Federalism and Massive Resistance:
Southern Responses to Brown v. Board of Education
Draft! Please do not cite without permission.
Paper presented at the meeting of the International Political Science Association in
Montreal, Quebec, Canada July 2014
1 Federalism and massive resistance:
Southern Responses to Brown v. Board of Education
This paper examines the institutional determinants of resistance to public school
integration efforts in the American South following Brown v. Board of Education. In
particular, this paper focuses on compact theory and the institutions of federalism and
the way these institutions provided meaning to the perception of the grievance and the
proposed method of redressing this grievance. This case provides insight into perennial
problems associated with federal institutions.
Key words: federalism, compact theory, massive resistance, segregation, integration,
nullification, interposition, centralization, decentralization
“The question was, how could we be so united as to be one people, in relation to foreign
nations for self-protection—and yet, in relation to one another, be separate, distinct and
independent States.”
-Robert Barnwell Rhett, antebellum fire-eater from South Carolina, describing his
interpretation of the American Union in a speech given on July 4, 1859
Introduction
One of the most indelible images of the Civil Right era shows Alabama’s
Governor, George Wallace, standing in a doorway at the University of Alabama,
confronting agents of the federal government and preventing them from integrating the
University of Alabama. Something extraordinary is taking place in that picture: an agent
of one government is attempting to prevent the agents of another government from
implementing its policy. Underpinning the actions of these individuals is a theory of
union and sets of institutions that grant legitimacy, structure actions, and point policy in
directions that make sense for those actors. This sort of thing might be common in the
realm of international politics, but this episode was playing out in the realm of domestic
politics. This is federalism.
2 Regional units within federations have a propensity for resisting central state
authority (Goldstein 1997). These units also serve as an essential check on the
centralizing tendencies of central states (Levy 2007). Why are sub-state units so prone to
such resistance? When, why, and how do sub-state units resist the policies of central
governments? With reference to what principles do they justify their actions? What can
resistance teach us about the promise and perils of federalism? This project explores this
larger set of questions by exploring institutional sources of “massive resistance” in the
American South in the immediate aftermath of Brown v. Board of Education.
Federalism is portrayed as a cure-all for conflict in deeply divided societies
(Bermeo 2002). The analysis conducted in this paper suggests that federalism might not
work as advertised in every context. Simply put, the origins of federalism and
constitutive character of federal institutions encourage the development and maintenance
of grievance in a way that increases the possibility of conflict. Thus, efforts to export
federalism to countries in conflict might be ill advised. This project helps to reveal some
of the fault lines that exist in a federal polity and provides us within insight in the
strengths and weaknesses of federalism.
This paper explores a critical moment in American Political Development from a
unique perspective. The focus of this paper is massive resistance in the form of formal,
legislative resistance to implementation of Brown—in particular, nullification and
interposition resolutions that were adopted to express dissatisfaction with Brown. I take a
brief look at the laws that provided the mechanism of delay. Taken together, these
resolutions articulated an argument about state sovereignty and the need to check central
government authority and these laws were the mechanics by which implementation of
3 Brown was blocked. Finally, this paper takes stock of this resistance and situates this case
in the larger debate regarding the stability of federal institutional structures.
Institutions, Federalism, Origins
There is a large literature in political science that explores the extent to which
institutions structure political outcomes (Hall and Taylor 1996). This so-called “new
institutionalism” was a response to the structural-functionalism and behavioralism of the
past, which tended to black-box state institutions. The idea that institutions structure
political outcomes in predictable ways has now become mainstream in political science.
Within the new-institutionalist literature, there are more specific questions and agendas:
there is a literature that explores the preconditions of federalism stability (Bednar 2009);
there is a literature that explores the origins of federations (Ziblatt 2004) and how these
origins relate to the propensity of regional conflict with center (Anderson 2014); there is
a literature on the paradox of federalism—that is, the link between federalism and
secession movements (Erk and Anderson 2010); there is a literature on the advisability of
exporting federal institutions to contexts where there is, or might be, conflict (Wibbels
2006). This project will make a contribution to research that explores all of these
questions, but especially the role origins play in federal stability. This project, then, is
situated within an active and evolving literature within political science.
Riker established the following essential features of federalism: “(1) two levels of
government rule the same land and people, (2) each level has at least one area of action in
which it is autonomous, and (3) there is some guarantee…of the autonomy of each
government in its own sphere”(Riker 1964: 11).
4 Rather than simply carrying out the political wishes of the center, as in a unitary
state, the constituent unit of the federal state possesses competency over a potentially
large set of policy areas independent of the central government. This formal granting of
policy competency does not exist in an institutional vacuum; coupled with a constituent
unit’s possession of a constitutionally mandated set of powers are state-like institutions
charged with executing those powers. In other words, existing at the regional level of a
federal state is a state—or at least a proto-state—with a substantial area of
constitutionally mandated policy-competency. This feature of federal states, with the
institutions and discourse that accompany them, can, under certain circumstances, make
them ripe for secessionism by placing secession on the agenda of feasible policy
alternatives and dramatically reducing the cost associated with secession.
In the broadest of outlines, federations are created through the coming together of
previously independent states through a compact or bargain or through the devolution of
political power in previously unitary states. We might, thus, refer to either comingtogether or holding-together federations (Stepan 1999). Previously sovereign entities
come together in order to create a new polity or a previously unitary state decides to
distribute state sovereignty among constituent units. We often regard federations rising
out of an agreement over the territorial-political distribution of authority. This misses the
mark. Federations arise out of a disagreement regarding how to distribute political
authority territorially. Federation is a half-way point between extreme centralization and
extreme decentralization. Federations do not simply arise fully formed from chaos; they
are created, and, in most instances, conceded as a second-best choice when most-
5 preferred is not possible. With few exceptions, federalism is a second choice for most and
a first choice for few.
The great genius of federalism is its indeterminacy. It partly satisfies those who
would have more centralization. It partly satisfies those who would have more
decentralization. This is why it is presented as a panacea for territorial-based conflict.
The problem is that it fully satisfies neither the centralizers nor the decentralizers, and it
provides institutional resources to those who seek to change the territorial-political status
quo. The same feature that makes federalism desirable makes it prone to conflict.
Federations are perpetually vulnerable to instability because a single federation
typically encompasses incoherent territorial-political preferences among its members.
Each preference set holder has a set of institutions that it can use to achieve its goals.
Thus, what we can expect to see in federations is regional units acting to increase
decentralization and central governments acting to increase centralization, though this
dynamic is likely to change over time. This means that federations are always potentially
vulnerable to destabilizing pressures.
Compact Theory
Conditions at the formation of the American union militated against the creation
of a highly centralized union. The colonies had their own separate existence. Conditions
at the adoption of the current Constitution also militated against the maintenance of a
highly decentralized union. Under the Articles of Confederation, the states were, in
effect, separate nations bounded together in compact under the Articles of Confederation.
The US Constitution was adopted in a political-territorial environment in which extreme
centralization was impossible and extreme decentralization was undesirable. Crucial
6 competencies were held by the states and crucial questions about the territorial-political
nature of the American union were left unanswered.
According to the tenets of compact theory, the United States exists as a bargain or
compact among the constituent states of the Union. The terms of the compact are spelled
out in the US Constitution. Central to the idea of compact theory is the notion that parties
to the compact (and not the creature created by the compact) have the ability—even the
obligation—to determine when the terms of the compact have been violated. That is to
say, state governments and not the federal government determine whether the compact
has been violated. Compact theory remained (and remains) a viable interpretation of the
American political union. It provides a way of understanding the American union and of
framing both grievance and redress.
Origins of Nullification: the Kentucky and Virginia resolutions
Compact theory has been an available interpretation of the Union since the
beginning. Still, it was not until the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions that the practical
import of compact theory became apparent for states that were dissatisfied with the
actions of the center.
Following the adoption of the Constitution, the Federalist Party dominated the
political institutions of the U.S. They did not enjoy unchallenged authority, however.
Looking for a way to blunt the harsh attacks leveled by its opponents, the Federalists
passed a series of laws known as the Alien and Sedition Acts in 1798. These laws
essentially made it illegal to criticize the government, made it more difficult for
foreigners to become citizens, and made it easier for those who were not citizens to be
deported.
7 Federalists desired these measures to silence Jeffersonian opponents, many of
whom came from France and England. Opponents of these acts saw them as unjust and
unconstitutional usurpations of power. Because the norm of judicial review was not yet
established, and because the judiciary was packed with Federalists, opponents of the laws
had to uncover a different method to challenge the constitutionality of these laws. The
Jeffersonians found their method in a corollary of the theory of state sovereignty: state
interposition or nullification. The theory of state sovereignty maintained that in the
absence of an institution explicitly charged with determining the constitutionality of laws,
it was the states that had this right. A state, in other words, had the authority to declare a
law passed by Congress unconstitutional.
The best-known challenge to the Alien and Sedition Acts was found in the
Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions of 1798 and 1799, prepared by Thomas Jefferson and
James Madison. The principles outlined in these resolutions were so widely accepted that
they enjoyed almost constitutional authority for a time. The resolutions contained two
essential elements: First, the U.S. was held to be a Union of states or sovereignties,
brought together through a compact between the states (The federal government was the
creature of these states and had no authority apart from the specific powers granted to it
in the Constitution); second, because no independent authority was given the power of
determining the constitutionality of laws, judgments of whether a law passed by Congress
was unconstitutional were within the competency of the separate states of the Union. The
Kentucky Resolutions of 16 November 1798 asserted:
That the government created by this compact was not made the exclusive
or final judge of the extent of the powers delegated to itself; since that
would have its discretion, and not the Constitution, the measure of its
powers; but that as in all other cases of compact among parties having no
8 common Judge, each party has an equal right to judge for itself, as well of
infractions as of the mode and measures of redress.
According to the 1799 Resolutions, the “rightful remedy” of an infraction of the
Constitution was through “nullification . . . of all unauthorized acts done under the color
of that instrument.”
The theory of state interposition was fully consistent with beliefs that were
dominant in the early republic, but what state interposition meant in practice was
disputed. The lack of clarity on what the practice of state interposition would look like
became apparent once South Carolina attempted to nullify federal law.
In the Federalist Papers, wrote that the Union was both federal and national in
character (Hamilton, Madison, and Jay 1961). That is, both the center and the states
shared the attributes of sovereignty. Despite this equivocation, Madison, with Jefferson,
made an essential—perhaps critical—contribution to the theory that the separate states
were the sovereign units of the Union. The moral authority of the authors of state
interposition did not prevent the assertion of state sovereignty with the concomitant
power of constitutional interpretation from sitting ill with some. The legislature of
Delaware, a slave state, claimed that the resolutions were “a very unjustifiable
interference with the General Government.” The state of Rhode Island declared that the
power of determining the constitutionality of acts of Congress lay within the Supreme
Court. Massachusetts denied Virginia’s right to determine the constitutionality of laws
passed by Congress, even going so far as to claim that the Alien and Sedition Acts were
not only constitutional, but also “expedient and necessary.” In spite of these rebukes, the
compact theory of the Union at the core of state interposition took hold in the North and
the South.
9 While the balance of power between the sections was maintained, each section
respected the limits on federal power assumed by state sovereignty. Once balance tipped
in favor of one section, however, the power-depleted section defensively adopted the
theory of state sovereignty.
State sovereignty and compact theory have a long history in the American Union.
Southern states—South Carolina, in particular—used compact theory to justify nullifying
federal tariffs in the 1830s. They used it to assert the right of secession in the 1850s. And
they used it to just justify secession in 1860.
The Case
The South has almost always been in a vulnerable position in the Union. It was a
numerical and institutional minority with distinctive racial institutions that were
vulnerable to the policy preferences of national majorities. In the lead up to the Civil
War, the South adopted defensive positions that were meant to reduce their
vulnerabilities. The South seceded, the Civil War was fought, and the Union was put
back together. The Civil War resolved questions about the territorial-political nature of
the union for some time. Secession was taken off the table. During Reconstruction,
Northern armies occupied the South. Following the compromise that ended
Reconstruction, Southern whites began to reassert their dominance in government, which
included exerting nearly total social, economic, and political control over the AfricanAmerican population within the those states. While questions of race, including the rights
of racial minorities, were left to the states, nullification, interposition, and compact theory
were not part of political debate (Bartley 1969).
10 Studies of the Civil Rights era tend to focus on the groups that were seeking to
advance Civil Rights and the cause of freedom. Personal aversion to the policy
preferences of segregationists should not prevent us from using this episode and their
actions to learn about the shape of conflict in federations and the limits of central state
authority. In one fundamental sense, what we see here is a conflict between the
centralizers and decentralizers. While the details will be different, the dynamic of this
conflict is a common feature of many federations.
In May 1954, the Supreme Court of the United States determined that the
maintenance of racially segregated public schools violated the equal protection clause of
the 14th Amendment. This was a major victory for the Civil Rights movement. The court
gave authority to the federal government to regulate the public schools of the separate
states on the issue of race relations. The first Brown decision simply defined public
school segregation as unconstitutional. The second ruling indicated only that integration
must take place with “all deliberate speed.”
Even if the timeline of implementation was not spelled out, the decision was
regarded as a violation of the compact between the states in the form of the US
Constitution. Specifically, Constitution does not give the federal government authority
over the state institution of public education. The 10th Amendment specifically states that
any power not granted to the federal government is reserved to the states. By asserting its
power over public education in the states, the federal court and thus the federal
government were seen as usurping power. The affected states had to rely on their own
efforts to stop this consolidation of power. Fortunately for these states, there was a long
tradition of resistance to rely upon.
11 Massive resistance as a strategy to respond to Brown did not begin quickly
(Tobias 1996). Initial reaction to the Brown decision seemed to vary between resignation
and grudging compliance. While there were institutional factors that worked in favor of
resistance in the American federation, there was nothing in the decision itself that
required resistance. Southern compliance was regarded as at least possible (Wihoit 1973).
For example, had President Eisenhower publicly expressed support for the decision,
resistance may have been muted. Moderation by political elites within these states could
have meant acceptance, even if reluctant, of integration. While some areas of the South
began efforts to integrate almost immediately, the states of the Deep South were
unwilling or were politically unable to accept integration as a reality. White southerners
saw themselves as having a great deal to lose (Sokol 2006).
Interposition and Nullification Resolutions
Massive resistance refers to legislative resistance and local, grass roots opposition
to integration and other policies and practices (Lewis 2006). Formally, resistance took the
shape of interpositions and nullification resolutions. Nullification and interposition are
different. Nullification declares a law null and void within a single state. Interposition
asserts the unconstitutionality of the law and the means by which this unconstitutionality
is to be dealt with, while providing protecting from the state to those who resist the law
(Grantham 2001; Hagley 1997). What we see in these interposition and nullification
resolutions is the importance of the compact theory of union. Compact theory not only
provides a historical understanding of what the union is and where it came from, but it
provides a way to conceptualize grievance and grievance remediation. A compact implies
terms, and the terms of this compact are outlined in the Constitution.
12 Perhaps more important than whether a state claimed to nullify Brown was that
these states offered an interpretation of the constitution according to which nullification
was permitted. The constitution was portrayed as a compact—this compact, the terms of
which were found in the text of the constitution, gave the federal government a specific
and limited grant of power. Other powers, including most notably, the responsibility for
public education, was the province of state governments. Brown, in effect was an
amendment to the constitution without going through the process. In other words, the
terms of the compact were violated.
South Carolina played the role of vanguard in the 1860 secession crisis (Anderson
2102). Virginia played the vanguard in massive resistance. Virginia exported its methods
and strategy of resistance to other states of the South (Klarman 1994). Given its
importance, Virginia has been the focus of numerous previous studies of massive
resistance (see, for example, Gates 1964). Interposition emerged in Virginia in a joint
resolution passed February 1, 1956. In this resolution, the legislature stated
that the powers of the Federal Government result solely from the compact
to which the States are parties…That the General Assembly of Virginia,
mindful of the resolution it adopted on December 21, 1798, and cognizant
of similar resolutions adopted on like occasions in other states, both North
and South, again asserts this fundamental principle: That whenever the
Federal Government attempts the deliberate, palpable, and dangerous
exercise of powers not granted it, the State who are parties to the compact
have the right, and are in duty bound, to interpose for arresting the
progress of the evil, and for preserving the authorities, rights and liberties
appertaining to them…”
Finally, the legislature resolved to “…resist this illegal encroachment upon our
sovereign powers…”
On February 2, 1956, the legislature of Alabama resolved “…that…the decisions
and orders of the Supreme Court of the United States relating to separation of races in the
13 public schools are, as a matter of right, null, void, and of no effect.” This action was
justified by reference to the compact theory of union. In this compact, “there can be no
tribunal above their [the states] authority to decide, in the last resort, whether the compact
made by them be violated.”
On February 14, 1956, the legislature of South Carolina passed a joint resolution
stating that “…the issues raised by this decision are of such grave import as to require
this sovereign State to judge for itself of the infraction of the Constitution.” Further,
“…the State of South Carolina as a loyal and sovereign State of the Union will exercise
the powers reserved to it under the Constitution to judge for itself of the infractions and to
take such other legal measures as it may deem appropriate to protect its sovereignty and
the rights of its people.”
South Carolina’s comparatively tepid response to Brown was somewhat ironic
given the state’s role as a vanguard state in the fight for Southern rights from 1828-1860
(Anderson 2012). In the current case, South Carolina pledged only Constitutional
resistance to Brown, not nullification or interposition, and it did do only after Virginia
and Alabama had acted.
The Mississippi legislature adopted a Senate Concurrent resolution no. 125 on
February 29, 1956. The resolution stated:
Be it resolved…That the Legislature of Mississippi explicitly and
peremptorily declares and maintains that the powers of the Federal
Government emanate solely from the compact, to which the States are
principals…That the Legislature of Mississippi asserts that whenever the
Federal Government attempts to engage in the deliberate, palpable, and
dangerous exercise of powers not granted to it, the states who are parties
to the compact have the right, and are in duty bound, to interpose… Be it
further resolved that…The State of Mississippi declares that it is the duty
and privilege of the states to object to the…invasion of its rights and does
hereby interpose its sovereignty to protect these rights…we do…declare
14 the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States…to be a
usurpation of power reserved to the several states and do declare, as a
matter of right, that said decisions are in violation of the Constitution of
the United States and the State of Mississippi, and therefore, are
considered unconstitutional, invalid and of no lawful effect within the
confines of the State of Mississippi.
The Southern Manifesto (formally, the Declaration of Constitutional Principles)
heralded the effort to fight back, but it also provided a glimpse into the difficulty of
collective action. The Manifesto helped to legitimate resistance in a way that the actions
of a single state were unable. The Southern Manifesto was read into the Congressional
Record on March 12, 1956. The vast majority of US Senators and Representatives from
the South signed it. The extent to which these signatories supported the Manifesto is
debatable (Badger 2008).
The manifesto did not make explicit reference to the compact theory of union, but
it did refer to explicit limits placed on the federal government—and it referred to the dual
nature of the American political system—and resistance:
With the gravest concern for the explosive and dangerous condition
created by this decision and inflamed by outside meddlers:
We reaffirm our reliance on the Constitution as the fundamental law of the
land.
We decry the Supreme Court's encroachment on the rights reserved to the
States and to the people, contrary to established law, and to the
Constitution.
We commend the motives of those States which have declared the
intention to resist forced integration by any lawful means.
We appeal to the States and people who are not directly affected by these
decisions to consider the constitutional principles involved against the
time when they too, on issues vital to them may be the victims of judicial
encroachment.
Even though we constitute a minority in the present Congress, we have
full faith that a majority of the American people believe in the dual system
of government which has enabled us to achieve our greatness and will in
time demand that the reserved rights of the States and of the people be
made secure against judicial usurpation.
15 We pledge ourselves to use all lawful means to bring about a reversal of
this decision which is contrary to the Constitution and to prevent the use
of force in its implementation.
The Southern Manifesto had the effect of legitimating the resistance that was
already taking place in the Southern states, but the document came with some irony,
considering the history of the South in the United States. First, according to the principle
of compact theory, the constituent units of the United States are its separate states, not the
federal government and not the “North” or the “South,” which were social and political
constructs. This suggests difficultly in achieving collecting action, which the Southern
states had experienced in the past, which South Carolina used to its advantage during the
second secession crisis, and which the South was experiencing in the current episode.
Again, some Southern states proceeded willingly with integration. Others resisted, but not
the same extent as the deep south states. Second, those that signed the Southern
Manifesto were elected officials within the federal government, not state governments,
which was where resistance efforts were located.
The state of Arkansas pursued resistance through state constitutional amendment.
The adopted amendment stated: “…the State of Arkansas shall take appropriate action
and pass laws opposing in every Constitutional manner the Un-Constitutional
desegregation decisions…of the United States Supreme Court, including interposing the
sovereignty of the state of Arkansas to the end of nullification of these and all deliberate,
palpable, and dangerous invasions or encroachment upon rights and powers not delegated
to the United States nor prohibited to the States by the Constitution of the United
States…” The proposed amendment was adopted by the legislature on April 18, 1956.
Arkansas did not explicitly refer to the union as compact, but this is clearly implied by
16 the words of the amendment, which echoed language in the 10th Amendment to the US
Constitution.
The legislature of Louisiana adopted a joint resolution on May 29, 1956. The
resolution referred to “…the Constitution of the United States, a compact in which the
several states are principals…” Further, “…the Legislature of Louisiana does hereby
solemnly declare the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States…to be in
violation of the Constitution of the United States, and the State of Louisiana; and, We
declare, further, our firm intention to take all appropriate measures honorably and
constitutionally available to us, to void this illegal encroachment upon the rights of the
several States…”
Florida was perhaps the first state of the New South, seeking northern industrial
investment, tourist dollars, and a larger role in national politics. As such, Florida’s racial
politics were somewhat more moderate that the states referred to above. Adopting its
interposition resolution April 18, 1957, Florida was the last state to adopt a resolution.
The resolution adopted pulled no punches, however. It referred to the union as a compact,
referred to the obligations of states to judge infringements of that compact, and declared
the court decision to be “null, void, and of no effect.”
The legislatures of Texas and North Carolina did not adopt such resolutions. The
Tennessee House of Representatives adopted an interposition resolution, but the Senate
did not ratify it. Thus, massive resistance was not universal. Even in states that
segregated, support for resistance varied. The failure to achieve unanimity has bedeviled
the South in its efforts to protect its institutions.
17 Resistance Laws
To assert the right to interpose or even to invoke it was a theoretical exercise with
little practical impact. The governor of Florida referred to his own state’s resolution as
meaningless and a “lie and a hoax” (Colburn and Scher 1977: 69 and 71). To be clear,
Brown was not nullified. Interposition did not take place. These theoretical challenges
were just that—theoretical. There was hope that a sufficient amount of resistance would
make implementation of Brown politically impossible. More important than these
resolutions, these states took additional actions that put their theory into practice. Pupil
placement laws were the most common and most effective practical means of preventing
enforcement of Brown. These laws gave local school boards the power to place pupils in
local schools, and they could do so for reasons other than race, thus skirting the
prohibition against segregation. Placing this power in local school boards also meant that
legal action by every segregated student against every segregating school board would be
required to achieve even token integration, let alone meaningful integration. While it did
not nullify Brown, it made it very difficult to enforce. In addition and in keeping with
state and local control over public schools, some districts simply closed public school
systems. These actions were based on the assumption that the Brown decision was
beyond the scope of federal authority and that states were the proper bodies to determine
that usurpation had taken place and to resist it. For some states, the form of resistance
employed was to allow for token integration in select schools in select districts (Douglas
1994).
18 Role of Compact Theory and Federalism
Federalism is typically adopted as a second-best alternative between two more
coherent and potentially more stable territorial-political extremes: unitarism (extreme
centralization) and confederation or separation (extreme decentralization). Federalism
was adopted in the United States because more stable and more territorially coherent
alternatives were not possible or were undesirable. That federalism was adopted in the
United States and how it was adopted meant that compact theory was always an available
interpretation of the American political union. In the United States, compact theory has
long provided means by which states that are not pleased with policies (or prospective
policies) of the federal government could conceptualize their grievance. Compact theory
provided the decentralizers with means of redress. Compact theory meant that each state
held on to sovereignty and each state was able to claim that it could decide for itself
whether federal law and federal court decisions were consistent with the terms of the
compact. Conflict over the extent of federal control over the states has been a permanent
feature of American federalism.
Conclusion
Federations arise out of environments in which there is a disagreement over the
extent of centralization/decentralization. This is the reason federalism is selected over
more territorially coherent alternatives. Conflict between these different sets of forces is
inevitable, because holders of each preference have an interpretation of union and a set of
institutions that justify and permit the advancement of its preferences. The centralizers
can use the institutions of the central state to create a more centralized polity. Likewise,
the decentralizers can use the institutions of the regional states to create a more
19 decentralized polity. This competing institutional logic is likely to persist over time. We
could just as easily explore recent resistance to the Affordable Care Act or to federal gun
control laws as part of this very real tension as massive resistance.
What role did federalism play in massive resistance? First, federalism meant that
incoherent territorial-political alternatives would be co-existing in the same polity.
Second, federalism provided members of the union with a way of interpreting the union
that justified a particular policy path and a way of conceptualizing dissatisfaction with
that path. Third, federalism provided every level of government with a set of institutions
through which this interpretation of union could be articulated and through which
resistance (or enforcement) could be accomplished.
What does resistance look like? How is it justified? These cases provide us with a
critical glimpse of the forces and conflict between centralization and decentralization
within a federation. What can this case teach us about the possibility of achieving longterm stability in federations? Given the rationale behind the adoption of federalism and
given that the institutions of federalism allow these competing rationales to be
instantiated, federations are perpetually beset by territorial-political instability. Here’s
why: centralizers and decentralizers pursue their respective (and mutually incoherent)
policy ends within the confines of the same polity. The prevalence of instability should
not lead to the conclusion that federations are not durable. The American federal system
has endured despite regular conflicts over the limits of central state authority.
20 Timeline
May 1954: Brown v. Board of Education
May 1955: Brown II
February 1, 1956: Virginia joint resolution
February 2, 1956: Alabama House Joint Resolution
February 14, 1956: South Carolina joint resolution
February 29, 1956: Mississippi Senate Concurrent resolution no. 125, adopted
March 1956: Southern Manifesto read into Congressional Record
April 18, 1956: Arkansas interposition Constitutional Amendment adopted
May 29, 1956: Louisiana interposition resolution
May 2, 1957: Florida interposition resolution
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