Filozofski vestnik
L etnik/V olum e XXII • Številka/N uraber 2 • 2001 • 21-42
AESTHETICS, PHILOSOPHY OF CULTURE AND
“THE AESTHETIC TURN”
L ars - O l o f  h lb er g
Zweifellos erleben wir gegenwärtig e in en Ästhetik-Boom. Er
re ic h t von d er individuellen S tilisierung ü b er die Stadt­
g e sta ltu n g u n d die Ö k onom ie bis zur T h e o rie . . . zu­
n eh m en d gilt uns die W irklichkeit im ganzen als ästhetisches
K onstrukt.
-W olfgang Welsch
A esthetics should be . . . reth o u g h t in such a way th a t it
becom es em bedded in a b ro ad er context within philosophy
o f h u m an culture.
-H e in z Paetzold
A book advocating philosophy as th e reasoned pursuit of
aesthetic living can n o t h arbor an essential dualism between
reason an d aesthetics, reflected in an unbridgeable divide
betw een the m odern an d postm odern.
-R ich ard Shusterm an
I
“A esthetics is a c h a o tic field o f inquiry w hich has h a d u n u su al difficulty
d e fin in g a n d o rg a n iz in g itself. It is also o n e o f th e m ost fascinating an d
ch a lle n g in g b ra n c h e s o f p h ilo so p h y ”, says K endall W alton in his review o f
M ichael Kelly’s Encyclopedia o f Aesthetics' W alton evidently thinks o f aesthetics
as philosophical a e s th e tic s , o r, as philosophy o f art, b u t ae sth e tic s can b e
u n d e rs to o d in a m u c h w ider c o n te x t - as it often is now adays- as a gen eral
th e o ry o f a rt a n d ae sth e tic ex p e rien ce , as the theory o f specific a rt form s, and
1 Kendall W alton, Review o f Encyclopedia of Aesthetics, ed. M ichael Kelly, 4 vols. (Oxford:
O x fo rd University Press, 1998), Times Literary Supplement, S eptem ber 29, 2000, p. 8.
L ars-O lof Ä m lb e r c .
as an in teg ra l p a rt o f th e philosophy o f c u ltu re . If p h ilo so p h ic a l ae sth etics is
a chaotic business, w hat th en a b o u t aesthetics b ro ad ly conceived?
In this p a p e r I p ro p o se to discuss so m e o f th e issues raised by R ich ard
S h u sterm an and W olfgang W elsch in th e ir re c e n t w ritings o n th e aim s a n d
pu rp o ses o f aesthetics. B oth p h ilo so p h ers advocate, w ith d iffe re n t em p h asis
an d p u rp o se , a refo rm ation a n d tran sfo rm atio n o f aesthetics as an in telle ctu al
discipline, an d they are b o th involved in th e “a e sth etic tu r n ” in p h ilosophy. I
shall b eg in by sk etch in g the b a c k g ro u n d against w hich th e c u r re n t revival o f
in te re st in aesthetics occurs b efo re discussing “th e a e sth e tic tu r n ” a n d in
p artic u la r S h u ste rm an ’s a n d W elsch’s views.
II
Aesthetics as the systematic philosophy o f a rt owes its existence, historically
s p e a k in g , to th e d is tin c tio n b e tw e e n aisthesis s e n s o ry p e r c e p t i o n a n d
e x p e rien ce ) an d noesis (reason a n d know ledge) in th e classical p h ilo so p h y o f
an tiq u ity , th e d ich o to m y b etw e en aisthesis a n d noesis d o m in a tin g m u c h
su b seq u e n t W estern philosophy a n d th o u g h t.
A esth e tic s as a p h ilo so p h ic a l d isc ip lin e , in a u g u r a te d by A le x a n d e r
B au m g arten in th e m id - 1750s b u t fo resh ad o w ed by L e ib n iz ’s re flectio n s o n
th e d ifferen ce b etw een clear a n d u n c le a r ideas a n d sen sa tio n s a n d th e ir
re la tio n sh ip to d istinct (th eo retical) id eas,2 is paradoxically b o th a ch ild o f
ratio n alism an d th e E n lig h te n m e n t a n d a t th e sam e tim e a c ritiq u e - a lb eit
an im plicit o n e - o f an absolute, logistic ratio n alism , w hich d o es n o t g ra n t
cognitive value to aisthesis. W olfgang W elsch rightly observes th a t B au m g arte n
conceived o f aesthetics (i.e. p h ilo so p h ical aesthetics) as c o m p le m e n tin g a n d
c o rre c tin g a one-sided a n d arid ra tio n a lism .3 Since th e palm y days o f th e
philo so p h y of a rt in th e 19th century, w h en th e p h ilo so p h y o f a rt was a t th e
c e n tre o f th e ph ilo so phical discussion a n d o c c u p ie d su ch an im p o rta n t place
in the philosophical systems o f H egel, S chelling a n d S ch o p en h a u er,4 aesthetics
2 Se Jeffrey Barnouw, “T he Beginnings o f ‘A esthetics’ an d th e Leibnizian C o nception
o f S ensation”, Eighteenth-Century Aesthetics and the Reconstruction o f Art, ed. Paul M a ttic k jr.
(Cam bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 52-95.
3 “B aum garten hat die Ä sthetik als K orrekturdisziplin des einseitigen R ationalism us
konzipiert u n d b egründet” (Wolfgang W elsch, Unsere postmoderne Moderne, 4e Aufl., Berlin:
A kadem ie Verlag, 1993), p. 88.
4W hen aesthetics as the philosophy o f art fell into d isrep u te d u rin g th e last decades o f
the 19th century this was in large m easure due to the overly speculative a n d “universalistic”
character o f H egel’s, Schelling’s and S c h o p e n h a u e r’s m etaphysics o f art, w hich elicited
22
A e s t h e t i c s , P h i l o s o p h y o f C u l t u r e a n d “T h e A e s t h e t ic T u r n ”
as th e p h ilo so p h y o f a rt has b e e n releg ated to the outskirts o f th e philosophical
la n d s c a p e b o th in th e p h e n o m e n o lo g ic a l a n d th e an aly tic tra d itio n s in
p h ilo so p h y d u rin g th e first h a lf o f the 20th century.5 D uring the 50s a n d the
60s, how ever, th e re is a ren ew ed in tere st in the philosophy o f a rt b o th in
C o n tin e n ta l p h ilo so p h y (“c o n tin e n ta l” b ein g an infelicitous geo g rap h ical
m e ta p h o r ) a n d in an aly tic p h ilo so p h y (“an a ly tic” b e in g a n in felicito u s
chem ical m e ta p h o r ). A lthough ontology, epistem ology, p hilosophy o f science,
p h i lo s o p h y o f l a n g u a g e a n d m o ra l p h ilo s o p h y h av e d o m in a te d th e
p h ilo so p h ic a l scen e, p h ilo so p h ic al aesthetics conceived as th e philosophy o f
a rt h as g a in e d a re s p e c te d b u t su b o rd in a te d po sitio n in g en e ral philosophy.
T his re n ew ed in te re st in aesthetics is at least in p art d u e to the “linguistic
t u r n ” in p h ilo so p h y , w hich can b e discerned b o th in p h en o m en o lo g ical a n d
h e rm e n e u tic tra d itio n s as well as in analytic ways o f d o in g philosophy.
D u rin g th e 1990s, how ever, aesthetics as th e philosophy o f art a n d as the
re fle c tio n o n aesth e tic p h e n o m e n a in general has becom e a m ajor co n c ern
in m any acad em ic d isciplines a n d interdisciplinary projects. A p le th o ra o f
w orks in a n d o n p h ilo so p h ic al aesthetics p u b lish ed in re c e n t years is a sign o f
th e tim es, b u t also in several o th e r disciplines such as cognitive science, the
psychology o f p e rc e p tio n as well as in cultural studies the ren ew ed in te re st in
a e sth e tic q u estio n s is visible. In ad d itio n to M ichael Kelly’s Encyclopedia of
Aesthetics (1998), th e first m o d e rn encyclopedia o f its kin d , six in tro d u cto ry
bo o k s by A nglo-A m erican p h ilo so p h ers o n aesthetics have b ee n pu b lish ed
w ithin n o less th a n th re e years: G o rd o n G ra h am ’s Philosophy of the Arts: A n
Introduction to Aesthetics ( 1997), D abney T ow nsend’s An Introduction to Aesthetics
(19 9 7 ), G eo rg e D ick ie’s Introduction to Aesthetics: A n Analytic Approach (1997),
C olin Lyas’s Aesthetics (1997), Jam es W. M an n ’s Aesthetics (1998), a n d N oël
C arrolls Philosophy o f Art: A Contemporary Introduction (1999). All these works
are m o re o r less firm ly situ ated w ithin the analytic tradition, a n d display b o th
th e c h a rac te ristic virtues a n d vices o f analytic aesthetics, th e excep tio n b ein g
C olin Lyas’s b o o k , w hich is by far th e m ost original and engaging. T h e works
an anti-philosophical bias in th e em erging em pirical discipines o f a rt history an d the
history o f literature.
5 Im p o rta n t an d influential works in the philosophy o f art have b een written d u rin g
this p e rio d as well, in p articular by idealistically inclined philosophers such as B enedetto
Croce (Estetica come scienza dell’espressione e linguistica generate, 1902) a n d R . G. Collingwood
( The Principles of Art, 1938) and by philosophers transform ing an d transcending the
idealistic tradition, E rnst Cassirer’s Philosophie der symbolischen Formen (1923-9), Jo h n Dewey’s
Art as Experience (1925), S usanne K. L an g er’s Philosophy in a New Key: A Study o f Symbolism
in Reason, Rite, and Art (1942) an d Feeling and Form: A Theory ofArt Developedfrom “Philosophy
in a New Key”( 1953) sho u ld be m e n tio n e d as well as Rom an In g a rd e n ’s Das literarische
Kunstwerk (1931) an d Untersuchungen zur Ontologie der Kunst (1965).
23
L ars - O l o f  i ii . b e r g
by these Anglo-Saxon w riters re p re s e n t a m o re o r less analytic a n d ah isto rical
ap p ro a c h to aesthetics a n d the p h ilo so p h y o f art, w hereas B rigitte S c h e e r’s
in tro d u c to ry work, Einführung in die philosophische Ästhetik (1997),° is m o re a
work in co n cep tu al history (“B egriffsgeschichte”) o r th e history o f p h ilo so p h y
th an a system atic in tro d u ctio n to th e p h ilo so p h y o f art. S c h e e r claim s th a t
aesthetics has enjoyed a rem ark ab le ren aissan ce in th e p ast fifteen years o r
so, n o t only in an institutional, acad em ic c o n te x t, b u t ra th e r as a p o te n t
fe rm en t, affecting m any philosophical disciplines. In h e r view, p h ilo so p h ic a l
aesthetics today has prim arily a critical fu n c tio n , relativizing th e claim s o f
ahistorical reason, attacking the c e n tra l p arad ig m o f W estern p h ilo so p h y , th e
trad itio n al, logocentric c o n cep tio n o f reason. P hilo so p h ical aesthetics, in h e r
view, is an in te r - a n d tran sd iscip lin ary e n d e a v o u r, a n d is to g e th e r w ith
epistem ology o n e o f th e fu n d a m e n tal p h ilo so p h ic al d is c ip lin e s .7
T h e re are, to be sure, aestheticians a n d p h ilo so p h e rs o f art, seek in g to
avoid th e two ex tre m es o f a d e te r m in e d a n ti-h isto ric a l a p p r o a c h a n d a
re so lu tely h isto ricist a p p ro a c h - b o th o f w h ich seem to m e to o c c lu d e
im p o rtan t aspects o f art and aesthetics. T heoretician s such as Luc Ferry, G érard
G enette andJean-M arie Schaeffer in F rance, O to M arquard, W olfgang W elsch,
H einz Paetzold and M artin Seel in G erm any exem plify th e a tte m p t to co m b in e
an historical ap p ro ach to the p ro b lem s o f a rt a n d aesthetics w ith a m o re o r
less system atic a n d constructive p e rsp ectiv e.x H ow th e h isto ric a l a n d th e
system atic/analytic sh ould b e re la te d to o n e a n o th e r is a m o o t q u e stio n ; a n d
we m ay w ell ask w h e th e r h isto rical c o n s id e ra tio n s a re always re le v a n t to
11Encyclopedia o f Aesthetics, 4 vols., ed. M ichael Kelly (O xford: O xford U niversity Press,
1998), Colin Lyas, Aesthetics (London: UCL Press, 1997), G eorge Dickie, Introduction to
Aesthetics: A n Analytic Approach (New York: O x fo rd U niversity Press, 1997), D abney
T ow nsend, A n Introduction to Aesthetics (O xford: Blackwell, 1997), G o rd o n G rah am ,
Philosophy of the Arts: An Introduction to Aesthetics (L ondon: R outledge, 1997), Jam es W.
Manns, Aesthetics (Armonk, USA, 1998), N oël C arroll, Philosophy o f Art: A Contemporary
Introduction (London: Routledge, 1999), Brigitte Scheer, Einführung in die philosophische
Ästhetik (Darm stadt: W issenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1997).
7 Brigitte Scheer, Einführung in die philosophische Ästhetik, p. 1-5.
8 See Luc Ferry, Homo Aestheticus: The Invention of Taste in the Democratic Age, trans.
R obert de Loaiza (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1993), G érard G enette, The
Aesthetic Relation, trans. G. M. G oshgarian (Ithaca, New York: C ornell University Press,
1999), Jean-M arie Schaeffer, Art of the Modem Age: Philosophy of Art from Kant to Heidegger
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), U do M arquard, Aesthetica und Anaesthetica:
Philosophische Überlegungen (Paderborn: S chöningh, 1989), W olfgang W elsch, Ästhetisches
Denken (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1990) and Grenzgänge der Ästhetik (Stuttgart: Reclam , 1996),
Jö rg Z im m erm ann, Hrsg., Ästhetik und Naturerfarhrung (Stuttgart-Bad C annstatt, 1996),
H einz Paetzold, Die Realität der symbolischen Formen: Die Kulturphilosophie E m st Cassirers im
Kontext (Darm stadt: W issenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1994), M artin Seel, Ästhetik des
Erscheinens (M ünchen: H anser, 2000).
24
A e s t h e t i c s , P h il o s o p h y o f C u l t u r e a n d “T h e A e s t h e t ic T u r n ”
p h ilo so p h ic al analysis. In any case, th e re seem s to be a grow ing awareness o f
th e im p o rta n c e o f h isto rical a n d co n tex tu a l ap p ro ach e s to philosophical
p ro b le m s, in p a rtic u la r to p ro b lem s in the philosophy o f c u ltu re a n d in
aesthetics. W h e n d ea lin g w ith p ro b lem s in aesthetics a n d th e philosophy o f
c u ltu re a d o w n rig h t h istoricist ap p ro ach dispensing with argum ents, reducing
p h ilo so p h ic a l q u estio n s to pu rely historical questions sh o u ld be avoided, as
sh o u ld th e o th e r e x tre m e, tre a tin g aesthetic a n d cultural concepts as if they
possessed so m e in te rn a l ah isto rical necessity thereby re d u cin g philosophical
q u estio n s to p u re ly logical ones. H istorical concepts have a logic a n d are
a m e n a b le to c o n c e p tu a l analysis, logical concepts have a history a n d can be
analysed fro m a h isto rical perspective. A ndrew Bowie’s aspiration to avoid
“th e ten d en c y tow ards m erely ‘m o n u m e n ta l’ history o f ideas characteristic o f
so m e w ork in h e rm e n e u tic s a n d the unconscious philosophical am nesia o f
m u ch analytic p h ilo so p h y ” is certainly co m m en d ab le.1'
T h e rev italizatio n a n d renew al o f aesthetics is, how ever, n o t a purely
ac ad em ic m a tte r, m any theorists are convinced th at co n tem p o rary aesthetics
has, o r, r a th e r sh o u ld , have a critical fu n ctio n in the larg e r cu ltu re as well;
aesthetics is o ften conceived o f as philosophy of culture and criticism o f culture.
As M ichael Kelly says in th e in tro d u c tio n to The Encyclopedia o f Aesthetics:
“ [A ]esthetics is u n iq u ely situ ated to serve as a m eeting place for n u m ero u s
academ ic disciplines a n d cultural traditions [my italics]”, aesthetics is “the critical
re fle c tio n o n a rt, c u ltu re a n d n a tu r e ”,10 a n d B rigitte S ch eer claim s th a t
“ph ilo so ph ical aesthetics has e x p erien ced an extraordinary renaissance d u rin g
th e p a st fiftee n years, n o t prim arily as an in stitu tio n , w hich keeps itself w ithin
its own disciplinary b o u n d arie s, b u t as a fe rm en t p en e tratin g a n d transform ing
alm ost all philosophical areas”.11 Philosophical aesthetics has above all a critical
p o te n tia l b ec au se p h ilo so p h ic al aesthetics in h e r o p in io n “rep u d iates the
c e n tr a l p a r a d ig m o f W e s te rn p h ilo s o p h y , th e tra d itio n a l lo g o c e n tric
c o n c e p tio n o f ra tio n a lity a n d th e abso lu tiflcatio n of th a t c o n c e p tio n ”.12
W h ereas “th e lin g u istic tu r n ” c a rried with it a h e ig h te n e d consciousness of
th e lin g u istic c h a ra c te r a n d la n g u a g e -d e p e n d e n t c h a ra c te r o f o u r w orld
view s,13 it is today a p p ro p ria te to speak o f an “aesthetic tu r n ”, she claims,
IJ A ndrew Bowie, From Romanticism to Critical Theory: The Philosophy o f German Literary
Theory (L ondon: R outledge, 1997), viii.
10 Kelly, “In tro d u c tio n ”, Encyclopedia of Aesthetics, xi.
11 Scheer, E inführung in die philosophische Ästhetik, p. 1, my trans.
12 Ibid.
14
S c h e e r’s ch aracterizatio n o f th e linguistic tu rn is som ew hat inaccurate, for the
linguistic tu rn involved above all a preoccupation with the structure o f language, the
rela tio n sh ip betw een w ord an d w orld, an d m ore generally th e analysis o f linguistic
25
L ars- O i.o f  i i i .b e r g
because aesthetics takes the in terp re tativ e a n d co nstructive c h a ra c te r o f o u r
sensations an d p ercep tio n s o f th e w orld seriously.14 In sh o rt, th e ae sth e tic
ch a ra c te r o f know ledge a n d e x p e rie n c e in g e n e ra l is ack n o w led g ed in m an y
q u arters today, S ch eer believes. S im ilar views are h e ld by W olfgang W elsch,
who in his essay “Ä sthetische G ru n d zü g e im g eg en w ärtig en D e n k e n ” (1991),
speaks o f cognitive a n d epistem ological ae sth eticizatio n , th e aesth e tic iz in g o f
know ledge a n d reality; in today’s (post) m o d e rn w orld th e re is, h e claim s, a
stro n g tendency, a tendency h e a p p a re n tly en d o rses, to view tru th a n d reality
as aesthetic p h e n o m e n a - aesthetic in a wide sense o f th e term . In W e lsc h ’s
view, co n stru ctiv ism is th e d o m in a n t p h ilo so p h y today, in stre ssin g th e
constructedness o f p ersonal identity, o f reality a n d o f th e w orld constructivism
im plies an aestheticization o f tru th , know ledge a n d reality .15 W elsch argues
in his essay “Ä sthetik a u ß e rh a lb d e r Ä sth etik - F ü r e in e n e u e F o rm d e r
D isziplin” (1995) in favour o f an “aesthetics o u tsid e o f ae sth e tic s”, ae sth etics
as a m ulti-disciplinary “trans-aesthetics”, w hich tran sc en d s th e b o u n d a rie s o f
trad itio n al art c e n tre d p h ilosophical aesthetics a n d o ccupies itself w ith th e
analysis a n d criticism o f co n tem p o rary cu ltu re a n d theory. Since th e ae sth e tic
has in v ad ed m ost, if n o t all, areas o f life a n d c u ltu re in “o u r p o stm o d e rn
m o d e rn w orld”, philosophy, a n d in p a rtic u la r p h ilo so p h ic al ae sth etics m u st
follow suit, W elsch believes.
m eaning. See The Linguistic Turn: Essays in Philosophical Method, ed. Richard Rorty (Chicago:
Chicago University Press, 1967). T he term “linguistic tu r n ” was, co n trary to a w idespeard
opinion, n o t invented by Rorty, the logical positivist Gustav B ergm ann seem s to be the
inventor o f the expression “linguistic tu rn ”, by which he m ean t so m eth in g else th an Rorty,
who ad o p ted the term for the collection o f essays The Linguistic Turn (See R. Rorty,
Consequences of Pragmatism: Essays 1972-1980, B righton: H arvester Press, 1982, xxi). T h e
different “turns” in philosophy and cultural theory seem to have rep laced the ad ap tio n of
K uhnian “paradigm s” to the hum anities; after “the epistem ological tu r n ” we have “the
linguistic tu rn ”, “the interpretive tu rn ” (Cf. The Interpretive Turn: Philosophy, Science, Culture,
eds. David R. Hiley, Jam es F. B ohm an, R ichard S husterm an, Ithaca: C ornell U niversity
Press, 1991), and “the cultural tu rn ” (Cf. Beyond the Cultural Turn: New Directions in the
Study o f Society and Culture, eds. Victoria E. B onnell & Lynn H u n t, University o f C alifornia
Press, 1999).
14 Scheer, Einführung in die philosophische Ästhetik, p. 3., my trans.
15W olfgang Welsch, “Ä sthetische G rundzüge im gegenw ärtigen D en k en ”, 1991, in W.
Welsch, Grenzgänge der Ästhetik (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1996), 62-105, trans, as Undoing Aesthetics
(London: Sage, 1997). An im portant discussion o f constructivism is fo u n d in J o h n S earle’s
The Construction of Social Reality (L ondon: A llen Lane, T h e P en g u in Press, 1995). Ian
H acking offers an interesting analysis o f various form s o f constructivism in his The Social
Construction o f What? (Cam bridge, Mass.: H arvard University Press, 1999).
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A e s t h e t i c s , P h i l o s o p h y o f C u l t u r e a n d “T h e A e s t h e t ic T u r n ”
III
W h a t th e n do es “ae sth e tic iz atio n ” m ean, w hat are th e im plications o f the
“th e aesth etic tu r n ” fo r re searc h in the cultural sciences, a n d w hat is the status
o f p h ilo so p h ic al aesth etics a fte r “th e aesthetic tu rn ”? Several answers suggest
them selv es, b u t b e fo re c o n s id e rin g R ich ard S h u s te rm a n ’s a n d W olfgang
W e lsc h ’s views a few co m m en ts o n the answers p ro p o se d by the Faculties o f
th e H u m a n itie s a n d Social S ciences a t U p p sala U niversity in th e “J o in t
P ro g ra m m e o f R enew al fo r th e H u m an ities”. “T he A esthetic T u rn ”, which
fo r m s p a r t o f th e p r o p o s e d p r o g r a m m e in “C u ltu r a l A n aly sis a n d
C o n te m p o ra ry C riticism ”, is d esc rib ed as follows:
W ithin philosophical aesthetics today, a frequently used term is “the
aesthetic tu rm ”, o r in o th e r words there is an increasing tendency to
view th e a e sth e tic d im en sio n as prim ary a n d fu n d a m e n tal to the
com position o f o u r perceptions and experience of reality, a tendency
th at is for instance an outcom e o f the cultural upheaval in which we are
living a n d which requires cultural analysis with a m ore aesthedcally
c o n d itio n e d reflectiveness. This d e e p e n in g and ex ten sio n o f the
aesthetic dim ension outside the traditional delim itations o f art faces
th e aesthetic disciplines with new and vital research tasks.w
T h e m a in p o in ts c a n b e su m m a riz e d as follows: (1) th e a e s th e tic
d im e n s io n is o f te n ta k e n as p rim a ry as re g a rd s o u r p e r c e p tio n a n d
a p p re h e n s io n o f reality, (2) this alleged tendency in co n tem p o rary th o u g h t
is th e re su lt o f re c e n t cu ltu ra l changes (the transition form m o dernity to
p o s tm o d e rn ity ? ), (3) th e a e s th e tic d iscip lin e s in c lu d in g p h ilo s o p h ic a l
aesthetics sh o u ld b ro a d e n th eir horizons so as to include aesthetic p h e n o m e n a
o u tsid e th e arts in th e ir purview . T h e first claim is certainly true, the aesthetic
d im e n sio n is tak en as p rim ary by m any leading p h ilo so p h ers a n d cultural
analysts today, b u t w h e th e r they are ju stified in doing so is a m o o t question,
th e re fo re th e s e c o n d claim th a t “cultural analysis with a m o re aesthetically
c o n d itio n e d reflectiv eness” is re q u ire d in o rd e r to u n d e rsta n d c o n tem p o rary
cu ltu re (a n d art?) seem s to m e m ore doubtful. T he third claim is unexceptional
if it is in te r p r e te d as an e x h o rta tio n to analyse the diversity o f aesth etic
p h e n o m e n a (a n d a e s th e tic asp ects o f diverse c u ltu ra l p h e n o m e n a ) in
c o n te m p o ra ry society, w hich to my m ind also includes a s h a rp e n e d awareness
o f th e co m p lex ity o f th e n o tio n o f the aesthetic, or, ra th e r, o f the d ifferen t
a n d h e te ro g e n e o u s n o tio n s o f th e aesthetic at play in th e discourse o f “the
aesth e tic tu r n ”.
10 U ppsala University, “H um anities and Social Sciences”, Proposal 2000-12-15, p. 23.
27
L ars - O i .o f  iil b e r g
T h e b ac k g ro u n d o f “the ae sth etic tu r n ” a n d th e tasks lying a h e a d fo r
aesthetics (broadly conceived) are clarified in th e follow ing passage:
T here has been a renewed interest in aesthetics d u rin g the past few
decades, both philosophical aesthetics and aesthetic analysis in the wider
sense, largely due to the critical discussions su rro u n d in g p o stm odern
theory (philosophy, aesthetics, cultural analysis) an d po stm o d ern art,
literature, and architecture. The aestheticization o f m orality an d lifestyle
is often said to be a characteristic feature o f contem porary culture. While
traditional aesthetic theory often displayed little o r no interest in cultural
spheres outside of high culture, an d therew ith lim ited its purview to
fine art and belles lettre, contem porary aesthetics has b ro a d e n e d its
scope to encompass everyday life and p opular culture as well. This m eans
that the very notion o f the “aesthetic” is u n d erg o in g a transform ation:
from having been a relatively well-defined concept, it has becom e a m ore
variegated an d chaotic notion, reflecting the com plex reality which is
its object of study.17
H e re “th e aesthetic tu rn ” is explicitly associated w ith p o stm o d e rn ism a n d
p o stm o d ern theory. W hereas the observation th a t trad itio n al aesth e tic th eo ry
(probably philosophical aesthetics is m e a n t) has p a id little o r n o in te re st to
aesthetic p h e n o m e n a outside o f h ig h a rt a n d c u ltu re is certain ly c o rre c t th e
claim th a t “co n te m p o ra ry ae sth e tic s” now adays in c lu d e s in to its purview
“ev ery d ay life a n d p o p u la r c u ltu r e as w e ll” is a lm o s t as c e r ta in ly a n
ex ag g eratio n . In th e first place this ch a ra c te riz a tio n applies to som e, p e rh a p s
many, co n tem p o rary aestheticians, (n o tab ly S h u ste rm a n a n d W elsch), b u t —
fo r b e tte r o r w orse- n o t to all o r even m o st p h ilo so p h ic al aesth etician s. In th e
seco n d place we sh o u ld n o te th at “everyday life a n d p o p u la r c u ltu re ” has fo r
a lo n g tim e cau g h t th e in tere st o f re se a rc h e rs in various disciplines d e a lin g
w ith a e s th e tic p h e n o m e n a (so c io lo g y o f c u ltu r e , so c io lo g y o f a r t a n d
lite ra tu re ). T h e re fo re it is a m o o t q u e s tio n w h e th e r th e n o tio n o f “th e
ae sth etic” has u n d e rg o n e , or, is u n d e rg o in g a tra n sfo rm a tio n . In fact, o n e
issue o f fu n d a m e n tal im p o rtan ce is w h at is m e a n t by “th e a e s th e tic ” a n d
“aesth etics” by th e ch am pions o f “th e ae sth e tic tu r n ”, a n d last b u t n o t l e a s t ,
w hat co u ld a n d w hat sh o u ld b e m e a n t by these n o tio n s. N o r a m I so su re th at
“th e a e sth e tic”, has b een “a relatively w ell-defined c o n c e p t” in th e tra d itio n a l
discourse o f philosophical aesthetics a n d th e a e sth e tic disciplines; it seem s to
m e th a t “th e aesth etic tu rn ” trades partly o n th e etym ologically sp ea k in g
o rig in a l m e a n in g o f “th e a e s th e tic ” as “w h a t p e rta in s to s e n sa tio n s a n d
p ercep tio n s and the sensuous enjoym ent o f sensuous a n d p ercep tu al qualities”.
17 Ibid., pp. 24-5.
28
A e s t h e t i c s , P h il o s o p h y o f C u l t u r e a n d “T h e A e s t h e t ic T u r n ”
I am in c lin e d to th in k th a t m u ch o f the im petus o f “the aesthetic tu rn ” derives
fro m p riv ileg in g o n e asp e ct o f th e trad itio n al m eaning o f “th e aesth etic”, or,
o n e use o f th e n o tio n o f “th e aesth e tic” at the ex p en se o f o th ers, a n d g ran tin g
“th e a e s th e tic ” in th e se n se o f “sen su o u s q u a litie s”, “w h a t p e rta in s to
(p lea su rab le) sen satio n s a n d p e rc e p tio n s”, p rid e o f place. O n e aspect o f “the
a e s th e tic ” h as b e c o m e d o m in a n t in “th e aesthetic tu rn ” at the expense o f
o th e rs, a n d in p a rtic u la r, at th e expense o f “the artistic”. T h e claim th a t “the
aesth e tic tu r n ” owes m u ch to p o stm o d ern theory an d postm odernism (as well
as p o stm o d ern ity ) is, I believe correct, therefore m any interesting a n d exciting
tasks await th e ph ilo so phical aesthetician a n d cultural analyst, for, postm odern
th eo ry a n d p o stm o d e rn ism in th e arts a n d in the cu ltu re at large is a very
m ix ed b a g .18 W e n e e d to ask ourselves w hich p o stm o d ern theories a n d ideas
have in flu e n c e d a n d d e te rm in e d the n atu re an d shape o f “th e aesthetic tu rn ”.
N eed less to say, o u r a ttitu d e tow ards “the aesthetic tu rn ” is c o n d itio n ed by
o u r views o n p o s tm o d e rn th eo ry a n d p o stm odernism in g e n e ra l.1'1
L e s t m y re m a rk s c o n c e r n in g th e p ro p o s a l fo r th e re n ew al o f th e
h u m a n itie s a t U p p sala U niversity b e m isu n d ersto o d , I h asten to ad d th at the
p ro p o sa l to e x p lo re “th e aesth e tic tu rn ” is, in my view, very tim ely a n d am ply
ju stifie d , b u t “th e ae sth etic tu r n ” should n o t sim ply b e tak en for g ran ted , nor,
s h o u l d t h e n a t u r e a n d e x t e n t o f “th e a e s th e tic t u r n ” b e ta k e n as
u n p ro b le m a tic a lly given; in s h o rt “the aesthetic tu rn ” sh o u ld b e subjected to
a critical analysis fro m various points o f views (philosophical, a rt historical,
so cio lo g ical), so m e th in g th a t is certainly n o t excluded by th e w ording o f the
d o c u m e n t. My ow n view is th a t th ere is in d e e d - for b e tte r o r worse - a
w id esp read aesth e tic iz atio n o f m any aspects o f c o n tem p o rary everyday life
a n d m ass c u ltu re (as well as o f theory), b u t “h edonistic co n su m erism ” is in
m a n y c o n te x ts p e r h a p s a m o re a p p r o p r ia te la b e l fo r w h a t is c a lle d
“a e sth e tic iz a tio n ”. I also believe th a t it is im p o rta n t for th e cultural sciences
in clu d in g p h ilo so p h ical aesthetics an d the philosophy and sociology o f culture
to c o n f r o n t “ th e s ta te o f c u l t u r e ” c ritic a lly . W h e n i t co m e s to th e
18 W e s h o u ld also n o te th a t, a c c o rd in g to som e analysts, p o s tm o d e rn ity a n d
postm o d ernism are already passé. T h e architectural historian an d critic Philip Jodidio,
fo r exam ple, asserts th a t “it is clear th a t the tim e o f the Post-M odern is g o n e” (Philip
Jo d id io , Contemporary European Architecture, vol. IV, Köln: T aschen, 1996, p. 6).
19 W ho is th e p ara d ig m atic p o stm o d ern theorist? Foucault, B audrillard, D errida,
L yotard, o r Rorty? A lth o u g h only Lyotard and Rorty (at a tim e) accepted th e label
“p o stm o d ern ist”, all thinkers m en tio n ed are habitually regarded as crown witnesses for
p o stm o d ernism . B ut th e re are fundam ental and irreducible differences betw een the
“p o stm o d e rn ism ” o f a F o u cau lt an d a D errida and a B audrillard, consequently the
im plications fo r “th e aesthetic tu r n ” differ widely d ependin g on which theorist we regard
as typical o f “the postm o d ern tu r n ”.
29
L ar .s - O i .o f  i i i . bkk «
aestheticization o f theory, a n d the claim s th a t k n ow ledge a n d reality have
b een “aesth eticized ” I am n o t so su re th a t this is w h a t actually has h a p p e n e d
across th e b o ard , m o reo v er I p a rt c o m p a n y w ith th o se w ho a p p la u d th e
aestheticization o f m orals, theory, reality a n d w h a t n o t. I shall o ffer som e
arg u m en ts for my position in the sequel, b u t now th a t th e c a t is o u t o f th e
bag, I tu rn to the views o f R ichard S h u ste rm an a n d W olfgang W elsch, p e rh a p s
the m ost influ en tial p ro p o n e n ts o f “th e aesth e tic tu r n ”.
IV
“T h e pro ject o f m odernity (with its E n lig h te n m e n t roots a n d ratio n alizin g
d ifferen tiatio n o f cu ltu ral sp h eres) has b e e n id e n tifie d w ith re a s o n ”, says
R ichard S h u sterm an in his re c e n t w ork, Practicing Philosophy: Pragmatism and
the Philosophical Life (1997).2H T he p o stm o d e rn , h e co n tin u es, is “con trastin g ly
ch a rac te rized as d o m inantly ae sth e tic”.21 Now, b o th S h u ste rm a n a n d W elsch
are p ro n e to contrasting the m o d ern a n d th e p o stm o d ern in this ra th e r cavalier
way, b u t although th ere clearly is so m eth in g in this co n trastin g ch aracterizatio n
o f th e m o d e rn a n d th e p o stm o d ern , I th in k we sh o u ld b e wary o f such sn ap p y
a n d f o r m u la ic d e s c r ip tio n s o f s o m e t h i n g as v a st, p o ly m o r p h ic a n d
h e te ro g e n e o u s as m o d ern ity a n d p o stm o d ern ity . In sp ite o f th e fact th a t
S h u sterm an warns us against taking these term s (“th e m o d e rn ” a n d “th e
p o s tm o d e rn ”) “as d e n o tin g d ic h o to m o u s , in im ic a l e s s e n c e s ”,22 h e c h a ­
racterizes H ab erm as as “c h a m p io n in g th e claim s o f re a so n a n d m o d e rn ity ”,
an d Rorty as “rep resen tin g the aesthetic a n d p o stm o d e rn ”.23 A lth o u g h I th in k
S h u sterm an has the aestheticization o f m orals a n d life-styles in m in d (p e rh a p s
w orld views a n d reality as well) w hen h e speaks o f th e p o s tm o d e rn as largely
aesthetic, h e ap p aren tly also believes th a t p o s tm o d e rn th eo ry is in som e sense
“aesth etic”, or, m o re aesthetic th an trad itio n al, m o d e rn theory, since aesth etic
a sp e c ts e n te r in to all o r m o st k in d s o f th e o r iz in g a c c o r d in g to h im .
P o stm o d ern ism has taken an aesthetic tu rn , says S h u ste rm a n , th in k in g o f th e
(a esth e tic a lly in sp ire d ? ) c ritiq u e o f re a s o n , a n d ab o v e all, o f th e “th e
p o stm o d ern im plosion o f aesthetics in to ethics a n d politics”.24 W h a t d oes th e
“im plosion o f aesthetics into ethics a n d p o litics” actually m ean? O n e th in g it
2,1 R ichard Shusterm an, Practicing Philosophy: Pragmatism and. the Philosophical Life (New
York: Routledge, 1997), 113.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid., p. 114.
24 Ibid., p. 127.
30
A e s t h e t i c s , P h il o s o p h y o f C u l t u r e a n d “T i i e A e s t h e t ic T u r n ”
d o e s n ’t m e a n , I suggest, is th a t ’’ethics a n d aesthetics are o n e ”, as S husterm an
im plies in q u o tin g W ittg en stein .2r’ W ittgenstein’s “p aren th etical p h ra se”, h e
claim s, is “to d ay so m e a n in g fu l”, because it “gives p o in te d expression to
im p o rta n t insights a n d p ro b lem s o f b o th aesthetic and ethical theorizing in
o u r p o s tm o d e r n a g e ”.21’ A c c o rd in g to S h u ste rm an , W ittg en stein “d en ies
m o d e rn is m ’s aesth e tic ideology o f artistic p u rism ” a n d “im plies th at such
iso latio n ist ideology is n o lo n g e r viable now th a t the traditional com partm en talizatio n o f know ledge a n d culture threatens to disintegrate into m anifold
form s o f in terd iscip lin ary activity”.27 S husterm an is, o f course, aware o f the
c o n te x t in w hich W ittg en stein ’s rem ark (proposition 6.421 in Tractatus) occurs,
a r e m a r k e x p re s s e d “in t h a t a u s te re ec o n o m y o f p r e g n a n t m in im a list
exp ressio n so ch aracteristic o f the m odernist style”,28 as h e puts it. S husterm an
knows th a t for th e early W ittgenstein ethics as well as aesthetics (as expressions
o f value) involve seein g things sub specie aetemitatis, th at ethics a n d aesthetics
a re tra n s c e n d e n ta l a n d c o n c e rn the realm o f the mystical, a conviction th at is
- m ildly p u t- u n co n g en ial to a postm odernist.2'1 T herefore S husterm an’s claim
th a t “W ittg e n ste in ’s am b ig u o u s dictum th a t ethics and aesthetics are o n e by
e re c tin g th e aesth e tic as th e p ro p e r ethical ideal”30 supports the p o stm o d ern
“a e sth e tic iz a tio n o f th e e th ic a l” is surprising. It may b e the case th a t the
p o s tm o d e rn co n v ictio n “th a t aesthetic considerations are o r should be crucial
a n d u ltim ately p e rh a p s p a ra m o u n t in d eterm in in g how we choose to lead or
sh a p e o u r lives” is w id esp read ,31 b u t it is certainly n o t W ittg en stein ’s idea n o r
is it a n id ea we sh o u ld ac c e p t lig h th earted ly .32
25
R ichard S husterm an, Pragmatist Aesthetics: Living Beauty, Rethinking Art (O xford:
Blackwell, 1992), p. 236-7.
20 Ibid., p. 237.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid., p. 236. W ittgenstein’s p roposition 6.421 reads: “It is clear that ethics cannot be
p u t into words. Ethics is transcendental. (Ethics and aesthetics are one and the sam e)”
(Ludw ig W ittg en stein , Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 1921, trans. D.F. Pears & B. F.
M cGuiness, L ondon: R outledge & Kegan Paul, 1961), the original G erm an parenthetical
sen ten ce being: “(Ethik u n d Ä sthetik sind Eins)”.
2‘' A ccording to H ans-Johann G lock W ittgenstein’s “sibylline p ro n o u n cem en t” involves
th e follow ing points: (1) ethics and aesthetics are concerned with necessities, which by
th e ir very n atu re ca n n o t be expressed in m eaningful propositions, b u t only shown, (2)
ethics an d aesthetics constitute a higher, transcendetal realm of value, and (3) ethics and
aesthetics are based on a mystical experience (Hans-Johann Glock, A Wittgenstein Dictionary,
O xford: Blackwell, 1996, p. 31).
30 S husterm an, Praermatist Aesthetics, p. 237.
1,1 Ibid.
32
Cf. Jo se p h M argolis’ rem arks ab o u t S husterm an’s use of W ittgenstein’s dictum (J.
M argolis, “All the T u rn s in ‘A estheticizing’ Life”, Filozofski Vestnik 1999:2, “Aesthetics as
31
L ars - O i .o f  iil b e r g
B ut w hat exactly is involved in “th e aesth e tic iz atio n o f th e e th ic a l”, a n d
w hat does “ae sth etic” m ean here? S h u ste rm a n offers th e follow ing clues. T h e
aestheticization o f the ethical, h e says, is “p erh ap s m o re ev id en t in o u r everyday
lives a n d th e p o p u la r im a g in a tio n o f o u r c u l t u r e t h a n in a c a d e m ic
p h ilo s o p h y ”,33 th is a e sth e tic iz a tio n b e in g m a n ife ste d “by o u r c u l t u r e ’s
p reo ccu p atio n with g lam our an d g ratification, w ith p erso n a l a p p e a ra n c e a n d
e n ric h m e n t”.34 This, S husterm an says, is “th e p o stm o d e rn ist eth ics o f taste”,
whose m ost in fluential philosophical advocate is R ich ard Rorty. R orty favours
“th e aesthetic life”, w hich am o n g o th e r things im plies th e id eal o f private
p erfectio n , self creatio n an d a life m otiv ated by “th e d esire to e m b ra c e m o re
a n d m o re possibilities”,35 a n d the “aesth etic search fo r novel ex p e rien ce s a n d
fo r novel lan g u ag e” [novel languages b e in g ways o f d e fin in g o n e s e lf in novel
ways].31' T h e “ethics o f taste”, S h u sterm an argues, is a c o n se q u e n c e (th o u g h
n o t a logical co n seq u en ce) o f anti-essentialism re g a rd in g h u m a n n a tu re . If
th e absen ce o f a h u m an essence, S h u ste rm an says, im plies n o d e te rm in a te
ethic, it c a n n o t im ply an aestheticized eth ic e ith e r, b u t “it still ca n lead to an
ethics o f taste, since in the absence o f any in trin sic fo u n d a tio n to ju stify an
eth ic,” S h u sterm an co n tin u es, “we m ay reasonably b e e n c o u ra g e d to ch o o se
th e o n e th a t m ost appeals to us”.37 T h e ap p e al o f an eth ic, h e believes, is
ultim ately an aesthetic m atter, “a q u estio n o f w hat strikes us as m o st attractiv e
o r m ost p erfec t”.38 It is im p o rtan t to n o te th a t S h u sterm an , follow ing B e rn a rd
Williams, m akes a distinction betw een ethics a n d m orality, ethics b e in g m ainly
con cern ed with values an d the good life a n d m orality with obligation.311 B earing
this d istin ctio n in m in d S h u ste rm a n ’s view th a t th e aesth e tic iz atio n o f ethics
is a g o o d th in g becom es p erh ap s less o b jectio n ab le, b u t w h at a b o u t m o ral
obligations? Can m oral obligations also b e “a e sth e tic iz e d ” a n d co n ceiv ed o f
in term s o f taste, ch oice a n d appeal? S h u ste rm an seem s to th in k so, for, h e
Philosophy", Proceedings o f the XlVth In tern atio n al C ongress o f A esthetics 1998, P art I,
Ljubljana 1999, p. 199).
33 Shusterm an, Pragmatist Aesthetics, p. 238.
34 Ibid.
35 R ichard Rorty, “F reud an d M oral R eflection”, in Freud: The Moral Disposition of
Psychoanalysis, eds.J. H. Sm ith &W. K errigan (Baltim ore: Jo h n s H opkins U niversity Press,
1986) p. 11.
“ Ibid., p. 15.
37 Shusterm an, Pragmatist Aesthetics, p. 243.
38 Ibid.
m “Ethics, as distinguished from morality, recognizes th a t th e re is m o re to th e good
life than th e fulfilm ent of obligations”, says Shusterm an (ibid., p. 245). A ccording to
Williams “morality [is] a special system, a p articular variety o f ethical th o u g h t” (B ern ard
Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, L ondon: F o n tan a/C o llin s, 1985, p. 174).
32
A e s t h e t i c s , P h il o s o p h y o f C u l t u r e a n d “T h e A e s t h e t ic T u r n ”
arg u es th a t “ [fjin d in g w hat is rig h t becom es a m atter o f fin d in g the m ost
fittin g a n d a p p e a lin g gestalt, o f perceiving the m ost attractive a n d h arm onious
c o n stellatio n o f various a n d w eig h ted features in a given situation o r life”.40
F in d in g w h a t is rig h t is, S h u ste rm an claims, “n o lo n g er th e d e d u c tio n o f o n e
o b lig atio n fro m a n o th e r m o re g en e ral obligation [.. .], n o r is it the o utcom e
o f a logical ca lcu latio n b ased o n a clear hierarch ical o rd e r o f obligations”.41
T h e re fo re , S h u ste rm a n co n clu d es, “ethical justification com es to resem ble
a e s th e tic e x p la n a tio n in a p p e a lin g n o t to syllogism o r alg o rith m b u t to
p e rc e p tu a lly persuasive a rg u m e n t [. . .] in its attem p t to convince”.42 Two
co m m en ts are in o rd e r: first, S h u sterm an alm ost im perceptibly switches from
“m o ra l” (in m o ral o b lig atio n ) to “eth ical” (in ethical ju stific atio n ), b u t h e
pre su m a b ly m ean s th a t m o ral d elib eratio n , fin d in g o u t w hat o u r obligations
are in a ce rta in situ atio n , is ra th e r like aesthetic ex p lan atio n an d ju stificatio n ;
sec o n d , h e speaks o f eth ica lju stificatio n , as resem bling aesth etic exp lan atio n
“in its a tte m p t to c o n v in ce”. T his seem s to be a ra th e r strange “d isem b o d ied ”
view o f m o ral o b lig atio n , fo r even if it is the case th at we som etim es are called
u p o n to ju stify o u r actions fro m a m oral p o in t o f view a n d alth o u g h it is also
tru e th a t we so m etim es feel th e n e e d to justify o u r actions a n d the actions o f
o th e rs a n d th a t th e re fo re th e p u rp o se o f offeringjustifications is to convince
(ourselves o r o th e rs ), this is by n o m eans always the case w hen trying to find
o u t w h a t co u rse o f ac tio n to take a n d w hen asking ourselves (o r others) w hat
o u r m o ra l o b lig atio n s are. M oral obligations are invoked n o t only in o rd e r to
justify a c e rta in co u rse o f actio n , o r to convince som ebody o f the rig h t course
o f a c tio n . F in d in g o u t (by w h a te v e r m e a n s - d e lib e r a tio n , in tu itio n ,
s p o n ta n e o u s feeling) w hat o u r m o ral obligations are in a given situation leads
n o rm ally to actio n ; m o ral obligations are action-guiding. T h e m ain p u rp o se
o f fin d in g o u t w h at o u r m o ral obligations are is n o t to ju stify an action o r to
a tte m p t to con v in ce so m ebody o f the rightness o f th e action in question, b u t
sim ply to d o th e rig h t thing. S h u ste rm a n ’s view o f m oral obligations seem s to
m e to b e stran g ely co n tem p lativ e a n d “intellectualised”. W hen S husterm an
says th a t “ [f] in d in g w h at is rig h t becom es a m atter o f fin d in g the m ost fitting
a n d a p p e a lin g g estalt” h e has, I think, e ith e r p ro n o u n c e d a tautology o r
actually left th e u n iv erse o f discourse o f ethics a n d m orality b eh in d . F or we
may well ask ab o u t th e m ost fitting a n d appealing gestalt, “fitting an d appealing
fro m w h at p o in t o f view”? F itting o r app ealin g from a m oral p o in t o f view o r
fro m an aesth e tic p o in t o f view? If the answ er is “from a m o ral p o in t o f view”
4,1 S husterm an, Pragmatist Aesthetics, p. 245.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
33
L a r s - O i .o f À iil b e r g
we are d ealin g with a tautology, if th e answ er is “fro m a n ae sth e tic p o in t o f
view” we have, I suggest, n o t so m u ch ae sth eticized ethics a n d m orality, b u t
a b a n d o n e d ethics a n d m orality alto g eth er. A pplying aesth e tic c o n sid e ra tio n s
a n d stan d ard s o f th e kin d envisaged by S h u ste rm an (a n d R orty) to ethics a n d
m orality m eans th a t questions o f rig h t a n d w rong, o f ju stic e a n d equality,
sh o u ld be answ ered by invoking “taste”, “a p p e a l” a n d “lik in g ” in ste a d o f by
ap p e alin g to norm s a n d standards (how ever ch a n g eab le, h e te ro g e n e o u s a n d
flexible). S h u ste rm an ’s view im plies to my m in d th e d en ial o f th e ra tio n a lity
o f ethics a n d m orality a n d m oral d e lib e ra tio n , a n d th e d isso lu tio n o f eth ics
a n d m orality as guides to action. T h e aesth eticizatio n o f ethics a n d m o rals is,
in my view, n o t a new ethics o r m orality, b u t a new a-m orality (I am n o t saying
im m o rality ). In spite o f this, a n d som ew hat paradoxically, S h u ste rm a n ca n b e
seen to advocate a new ethics a n d a new m orality. F or all his anti-essentialism
a n d anti-foundationalism S husterm an seem s to th in k th a t his anti-essentialism
a n d an ti-foundationalism provides som e k in d o fju stific a tio n fo r a new ethics
a n d m orality, for an aestheticized ethics a n d m orality. S h u ste rm a n ’s views are
th e re fo re rem in iscen t o f ea rlier e n d eav o u rs to fin d a “ju s tific a tio n ” fo r ethics
a n d m orality. B ut “to propose a new ju stific atio n [for m orality] w ould b e to
in au g u ra te a new p ractice”,43 as Paul J o h n s to n has a rg u e d convincingly to m y
m ind. If th e p ro p o sed practice (“th e aesth eticizatio n o f e th ic s”) differs in
fu n d a m e n ta l respects from w hat has h ith e rto b e e n c o n sid e re d to b e ethics
an d m orality we are ju stified in re g a rd in g the new p ractice as a new a-m orality.
S h u sterm an may be rig h t in m a in ta in in g th a t in th ese p o stm o d e rn tim es
aesthetic co n sid eration play a fu n d a m e n ta l ro le in “c h o o sin g ” life-styles a n d
v alu es a n d in d e c id in g w h a t th e p r o p e r a n d r i g h t a c tio n is in g iv en
circum stances. B ut if we ap p lau d this state o f affairs, as S h u ste rm a n does,
have we n o t d iscarded ethics a n d m orality a lto g e th e r, o r, ra th e r, a c c e p te d a
playful h ed o n ism - som e w ould say nihilism - as th e g u id in g p rin c ip le o f life
a n d action?44
I have said th at S h u ste rm an ’s id e a o f th e ae sth eticizatio n o f ethics is less
ob jectio n ab le th an his analysis o f m orality, b ecause it is obvious th a t th e re are
m any conflicting versions a n d visions o f the g o o d life in c o n te m p o ra ry society,
an d it seem s th at we have n o “n e u tra l” c rite ria by w hich d iffe re n t versions o f
th e g o o d life co u ld be ju d g e d . N evertheless, so m e th in g m o re can b e said
ab o u t th e supposedly arbitrary a n d “aesth etic” choices p eo p le m ake re g a rd in g
4:1Paul Johnston, Wittgenstein and Moral Philosophy (L ondon: R outledge, 1989), p. 69.
44 Paul Jo h n sto n ’s rem arks about B ernard W illiam ’s “ju stifica tio n ” o f m orality apply in
this case too: “C entral m oral concepts such asjustice, integrity, an d guilt are m arginalized
or ren d ered opaque, while the very notion of obligation com es to seem highly p roblem atic”
(Johnston, Wittgenstein and Moral Philosophy, p. 73).
34
A e s t h e t i c s , P h i l o s o p h y o f C u l t u r e a n d “T i ii ; A e s t h e t ic T u r n ”
th e g o o d life in th ese p o s tm o d e rn times. In the first place, S h u sterm an like
R orty a n d W elsch ex ag g erates the e x te n t to w hich we are able to choose a life­
style a n d an ethic. E conom ic, social, cultural an d psychological realities im pose,
I suggest, ro b u s t lim itatio n s to w hat life-styles, a n d w hich ethics are o p e n to
us. N o r sh o u ld it b e fo rg o tte n th a t the choices o p e n to us a n d the choices we
actually m ak e m ay b e - to a la rg e r e x te n t th an we realize - c o n d itio n e d by
factors b ey o n d o u r co n tro l. T h e aestheticization o f ethics seem s to appeal
m ainly to liberally m in d e d p o stm o d e rn philo so p h ers a n d intellectuals an d
reflects p e rh a p s also th e p re d ic a m e n t o f m any “ordinary” middle-class persons
in a fflu e n t societies, b u t large sections o f the p o p u latio n in afflu en t societies,
n o t to m e n tio n p o o r societies, have a m uch m o re restricted ran g e o f “choices”
o f life-style a n d e th ic s .4Г’ I also believe th at som ething m ore th an ju s t aesthetic
a p p e a l e n te rs, a n d sh o u ld e n te r o u r ethical d eliberations, o u r th in k in g a b o u t
th e g o o d life. C o n sid e r th e follow ing exam ple. I suppose racist a n d sexist
values a n d attitu d e s can b e p a r t o f an ethic, i.e. o f a co n c ep tio n o f th e good
life. If we a c c e p t th e aesth eticizatio n o f ethics, it seem s th a t the only th in g
th a t can b e said a b o u t this eth ic is th at we dislike it, that it does n o t appeal to
us. B u t racist a n d sexist values are n o t free-floating p h e n o m e n a , they have a
h istory a n d they fit in to c e rta in social, econom ic, cu ltu ral a n d psychological
p a tte rn s. T h e se values are, fo r those, w ho em brace them a n d live by th em n o t
so m eth in g th e y ju st find appealing, m any racists, perhaps m ost actually believe
th a t it is a scientific tru th th a t non-w hites are m entally an d m orally in ferio r to
w hites. S ince this view is a d elu sio n , a racist ethic can be rejected, n o tju s t on
aesth e tic g ro u n d s, n o t j u s t because we dislike it, b u t on ra tio n al g ro u n d s.41’
Even if a e sth e tic co n sid eratio n s m ay e n te r o u r d elib eratio n s ab o u t th e good
life, I th in k , S h u ste rm an a n d com pany play dow n the role o f reason an d
a rg u m e n t in ethics.
У
In th e wake o f “th e aesth etic tu rn ”, W olfgang W elsch envisages aesthetics
as a new “p rim a p h ilo s o p h ia ”. M o d ern epistem ology, W elsch claims, has b een
c o n tin u o u sly “ae sth e tic iz e d ” since Kant. T h ere is, h e says, “a fu n d a m e n tal
aesth e tic iz atio n o f know ledge, tru th a n d reality”.47 A esthetic categories such
45 See, fo r ex a m p le , Z yg m u n t B a u m a n ’s Globalization: The H um an Consequences
(C am bridge: Polity, 1998).
4<i Even if argum ents are unlikely to convert racists to a m ore hum an e an d tolerant
ethic it rem ains tru e th a t racism is n o t only distasteful, b u t also irrational.
47 W elsch, Grenzgänge der Ästhetik, p. 96, my trans.
35
L a r s - O i .o f  iil b e r g
as a p p e a r a n c e o r fic tio n a lity ( “S c h e in ”), m o b ility ( “B e w e g lic h k e it”),
g ro u n d lessn e ss (“B o d e n lo sig k e it”) a n d u n c e rta in ty (“S c h w e b e n ”) have,
acco rd in g to W elsch, rep laced “th e classical o n to lo g ic al categ o ries o f b ein g ,
reality, p e rm a n e n c e ”.48 B ut it is in th e first place far fro m clear, w h e th e r th e
“cla ssic a l” c a te g o rie s have in fa c t b e e n re p la c e d by th e c a te g o rie s o f
a p p e a ra n c e , m obility a n d u n certain ty , a n d in th e se c o n d place I fail to see
w hat is specifically aesthetic a b o u t th ese la tte r categories. In any case W e lsc h ’s
co n te n tio n th at “o u r ‘first p h ilo so p h y ’ has to a sig n ifican t d e g re e b e c o m e
a e sth etic”,4il seems to m e to b e based o n a confusion. A lth o u g h aesth etics is
re g ard e d a new “first philosophy”, it is a first philosophy o f an en tirely d iffe re n t
k ind from the “first p hilosophy” of, say, D escartes o r K ant, th a t is to say, n o t a
first ph ilo so p h y a t all, for aesthetics as a “first p h ilo so p h y ” im plies, a c c o rd in g
to W elsch, that, in fact, th e re are n o fo u n d a tio n s, a n d aesth etics is n o t a new
“fo u n d a tio n a l” p h ilo sophy o r science: “A esthetics [. . .] d o es n o t o ffe r a
f o u n d a t i o n ”.50 T h e very a b s e n c e o f a f o u n d a tio n , W e lsc h c o n te n d s ,
characterizes th e aesthetic tu rn , a n d co n stitu tes a p a ra d ig m shift. W elsch ’s
use o f th e K uhnian term “p arad ig m ” in cid en tally reveals th e affinity b etw een
th e d iscourse o f “tu rn s” a n d the discourse o f “p a ra d ig m s” - a n d th e p ro b lem s
with b o th . W elsch’s use o f “p a ra d ig m ” in this c o n te x t, seem s to m e to b e o n e
a m o n g th o u san d s o f ex am p les o f m isu sin g a n v u lg a riz in g th e K u h n ia n
co n c ep tio n of paradigm s a n d p arad ig m shifts.51 W elsch detects th e signs o f
aestheticization everywhere in c o n tem p o rary theorizing, in p h ilo so p h y as well
as in th e sciences: “T he insight th a t reality is aesthetically c o n stitu te d is n o t
only sh ared by m any aestheticians, b u t is a view h e ld by all th in k in g th eo rists
o f science an d reality in the 20th ce n tu ry ”.52 In o rd e r to s u p p o rt this ra th e r
ex trao rd in ary claim (those who d o n o t u n d e rsta n d , le t alo n e accept, th e claim
th at reality is aesthetically constituted are ap p aren tly u n th in k in g reactionaries)
W elsch appeals to N ietzsche a n d refers to his in flu e n c e o n c o n te m p o ra ry
thinking. Even those, w ho are n o t N ietzscheans, h e claim s, are fo rced to arg u e
48 Ibid., p. 71, my trans.
*■' Ibid., p. 96, my trans.
511Ibid., p. 97, my trans.
51 In the postscript (1969) to The Structure of Scientific Revolution K uhn says th a t th e re
are ’’two very different usages of the term [paradigm ] ” in the original text, viz. paradigm s
as the constellation of group com m itm ents, w hich m eans th a t th e re is a “disciplinary
m atrix”, which is shared by “the practicioners o f a p articular discipline”, an d paradigm s
as shared exam ples (Thom as Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 1962, 2nd. ed.,
University o f Chicago Press, 1970, pp. 182,187). No cultural analyst o r social scientist has
to my knowledge spoken of “disciplinary m atrixes” or “shared exam ples”, p erh ap s because
th ere a re n ’t any in the hum an and the social sciences.
52 Ibid., p. 85, my trans.
36
A e s t h e t ic s , P h il o s o p h y o f C u l t u r e a n d “T h e A e s t h e t ic T u r n ”
like N ietzsch e w h e n th e fu n d a m e n ta l problem s in the p h ilo so p h y o f science
are discussed, a n d W elsch qu o tes Karl P o p p e r’s well-known view th a t all o u r
know ledge is u n c e rta in a n d c h a n g e a b le /’3 If N ietzsche said th a t all know ledge
is u n c e rta in a n d if P o p p e r said th a t all know ledge is u n c e rta in , th at certainly
d o es n o t m e a n th a t P o p p e r a rg u e d in th e sam e way as N ietzsche, n o r th a t
P o p p e r im plicitly ad m itte d th a t the “fu n d a m e n ts” o f know ledge a n d reality
are in som e sense aesthetic. W e find a sim ilar non sequiturxn W elsch’s discussion
o f R o rty ’s Contingency, Irony and Solidarity a n d in his com m ents on th e w ork o f
so m e p ro m in e n t physicists. R orty show ed, in W elsch’s o p in io n , th at “all o u r
‘fu n d a m e n ts ’ are aesthetically constituted, in th at they are th ro u g h o u t cultural
a rte fa c ts ”/ ’4 It is, a c c o rd in g to W elsch, com m on know ledge th a t physicists
such as B ohr, D irac, E instein a n d H eisenberg realized th at th e ir theories were
n o t re p re s e n ta tio n s o f reality, b u t ra th e r productions. T h ey were, m oreover,
aw are, W elsch says, th a t im ag in atio n is indispensable fo r succesful scientific
re searc h . Now R o rty ’s c o n c e p tio n o f know ledge a n d reality as p re sen ted in
Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, is certainly no n -fo u n d atio n al, constructivist
a n d pragm atist. B u t why sh o u ld we say th at all o u r fundam ents are aesthetically
c o n s titu te d b ecau se they are cu ltu ral artefacts? Most, p e rh a p s all aesthetic
p h e n o m e n a are cu ltu ra l artefacts a n d if know ledge an d reality are cultural
artefacts, they a re also cu ltu ra l artefacts, b u t from that fact (if it is a fact) it
does n o t follow th a t know ledge a n d reality are aesthetically constituted. Welsch
is h e r e co n fla tin g th e n o tio n s o f “aesthetically c o n stitu te d ” a n d “culturally
c o n s titu te d ”. His case is equally weak in reg ard to the fam ous physicists he
ad d u ces as ev idence fo r the im p o rtan ce o f aesthetic consideration in scientific
th eo rizin g . For, even if im ag in atio n en ters scienflc research (it does), an d
even if aesth e tic co n sid eratio n s play a role in scientific th eo riz in g (they d o ),
th e r e is n o re a s o n to c o n c lu d e th a t B o h r a n d co m p an y u se d a e sth e tic
arg u m e n ts in solving crucial th eo retical problem s. W elsch’s statem en t th at
th e m a th e m a tic ia n a n d p h ilo s o p h e r P oincaré believed aesthetic skills to be
m o re im p o rta n t th a n logical o n es in m atehm atics is equally m isguided, fo r in
th e p a ssa g e q u o te d by W e lsc h , P o in c a ré says n o su ch th in g ; a e sth e tic
c o n s id e r a tio n , says P o in c a ré , play a g re a t ro le in m ath em atics, a n d h e
em p h asizes th a t m ath em atician s n ee d im agination, a special “m athem atical
im a g in a tio n ”.r’r’ T his, I suggest, has very little to do with th e aesthetic tu rn an d
th e aesth e tic iz atio n o f know ledge an d reality. T he truth is th a t we can d etec t
a e s th e tic asp ects everyw here (even in a rt), we can view things sub specie
53 Ibid., p. 85.
54 Ibid., p. 87.
55 Ibid., p. 92, fo o tn o te 72.
37
L a r s - O i .o f  i i i . b e r g
aestheticae, b u t th a t does n o t m ake everything a e sth e tic e x c e p t by an illicit
co n c ep tu al m anoeuvre.
W elsch is on firm er g ro u n d (!) w hen h e analyzes th e aestheticization o f
life-styles, ethics a n d everyday life. A esthetic processes, h e co n ten d s, are n o t
only o f decisive im portance in the new m edia, aesthetic (in the sense o f “virtual”)
processes create a m ediated reality, or, ra th e r, an im aginary ro o m , w h ere th e
distinction betw een real a n d u n re al seem s to vanish. W elsch detects a d iffe ren t
form o f aestheticization in the stylization o f subjects a n d life-styles, th a t m ay
ultim ately lead to the homo aesteticus. All life form s, all ap p ro ach e s to reality a n d
to ethical norm s, W elsch claims, have assum ed “a p ecu liar aesthetic quality”.
Welsch is h e re referrin g to w hat I have earlier called “h edonistic co n su m erism ”.
T h e criteria for choosing betw een d iffe re n t m oralities, h e thinks, c a n n o t b e
b u t aesthetic. In discussing S husterm an I have a rg u ed th a t talk o f ch o o sin g life
styles a n d ethics is som ew hat exaggerated; I quite fail to see how anyone actually
chooses a life style o r an ethic in the way o n e chooses a sh irt o r a cake (n o t th a t
choosing a shirt o r a cake is an entirely arb irtrary m a tte r). T h e re is, to b e sure,
an elem e n t o f choice a n d arb ritratio n in reflecting o n ethics a n d m orality, b u t
I do n o t believe th at we can choose a life style o r a m orality a t will. T h e re are, I
think, p ro fo u n d psychologically, socially a n d culturally d e te rm in e d lim its to
w hat we can conceivable choose, believe a n d do.
I have arg u ed th a t W elsch’s aesth e tic iz atio n rests, a t least in p a rt, o n
co n cep tu al confusion a n d conflation. W elsch, how ever, claim s th a t th o se w ho
find th e aestheticization o f everyday life etc. distasteful o ften avail them selves
o f a c h e a p co n cep tu al trick a n d a rg u e th a t aesthetics by d e fin itio n deals only
with art. T h e o p p o n en ts o f aestheticization th eo rie s are in W elsch ’s o p in io n
th ere fo re guilty o f an illicit co n cep tu al m ove. T his attitu d e , W elsch co n tin u es,
is escapistic, a n d d o es n o t e n h a n c e o u r p h ilo so p h ic a l u n d e r s ta n d in g o f
c o n tem p o rary reality.“ In response to W elsch ’s ch a rg e I a d m it th a t I dislike
som e o f th e effects o f the aesth eticizatio n o f everyday life (as does W elsch).
B ut th a t is surely beside the point. In a rg u in g th a t m o st o f th e p h e n o m e n a
W elsch reg ard s as th e effects o f aesth e tic iz atio n I am n o t saying th a t th ese
aspects o f c o n tem p o rary life sh o u ld b e ig n o re d , n o r th a t they s h o u ld n ’t b e
studied by philosophers. T hey fall, how ever, m o re naturally w ithin th e d o m ain
o f a g en e ral philosophy a n d sociology o f c u ltu re th a n w ithin aesthetics. I see
n o p o in t in b ro a d e n in g th e c o n c e p t o f th e ae sth e tic a n d aesth etics to such an
e x te n t th a t alm ost everything fro m science, p h ilosophy, ethics, m orals, life
styles, th e p ro d u c ts o f th e e n te r ta in m e n t in d u stries, etc. a re re g a rd e d as
aesthetic p h e n o m e n a to be studies in th e new discipline o f trans-aesthetics. It
56 Ibid.,
p . 20.
38
A e s t h e t i c s , P h il o s o p h y o f C u l t u r e a n d “T h e A e s t h e t ic T u r n ”
is in d e e d re m a rk ab le d ra t alm ost everydiing, ex c ep t art, seem s to be included
in th e aesth e tic iz atio n o f reality, an d thus a fit subject fo r the new “trans­
ae sth e tic s”.
In his c o n trib u tio n to the In tern atio n al Congress o f Aesthetics in Ljubljana
in 1998 W olfgang W elsch p re sen ts w hat h e regards as a case study o f the
ae sth e tic iz atio n o f th e everday. C o n tem p o rary sport, acco rd in g to W elsch,
“obviously re p re se n ts a strik in g exam ple o f today’s aestheticization o f the
everyday”.57 T h e re is a shift W elsch m aintains in todays’s sp o rt “from an ethical
to an aesthetic perspective” o n health.™ T oday’s sport, he believes, has “tu rn ed
in to a c e le b ra tio n o f th e b o d y ”,r,!l the o ld e r “m o d e rn ” p ractice o f s p o rt
presu m ab ly b ein g so m eth in g else, m ortifying the body, for exam ple, o r forcing
th e body to p erfo rm b ey o n d all reasonable limits. “This novel type o f training”,
W elsch m ain tain s, “respects th e body a n d does away with th e old ideology o f
m a ste rin g th e b o d y ”,60 a n d W elsch quotes the F innish w orld ch am p io n in
cross-country skiing M ika Myllylä as saying th at “the greatest enjoym ent com es
from train in g , n o t from w inning”.1’1 H ad W elsch q u o ted Myllylä as an exam ple
o f a new “a e sth e tic iz ed ” a ttitu d e to sp o rt if h e h a d finished seventh o r fiftysev en th in th e w orld ch a m io n sh ip s in Ram sau in 1999,02 h ad h e q u o te d him
as an e x a m p le o f “a new care fo r the body” if h e h ad know n th a t Myllylä
w o u ld b e c a u g h t u sin g p e rfo m a n c e e n h a n c in g dru g s d u rin g th e w orld
ch a m p io n sh ip s in cross-country skiing in Lahti in F ebruary 2001? T h e fact
th a t th e F in n ish skier, w hom W elsch regards as a shining exam ple o f a new
“p o s tm o d e rn ” ae sth e tic iz ed a p p ro a c h to sport, was ca u g h t cheating, is n o t
only iro n ic , b u t casts a ra th e r lu rid lig h t o n p o stm o d ern aestheticization
processes. T h e d istin ction betw een reality a n d ap pearance is m ore im p o rta n tb o th o n to lo g ically a n d m orally th a n W elsch is p re p a re d to adm it.
VI
A lth o u g h th e d iscourse o f “aesth eticizatio n ” an d the “aestheticization o f
th eo ry , reality a n d e th ic s” is a relatively new (a n d co n tem p o rary ) p h e n o ­
m e n o n , it is n o t w ith o u t p re c e d e n ts . T h e co n cep ts o f th e ae sth e tic , o f
57 W olfgang W elsch, “S port - Viewed Aesthetically, and Even as Art?”, Filozofski Vestnik
1999:2, “A esthetics as Philosophy”, Proceedings of the XlVth In tern atio n al Congress o f
A esthetics 1998, P art I, L jubljana 1999, p. 213.
58 Ibid., p. 217.
r"‘ Ibid. p. 215.
m Ibid. p. 218.
01 Ibid.
112 Myllylä won the 10, 30 an d 50km cross-country races.
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L a r s - O l o f  i il b e r g
a e s th e tic s , a n d o f a e s th e tic is m a re o p e n to d if f e r e n t a n d c o n f lic tin g
in terp re tatio n s. T h e co n c ep t o f aestheticism , as u sed by th e h isto ria n o f ideas
Allan M egill in his b o o k Prophets o f Extremity (1985) shows so m e affinities to
S h u ste rm an ’s a n d W elsch’s co n cep tio n s o f aestheticization. By “a e sth e tic ism ”
Megill u n d ersta n d s the tendency “to see ‘a r t ’ o r ‘la n g u a g e ’ o r ‘d is c o u rse ’ o r
‘tex t’ as co n stitu tin g th e prim ary realm o f h u m a n e x p e rie n c e ”,'’3 a ten d e n c y
h e re g a rd s as c h a ra c te ris tic o f m u c h r e c e n t a v a n t-g a rd e th o u g h t. T h is
aestheticism , em phasizing the p o te n tia l o f lan g u ag e to c re a te its ow n reality
is, acco rd in g to Megill, a c o u n te rp a rt to th e post-R om antic n o tio n o f th e w ork
o f a rt creatin g it own reality.1'4 M egill’s “aesth eticism ” shares w ith p o stm o d e rn
a e sth e tic iz a tio n th e c ritiq u e o f E n lig h te n m e n t th o u g h t in s tre ssin g th e
constructivist ch aracter o f discourse a n d language, p erh ap s also in th e a tte m p t
“to b rin g back into th o u g h t an d in to o u r lives th a t form o f edification, th a t
reaw akening of ekstasis, which in the E n lig h ten m en t a n d the post-E nlightenm ent
view has largely b een confined to th e realm o f a rt”.6r’ T h e “aesth eticism ” o f th e
E n lig h ten m en t critics such as Nietzsche, H eidegger, F oucault a n d D errid a, a n d
the “aestheticization” discourse o f S husterm an a n d W elsch can thus b e seen to
refo rm u late and to transform central them es in R om antic a n d post-R om antic
ae sth e tic s. S h u s te rm a n ’s a n d W e lsc h ’s re fo rm u la tio n o f a e s th e tic s a n d
celebration o f (certain aspects) o f th e aestheticization o f co n tem p o rary life can
be seen as a dem ocratic and pragm atic version o f the high-brow aestheticism
Megill finds in Nietzsche and H eidegger.
In o rd e r to p u t the renew al o f aesthetics envisaged by S h u ste rm a n a n d
W elsch in sh a rp e r focus, it may b e useful to c o n tra st th e ir views o f th e tasks o f
aesthetics with m o re traditional c o n c e p tio n s o f th e aim s a n d p u rp o se s o f
ph ilo so p h ical aesthetics. T h e Polish p h ilo s o p h e r a n d a e sth e tic ia n , B o h d a n
D ziem idok, presents the follow ing d e fin itio n o f aesthetics in The Blackwell
Dictionary o f Twentieth-Century Social Thought (1993):
In its m odern m eaning aesthetics is m ost frequently u n d ersto o d as a
philo so p h ical discipline w hich is e ith e r a p h ilo so p h y o f aesth e tic
ph en o m en a (objects, qualities, experiences an d values), o r a philosophy
o f art (of creativity, of artwork, and its perception) o r a philosophy o f
art criticism taken broadly (m etacriticism ), or, finally, a discipline which
is concerned philosophically with all three realm s jointly.1’0
03 Allan Megill, Prophets of Extremity: Nietzsche, Heidegger, Foucault, Derrida (Berkeley:
University o f California Press, 1985), p. 2.
114Ibid.
65 Ibid., p. 342.
r,(’ B ohdan Dziemidok, “Aesthetics”, The Blackwell Dictionary o f Twentieth-Century Social
Thought, eds. William O uthw aite & T o m B ottom ore (O xford: Blackwell, 1993), p. 4.
40
A e s t h e t i c s , P h i l o s o p h y o f C u l t u r e a n d “T h e A e s t h e t ic T u r n ”
A esthetics is th u s basically a p h ilosophical discipline c o n c e rn e d with
a e sth e tic p h e n o m e n a in g e n e ra l a n d w ith works o f a rt in p artic u la r as well as
th e p h ilo s o p h ic a l analysis o f a r t criticism (m etacriticism ). A lth o u g h the
p h ilo so p h ic a l study o f aesth etic p h e n o m e n a in general are said to form p a rt
o f a e sth e tic s, D z ie m id o k ’s d e fin itio n is clearly a rt c e n tre d in a way th a t
S h u s te rm a n ’s a n d W elsch’s co n c ep tio n s o f aesthetics a r e n ’t.07 T h e British
p h ilo s o p h e r a n d ae sth e tic ia n M alcolm B udd presents a sim ilar definition in
a n o th e r re c e n t p u b lication, The Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (1998), w hen
h e d escrib es aesth etics as “consist[ing] o f two parts: th e philosophy o f art,
a n d th e p h ilo s o p h y o f a e s th e tic e x p e rie n c e a n d c h a ra c te r o f objects or
p h e n o m e n a th a t are n o t a rt”.08 W hereas the problem s o f the philosophy o f
a r t a re relativ ely well d e fin e d , “th e p h ilo so p h y o f a e sth e tic e x p e rie n c e ”
c o n c e rn s a variety o f h e te ro g e n e o u s p h en o m en a , including n o t only aesthetic
e x p e rie n c e s o f n a tu re (e n v iro n m e n tal aesthetics), b u t it h ard ly includes “the
aesth e tic iz atio n o f ethics a n d everyday life”.1'’1
T h e r e is n o th in g w ro n g in studying the aestheticization o f ethics an d
ev e ry d ay life, o n th e c o n tra ry , it is im p o r ta n t to stu d y th e m a n ifo ld
a e s th e tic iz a tio n p ro cesses at w ork in co n te m p o ra ry c u ltu re , b u t I d o u b t
w h e th e r th ese co n c e rn s sh o u ld b e at ce n tre o f philosophical aesthetics. T he
arts a n d th e e x p e rie n c e o f a rt raise m any im p o rta n t an d in trig u in g p roblem s
th a t sh o u ld n o t b e p u t in to th e m ixed an d ra th e r ill-defined bag o f “trans­
ae sth e tic s”, n o r sh o u ld they b e swallowed by a new “som a-aesthetics”. Aleš
Erjavec is rig h t in saying th a t th e re is a “b ro a d en in g o f th e n o tio n o f the
aesthetic” a t w ork h e re a n d th a t W elsch’s trans-aesthetic im plies a “collapsing
o f th e aesthetic a n d o f aesthetics".7H I entirely agree with him th a t a rt should be
07 Cf. Susan Feagins definition o f “aesthetics” in The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy
( 1995) .w h ere aesthetics is defined as “ the b ranch of philosophy th a t exam ines the nature
o f art a n d th e character o f experience o f art and the natural environm ent” (Susan Feagin,
“A esthetics”, The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, ed. R obert Audi, Cambridge: Cambridge
U niversity Press, 1995, p. 10). A esthetics is thus not identical with the philosophy o f art, it
includes environm ental aesthetics, b u t hardly “the aestheticization of ethics and everyday
life”.
08 M alcolm Budd, “A esthetics”, The Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vol. 1, ed. Edward
Craig (L ondon: R outledge, 1998), 59.
00
The Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy is intended to replace Paul Edwards large
Encyclopedia o f Philosophy, published in 1967. T he definition of “aesthetics” offered by
Jo h n H ospers in th a t work reads: “ [T] he philosophy of art covers a somewhat m ore narrow
area th an does aesthetics, since it is co ncerned with the concepts an d problem s th at arise
in co n n e ctio n with works o f a rt an d excludes, for exam ple, the aesthetic experience of
n a tu re ” (John H ospers, “A esthetics, Problem s o f ’, The Encyclopedia o f Philosophy, vol 1-2,
ed. Paul Edwards, New York: M acm illan, 1967, p. 36).
70 Aleš Erjavec, “A esthetics as P hilosophy”, Filozofski Vestnik 1999:2, “A esthetics as
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L ars - O ijo f  i il b e r g
viewed as “a relatively distinct p h e n o m e n o n re q u irin g its relatively d istin c t
th eo retical re flectio n ”.71 T h e p ro b lem s o f re p re s e n ta tio n in art, th e value o f
art, the rationality o f critical ju d g e m e n t etc., will n o t go away by sim ply ig n o rin g
th em .72 If we are n o t interested in such questions, we are n o t, I suggest, d o in g
p h ilo so p h ic al aesthetics (but, ra th e r, u n d o in g ae sth e tic s). T h e q u e stio n s
c o n c e rn in g the aestheticization o f theory, ethics a n d everyday life are b est
viewed as p ro b lem s for the p h ilo so p h y a n d sociology o f c u ltu re a n d th e
criticism o f culture. A rt a n d aesthetics are to o im p o rta n t to m e rg e in to an
un d ifferen tiated new discipline studying “the aestheticization o f everything”.73
Philosophy”, Proceedings of the XlVth In tern atio n al Congress o f A esthetics 1998, P art I,
Ljubljana 1999, p. 18.
71 Ibid.
12 See, for exam ple, the excellent collection o f essays Art and Representation w hich
discusses the problem o f representation in general an d the problem s o f rep rese n tatio n
invarious art forms (Art and Representation: Contributions to Contemporary Aesthetics, ed. A nanta
Ch. Sukla, W estport, Connecticut: P raeger, 2001).
73 This article is partly based on a p ap e r p resen ted at th e In tern atio n al C olloquium
“Aesthetics as Philosophy o f C ulture”, organized by th e Slovenian Society o f A esthetics in
Ljubljana, 29 June-lJuly 2000. A few passages in sections II an d IV have ap p e ared in my
article, “Aesthetics between Philosophy an d Art: F our V ariations”, in Swedish in Nordic
Journal o f Aesthetics 2000:20-1, pp. 55-77.
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