ARMED CONFLICT RISK
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Syria: Foreign Actors and Their
Interests.
Territorial Map of Syria
Source: Solace Global Intelligence
SITUATION SUMMARY
Armed Conflict: After over four years of civil war, Syria has been decimated by a conflict that has become increasingly international in nature. The war has
killed hundreds of thousands, while displacing millions throughout Syria. Much of the conflict has been defined by many compe ting groups, militias, and
international actors, all vying for influence in the country. One major issue was that much of the Syrian Army disintegrated in 2012. In the face of popular
protests, many of the military units in the tribally and religiously diverse Syrian army went back to their native villages, and joined the local militias. They
took with them their weapons and expertise, and this resulted in the many different rebel groups that are seen today. These u nits held little allegiance to
Assad, and were more concerned with their own religious sects and tribes. Domestic actors range from Islamic extremist groups like the Islamic State (IS)
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and Al Nusra front, to more moderate bodies like the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). In addition, cross-border international forces, such as Hezbollah and
various Kurdish militias, have played a significant role in the civil war. Major international actors in Syria no w comprise of Russia, Turkey, Iran, and the
United States. Each country seeks different outcomes to the conflict due to specific interests in Syria. The sheer number of competing groups and interests
in Syria makes the final outcome of the conflict hard to predict. This Special Advisory seeks to determine how the internatio nal actors of Iran, Russia, Turkey,
and the US have navigated this complex environment, and what each actor seeks to gain from the conflict.
SYRIA AND THE ASSAD REGIME
SYRIA
The aim of Syrian President Assad, and the remnants of the Syrian government that he controls, is to retain
power in as much of Syria as possible. Assad’s autocratic and brutal regime provided the initial impetus for
Supported By: Russia and Iran
the protests and demonstrations. The government’s violent suppression of the initially peaceful uprisings
Contributions: Military equipment, ground troops,
led to the devolution of the protest movement into civil war. Assad continues to be a pragmatic actor in
and air support.
Syria, and does not hesitate to pick and choose his enemies. During the initial protests, Assad’s regime
Opposing: Kurdish forces and Islamic terror
strategically released a significant number of Islamic extremists from Syrian jails. This meant that with
groups.
Islamic extremists seemingly fighting against him, Assad would be perceived by Western powers as the
Aims: To maintain control of the country with
lesser of the two evils. Indeed, Assad continues to prioritise the fight against more moderate opposition
executive power centered in the Assad regime.
groups over the hard-line Islamists operating in Syria. This is because international actors, specifically
Western nations, are likely to combat Islamic extremists themselves, meaning Assad can focus on groups
more politically threatening to him. In mid-2015, Assad was in a very weak position; some commentators suggested that government forces only controlled
around one sixth of the country. The primary factor in changing this situation was the increased support of Assad by Russia.
Assad is supported by several Shia militias. This is a result of his Alawite tribal links; the Alawite tribe follows a subsect of Shiite Islam. The mostly Alawite
Shabiha mafias are led by extended members of the Assad family, and have also been linked to some of the worst brutality in the conflict. Assad is also
supported by many of the Shiite based Popular Committees. These groups are drawn from local communities, and are often used for more defensive than
offensive purposes. As previously noted, Assad’s pro-government forces have primarily focussed on defeating moderate opposition groups, such as the
Syrian Democratic Council/Forces. Many of these forces had been centred in Aleppo; Assad’s recent victory in the city indicates that these moderate forces
are weakening. As a result, Assad is increasingly engaging with Islamic extremist groups, such as IS and the Al Nusra front. These groups have primarily
dominated the eastern areas of Syria, suggesting that Assad is seeking to extend his influence to this region. Assad is currently the strongest domestic actor
in Syria. It is likely that the conflict will be resolved with Assad still in power, as his regime is perhaps the only cohesive domestic group in the country.
UNITED STATES AND THE WEST
UNITED STATES
The United States has been criticised over its relative inaction over Syria. The US aims to maintain regional
peace, while also promoting democratic reform in the country. The Obama administration was initially against
Supporting: Kurdish Forces,
the Syrian government and Assad regime. Strategic funding and support was promised to several moderate
Free Syrian Army, Syrian Democratic Forces
democratic opposition groups. This was initially centred around the Free Syrian Army (FSA), which was made
Contributions: Humanitarian aid, military
up of many ex-governmental soldiers that had defected. However, this funding has been cut, as the FSA has
equipment, ground troops in training and
degenerated, with most individuals joining Islamist opposition groups. As a result, the US is struggling to
advisory roles, and airstrikes on terror targets.
identify a moderate alternative to Assad’s regime. Much of the previous funding has now gone to the Syrian
Opposing: The Assad regime, Islamic
Democratic Forces (SDF). These forces are often hard to define, and are made up of small local community
extremists, and the increasing influence of
militias which oppose both the Assad regime and Islamist forces. The US provides these forces with some
Russia and Iran.
military armaments, as well as tactical support and training. However, there has been controversy over the
Aims: To rid the region of Islamic State, create
efficacy and intentions of elements of the Syrian Democratic Forces. There have been accusations that some
a democratic Syria, and maintain (or increase)
factions within the SDF are increasingly Islamist, and may form allegiances with Al Nusra Front.
influence in the region.
Significant funding has been given to Kurdish groups in the north of the country. These groups, known as the
People’s Protection Unit (YPG), are now the most effective US ground partner in Syria. However, this is a contentious issue, as the major US ally, Turkey,
are actively engaging Kurdish elements of the YPG. Nevertheless, assorted Kurdish militias are now major benefactors of US support in Syria. Yet the YPG
remains limited in its scope; the Kurdish forces are effective in the north of the country, but have had little impact throughout the rest of Syria. This indicates
that the United States still requires further alliances in Syria, in order to extend its influence throughout the country.
The primary focus of the US and its Western allies has been to combat Islamist groups, in particular IS. This has primarily been achieved through airstrikes
and bombing raids. Yet the use of such air power is undermined by the lack of alliances on the ground, and the US is becoming increasingly irrelevant in the
conflict. Nevertheless, in March 2017, the US deployed a small number of special forces to the city of Manbij. These troops were put in place to ensure that
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Turkish- and US-backed groups in the area do not attack each other. This shows the ideological disparity between competing rebel organisations in the
Syrian conflict, given that they are willing to attack each other rather than focussing on nearby Islamic State militants. US diplomats have become less critical
of Assad, perhaps indicating an acknowledgement that Assad is likely to retain power in the aftermath of the civil war.
It is unclear what the new Trump administration plans to do in Syria. Some suggestions have indicated that President Trump will ally more closely with
Turkey, in order to prioritise the fight against IS in the towns of Raqqa and al-Bab. In addition, President Trump appears to be planning to create ‘safe zones’
in Syria and surrounding countries, designed to accommodate millions of refugees. This is indicative of President Trump’s action against Syrian refugees;
refugees were also banned from entry into the US, before the executive order was quashed.
RUSSIA
RUSSIA
Supporting: The Assad Regime
Contributions: Humanitarian aid, military
equipment, ground troops, and air support.
Opposing: Moderate opposition (including
Kurdish forces), and Islamic extremists
(secondary target).
Aims: To increase its influence in the region and
have access to a warm water port.
Russia’s support for Syria has given it a major role in the Middle East, which Moscow has been lacking
since at least the end of the Cold War. Russia has historically had very few footholds in the Middle East,
and the Syrian conflict gives Moscow the opportunity to expand its influence in the region. Moscow has
a vested interest in the success of President Assad, due to the need for Russia to retain several strategic
locations. Russia has a major warm water port in Tartous; this is its only port in the Mediterranean Sea,
and is a major location for the Russian Navy to refuel. In addition, there is a major Russian airbase at
Latakia, which is one of the country’s only airbases in the Middle East. Both of these locations are within
the tribal heartlands of Assad’s Alawite tribe. As such, the surrounding areas have been consistently
controlled by Assad and assorted pro-government forces. Russia is therefore pragmatically allied with
Assad in order to retain control of these areas.
Russia’s support for the Syrian government has been through joint military ventures. This has been through coordinated air strikes, as well as the use of
Russian special forces on the ground. In addition, training and weapons have been provided by Russia to Syrian government forces. This collaboration goes
so far that Syrians government forces have reportedly been piloting Russian aircraft. Russia has prioritised attacks on those directly opposed to Assad. This
has therefore meant that some moderate opposition groups have been attacked by Russian aircraft. Russia has been accused of bombing groups supported
by the United States. This includes the Free Syrian Army, as well as some Kurdish groups. Controversially, Russia has also bombed assets belonging to the
US; in July 2016, an outpost in southern Syria was bombed, which had previously held British and American special forces. It has been suggested that such
actions have been used by Russia to try to force the US to cooperate more with Russian military assets in Syria.
One of the largest Russian influences has been in its concerted air campaign in Aleppo. The siege of the city has led to international condemnation, with
critics claiming that Russian airstrikes were exacerbating the humanitarian crisis in the city. Indeed, in September 2016 Russian aircraft reportedly destroyed
a UN aid convoy in an airstrike. While Russia denies the accusation, many humanitarian and military agencies have indicated that the attack was a deliberate
attempt by Russia to reduce humanitarian aid in the city. Interestingly, Russia has not been as brutal in its tactics towards Islamist groups, though Russian
aircraft and special forces have had limited engagement with groups such as IS and Al Nusra. This is currently centred on the cities of al-Bab and Raqqa.
Such engagements are likely to increase, as both Assad and Russia refocus their campaigns on Islamist groups. Russia is now a primary backer of the most
recent ceasefire and attempts towards peace in Syria. Russia is a major broker for pro-government forces, while Turkey acts as the broker for many opposition
forces. Together, Russia and Turkey have forced a ceasefire in the country. However, there are conflicting reports as to how effective this has been;
accusations have been made that pro-government forces have used the ceasefire to regroup, before systematically breaking the truce as and when it was
needed. It is unlikely that the ceasefire will hold, but it shows the power and influence held by Russia.
TURKEY
Turkey is now a major player in the Syrian conflict. Alongside Russia, Turkey is a primary backer of the most recent ceasefire and peace negotiations in the
country. Turkey represents many moderate Islamist groups, as well as some democratic opposition groups. Turkey has several motivations for action in
Syria. Turkey seeks a greater regional role; the Syrian conflict has given Turkey the opportunity to expand its sphere of influence in the region. Turkey also
seeks to mitigate the threat of Kurdish groups in northern Syria. The Kurdish Popular Protection Units (YPG), operating in northern Syria, are seen as one
of the most effective forces fighting IS in the area. Indeed, many of these groups have been supported in various ways by the US. However, Turkey view
the YPG as extensions of its own domestic Kurdish terror group, the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party). Turkey fears that the successes of the YPG will allow
the group to continue carving out a semi-autonomous Kurdish region within Syria. On 24 August 2016, Turkey launched Operation Euphrates Shield, a crossborder military incursion into Syria. The objectives of the campaign are to maintain border security, by militarily engaging the Islamic State group and the
YPG. Therefore, Turkey is one of the few international actors with troops on the ground in Syria.
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TURKEY
Supporting: Hamza Brigade, Hayat Tahrir alSham (moderate Islamist groups) and
moderate democratic groups.
Contributions: Humanitarian aid, military
equipment, ground troops, and air support.
Opposing: Kurdish forces, Islamic terror
groups, and the Assad regime.
Aims: To secure its border with Syria, root out
Kurdish militant groups, prevent the flow of
Turkey is a majority Sunni Muslim country. As such, Turkey has formed alliances with several Sunni Islamist
groups. Key to this is Turkish support for the Hamza Brigade, a moderate Islamist group operating in northern
Syria. With Turkish support, the Hamza Brigade effectively defeated IS in the strategically important city of
Dabiq. Many of the groups supported by Turkey are moderate Islamists. However, Turkey has supported the
Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) group. This is a loose collection of different Islamist organisations, which includes
some hard-line Jihadists, such as the Al Qaeda affiliate Al Nusra Front. In effect, Turkey has at times supported
Al Qaeda operatives within Syria. Nevertheless, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham is now one of the most popular and
successful opposition groups operating in Syria. However, it must be noted that Al Nusra Front is also in
conflict with Ahrar al-Sham, another faction within Hayat Tahrir al-Sham. This conflict could reduce the efficacy
of HTS in the long term. Nevertheless, Turkey is likely using its ties to HTS to stay relevant in Syria, thereby
expanding its own influence in the region.
refugees, defeat Islamic terror groups, and
increase its influence in the region.
IRAN
IRAN
Iran is a major backer of President Assad. Iran seeks greater regional influence, and has allied itself with Shiite
actors within Syria. Iran was one of the first to come to President Assad’s aid, capitalising upon Assad’s Shiite
Supporting: The Assad Regime and Shiite
Muslim roots. This backing has come in the form of financial support, military training, and troops on the ground.
militias (including Hezbollah)
Significantly, Iran has supplied Quds forces, which are an elite division of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards.
Contributions: Financial aid to the regime,
This group has been taking on a progressively larger combat role. These Iranian forces have a specific focus
military training, and ground troops (including
on the destruction of Sunni Islamist groups; primarily the Islamic State and Al Nusra Front, as well as the Hayat
elite forces).
Tahrir al-Sham coalition. This is indicative of the wider Sunni -Shiite conflict in the region.
Opposing: Opponents of the regime and Sunni
militant groups (including Islamic State)
In addition to providing its own forces, Iran has been key in providing support to various Shiite militias. In
Aims: To increase its regional influence versus
December 2016, senior Iranian military officials boasted that Assad’s victory in Aleppo was a result of the
Saudi Arabia and the West.
support of Tehran. This is due to the high numbers of Iranian-backed Shiite militias that were key to the final
result in Aleppo. One major group that has aided Assad has been the Iranian backed Hezbollah units.
Hezbollah has been a long-time ally of Iran, and has been operating in Syria for some time. Indeed, Hezbollah is a well-established Shiite militant group,
having had decades of military experience in Lebanon. At Iran’s request, Hezbollah is now a key actor within Syria.
There have been fears that Iranian elements in Syria have been less willing to negotiate for peace. This was perhaps seen most clearly in the recent ceasefire
initiated in Aleppo. Iranian backed forces were the key ground troops in the city, however, they were seemingly surprised by the Russian- and Turkish-backed
truce. As a result, there were many serious breaches of the ceasefire in Aleppo, with Hezbollah being accused of shooting at ambulances and aid convoys.
Indeed, Iran has since imposed many conditions upon the ceasefire agreement that seem beyond the capability of opposition forces to fulfil. Commentators
have noted that both Iran and Assad are not interested in beginning a peace process at this time. Neither Iran nor Assad seem willing to compromise at a
time when they have the upper hand, and are in the process of beating most moderate groups, as well as many Islamists. It is thought that Iran views the
conflict as a way to totally dominate the country, as it has begun to do in Iraq as well. This will significantly increase the country’s regional standing and
sphere of influence.
FUTURE TRENDS
The conflict in Syria seems to be drawing to a close. As it stands, President Assad is likely to retain power in the aftermat h of the conflict, if at least in the
short term. Assad has strategically allied himself with Iran, and assorted Shiite groups within Syria. All of these actors have a vested interest in seeing Assad
remain in power, or at least a continuation of the Shiite-dominated politics within Syria. Iran and Assad together now have enough troops on the ground to
enforce their authority upon the major cities in Syria, including Damascus, Aleppo, and Tartous. Russia is likely to continue its support for Assad, or indeed
an Alawite replacement; this is to secure the port of Tartous, which lies in the Alawite tribal heartlands. However, there may be conflict between Russia and
Iran/Assad. Russia seems to be pushing for a resolution to the conflict via some diplomatic means. This is shown in the current peace talks in Astana, and
the ceasefire backed also by Turkey. Assad and Iran however, are likely to try and capitalise on their current winning run, and only seek negotiations from a
position of complete military dominance. Turkey and Russia seem likely to remain the primary backers of the peace process. Iran’s status as an international
pariah means that it lacks the political standing to enforce agreements on the international stage. With the recent election of Donald Trump, the future of US
involvement in Syria is unclear. Given President Trump’s proven hostility to both Islamic State and Syrian refugees, the US may increase its military campaign
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against IS and other Islamist groups. The US may potentially also limit its Syrian refugee programme, along with US-funded humanitarian operations in the
country.
Kurdish groups will make substantial progress in Syria, having proven themselves in the north of the country. Despite protests by Turkey, Kurdish groups
seem to have gained enough international support to push for greater autonomy. Turkey will at some point be forced to withdraw its ground troops from
Syria, especially if Assad regains control of the northern areas of Syria. Nevertheless, it seems likely that Turkey will try to maintain its influence in the region.
This could be done by continuing its support for Sunni Islamist groups. These groups have been gaining increasing popularity in Syria as one of the most
powerful and coherent opposition to Assad and Iran’s Shiite alliance. Indeed, the Al Qaeda affiliate Al Nusra Front is gaining increasing traction, and seems
likely to overtake Islamic State as the pre-eminent Sunni group in Syria. Dangerously, the popularity of Al Nusra Front may lead some to overlook its Islamic
extremism, especially if Al Nusra becomes the primary opposition to Assad and his Shiite allies. Sunni populations have thrown enough support behind
Islamist groups that there is a necessity for Assad to include such groups within power sharing agreements in Syria. Should Assad regain full control of Syria
without capitulating to Sunni groups, there is likely to be a severe Islamic insurgency in the country.
CASUALTY ESTIMATES OF THE SYRIAN CIVIL WAR FROM MARCH 2011 – PRESENT
120000
100000
96000
80000
52300
60000
60900
55800
45000
40000
20000
2600
1400
6800
0
Civilians
Opposition
Foreign
Defectors from
Hezbollah
Government
Loyalist
Foreign
Fighters
Fighters
Government
Fighters
Forces
Fighters
Fighters
Supporting the
Forces
Supporting the
Opposition
Government
CIVILIAN AND NON-CIVILIAN DEATHS IN SYRIA
REPORTED DEATHS IN SYRIA
FROM MARCH 2011 – FEBRUARY 2017
FEBRUARY 2017
CIVILIAN
NON-CIVILIAN
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SYRIAN
OPPOSITION
RUSSIAN
INTERNATIONAL COALITION
ISLAMIC STATE
KURDISH
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SECURITY ADVICE
SEVERE ARMED CONFLICT RISK
While travellers may have access to Syria, exiting the country is much harder. There are serious international sanctions and embargoes on the country,
which can inhibit travellers from leaving Syria. These include border closures in Turkey, Iraq, Lebanon, Israel, and Jordan. Such closures are intended to
limit the supply of fighters and weapons from exiting Syria, thereby containing the Islamist threat. However, this also direc tly impacts those needing
medical evacuation. As well as border closures, there is limited airport access, alongside regular flight cancellations. This is a result of continued air
strikes throughout Syria. Because of the high risk of air accidents, due to Syria’s overpopulated airspace, commercial aircra ft are often grounded at short
notice. Again, this limits medical evacuations in Syria, heightening the risk for travellers.
Much of eastern Syria is subject to ongoing warfare. In these areas, there is a large presence of Islamic State militants. IS continues to have influence in
the strategically important cities of Raqqa and Palmyra. Both of these cities are sites of constant conflict. There are continuous air raids against IS by
international actors, including Russia, Syria, the United States, and Turkey. Ground forces are preparing to attack Raqqa, while Palmyra was recaptured
by IS in 2016 from Syrian government forces. Moreover, IS has a strong hold on many towns and villages near the Iraqi border. Again, these are subject
to constant air raids. Recently, Iraqi security forces have launched air raids upon IS held towns across the border in Syria. As such, the Syrian border
with Iraq is also incredibly dangerous, as there is a high chance of being caught up in the conflict.
In northern Syria, key areas of conflict revolve around Al Bab and Aleppo. Al Bab was recaptured by Turkish-backed forces in February 2017. However,
there is now a severe terrorist insurgency underway in the city and its surrounding areas. Islamic State an d Al Nusra Front are involved in this
campaign, and are targeting both the Free Syrian Army and Turkish fighters. Alongside this, Kurdish areas are threatened by t errorism. There have
been attacks by assorted Jihadist groups, which have targeted Kurdish civilians an d Peshmerga forces, as well as Turkish soldiers. Turkish forces have
also been targeted by Kurdish militants in the area, most notably by the PKK. Recently , attacks have taken place at Turkish border crossings, which has
further disrupted exit from Syria.
While Damascus is more secure than northern and eastern Syria, there is still a severe risk of terrorism. There is also conti nued fighting between Syrian
government troops and rebel forces in the outskirts of Damascus. On 15 March 2017, a suicide bomber killed 31 people in the main court complex in the
centre of Damascus. Another major area of conflict is the Wadi Barada area, where rebel forces are being pushed back. This area holds much of
Damascus’s water supply, and is therefore a strategic area to hold. More recently, there have been clashes reported between rebels and government
forces in the Jobar District on 19 March 2017. The government claims it has been able to push the rebels back. It should be noted that irrespective of
which actor currently controls a city or area in Syria, the situation could change swiftly. In addition, terrorist attacks have occurred throughout the
country, and often come with little warning.
Solace Global would advise clients to employ the highest possible security measures and journey management planning when visi ting Syria. Solace
Global would advise clients to employ a fully-armed and armoured transportation detail for the foreseeable future, including a secondary convoy vehicle.
Hostile Environment and First Aid Training (HEFAT) is also strongly recommended prior to deployment. We would also advise travellers to use traveltracking technology in order to gain rapid access to the latest incidents and to notify others should an incident occur. Thes e enhanced security
measures are required throughout Syria, as the risk of travellers becoming caught up in terrorist attacks or airstrikes are high, regardless of the level of
militarisation in the area.
Solace Global remains available to provide the full range of Travel Risk Management services to clients.
Solace Global is also able to provide comprehensive crisis management, response, and evacuation services.
For further details please contact +44 (0)1202 795 801 or email [email protected]
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