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Article Written: June 27, 2007
Iran-Contra Scandal
Was Oliver North a Criminal or a Scapegoat?
Introduction
The U.S. and the Contras
Iran and the U.S.: Weapons Sales, Hostages and the Contra Diversion
Exposure and Fallout
The Case Against Oliver North
The Case in Defense of Oliver North
Prosecutions and the Iran-Contra Legacy
Discussion Questions & Activities
Suggested Web Sites
Bibliography
The issue: In 1989, Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North was charged with 16 felony counts for his role in the Iran-contra scandal,
which centered around two secret initiatives that involved weapons sales to Iran in exchange for the release of American
hostages in the Middle East, and diverting the funds from the sales to the "contra" rebel army in Nicaragua seeking to
overthrow the leftist government. Was North a criminal or a scapegoat for his role in Iran-contra?
Arguments against North: North's covert actions on behalf of the contras violated U.S. laws placing restrictions on what certain
government agencies could do for the contras. In particular, he violated the so-called Boland Amendments, which explicitly forbade
the Central Intelligence Agency to use funds to support the overthrow of the Nicaraguan government. North admitted that he misled
Congress when he falsely denied that he was involved in prohibited contra support activities, and also admitted that he shredded key
memos and financial records detailing his contra work. North and his collaborators also violated federal law by selling arms to Iran.
Arguments in defense of North: North's contra support activities did not violate congressional legislation because the Boland
Amendments did not apply to the agency North was working for, and therefore he could not have violated the laws' restrictions. And
even if his actions could be considered criminal, they were morally justified: The U.S. was enmeshed in the Cold War with the Soviet
Union, and had to use all means at its disposal—including covert operations that violated laws—to protect itself from the threat posed
by Nicaragua, which was linked to communist powers such as Cuba and the Soviet Union. Also, North did not receive a fair trial in
connection with his Iran-contra activities. His appearance before a congressional committee in 1987, in which he provided partially
immunized testimony while millions watched on television, tainted witnesses who would later appear at his trial.
Chris Wilkins/AFP/Getty Images
Oliver North prepares to testify before the House-Senate Foreign Affairs Committee on the
Iran-Contra scandal.
Introduction
In late 1986, two secret initiatives carried out by the administration of President Ronald Reagan (R, 1981-89) were unmasked, igniting a political scandal of
unprecedented scope. One of those initiatives involved supporting the "contra" rebel army in Nicaragua, and the other, to which the first was linked by certain financial
transactions, involved weapons sales to Iran in exchange for the release of American hostages in the Middle East. The Iran-contra scandal, as it came to be known,
prompted several official inquiries and nearly a dozen criminal cases, marred Reagan's presidency and tested the public's faith in U.S. democratic institutions.
At the start of Reagan's presidency in 1981, the U.S. found itself increasingly concerned with the political situation in the Central American nation of Nicaragua. A recent
revolution had ousted the long-standing pro-U.S. regime and had set Nicaragua on a more independent course under its new, leftist Sandinista government. Worried
about the U.S.'s waning influence in the region, the Reagan administration set out to disrupt the activities of the new Nicaraguan government.
Initially, the Reagan administration's Nicaragua policy—which mainly involved supporting a group of antigovernment, right-wing militants known as the contras—had been
sanctioned by Congress. But as the months wore on, Congress's willingness to endorse the policy eroded. Beginning in late 1982, Congress began legislating yearly
restrictions on aid to the contras, each stricter than the last, making it almost impossible for the Reagan administration to carry out its Nicaragua policy. Yet, despite the
restrictions, and presidential promises to abide by them, support for the contras continued unabated without the knowledge of Congress and the public.
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At the same time, the U.S. was also focusing attention on the Middle Eastern nation of Iran, which had become a source of grave concern for the Reagan administration. A
long-time pro-U.S. regime had recently been overthrown. Iran's new leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, was avowedly anti-American, and there were allegations that
Iran was supporting terrorist acts in the region, including the seizure of seven Americans by pro-Iranian militants in Lebanon in the mid-1980s.
In public, Reagan took a strong stance against Iran, freezing billions of dollars in Iranian assets and imploring other nations to refrain from selling Iran weapons. But in
private, some officials proposed an unorthodox plan: What if the U.S. sold weapons to Iran in an attempt to reach out to moderate elements in the government and foster
better relations? Would it work? Could it help secure the release of the hostages in Lebanon?
The Reagan administration decided to carry out that plan, and to do so in secret. To oversee the plan, the administration turned to Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North, a
loyal, hard-working and experienced White House staff member. He also happened to be the same person helping to keep the contras afloat.
A decorated Vietnam War (1959-75) veteran and career soldier, North had been working for the Reagan administration since 1981 as a staff member of the National
Security Council (NSC), a presidential advisory group comprised of high-level officials. From his office in the White House, North now assumed two big responsibilities:
administering covert support for the contras and secretly coordinating arms-for-hostages deals with Iran. [See National Security Council (sidebar)]
In October 1986, North's activities on behalf of the contras and the arms-for-hostages deals with Iran were exposed in dramatic fashion after the Nicaraguan military shot
down a plane that was later revealed to have been a U.S. plane carrying supplies to the contras. There was an added revelation in November that apparently stunned
even some of North's colleagues: North had diverted profits from the Iranian weapons deals to fund contra operations. This gave birth to the Iran-contra scandal.
As investigators began to probe the details of the scandal, North became a household name. His testimony before a joint House-Senate congressional hearing in 1987
was beamed into millions of homes across America. Questioned by members of Congress on live television about his involvement in the scandal, North shocked many by
candidly admitting that he had lied to Congress on previous occasions when it inquired about his activities. He also claimed that he undertook his covert Iran-contra
activities in the belief that Reagan was fully aware of them. [See Senator Mitchell's Opening Statement for the Congressional Committee Investigating Iran-Contra
(Excerpt) (primary document)]
North was charged with 16 felony counts related to his Iran-contra activities, and his legal odyssey became one of the most compelling subplots within the entire
Iran-contra drama. Notwithstanding his innocence or guilt, one thing was certain: North was a polarizing figure. To his critics and legal opponents, he was a criminal, a liar
and possibly a traitor; to his allies and defenders, he was innocent of any criminal wrongdoing, was a scapegoat for the misdeeds of higher officials, and was a patriot for
going to great lengths to defend his nation against its enemies.
North's critics argued that his covert actions on behalf of the contras violated congressional legislation and other laws. In particular, they claimed that he violated the
so-called Boland Amendments, which explicitly barred the CIA from using funds to support the overthrow of the Nicaraguan government. They also claimed he mishandled
certain funds, including improperly cashing traveler's checks given to him by a contra leader, and accepting an illegal gratuity from a contra operation associate.
Opponents also argued that North deliberately lied to Congress about his contra support activities and later undertook efforts to obstruct investigations into the Iran-contra
scandal. Opponents cited North's own admission that he misled Congress when he falsely denied that he was involved in prohibited contra support activities. They also
cited his admission that he shredded key memos and financial records detailing his contra work.
Turning to the Iran side of the scandal, North's opponents asserted that he and his collaborators in the Reagan administration violated federal law by selling arms to Iran.
Under the Arms Export Control Act of 1968, opponents claimed, the Reagan administration was obligated to notify Congress of its intention to sell arms to Iran. Since
Congress was never notified, they said, the administration broke the law.
Supporters of North, on the other hand, disputed that his contra support activities violated congressional legislation. Supporters claimed that the Boland Amendments did
not apply to the agency North was working for, and therefore he could not have violated the laws' restrictions. North's defenders added that his actions, from covert contra
activities to the shredding of documents, were not crimes because he did not have any criminal intent when he undertook them. Rather, they claimed, he was just obeying
his superiors and protecting them from public disgrace.
Allies further contended that North did not receive a fair trial in connection with his Iran-contra activities. They asserted that his appearance before a congressional
committee in 1987, in which he provided partially immunized testimony while millions watched on television, tainted witnesses who would later appear at his trial. Allies
cited the statements of actual witnesses at North's trial who confessed to having been influenced by his committee testimony.
Finally, setting aside all legal considerations, some defenders of North said that what he did in the Iran-contra affair was morally justified and necessary. They pointed out
that the U.S. was enmeshed in a Cold War with the Soviet Union. The government had to use all means at its disposal— including covert operations that violated
laws—to protect itself from the threat posed by Nicaragua, which was linked to communist powers such as Cuba and the Soviet Union, they contended.
The U.S. and the Contras
The U.S. has a long history of economic, military and political intervention in Nicaragua, Central America's largest and most populous nation. One of the earliest of such
interventions, dating back to 1909, was triggered when Nicaraguan President Jose Santos Zelaya decided that he would grant concessions to U.S. rivals Japan and
Germany for the construction of a transoceanic canal in his country. The U.S., which was overseeing the construction of its own canal in neighboring Panama, dispatched
400 marines to help drive the Nicaraguan president from office and install a more compliant ruler. A parade of similar interventions, many not as overt but still achieving
roughly the same results, would follow during the rest of the 20th century.
For four decades, from the 1930s to the 1970s, Nicaragua was ruled by the Somoza family, a right-wing political dynasty. Supported by U.S. funds, the Somozas used
notoriously brutal tactics to maintain law and order, breeding resentment among the population. In 1979, an armed revolution by a homegrown, broad-based, left-wing
movement called the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN), or Sandinistas for short, drove the Somozas from power. The Sandinistas then assumed control of
Nicaragua.
The Sandinistas' takeover of Nicaragua elicited an immediate reaction from the U.S. The U.S. president at the time of the takeover was Jimmy Carter (D, 1977-81). While
Carter did not repudiate the Sandinistas, and even continued to provide some aid, in the main he followed in the footsteps of his predecessor in the White House, Gerald
Ford (R, 1974-77), trying to ensure that Nicaragua did not stray out of U.S. control. To achieve that end, Carter turned to the CIA, which he authorized in 1979 to provide
covert financial and material support to Sandinista opponents.
After Reagan defeated Carter in the 1980 presidential election, U.S. policy toward Nicaragua became more antagonistic. In February 1981, Reagan suspended all aid to
the Central American country, and by the end of the year he had authorized the CIA to proceed with covert programs designed not only to bolster anti-Sandinista elements
but also to crush leftist movements springing up in other politically volatile Central American nations, such as El Salvador.
Reagan, a committed anticommunist, maintained that Central America was a central front in the Cold War struggle for global supremacy. Were Central America to become
communist-controlled, Reagan and his allies reasoned, enemies of the U.S. would have a key strategic foothold only a short distance from border states like Texas,
thereby posing a direct threat to the security of the entire nation.
At the time Reagan initiated his plan for Nicaragua, there were two main groups that could be described as anti-Sandinista. One consisted of disenchanted former
Sandinistas who had splintered off to pursue their own agenda. The other, and the one that the U.S. ended up throwing major support behind, consisted of former
members of the Somoza regime's army, known as the National Guard. Since their ouster from Nicaragua in 1979, they had been gathering in nearby Honduras and
plotting a return to power. The Sandinistas branded them "contrarevolucionarios" (Spanish for counterrevolutionaries), or "contras" for short.
To legally provide support for the contras via the CIA, the Reagan administration was required to obtain the consent of Congress. Initially, the administration obtained
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such consent. However, the range of covert activities that Congress agreed to support (as members of Congress themselves would later claim) was narrowly
circumscribed. The legislative branch granted the CIA permission to support the contras in their efforts to stop the flow of arms from the Sandinistas to left-wing rebels in
neighboring El Salvador, but not in their efforts to overthrow the Sandinista government.
Following such a directive required walking a fine line, and it was not long before reports surfaced alleging that the CIA was doing more than it had been given permission
to do. In early 1982, as sensational media stories about CIA efforts against the Sandinistas fanned widespread outrage, Congress addressed the matter directly. On
December 8, 1982, the House passed the Boland Amendment, 411-0. Named for its chief sponsor, Representative Edward Boland (D, Massachusetts), the law was
attached to the defense appropriations bill for 1983, thus requiring yearly renewal to stay in effect. Congress cleared the bill on December 20, and Reagan signed it the
following day.
While Reagan publicly pledged to follow the new law despite his personal reservations, his administration immediately began seeking ways to circumvent it, either by
exploiting legal loopholes or, as many critics would allege, by breaking the law outright. In any case, the Reagan administration's maneuvering in the wake of the Boland
Amendment's passage quickly ran afoul of Congress and precipitated a more severe legislative backlash.
In May 1984, shortly after reports surfaced that the CIA had been directly responsible for the mining of Nicaraguan harbors in an attempt to disrupt the country's
international trade and thereby weaken the Sandinista government, Congress passed a law known as Boland II. That law prohibited "the Central Intelligence Agency from
using appropriations "which would have the effect of supporting, directly or indirectly, military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua by any nation, group, organization,
movement or individual." Reagan signed the legislation on October 12.
With the passage of Boland II, many in Congress and among the American public expressed the belief that U.S. support for the contras was finished. As it turned out, they
were wrong.
When it comes to the next phase of U.S. involvement in Nicaragua, covertly supporting the contras despite Boland II, it remains unclear who conceived and ordered it.
Some said it was the president himself, while others claimed it was a case of various officials taking their own initiative or simply misinterpreting orders. However, there is
little dispute over how the basic mechanism of involvement worked following the passage of Boland II. In essence, the task of maintaining U.S. support for the contras
post-Boland II was assigned to North, a young lieutenant colonel serving on the NSC. From 1984 to 1986, North—with crucial help from various top-ranking members of
the Reagan administration, including CIA Director William Casey, national security adviser Robert MacFarlane and MacFarlane's successor, Admiral John Poindexter
—coordinated a complex and covert operation to keep the contra organization running.
North's main activities fell into two broad categories: the solicitation, acquisition and management of funds, and the delivery of arms and supplies. In mid-1984, anticipating
the cut-off of contra funding via Boland II, the Reagan administration approached the oil-rich Middle Eastern nation of Saudi Arabia, a U.S. ally, for help. The Saudis, for
reasons that were never made fully clear in later testimony, responded by donating $1 million a month to support the rebel group. They later increased the donation to $2
million a month and in the end would contribute a total of $32 million to the operation.
The Saudi money, along with smaller contributions from other nations such as Taiwan and South Korea, as well as donations from wealthy private American citizens who
were lobbied by North and his cohorts, was transferred to either of two destinations. One was a Miami, Florida-based bank account held by a contra leader named Adolfo
Calero. The other was a Swiss bank account held by two North associates: Richard Secord, a retired Air Force major general, and Albert Hakim, an Iranian-born American
businessman.
Under North's command, Secord and Hakim became the principal procurers of arms and supplies for the contras. In effect, they would purchase the goods on the
international arms market and arrange for their sale and delivery (by land, sea and air) to the contras. North, Secord and Hakim referred to their secret collaboration as
the Enterprise.
By the summer of 1985, the Enterprise had moved well beyond its basic fund-raising and arms-procurement origins, having blossomed into a sophisticated, multifaceted
operation. It now boasted substantial assets, including its own supply airplanes, flight crews and warehouses, access to CIA intelligence (which was passed on to contras
in the field), political leverage over Central American nations hosting contra bases, and ties to powerful domestic lobbying and fund-raising groups. The contras,
meanwhile, had grown considerably as a result of all the support they were receiving. In mid-1984 they had 9,500 recruits; a little more than a year later, they had more
than 16,000.
In the fall of 1985, North and his associates became the focus of substantial media interest and congressional scrutiny for the first time. Shortly after allegations began to
surface that the U.S., via the NSC staff, was substantially involved in contra-related support activities despite legislative prohibitions, members of Congress started asking
questions. Their inquiries, in the form of letters, were submitted to MacFarlane; several arrived at MacFarlane's desk over a period of weeks.
With North advising him to withhold information, and even helping him compose his answers, MacFarlane responded to the inquiries by, in effect, assuring Congress that
the news reports were nothing but false rumors and that the Reagan administration was not engaged in any contra-related activities beyond limited but fully legal
communications. As much as Congress might have wanted to pursue the matter, the evidence of wrongdoing was simply not strong enough, and so the scrutiny subsided.
(A second inquiry in the summer of 1986 brought North to the Capitol for in-person meetings with members of the House Intelligence Committee, but there too he denied
involvement in fund-raising activities for the contras or any other illegal conduct, once again squelching any further official investigation.)
Although able to evade major public exposure, North's contra operation still faced serious challenges in the fall of 1985. The biggest one was that contras—in essence a
large, private army—had become a very expensive instrument of policy. With congressional funding a remote possibility at best and Saudi funds proving increasingly
inadequate, the future of the contra operation as a whole seemed for many to hang in the balance. But, North and his collaborators conceived a strategy to overcome the
burgeoning crisis:—using profits from the sale of American-made weapons to Iran, an official U.S. enemy, to fund contra operations.
Iran and the U.S.: Weapons Sales, Hostages and the Contra Diversion
Just like Nicaragua, Iran underwent sweeping political change in 1979 after decades of repressive rule under a U.S.-supported political dynasty. Instead of a broad-based
left-wing guerrilla movement, however, Iran's revolution was galvanized by disaffected university students and followers of an exiled Islamic cleric, Khomeini. When
student protests and civil disorder reached a zenith in January 1979, Iran's U.S.-supported ruler, Shah Mohammed Riza Pahlevi, left Iran, never to return. With the
collapse of the shah's regime and its notoriously repressive secret police apparatus, known as Savak, Khomeini returned to Iran and soon became its leader, transforming
the oil-rich nation from a Western-oriented monarchy into a conservative Islamic republic.
An immediate consequence of Khomeini's takeover was the souring of U.S.-Iran relations, with animosities running strong on both sides. Then, on November 4, 1979, a
major international crisis erupted when angry Iranian students stormed the U.S. embassy in Tehran, Iran's capital, and seized about 90 hostages, most of them Americans.
In exchange for the hostages' release, the students demanded the extradition of the shah, then living in the U.S., to face trial in the country he once ruled. Carter's
administration reacted to the hostage crisis by severing all diplomatic ties with Iran and instituting economic sanctions against it.
The hostage crisis lasted a total of 444 days, ending with the hostages' release on January 20, 1981—the day Reagan was sworn in as president. Their release followed
five days of intense negotiations by the outgoing Carter administration. Final agreement was reached on January 19; in return for the release of the hostages, the U.S.
would unfreeze $8 billion in frozen Iranian assets and lift trade sanctions against Iran. Iran desperately needed the money because it had been at war with neighboring
Iraq since the previous year. The Iran-Iraq War would last a total of eight years and claim millions of lives on both sides.
Khomeini's regime posed a serious policy challenge for the Reagan administration in the early 1980s. Chief among Reagan's concerns was the regime's apparently close
connection to major acts of terrorism across the Middle East. In 1983, for example, the bombing of a U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut, Lebanon, that killed 241 American
servicemen was widely believed to have been carried out by a militant group with close ties to Iran. And in 1984 and 1985, terrorists with presumed ties to Iran took seven
Americans hostage in Lebanon, including two journalists, a Presbyterian minister and the CIA's Beirut station chief.
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As the Lebanon hostage crisis unfolded, the Reagan administration's policy for dealing with Iran and its supposed links to terrorism remained a work in progress. The only
major initiative the Reagan administration had in place at the time was a concerted diplomatic effort, begun in the spring of 1983, to pressure other nations to stop selling
weapons to Iran. Known as Operation Staunch, the program involved State Department officials reaching out to Israel, South Korea, Italy, Portugal, China and other
nations.
Although it produced mixed results, Operation Staunch embodied an unambiguous declaration of U.S. principle: To arm Iran under any circumstance was unacceptable.
With the hostage crisis looming large, the Reagan administration made it clear that it would not sell arms to Iran, or to supporters of terrorism in general, in exchange for
the release of hostages. As Reagan proclaimed in a 1985 news conference:
Let me further make it plain to the assassins in Beirut and their accomplices, wherever they may be, that America will never make concessions to
terrorists—to do so would only invite more terrorism—nor will we ask nor pressure any other government to do so. Once we head down that path there
would be no end to it, no end to the suffering of innocent people, no end to the bloody ransom all civilized nations must pay.
Despite Reagan's public pronouncements, however, some in his administration were privately warming to the idea of selling arms to Iran. The administration became so
open to the idea, in fact, that by late 1985 the first few shipments of high-tech weaponry to Iran were under way, with several more following in 1986. How and why did
that happen?
While securing the release of American hostages in Lebanon was a major short-term priority of the Reagan administration in late 1985, in the grand scheme of the
president's emerging Iran policy it was somewhat secondary. Of greater concern to the Reagan administration was the long-range question of whether the U.S. should try
to rehabilitate its relations with Iran. Following a series of meetings and communications with Israeli officials and other foreign intermediaries—including a rich Saudi
businessman named Adnan Khashoggi and an Iranian deal-maker named Manucher Ghorbanifar—the Reagan administration became convinced that rehabilitating
U.S.-Iran relations was not only strategically desirable but entirely feasible.
Supporters of that course of action reasoned that Khomeini, who turned 83 in 1985, would likely die soon. His death would leave a power vacuum that various competing
Iranian political factions, ranging in orientation from ultraconservative anti-American to Western-leaning moderate, would attempt to fill. However, if the Reagan
administration were to lend support to the moderate factions now, they maintained, the chances of cultivating a more pro-American regime in the post-Khomenei era would
increase dramatically.
That support took the form of weapons. Supply arms to the Iranians so they can continue their war against neighboring Iraq, officials proposed, and the U.S. would be
paving the way for future friendship. And as an added dividend of the arms sales, Iran would use its leverage to secure the release of American hostages in Lebanon.
However, apart from the fact that the administration would be saying one thing publicly and doing the opposite in secret, there was the issue of legality. Under the Arms
Export Control Act, passed in 1968, the president was required to notify Congress about certain activities related to arms sales to foreign nations.
Yet administration officials believed that there were ways around the legal issue, so they went ahead and pursued the policy. What followed over the course of the next
year was an enormously complex web of transactions, which fell under two basic strategies.
The first strategy, which was put into practice on three occasions in the second half of 1985, was to have Israel sell weapons to Iran. That method, involving the delivery
of hundreds of American-made antitank missiles and a handful of antiaircraft missiles to Iran, did manage to secure the release of one hostage. Overall, however, the
mechanism was plagued by logistical problems, leading the dissatisfied Reagan administration to try another method.
The second strategy, which Reagan personally authorized in 1986 with the signing of an official "Finding," in effect placed the NSC staff—North in particular—in charge of
managing the arms sales and hostage negotiations. Having participated in the U.S.-sponsored arms deals brokered by the Israelis in late 1985, North had little trouble
assuming a central role in the affair at the start of 1986.
Using his Enterprise associate Secord as the U.S.'s official third-party arms dealer, and with crucial help from Poindexter, the CIA and the Defense Department, North
covertly delivered hundreds of American-made missiles and missile spare parts to Iran on five occasions in 1986. The deals managed to secure the release of two more
hostages. They also helped open some channels of communication with Iranian officials.
However, North did not stop at selling arms to Iran. Through some clever negotiating tactics in his role as middleman between the U.S. and Iranian governments, he was
able to sell the arms to Iran at a much higher price than the price he paid when he bought them from the U.S. military. It has been estimated that North's scheme netted
$16 million in profits. And with those profits being held in the Enterprise's Swiss bank account (the Hakim-Secord account) as opposed to an official government account,
few officials knew the money existed, thus granting North wide latitude to use it as he pleased. North decided to divert the profits of the arms sales to fund the contra
operation. He would later characterize the diversion as a "neat idea." [See Oliver North's 'Diversion Memo' (Excerpts) (primary document)]
Exposure and Fallout
In late 1986, the Reagan administration's covert programs involving the contras and Iran were abruptly and dramatically exposed, igniting one of the biggest scandals in
American history. Two separate incidents—a plane crash and the publication of a newspaper article—are often credited with triggering the cascade of events leading to
public exposure of the covert programs.
The first event took place on October 5, when Nicaraguan soldiers shot down a small cargo plane flying above Nicaragua on a secret contra supply mission. All aboard
the plane were killed except for one person, an American named Eugene Hasenfus, who parachuted to safety. The Nicaraguan military captured Hasenfus and recovered
documents from the wreckage of the plane. When analyzed, the documents linked the plane to North's network of associates, thereby dragging the secret contra supply
operation onto the public stage for the first time. (Hasenfus was put on trial in Nicaragua and sentenced to 25 years in prison, but was pardoned and released in
December 1986 as "a gesture of peace.")
The second event occurred on November 3, when a Lebanese newspaper called Al-Shiraa published a report alleging that the U.S. had been selling arms to Iran and
diverting the profits to fund the contras in Nicaragua. The story became a huge sensation and helped unmask the Reagan administration's secret Iran policy.
With the new revelations making it virtually impossible to deny that anything illegal had taken place, the administration in mid-November acknowledged that weapons had
been sold to Iran to improve U.S. relations with that country. However, Reagan denied any specific arms-for-hostages transactions. By the end of month, Reagan had
fired North, accepted Poindexter's resignation and set up a special review board to investigate Iran-contra. Chaired by former Senator John Tower (R, Texas), the board
was known as the Tower Commission. [See President Reagan Addresses the Nation Regarding Iran-Contra (primary document)]
Then, in December, and in perhaps his most significant response to the scandal, Reagan heeded the recommendation of Attorney General Edwin Meese and called for
the appointment of an independent counsel to investigate the Iran-contra affair and, if necessary, to prosecute any criminal wrongdoing. On December 19, a three-judge
panel named Lawrence Walsh, a former judge and diplomat, as independent counsel. Once his appointment became official, Walsh commenced what would ultimately be
a six-year, $47 million investigation. [See Independent Counsel Walsh's Iran-Contra Report: Summary and Conclusions (Excerpts) (primary document)]
Meanwhile, Congress initiated its own inquiries into the matter. In early 1987, the Senate set up the Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the
Nicaraguan Opposition and the House established the Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran. Those committed were then merged,
undertaking a joint investigation. Seven months into those investigations, during highly charged public hearings, North and Poindexter testified before Congress on their
roles in the Iran-contra affair. Both were granted limited legal immunity in exchange for their testimony. In the case of North, that paved the way for congressional
testimony in which the lieutenant colonel candidly described how he deliberately misled Congress during previous inquiries. [See Congress: Majority and Minority Reports
of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair]
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A year after North's and Poindexter's appearances before Congress, Walsh launched a criminal case against them. On March 16, 1988, North, Poindexter, Secord and
Hakim—whom Walsh considered the central players in the Iran-contra affair—were indicted on multiple felony charges, including conspiracy to defraud the U.S. Walsh
sought to try all four men in a single trial, but in what many considered a major setback for the independent counsel, the presiding judge ordered four separate trials
instead.
On January 31, 1989, North's trial began. The lieutenant colonel and former NSC staff member faced 16 felony counts—and a lengthy prison sentence if convicted. [See
Charges Against Oliver North in the Iran-Contra Affair (primary document)]
The Case Against Oliver North
Critics of Oliver North argued that his activities on behalf of the contras were illegal because they violated the Boland Amendments, which specified
that no "agency or entity of the United States involved in intelligence activities" could directly or indirectly help overthrow Nicaragua's government.
Since North worked for the NSC, an agency that was clearly involved in intelligence activities during Iran-contra, the Boland laws applied to him,
critics charged. "In short, the [contra] operation functioned without any accountability required of Government activities. It was an evasion of the
Constitution's most basic check on Executive action—the power of Congress to grant or deny funding for Government programs," the report of the
congressional committee investigating Iran-Contra stated.
North's critics also contended that he broke the law by lying to Congress and obstructing its work when it inquired about his activities with respect to
the contras. They said he lied in several letters he and MacFarlane submitted to Congress in 1985 in response to their questions, and additionally lied
during a face-to-face meeting with members of Congress in 1986. In both cases, North lied by denying—falsely—that he was involved in any support
activities for the contras prohibited by the Boland Amendments, critics argued.
They quoted North's response to such deceptions in his appearance before the congressional committee in 1987: "I will tell you right now, counsel,
and all the members here gathered that I misled the Congress." For critics like Robert Parry, one of the first journalists to write about North's contra
activities, the lying to Congress was merely standard procedure for the Reagan administration in its Iran-contra scheming. "[I]t wasn't a case of just
Oliver North and a few men of zeal taking action, it was a case of an administration essentially bringing the policy underground and then when it was
exposed in part, just replacing it with a new coverup," Parry wrote.
North engaged in further violation of the law, his critics argued, when he shredded key documents, including financial records and official NSC
memoranda providing details of his contra operation, after the Hasenfus incident of October 5. Anticipating the exposure of his contra support
operation after Hasenfus's capture, North destroyed the documents to eliminate potentially incriminating materials. North admitted as such, critics
noted, telling the congressional committee in 1987, "I certainly knew that I would be leaving the NSC shortly, and I took steps to go through my files
and clean things out that no longer would be pertinent."
The shredding of the documents, critics argued, destroyed evidence that would later be sought by official investigators, and therefore broke the law.
North's law-breaking and attempted portrayal of his actions as a case of following orders especially outraged Senator Daniel Inouye (D, Hawaii), who
invoked the Uniform Code of Military Justice (the military's core laws) and the Nuremberg prosecutions of Nazi war criminals when he said to North
during the congressional hearings. "The uniform code makes it abundantly clear that it must be the lawful orders of a superior officer," Inouye stated.
He continued, "In fact it says, 'Members of the military have an obligation to disobey unlawful orders.' This principle was considered so important that
we—we, the government of the United States, proposed that it be internationally applied in the Nuremberg trials."
North's opponents also claimed that the lieutenant colonel broke the law several times by mishandling funds connected to the contra supply operation
and accepting an improper gratuity from an Enterprise associate. When it came to mishandled funds, opponents cited examples such as an estimated
$100,000 in traveler's checks North received from contra leader Calero to fund contra support activities in the U.S. Accepting that money—$4,300 of
which North admitted to using for personal purposes—was illegal, critics argued.
As for improper gratuities, critics said, in 1985 North grew concerned for his own safety and that of his family and wanted a security system installed in
his home; unable to find a company willing to install the system on short notice, North turned to his associate Secord. Secord introduced North to a
friend who a few days later installed a security system in North's house. North later admitted that he never received a bill, critics noted, and also
confessed to forging letters meant to serve as evidence that he had paid for the system. North's receipt of the free security system was illegal because
government officials are not allowed to accept gratuities, critics contended.
Finally, turning to the Reagan administration's sales of arms to Iran—activities in which North played a central role—critics argued that the whole
scheme violated the Arms Export Control Act, which authorized the president to maintain a list, known as the "United States Munitions List," containing
defense-related items whose export to foreign nations should be regulated to protect U.S. security. The legislation required that key members of
Congress, including the Speaker of the House, be kept informed about changes to the munitions list. As critics argued, the Reagan administration's
sale of weapons to Iran was kept secret from Congress, even though it constituted a major change in U.S. arms export policy. Therefore, they
concluded, the arms sales were illegal. In his final report, Independent Counsel Walsh raised the possibility that the act had been violated. "They
skirted the law, some of them broke the law, and almost all of them tried to cover up the President's willful activities," he declared.
The Case in Defense of Oliver North
North's allies disputed the claim that he or anyone working for the NSC violated the Boland Amendments, arguing that the Boland Amendments in fact
did not apply to the NSC. Pointing to the specific wording of Boland II, they noted that it barred only the CIA, the Defense Department and "any other
agency or entity of the United States involved in intelligence activities" from engaging in contra support activities. According to North's defenders, the
NSC was an advisory group, not a policy-making group, and did not engage in intelligence activities. Therefore, they reasoned, it was not subject to
Boland restrictions.
For supporters of North, the key issue in determining his innocence or guilt was not the legality of his Iran-contra activities per se, but whether he had
criminal intent when he undertook them. Supporters claimed, as did North himself, that he was merely following the instructions handed down by his
superiors, including the president. As later recounted by high-level witnesses, MacFarlane told North that Reagan, after passage of the Boland
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Amendments, wanted the contras to be kept together "body and soul."
From that statement and others like it, North and his supporters believed it was reasonable to assume that the president, who once told the public in
1985 that the contras were "the moral equivalent of the Founding Fathers," was ordering North to do whatever was necessary to keep the contras
going. In that sense, they said, North was not acting criminally; he was just being a good soldier, following orders and respecting the chain of
command.
Supporters used similar logic to defend North's actions after Iran-contra was thrust into the public spotlight—for instance, his destruction of key
financial records and official NSC memoranda. Supporters argued that North shredded the documents not out of a desire to impede investigations or
deceive people, but to protect his superiors, as any good soldier would. When MacFarlane testified at North's trial, the former national security adviser
claimed to have interpreted North's revelation in 1986 that he was about to shred key documents "not as an act of malice, but just a statement to me
that he was going to make sure that I wasn't hurt. And I took it as a statement of a subordinate trying to be loyal."
Many of North's defenders, advancing an argument based on legal technicalities, conceded that the former NSC staff member might have committed
crimes, but argued that certain circumstances in his case gravely compromised his chances of receiving a fair trial. The American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU), for instance, claimed that because North gave immunized testimony before Congress in 1987, witnesses and jurors in his subsequent trial
would be prejudiced by what they had seen or heard during those hearings. MacFarlane lent credence to that notion in testimony he provided during a
1991 hearing, when he said his testimony during North's trial was "colored" by what North had told the congressional committees in 1987.
Others contended that North's access to a fair trial was hindered because much of the evidence involved in his case pertained to classified national
security matters. Declassifying documents to present them as evidence in a public trial was not feasible because it would compromise national
secrets, they said. Supporters concluded that a trial in which potentially exculpatory evidence could not be presented because of national security
reasons would not be a fair trial.
Some supporters of North contended that issues of legality and whether the president or his closest advisers authorized any of the covert Iran-contra
actions were ultimately secondary to the main defense: What North did was necessary and justified. Because the Cold War threat against the U.S.
posed by the Sandinistas and their communist allies in Cuba, the Soviet Union and elsewhere was so great, they argued, North was being a great
patriot by undertaking the Iran-contra activities. As Reagan himself told North in a 1985 letter, "You are a man who has devoted your life in the most
unselfish manner to building our nation. As a heroic soldier in the field, as a military planner and as an aide to me on some of the most important
issues of our time, you have proven yourself to be an outstanding American patriot."
Prosecutions and the Iran-Contra Legacy
North's trial lasted approximately three months. At its conclusion on May 4, 1989, North was convicted on three counts: accepting an illegal gratuity in the form of a home
security system from Secord, aiding and abetting in the obstruction of a congressional inquiry, and destruction of documents. The presiding judge sentenced North to a
three-year suspended prison term, two years' probation, $150,000 in fines and 1,200 hours of community service.
North's conviction did not signal the end of his legal battle, however. During the following year, North and his defenders pursued an appeal of the convictions based on
the argument that the lieutenant colonel's criminal trial had not been fair. The argument claimed that North's immunized testimony at the congressional hearings in 1987
influenced witnesses at his trial. On July 20, 1990, an appeals panel agreed with North's claim; it overturned the documents destruction conviction, and suspended the
two others, sending them back to the lower court. In 1991, after the U.S. Supreme Court refused to hear the case, Walsh dropped the case, citing his belief that the
government would not be able to obtain a "successful outcome."
Overall, Walsh charged 14 people with criminal wrongdoing in connection with the Iran-contra scandal. He secured 11 felony or misdemeanor convictions, two of which—
North's and Poindexter's—were overturned on appeal. (Poindexter successfully advanced the same immunity argument as North.) The remaining nine convictions were
secured against, among others, North's Enterprise associates Hakim and Secord, and MacFarlane.
In 1992, President George H.W. Bush (R, 1989-93) pardoned MacFarlane, as well as five other figures who had been convicted or charged in connection with the
Iran-contra scandal. The pardons fueled substantial controversy, as Bush had been Reagan's vice president when arms were sold to Iran and when support operations
for the contras were being carried out by members of the NSC staff and other high-level officials. [See President Bush's Proclamation Pardoning Iran-Contra Figures
(primary document)]
The scandal also marred the second term of Reagan's presidency. The Tower Commission and congressional commissions concluded that, although Reagan denied
knowledge of the diversion of funds to the contras, he still bore overall responsibility for the actions of his staff. However, in the end Walsh cleared Reagan of any criminal
acts. [See Tower Commission Report on Iran-Contra (Excerpts) (primary document)]
The legacy of the Iran-contra scandal is far-reaching. Unlike other major scandals in 20th century American history (for example, the Teapot Dome Scandal of the 1920s,
involving the controversial leasing of U.S. oil reserves, or the Watergate scandal, involving President Richard Nixon's cover-up of a break-in at the headquarters of the
Democratic National Committee in 1972), Iran-contra was both a domestic scandal and an international scandal. It left an indelible mark not only on the American
democratic landscape—questions about the limits of presidential power and the appropriate applications of congressional oversight are as controversial as ever—but also
greatly influenced subsequent developments in two foreign nations: Nicaragua and Iran. [See Teapot Dome Scandal, Watergate Affair]
In Nicaragua, the U.S.-funded contras waged a war on the Sandinistas that claimed tens of thousands of lives and did not conclude until 1990, when both sides, after 11
years of fighting, agreed on a permanent cease-fire. Though elections held that year loosened the Sandinistas' grip on power, they never faded away completely. In fact,
in 2006 Daniel Ortega Saavedra, the former Sandinista commander and president of Nicaragua from 1985 to 1990, won the nation's presidential election and returned to
power.
In Iran, the high-tech weaponry that the U.S. supplied in the 1980s helped the Islamic republic continue its war with neighboring Iraq (which also benefited from U.S.
assistance) until both sides, stalemated and suffering immense losses, agreed to stop fighting in 1988. The death of Khomeini the following year brought about no major
change in U.S.-Iran relations. As of 2007, because of the continuing and complex fallout of the U.S.'s 2003 invasion of Iraq as well as Iran's aggressive pursuit of nuclear
technologies, possibly including nuclear weapons, U.S.-Iranian relations are as tense as ever.
Discussion Questions & Activities
1. Who do you think was ultimately responsible for the secret Iran-contra initiatives?
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2. What did supporters mean when they said the Iran-contra initiatives were "morally justified"? Do you agree with that assessment?
3. What impact did the Iran-contra scandal have on President Ronald Reagan's legacy?
4. What impact, if any, has the Iran-contra scandal had on U.S. relations with Nicaragua and Iran today?
5. Imagine that you were Oliver North; write a speech in which you defend your actions with regard to Iran-contra.
Suggested Web Sites
"The Iran-Contra Affair 20 Years On"
"The Oliver North File"
"Final Report of the Independent Counsel for Iran/Contra Matters"
Bibliography
Cohen, William S. and George J. Mitchell. Men of Zeal: A Candid Inside Story of the Iran-Contra Hearings. New York: Viking, 1988.
Draper, Theodore. A Very Thin Line: The Iran-Contra Affairs. New York: Hill and Wang, 1991.
Freedman, Robert, ed. The Middle East from the Iran-Contra Affair to the Intifada. Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1991.
Houghton, David. US Foreign Policy and the Iran Hostage Crisis. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
Kornbluh, Peter and Malcolm Byrne, eds. The Iran-Contra Scandal: The Declassified History. New York: New Press, 1993.
North, Oliver L. with William Novak. Under Fire: An American Story. New York: Harper Collins, 1991.
Walsh, Lawrence. Firewall: The Iran-Contra Conspiracy and Cover-Up. New York: Norton, W. W. & Company Inc., 1998.
© 2011 Facts On File News Services
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