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‘You too can be like us’: Americanising
European (Road) Transport after WW II1
Frank Schipper (Ph.D. student)
Section History of Technology
Technical University Eindhoven
[email protected]
T2M Conference, York
6-9 October 2005
1. Introduction ....................................................................................................... 1
2. The Marshall Plan and Its Prelude...................................................................... 4
3. More Room for Roads ....................................................................................... 8
4. Transatlantic Tourism ...................................................................................... 12
5. Conclusion....................................................................................................... 15
1. INTRODUCTION
The first post-WW II decades formed a period of unprecedented economic growth,
ultimately resulting in high levels of prosperity in many Western European countries.
These decades formed a sharp contrast with the first post-war years when
reconstruction was slow and there were worries about a possible slip-back. For
economic, strategic and humanitarian reasons the United States came to the rescue
with the unprecedented European Recovery Program (ERP), as it was convinced that
a healthy Europe was vital to its interests. The ERP, better known as the ‘Marshall
Plan’, has been described as “the most unsordid act in history”.2 Publicity being an
important part of it, its name is still widely remembered, and historians continue to
debate its legacy.
The post-war decades were also a time of change for Europe’s transport system.
European mass motorization would start in the 1950s and the importance of road
transport would steadily increase, eventually becoming the dominant mode of
transport. It is tempting to link the transformation of European transport with
American hegemony at the time. Europeans had admired the American car culture for
a long time. Given America’s position of power in the new bipolar world and the
1
I am grateful to the George C. Marshall Foundation (Lexington, Virginia, USA), which has
enabled me to conduct the research for this paper with a Marshall/Baruch fellowship. I would like to
thank archivist Joan Hartog in particular for her help.
2
The qualification is Churchill’s, see Peter Grose (1997), “Editor’s Note: The Marshall Plan – Then
and Now”, in: Foreign Affairs 76: 3, p.159.
1
unshakeable trust in American technology in post-war Europe,3 there are good
grounds for assuming that a unique window of opportunity existed for the United
States to promote its view of mobility in Europe with a considerable degree of
success. Furthermore, the Americans made a conscious effort to “refashion Western
Europe in [its] image,”4 as epitomized in the central message of the propaganda
selling the Marshall Plan to the public: ‘you too can be like us’.5 My hypothesis is that
the changes in Europe’s transport system can be interpreted as an example of
‘Americanisation’, a process by which parts of American culture are transferred to
other geographic areas. The term is disliked for several reasons. For example, it
implies passivity on the part of the receivers, thus obfuscating their role as active
participants in the process. It is also important to realize that for a successful transfer,
adaptation to local circumstances is crucial.6 Some go as far as calling the
phenomenon a ‘myth’.7 Be that as it may, it is still true that the United States tried to
spread the ‘American way’ across the globe, particularly in post-war Western Europe.
For European transport this implied that roads and road transport were to play a more
important role than before, as they did in the United States.
Literature on the Marshall Plan hardly addresses transport issues, despite the fact
that transport was identified at the time as a significant bottleneck that could prevent
the Plan from having success. Literature on the ERP started to be written immediately
after the Program’s end.8 Landmark studies by Milward and Hogan appeared in the
1980s, dealing with ‘traditional’ economic aspects of the overall program.9 Over the
years they have been followed up by further overall studies and complemented by
studies of the Marshall Plan’s legacy in specific countries.10 A new wave of
3
Frida de Jong (1994), Gas Geven: Geschiedenis van BK-GAS B.V. 1954-1994, Den Haag/
Eindhoven: Stichting Historie der Techniek, p.45.
4
Michael J. Hogan (1987), The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western
Europe, 1947-1952, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p.87.
5
See David Ellwood (1998), “ ‘You Too Can Be Like Us’: Selling the Marshall Plan”, in: History
Today 48: 10, pp.33-39.
6
Frank Inklaar (1997), Van Amerika Geleerd: Marshall-Hulp en Kennisimport in Nederland,
dissertation University of Amsterdam, Den Haag: Sdu Uitgevers, pp.140-141.
7
Richard Pells (1997), Not Like Us: How Europeans Have Loved, Hated, and Transformed
American Culture Since World War II, New York: Basic Books, pp.xiv-xv.
8
One of the earliest studies was Harry Bayard Price (1955), The Marshall Plan and Its Meaning,
Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
9
Alan S. Milward (1984), The Reconstruction of Western Europe 1945-1951, London: Methuen &
Co.; Hogan, op.cit. For a critical assessment of both, see William Diebold, Jr. (1988), “The Marshall
Plan in Retrospect: A Review of Recent Scholarship”, in: Journal of International Affairs 41: 2,
pp.421-435.
10
David W. Ellwood (1992), Rebuilding Europe: Western Europe, America and Postwar
Reconstruction, London: Longman; Günter Bischof, Anton Pelinka & Dieter Stiefel (eds.) (2000), The
2
publications appeared in 1997 in the wake of the 50th anniversary of the Marshall
Plan.11
Currently there seems to be a consensus that the main legacy of the Marshall Plan
was not financial or economic, but rather cultural and psychological, imbuing
Europeans with hope and good spirit.12 Research on these aspects of the Marshall Plan
is still in its infancy though. Through the study of specific parts of the Plan we can
gain insight if and how it was used as a tool to transfer American knowledge,
techniques and visions across the Atlantic and embed them in a European setting. As
historians of technology have proven themselves particularly sensitive to
domestication processes, a focus on technology transfer in the road transport sector
seems a fruitful way to expand and enrich our knowledge of the Marshall Plan and
our understanding of Americanisation in post-war Europe.13
A recent example of how this kind of analysis can be brought to fruition is a
symposium issue of Comparative Technology Transfer and Society, edited by Seely
which demonstrates how the American car society was brought to Europe, and in
particular how this process took place in Norway and Sweden.14 They highlight the
role of non-governmental organisations like the International Road Federation, and of
knowledge transfer in the field of traffic engineering. Although they do mention the
Marshall Plan, its road transport aspects remain elusive. This paper will therefore
address road transport issues in the Marshall Plan, giving attention to both the
infrastructure and its operation. It thus aims to make a modest contribution to the
Marshall Plan in Austria, Contemporary Austrian Studies vol.8, New Brunswick: Transaction
Publishers; Charles S. Maier (ed.) (1991), The Marshall Plan and Germany: West German
Development within the Framework of the European Recovery Program, New York: Berg.
11
Richard T. Griffiths (ed.) (1997), Van Strohalm tot Strategie: Het Marshall-Plan in Perspectief,
Assen: Van Gorcum; Peter Grose (ed.) (1997), “The Marshall Plan and Its Legacy: Special
Commemorative Section”, in: Foreign Affairs 76: 3, pp.157-221; John Killick (1997), The United
States and European Reconstruction, 1945-1960, Edinburgh: Keele University Press.
12
Inklaar, op.cit., p.12; Ruth Oldenziel (2004), Vluchten over de Oceaan: Amerika, Europa en de
Techniek, inaugural lecture Technical University Eindhoven, p.11. ECA administrator Hoffman was
aware of these ‘intangible gains’, and this is one of the reasons why much attention was given to
Marshall Plan publicity, folder ‘1948, December 1, National Association of manufacturers, New York’,
box 114, Paul Gray Hoffman Papers (Hoffman Papers), Truman Library, Independence, Missouri, USA
(Truman Library). See also ‘Text of remarks by Paul G. Hoffman’, 2-6-1967, folder 4, European
Recovery Plan Commemoratives collection, Marshall Library, Lexington, Virginia, USA.
13
This is a central point raised by Oldenziel, op.cit.
14
Bruce E. Seely (2004), “ “Push” and “Pull” Factors in Technology Transfer: Moving AmericanStyle Highway Engineering to Europe, 1945-1960”, in: Comparative Technology Transfer and Society
2: 3, pp.229-246; Per Østby, “Educating the Norwegian Nation: Traffic Engineering and Technological
Diffusion”, in: idem, pp.247-272; Pär Blomkvist, “Transferring Technology – Shaping Ideology:
American Traffic Engineering and Commercial Interests in the Establishment of a Swedish Car
Society”, in: idem, pp.273-302; Per Lundin, “American Numbers Copied! Shaping the Swedish
Postwar Car Society”, in: idem, pp.303-337.
3
debate on the historical interpretation of the Marshall Plan. I will continue with a
short description of the Marshall Plan and its transport aspects in the next paragraph,
subsequently treat two road transport related issues of the Plan in paragraphs 3 and 4,
and end with a conclusion in paragraph 5.
2. THE MARSHALL PLAN AND ITS PRELUDE
During 1945-1947 the American government became increasingly convinced that it
would be necessary to formulate a comprehensive aid program for Europe in order to
get recovery back on track. This conviction culminated in the famous speech
Secretary of State George C. Marshall made on June 5, 1947 at Harvard University.
The speech contained few specifics, leaving the Europeans room to take the initiative,
as their mecenas expected them to. Guided by France and the United Kingdom, a total
of sixteen mainly West European countries eventually participated in the program. As
he was defending the European Recovery Program in Congress six months after his
speech, Marshall asked for $ 17 billion in aid spread over a period of four years. At
the end of this period the Sixteen were supposed to be able to stand on their own feet
again. In order to achieve this overall aim, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1948
formulated three main goals, namely the promotion of industrial and agricultural
production, the restoration of soundness of currencies, budgets and finance, and the
stimulation of international trade by reducing barriers hampering it.15
An independent governmental agency, the Economic Cooperation Administration
(ECA), was set up to administer the Program. As its head, president Truman
appointed Paul G. Hoffman, who had been president of the Studebaker Corporation.16
Participating European countries joined in the Committee of European Economic
Cooperation (CEEC) to draw up a response to Marshall’s proposals. The temporary
committee was transformed into the Organisation for European Economic
Cooperation (OEEC) in April 1948, with its seat in Paris. A Special Representative
represented ECA at the OEEC.
The birth of the ERP and its further development have been extensively described
elsewhere. Here, I will zoom in on the road transport issues related to it. Even though
the overall goals of the ERP did not mention transport as such, it can easily be linked
15
First Report to Congress of the Economic Cooperation Administration, for the quarter ending
June 30, 1948 (ECA, 1st Report, 30-6-1948), p.1.
16
Hoffman had also been involved in the activities of several organisations, including the
Committee for Economic Development, which stimulated to plan the post-war American economy
during WW II, and the Automotive Safety Foundation.
4
to the general spirit of the program, the construction of infrastructures and production
of vehicles raising industrial output levels, and the lack of adequate transport facilities
forming a barrier to trade.
The war had deeply wounded European road transport. During the first years of the
war, the Germans repaired those connections that were important for economic or
strategic reasons. Work on the Autobahnen network continued and plans for it were
extended to include newly conquered areas. In the latter part of the war, however,
road transport gradually diminished until it virtually disappeared. Many private
vehicles had been requisitioned and as the war continued, shortages of tyres, gasoline
and spare parts hindered the repair and use of vehicles. Besides, the road network
suffered severely from physical devastation.17 The destruction of bridges, vital
elements of the road network in the densest parts of the European network in the
northwest, blocked several important routes.18 People were very inventive in trying to
keep road traffic going, using alternative fuels when traditional ones were
unavailable, for example. The ‘war-surplus vehicles’ that were left behind by
American troops helped easing the scarcity of vehicles.19 It was clear though that the
life span of many vehicles had been stretched to its limits and soon many would have
to be replaced.
A similar fatigue was found among other modes of transport. All in all the
European transport system was left in complete disarray. As a consequence, the
European inland transport system experienced difficulties in handling even the
17
During the war the League of Nations kept track of transport developments in Europe, see
‘Transport Problems which Arose from the War of 1914-1918 and the Work of Restoration Undertaken
in this Field by the League of Nations’, C.29.M.29.1944.VIII, August 1944, League of Nations, pp.3238, League of Nations Archives, Geneva (LoN Archives); memorandum by Luka for the acting
secretary-general, April 1944, 9A/42417/39706, folder ‘Transit and Communications: Post-War (19391945) Problems, Restoration by UNRRA of the transport system in Continental Europe – Secretariat
Suggestions concerning Collaboration between UNRRA and the Organisation for Communications and
Transit’, box R1135, LoN Archives; ‘Situation des Transports dans l’Europe Continentale au Cours de
la Présente Guerre’, C.C.T.730, 15-8-1942, LoN Archives; see also Peter Duignan & L.H. Gann
(1992), The Rebirth of the West: The Americanization of the Democratic World 1945-1958,
Cambridge: Blackwell, pp.22-29.
18
In France 7000 bridges were destroyed, in Belgium 1120, CEEC Report (1947), vol. II, Technical
Reports, p.228.
19
Transportation as it Affects the European Recovery Program, Preliminary Report 17 of the House
Select Committee on Foreign Aid pursuant to H. Res. 296 A Resolution Creating a Special Commitee
on Foreign Aid, House Report No. 1504, 4-3-1948 (House Report 1504), p.49. This phenomenon is
reminiscent of the post-WW I experience, when American war vehicles were also left behind. In
Germany these vehicles were important in ‘creating a desire for automobiles’, see Kurt Möser (1998),
“World War I and the Creation of Desire for Automobiles in Germany”, in: Susan Strasser, Charles
McGovern & Matthias Judt (eds.), Getting and Spending: European and American Consumer Societies
in the Twentieth Century, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
5
relatively low production levels of the immediate after-war and it was barely able to
squeak through the winter of 1946-1947.20
Transport concerns were hence part of the Marshall Plan from the start, but,
although a good transport system was considered a necessary condition for European
recovery, attention for it was not overwhelming. Still, transport issues ranked higher
on the political agenda in the direct post-war period than they perhaps ever did,21
precisely because transport was considered a major bottleneck to restoration: “It is
clear that this is one of the most vital spots in the whole foreign aid program, since if
Europe’s transport system cannot carry a minimum load, imported commodities
cannot be distributed, and it is useless to hope for a revival of the European
economy.”22
The Sixteen were well aware of these concerns, which were also their own. This
was reflected in the report the CEEC delivered in the autumn of 1947, known as the
Paris Report. It consisted of a general report and a number of technical reports dealing
with specific problems of European recovery. One of the latter reports was dedicated
to inland transport and formulated a 25% increase target for transport with regard to
base year 1938, to be reached by 1952.23
American policy makers were very dissatisfied with the Paris Report, qualifying it
as ‘extremely disappointing’ and ‘inadequate’.24 The methods used for establishing
productivity goals remained unclear. Furthermore, how the goals might be achieved
was hardly specified. The 25% increase for transport seemed to be fabricated in a
haphazard way. Subsequent conversations in Washington between American policy
20
USD/56, 4-11-1947, p.3, folder ‘Inland Transport’, box 2, Lot 123, Historical Collection Relating
to the Formulation of the ERP 1947-1950 (ERP Collection), Record Group 59, General Records of the
Department of State (RG 59), National Archives at College Park, Maryland, USA (Archives II);
European recovery and American Aid: A Report by the President’s Committee on Foreign Aid,
(Harriman Report, named after its chair, US Secretary of Commerce W. Averell Harriman), 7-11-1947,
Washington DC, p.H8.
21
This is illustrated by the fact that improving European transport was mentioned among the first
tasks of the Economic Commission for Europe, founded in 1947 to be the first UN regional economic
commission, see Resolution of the Economic and Social Council Creating the Economic Commission
for Europe, 28-3-1947.
22
Harriman Report, p.H8; see also press release no. 391, 7-5-1947, Department of State on the
address of under-Secretary of State Dean Acheson before the Delta Council, Cleveland, on 8-5-1947,
folder 11, box 47, Dean Acheson Papers, Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University, New Haven,
USA; Recovery in Europe: The First Two Years of Marhsall Aid (1950), London: His Majesty’s
Stationary Office, p.10.
23
CEEC Report, vol. II, Technical Reports, section F, ‘Inland Transportation’.
24
Minutes 9-9-1947, Interdepartmental Committee on the Marshall Plan, folder ‘Advisory Steering
Committee’ (1 of 8), box 2, President’s Committee on Foreign Aid 1947 (Harriman Committee),
Truman Library; summary of the interim report of the inland transport committee, n.d., folder ‘Inland
Transport’, box 1, Lot 123, ERP Collection, RG 59, Archives II.
6
makers and French representative Outrey in order to clarify the inland transport report
were to no avail. Frustrated, the Americans concluded that just asking for additional
information would not be enough and they therefore demanded a ‘fundamental
revision of the methods of analysis in order to allow more explainable conclusions’.25
American policy makers made clear that they thought the report did not pay enough
attention to the needs and possibilities of road transport.26 Road transport was barely
mentioned in the Paris Report, despite the fact that it was hindered by a myriad of
legal barriers and according to the Americans constituted a solution for at least some
of Europe’s transport problems. They therefore tried to increase the role of road
transport in different ways, working through the Marshall Plan machinery, but also
using their representation in intergovernmental organisations dealing with European
transport. The Inland Transport Committee (ITC) of the Economic Commission for
Europe (ECE) provides an excellent example of the latter kind and I will therefore
dedicate a brief intermezzo to it here.
The ITC-ECE is interesting for several reasons. First, it was originally intended that
the Marshall Aid would be channelled through the ECE, although this option was
ruled out by late 1947. Second, there was considerable overlap in the diplomats
representing the United States in Paris and in Geneva. Staff of the Office of the
Special Representative in Paris would travel to Geneva to meetings of the ECE. Third,
although the United States was rather sceptical about the usefulness of many technical
committees of the ECE, rather weary about the USSR using the ECE as an instrument
for obstruction and anti-American propaganda, and rather worried about the ambitions
of ECE’s Secretary General Myrdal and his lenience towards the USSR,27 the
Americans were at the same time rather enthusiastic about the achievements of a
limited number of ECE’s technical committees, especially the ITC, ‘the most
effective of all the ECE committees’.28 American policy makers were therefore
expected to fully cooperate with the ECE’s ITC.29
25
‘Proposed Questions for Discussion with CEEC Delegates’, 10-10-1947, folder ‘Washington
Conversations – General’, box 20, Harriman Committee, Truman Library.
26
Harriman Report, p.H10; summary of the interim report of the inland transport committee, n.d.,
folder ‘Inland Transport’, box 1, Lot 123, ERP Collection, RG 59, Archives II.
27
Minutes of 97th meeting Policy Planning Staff, 8-6-1949, folder 11, box 5, C. Ben Wright Kennan
Biography Project, Marshall Library.
28
Phillips to Cohan, 31-10-1951, folder ‘ECE-ITC February 1951-December 1951’, box 23, Lot
54D388, Records of the Component Offices of the Bureau of European Affairs, 1944-1962 (Bureau of
European Affairs), RG 59, Archives II. See also Current Developments Report on European Recovery
7
The United States was represented at the ITC from the moment it started its work in
October 1947. American transport attaché McClure made clear that the Americans
thought road transport should play a larger role in Europe. He criticised the Europeans
for associating road transport with short hauls, while American experience had
showed its usefulness for distances far longer than the ones usual in Europe.30
McClure therefore proposed to the ITC the following resolution, which would be
adopted with only minor changes: “THE COMMITTEE considering that the increased
use of road transport offers promise of a partial remedy of the present transport crisis
in Europe, RESOLVES to set up a Working Party consisting of representatives of
interested governments and of competent experts, which with the assistance of the
Executive Secretary shall study the additional contribution which road transport might
make and the emergency measures required to remove or simplify the present
administration or operation hindrances, DIRECTS the Working Party to report the
results of its work to the Inland Transport Committee not later than at its next session,
draws the attention of governments to the urgency of the problem and asks all
possible cooperation in reaching a fruitful solution.” 31
The Marshall Plan machinery was also used for promoting road transport. Parts of
the Marshall funds would be dedicated to the road transport sector. A much more
subtle way for stimulating road transport was through American tourism in Europe. I
will deal with both in the next two paragraphs.
3. MORE ROOM FOR ROADS
The difficulties experienced in the railway sector in the immediate aftermath of the
war were a major rationale behind increasing the role of road transport in Europe.
Like road transport itself, rail transport had been hit hard by the war. On a total of
2.000.000 railway freight cars, 300.000 had been destroyed, and 800.000 damaged.32
By late summer 1947, around 500 rail freight cars would go out of service every week
in the important Ruhr area, while 40.000 tons out of the daily mined total of 240.000
no.4, p.7, folder ‘Marshall Plan’, box 78, Hoffman papers, Truman Library; Hayes to Phillips, 19-31951, box 23, Lot 54D388, Bureau of European Affairs, RG 59, Archives II.
29
The Committee for the Marshall Plan stressed that the bill concerning the Marshall Plan should
authorize full cooperation with the UN, its affiliated agencies, as well as with other international
organisations the OEEC, see minutes of the executive committee meeting, 16-1-1948, box 1, Records
of the Committee for the Marshall Plan, Truman Library.
30
Long-distance road transport did develop in the UK, see Harriman Report, p.216.
31
E/ECE/TRANS/SR.1/3, 21-10-1947, Summary record 3rd meeting, 1st session, folder G. IX
9/2/3/5/2597, box 988, ECE Transport Series (1946-1983), United Nations Office at Geneva Archives.
32
House Report 1504, p.47.
8
could not be distributed due to transport deficiencies in the rail sector.33 The Paris
Report therefore contained a large request for rail freight cars to improve Europe’s
rolling stock. The United States, however, could not supply the requested quantity due
to high domestic demand and the scarcity of steel. Furthermore, as they suspected
some governments, particularly those of France and Switzerland, of trying to protect
the state-owned railways at the expense of road transport, they were critical of the
request for rail cars, viewing it as exaggerated.34 Eventually 20.000 freight cars would
be supplied for the first year of the ERP and 6000 for the second. Almost all of them
went to Germany, the export of coal from the Ruhr being the primal concern served.
Given the difficulties in the railroad sector, the Americans deemed it essential to
use existing highway and inland waterway transport facilities as much as possible.35
They claimed that during the recovery phase road transport would be more flexible
and adaptable than both rail and inland waterways, which could not be restored
quickly enough to provide sufficient distribution possibilities for rising production.36
The existing road system could easily accommodate the increases through a more
intensive use of existing facilities. Heavier highway traffic was particularly expected
in France, Germany, Turkey and the United Kingdom.37 Some would describe the
condition of the road network as ‘good’ by 1947,38 but this opinion was not generally
33
Harriman Report, p.H8; ‘Illustrative Composition of Imports of Commodities and Services form
Western Hemisphere, April 1, 1948 through June 30, 1949 and Possible Sources and Distribution of
Financing’, ASC D-24, 21-1-1948, folder 6, box 4, Harriman Committee, Truman Library; McClure to
Conway, 5-9-1947, folder ‘Subcommittees – Transportation’, box 7, Harriman Committee, Truman
Library; ‘Part I: The European Need for United States Economic Assistance’, n.d., p.6, folder ‘State
Department’, box 10, Harriman Committee, Truman Library; working paper ‘Certain Aspects of the
European Recovery Problem from the United States Standpoint’, 23-7-1947, folder ‘ERP’ (2 of 4), box
5, Clark M. Clifford Papers (Clifford Papers), Truman Library.
34
Cohan to Phillips, 26-5-1952, folder ‘ECE ITC 1952 January-July’, box 23, Lot 54D388, Bureau
of European Affairs, RG 59, Archives II.
35
Harriman Report, p.H9; ‘Relations of ECE to ERP’, n.d., p.9, folder ‘Economic Commission for
Europe’, box 9, Lot 54D389, RG 59, Archives II.
36
‘Statement on Highway Transport’, n.d., p.2, file ‘Inland Transport’, box 1, Lot 123, ERP
Collection, RG 59, Archives II; Phillips to Camp, 18-11-1947, folder ‘ECE 1947-1948’, box 9, Lot
54D389, RG 59, Archives II.
37
USD/37, 24-10-1947, p.3, folder ‘USD-37 Report of the Inland Transport Committee’, box 21,
Harriman Committee, Truman Library.
38
Harriman Report, p.216 (the latter page number refers to a different version of the report, seen in
folder ‘ECA – Report by President’s Committee on Foreign Aid, November 7, 1947’, box 25, Hoffman
Papers, Truman Library; subsequent references to the Harriman Report containing page numbers
without a capital letter preceding them refer to this version).
9
shared, as others stressed that the need for maintenance and improvement was
accumulating.39
The troubles road carriers had to go through to operate the existing network were
the largest problem in European road transport. There were many regulatory barriers
for international road transport between European countries, which made it even
necessary in some cases to transfer goods from one truck to another at the border in
order to get goods to their final destination. The Americans therefore stressed the need
for the international regulation of trucking in conventions or bilateral agreements.40
A solution was found in the ‘freedom of the road’ agreements that liberated
commercial road traffic between European countries on a large scale. The agreements
had been signed by the Sixteen, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. The first agreement
created or maintained the freedom of operation for transit traffic for a period of six
months starting December 6, 1947.41 Eventually a more permanent solution was to be
found in adjusting existing road conventions to the present circumstances or regulate
international highway transport along the lines of the Berne Conventions for
international railway transport.42 This would eventually be achieved in one of the first
international transport agreements drawn up by the ECE, the Convention on Road
Traffic, September 19, 1949. The implementation of the document would prove more
problematic though.
It is significant that the Marshall Planners decided to spend part of the Marshall
funds on exporting road vehicles to Europe, despite the fact that the Paris Report did
not ask for it. The estimates of the Paris Report showed that the Sixteen expected to
be able to produce the necessary trucks itself,43 but the Marshall Planners found it
hard to believe that the upward trend in the sizeable imports of trucks in 1946 and
1947 would disappear over the course of the Program.44 Moreover, the Paris Report
39
OEEC (1951), Economic Progress and Problems of Western Europe, p.62; CEEC/IV A 9th
meeting, 12-8-1947, folder ‘CEEC/IVa/Inland Transport’, box 21, Lot 123, ERP Collection, RG 59,
Archives II.
40
Harriman Report, pp.H9, H10, p.216.
41
‘Relations of ECE to ERP’, n.d., p.9, folder ‘Economic Commission for Europe’, box 9, Lot
54D389, RG 59, Archives II; ECA, 2nd Report, 30-9-1948, p.17; OEEC (1949), Report to the Economic
Cooperation Administration on the First Annual Programme, July 1st, 1948 – June 30th, 1949, p.39.
42
USD/56, 4-11-1947, p.14, folder ‘Inland Transport’, box 2, Lot 123, ERP Collection, Archives II.
43
The total required estimate was 1.175.000 new trucks, domestic production was estimated at 1,3
million trucks, House Report 1504, p.57.
44
Document with estimates, n.d., p.21, folder ‘Harriman Committee – Commodity Estimates’, box
10, Harriman Committee, Truman Library. Domestic production in Europe soared at the same time and
was far bigger than importations under the Marshall scheme. Given Europe’s large domestic
10
estimates were deemed overly optimistic, because they had not taken into account the
possibility of production difficulties and no credible evidence had been submitted to
prove that the estimated production capacity in fact existed.45 The impossibility of
exporting large amounts of rail freight cars was given as a supplementary reason for
the export of trucks.46 Virtually all of the exported vehicles came from the United
States. The export of motor vehicles to Europe formed part of that of ‘equipment and
capital goods’, which were considered the ‘base-rock’ of the ERP.47 Funds were also
spent to improve road vehicle production facilities in Europe itself. Financial aid was
granted to Fiat, where production from 71.000 vehicles in 1949 to 107.000 in 1950,48
and for the modernization of the factories of Simca and Citroën.49
The technical assistance program offered another possibility for the promotion of
roads. Technical assistance projects were financed through the Marshall Plan in order
to transfer the “odd and unique set of arrangements we call “the American way of
life” across the Atlantic with the aim of increasing productivity in Europe.50 Rather
unimportant in the first years of the Plan, technical assistance gained prominence in
its latter years. Under the technical assistance scheme, American specialists would
travel to Europe to teach and European specialists would travel to the United States to
learn. For example, European engineers would participate in courses on highway
improvement financed through the Marshall Aid. The 1950 program was a kind of
summer school, running from mid-May to Mid-September. Teaching took place in
Washington, but at the end of the course there would be an extensive, 5-week field
production of vehicles, the exports were referred to as ‘a drop in the bucket’, see “How to Do Business
under the Marshall Plan”, in: Kiplinger Magazine, May 1948, p.15.
45
USD/2, 13-10-1947, p.4, folder ‘Inland Transport’, box 2, Lot 123, ERP Collection, RG 59,
Archives II, see also CEEC/IV A 9th meeting, 12-8-1947, folder ‘CEEC/IVa/Inland Transport’, box 21,
Lot 123, ERP Collection, RG 59, Archives II.
46
“How to Do Business under the Marshall Plan”, in: Kiplinger Magazine, May 1948, p.15; note,
14-8-1947, folder ‘Mason, Edward S.’, box 2, Harriman Committee, Truman Library.
47
Melvin J. Fox (1947), The European Recovery Program: A Summary of the Reports by the
Committee of European Economic Cooperation on Needs and Plans for Rehabilitation and of United
States Government Reports on Economic and Financial Capacities for Assistance and Proposals for
International Aid, pp. 832-833. This might be a reason to deem their relative importance larger than
their sheer absolute, and rather small numbers.
48
Press Release ‘Board of Directors approved credits for Italian industries’, 23-10-1947, folder
‘Export Import Bank Recommendations’, box 4, Clifford Papers, Truman Library; ECA, 6th Report,
30-9-1949, p.41; “pay-off in Turin”, ECA, 9th Report, 30-6-1950, p.56.
49
ECA, 9th Report, 30-6-1950, p.54.
50
Foreword by Hoffman, in: Russell W. Davenport (n.d. [1951]), USA: The Permanent Revolution,
New York: Prentice-Hall. This pocket book was given to those visiting the USA under the technical
assistance scheme upon arrival. See also: ECA (n.d.), Technical Assistance in Action: Methods,
Results, Objectives, Washington D.C.
11
trip to various road projects across the United States.51 The American Bureau of
Public Roads was also involved in teaching European engineers in the early 1950s.52
Last but not least, Marshall money also went into road-building projects, which
were authorized as investment projects by the ECA. The combined size of these
projects was rather small, but their significance in individual cases could be quite
large. Turkey, where the national road system was greatly improved with the help of
Marshall Aid, is an excellent example. The Turkish road building program had to be
started up from scratch and was executed in cooperation with the American Bureau of
Public Roads, which sent its Deputy Commissioner K.E. Hilts to Turkey “to give
them the benefit of American experience”. The total amount for improving the
national Turkish road system was 180 million dollars, of which approximately 35
million (19%) was supplied by ECA. It provided Turkey with 20.000 km of allweather roads, linking the important centres of the country together. Special attention
was paid to military interests.53
4. TRANSATLANTIC TOURISM
One of Europe’s urgent problems needing to be solved was the so-called dollar gap.
It meant that many European countries did not have enough dollars to pay for their
imports from the United States, which were far larger than its exports. Any dollar
earned in Europe was therefore most welcome,54 and attracting American tourists was
hence of prime importance. The flocks of American tourists visiting the Old World
before the war had vanished and during 1945 and 1946 American tourism was
insignificant. The potential for tourism from America was high though. Much was
expected from Americans of European descent, totalling 30 million in the United
States.55 It was one of the reasons for assigning the promotion of American travel to
and in Europe as one of the special tasks of the Administrator of ECA in the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1948.
51
C(50)61, 27-2-1950, OEEC 1049, Working Papers of the Council, Historical Archives of the
European Union, Florence (EU Archives).
52
Seely, op.cit., p.237.
53
Reiter to Pedersen, 13-11-1953, folder ‘Automotive Safety Foundation 1937-1960’, box 70,
Hoffman Papers, Truman Library; ECA, 12th Report, 31-3-1951, p.45.
54
See e.g. Ernest W. Wimble (1948), European Recovery 1948-1951 and the Tourist Industry,
Report prepared for the Oslo Conference of the International Union of Official Travel Organisations,
London: British Travel Association, p.29.
55
In 1949, 58% of the tourists visiting Europe were descendants of European families in first or
second generation, see OEEC (n.d.), Tourism and European Recovery, p.5.
12
The number of American visitors started to rise again in the late 1940s. IntraEuropean tourists easily outnumbered them in numerical terms, but their importance
dwindled when per capita spending was taken into account (see table 1). Furthermore,
the intra-European tourist did not bring in the dollars Europe needed so badly. In the
summer of 1949, ECA Administrator Hoffman predicted that Europe would earn 1
billion dollars through exports in 1949, supplemented by 225-250 million ‘tourist
dollars’. American tourism would hence account for approximately 1/5 of Europe’s
dollar earnings according to these estimates.56 Besides its financial importance, some
also linked tourism to raising public opinion and the maintenance of peace in Europe,
as exemplified in the slogan used by the OEEC’s European Travel Commission:
“Understanding...through travel...is the passport to peace”.57
Table 1. Amount of American Tourists and Expenditure in Europe, 1937-1952
1937
1948
1949
1950
1952
American tourists (N)
248.000 192.000 251.000 327.000 400.000
Expenditure (total, million $)
82
119
177
370
450
Expenditure (per capita, in $)
331
620
705
1131
1125
Source: ECA, 8th Report, 31-3-1950, p.19 (’37, ’48, ’49); OEEC (1950), Tourism in the European
Recovery Program (’50, ’52)
The most important transport problem connected to transatlantic tourism was how
to get people across the ocean.58 The capacity of ocean vessels and aircraft was too
small to allow significant increases in the number of tourists. Capacity was especially
problematic during the holiday peak. A solution to attenuate the problem was the
staggering of holidays through stimulating off-season travel. One of the measures
used to achieve this was lowering off-season rates for tourist facilities.
Road transport was stimulated in subtle ways through transatlantic tourism. As soon
as Americans crossed the Atlantic, they were confronted with the differences in
mobility culture. Americans were much more used to moving around in their own car
than European citizens. As Americans liked best to travel by automobile,59 American
policy-makers helped the European tourist sector adapt itself to the expectations of the
American tourist travelling to the Old World. One of the aims of improving road
56
Figures are approximate, see Statement made by Mr. Hoffman, C(49)127, 17-8-1949, p.4, folder
‘ECA – Speeches and statements, 1948-1951’, box 25, Hoffman Papers, Truman Library.
57
‘A business man looks at Europe’, p.9, Harriman Committee, box 10, folder ‘Public Opinion’;
ETC slogan: see Nordholm to Haulot, 10-6-1953, OEEC 1388, Joint Publicity for the Development of
American Tourism in Europe, EU Archives.
58
ECA, 3rd Report, 31-12-1948, p.26.
59
TOU(50)6, 18-9-1950, p.16, OEEC 1300, Tourism Working Papers, EU Archives.
13
transport facilities was to widen the distribution of tourists, getting them into the
countryside and alleviating overcrowded urban tourist centres. This would also
disperse tourist dollars more evenly between rural and urban areas.60
In order to move around the continent comfortably, several American tourists
would simply ship their automobiles across the ocean. In 1949 a total of 3000 cars
were shipped to Europe, falling short of the total carrying capacity of 13.000
vehicles.61 The American Automobile Association (AAA) promoted facilities of this
kind enthusiastically and was also involved in car hire services in Europe through
their International Travel Department, thus providing their customers with a
temporary replacement for their own automobile. Americans travelling to Europe
frequently expressed the wish to hire such cars to travel from their ‘port of landing’ to
their ‘port of embarkation’.62
Besides individual automobility there was the option of collective road transport. It
was generally thought that Americans preferred travelling by bus to taking the train.
‘Package tours’ by motor coach were very much to their liking. By the early 1950s,
the AAA was carrying most participants of the summer tours in Europe it organized
each year by motor coach.63 Several long-distance bus connections were being
established on the European continent at the time and even train companies became
involved in the business.
American preference for travelling by road was underlined by the technical
assistance missions in the field of tourism. The six week program would typically
include a meeting with a representative of the AAA on one of the first days of the
mission to learn about tourists’ (auto)mobility preferences.64 The prime question
always remained if these could be integrated in Europe. Motor courts provide us with
an example in which this seemed not to be the case. They had developed into an
important branch of the tourist industry in the United States and could be built for a
fraction of the costs of a conventional hotel, hence considerably lowering customer
60
ECA (1950), Tourism in the European Recovery, Special Analysis Series, Statistics and Reports
Division, p.24.
61
ibidem, p.12
62
AAA advertisement ‘Going to Europe?’, New York Times, 4-1-1950, p.C71. The AAA arranged
car-hire in the British Isles, France, Italy, and Switzerland at the time. OEEC (n.d.), Tourism and
European Recovery, p.52.
63
Phillips to Cohan, 17-9-1952, folder ‘ECE ITC August-December 1952’, box 23, Lot 54D388,
Bureau of European Affairs, RG 59, Archives II.
64
TOU(50)2, 18-4-1950, TOU(50)3, 19-4-1950, TOU(50)5, 6-6-1950, OEEC 1300, Tourism
Working Papers, EU Archives.
14
prices. However, it was deemed that distances travelled by car were not large enough
to make this business a success in European countries.65
5. CONCLUSION
The restoration of transport in Europe was a rapid process. By 1950 the conclusion
was drawn that transport facilities, almost completely wrecked in many countries at
the war’s end, had been rebuilt.66 The resulting European transport system was,
however, not the same as before the war. Proportions among the different modes of
transport were shifting and steadily road transport would grow into a position of
dominance in many West European countries.
It would be wrong to claim that the Americans produced or imposed this change in
European mobility patterns. Despite their position of power, they could not have
achieved this even if they would have wanted to. American policy makers were well
aware that if they pressed too hard in favour of road transport, they would only reap a
reaction contrary to what they wanted to achieve.67 Within these limits, however,
American policy makers consistently made clear that they thought road transport
should play a larger role than it had done before.
Transport formed a small but crucial part of the Marshall Plan. Initially the Sixteen
did not pay much attention to the needs of road transport, as is shown by the content
of the Paris Report. The Americans made sure that road transport issues would take
their proper place as the details of the Plan were being filled in. This is well illustrated
by the example of truck exports to Europe under the Marshall Plan, while the Sixteen
had not requested them. Some claimed the exports were prove of the fact that the
Marshall Plan was run by big business and was only meant to offer American
industrialists a lucrative market for their vehicles to the detriment of domestic
production in Europe.68 For the end result, namely increased road transport capacity in
Europe, it did not really matter what the rationale behind the export was.
65
Dipl.-Kfm. Dr. Paul Bernecker (1950), Gäste aus Amerika: Bericht über eine OEEC-Studienreise
in die Vereinigten Staaten im Rahmen von Technical Assistance, vom 3. April bis 18. Mai 1950,
Vienna: Österreichisches Produktivitäts-Zentrum, pp.80-83.
66
ECA, 9th Report, 30-6-1950, p.4; see also United Nations Department of Economic Affairs
(1948), A Survey of the Economic Situation and Prospects of Europe, Geneva: ECE, Research and
Planning Division, p.12; idem (1949), Economic Survey of Europe in 1948, Geneva: ECE, Research
and Planning Division, p.18; ECA (1949), A Report on Recovery Progress and United States Aid, pp.4,
71.
67
Phillips to McClure, 20-3-1951, folder ‘ECE-ITC February 1951-December 1951’, box 23, Lot
54D388, Bureau of European Affairs, RG 59, Archives II.
68
Marque to Hoffman, 28-9-1948, folder ‘ECA – Correspondence, 1948’, box 21, Hoffman Papers,
Truman Library.
15
The Americans did not limit themselves to the Marshall Plan machinery for
spreading the gospel of the road and expressed their mobility wishes too in
intergovernmental organisations where the United States was represented, as has been
shown by the example of the ECE. A further reinforcement of the European road
transport sector came from American citizens who visited the Old World as tourists.
Earning dollars was important in post-war Europe and therefore the tourist sector
showed a basic willingness to adapt to the American customer.69 As the latter had
become inseparable with his car,70 ways had to be found to enable him to either bring
his own vehicle or offer a temporary replacement for it in the form of either a private
or collective road vehicle.
In the end, more Marshall funds would be spent on road transport than would have
been the case without American interference, more reinforcement was given to the
road lobby than would have been the case without the unremitting American emphasis
on the importance of road transport, and more attention was paid to road issues by the
important tourist sector than would have been the case without American tourist
presence in Europe. The end result was that, through these conscious and unconscious
mechanisms, the European transport sector came to resemble its American
counterpart, making it legitimate to argue that Americanisation of European transport
did indeed take place to a certain extent.
69
TOU(50)6, 18-9-1950, addendum 1 ‘Suggestions to European Hotel-Keepers as to How to Please
Their American Clientele’, OEEC 1300, Tourism Working Papers, EU Archives.
70
This conclusion had already been drawn in the famous Middletown-studies, see Robert S. Lynd &
Helen Merrell Lynd (1929), Middletown: A Study in American Culture, London: Constable, p.253;
idem (1937), Middletown in Transition: A Study in Cultural Conflicts, New York: Harcourt, Brace and
Co., p.265.
16