University of Trento
School of International Studies and
Department of Humanities
The European Community’s opening to the People’s
Republic of China between 1975 and 1977
- M. Teresa Vicentini -
Going Global. The History of EC/EU External Relations. A Jean Monnet Module on
the History of European Integration (Professor Sara Lorenzini)
M. Teresa Vicentini - The European Community’s opening to the People’s Republic of China between
1975 and 1977
“For forty years China and Europe have been building a very important
relationship, a global relationship (..).
We all know that in today's globalised world, coordination, cooperation and
compromise are the key for success.
Our successful futures will depend on us working together”.
Martin Schultz, President of the European Parliament
(Speech at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing - March 18, 2015)
2
M. Teresa Vicentini - The European Community’s opening to the People’s Republic of China between
1975 and 1977
Table of content
Introduction: the 40th anniversary since the establishment of the EC-China’s
diplomatic relations
4
The emerging convergence between EC-China in the early 1970s
6
EC-China relations in the mid-1970s
9
The EC’s role in the negotiations with the PRC
13
Conclusion
14
Bibliography
16
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M. Teresa Vicentini - The European Community’s opening to the People’s Republic of China between
1975 and 1977
Introduction: the 40th anniversary since the establishment of the EC-China’s
diplomatic relations
On 6 May, 2015 the EU and China celebrated the forty anniversary since the
establishment of economic and diplomatic relations. Originally developed in the
framework of economic cooperation, the EU and China now look forward to
further developing the exchanges between the two parties in the light of a “new
dialogue mechanisms”1.
As recalled by the Chinese President Xi Jinping during his meeting with the
President of the European Parliament Martin Schulz at the Great Hall of the
People (Beijin, China) on 16 March, 2015, a firm support to European integration
is needed for an even closer cooperation between China and the EU to be pursued.
According to Xi, the EU’s development was essential for the ‘multi-polarization
of the world’2. Moreover, Xi maintained that both China and the EU should
consider this anniversary as a new starting point, and should keep working
together to increase political interactions and practical cooperation. On behalf of
the EU, Schulz recalled how beneficial it is for both countries to advance a closer
partnership, since they share many common interests.
Given the significance of this anniversary, the paper seeks to shed light on how
the negotiations were conducted and how they affected the European Integration.
Therefore, this research focuses on the negotiations leading to the official opening
of the European Community (EC) towards the People’s Republic of China (PRC)
between 1975 and 1977. It will be argued that the European Commission, acting
through sir Christopher Soames, was the main actor involved in the negotiations
and that, in so doing, the Commission also promoted a deeper integration within
the EC.
The EC’s opening to China refers to the establishment of official political and
commercial links between the two countries. This process of gradual opening
towards China was part of the ‘foreign policy’ of the Community.
Defined as the process of integrating policies and actions of the Member States
and the EC institutions towards the outside world, the foreign policy is directed at
1
Taken
from
“EU-China
relations
(03/02/2015)”,
EEAS
website:
http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/china/press_corner/all_news/news/2015/political_relations_en.ht
m Last accessed 15 April, 2015.
2
Xi reaffirms China's support for European integration, English.news.cn, Editor: huaxia, March
16, 2015, available online at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-03/16/c_134071716.htm
last accessed 14 April, 2015.
4
M. Teresa Vicentini - The European Community’s opening to the People’s Republic of China between
1975 and 1977
non-members and international organisations and concerns political, economic,
trade, and security-related issues3.
In the following it is argued that, in establishing a close cooperation with Beijing,
the EC also witnessed a substantial furthering and deepening of the integration
process. Recalling Gilbert’s definition, European Integration can be defined as
“the historical process whereby European nation-states have been willing to
transfer, or more usually pool, their sovereign powers in a collective enterprise”4.
Interestingly, by tracing the origins of the EC’s opening to Beijing the work will
also highlight the emergence of the EC as an independent political agent on the
international scale.
Regarding the scope of the research, the main focus is on the PRC: since the EC
dealt with Hong Kong independently of the PRC, the British colony of Hong
Kong is therefore not included. Moreover, the research focuses on the two-year
period between 1975 and 1977.
In 1969 the EC Heads of State and Government decided at the Hague Summit to
relaunch European integration in terms of completion, widening and deepening.
This relaunch coincided with the official end of the Cultural Revolution and a
turn-around in Chinese foreign policy towards the EC, which Beijing now
supported as a counterweight to the United States, and later also against the
USSR5. The final outcome of the cooperation between EC and China was the
textile agreement concluded in 1978.
Since this research is conducted within a course focused on European Integration,
it is important to consider the internal, institutional dimension of Community
politics in explaining the EC’s opening to China.
In the closing of this introductory section, a further clarification is needed as to
the sources I consulted for this work. As part of a Jean Monnet Module Course,
the paper benefited from a short but intense and fruitful research at the Historical
Archives of the European Union (HAEU) at the European University Institute in
Florence, Italy. Most of the sources I consulted at the HAEU concerned reports,
telegrams and official statements by the European Institutions (mainly the
3
R. H. Ginsberg, Foreign Policy Actions of the European Community: the Politics of Scale,
Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 1989, p.1.
4
M. Gilbert, European Integration: a Concise History, Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield
Publishers, 2012, p.1.
5
L. Liu, “The Evolution of China’s EU Policy: from Mao’s Intermediate Zone to a Strategic
Partnership Based on Non-shared Value”, Journal of European Integration History, 18 (1), 2012,
pp. 11–24.
5
M. Teresa Vicentini - The European Community’s opening to the People’s Republic of China between
1975 and 1977
European Commission) as well as diplomatic missions’ reports contained in the
folder: “Relations with the People’s Republic of China”, BAC 48/1984 years
1972/1979 Microfilm. Other folders alongside readings and articles have been
consulted mainly as background sources of information. Where appropriate,
footnotes will indicate the reader the exact source consulted.
In order to examine these issues the paper is structured as follows: in the first
paragraph, a brief historical account will be provided concerning the relations
between the EC and China at the beginning of the 1970s. The second paragraph
will focus more closely on the diplomatic relations established between the two
countries in the years 1975-1977. In this section I will mainly rely on the findings
of the research carried at the HAEU. On the basis of these sources, a discussion of
the main facts and achievements will be made. Some concluding remarks will
then follow.
The emerging convergence between EC-China in the early 1970s
Regarding the early years of the opening between the EC and China, the central
features to be addressed concern who the drivers of the opening were, and what
motivated them.
In general terms, the Chinese were those who established formal political and
commercial links with the EC, thereby controlling the agenda. Interestingly until
1970, only two Member States, namely France and The Netherlands had
diplomatically recognised the People’s Republic of China6. The other EC
Members - Belgium, Luxembourg, Italy and Germany - were highly reluctant to
establish official relations with the Chinese Communist government. This might
be due to the fact that fostering a closer and open relation with China would have
put at strains their relationship with the United States7.
Therefore, it was not until the 1971 that the EC-Chinese relations underwent a
major turning point8. First, in October 1971 the Western European delegations
departed from their alignment with the US and did not support the American
resolution to keep a seat for Taiwan at the United Nations. This was in line with
the ‘One China Policy’ pursued by the EC as can be inferred from a press
6
C. Mackerras and Amanda York, The Cambridge Handbook of Contemporary China,
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991, pp.151–155.
7
See G. Bressi, “China and Western Europe”, Asian Survey, 12, no. 10, 1972, 819–845.
8
Ibid., p. 827
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M. Teresa Vicentini - The European Community’s opening to the People’s Republic of China between
1975 and 1977
conference note of 1975 at the end of Soames’ visit to China. In this note Soames
made it clear that “the matters such as the recognition of states did not come
within the responsibility of the Community”9. The Community respected and
would abide by agreements reached by the Member States with China and
therefore did not have any official relations with Taiwan. To a certain extent,
Soames was able to side-step the Taiwan issue10.
This might have been also favored by increasing contacts with China and above
all by the diplomatic recognition of China by several West European
governments, namely Italy (November 1970), Austria (May 1971) and Belgium
(October 1971). In May the Netherlands also exchanged ambassadors with
Beijing.
Parallel to the diplomatic recognitions, intergovernmental exchanges were
underway. It was France which reaped most of the benefits of China's engagement
towards Western Europe. In July 1970, French Planning Minister Bettencourt met
Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai in Beijing. In July 1971 a parliamentary mission
flew to China for two weeks. In September and October the Chinese Minister for
Foreign Trade, Pai Hsiang-kuo, undertook the first official visit to France by a
Chinese Minister since 1945. Following the visit of another parliamentary mission
to China, in February 1972, Schumann was the first Western European Foreign
Minister to establish political talks with the Chinese leaders in China since World
War II, signing an agreement on scientific, university, cultural and sport
exchanges.
At the same time, an extensive program of ministerial exchanges between China
and Britain was launched. Anthony Royle of the British Foreign Minister visited
Beijing in June to discuss commercial transactions, but cultural exchange also
came under discussion. For instance, it was established that Chinese Foreign
Trade Minister should visit London before the British Industrial and
Technological Exhibition. Significantly, in the early 1970s China also exchanged
governmental trade missions with Italy: in April 1972 an Italian-Chinese
commission in Beijing discussed matters relating to trade, payments, credits.
9
Notes for a press conference, 1975 as cited in P. Lim, S. Winkler, “The European Union’s
Relations with the Republic of China (Taiwan)” in J. Damm, Lim P. (eds), European perspectives on
Taiwan - East Asia in the 21st century: politics, society, security, regional integration, Springer VS,
2012, p. 175.
10
Ibid.
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M. Teresa Vicentini - The European Community’s opening to the People’s Republic of China between
1975 and 1977
In 1971, Denmark also sent a trade delegation to China, while in July 1972 the
German Foreign Minister Gerhard Schroeder inaugurated high level contacts
between West Germany and China.
The clearest evidence of the engagement of the PRC with the EC politics was that
the Member States pledged to strengthen the cohesion of their foreign policies
towards the PRC in their Declaration of European Identity11. Published within the
Copenhagen Summit of the Heads of State and Government, the Declaration
reflected a concept of European identity based on three aspects: the cohesion of
the Community, the position and the role of the Member States vis-à-vis the rest
of the world, and the dynamic character of the construction of a United Europe12.
In particular, the significance of this Declaration lies in the fact that, for the first
time, the Member States declared publicly their intention to adopt a common
approach towards China. The PRC is referred to in the second section of the paper
where the Member States drew a list of different countries, divided according to
different zones13.
The Declaration of European Identity had a huge impact on the EC’s approach to
the PRC: for the first time the Member States publicly pledged to work towards a
common approach to the PRC. With the benefit of the hindsight, it can be said
that the Declarations held a dual function: not only did it epitomize the role of the
EC in the dramatically changing international affairs of the 1970s, but, perhaps
more importantly, it fostered internal cohesion.
Even though neither the Commission nor the European Parliament played an
active role in writing the Declaration, they still provided the impetus for the
Community to define its identity in international relations. For instance, the
European Parliament actively called for a concerted European voice when dealing
with the PRC14.
11
Declaration of European Identity, in European Commission, Bulletin of the European
Communities, 12/12, 1973, pp.118–122
12
See M. Gainar, Aux origines de la diplomatie européenne. es Neuf et la Coopération politique
européenne de 1973 à 1980, Bruxelles, PeterLang, 2012, pp.131–141.
13
The list includes the relations to the other Western European countries, followed by the
Mediterranean, African and Middle Eastern countries, the United States, other industrialised
countries such as Japan and Canada, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, China and the other
Asian countries, Latin America and the developing world. Lutz Niethammer (1997) interprets the
order of the listing as a deliberate hierarchy of relations from the most to the least important.
14
See on this point G. Kreis, “The emergence of the notion of identity in the European
Community’s politics. Some reflections on the Declaration of the Copenhagen Summit of 1973”,
Relations internationales 4/2009 (No 140) , p.55.
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M. Teresa Vicentini - The European Community’s opening to the People’s Republic of China between
1975 and 1977
Of course, the Cold War, China’s communism and the Cultural Revolution were
all factors that led the Member State to retain a cautious attitude towards the
People’s Republic. Against this backdrop, however, the European Community
provided the Member States with a significant foreign policy instrument they
could use to build relations with Beijing. In particular, for the Commission the
official opening of the relations with China offered the possibility to prove to the
Member States how to step towards a more community-oriented decision making
procedure in the trade relations. Soames taking up office as Commission vicepresident was the person determined to use that possibility. It could show that the
Commission wielded a unique political asset, a supranational platform, which the
Member States had an interest in leaving room for manoeuvre for.
Having briefly traced the main facts concerning the EC-PRC relations in the early
1970s, particularly as far as the diplomatic and commercial exchanges were
concerned, the next section of the work deals with the developments of these
relations in the mid 1970s and will focus more closely on the role of the European
Commission in successfully conducting the negotiations.
EC-China relations in the mid-1970s: the role of the Commission
The economic and diplomatic relations between the EC and China in mid-1970s
intensified significantly. Surprisingly, the EC-China cooperation intensified
precisely in a decade - the 1970s - which was, to larger extents, a turbulent one
worldwide: on the one hand these years were marked by deep crises with the
collapse of the Bretton Woods system and the energy crises, on the other hand
international trade cooperation expanded with the GATT negotiations, the
establishment of new institutions such as the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund. All these processes occurred against the delicate political and
institutional backdrop of the Cold War.
The delicate international context of the Cold War did play a major role during the
negotiations. At the second Plenum of the Central Committee of the Chinese
Communist Party, in August-September 1970, the Chinese leadership was in
favour of an opening to the US, which could be exploited to China's advantage.
This position significantly altered the way which China assessed its position vis-ávis the two superpowers.
9
M. Teresa Vicentini - The European Community’s opening to the People’s Republic of China between
1975 and 1977
The opening towards the US allowed Chinese foreign policy to become global in
a very short time. In fact, Nixon's announcement in July 1971 of his intention to
visit to China virtually opened the doors of the UN to the People's Republic.
Beijing therefore started to push towards strengthening its strategic position on the
international stage, and the intensification of the diplomatic exchanges with the
EC were undoubtedly part of this process.
From their part, the Europeans too considered the geopolitical implications of a
close cooperation with China. In January 1974 in a confidential note to
Christopher Soames by the Directorate General of External Relations, two key
issues were raised concerning the EEC-China relations. First, when the
Directorate contacted and then met the Chinese Embassy Delegate on 11 January,
1974 a “positive attitude of the CPR Governments towards Western European
Integration”15 was highlighted. However, the EC Directorate noted that their
primary interest was “to collect as much information as possible on the current
activities of the Community”16. This was due, as the Chinese explained, to the fact
that the Chinese Government was undergoing a “period of information as far as
the EC was concerned”17. Second, with regard to the Chinese contacts with the
UN, the Chinese affirmed that they were “doing their best to resist the excessive
influence of the two super powers”18. Moreover, the Chinese representatives
appreciated the Community’s support to their view on the relations with the super
powers.
As reported in a note of the General Direction for External Relations’ dossier
dated 11 September 1975, according to the Chinese the world was divided into
three zones: the superpowers constitute the first zone, the second zone also
referred to as ‘the intermediary zone’ consists of all the other (developed)
countries, including Japan, Canada and Western Europe whereas the third world
states - which included China - constitute the third zone.
The foreign policy of the Chinese rests on the principle according to which it
appears sensible for those countries of both the second as well as the third zone
firmly oppose the influence of the super powers, in particular the influenced
15
E. Wellenstein - Directorate General of External Relations E-1 Note for the attention of
Christopher Soames, Brussels, 11 January, 1974, in Historical Archives of the European Union
(hereinafter HAEU), BAC 48/1984 years 1972/1979.
16
Ibid.
17
Ibid.
18
Ibid. emphasis added.
10
M. Teresa Vicentini - The European Community’s opening to the People’s Republic of China between
1975 and 1977
exerted by the USSR. The Chinese delegates were in favour of a unified Europe,
independent of the superpowers, and they favourably greeted the Paris Summit of
1972 as well as the European dialogue with the OPEC Countries19.
Regarding the international relations, the Europeans clearly expressed their view.
As Brian Lenihan, Member of the European Parliament, said in his speech before
the European Parliament in June 1975:
“We have to recognize that in the world of today the old balance-of-power idea,
given a new civilized and sophisticated dimension, may be the best guarantee of
peace in the immediate and near future. There is a recognition in this Soames
initiative of the fact that we are a political as well as a trading community” 20.
But what precisely was the initiative Soames had taken and how did he deal with
this?
In early 1975, following a series of secret meetings with the Chinese ambassador
to Belgium Li-Lianpi, Sir Christopher Soames, vice-president of the Commission
responsible for external relations, accepted the invitation to visit Beijing in an
official capacity from May, 4 to 11.
It was only after a press leak that Soames officially announced to member state
permanent representatives about his visit. As soon as he arrived in Beijing on 4
May 1975, Soames proposed to set up official relations in the name of the
Community, subsequently sealing the deal. This diplomatic initiative was a
landmark in the Community’s opening to the PRC which conferred higher
visibility to a policy area which touched on the sovereignty as well as the
competences of the EC Member States. These facts notwithstanding, Soames’
initiative was successful: behind the commercial primary goals a far reaching
result were achieved concerning the strengthening of the Community on the
international arena.
Already in July of 1975 in a confidential letter to the ambassador Bombassei
Frascani de Vettor, Soames referred to “rounds of exploratory talks which we
shall be holding with shortly with the Chinese authorities”21 .
19
Direction Generals Des Relations Exterieures, Bruxelles, 11 Setembre 1975, Note de Dossier,
HAEU, BAC 48/1984 (original text in French, translated into English and paraphrased).
20
Debates of the European Parliament, Report of Proceedings from 16 to 20 June 1975, Official
Journal C 192, 1975, emphasis added.
21
Letter of Christopher Soames to His Excellency Mr. Giorgio Bombassei Frascani de Vettor, 8
July, 1975, HAEU, BAC 48/1984, emphasis added.
11
M. Teresa Vicentini - The European Community’s opening to the People’s Republic of China between
1975 and 1977
The reference to the exploratory talks appears also in a confidential note edited by
the Directorate General for External Relations of January, 21 1976 concerning the
fourth meeting with Representative of the Chinese Mission. Here the
Commissioner de Kergorlay explicitly recalled how useful Soames had found the
conversation with the Chinese Ambassdor and “proposed the week of 23-27
February for the first visit of a delegation from Beijing for the exploratory talks
(..). The next stage of these talks would be a report issued to the Council by the
Commission”22. After a report had been issued, the Commission could be given
the necessary mandate for the negotiating phase - which was meant to be largely a
formality23 - to start.
One of the main points this work seeks to raise concerns precisely the engagement
of the European Commission, acting through Christopher Soames, in carrying out
the negotiations. In doing this, the European Commission sought to foster the
European Integration in a period - the 1970s - which many scholars consider as a
stalemate for the EC24. Challenging this claim we can argue that the Integration
process went ahead. This was, to a greater extent a reaction to external pressures,
namely the necessity to conclude an agreement with the PRC. From its part, as we
can induce from a document presumably of the end of 197725, the Chinese
strongly favoured the European Integration which, as we can read from the
document would be particularly beneficial in counter forcing the influence of the
USSR in Europe.
Therefore, the contacts to China seem to offered great political legitimacy to the
Community, in particular to the Commission. The commercial negotiations were
the concrete instrument for this legitimacy to be pursued: the visit of Soames in
May 1975 to Beijing marked an important step in this process.
22
Directorate General for External Relations, Confidential File Note, “Fourth Meeting with
Representatives of the Chinese Mission”, 20 January 1976, HAEU, BAC 48/1984.
23
Ibid.
24
See for instance F. W. Scharpf’s theory on the ‘Joint Decision Trap’ (1988).
In order to explain the stalemate of the European politics in the 1970s and early 1980s, Scharpf
compared the institutional setting of European policy-making to the German cooperative
federalism which in those days were faced with similar problems. In both cases legislative
institutions constituted multilateral negotiation systems which compelled actors to come to an
agreement. If decisions in such settings concern redistributive issues, policy-making is doomed to
fail. Despite these problems, Scharpf did not expect the institutional setting of joint decisionmaking to be reformed. Even if governments cooperating in multi-level governance might be
frustrated with political stalemate they are trapped in an institutional status quo since any changes
implies a redistribution of powers on which a common agreement is highly unlikely to be reached.
25
“Exposé des motifs”, undated, HAEU, BAC 48/1984.
12
M. Teresa Vicentini - The European Community’s opening to the People’s Republic of China between
1975 and 1977
Parallel to these considerations, it is important to bear in mind the particularly
delicate context China was undergoing at that time, deeply affected by the legacy
of the Cultural Revolution. In fact, back in 1966, China’s Communist leader Mao
Zedong launched what became known as the Cultural Revolution in order to
reassert his authority over the Chinese government. Afraid of the fact that the
Communist leaders were driving the party - and China itself - in the wrong
direction, Mao called on the nation’s youth to purge the “impure” elements of
Chinese society and revive the revolutionary spirit that had led to victory in the
civil war 20 decades earlier and the formation of the People’s Republic of China.
The Cultural Revolution went on until Mao’s death in 1976, and its tormented and
violent legacy would resonate in Chinese politics and society went on for years26.
The Cultural revolutions had serious consequences for the Chinese system as a
whole. In the short run, it resulted in greater political instability and slower
economic growth. But the revolution had also more-serious, longer-term
legacies27. Firstly, a severe generation gap had been created in which young adults
had been denied an education and had been taught to redress grievances by taking
to the streets. Secondly, corruption grew within the CCP and the government, as
the terror and accompanying scarcities of goods during the Cultural Revolution
had forced people to fall back on traditional personal relationships and on
extortion in order to get things done. Thirdly, the CCP leadership and the system
itself suffered a loss of legitimacy when millions of urban Chinese became
disillusioned by the obvious power plays that took place in the name of political
principle in the early and mid-1970s
28
. In the wake of these events, fostering a
closer cooperation with the EC could reassert the Chinese international
legitimacy.
The EC’s role in the negotiations with PRC
As Chenard notes in her detailed research29, the manner and the timing in which
EC-China relations were set up raise particular interest. In light of the delicate
26
See http://www.history.com/topics/cultural-revolution (accessed on 11.05.2015).
K. G. Lieberthal, Consequences of the cultural revolution, Encyclopaedia Britannica:
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/111803/China/71859/Consequences-of-the-CulturalRevolution (accessed on 11.05.2015).
28
Ibid.
29
M. J. Chenard, The European Community’s Opening to the People’s Republic of China, 19691979: Internal Decision-Making on External Relations, LSE - Department of International
History, 2012, p. 93.
27
13
M. Teresa Vicentini - The European Community’s opening to the People’s Republic of China between
1975 and 1977
international context, although the Member States wanted the initiative to be left
to the Chinese30, the events took a different path.
Eventually, not only did Soames took the initiative to set up relations, but it was
him who flew to Beijing. Acting through Soames, the Commission made choices
which were largely driven by political interests which evolved in response to
geopolitics and bureaucratic politics within the Community.
The Chinese welcomed the EC’s initiative. In fact, according to an undated
document concerning the expositions of the reasons, the first appointed Chinese
Ambassador presented his “lettres de créance”31 in September 1975. On 28 March
1977 the Chinese Government Invited the European Commission to a meeting in
Beijing for discussing the details of this commercial agreement whose conclusions
are contained in a secret note to the Council dated 17 May, 1977.
Crucially, Soames was able to go as far as he did because the Member States let
him to do so. The Member States in principle had consented to setting up official
EC-PRC relations32. They were concerned with more pressing internal issues such
as addressing the economic crisis in Europe characterised by inflation, recession
and high unemployment. Therefore, there were other items that took priority on
the EC agenda than the relations with PRC. The Member States had all - apart
from Ireland - diplomatically recognised the PRC without further developing
bilateral political or economic links with the PRC. In establishing a partnership
with China, the Commission demonstrated that, besides the crises the Community
was facing at that time, a supranational authority was there and was capable of
making the EC a more influential actor on the international stage.
Conclusion
In conclusion, this short research has sought to show how, in the midst of the
international crises of the 1970s, the Community’s opening to China, rather than
in a stalemate, resulted in new dynamics in European Integration.
In particular, the opening to China demonstrates the extent to which the
Community could achieve a high degree of coordination in the field of external
relations, a field which was sensitive to State’s sovereignty and in which
30
Ivi, p. 94.
“Exposé des motifs”, undated, HAEU, BAC 48/1984.
32
See European Commission, 8th General Report on the Activities of the European Communities in
1974, Brussels, 1975, available online at: http://aei.pitt.edu/view/eusubjects/H010006.html.
Accessed on 15.4. 2015.
31
14
M. Teresa Vicentini - The European Community’s opening to the People’s Republic of China between
1975 and 1977
coordination, as Ludlow puts in, was “a luxury rather than an absolute
necessity”33.
Against the backdrop of the Cold War, a furthering European integration, through
an extension of the EC foreign policy towards China, meant a significant
contribution towards a détente in Europe.
In establishing the official relations in May 1975, and in subsequently signing the
Trade Agreement with the PRC in 1978, the EC therefore promoted a deeeping of
the Integration process. This was not simply a matter of ‘spill-over’ which
functionalists as Ernst Haas34 puts in, which assumes an almost automatic and
passive process of further European integration.
Furthermore, the opening of diplomatic relations between the EC and China
provides a great example of a viable new way for both parties to increase their
international political legitimacy.
33
N. P. Ludlow, European Integration and the Cold War: Ostpolitik-Westpolitik, 1965-1973, New
York, Routledge, 2007, p. 148.
34
See E. Haas, The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social, and Economic Forces, 1950-1957,
Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1968.
15
M. Teresa Vicentini - The European Community’s opening to the People’s Republic of China between
1975 and 1977
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M. Teresa Vicentini - The European Community’s opening to the People’s Republic of China between
1975 and 1977
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 Mackerras Colin, York Amanda, The Cambridge Handbook of Contemporary China,
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 Rosamond Ben, Theories of European Integration, Basingstoke, New York: Palgrave
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 http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/china/press_corner/all_news/news/2015/political_re
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 http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-03/16/c_134071716.htm
 http://aei.pitt.edu/view/eusubjects/H010006.html
 http://www.history.com/topics/cultural-revolution
 http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/111803/China/71859/Consequences-ofthe-Cultural-Revolution
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