What to Show the World: The Office of War Information and Hollywood, 1942-1945
Author(s): Clayton R. Koppes and Gregory D. Black
Source: The Journal of American History, Vol. 64, No. 1 (Jun., 1977), pp. 87-105
Published by: Organization of American Historians
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Whatto Showthe World:
and
of WarInformation
The Office
Hollywood,1942-1945
CLAYTON R. KOPPES
AND
GREGORY
D.
BLACK
IHE uneasy relationshipbetweenpropagandaand democracy
the
provedespeciallytroublesomeduringWorld War II. Interpreting
Information
war as a worldwidecrusade,liberalsin the Officeof War
controloverthecontentofAmericanmotion
(OWI) won unprecedented
of the interactionbetweenOWI and
pictures.An understanding
Hollywoodshedslighton boththe objectivesand methodsof the nation's propagandacampaignand the contentof wartimeentertainment
offersinsightsinto
films.This episode,all but ignoredby historians,
ofpoliticsand massculture
America'swarideologyand theintersection
in wartime.Moreover,it raisesthe questionof whetherthe Roosevelt
propagandastrategyhelped underminesome of its
administration's
avowedwaraims.'
agencyduringWorldWar II,
propaganda
OWI, thechiefgovernment
was formedby an executiveorderon June13, 1942, thatconsolidated
agencies.OWI's domesticbranchhandled
severalprewarinformation
the homefront;its overseasbranchsupervisedall UnitedStatesforeign
ofTechnology.
in theCalifornia
Institute
ClaytonR. Koppesis a seniorresearchfellowin history
ofKansas.
in theUniversity
ofhistory
professor
Gregory
D. Blackis assistant
' Film historianssuch as Lewis Jacobsand Paul Rotha and RichardGriffith
recognizethe
heavy ideologicalemphasisof World War II movies,but do not realize the influenceof the
(OWI). Lewis Jacobs,"World War II and the AmericanFilm,"
Officeof War Information
The Film
CinemaJournal,VII (Winter1967-68), 1-21; and Paul Rotha and RichardGriffith,
Till Now: A Surveyof WorldCinema(London,1967), 464-67. The mostcompletehistoryof
its filmcoverageto the Bureau of Intelligence.Allan M. Winkler,"Politics and
OWI restricts
Propaganda: The Office of War Information,1942-1945" (doctoral dissertation,Yale
University,1974). John Morton Blum accepts OWI's contentionthat producersshould use
theirown judgmentabout wartimemovie contentand concludesthat "with few exceptions,
Wilsonand Missionto Moscow fortwo,filmsdesignedforthe box officecarriedno messageof
purposeor idealism." JohnMortonBlum, V Wasfor Victory:Politicsand AmericanCulture
During WorldWar II (New York, 1976), 25, 36. A popularaccountdiscussesOWI influence
ended in mid-1943.RichardR.
fashion,but says thatthe interaction
on filmsin a lighthearted
Lingeman,Don't You Know There'sa War On? The AmericanHome Front,1941-1945(New
York,1970),168-210.
87
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88
The Journal
ofAmerican
History
propagandaactivities,exceptin Latin America,which remainedthe
preserve of the coordinatorof inter-Americanaffairs,Nelson
a proOWI to implement
FranklinD. Rooseveltinstructed
Rockefeller.
gramthroughthe press,radio,and motionpicturesto enhancepublic
of
activities
thewar-information
ofthewar;to coordinate
understanding
betweenfederalagenall federalagencies;and to act as theintermediary
OWI directorElmer
cies and the radioand motionpictureindustries.
insistedthattheagency'spolicywas
Davis, a liberalradiocommentator,
couldnotbe separatedfrominterpretato tellthetruth.But information
bias. In all
tion,and OWI toldthetruthby degreesand withparticular
respectsOWI met the criterionof a propagandaagency.It
important
information
andto
designednotonlyto disseminate
was an organization
symbolsand ideas.
issuesbutalso to arousesupportforparticular
clarify
"The easiest way to inject a propagandaidea into most people's
minds,"said Davis, "is to letit go in throughthemediumofan entertainment
picturewhentheydo notrealizethattheyare beingpropagandized."2
Around Davis clustereda liberalstaffthat gave OWI one of the
New Dealers of any wartime
highestpercentagesof interventionist
agency. Two assistant directors,Pulitzer-prizewriters,Archibald
MacLeish and Robert Sherwood,were enthusiasticNew Dealers;
MiltonS. Eisenhower,thoughfiscallymore
anotherassistantdirector,
who held
cautious,was a New Deal veteran.The onlyassistantdirector
the New Deal at some distancewas GardnerCowles,Jr.,a moderate
Republicanpublisherwho had been recruitedto give OWI an air of
the secondand third
Liberalsofvarioushues permeated
bipartisanship.
ArthurM.
levelsofthe agencyand includedsuch figuresas historians
Schlesinger,
Jr.,and HenryPringle,formerHenryA. Wallace speech
JosephBarnesand
writerJackFleming,novelistLeo Rosten,journalists
hand" Owen
and
"China
Alan Cranston,financier
JamesWarburg,
Lattimore.3
2 Elmer Davis to Byron Price, Jan. 27, 1943, Box 3, Records of the Officeof War
Information,RG 208 (Federal Records Center, Suitland, Md.); Winkler, "Politics and
in
Propaganda";LaMar Seal Mackay,"Domestic Operationsof the Officeof War Information
of Wisconsin,1966), ch. 1-2. See also Public
University
WorldWar II " (doctoraldissertation,
Opinion Quarterly,VI (Spring 1942); Harold D. Lasswell,Propaganda Technique in the
World War (New York, 1938), 9; and JacquesEllul, Propaganda:The Formationof Men's
Attitudes(New York, 1965), x-xiv.For ElmerDavis, see AlfredHaworthJones,"The Making
on the Air: ElmerDavis and CBS News, 1939-1941," PacificHistorical
of an Interventionist
Review,XLII (Feb. 1973), 91.
the presenceof prominentliberalsin OWI, ideology
3 Althoughsome scholarsacknowledge
has not receivedthe emphasisthat its pivotalimportancein the agencymerits.See Winkler,
"Politics and Propaganda,"13-14, 22-28, 37-41. For example,not onlythe questionsof techfueledthe"writers'quarrel"of
butalso ideologicaldifferences
niqueexaminedbySydneyWeinberg
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Whatto ShowtheWorld
89
The Bureau of Motion Pictures(BMP) in OWI was a New Deal
stronghold.Its chief, Lowell Mellett, a formerScripps-Howard
newspaper
editorwhohad beena Rooseveltaide since 1939, had headed
the firstprewarinformation
agency,the Officeof Government
Reports
(OGR). "OGRE" and "Mellett's Madhouse" to conservative
critics,
filmprogram.In responseto themovie
OGR supervised
thegovernment
industry's
offer
ofsupportin December1941, RoosevelttoldMellettto
advise Hollywoodhow it could further
the war effort.
Mellettestablisheda liaisonofficein Hollywoodand appointedas its head Nelson
Poynter,a Scripps-Howard
colleague.Poynterdid not followmovies,
buthe sharedMellett'senthusiasms.
AssistingPoynterwas a staunchly
liberalreviewing
staff
headedby DorothyJones,a former
researchassistantforHaroldLasswelland a pioneerin filmcontentanalysis.4
The Hollywoodofficebecamepart of OWI domesticoperationsin
June 1942 and began one of the agency's more important
and controversial
activities.
The motionpicture,said Davis, couldbe "the most
instrument
powerful
of propagandain the world,whetherit triesto be
or not." Rooseveltbelievedmovies were among the most effective
meansof reachingthe Americanpublic.The motion-picture
industry
experiencedfar fewerwartimerestrictions
on outputthan most industries.Hollywoodturnedout nearly500 picturesannuallyduringthe
war and dreweightymillionpaid admissionsper week,well above the
prewarpeak. Hollywood'sinternational
influencefarexceededthatof
Americanradio and the press; foreignaudiences,whichalso reached
whethera filmmadea profit.
eightymillionperweek,oftendetermined
1943. SydneyWeinberg,"What to Tell America:The WritersQuarrel in the Officeof War
Information,"
Journalof AmericanHistory,LV (June1968), 76, 88. For New Dealersin OWI,
see Harold Gosnell to Files, Sept. 14, 1945, in "Preparationof War Historiesby Agencies:
OWI, 1942-1945," item 127, series 41.3, Bureau of the Budget Records, RG 51
(NationalArchives).See also NormanMarkowitz,The Rise and Fall of the People's Century:
HenryA. Wallaceand AmericanLiberalism,1941 1948 (New York, 1973), ch. 2, and Blim, V
Wasfor Victory,ch. 7-9. In this essay the term "ideology" is used not to imply"a rigid.
doctrinaire,
black-and-white
understanding
of the world,but, rather,. . . the systemof beliefs,
values, fears,prejudices,reflexes,and commitments-insum, the social consciousness" of a
group.See Eric Foner,Free Soil, Free Labor,Free Men: The Ideologyof the RepublicanParty
BeforetheCivilWar(New York,1970). 4.
4Lowell Mellettand Nelson Poynterwere not on OWI payrollbut drewtheirsalaryfrom
the ExecutiveOfficeof the President.Reductionof NonessentialExpenditures.
Hearingsbefore
the JointCommitteeon Reductionof NonessentialFederalExpenditures,
(Washington,1942),
1140-55, 1208-25, 1308-13; Lowell Mellett,"The Officeof GovernmentReports," Public
Administration
Review,I (Winter1941), 126; MargaretHicks Williams," 'The President's'
Officeof GovernmentReports,"Public OpinionQuarterly,V (Winter1941), 548-62; Clayton
R. Koppesinterviews
withPoynter,Jan.8, 1974, and DorothyJones,Dec. 6, 1974; DorothyB.
Jones,"QuantitativeAnalysisof Motion PictureContent,"Public OpinionQuarterly,VI (Fall
1942), 411-27. See also RichardDyer MacCann, The People's Films:A PoliticalHistoryof U.S.
Government
Motion Pictures(New York, 1973), 129-35. This essay, however,considersonly
OWI's attempt
to influence
feature
filmsproducedbythemovieindustry.
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90
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BMP believedthat every film enhanced or diminishedAmerica's
reputation
abroadandhenceaffected
thenation'spower.5
The movieindustry
sharedOWI's perhapsexaggerated
ideaofitsproducts' power,buthow effectively
it wouldcooperateremainedunclear.
From the mid-1930sto the eve of World War II the industrywas
isolatedfromnationalintellectual,artistic,and politicallife. When
BenitoMussolini'sarmyinvadedEthiopiain 1935, an agitatedfriend
askeda producer,"Have youheardanylatenews?" The excitedmogul
replied: "Italy just banned Marie Antoinette!" Conservative
businessmenand theirbankersran the studios.Louis B. Mayer of
man in Hollywood,
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer,
the singlemostinfluential
decoratedhis deskwithportraits
of HerbertHoover,FrancisCardinal
Spellman,and DouglasMacArthur.The artistic,
moreliberalsideofthe
and particularly
industry-thedirectors
thewriters-felt
squelched.The
industryavoided "message films" in favorof romances,musicals,
murdermysteries,
and westerns-"pure entertainment"
in Hollywood
parlance.Stereotypes
flourished;
accuracywas incidental.Since 1934
theHays Officehad censoredsex and profanity
and taughtthatsin was
alwayspunished;the movies' idealworldwas an adolescentperception
of middle-class
America.Althoughinternational
themesincreasedbetween1939 and 1941, social awarenessremaineddim. "Most movies
are made in the evidentassumptionthatthe audienceis passiveand
wantsto remainpassive," notedthefilmcriticJamesAgee; "everyeffortis made to do all the work-the seeing, the explaining,the
" v6
eventhefeeling.
understanding,
of
to avoid issues; OWI demandedaffirmation
Hollywoodpreferred
New Deal liberalism
forAmericaand theworld.WhenPoynterarrived
in the moviecapitalhe foundthe industry
doinglittleto promotethe
largerissuesofthewar. In the summerof 1942 Hollywoodhad under
5 Davis press conference,Dec. 23, 1942, Box 1442, Records of the Office of War
Information;
Reductionof NonessentialExpenditures,1213-14; Movies at War, Reportsof
WarActivities,
MotionPictureIndustry,
1942-1945,Vol. I, No. 1, pp. 1-5.
6 JamesAgee, Agee on Film:Reviews
and Comments(New York, 1972), 329. Leo C. Rosten,
Hollywood:The Movie Colony,The Movie Makers(New York, 1941), 30-39, 133-62, 246-47;
RobertSklar,Movie-MadeAmerica.A Social Historyof AmericanMovies (New York, 1975),
173-76, 188, 195-97; ThorntonDelehanty,"Czars Fall on Hollywood," North American
Review,241 (Winter1936-37), 268; DudleyNichols,"The Writerand theFilm," TheatreArts,
XXVII (Oct. 1943), 591-602; Rotha and Griffith,
Film Till Now, 445-46; Ruth Inglis,
Freedomof the Movies: A Reporton Self-Regulation
fromthe Commissionon Freedomof the
Press (Chicago, 1947), 128; Charles Higham, The Art of the AmericanFilm (Garden City,
N.Y., 1974), 199-201; Donald Ogden Stewart,By a Strokeof Luck! (New York, 1975), 199;
AndrewBergman,We're in the Money: DepressionAmericaand Its Films(New York, 1971),
169; Jacobs,"WorldWarII andtheAmericanFilm," 1.
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Whatto ShowtheWorld
91
or in production
consideration
213 filmsthatdealtwiththewarin some
manner.Fortypercentofthosefocusedon the armedforces,usuallyin
combat.Less than20 percentdealtwiththeenemy,and mostof those
portrayedspies and saboteurs.Other categories-thewar issues, the
minimalattention.
Even
UnitedNations,and thehomefront-received
more disturbing
to OWI, Hollywoodhad simplygraftedthe war to
and actionplotsor appropriated
it as a backdrop
conventional
mystery
forfrothy
comedies.Interpretation
of the war remusicalsand flippant
mainedat a rudimentary
level:theUnitedStateswas fighting
becauseit
had beenattacked,
and itwouldwin.7
"raise itssights,"Poynterand his staff
wrotea
To helptheindustry
"Manual fortheMotion-Picture
Industry"in June1942 thattheyintendedas a guideformoviemakersin future
projects.The manualranks
ofOWI's interpretation
as probablythe mostcomprehensive
statement
ofthewar.OWI believedthewarwas notmerelya struggleforsurvival
the crusadeof
but a "people's war" betweenfascismand democracy,
A.
Common
Man."
Vice PresidentHenry Wallace's "Centuryof the
worldbasedon theFour
The UnitedStatesfoughtfora new democratic
fromwantand
Freedoms-freedom
of speechand religionand freedom
fear.The war was a people's struggle,BMP emphasized,"not a national,class or race war." Everypersonin the worldhad a concrete
stakein theoutcome;an Alliedvictory
promisedto all a decentstandard
of living, includinga job, good housing, recreation,and health,
and old-ageinsurance-a worldNew Deal. The average
unemployment,
manwouldalso enjoytherightto participate
in government,
whichsugstance. Americanminoritieshad not
gested OWI's anti-imperialist
enteredutopia,the bureauconceded,but progresswas possibleonly
underdemocracy,
and the wartimegainsof blacks,women,and other
A nationofunitedaveragecitizens,who
minorities
wouldbe preserved.
believeddeeplyin the cause of freedomand sacrificed
willingly
to promotevictory,
was thehallmark
ofBMP's democracy.8
The enemywas fascism.The enemywas notthe Axis leadershipnor
all of the Axis-ledpeoplesbut fascistsupporters
anywhere,
at homeas
or religiousinwell as abroad. "Any formof racial discrimination
' Jonesto Poynter,"War FeaturesInventory
as ofSept. 15, 1942," Box 1435, OWI Records;
GregoryD. Black and Clayton R. Koppes, "OWI Goes to the Movies: The Bureau of
Criticism
ofHollywood,1942-1943," Prologue,6 (Spring1974), 44-59.
Intelligence's
8 HenryA. Wallace,"The Priceof Free WorldVictory:
The Centuryofthe CommonMan,"
VitalSpeechesof the Day, VII (June1, 1942), 482-85; RobertA. Divine,Second Chance: The
in America During World War II (New York, 1967), 64-66;
Triumphof Internationalism
Manual forthe MotionPictureIndustry,"Summer1942, April29,
"GovernmentInformation
1943, Jan.1944, Box 15, OWI Records.
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92
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History
ofanycitizenare manifestations
tolerance,specialprivileges
ofFascism,
and shouldbe exposedas such," the manualadvised.A fascistvictory
wouldentailracialdiscrimination,
destruction
ofpoliticalrights,eradicationofthe rightsoflabor,and "completeregimentation
ofthepersonal
life" ofthecommonman. "There can be no peace untilmilitarism
and
fascismare completely
wipedout," BMP warned.Whenvictorycame,
the UnitedNations,eschewingnationalinterestand balance-of-power
politics,wouldbuilda new worldexpressiveof the collectivewill. The
manualenjoyedwidedistribution
in Hollywood;somestudiosreproduced the entirecontentsfortheirpersonnel,and manywriterswelcomed
thebureau'sinterpretation.9
The manualreflected
theintellectual
ferment
ofthe 1930s. Many intellectualshad put a premiumon commitment
to some largeideal or
a predetermined
movement;
response,notan examination
ofexperience
in its manyfacets,was all-important.
The quest forcommitment
convergedin the late 1930s withthe searchforAmerica;the war seemed
to offer
thatunifying
and it reducedintellectual
commitment
contentto
an uncritical
in
adulationof Americaand Allies. Thus, BMP reviewers
1942 objectedto the depictionof SpanishLoyalistviolencein Paramount'sFor Whomthe Bell Tolls, "particularly
at thistimewhenwe
mustbelievein therightness
ofourcause." The bureaucontinued:
Now it is necessary
thatwe see thedemocratic-fascist
battleas a wholeand
recognize
thatwhattheLoyalists
werefighting
foris essentially
thesamething
thatwe are.To focustoomuchattention
on thechinksin ourallies'armoris
justwhatourenemies
might
wish.Perhaps
itis realistic,
butitis alsogoingto
beconfusing
toAmerican
audiences."1
To OWI therealityofexperience
threatened
response.
Beforethemanualcould havemucheffect,
however,thebureaufaced
some immediateproblems.Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer
(MGM) wantedto
re-releasethe 1939 filmThe Real Glory,whichdealtwiththe United
Moro rebellion,but
oftheturn-of-the-century
Statesarmy'ssuppression
now billedas war betweenAmericanand Japanesetroops.Philippine
and Mellettconvinced
PresidentManuel Quezon protested
vigorously,
Manual forthe Motion PictureIndustry,"Summer1942, April
"Government Information
29. 1943. Jan. 1944, Box 15. OWI Records;Eddie Mannix to Executives,Producers,Writers,
andDirectorsat MGM. Aug. 24, 1942, Box 1433E, OWI Records.
" ScriptReview,"For Whom the Bell Tolls," Oct. 14, 1942, Box 3530, OWI Records;
RobertWarshow,The ImmediateExperience:Movies, Comics, Theatre& Other Aspects of
PopularCulture(GardenCity.N.Y., 1962), 33-39; Warren1. Susman,"The Thirties,"Stanley
Coben and LormanRatner,eds.. The Developmentof an AmericanCulture(EnglewoodCliffs,
1970). 20-006. 214.
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Whatto ShowtheWorld
93
thepicture.The bureau'spatriotic
producerSam Goldwynto withdraw
of Britishimappeals also stavedoffre-releaseof two glorifications
perialism,RKO's Gunga Din and MGM's Kim. When Columbia
soughtBMP adviceon itsproposed"Trans-Sahara,"Mellettcautioned
thatAmericanpolicyin Africawas notyetclear,andthestudiodropped
theproject."
and patrioticpersuasionhad limits,OWI discovered
But suggestions
LittleTokio,
in July1942 whenit screenedTwentiethCentury-Fox's
themeto a conventional
murder
a fifth-column
US.A. The filmgrafted
"this Oriental
mysteryand portrayedthe Japanese-Americansbund"-as benton sabotageand tryingto take over California.The
bulliedhis way into a home withouta searchwarrant,
hero-detective
and the police beat up Japanese"spies" theyhad arrestedand diswho asked,
armed.These "Gestapo methods"dismayedthereviewers,
for
"Did somebodymentionthatwe are presumably
fighting thepreservationof the Bill of Rights?" By the end of the film,the JapaneseAmericanswere marchedoffto detentioncamps; and the detective's
and tolerancefor
converted
fromisolationism,
appeasement,
sweetheart,
Japanese-Americans,
imploredpatriotsto save America."Invitationto
theWitchHunt," criedBMP.
ColonelJasonJoy,to makeenough
Poynterappealedto theproducer,
changesto "take mostofthecurseoff."But JoyaccusedPoynterofgoLittleTokio,
ing softon the Japaneseand gave OWI an ultimatum:
U.S.A. wouldgo out as it stoodor it could be killedifit contradicted
TwentiethCentury-Fox
had regovernment
policy.Poyntercapitulated.
ceivedarmyapprovalforthefilmandhadrushedcameracrewsto "Little
oftheactualevacuation.12
Tokio" in Los Angelestoshootfootage
OWI now recognizedthat to inject its propagandaideas into feature films,the Hollywoodbureau had to influencethe studioswhile
filmswere beingproduced;moreover,since the armywas interested
mainlyin securitynot ideology,the bureauhad to be the sole pointof
contact between the governmentand the industry.Accordingly,
forreview.
Poynteraskedthestudiosto submittheirscriptsto his office
Whilehe had no directpowerto demandscripts,Poynterachievedsome
step. The Comlimitedcooperation.He had takenan unprecedented
11 Manuel Quezon to Lowell Mellett,Aug. 17, 1942, Mellett to Sam Goldwyn,
Aug. 20,
1942, Goldwynto Mellett,Aug. 22, 1942, Box 1433B, ScriptReview,"Kim," Aug. 4, 1942,
Box 1438, Leo Rostento Mellett,June23, 1942, Box 888, Mellettto VictorSaville,Sept. 23,
1942, Box 3527, Poynterto Mellett,Aug. 25, 1942, Mellettto Poynter,Sept. 1, 1942, Box
Sept.6, 1942.
1438, OWI Records;Harrison's Reports,
12 Feature
Review,LittleTokio,US.A., July9, 1942, Box 3518, OWI Records.
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History
mitteeon Public Information
(Creel Committee)of WorldWar I had
allowedfilmsto go abroadonly if the committee'sshortswentwith
them,but GeorgeCreel apparently
had not attempted
to influencethe
13
contentofentertainment
filmsdirectly.
As studioshesitantlybegan submittingscripts,OWI encountered
problems.Particularly
sensitivewas the depictionof home-front
race
relations.MGM's "Man on America'sConscience" refurbished
Andrew Johnsonas the hero of Reconstruction;
vulture-like
Thaddeus
Stevensfulfilled
the need fora heavy.OWI passedthe scriptto Walter
White,executivesecretary
oftheNationalAssociationfortheAdvancementof ColoredPeople,who,withthe blackpress,theDaily Worker,
and a group of Hollywoodluminaries,raised a chorus of protest.
Mayerdismissedthe outcryas the workof whathe called "the communistcell" at MGM. When Mellettappealedto nationalunity,the
studioat lastagreedto deletetheinflammatory
references
to slaveryand
to changeStevensinto a sincere,if still misguided,figure.The film,
releasedin December 1942 as TennesseeJohnson,did not entirely
please OWI, but it demonstrated
nonethelessthe influencethe bureau
14
couldwieldbyreadingscripts.
Poynterseizedthatopportunity
withone ofthefewscriptsParamount
submitted,
So ProudlyWe Hail, a $2 millionepicoftheseigeofBataan.
He suggestedthatone ofthearmynursesheadedformartyrdom
might
We thoughtwe ...
say: "Why are we dying?Whyare we suffering?
could not be affected
by all the pestiferous,
politicalspotselsewherein
the world. We have learned a lot about epidemicsand disease....
when
a politicalplaguebrokeout there[in Manchuria]byinvasion,we would
not have been willingto do somethingabout it. We had to wait until
thisplaguespreadout further
and further
untilit hitPearlHarbor." He
also outlineda Christmassermonthattracedthe cause of democracy
fromJesusChristthroughthe "Centuryof the CommonMan." The
studiowrotein someofPoynter'sideas,thoughnotin his exactwords,
and OWI rankeditamongthebestofthewarfilms."5
3Poynterto Mellett,July23, Sept. 2, 1942, Box 3518, Davis to NormanThomas,Sept. 23,
press release,"Synopsis of Little Tokio,
1942, Box 3. OWl Records;TwentiethCentury-Fox
U.S.A..' LittleTokio, US.A. file(MargaretHerrickLibrary,Academyof Motion PictureArts
and Sciences, Beverly Hills); James R. Mock and Cedric Larson, Words That Won the
War: The Story of the Committeeon Public Information,1917-1919 (Princeton,1939),
142-56.
" Jones to Poynter.Aug. 6. 1942, WalterWhite to Mellett,Aug. 17, 1942, Mellettto
Maurice Revnes,Aug. 18, 1942. Mellettto Poynter,Aug. 27, 1942, Box 1433E, Poynterto
Mellett.Aug. 25. 1942. FeatureReview,TennesseeJohnson,Nov. 30, 1942, Mellettto Louis B.
Mayer,Nov. 25, 1942, Box 3510. OW1Records.
" ScriptReview."So ProudlyWe Hail," Nov. 19, 1942, Poynterto Mark Sandrich,Oct. 28,
1942, June22, 1943. "Re ChaplainSpeech-So ProudlyWe Hail", Nov. 25, 1942, Box 3511,
OWl Records.
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Whatto ShowtheWorld
95
CombatfilmsreflectedOWI's influenceprobablyas much as any
andgeographically
type.In thebureau'sidealcombatmoviean ethnically
diversegroupof Americanswould articulatewhat theywere fighting
for,pay due regardto the role of the Allies,and battlean enemywho
was formidable
but not a superman.In RKO's Bombardiers
a pacifistinfluencedbombardier
worriedabout bombinginnocentcivilians.At
OWI's suggestion
therevisedscriptintroduced
theconceptofa justwar
and explainedthat the enemy's targetswere everywhere
while the
Americans',althoughadmittedly
notsurgically
precise,werelimitedto
militarytargets.Occasionallythe studios became too bold for the
bureau."War is horrible,"BMP acknowledged,
butit nevertheless
asked the studioto "minimizethe more bloodyaspects" in Corregidor.
OWI likedrealitybutnottoo muchofit,whichreinforced
Hollywood's
inclination
towardavoidance.This, evenmorethanOWI's sermonettes,
vitiatedthe impactof manycombatpictures.So ProudlyWe Hail remainedchieflya cheesecake-studded
storyof love on the troopcarriers
and in the foxholes.And "the mostsincerethingParamount'syoung
womendid," said Agee, "was to altertheirmake-upto favorexhaustion (and not too much of it) over prettiness(and not too littleof
that)...." Few featurefilms approachedthe impact of combat
such as JohnHuston'sBattleofSan Pietroand especialdocumentaries,
16
lytheBritishDesertVictory.
By the fallof 1942 filmsin all categorieswereshowingOWl's imprint,whetherthroughscriptreviewor application
ofthemanualforthe
The motionpicturebureaupraisedtwofilmsreleasedin 1942
industry.
forfillingin gaps on the home front.MGM's Keeper of the Flame
dramatized
nativefascism.A wealthyAmericanwantedto institute
antilabor,anti-Negro,
anti-Semitic,
and anti-Catholic
campaignsand to exploitthepeopleoftheUnitedStatesformembersofhis class. Universal
Picturesmade Pittsburgh
to show the home frontgearedforwar. A
love trianglecomposedof JohnWayne,RandolphScott,
tempestuous
and MarleneDietrichwas resolvedwhenlaborand management
united
behindsomething
greaterthanthemselves,
the war effort.
Some of the
speecheshad been "culled directly"fromtheOWI manual,thebureau
observed,"and mighthave been improvedby translation
into terms
more directlyand simplyrelatingto the characters. . . in this particular
16 ScriptReview,"Air Force," Oct.
27, 1942, Box 3515, ScriptReview,"Bombardier,"Oct.
19, 1942, Box 3522, Script Review, "Corregidor," Nov. 21, 1942, Feature Review,
Corregidor,
March 3, 1943, Box 3515, FeatureReview,GuadalcanalDiary, Oct. 26, 1943,
Feature Review,Desert Victory,April 22, 1943, Box 3518, OWI Records;Manny Farber,
"Love in theFoxholes,"New Republic,109 (Sept.27, 1943), 426; Agee,Agee on Film,52-53,
65; Sklar,Movie-MadeAmerica,255; Jacobs,"WorldWarII andtheAmericanFilm," 13.
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96
ofAmerican
The Journal
History
film." But OWI HollywoodreviewersurgedMellettnot to missPittsburghorKeeperoftheFlame.17
If the studioschose to ignoreOWI, however,theycould turnout
whatPoyntertermed"ill-conceivedatrocities."PrestonSturges'giddy
ParamountcomedyPalm Beach Storycarriedon the Hollywoodtradithe idle rich.But the BMP fearedthatthis "libel on
tionof satirizing
would
ofwartimehardships,
Americaat war," withits blithedisregard
offendthe Americanallies. AnotherHollywoodstaplethat disturbed
OWI was the gangsterfilm,of whichParamount'sLuckyJordanwas
The herotriedto dodgethedraftand swindlethearmy;
representative.
grandpanhandling
but when the Nazi agentsbeat up a gin-swilling,
him,he convertedto the Americancause,
motherwho had befriended
to the army.
helpedroundup the Axis spy ring,and meeklyreturned
His turnaboutdramatizedin specific,human terms the realityof
suggestedto OWI reviewers
commitment
fascism.Yet his individualistic
thatthe UnitedStateshad nothingideologicalagainstAdolfHitler;as
theheroputit,AmericansjustdidnotlikethewayNazis pushedpeople
intellectual
around.OWI wantedthe heroto undergoa moreprofound
BMP feared,moreover,that
awakeningand to announceit explicitly.
harmful
whilenotparticularly
films'cynicismand lawlessness,
gangster
at home,tendedto supportAxis propagandaabroad.The bureauasked
the Officeof Censorshipto bar Palm Beach Story,LuckyJordan,and
otherfilmsit dislikedfromexport.The censorshipcode was limited
however,and since thesefilmshardly
mainlyto securityinformation,
secrets,thecensorgrantedthemexportlicenses.The
containedmilitary
was morelenientthantheadvocatesoffreespeech."8
censor,ironically,
bad reportson the effectof Americanfilms
Hearing increasingly
abroad,Davis lookedfora wayto keepHollywoodfromputtingacross
"day in and day out, the mostoutrageouscaricatureof the American
of OWI's overseas
character."Mellettproposedthata representative
could morecredibly
branchjoin BMP's Hollywoodoffice;thisofficial
relationsand couldcarryOWI's
objectthatcertainfilmsharmedforeign
case to thecensor."It wouldhurtlikehell" ifa picturewerewithheld
Mellettpointedout. Davis agreedand apfromforeigndistribution,
" FeatureReviews,KeeperoftheFlame,Dec. 7, 1942, Box 1435, Pittsburgh,
Nov. 30, 1942,
Poynterto Mellett,Dec. 2, 1942, Box 3520, OWI Records;"Fascist Flame," Newsweek,XXI
(March 22, 1943), 80-81; "Keeper ofthe Flame," Time,XLI (Jan.25, 1943), 86, 88; Stewart,
Bya StrokeofLuck!,261-63.
8 Jonesto Poynter,
Nov. 6, 1942, Box 1433, FeatureReview,LuckyJordan,Nov. 17, 1942,
Box 1435, UlricBell to RobertRiskin,Dec. 10, 1942, Box 3, Poynterto Mellett,Oct. 6, 19, 29,
1942, Officeof CensorshipCircular,Sept. 9, 1942, Box 1438, OWI Records.See also Michael
Wood,AmericaintheMovies(NewYork,1975), 37-38.
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97
pointedone ofSherwood'schiefaides,UlricBell, as theoverseasarm's
bureauchiefforthe
Washington
representative
to Hollywood.A former
Bell possessedimpeccableNew Deal credenLouisvilleCourier-Journal,
tialsand had been one of the keyfiguresin the prewarinterventionist
movement.Arrivingin Hollywoodin November1942, he shared
Poynter'sreviewingstaff.Bell's influencesoon exceededwhatMellett
andPoynterhad dreamedofor,indeed,thoughtproper.19
OWI then tried to cut in on the chummyrelationshipbetween
Hollywoodand the more glamorousarmedforcesin earlyDecember
furnished
men,equipment,and
1942. The war and navydepartments
advice to the compliantindustry.The militarybranchesscrutinized
scriptsand filmsmainlyforsecurityand seldomcooperatedwithOWL.
Davis askedthe war and navydepartments
to channelall of theircontactswiththe movieindustrythroughOWI's Hollywoodoffice.The
declined.20
military
flatly
a hotlycontroversial
letterto the
At thesametimeMellettdispatched
and
studios.He advisedthe industryto submitroutinelytreatments
scripts,to Poynter'sofsynopsesof projectedfilms,as well as finished
fice. Mellett also asked the producersto submit all filmsto his
Hollywoodoutpostin thelongcut,thelaststagebeforefinalprintswere
made. While littlenew materialcould be addedthen,OWI could still
recommend
thatharmful
scenesbe snippedout. Moreover,all contacts
services,
betweenthestudiosand federalagencies,includingthemilitary
should be channeledthroughBMP. "Censors SharpenAxes," banneredVariety.Mellettwanted"completecensorship
overthepolicyand
of Twentieth
contentof our pictures,"said Bill Goetz,vice president
theattitudeofnearlyall studioheads.The magnates
Century,
reflecting
wantedan in-housecensor,such as Mayer or Y. FrankFreeman,the
conservative
headofParamount.2"
Shockedbytheindustry's
furiousreaction,Mellettand Davis triedto
soothethe executives.Studiosremainedfreeto makeany picturethey
wantedwithoutconsultinganybody,and, shortof violatingtreason
19 Davis to Mellett,Sept. 7, 1942, Mellettto Davis, Sept. 9, 1942, Box 890, Davis press
release,Sept. 11, 1942, Box 3510, OWI Records;WilliamTuttle,Jr.,"Aid-to-the-Allies
Short
of War versus American Intervention,1940: A Reappraisalof William Allen White's
Leadership,"Journalof AmericanHistory,LVI (March 1970), 840-58; Mark L. Chadwin,The
AmericanInterventionists
beforePearlHarbor(New York,1970), 51-52.
Warhawks:
20 Poynter
to Mellett,Oct. 6, 20, 1942, Box 1438, Davis to HenryL. Stimson,Dec. 3, 1942,
A. D. Surlesto Davis, Dec. 11, 1942, Box 1, OWI BoardMinutes,Oct. 31, 1942, Box 41, OWI
Records;Winkler,"PoliticsandPropaganda,"5 5-62.
21 Mellettto Goldwyn,
Dec. 9, 1942, Box 1443; Bill Goetzto Mellett,Dec. 21, 1942, Goetzto
GardnerCowles,Jr.,Dec. 22, 1942, JeanHerrickto Cowles,Dec. 19, 1942, Box 12A, OWI
Records;Variety,
Dec. 23, 1942.
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98
The Journal
ofAmerican
History
any picturein the UnitedStates.The
statutes,theycould distribute
main purposeof the letter,Mellettand Davis insisted,had been to
clarifythe relationship
betweenOWI and the armedforcesforthe indialogue
dustry.Privately
MelletttoldPoynterto pull back.Suggesting
forSo Proudly We Hail had been a mistake,Mellettsaid; Poynter
pridein Pittsburghand Keeper of the
agreed.The Hollywood-office
in those
Flamecould"only resultfromtheappearanceofyourownstuff
two pictures,"BMP's chiefcontinued."The propagandasticksout
disturbingly.""Great things" had alreadybeen accomplished,but
Mellett warnedPoynterto modifyhis operationin whateverways
untilthestormsubsided.22
necessary
in the
decidedimprovement
In fact,BMP reviewersacknowledged
treatment
ofOWI themesin late 1942 and early1943. Hollywoodtried
to redeemits prewarcondescension
by stressingthe
towardforeigners
Resistance.BMP likedthe 1942 AcademyAwardwinnerCasablanca
forits depictionof the valiantunderground,
the UnitedStatesas the
ofpersonaldesiresto the
havenoftheoppressed,
and thesubordination
thatthe
greatercause of the war-althoughtheywouldhave preferred
herohad verbalizedthe reasonsforhis conversion.As OWI suggested,
Fritz Lang's storyof Lidice,Hangmen Also Die, showed a united
CzechoslovakiaresistingGermanbarbarism.This Land Is Mine, the
workofJeanRenoirand DudleyNichols,seemedto OWI a "superb"
cappedby the "vital" orationof the
pictureof the Frenchresistance,
once cowardlyschoolmasterdefyingoccupationauthorities.Yet, as
criticssuch as Leo Braudynoted,the teacher,forall his passion,remained"a manoratingin a lockedroom." Even in thetalentedhands
of Renoir and Nichols, the message overwhelmedthe creationof
and realsituations.23
believablecharacters
efforts
to
Such problems,amongothers,counteracted
OWI-approved
reverseHollywood'snegativeprewarimage of the SovietUnion. The
idea of filmingAmbassadorJosephE. Davies' Mission to Moscow
madesome
didnotoriginatewithOWI, butBMP reviewers
apparently
whentheyreadthe script,whichfollowed
relatively
minorsuggestions
Beneatha giantworldmap, the prescient
the book all too faithfully.
22 Davis pressconference,
Dec. 23, 1942, Box 1442, OWI BoardMeetingMinutes,Dec. 22,
26, 1942, Box 41, Mellettto Goetz,Dec. 26, 1942, Box 12A, H. M. Warnerto Mellett,Dec. 16,
1942, Box 1443, OWI Records;Mellettto Poynter,Dec. 30, 1942, Box 16, LowellMellett
HydePark).
Papers(Franklin
D. RooseveltLibrary,
23 Bell to Riskin,
Dec. 9, 1942, Feb. 23, 1943, Box 3, FeatureReviews,Casablanca,Oct. 28,
1942, HangmenAlso Die, Feb. 22, 1943, Box 3523, Poynterto DudleyNichols,Oct. 9, 1942,
Box 3515, OWI Records;Leo Braudy,Jean Renoir: The Worldof His Films (Garden City,
N.Y., 1972), 139; Andre Bazin,JeanRenoir(New York, 1973), 264-68; RaymondDurgnat,
1974), 236-37; Higham,ArtoftheAmericanFilm,266.
JeanRenoir(Berkeley,
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Whatto ShowtheWorld
99
Davies chattedamiablywith an avuncularJosephStalin,illustrating
how Americansand Russianswereall brothersunderthe skin in the
globalstruggle.Bell termedthepicture"a sockojob on theisolationists
and appeasers-the boldest thing yet done by Hollywood." Bold
perhaps,but its cosmetictreatmentof the occupationof Finland,
whitewashof the Moscow purgetrials,and abnormally
simplisticformula evidentlyconvinced few viewers. Mission to Moscow was
"mishmash,"said MannyFarberofNew Republic."A greatgladtwomillion-dollar
bowl of cannedborscht.
. . ,"
sighedAgee.24
LillianHellman'sscript
Brotherhood
usuallymeantAmericanization.
forGoldwyn'sNorthStarhad goodpossibilities,
in itssemiparticularly
documentaryapproach to ordinaryRussians. But directorLewis
MilestoneturnedtheBessarabiancooperativeintoan Americanprairie
town,and thehandsomepeasantssangand dancedas iftheyhad strayed
froma Broadwaymusical."War has put Hollywood'straditional
conceptionof the Muscovitesthroughthe wringer,"observedVariety,
"and theyhavecomeout shaved,washed,sober,goodto theirfamilies,
Rotarians,
brother
Elks,and 33rdDegreeMason."25
The motion-picture
bureaualso recordedsuccess in reorienting
the
portrayalof the home front.One Destiny told how Pearl Harbor
changedthelivesand affections
ofvariouspersonsin an Iowa farmcommunity.The bureaupersuadedTwentiethCentury-Fox
to changethe
originalscript'semphasison ill feelingbetweenan enlistedman and a
man who stayedon thefarmto an understanding
ofhow thewareffort
needed various talentsin many places. King Vidor's An American
Romanceoriginallyrecountedthe rags-to-riches
saga of a Slavic immigrantwho becamea greatautomobilemanufacturer,
sold out, and
then returnedto manufacture
aircraftfor the war effort.The individualistic,Henry Ford-inspired
hero troubledOWI, but bureau
inducedchanges softenedthe picturesufficiently
for OWI approval.
Blacks,who in thefirstscripthad beennice butdefinitely
to be keptin
theirplace, were eliminated.The depictionof labor unionsas radical
24 ScriptReview,"Mission to Moscow," Nov. 30, 1942, Poynter
to Bob Buckner,Dec. 3,
1942, FeatureReview,Missionto Moscow,April29, 1943, Bell to Riskin,April29, 1943, Box
3523, OWI Records;Manny Farber,"Mishmash," New Republic,108 (May 10, 1943), 636;
Agee, Agee on Film, 37-39; JackWarner,My FirstHundredYearsin Hollywood(New York,
1965), 290. See also Melvin Small, "Buffoonsand Brave Hearts: HollywoodPortraysthe
Russians, 1939-1944," CaliforniaHistoricalQuarterly,LII (Winter 1973), 330-33; Charles
Higham,WarnerBrothers
(New York,1975),158-71.
25 Script Review, "The North Star," May 12, 1943, Box 1434, OWI Records; Lillian
Hellman, An UnfinishedWoman (Boston, 1969), 125; Richard Moody, Lillian Hellman:
Playwright(New York, 1972), 140; Elliot Paul, "Of Film Propaganda,"Atlantic,CLXXVI
(Sept.1945),123; "The New Pictures,"Time,XLII (Nov. 8,1943), 54; Variety,
Oct. 28,1942.
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100
The Journal
ofAmerican
History
violentconspiracies-"a fascisttacticpure and simple," said OWIwas altered.For OWI and outsidereviewersalike,the strength
of An
AmericanRomancelay in its documentary-style
celebrationof United
Statesgeography
thatconveyed"the greatness
ofAmerica."26
DespiteBMP's influenceon moviecontent,Bell begancampaigning
to curbpictureshe feltwerestillundesirable.
The OfficeofCensorship
issueda newcode on December11, 1942, thathelpedBell immensely.
The newindexbannedfromexportfilmsthatshowedrationing
or other
economicpreparations
fora long war, scenes of lawlessnessin which
orderwas not restoredand theoffenders
punished(thisaimedprimarily
in the United
at gangsterfilms),and portrayals
oflaboror class conflict
Statessince 1917. Bell wantedthe code tightened
even more.Poynter
vehementlydisagreed,especiallywith the restrictions
on post-1917
America.If OWI's strategy
was to tell the truth,he argued,it should
"make a sacrificehit now and then." Filmsshouldadmitthe United
States had problems,as foreignersknew, but should show how
democracysolvedthem."Fascist methodsneed not be used to defeat
the commonenemyof Fascism," he toldBell. Poynterpredictedthat
the new code would make studios shy away fromsignificant
war
themes.27
Bell nevertheless
pressedthe censor,particularly
as a meansof trapping"B" moviesthatwereoftenshotwithoutscriptsand ofthwarting
studiosthat triedto parlaymilitaryor FBI approvalinto an export
license.They Came to Blow Up America,whichdealtwiththe seven
saboteurswho landedon LongIslandin 1942, was a case in point.The
FederalBureauofInvestigation
saw nothingwrongwiththe script,but
Bell thoughtthesabotagewas exaggerated
and FBI was shownas inefficient."Even the FBI's approvaldoes not makeit suitableforoverseas
presentation,"he said. The censor passed it anyway.Bell enlisted
Davis' help in February1943 fora testcase, Republic'squickie"B"
feature,London BlackoutMurders.This pictureimpliedthe British
wouldaccepta negotiated
government
peace,tooksome mildswipesat
LendLease,and showedan overworked
doctoraccidentally
cuttingoffa
her leg. Censorwoman'shead duringa blackoutinsteadof amputating
26 ScriptReviews,"One Destiny,' Jan.4, March 24, April27, 1943, Box 1434, "America,"
Nov. 5, 1942, FeatureReview,America,WilliamS. Cunninghamto Revnes,Feb. 17, 1944,
Box 3525, OWI Records;HermineRich Isaacs, "Salute to the Living: Films in Review,"
TheatreArts, XXVIII (Nov. 1944), 669; "An AmericanRomance," Time, XLIV (Oct. 16,
1944), 94.
to Bell, Feb. 13, 1943, Box 1438, Bell to Riskin,March 31, 1943, Box 3510, Bell
21 Poynter
to Riskin,April3, 1943, Box 15, OWI Records;Bell to Poynter,May 19, 1943, Poynterto Bell,
toMellett,June5, 26, 1943, Box 16, MellettPapers.
June4, 1943, Poynter
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Whatto ShowtheWorld
101
shipdirectorByronPricecould not agreethat"suppressionshouldgo
thelengthsBell has suggested."America'salliescould "take it," Price
said, "and the enemy would find ways to distortdevelopments
pictureI WalkedWitha Zombie
anyway." RKO hid its low-budget
fromBell untilthe censorgrantedan exportlicense.In similarfashion
LamourpicaresqueRoad
otherfilms,includingthe Bob Hope-Dorothy
to Morocco,whichEisenhowerhad said "simplymustnotreachNorth
outofthecountry.28
Africa,"werespirited
Congress'anti-New
In mid-summer
1943, however,Bell triumphed.
Deal axe choppedOWI's domesticbranchto a fractionof its former
size. Mellettand PoynterleftBMP, ParamountexecutiveStantonGrifand
fistookchargeofwhatlittleremainedofBMP's own productions,
the Hollywoodreviewstaff.FreedofPoynter'srestraints
Bell inherited
Rothacker
to adopthis apBell convincedWestCoastcensorWatterson
audiencesFugitive
deniedforeign
proach.In quicksuccessionRothacker
froma PrisonCamp, The GreatSwindle,The Batman,HillbillyBlitzkrieg,SleepyLagoon,andSecretServicein DarkestAfrica.By fall1943
in almostall cases. Films
the censorfollowedOWI's recommendations
wouldbe barredfrom
such as LuckyJordan,Bell said,almostcertainly
between
OWI and thecenThe
difference
remaining
major
exportnow.
whites'
such as BuffaloBill, whichdramatized
sor concernedwesterns,
of Indians.The filmhad a factualbasis, Rothackerobmistreatment
served,and sinceit was set before1917 he couldnottouchit. OWI had
becomethe censor's advanceguard.Hollywoodcould stillmake any
filmit chose, but as the Motion PictureHerald pointedout, no one
wouldproducea picture"known in advanceto be doomedto domestic
exclusively."29
exhibition
BMP's increasinginfluenceover a Hollywoodwillingto cooperate
especiallyjuveniledelinwas apparentin moviesaboutthe homefront,
quency.WhereAre Your Children?appalledBMP reviewerswithits
drunkenness,
youthful
ofa younggirl'sdownfall,
"sensationalportrayal
a
in
a
orgiasticdancingand necking, seductionresulting pregnancy,
28 Bell to Davis, Jan.9, 1943, Davis to Price,Jan. 16, 1943, Priceto Davis, Jan. 23, 1943,
MiltonS. Eisenhowerto Bell, Dec. 31, 1943, Box 3, Bell to Davis, March 8, 1943, Box 3509,
BelltoPhilHamblet,Feb. 23, 1943, Box 3518, OWI Records.
29 Bell to Louis Lober,Dec. 15, 1943, Cunningham
to Lober,June29, 1944, Box 3509, Bell
to Riskin,Nov. 1, 1943, Box 3, FeatureReview,BuffaloBill, Box 3518, "ReportofActivitiesof
the OverseasBranch,Bureau of Motion Pictures,HollywoodOffice,January1, 1943-August
15, 1943," Box 65, OWl Records;MotionPictureHerald, Aug. 14, 1943; Winkler,"Politics
and Propaganda," 84-85. RichardR. Lingemanerroneouslyconcludes that the Hollywood
liaisonefforts
endedwiththe budgetcut. Lingeman,Don't You Know There'sa WarOn?, 188.
Althoughthe revisedcensorshipcode was issuedaboutthe same timeas Mellett'sletterto the
studios,thetwoeventsappearnotto beconnected.
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102
ofAmerican
History
The Journal
suicideand therepentant
stolencar,a joy ride,a murder,an attempted
older generation."While the filmpromisedsomethingforeveryone,
OWI told MonogramPicturesto tone it down if it wantedforeign
release.The studio'scuts did notsatisfyOWL. FollowingBMP recomordered508 feetcutfromthefilmbefore
mendations
closely,Rothacker
was a film
to delinquency
he approvedit forexport.RKO's contribution
OWI
under
modification
its
suggested
of
titles
whose progression
pressure:YouthRuns WildbecameAre TheseOur Children?thenThe
DangerousAge, whichwas releasedas Look to Your Children,whose
conclusionassembleda seriesof "stock shots showinghow the Boy
are combatand similarinstitutions
Scouts,4-H Clubs,cityplaygrounds
solvtingjuvenileproblems."Likesin punishedin theend,democracy
was ruledsuitableforexport.30
ingitsproblems
Almostall the majorOWI themesconvergedin the mostexpensive
picturemade up to thattime,DarrylZanuck's hagiographicWilson,
LamarTrottito
releasedin August1944. BMP persuadedscreenwriter
balancemachinepoliticiansby emphasizingthe people's power.The
studioexciseda lineto whichBMP objected:"With Wilsonnow firmly
in the saddle and riding herd on a docile Congress.
. . ."
While the
originalscripthad dwelledon the failureof the League ofNations,the
mencouldnotkillthe
revisedversionstressedhope. A fewobstructive
League,WoodrowWilsonsaid; "the dreamof a worldunitedagainst
the awfulwastesof war is too deeplyimbeddedin the heartsof men
in
everywhere."OWI recommendedWilson for special distribution
liberatedareas, not merelybecause its themewas "so vital to the
warfareof the UnitedNations," but becauseof the picpsychological
and a $5.2
value." Despitegood intentions
ture's "rare entertainment
millionbudget,however,Hollywoodand OWI reduceda character
worthyof WilliamShakespeareto a cardboardprig and his ideas to
a bore;
as entertainment,
it was a travesty;
As history
primersimplicity.
a bust.3'
as box-office,
withOWI
Wilsonwas one ofthelastmajorfilmsto deal significantly
themes.Combatpictures,such as ThirtySeconds Over Tokyo,held
suchas PrideoftheMarines,
steady;and picturesaboutthehomefront,
30 Bell to Watterson
Rothacker,Nov. 12, 1943, FeatureReview,WhereAre Your Children,
for'Where Are Your Children'" [Dec. 1, 19431,
Nov. 8, 1943, "Cuts Requiredby Rothacker
Box 3530, FeatureReviews,The DangerousAge, March 30, 1944, YouthRuns Wild,July25,
1944, Box 3515, OWI Records.Michael Wood suggeststhatthis typicalHollywoodtreatment
of "middle class Americanliberalism."Wood, Americain
of social problemsis representative
theMovies,126, 129, 125.
31 ScriptReview,"Wilson," Sept. 20, 1943, FeatureReview,Wilson,Aug. 1, 1944, Box
3518, OWI Records;Agee,Agee on Film,110-13; Divine,SecondChance,169-72.
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Whatto ShowtheWorld
103
whichfulfilled
OWI's desireforfilmsaboutreturning
veterans,showed
a slightincrease.But the otherOWI categoriesshowedsharpdeclines.
The 1944 AcademyAward winner,Bing Crosby'sGoing My Way,
reflected
theshiftto non-ideological,
frequently
religious,entertainment
picturesin which war and rumorsof war seldom intruded.Several
reasonscontributed
to thisshift,amongthemincreasing
warweariness
and a sensethatthewarwouldend soon. But anotherimportant
cause
of the declinewas what Poynterhad predicted:the alliancebetween
OWI and the censor made the studios shy away fromsignificant
themes.32
By thefallof 1943 Bell had convincedeverystudioexceptParamount
to let OWI read all theirscriptsinsteadof certainselectedones, and
evenParamountagreedto discussitsscriptswithOWI in generalterms.
In 1943 OWI read 466 scripts,in 1944, 744. The 1,210 scripts
reviewedin those two yearsrepresented
almostthreefourthsof the
1,652 scriptsthe Hollywoodofficeread betweenMay 1942 and its
demisein August1945. FromSeptember1943 throughAugust1944,
BMP analyzedeighty-four
scriptswithAmericanlawlessnessor corruption as a main theme;forty-seven
were correctedto its satisfaction.
Racial problemswerecorrectedor eliminatedin twentyof twenty-four
instances,distortions
of military
or politicalfactsin forty-four
of fiftynine cases. Fifty-nine
of the eightyscriptsthatportrayed
Americans
obliviousto the war wereimproved.DuringthisperiodOWI managed
to have 277 ofthe 390 cases ofobjectionable
materialcorrected,
a success ratioof71 percent.Yet thesestatistics
understate
OWI's influence.
Many scriptsalreadyshowedtheinfluence
ofthe "Manual fortheMotionPictureIndustry"whentheyreachedOWI readers,makingalterations unnecessary.Completestatisticsare not available, but from
JanuarythroughAugust 1943-before Bell's agreement
withthe censor had much effect-BMP inducedthe industry
to droptwenty-nine
scheduledproductions
and, particularly
to reworkpartsof
noteworthy,
fivefilmsalreadyapprovedbythecensor.Bell closedtheremaining
gaps
in the line establishedby Mellettand Poynter.Frommid-1943 until
the end of the war,OWI exertedan influence
overan Americanmass
mediumneverequaledbeforeor since by a government
The
agency.33
"Feature Review,ThirtySeconds Over Tokyo,Sept. 12, 1944, Box 3517, OWI Records;
DorothyB. Jones, "The HollywoodWar Film: 1942-1944," HollywoodQuarterly,I (Oct.
1945), 1-14.
" Bell to Lober,Dec. 15, 1943, Box 3530, "Report of Activitiesof the OverseasBranch,
Bureau ofMotionPictures,HollywoodOffice,January1, 1943-August15, 1943," "Reporton
Activities,
1942-1945," Sept.18, 1945, Box 65, OWI Records.
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104
The Journal
ofAmerican
History
contentof World War II motion picturesis inexplicablewithout
to thebureau.
reference
compliant.The industry
Hollywoodhad provedto be remarkably
with
neednotinterfere
foundthatitssinceredesireto helpthewareffort
businessthatwas betterthanusual. Freedomof the screenhad never
been Hollywood'slong suit: an industrythat had fearedbeing "enslaved" by Mellettwas alreadyin thrallto Will Hays. As the studios
learnedthatOWI wanted"'onlyto be helpful,theirattitudeschange[d]
miraculously,"observedRobertRiskin,a Sherwoodaide who had been
writers.In "brutal honesty,"Riskin
one of Hollywood'shighest-paid
continued,the industry's"unprecedentedprofits" had encouraged
cooperationthatsurprisedeven the "movie moguls." The studioslet
forproduction-someof
BMP knowwhatstoriestheywereconsidering
the hottestsecretsin movieland-so thatthe bureaucould steerthem
intoless crowdedareas and thussmoothout the picturecycle.OWL's
role was especiallyimportant.Hollywoodfilmshit the
international
beachesrightbehindthe Americantroops,providedtheyhad OWI approval;the agencychargedadmissionand held the moneyin trustfor
thestudios.UnitedStatesfilmmakerswereplanninga large-scaleinvaindispension ofthe foreignmarketafterthewar,and OWI established
sablebeachheads.Indeed,Riskinlamentedin mid-1944:"An unsavory
opinionseemsto prevailwithinOWI thattheMotionPictureBureauis
interests.'34
forcommercial
undulyconcernedwithconsiderations
conflict,
theyeventuseemed
to
first
and
Hollywood
OWI
Although
ally developedexcellentrapport,fortheiraims and approacheswere
essentiallycompatible.The "chief functionof mass culture," Robert
Warshowhas observed,"is to relieveone ofthenecessityofexperiencing one's life directly." Hollywood,conceivingof its audience as
and avoidanceof issues. OWI enpassive,emphasizedentertainment
couragedHollywoodto treatmoresocialissuesand to movebeyondnamainly
tionaland racialstereotypes.
However,sinceOWI was interested
it raisedsocial issues
in response,it stressedideologyand affirmation;
divergent
washthemaway.Here theseemingly
onlyto havedemocracy
bothled
pathsofHollywoodand OWI joined:avoidanceand affirmation
by
to evasionofexperience.Insteadofopeningrealmsofunderstanding
confronting
experience,OWL, the propagandaagency,and Hollywood,
" Riskinto Bell. Oct. 22, 1943, Box 3510, Riskinto EdwardBarrett,Aug. 12, 1944, Box 19,
withJones,Dec. 6, 1974; RobertB. Randle,"A Studyof the
OWI Records:Koppes interview
War Time Control Imposed on the Civilian Motion Picture Industry" (masters thesis,
1950), 8 5-86.
University
ofSouthernCalifornia,
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Whatto ShowtheWorld
105
the dreamfactory,
joinedhandsto denyrealities.Howeverlaudablethe
goals ofpropaganda,
JaquesEllul has suggestedthatit createsa person
in the mass, who rejects
"'who is not at ease exceptwhen integrated
because he clings to
criticaljudgments,choices,and differentiations
clearcertainties."35
Throughtheirinfluenceover motionpictures,the
OWI's liberalsunderminedthe liberationfor which they said they
fought.
" Warshow.Immediate
Experience.38: Agee,Agee on Film.330: Ellul.Propaganda,256.
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