upon that capacity.
Again, the Sovereign, being formed wholly of the individuals who compose it,
neither has nor can have any interest contrary to theirs; and consequently the
sovereign power need give no guarantee to its subjects, because it is impossible
for the body to wish to hurt all its members. W e shall also see later on that it
cannot hurt any in particular. The Sovereign, merely by virtue of what it is, is
always what it should be.
This, however, is not the case with the relation of the subjects to the Sovereign,
which, despite the common interest, would have no security that they would fulfill
their undertakings, unless it found means to assure itself of their fidelity.
In fact, each individual, as a man, may have a particular will contrary or dissimilar
to the general will which he has as a citizen. His particular interest may speak to
him quite differently from the common interest: his absolute and naturally
independent existence may make him look upon what he owes to the common
cause as a gratuitous contribution, the loss of which will do less harm to others
than the payment of it is burdensome to himself; and, regarding the moral person
which constitutes the State as a persona ficta , because not a man, he may wish
to enjoy the rights of citizenship without being ready to fulfill the duties of a
subject. The continuance of such an injustice could not but prove the undoing of
the body politic.
In order then that the social compact may not be an empty formula, it tacitly
includes the undertaking, which alone can give force to the rest, that whoever
refuses to obey the general will shall be compelled to do so by the whole body.
This means nothing less than that he will be forced to be free; for this is the
condition which, by giving each citizen to his country, secures him against all
personal dependence. In this lies the key to the working of the political machine;
this alone legitimizes civil undertakings, which, without it, would be absurd,
tyrannical, and liable to the most frightful abuses.
The Civil State
The passage from the state of nature to the civil state produces a very
remarkable change in man, by substituting justice for instinct in his conduct, and
giving his actions the morality they had formerly lacked. Then only, when the
voice of duty takes the place of physical impulses and right of appetite, does
man, who so far had considered only himself, find that he is forced to act on
different principles, and to consult his reason before listening to his inclinations.
Although, in this state, he deprives himself of some advantages which he got from
nature, he gains in return others so great, his faculties are so stimulated and
developed, his ideas so extended, his feelings so ennobled, and his whole soul so
uplifted, that, did not the abuses of this new condition often degrade him below
that which he left, he would be bound to bless continually the happy moment
which took him from it for ever, and, instead of a stupid and unimaginative animal,
made him an intelligent being and a man.
Source: Translated by G. D. H. Cole
John Locke, Second Treatise of Government
John Locke, 1632-1704, was an important English philosopher,
whose political views have been profoundly influential. His views
on government were expressed in his work Two Treatises of
Government. He asserted that government rests on the consent of
the governed and that revolution is permissible when government
subverts the natural rights (life, liberty and property) of the
people.
Political power, then, I take to be a right of making laws, with penalties of death,
and consequently all less penalties for the regulating and preserving of property,
and of employing the force of the community in the execution of such laws, and in
the defense of the commonwealth from foreign injury, and all this only for the
public good.
Chapter II: Of the State of Nature
To understand political power aright, and derive it from its original, we must
consider what estate all men are naturally in, and that is, a state of perfect
freedom to order their actions, and dispose of their possessions and persons as
they think fit, within the bounds of the law of Nature, without asking leave or
depending upon the will of any other man.
A state also of equality, wherein all the power and jurisdiction is reciprocal, no
one having more than another, there being nothing more evident than that
creatures of the same species and rank, promiscuously born to all the same
advantages of Nature, and the use of the same faculties, should also be equal one
amongst another, without subordination or subjection, unless the lord and master
of them all should, by any manifest declaration of his will, set one above another,
and confer on him, by an evident and clear appointment, an undoubted right to
dominion and sovereignty. . . .
But though this be a state of liberty, yet it is not a state of license; though man
in that state have an uncontrollable liberty to dispose of his person or
possessions, yet he has not liberty to destroy himself, or so much as any creature
in his possession, but where some nobler use than its bare preservation calls for
it. The state of Nature has a law of Nature to govern it, which obliges every one,
and reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind who will but consult it, that
being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm an other in his life, health,
liberty or possessions; for men being all the workmanship of one omnipotent and
infinitely wise Maker; all the servants of one sovereign Master, sent into the world
by His order and about His business; they are His property, whose workmanship
they are made to last during His, not one another's pleasure. And, being furnished
with like faculties, sharing all in one community of Nature, there cannot be
supposed any such subordination among us that may authorize us to destroy one
another, as if we were made for one another's uses, as the inferior ranks of
creatures are for ours. Every one as he is bound to preserve himself, and not to
quit his station willfully, so by the like reason, when his own preservation comes
not in competition, ought he as much as he can to preserve the rest of mankind,
and not unless it be to do justice on an offender, take away or impair the life, or
what tends to the preservation of the life, the liberty, health, limb, or goods of
another.
And that all men may be restrained from invading others' rights, and from doing
hurt to one another, and the law of Nature be observed, which willeth the peace
and preservation of all mankind, the execution of the law of Nature is in that
state put into every man's hands, whereby every one has a right to punish the
transgressors of that law to such a degree as may hinder its violation. For the law
of Nature would, as all other laws that concern men in this world, be in vain if
there were nobody that in the state of Nature had a power to execute that law,
and thereby preserve the innocent and restrain offenders; and if any one in the
state of Nature may punish another for any evil he has done, every one may do
so. For in that state of perfect equality, where naturally there is no superiority or
jurisdiction of one over another, what any may do in prosecution of that law,
every one must needs have a right to do.
And thus, in the state of Nature, one man comes by a power over another, but
yet no absolute or arbitrary power. . . .
Chapter III: Of the State of War
[It is] reasonable and just I should have a right to destroy that which threatens
me with destruction; for by the fundamental law of Nature, man being to be
preserved as much as possible, when all cannot be preserved, the safety of the
innocent is to be preferred, and one may destroy a man who makes war upon him,
or has discovered an enmity to his being, for the same reason that he may kill a
wolf or a lion, because they are not under the ties of the common law of reason,
have no other rule but that of force and violence, and so may be treated as a
beast of prey, those dangerous and noxious creatures that will be sure to destroy
him whenever he falls into their power.
And hence it is that he who attempts to get another man into his absolute power
does thereby put himself into a state of war with him; it being to be understood
as a declaration of a design upon his life. For I have reason to conclude that he
who would get me into his power without my consent would use me as he pleased
when he had got me there, and destroy me too when he had a fancy to it; for
nobody can desire to have me in his absolute power unless it be to compel me by
force to that which is against the right of my freedom - i.e. make me a slave. To
be free from such force is the only security of my preservation, and reason bids
me look on him as an enemy to my preservation who would take away that
freedom which is the fence to it; so that he who makes an attempt to enslave me
thereby puts himself into a state of war with me. He that in the state of Nature
would take away the freedom that belongs to any one in that state must
necessarily be supposed to have a design to take away everything else, that
freedom being the foundation of all the rest; as he that in the state of society
would take away the freedom belonging to those of that society or commonwealth
must be supposed to design to take away from them everything else, and so be
looked on as in a state of war. . . .
20. But when the actual force is over, the state of war ceases between those that
are in society and are equally on both sides subject to the judge; and, therefore,
in such controversies, where the question is put, "W ho shall be judge?" it cannot
be meant who shall decide the controversy; every one knows what Jephtha here
tells us, that "the Lord the Judge" shall judge. W here there is no judge on earth
the appeal lies to God in Heaven. That question then cannot mean who shall
judge, whether another hath put himself in a state of war with me, and whether I
may, as Jephtha did, appeal to Heaven in it? Of that I myself can only judge in my
own conscience, as I will answer it at the great day to the Supreme Judge of all
men.
Chapter IV: Of Slavery
The natural liberty of man is to be free from any superior power on earth, and not
to be under the will or legislative authority of man, but to have only the law of
Nature for his rule. The liberty of man in society is to be under no other
legislative power but that established by consent in the commonwealth, nor under
the dominion of any will, or restraint of any law, but what that legislative shall
enact according to the trust put in it. Freedom, then, is not what Sir Robert
Filmer tells us: "A liberty for every one to do what he lists, to live as he pleases,
and not to be tied by any laws"; but freedom of men under government is to have
a standing rule to live by, common to every one of that society, and made by the
legislative power erected in it. A liberty to follow my own will in all things where
that rule prescribes not, not to be subject to the inconstant, uncertain, unknown,
arbitrary will of another man, as freedom of nature is to be under no other
restraint but the law of Nature.
This freedom from absolute, arbitrary power is so necessary to, and closely joined
with, a man's preservation, that he cannot part with it but by what forfeits his
preservation and life together. . . .
Chapter VIII: Of the Beginning of Political Societies
MEN being, as has been said, by nature all free, equal, and independent, no one
can be put out of this estate and subjected to the political power of another
without his own consent, which is done by agreeing with other men, to join and
unite into a community for their comfortable, safe, and peaceable living, one
amongst another, in a secure enjoyment of their properties, and a greater
security against any that are not of it. This any number of men may do, because
it injures not the freedom of the rest; they are left, as they were, in the liberty of
the state of Nature. W hen any number of men have so consented to make one
community or government, they are thereby presently incorporated, and make one
body politic, wherein the majority have a right to act and conclude the res t.
For, when any number of men have, by the consent of every individual, made a
community, they have thereby made that community one body, with a power to
act as one body, which is only by the will and determination of the majority. . . .or
else it is impossible it should act or continue one body, one community, which the
consent of every individual that united into it agreed that it should; and so every
one is bound by that consent to be concluded by the majority. . . .
And thus every man, by consenting with others to make one body politic under
one government, puts himself under an obligation to every one of that society to
submit to the determination of the majority, and to be concluded by it; or else
this original compact, whereby he with others incorporates into one society,
would signify nothing, and be no compact if he be left free and under no other
ties than he was in before in the state of Nature.
Chapter IX: of the Ends of Political Society and
Government
If man in the state of Nature be so free as has been said, if he be absolute lord of
his own person and possessions, equal to the greatest and subject to nobody,
why will he part with his freedom, this empire, and subject himself to the
dominion and control of any other power? To which it is obvious to answer, that
though in the state of Nature he hath such a right, yet the enjoyment of it is very
uncertain and constantly exposed to the invasion of others; for all being kings as
much as he, every man his equal, and the greater part no strict obse rvers of
equity and justice, the enjoyment of the property he has in this state is very
unsafe, very insecure. This makes him willing to quit this condition which, however
free, is full of fears and continual dangers; and it is not without reason that he
seeks out and is willing to join in society with others who are already united, or
have a mind to unite for the mutual preservation of their lives, liberties and
estates, which I call by the general name- property.
The great and chief end, therefore, of me n uniting into commonwealths, and
putting themselves under government, is the preservation of their property; to
which in the state of Nature there are many things wanting.
Chapter XV: Of Despotical Power
. . . Despotical power is an absolute, arbitrary power one man has over another,
to take away his life whenever he pleases; and this is a power which neither
Nature gives, for it has made no such distinction between one man and another,
nor compact can convey. . . . For having quitted reason, which God hath given to
be the rule betwixt man and man, and the peaceable ways which that teaches, and
made use of force to compass his unjust ends upon another where he has no
right, he renders himself liable to be destroyed by his adversary whenever he can,
as any other noxious and brutish creature that is destructive to his being.
Chapter XIX: Of the Dissolution of Government
The reason why men enter into society is the preservation of their property; and
the end while they choose and authorise a legislative is that there may be laws
made, and rules set, as guards and fences to the properties of all the society, to
limit the power and moderate the dominion of every part and member of the
society. For since it can never be supposed to be the will of the society that the
legislative should have a power to destroy that which every one designs to secure
by entering into society, and for which the people submitted themselves to
legislators of their own making: whenever the legislators endeavor to take away
and destroy the property of the people, or to reduce them to slavery under
arbitrary power, they put themselves into a state of war with the people, who are
thereupon absolved from any farther obedience, and are left to the common
refuge which God hath provided for all men against force and violence.
Whensoever, therefore, the legislative shall transgress this fundamental rule of
society, and either by ambition, fear, folly, or corruption, endeavor to grasp
themselves, or put into the hands of any other, an absolute power over the lives,
liberties, and estates of the people, by this breach of trust they forfeit the power
the people had put into their hands for quite contrary ends, and it devolves to the
people, who have a right to resume their original liberty, and by the establishment
of a new legislative (such as they shall think fit), provide for their own safety and
security, which is the end for which they are in society. W hat I have said here
concerning the legislative in general holds true also concerning the supreme
executor, who having a double trust put in him, both to have a part in the
legislative and the supreme execution of the law, acts against both, when he goes
about to set up his own arbitrary will as the law of the society.
Whosoever uses force without right- as every one does in society who does it
without law- puts himself into a state of war with those against whom he so uses
it, and in that state all former ties are cancelled, all other rights cease, and every
one has a right to defend himself, and to resist the aggressor.
Edited by Jennifer Brainard, c. 2000-2003
Declaration of Independence, excerpts
IN CONGRESS, July 4, 1776.
The unanimous Declaration of the thirteen united States of America,
When in the Course of human events, it becomes necessary for one people to
dissolve the political bands which have connected them with another, and to
assume among the powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which
the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God entitle them, a decent respect to the
opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel
them to the separation.
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they
are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these
are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.--That to secure these rights,
Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the
consent of the governed, --That whenever any Form of Government becomes
destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it,
and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and
organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect
their Safety and Happiness. Prudence, indeed, will dictate that Governments long
established should not be changed for light and transient causes; and accordingly
all experience hath shewn, that mankind are more disposed to suffer, while evils
are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are
accustomed. But when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably
the same Object evinces a design to reduce them under absolute Despotism, it is
their right, it is their duty, to throw off such Government, and to provide new
Guards for their future security.--Such has been the patient sufferance of these
Colonies; and such is now the necessity which constrains them to alter their
former Systems of Government. The history of the present King of Great Britain is
a history of repeated injuries and usurpations, all having in direct object the
establishment of an absolute Tyranny over these States. To prove this, let Facts
be submitted to a candid world.
Thomas Paine: Common Sense 1776, Excerpts
“The cause of America is in a great measure the cause of all mankind… ”
“Volumes have been written on the subject of the struggle between England
and America. Men of all ranks have embarked in the controversy, from different
motives, and with various designs; but all have been ineffectual, and the period
of debate is closed. Arms, as the last resource, decide the contest; the appeal
was the choice of the king, and the continent hath accepted the challenge.”
“The sun never shined on a cause of greater worth. ‘Tis not the affair of a city,
a country, a province, or a kingdom, but of a continent— of at least one eighth
part of the habitable globe. ‘Tis not the concern of a day, a year, or an age;
posterity are virtually involved in the contest, and will be more or less affected,
even to the end of time, by the proceedings now… ”
“But Britain is the parent country, say some. Then the more shame upon her
conduct. Even brutes do not devour their young, nor savages make war upon
their families … ”
“I challenge the warmest advocate for reconciliation, to shew, a single advantage
that this continent can reap, by being connected with Great Britain. I repeat the
challenge, not a single advantage is derived… ”
“Every thing that is right or natural pleads for separation. The blood of the slain,
the weeping voice of nature cries, ‘TIS TIME TO PART… ”
“As to government matters, it is not in the power of Britain to do this continent
justice: The business of it will soon be too weighty, and intricate, to be managed
with any tolerable degree of convenience, by a power, so distant from us, and so
very ignorant of us; for if they cannot conquer us, they cannot govern us … ”
“I am not induced by motives of pride, party, or resentment to espouse the
doctrine of separation and independance; I am clearly, positively, and
conscientiously persuaded that it is the true interest of this continent to be so… ”
“O ye that love mankind! Ye that dare oppose, not only the tyranny, but the
tyrant, stand forth!”
Voltaire: A Philosophical Dictionary 1764, Excerpts
Voltaire, (Francois-Marie Arouet), a French literary figure and enlightenment
philosopher, wrote powerfully in support of religious toleration and freedom of
speech. He is most famous for his novel “Candide” in which he made fun of
Leibniz who held that this is the best of all possible worlds. He was a bitter and
outspoken critic of the Catholic church - "crush the infamous thing."
Astrology may rest on better foundations than Magic. For if no one has seen
either Goblins, or Lemures, . . . or Demons, . . . the predictions of astrologers
have often been seen to succeed. If of two astrologers consulted on the life of a
child and on the weather, one says that the child will live to manhood, the other
not; if one announces rain, and the other fine weather, it is clear that one of them
will be a prophet.. . .One of the most famous mathematicians in Europe, named
Stoffler, who flourished in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, and who long
worked at the reform of the calendar, proposed at the Council of Constance,
foretold a universal flood for the year 1524. This flood was to arrive in the month
of February, and nothing is more plausible; for Saturn, Jupiter and Mars were then
in conjunction in the sign of Pisces. All the peoples of Europe, Asia and Africa,
who heard speak of the prediction, were dismayed. Everyone expected the flood,
despite the rainbow. . . .Everyone armed himself with a boat as with an ark. . . .
At last the month of February arrived, and not a drop of water fell: never was
month more dry, and never were the astrologers more embarrassed. Nevertheless
they were not discouraged, nor neglected among us; almost all princes continued
to consult them.I have not the honor of being a prince; but the celebrated Count
of Boulainvilliers and an Italian, named Colonne, who had much prestige in Paris,
both foretold that I should die infallibly at the age of thirty-two. I have been so
malicious as to deceive them already by nearly thirty years, wherefore I humbly
beg their pardon.Authority W retched human beings, whether you wear green
robes, turbans, black robes or surplices, cloaks and neckbands, never seek to use
authority where there is question only of reason, or consent to be scoffed at
throughout the centuries as the most impertinent of all men, and to suffer public
hatred as the most unjust. A hundred times has one spoken to you of the
insolent absurdity with which you condemned G alileo, and I speak to you for the
hundred and first, and I hope you will keep the anniversary of it for ever; I desire
that there be graved on the door of your Holy Office: "Here seven cardinals,
assisted by minor brethren, had the master of thought in Italy thrown into prison
at the age of seventy; made him fast on bread and water because he instructed
the human race, and because they were ignorant." . . . Further on a [university]
faculty, which had not great faculties, issued a decree against innate ideas, and
later a decree for innate ideas, without the said faculty being informed by its
beadles what an idea is. In the neighboring schools judicial proceedings were
instituted against the circulation of the blood. An action was started against
inoculation, and parties have been subpoenaed.At the Customs of thought
twenty-one folio volumes were seized, in which it was stated treacherously and
wickedly that triangles always have three angles; that a father is older than his
son; that Rhea Silvia lost her virginity before giving birth to her child, and that
flour is not an oak leaf. DemocracyOrdinarily there is no comparison between the
crimes of the great who are always ambitious, and the crimes of the people who
always want, and can want only liberty and equality. These two sentiments,
Liberty and Equality, do not lead direct to calumny, rapine, assassination,
poisoning, the devastation of one's neighbors' lands, etc.; but ambitious might
and the mania for power plunge into all these crimes whatever be the time,
whatever be the place. Popular government is in itself, therefore, less iniquitous,
less abominable than despotic power. The great vice of democracy is certainly
not tyranny and cruelty: [But] democracy seems suitable only to a very little
country, and further it must be happily situated. Small though it be, it will make
many mistakes, because it will be composed of men. Discord will reign there as in
a monastery; but there will be no St. Bartholomew, no Irish massacres. . . no
inquisition, no condemnation to the galleys for having taken some water from the
sea without paying for it, unless one supposes this republic composed of devils in
a corner of hell. One questions every day whether a republican government is
preferable to a king's government? The dispute ends always by agreeing that to
govern men is very difficult. The Jews had God Himself for master; see what has
happened to them on that account: nearly always have they been beaten and
slaves, and to-day do you not find that they cut a pretty figure?EqualityIt is clear
that men, enjoying the faculties connected with their nature, are equal; they are
equal when they perform animal functions, and when they exercise their
understanding. The King of China, the Great Mogul, the Padisha of Turkey, cannot
say to the least of men: " I forbid you to digest, to go to the privy and to think."
All the animals of each species are equal among themselves.
In our unhappy
world it is impossible for men living in society not to be divided into two classes,
the one the rich that commands, the other the poor that serves; and these two
are subdivided into a thousand, and these thousand still have different
gradations.All the poor are not unhappy. The majority were born in that state, and
continual work stops their feeling their position too keenly; but when they feel it,
then one sees wars, like that of the popular party against the senate party in
Rome, like those of the peasants in Germany, England and France. All these wars
finish sooner or later with the subjection of the people, because the powerful
have money, and money is master of everything in a state: I say in a state; for it
is not the same between nations. The nation which makes the best use of the
sword will always subjugate the nation which has more gold and less courage.All
men are born with a sufficiently violent liking for domination, wealth and pleasure,
and with much taste for idleness; consequently, all men want their money and the
wives or daughters of others, to be their master, to subject them to all their
caprices, and to do nothing, or at least to do only very agreeable things. You see
clearly that with these fine inclinations it is as impossible for men to be equal as
it is impossible for two predicants or two professors of theology not to be jealou s
of each other. The human race, such as it is, cannot subsist unless there is an
infinity of useful men who possess nothing at all; for it is certain that a man who
is well off will not leave his own land to come to till yours; and if you have need
of a pair of shoes, it is not the Secretary to the Privy Council who will make them
for you. Equality, therefore, is at once the most natural thing and the most
fantastic. As men go to excess in everything when they can, this inequality has
been exaggerated. It has been maintained in many countries that it was not
permissible for a citizen to leave the country where chance has caused him to be
born; the sense of this law is visibly: " This land is so bad and so badly governed,
that we forbid any individual to leave it, for fear that everyone will leave it." Do
better : make all your subjects want to live in your country, and foreigners to
come to it. All men have the right in the bottom of their hearts to think
themselves entirely equal to other men : it does not follow from that that the
cardinal's cook should order his master to prepare him his dinner; but the cook
can say: " I am a man like my master; like him I was born crying; like me he will die
with the same pangs and the same ceremonies. Both of us perform the same
animal functions. If the Turks take possession of Rome, and if then I am cardinal
and my master cook, I shall take him into my service." This discourse is
reasonable and just; but while waiting for the Great Turk to take possession of
Rome, the cook must do his duty, or else all human society is perverted. As
regards a man who is neither a cardinal's cook, nor endowed with any other
employment in the state; as regards a private person who is connected with
nothing, but who is vexed at being received everywhere with an air of being
patronized or scorned, who sees quite clearly that many monsignors have no more
knowledge, wit or virtue than he, and who at times is bored at waiting in their
antechambers, what should he decide to do? W hy, to take himself off.
Translated by H.I. W oolf, New York: Knopf, 1924
Edited by Jennifer Brainard, c. 2000-2003