Survival of the Richest? Testing the Clark hypothesis using English pre-industrial data from
family reconstitution records 1
Nina Boberg-Fazlic, University of Copenhagen
Paul Sharp, University of Copenhagen
Jacob Weisdorf, University of Copenhagen
Abstract: We use data collected by the Cambridge Group to investigate Greg Clark’s hypothesis that
middle class values spread through English society prior to the industrial revolution. This idea relies on
two pieces of evidence. We confirm both the first, that the middle classes had higher fertility than lower
classes, and the second, that society was fairly static, although only until the early 1700s. However, we
find little evidence to suggest that the scale of the cultural transmission from the middle to lower classes
was anything like enough to provide support to Clark’s hypothesis.
Keywords: Demography, pre-industrial England, social mobility, survival of the richest
JEL Codes: N33
1
We would like to thank the Cambridge Group for making their data available to us, and Tommy Bengtsson, Martin
Dribe, Markus Lampe, Karl Gunnar Persson and participants at the Copenhagen FRESH meeting for valuable
comments and suggestions.
1. Introduction
This paper sets out to re-investigate the twin hypothesis formulated by Clark and Hamilton (2006) and
Clark (2007), that up until 1800 England was socially static, and that middle class families had greater
reproductive success than their lower social-class counterparts. Clark stressed that the combination of
the two meant that middle class values would spread throughout society through downward mobility,
and that this was a stimulus to England’s industrial revolution. While Clark’s postulates have been
subject to a hefty debate, particularly in the present journal (Clark 2008; Grantham 2008; McCloskey
2008; Persson 2008; Voth 2008), very few attempts have been made to visit the relevant evidence in
order to confirm or refute his propositions.
We use demographic data from the Cambridge Group population history of England from family
reconstitution, documented by Wrigley et al. (1997), to test Clark’s hypothesis. This data, which covers a
substantial time-period from the beginning of the early modern era through the industrial revolution,
offers two main advantages compared to that on which Clark draws his conclusions. Firstly, whereas
Clark’s data concern only a fraction of England, mainly East Anglia but also London, Bristol and
Darlington, the Cambridge data covers 26 parishes scattered across England in a way that makes them
representative of the entire country (Wrigley et al. 1997). Secondly, the Cambridge data offers much
more detailed information when it comes to analysing the reproductive success of families, as well as
social mobility across generations within families.
We find that the Cambridge data generally supports Clark’s twin hypothesis, but with a twist. It is true
that up until 1800, the non-manual workers (the highest social class in our sample and those that best
correspond to Clark’s idea of a middle class) are indeed the most successful in terms of reproduction,
both when it comes to the number of offspring born, and in terms of offspring surviving to adulthood
(age 15). Around 1800, however, they began to limit their fertility, so that they had fewer offspring than
manual workers. It is also true, but only up to about 1700, that English society is largely stable in that
the relative sizes of the social classes remain roughly constant over time. We find that middle class
downward mobility is indeed taking place, but it is worth noting that two out of three sons of middle
class fathers remain in the class in which they were born. Hence, the degree to which middle class
values spread through society by means of downward mobility is rather limited, at least up to 1700.
After 1700, on the other hand, the middle class shrinks dramatically, but continues to dominate other
classes in terms of reproduction. Although this greatly increased the scope for the diffusion of middleclass values throughout society, as the share of middle class sons dropping into lower social classes rose
2
to more than fifty percent, their actual number is quite low, and so their cultural influence on the lower
social classes is arguably fairly modest.
In order to demonstrate how we made these findings, we proceed as follows. First, we describe the data
used for the exercise. Next, we study the reproductive success of the various social classes scrutinized.
Then, we study several aspects of social mobility between the classes. Finally, we conclude.
2. The Data
2.1 Description of the data
To test Clark’s hypothesis as described above, we use demographic data from the Cambridge Group
population history of England from family reconstitution. This data was collected from church book
registers from a total of 26 parishes scattered across England, as documented in Wrigley et al. (1997).
The data covers the period 1541 to 1871, depending on the variables we look at. The data is based on
so-called family reconstitution forms, all of which build on a marriage. A complete marriage form (some
information is missing) includes the dates of birth and death (or baptism/burial) of the couple, their
number of offspring as well as the offspring’s birth and death dates, the marriage date, and finally the
spouses’ occupations at marriage and at death.
If the couple’s offspring went on to marry themselves, then the family reconstitution form will also
detail the number of offspring, allowing us to draw a link between parents’ and children’s occupations.
Since males at the time were more often in the labour market than females, female occupation is often
missing in the data, and so we focus on the occupational link in the data between fathers and sons. In
total, there were 5,187 observations with occupation known for sons; 13,652 observations for fathers;
and 2,094 joint observations.
When available, we use the occupation at marriage for sons, and at death for fathers. This is based on
the idea that a father’s occupation later in life is the one most relevant for the status passed on to his
descendents. In some cases, however, the data only allows us to use occupation at death for sons, or at
marriage for fathers.
Clark’s hypothesis rests on data concerning the income of individuals, which is unavailable in the
Cambridge data. We can however approximate an income ranking between the occupations in our data
3
by grouping all individuals into a total of four social classes based on the HISCLASS system (van Leuwen
et al., 2007). We do this as follows. First, occupations are given a HISCO code, which is then used to
identify the relevant social class in the HISCLASS system. The HISCLASS system permits a classification of
work into a total of 12 social classes along the dimensions of manual versus non-manual labour, the
level of skills, the degree of supervision exercised, as well as the type of economic activity (mainly
farming versus non-farming activities). In order to have enough observations in each class, we aggregate
the 12 classes to a total of four classes. Class 1, comprising non-manual workers and managers, we
believe best parallels Clark’s concept of middle class. The remaining classes all comprise manual
workers: class 2 includes higher-skilled manual workers, class 3, comprises lower-skilled manual
workers, while class 4 consists of unskilled manual workers. It follows that movements between the
classes, using the present definition, is vertical mobility, while we abstract due to our amalgamation of
classes from the horizontal movements possible in the original HISCLASS class system.
2.2. How representative is the data?
One potential problem of the Cambridge data is that people may move, not from one social class to
another, but from a parish in the Cambridge dataset to a parish outside those included in the Cambridge
Group’s sample (Souden, 1984). This issue may affect our conclusions. For instance, if class 1 sons were
more likely than their lower-class counterparts to move to an unobserved parish, then that would bias
our findings. In general, evidence on the relation between geographical mobility and class origin is rare
and rather ambiguous. Mendels (1976), for example, notes that, before the industrial revolution, it
might especially have been sons who did not inherit land from their fathers who would be forced to
move away. It does not seem implausible that especially descendants of poorer families were forced to
move in order to find work. This would speak for higher geographical mobility within the lower classes.
On the other hand, one could well imagine that especially descendants of higher classes could afford to
move in order to receive an education or use their acquired skills.
One way to find out whether the issue of geographical mobility is relevant here, is by looking at how
often we are able to observe the fathers but not the sons, contingent on their class of origin. If there are
large differences between the classes, this would indicate that descendants of one class are particularly
likely to move. On the other hand, it may also be the case that we observe particularly many sons in one
class, who have moved into a parish. This would be indicated by observing more sons in one class
without observing the father. Both are analyzed in Tables 1a and 1b below. In the first case (Table 1a), it
is clear that there is no significant difference in the share of missing observations between the four
4
classes. In the second case, it appears that class 4 may suffer more from missing observations than any
of its higher-ranked counterparts, indicating that poor people move more often than more well-off
people do. That result, however, has no bearings on our findings concerning the reproductive success
and downward mobility of the middle class.
Class
son missing
fathers in total
percentage missing
1
4513
4826
93.51 percent
2
8365
9091
92.01 percent
3
5592
6123
91.33 percent
4
7416
7940
93.40 percent
Table 1a: Missing observations, sons
Class
father missing
sons in total
percentage missing
1
302
510
59.22 percent
2
1372
2327
58.96 percent
3
897
1566
57.28 percent
4
522
784
66.58 percent
Table 1b: Missing observations, fathers
Another potential problem of the data is the representativeness of the subsample used here. Focussing
on the observations where occupation is recorded, poses the risk that some classes might be over- or
underrepresented. It is, for example, possible that the higher classes had a greater tendency to have
their occupation noted on the family reconstitution forms. A simple test of this issue is to look at
average fertility in our subsample and compare it to average fertility in the Cambridge Group dataset as
a whole. This is presented in Figure 1.
5
surviving to age 15
4,00
3,50
3,00
2,50
2,00
subsample
all
Figure 1: Average fertility in our subsample compared to in the whole dataset
It seems like class 1 is somewhat overrepresented in our subsample, since the number of surviving
offspring is first higher and later lower in the subsample than in the whole dataset, as will be explained
in the next section. However, if class 1 is overrepresented through the whole period, then this should
not affect our qualitative results. Moreover, Stone (1966), for example, notes that non-manual workers
would usually comprise a share of around 10% of society during the period 1500-1700. This is not too far
from our figures presented in section 4.
Before we turn to the study of social mobility, which will provide a picture as to how static pre-industrial
England was socially, we will use the data to measure the reproductive success of fathers across social
classes.
3. Reproductive Success by Social Class
Clark has argued that ”middle class” families had persistently higher reproductive success before the
industrial revolution than their lower social class counterparts (Clark, 2007). This seems to be confirmed
by looking at fertility levels (children born to a family) for the different social classes. The graph shows
the 25-year moving average of the number of children born to fathers who married in the 25-year
period before a particular year. We have illustrated the data in this way in order to show the stability of
the patterns we observe in the data, but note that this implies that it is not possible to interpret year on
year fluctuations meaningfully – rather it is the longer term trends that can be used and are important
for this study.
6
6
5,5
fertility
5
4,5
4
3,5
3
2,5
1590
1601
1612
1623
1634
1645
1656
1667
1678
1689
1700
1711
1722
1733
1744
1755
1766
1777
1788
1799
1810
1821
1832
1843
2
1
2
3
4
Figure 2: Fertility by social class
Figure 2 shows that, with the exception of a few short periods such as the middle of the seventeenth
century, class 1 families gave birth to roughly one more child than their class 4 counterparts.
What ultimately counts, however, as was also stressed by Clark and Hamilton (2006) and by Clark
(2007), is not the number of children born to a family, but the number of surviving children. Figure 3
shows the number of children surviving to adulthood (age 15) by social class. Remarkably, Figure 3 is
virtually identical to Figure 2, with class 1 families producing roughly one more surviving offspring than
their class 4 equivalents. Clark and Cummins (2009), using data on testators, reach a qualitatively similar
conclusion. They show that wealthier testators left more surviving offspring before around 1800 and
fewer thereafter.
7
surviving to age 15
4,5
4
3,5
3
2,5
2
1590
1601
1612
1623
1634
1645
1656
1667
1678
1689
1700
1711
1722
1733
1744
1755
1766
1777
1788
1799
1810
1821
1832
1843
1,5
1
2
3
4
Figure 3: Reproductive success by social class
Importantly, Figures 2 and 3 also reveal that the decline in the number of children born – one of the
main components of the historical demographic transition – starts much earlier among class 1 families
than among the lower social classes. This finding also matches that of Clark and Cummins (2009). In the
Cambridge data, class 1 families begin to limit their fertility already by the end of the 18th century
(Figure 2). The fact that the number of surviving children also declines (Figure 3) is a strong case against
the widespread hypothesis that families have a constant target number of surviving children, and that
mortality decline is responsible for the fall in fertility associated with the demographic transition.
Rather, the present findings suggest a conscious fall in the target size of the family.
It is also striking that the onset of the fall in fertility among middle class families coincides with that of
French families (Weir, 1994), where it also seems to have been the richest groups who reduced fertility
first (Cummins, 2009). The early fertility decline in France has been a great puzzle to scholars of
demography, since it is difficult to explain why the fertility of the French declined before the fall in
mortality. The Cambridge data points to the fact that England, at least among non-manual families, saw
a pattern that was similar to that of the French.
Summing up, the Cambridge data confirms the first part of Clark’s hypothesis, that higher social classes
have more surviving offspring than their lower-class counterparts. This is, however, only true up until
1800. By the end of the eighteenth century, a drop in fertility among class 1 families, which reduced the
number of their surviving offspring, combined with a drop in child mortality among the lower classes
8
(classes 2, 3 and 4), who thus left more surviving children, together made the lower classes more
successful in terms of reproduction.
As concerns the second part of Clark’s hypothesis, that middle class values spread throughout society
through downward mobility, this requires that society is either socially static meaning that the middle
class’ fraction of society is constant over time, or that the relative size of the middle class declined over
time. This part of the hypothesis is examined in the subsequent sections.
4. Class Society and Social Mobility
In order to investigate whether pre-industrial England was socially static, we now look at the
composition of English social classes, i.e. the evolution of the relative size of each social class, over time.
This is illustrated in Figure 4.
1590
1598
1606
1614
1622
1630
1638
1646
1654
1662
1670
1678
1686
1694
1702
1710
1718
1726
1734
1742
1750
1758
1766
1774
1782
1790
1798
1806
1814
1822
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
4
3
2
1
Figure 4: Shares of social classes
Does the data support Clark’s hypothesis of a socially static society up until 1800? It does seem like the
shares were indeed relatively constant up until the end of the seventeenth century. But after that,
structural change appears to be taking place. Specifically, classes 2 and 3 are growing as a share of
society, while classes 1 and 4 are declining.
Class 2 increases by almost 10 percentage points, from approximately 25 percent before 1700 to around
35 percent by 1800. Class 3 increases by around 6 percentage points, from an average of 40 percent
9
before 1700 to around 46 percent by 1800. Class 1, on the other hand, experiences a huge decline, from
around 16 percent to less than six percent. The same is true for class 4, although the drop in its relative
size is slightly smaller: a five percentage points drop from around 18 percent before 1700 to on average
13 percent around 1800.
Perhaps not surprisingly, given what we know about the huge structural changes taking place in England
during the industrial revolution, it thus appears that manual work becomes more widespread after
1700, as the share of non-manual workers in society (class 1 members) declines sharply. At the same
time, the data shows that it is skilled manual work rather than unskilled labour that becomes important
after 1700, as is also reflected in the decline in class 4, as opposed to the increase of classes 2 and 3.
Hence, as documented by Leunig et al. (2009), education grew in importance over this period, but
mostly in the form of apprenticeships requiring skills needed for manual labour, such as that used in
manufacturing (van der Beek, 2010).
Another way of illustrating this is by looking at what happens to structural mobility. Structural mobility is
calculated using mobility tables, such as Table 2 below, but using the actual numbers of sons displaying
intergenerational stability or mobility, rather than the percentages. In these tables structural mobility is
then distinguished from exchange mobility, where structural mobility is defined as mobility taking place
because one or more classes absorb a larger share of society. Exchange mobility, on the other hand, is
mobility taking place as an exchange between classes, also called pure mobility (see, for example,
Persson (1977)). Figure 5 shows a relatively steep rise in structural mobility taking place in England after
1700.
0,5
percent
0,4
0,3
0,2
0,1
0
structural mobility (share of total obs.)
Figure 5: Structural mobility
10
5. A Trickle Down Effect Through Social Mobility?
The Cambridge data confirms the notion that up until around 1800 the middle class was in fact more
successful in terms of reproduction than their lower class counterparts. They also offer evidence that
pre-industrial England was indeed rather static, socially, up to 1700. By implication, this lends support to
Clark’s hypothesis that middle class values could, in principle, have been distributed across society
through downward mobility of middle class individuals, at least up to the end of the eighteenth century.
The Cambridge data, however, permits us the possibility of going one step further in addressing the
issue as to what extent middle class values were trickling down by middle class children leaving the
social class in which they were born. In the following, we thus set out to investigate the mobility
patterns in English society during the seventeenth and eighteenth century, with particular focus on
downward mobility of the middle class, as well as the degree to which values may or may not have
dispersed though class mobility.
First, we look at outflow mobility. This shows us the destination classes of sons contingent on their
father’s social class. Since we now know that structural changes were happening around 1700, the
following tables are shown for the period before and after 1700, where the year applied is the birth-year
of the son.
Diagonal numbers refer to the percentage of sons remaining in the social class of their fathers. On
average, nearly 60 percent of all sons of class 1 fathers remained in class 1 themselves. With 28 percent
moving downward to class 2, a downward transmission of middle class values would, therefore, rarely
reach the lowest classes – only six percent of sons born into class 1 ended up as unskilled labourers.
Father’s class
Son’s class
1
2
3
4
N
1
58.6
28.03
7.64
5.73
157
2
8.78
66.41
13.36
11.45
262
3
5.61
31.31
51.87
11.21
214
4
10
23.64
29.09
37.27
110
Total
18.57
41.86
25.57
14
743
Table 2: Pre-1700 mobility table (row percentages)
11
Class 2 had the highest percentage (66 percent) of sons residing in the social class to which they were
born, while half of all sons of class 3 fathers remained in the same social class as their fathers. Mobility
mainly took place in class 4, with 63 percent of all sons moving upward in society, mostly to class 3 and
2, but with a staggering one in ten making the leap all the way up to class 1. Generally, mobility to
adjacent classes was the norm. For instance, 28 percent of class 1 fathers saw their sons moving down
to class 2, while only eight percent moved to class 3, and six percent to class 4.
Father's class
Son's class
1
2
3
4
N
1
20.51
41.67
29.49
8.33
156
2
3.23
66.38
25.22
5.17
464
3
5.05
39.75
46.69
8.52
317
4
1.69
35.02
40.58
22.71
414
Total
5.18
47.67
35.46
11.7
1,351
Table 3: Post-1700 mobility table (row percentages)
After 1700, mobility increases dramatically, as is illustrated in Table 3. The percentage of class 1 fathers
retaining their sons in class 1 drops severely, from almost 60 percent before 1700 to a mere 20 percent
after 1700. This is consistent with Figure 4 above, which shows that class 1 families declined sharply as a
share of society after 1700. And this is despite the fact that they continued their dominance in terms of
reproductive success through to 1800. Compared to the time before 1700, this, then, gave rise to a
sizeable downward mobility of class 1 sons. Whereas most class 1 sons still ended up in class 2 (42
percent), one in three would now move two steps down the ladder to class 3, while one in ten would hit
the bottom of society. Hence, if middle class values ever spread through society by downward mobility
of middle class sons, the eighteenth century was where this happened.
On the other hand, and consistent with the decline of class 1 families as a share of society, there is very
little movement into class 1, with only three, five and two percent of all sons from classes 2, 3 and 4,
respectively, making it to the middle class. Upward mobility among class 4 sons increased significantly
compared to before 1700, with nearly 75 percent moving to class 2 or 3. However, after 1700 only two
in every hundred made the leap all the way up to class 1. The mobility patterns for classes 2 and 3
remain roughly stable over time, where most of the mobility that there is, is taking place between these
two classes after 1700. In general, it seems that crossing the line between lower-skilled and higher12
skilled manual labour becomes more widespread, while making it from manual to non-manual labour
occupations becomes very usual, with the opposite becoming very common. Finally, it seems that the
acquisition of skills for manual work becomes more important.
That there is very little mobility between manual and non-manual occupations is known as the ‘bufferzone’ hypothesis, and has been widely observed for Britain in more recent times, e.g. Heath and Payne
(2000) and Miles (1999), although this is most stringent when looking at relative mobility rates (relative
to perfect mobility) as noted by (Goldthorpe, Llewellyn and Payne, 1980). Whereas mobility in preindustrial England, according to the Cambridge data, often occurs between proximate classes, the
massive movement from class 1 to class 2 after 1700 does speak against the buffer-zone hypothesis.
One of the main reasons for this could be that an increasing wage-premium for skilled manual labourers
at the dawn of the industrial revolution lured sons of non-manual fathers into getting apprenticeships
within manual occupations (van der Beek, 2010). In light of the widespread movement across the
manual/non-manual barrier after 1700, however, a buffer-zone is perhaps more likely to have existed
before 1700.
The growing mobility among classes 1 and 4, and the continued stability of classes 2 and 3, stands out
clearly from Table 4, which shows the percentage of fathers having sons who remained in the same
class.
pre-
1600-
1625-
1650-
1675-
1700-
1725-
1750-
1775-
1800-
1600
1624
1649
1674
1699
1724
1749
1774
1799
1824
Class 1
58.62
80
57.14
57.58
43.24
23.08
19.15
26.53
7.69
25
Class 2
70.77
73.68
60.53
60
63.46
71.76
71.76
60.8
71.74
74,19
Class 3
36.96
44.19
40.91
75.68
65.91
48
50
51.16
40.32
37,5
Class 4
37.5
30
45.83
35.71
36.11
27.45
28.57
14.81
13.51
34,12
Table 4: Intergenerational stability (percentage of fathers with son in the same class)
1600-
1625-
1650-
1675-
1700-
1725-
1750-
1775-
1800-
pre-1600
1624
1649
1674
1699
1724
1749
1774
1799
1824
Total
Stable
55.13
60.67
50.75
61.19
53.85
49.53
42.81
40.49
40.55
48.09
48.11
Upward
25.64
22.67
27.61
15.67
23.08
29.72
31.37
36.96
37.40
38.80
30.59
downward
19.23
16.67
21.64
23.13
23.08
20.75
25.82
22.55
22.05
13.11
21.30
156
150
134
134
169
212
306
368
254
183
2,066
N
Table 5: Mobility trends, in percent
13
Table 5 shows in what direction the mobility typical went, regardless of the son’s class of origin. Overall,
social stability is declining in the sense that more sons are likely to move as time goes by. The main
reason, as we saw above, is that sons increasingly moved away from classes 1 and 4, and that these
were being absorbed by classes 2 and 3. In the beginning of the period observed, upward and
downward mobility largely cancels out. However, as time goes by, upward mobility becomes the
dominant trait. This is caused mainly by class 3 individuals moving up to class 2, and class 4 people
moving to 3 and 2, as was also illustrated by Table 3, and by the fact that class 1 shrinks dramatically
from the beginning of the eighteenth century (Figure 4), despite the fact that there is downwardmobility from class 1 chiefly to classes 2 and 3.
pre-1700
post-1700
Class 1:Class 2
15,81
10,12
Class 1:Class 3
70,92
6,43
Class 1:Class 4
38,12
33,09
Class 2:Class 3
8,23
3,09
Class 2:Class 4
9,14
8,33
Class 3:Class 4
5,93
3,07
Table 6: Symmetrical odds ratios
Odds ratios are sometimes used to measure the chances of ending up in a particular social class,
conditional on the class of birth. Table 6 reports these before and after 1700. In general, it seems that,
before 1700, class 1 is quite ‘closed’ relatively to the lower classes. For instance, sons born into class 1
have 15 times higher chances of staying in class 1, as opposed to moving to class 2, than class 2 sons
have of doing the opposite (moving to class 1 rather than staying in class 2). Comparing class 1 sons to
those of classes 3 and 4, the odds of making it to class 1 are much worse for sons born outside of class 1.
Indeed, a chance of 38:1, which are the odds of making it into class 1 when born in class 4, is extremely
high by more recent standards (Heath and Payne, 2000). Class 2, by comparison to class 1, is much more
‘open’ in the sense that the odds of making in into this class, when born into a lower class, are up to
seven times higher than making it to class 1. Again, this is supportive of the existence of a buffer-zone
between manual and non-manual labourers. After 1700, however, the odds ratios pick up the fact that
mobility between the classes increased.
Two striking aspects of the Cambridge data vis-à-vis Clark’s hypothesis about downward-mobility and
dispersion of middle class values need mentioning. Firstly, before 1700 class 1 is fairly difficult to access
14
for outsiders, and, in this regard, it is able to form its ‘own’ cultural values. But there is not much
dispersion to other social classes at this point (see Tables 2 and 4). Secondly, after 1700, where middle
class sons are increasingly moving into lower social classes, the trend in mobility is mostly upward (Table
5). That means that, while middle class values may be spreading throughout society, the messengers
(sons moving downward from class 1) do not comprise a large fraction of society.
The latter conclusion stands out more clearly if we look at mobility into the various social classes: i.e.
where its members came from.
Father's class
Son's class
1
2
3
4
Total
1
66.67
14.15
6.32
8.65
21.13
2
16.67
55.95
18.42
28.85
35.26
3
8.7
21.54
58.42
23.08
28.8
4
7.97
8.36
16.84
39.42
14.8
N
138
311
190
104
743
Table 7: Pre-1700, composition of classes (column percentages)
Table 7 reveals that, before 1700, 67 percent of all class 1 members came from class 1. In class 2, 14
percent came from class 1, while in classes 3 and 4 six and nine percent, respectively, were born in class
1. Hence, up until the beginning of the eighteenth century, the class mostly exposed to middle-class
values was the middle class itself. In this respect, class 1 is the most self-contained class by comparison
to its lower social-class counterparts.
Father's class
Son's class
1
2
3
4
Total
1
45.71
10.09
9.6
8.23
11.55
2
21.43
47.83
24.43
15.19
34.34
3
22.86
19.57
30.9
17.09
23.46
4
10
22.52
35.07
59.49
30.64
N
70
644
479
158
1,351
Table 8: Post-1700, composition of classes (column percentages)
After 1700, the picture changes somewhat. The composition of class 1 members is now much more
diverse, with only 46 percent coming from class 1 families and another 45 percent from class 2 and 3
families. The same pattern applies to classes 2 and 3, although to a lesser extent. Only class 4, which
15
before 1700 was the most diverse of all social classes, is now dominated by members born in class 4. It is
clear also that sons born into class 1, who move to lower classes, do not give a big ‘input’ to their lowerclass counterparts, consisting of at most ten percent of classes 2, 3 and 4 after 1700. That limits the
potential for the diffusion of cultural values from the middle class. Further, the fact that almost 45
percent of the members of class 1 come from classes 2 and 3 is evidence that the buffer-zone between
the manual and non-manual classes breaks down, possibly helped by the changes in economic activities
occurring at the time of the industrial revolution.
1600-
1625-
1650-
1675-
1700-
1725-
1750-
1775-
1800-
pre-1600
1624
1649
1674
1699
1724
1749
1774
1799
1825
Class 1
73.91
70.59
64.00
67.86
57.14
27.27
52.94
56.52
40.00
50.00
Class 2
53.49
64.62
41.82
62.50
57.89
61.00
14.00
41.99
45.21
58.23
Class 3
54.84
59.38
64.29
65.12
51.79
42.86
36.21
31.65
30.86
17.91
Class 4
37.50
31.58
42.31
33.33
46.43
41.18
59.46
64.00
45.45
82.86
Table 9: Percent of second-generation members per class
Breaking down the time-period even further, Table 9 shows that until the end of the seventeenth
century more than three-thirds of class 1 members are sons of class 1 fathers. This share of sons
remaining in the class of birth is higher than any of their lower-class counterparts – notably class 4
where only one in three stay on. It is clear, therefore, that not only are more than two-thirds remaining
in class 1, limiting the scope for diffusion of values from this class to lower social classes; the influence
going in the opposite direction – from the lower classes to class 1 – is also quite restricted, allowing the
middle class to develop a very class-specific culture. From the end of the seventeenth century, the share
of sons remaining in the class they were born into is now more evenly distributed among the four
classes. What stands out, if anything, is that the sons of class 4 fathers ended up having a higher
tendency to remain at the bottom of society. That is, the poor were increasingly likely to get stuck in
poverty, as we go through the time of the industrial revolution. Notably, however, there was still one in
three moving up the social ladder in this period. Above, it was shown that upward mobility in fact
increased for class 4 descendants. This pattern can be reconciled with a high percentage of secondgeneration members by the fact that class 4 had rather high fertility in the end of the period but was
declining in share.
16
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
1590
1600
1610
1620
1630
1640
1650
1660
1670
1680
1690
1700
1710
1720
1730
1740
1750
1760
1770
1780
1790
1800
1810
1820
1830
0
predicted
actual
Figure 6: Actual and predicted share of class 1
That there is not enough room at the top is evident from Figure 6. This graph shows the share of society
of class 1 if they had increased in relative size in accordance with their reproductive success (the dashed
line) against their actual relative size (the solid line). The rising gap between the two lines, illustrating
the degree to which downward-mobility of class 1 took place, does indeed suggest a massive potential
for the spread of middle class values to lower social classes. But it needs to be kept in mind that the
sheer size of the middle class was fairly limited compared to the size of the remaining social classes, and
that it had become a rather small share of society by 1800 (Figure 4). Miles (1999) draws the same
conclusion based on historical evidence.
7. Conclusion
This study offered an attempt to investigate the notion forwarded by Gregory Clark that the spread of
middle class values to lower social classes, through social mobility, might have been a stimulus to
England’s industrial revolution. We used data from the Cambridge Group’s population history of England
from family reconstitution to carry out two specific analyses required to test Clark’s hypothesis. One was
to find out whether middle class families were more successful in terms of reproduction than their lower
social-class counterparts. The other was to test if pre-industrial England was socially static over time.
The Cambridge data has the advantage that it covers much more ground, geographically, than the data
used by Clark to draw his conclusion. It also offers a much more detailed set of demographic variables
useful for testing the reproduction hypothesis.
17
According to the Cambridge data, both notions – that of reproduction and that of social stability – were
true up until 1700. Clark’s idea about the spread of values through social mobility, therefore, cannot be
rejected on these grounds. However, it is worth noting that the size of the impact of class values must
have been fairly limited before 1700, as nearly seventy percent of middle class sons remained in the
class in which they were born. Between 1700 and 1800, middle class families were still ahead of other
social classes in terms of reproductive success, but society – in contrast to Clark’s claim – was far from
static. The Cambridge data does support his views, however, as the middle class shrunk dramatically.
This left plenty of scope for middle class values to spread through society between 1700 and 1800, had
it not been for the fact that the absolute size of the middle class was becoming much smaller.
18
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