Black and White Americans and Latino Immigrants: A Preliminary Look at Attitudes in Three Southern
Cities
Paula D. McClain
Duke University
Monique L. Lyle
RWJ/University of Michigan
Efrén O. Peréz
Vanderbilt University
Jessica Johnson Carew
Eugene Walton, Jr.
Candis S. Watts
Duke University
Gerald F. Lackey
Danielle Clealand
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
Shayla C. Nunnally
University of Connecticut
A paper prepared for presentation at the 2009 American Political Science Association, September 2-6,
2009, Toronto, Ontario, Canada. The survey reported in this paper was funded by a grant from the
Russell Sage Foundation (What’s New about the New South: Race, Latino Immigration, and Intergroup
Relations, Grant # 88-06-11).
McClain et al., Black and White Americans
1
Introduction
Immigration into the United States soared between the 1990 and 2000 censuses and continued
during the 2000 to 2007 period, resulting in significant demographic shifts in some regions of the country.
Latino immigration accounts for much of this increase with the South receiving the largest demographic
shift. A number of Southern states, such as North Carolina, Alabama, and Georgia, reported substantial
increases in the size of their Latino populations from 1990 to 2000 (U. S. Census 1990, 2000). Many
experienced even greater growth in Latino residents between 2000 and 2007. North Carolina experienced
a 68.8 percent increase, seeing its Latino population grow from 377,084 in 2000 to 636,442 in 2007.
Arkansas’ Latino population increased 77.8 percent, from 85,303 in 2000 to 145,918 in 2007 (Pew
Hispanic Center 2007). Moreover, the top five states with the largest growth in Latino population
between 2000 and 2006 were in the South—Arkansas, Georgia, South Carolina, Tennessee and North
Carolina (U.S. Census Bureau 2006) -and the region holds the second largest concentration of Latinos
(14.5 percent) after the West (26.6 percent) (U. S. Bureau of the Census 2006). Singer (2008) refers to
these Southern states as being part of the twenty-first-century immigration gateways.
No other region of the country has been as defined by race as has the South. These new
immigrants are moving into a region where race and race relations between blacks and whites have
defined virtually every social and political outcome, e.g., life chances, educational opportunities, legal
rights, and violent experiences, among others. Given the recent nature of Latino immigration into the
South, it is not surprising that little scholarly attention has been paid to the topic. Some economists have
begun to examine labor force effects of and the types of jobs Latino immigrants take in the South
(Murphy, Blanchard, and Hill 2001; Mohl 2003; Ciscel, Smith and Mendoza 2003; Torres 2000; Kandel
and Parrado 2004; Griffith 1993), and several social scientists have done or are doing ethnographic
studies in selected Southern communities (Helen Marrow 2008, 2009; Jaime Winders 2008a, 2008b; Ted
Henken 2005; Hernández-León and Zuñiga 2005, 2002, 2003, 2001, and 2000; Smith and Winders 2007.
The changes in the racial dynamic of the South raise many questions, one of which we seek to address in
this project: how are native-born black and white Americans reacting to the presence of a third
McClain et al., Black and White Americans
2
population, one with little or no history in the region? Research in the area of the effects of Latino
immigration on intergroup relations in the South is very recent and not extensive (McClain et al. 2006,
2007; Marrow 2008, 2009; Winders 2008a, 2008b). This paper will provide a glimpse at the context in
which racial intergroup relations will be developed in three Southern locations—Durham, NC; Memphis,
TN; and Little Rock, AR. These locations represent different Southern environments: Memphis is a
majority black city, Durham holds nearly equal numbers of blacks and whites and Little Rock is a
majority white city.
White Attitudes toward Immigration 1
Research in political science on white attitudes toward immigration has run along four parallel
lines of inquiry--number and type of immigrants, economic perceptions, cultural concerns, and prejudice.
Research in the first area, number and type of immigrants, examines the extent to which opposition to
foreigners is influenced by the demographic balance between immigrants and native-born populations.
Tolbert and Hero (1996), in an examination of county support for Proposition 187, California’s 1994 antiimmigrant ballot measure, find that net of party affiliation and economic conditions, the proportion of
Latinos within a given county had a significant and positive effect on county support for the ballot
initiative. This relationship, however, is qualified by the racial/ethnic balance of counties. Counties
where Anglos and Latinos comprise the bulk of the population strongly supported Proposition 187,
whereas counties with a more heterogeneous racial/ethnic composition manifested weaker support for the
anti-immigrant measure. Additionally, Hood and Morris (1998) find that individual support for increased
levels of immigration decreases as one’s proximity to large populations of undocumented immigrants
increases. On the other hand, other studies failed to find a relationship between anti-immigrant opinion
and proximity to large populations of foreigners (Hood and Morris 2000, 1997; Stein et al. 2000).
In contrast to work on the number and type of immigrants, other scholars have paid special
attention to the role that economic factors play in generating white opposition to immigration. While
research has shown that one’s personal economic situation is a poor predictor of one’s position on
1
This section borrows heavily from Pérez (2008).
McClain et al., Black and White Americans
3
immigration policy, one’s view about national economic health, as well concern with immigrants’
negative effect on job opportunities and taxes, strongly predict individual opposition to higher levels of
immigration (Citrin et al. 1997; Espenshade and Hempstead 1996; Kessler 2001; Harwood 1983; Alvarez
and Butterfield 2000).
The third approach to examining white attitudes toward immigration is one that investigates the
role of a perceived threat to the national culture, orcultural threat (Fetzer 2000). Indeed, a series of studies
document that an individual’s perception that immigrants endanger national cultural identity is a key
predictor of opposition to immigration (Sniderman et al. 2000; Citrin et al. 1997; Citrin, Reingold, and
Green 1990; Hood and Morris 1997; Hood, Morris, and Shirkey 1997). According to these analyses,
immigrants are considered a threat because they imperil the integrity of national identity through their
introduction of foreign customs, languages, values, and traditions to the adopted country.
Finally, some researchers have focused on the role of prejudice in activating opposition to
immigration. This line of inquiry finds that bigotry toward immigrants is a powerful predictor of white
opposition to immigration (Citrin et al. 1997; Burns and Gimpel 2000). Pérez (2008) refines these results
by suggesting that prejudice toward immigrants comes in explicit and implicit manifestations. The former
concerns the type of prejudice individuals are willing and able to report, while the latter involves a
manifestation of prejudice that is automatic and often beyond an individual’s introspection. Pérez (2008)
finds that while explicit prejudice influences subjects’ views of Latino and non-Latino immigrants,
implicit prejudice is honed in on a specific target, namely, Latino immigrants. Moreover, while
individuals can suppress the influence of explicit prejudice on their judgments of immigration, these same
individuals find it difficult to control the influence of implicit biases.
Black Attitudes toward Immigration
Relative to the research on white attitudes toward immigration, substantially less attention has
been paid to the attitudes of blacks toward immigration. Historically, blacks have expressed their
opinions during each wave of immigration to the United States. While immigration into the United States
McClain et al., Black and White Americans
4
began in the nineteenth century, European immigration at the turn of the twentieth century was
particularly troublesome for black advancement as blacks were routinely excluded from employment
opportunities in favor of white immigrants (Berthoff, 1951; Parker, 1948; Roediger, 1999; Hellwig, 1981;
Higham, 1973; Rubin, 1978). Furthermore, the ease with which European immigrants adopted anti-black
racism and engaged in anti-black violence created a physical, economic and political threat among blacks
(Ignatiev, 1997; Jacobson, 2001; Roediger, 1999). This sense of threat did not manifest into antiimmigrant sentiments, but did create a sense of ambivalence among blacks toward immigration
(Diamond, 1998; Hellwig, 1981; Rubin, 1978).
This ambivalence was not limited to European immigrants, but extended to Asian and West
Indian immigrants during the twentieth century. The principle concern for blacks was whether these
groups would be viewed more positively by the broader white society and possibly surpasses the native
born black population. To a certain extent, these fears were confirmed as whites often perceived West
Indian immigrants as different, perhaps better than, African Americans. Likewise, while still perceiving
Asians as “foreign”, whites perceived them to be superior to native-born blacks. Neighborhoods were
also affected by this wave of immigration given the urban nature of settlement patterns of new immigrants
and many black areas became racially heterogeneous.
The limited literature on black attitudes toward immigration in general presents a mixed picture.
Epenshade and Hempstead (1996) suggest that blacks, along with Hispanics and Asians, are more likely
to express pro-immigration views than are non-Hispanic whites, yet these findings ran counter to earlier
findings by the same authors (Espenshade and Calhoun 1993). Cummings and Lambert (1997), in a
comparison of Anglo and black attitudes toward Hispanic and Asian American communities, they found
that blacks harbored no more negative sentiment toward Asian and Hispanic communities than their white
counterparts. Moreover, the authors discovered that the issues that move black opinion are not the same
as those that affect white opinion, suggesting that the factors that shape black opinion on immigration
may differ from those that shape white opinion.
McClain et al., Black and White Americans
5
Diamond (1998) found much the same result--blacks hold somewhat milder attitudes than whites
with respect to immigration, albeit with some caveats. While a majority of whites supported a
moratorium on immigration, a majority of blacks opposed it. Yet, a majority of blacks favored a
reduction in the level of immigration and when the questions addressed economic costs associated with
immigration, blacks were more likely to be in favor of restricting immigration than were whites. Finally,
if public officials and the media begin to use race as a frame for immigrants and immigration, then blacks
tend to modify their opinions and become less supportive of efforts to restrict immigration.
Johnson, Farrell and Guinn (1997) analyzing data from the 1994 Los Angeles County Social
Survey, found that about one-half of non-Latino and black respondents believed they would have less or a
lot less political and economic influence than they currently have if immigration continued at the present
rate. On the other hand, Citrin et al. (1997) found that concern about financial stress from immigration
was not more significant in influencing attitudes about immigration among blacks than among whites.
Thornton and Mizuno (1999) found that concerns about economic health might influence black
opinion on immigration and immigrant groups. Using data from 1984, the authors find that blacks
generally hold more positive attitudes toward immigrants than do whites, and that black men were more
likely than black women to feel closer to all groups involved. Feelings of economic insecurity did not
appear to make blacks feel more negatively toward West Indian and Hispanic immigrants. Though the
authors hypothesized that more economic insecurity would dampen black attitudes toward immigrants,
they did not find consistent evidence to support this claim.
Carter (2007) examines the relationship between blacks’ perceptions of their place in American
society and the relationship to attitudes toward immigration. She finds some support for the idea that
black attitudes are mediated by their perceptions of white discrimination. In particular, those blacks who
feel that the promise of political inclusion, secured during the Civil Rights Movement, has yet to be
realized are ambivalent about immigration. As a result, immigration for blacks becomes a vehicle for
airing their grievances for this unfulfilled promise of American citizenship. Although blacks were fearful
McClain et al., Black and White Americans
6
that continuing immigration could be harmful to their community, they were not in favor of a complete
restriction on immigration.
In a study examining the attitudes toward Latino immigrants by native-born blacks in a southern
city, McClain et al. (2007) found that blacks perceived more of an economic threat, especially in the
belief that they are losing jobs to Latinos, from Latino immigration than did whites. While not as
concerned as blacks, a good portion of whites were also concerned about continued Latino immigration.
What remains constant across these differing works is that blacks have an uneasy relationship
with immigration. On the one hand, blacks are generally lukewarm in their support for immigration
because of the losses, real or perceived, incurred by their community (Scott, 1999). On the other, blacks
are opposed to supporting what they saw as racist efforts to harm other communities of color (Carter,
2007; Diamond, 1998). At present, black concerns about racial progress remain a vital lens through
which they view the issue of immigration (Carter, 2007).
Racial Threat and Competition Theories
It is possible that, as Latino immigration increases the numbers of Latinos in an area, blacks will
begin to feel threatened by the increasing presence of Latinos and begin to act accordingly. Most of the
literature on political and economic threat focuses on the threat whites perceive from blacks, but the
framework may be useful for examining relations among similarly situated racial minority groups.
Blumer’s (1955, 1958) Group Position Model argues that feelings of competition and hostility emerge on
the part of whites (ingroup) as whites begin to feel that blacks (outgroup) are encroaching upon their
status and position. Central to this model are the subjective feelings where whites feel they stand vis-à-vis
blacks, with negative feelings and beliefs toward blacks being central to whites’ reactions.
Oliver and Mendelberg (2000) suggest that white racial animosity increases as the percentage of
blacks in a given environment increases. They also suggest that white animosity toward blacks is
heightened by conditions of economic stress or status anxiety. Giles and Evans (1986) found that the
greater the competition between blacks and whites, the stronger the sense of ingroup solidarity and
McClain et al., Black and White Americans
7
hostility toward the outgroup. Giles and Buckner (1993), in exploring what factors contributed to whites
voting for David Duke for governor in 1990, found that white voter mobilization for Duke was positively
associated with the level of black concentration among registered voters.
Bobo and Hutchings (1996), using data gathered in Los Angeles, examined the group position
model in a multiracial setting. They found that the more that members of a racial group feel alienated or
oppressed, the more likely they are to regard other racial groups as competitive threats to their own
group’s social position. They also found that blacks and Latinos were most likely to perceive their
relations with other minority groups in zero-sum terms. Moreover, the greater the social distance that
Asians and Latinos perceive between themselves and blacks, the more likely they are to see blacks as
competitors. Oliver and Wong (2003) also examined attitudes of racial groups in multiracial settings,
finding that, with the exception of Asians, people who live in neighborhoods where their group dominates
tend to harbor greater negative stereotypes toward other racial minority groups. In other words, racial
stereotypes increase as the percentage of one’s own group in the neighborhood increases—the greater the
perceived percentage of ingroup members within the neighborhood, the greater the sense of zero-sum
competition with minority outgroups and the greater the perception of threats from immigration. Blacks
and Latinos, who are the most racially isolated, harbor the most negative views toward other groups, but
this pattern was not as pronounced among blacks and Latinos residing in neighborhoods that are racially
diverse.
Adding to the possibility that Southern blacks will perceive Latino immigrants as threats are the
findings from three studies that examined the interactions of Latino immigrants and Southern blacks
(Mohl 2003; Griffith 2005; McClain et al. 2007). Some of the earliest work on the possible effects of
Latino immigrant labor on native-born labor was conducted by sociologist David Griffith beginning in the
1980s. In more recent work on the agriculture industry, Griffith found that the workforce shifted from
being predominantly white and African American in the early 1980s to being predominantly Mexican by
1988 (Griffith 2005). The same pattern was apparent in the poultry and meatpacking plants—Mexicans
began to fill jobs that were previously held by African Americans. In interviews with plant mangers,
McClain et al., Black and White Americans
8
Griffith found they readily admitted to a preference for Mexican over African American workers. He
found the same patterns and sentiment in the seafood processing plants. Griffith concluded that during
the 1980s, black workers were pushed out of work by immigrant Mexican labor.
Examining newspaper and interview accounts in several Georgia communities, Mohl (2003)
suggests that Latino immigrants in the South now fill jobs formerly held by blacks, as employers appear
to prefer Latino immigrants to Black American workers. Additionally, in many urban centers of the
South, Latino immigrants are moving into predominantly black neighborhoods. Job competition and
unwelcome neighbors have contributed to black resentment toward Latino immigrants, and the
perception, from Mohl’s analysis that blacks are losing out to Latino immigrants. Moreover, while exact
numbers of undocumented immigrants in the South are difficult to determine, Mohl suggests that a
sizeable portion of the new immigrants competing with blacks for jobs are undocumented (Mohl 2003)).2
McClain et al. (2007), using survey data from Durham, NC, found that in general, blacks and
whites in Durham perceive a potential economic threat from continued Latino immigration, but blacks
feel more threatened than do whites. Among blacks, those that held negative stereotypes of Latinos were
significantly more likely than were blacks with fewer stereotypes to feel that continued immigration will
lead to decreased economic opportunity for blacks. Blacks and whites both appear to be concerned about
the rapid growth in the Latino population, but the factors contributing to the concern appeared to be
different for blacks and whites. The perception of economic threat was not the only significant factor in
blacks’ concerns over Latino immigration. Holding negative stereotypes of Latinos was also a prominent
contributor. Blacks with negative stereotypes of Latinos were more likely than were blacks with fewer
stereotypes to be concerned about the rapid growth in the Latino population.
While Griffith (2005) and Mohl (2003) document job replacement, and McClain et al. (2007)
identify the perception of Latino immigrants as taking jobs from southern blacks, the economics literature
2
Work on Dalton, Georgia, by Rubén Hernández-León and Victor Zúñiga (2000, 2001, 2003, and 2005) does not
focus on intergroup relations between the new Latino immigrants and the extant Black American population,
primarily because the Black population has declined in size over the years. Their work focuses primarily on the
integration of Latino immigrants into the largely White town.
McClain et al., Black and White Americans
9
is mixed on the effects of immigration on black earnings and the question of whether Latino immigrants
are taking black jobs nationally. Borjas (1987, 1990), using 1980 data, found that in some instances
immigrants tended to be substitutes for some labor market groups, but they were also complements to
others. Native-born white men appeared to be adversely affected by immigration, whereas native-born
black men gained slightly from increases in immigrant labor supply. On the other hand, Borjas did find
that Mexican immigrants had a significantly negative, albeit small, effect in decreasing the earnings of
both native-born white and black men. In examining the effects of undocumented Mexican immigrants on
the wages of other groups, Bean et al. (1988) found, also using 1980 data, no significant effect. They did
find small negative effects of legal immigration on the wages of white and native-born minorities.
Examining another labor dimension, Stoll et al. (2002) found that a large concentration of
immigrants adversely affects the wages of lower-skilled black men. Pastor and Marcelli (2003), in one of
the most recent studies using 2000 Census data, found that as the proportion of undocumented Mexican
immigrants increased, the wages of low-skilled black men declined about 30 percent. Moreover, while the
wages of low-skilled black men declined, the wages of undocumented Mexican immigrants increased.
Ong and Valenzuela (1996) found that Latino immigration to Los Angeles increased joblessness among
low-skilled black Americans with low levels of education, yet at the same time boosted the earnings of
those with a job. In another study using 1990s data, Borjas (1998) found that the low-skilled black native
population loses out in competition with low-skilled immigrants. Moreover, he found that regardless of
the skill set of immigrants, native black per capita income decreases with increased immigration.
Waldinger (1997), in a study of hotels and restaurants in Los Angeles, found a strong employer
preference for immigrants over African Americans (Ong and Valenzuela, 1996). The situation was
magnified when the immigrants were undocumented, as employers believed that these individuals would
work harder and were easy to exploit because they were concerned about being deported. In another
study, using interview data from employers in Los Angeles collected in the 1990s, Waldinger (1997)
identified a number of factors that worked against native-born blacks and in favor of Latino immigrants in
hiring. First, employers appear to operate within a hierarchy of ethnic preferences, with native whites at
McClain et al., Black and White Americans
10
the top, followed by immigrant whites, immigrant Hispanics, and native blacks at the bottom. Employers
see Latino immigrants as more hardworking and willing to work long hours for less pay than are Black
Americans. In addition, once Latino immigrants are hired, employers rely on their network with other
immigrants to hire more. Using this network hiring approach increases the probability that a work force
will become predominantly immigrant within a short period of time. Waldinger noted that employers saw
blacks as being concerned with mobility and job advancement, while Latino immigrants were only
concerned with the opportunity for employment.
Based on the literature on black and white attitudes toward immigration, the three studies on
competition between blacks and Latinos for jobs, and, despite the lack of consensus in the economics
literature on whether immigrants, in general, and Latino immigrants, in particular, are taking jobs from
blacks, the fact remains that blacks may perceive the loss of jobs and deleterious economic effects from
Latino immigrants. Based on racial threat and competition theory, along with the limited evidence that
Latinos are taking jobs from southern blacks, we pose the following hypotheses:
H1: Southern Black Americans will perceive Latino immigrants as threats to their own economic
well-being, such that
H2: Southern Black Americans will be more concerned about immigration than their white
counterparts.
These are the same hypotheses we addressed in our earlier study (McClain et al, 2007), and with
new data from three Southern locations, we will analyze whether the relationships we found in our earlier
work hold across locations. This work will be a vital contribution to the scholarship on Latino
immigration into the South and possible regional patterns.
Research Settings
We use three Southern cities--Durham, NC; Memphis, TN; and Little Rock, AR.--to examine
questions of the attitudes about immigration and intergroup relations among blacks, whites and Latinos.
These locations represent different Southern environments from a majority black city (Memphis), to one
McClain et al., Black and White Americans
11
where blacks and whites are represented in nearly equal proportions in the population (Durham) to one
where blacks are a minority of the population (Little Rock).
Durham, North Carolina. The City of Durham, like many Southern locations, is undergoing
demographic change. In 1990, Latinos were slightly more than one percent of the population, but by
2000, their percentage reached 8.6 percent. For decades, whites were the majority in Durham (51.6% in
1990), but the increasing Latino population, along with a smaller increase in the Asian population, have
reduced the white proportion where in 2000 blacks and whites constituted almost equal percentages of the
population, 45.5 percent for whites and 43.8 percent for blacks.3 By 2006, both the white and black
populations declined as a proportion of the city’s population, yet were still virtually equal in proportion,
with whites declining to 39.9 percent and blacks declining to 41.3 percent. Latinos as a proportion of the
population rose from 8.6 percent in 2000 to 12.5 percent in 2006.
[Insert Table 1 About here]
Compared to other Southern cities, Durham is a relatively new city (post-bellum) having been
incorporated in 1869. As white areas in Durham developed, a parallel black community, Hayti, was
developing just outside of “Durham proper” (Anderson 1990; Boyd 1925). Land in the Hayti district was
recorded as being sold to blacks around 1877. Boyd (1925:284) estimates that the value of black
property in Durham exceeded $4 million in 1923. Anderson (1990) suggests that the strong black
leadership in Durham and its connections to some of the major white leaders in Durham were important
for maintaining peaceful relations between blacks and whites (See also Greene 1996, Brown 1997, and
Houck 1941).
Despite a history of racial segregation extending back to the 1870s, Durham is a city that has
historically had a very prosperous upper and upper-middle class black community. One of the great
ironies of segregation was that it allowed many black businesses to flourish and prosper, as in the case of
Durham. The largest black-owned insurance company in the United States, North Carolina Mutual, was
3
Both of these groups gained in absolute numbers of people, but lost as a proportion of the population from
1990 to 2000, and in the 2000 to 2006 time interval.
McClain et al., Black and White Americans
12
founded in Durham and is still headquartered there. In addition, Durham supports a number of black
banks, libraries, hospitals, educational institutions, and numerous other businesses. Much of this black
middle class is present and active in everyday Durham community today. For example, the median black
family income in Durham in 2000 was $33,447. Almost three-fourths, 72.3 percent, of the Durham black
population age twenty-five and over have finished high school. Despite these gains, black poverty is
significant in Durham. Almost a quarter, 22.1 percent of the Durham black population lived below the
poverty level in 2000 (U. S. Bureau of Census 2000).
The black elite in Durham have been quite successful in achieving a significant measure of
political power, , primarily through their political organization. Due to blacks’ political success and
access to the ballot, Durham County was not one of forty North Carolina counties covered by Section 5 of
the Voting Rights Act of 1965.
While black elites were the face of civil rights in Durham, the movement would not have thrived
without significant contributions from the black poor and working class (Davidson, 2007). Though the
exigencies of racism made the coalition between poor and wealthy blacks necessary, there were
significant tensions between these communities (Davidson, 2007). Despite this alliance, wealthier blacks
were much more economically secure, primarily due to the strong business sector, than were poor blacks,
many of whom risk being fired for their activism by white employers (Davidson, 2007). Moreover, in
many poor black communities black elites owned and operated the services and housing, and poor blacks
found that racial solidarity did not preclude wealthier blacks from exploiting them.
Durham’s Latino population originates primarily from Mexico and Central America,
economically depressed countries relative to the United States. In 1998, The News and Observer
(Raleigh, NC) identified that many of the Mexican immigrants coming into North Carolina were
primarily from rural towns in the State of Puebla (November 29, 1998; November 30, 1998) but by 2004,
the majority of Mexican immigrants came from nine states in the lower west-central and southern
Mexico—Guerrero, Veracruz, Guanajuato, Michoacan, Hildalgo, Oaxaca, Estado de Mexico, Puebla, and
Distrito Federal. About two fifths of these immigrants came directly to North Carolina, while another
McClain et al., Black and White Americans
13
two-fifths initially entered the country at another point and made their way to North Carolina (Kasarda
and Johnson 2006). The majority of these immigrants are unskilled and poorly educated. Only 52.4
percent of Latinos age twenty-five and over in Durham have finished high school. The low level of
education and skills among Latino immigrants leads them primarily to low-paying, unskilled jobs in
Durham. As such, Latino immigrants are most likely to come into competition for jobs and social
services with low-skilled blacks.4
Memphis, TN. Memphis, TN is a much larger city than both Durham and Little Rock, with a
2006 population of 643,122 people. Memphis is a majority-black city, 63.5 percent, with non-Hispanic
whites making up 30.5 percent and Latinos, constituting 4.7 percent of the city’s population. In 1990,
there were only 4,455 Latinos in Memphis, but by 2006 that number had risen to 30,356 and the numbers
continue to increase. Most of these Latino residents are of Mexican heritage. More specifically,
interviews with local immigrants reveal that many of them are from the west-central Mexican states of
Jalisco, Michoacan, Guanajuato, and San Luis Potosi (Burrell et al. 2001).5
Memphis, Tennessee has always been a city of commerce. Given its juxtaposition to the mighty
Mississippi river, this Southern city has served as a hub for trade, manufacturing, and distribution since
the early 1800s. As a mainstay of Southern industry, the city has also consistently attracted immigrants
since its early days. Irish, German, and Jewish newcomers made Memphis their home from the 1820s
through the beginning of the 1900s. Indeed, by 1860, Memphis’ foreign-born population comprised
nearly 31percent of the city’s population (Biles 1988). This immigrant heritage distinguishes Memphis
from other Southern cities, particularly the other two cities (Durham and Little Rock) in our study. Unlike
its counterparts throughout the region, immigrants have left their mark on the city’s social, economic, and
4
In a series of articles throughout 2002 chronicling the lives of area residents living in poverty, The Herald Sun
(Durham) provided a picture of life for Latinos in Durham. Fully 26 percent of the more than 16,000 Latinos in
Durham live below the federal poverty level, and, in order to make a good living, it is necessary for them to work
more than one job (Assis and Pecquet 2002: A12).
5
This is based on interviews by the Burrell et al. with local immigrants. But anecdotal evidence comports with this
more systematic evidence. For instance, several buses offer direct trips from Memphis to various cities in the
aforementioned Mexican states.
McClain et al., Black and White Americans
14
political structure. Waller (1984), for instance, explains how the Irish immigrants of the 1820s eventually
filled the ranks of police officers in Memphis by mid-century.
Memphis also stands apart from other Southern municipalities in that Memphis’ black residents
did not predate the Civil War; rather, African Americans began settling in the city in large numbers
following this conflict’s wake. As Union soldiers freed black slaves in Memphis’ surrounding environs,
African Americans flocked to the city and settled in neighborhoods traditionally inhabited by Irish,
Italians, and German immigrants (Lewis 1998). Tensions ensued, as the perception of competition over
jobs and housing gripped the mostly Irish denizens of these neighborhoods (Waller 1984; Lewis 1988;
Biles 1988). Thus, in an ironic twist of roles, Memphis’ early foreign-born residents looked down on
native-born blacks as both outsiders and competitors.
In some ways, Memphis is similar to Durham, in that, although Jim Crow dictated the parameters
of black and white public interactions and blacks were often disenfranchised at the state and national
level, blacks enjoyed the right to vote in municipal elections—a pattern which is incongruent with most
other Southern cities at the time. This modicum of political muscle had its limitations, however. Black
votes in Memphis city politics counted only to the extent that they were cast in favor of the Republican
political machine spearheaded by Edward Crump, which dominated local politics from the early 1900s
through the early 1950s (Dowdy 2006).
Political power did not come easily to black Memphians. The Crump machine refused to run
black candidates. This extended exclusion from elective office made it extremely difficult for blacks to
gain a foothold politically (Wright 2000). The Memphis civil rights movement and events such as the
assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr. in 1968, substantially increased tension between blacks and
whites. The first black candidate for mayor ran in 1967, but blacks were not successful in electing a black
mayor until 1991 in a racially divisive and polarizing campaign (Wright 2000:123-172).
While political power was late in coming, blacks in Memphis developed the full range of black
class structures similar to that of Durham. Blacks owned businesses, newspapers, banks and savings and
McClain et al., Black and White Americans
15
loans, an amusement park, and numerous other businesses (Wright 2000: 35). Thus, it resembles Durham
in class structure, but differs in its level of cooperative race relations.
Little Rock, AR. For most Americans of a certain age cohort, Little Rock is seared in their memory
as the site of the integration of Central High School in 1957. It is a city with a tortured civil rights
history, a history that still appears to affect the attitudes of its residents. Little Rock is a city where nonLatino whites are still the dominant portion of the population, 50.1 percent, although their proportion is
not as great as it was in past years. Blacks represent about two-fifths of the population, 41.9 percent,
while Latinos are 4.7 percent. In 2005, 67 percent of Arkansas’ immigrant population came from Mexico
as well as other Latin and Central American countries (Capps et al. 2007). The majority of Latino
immigrants come from Mexico with the largest portion coming from the state of Guanajuato, and smaller
numbers coming from Estado de Mexico, Zacatecas, Michoacan, San Luis Potosi and Distrito Federal
(Mora López 2009). In addition, many Latinos in the state are also coming from initial immigration
destinations in the United States, including California, New Mexico and Arizona (The Economist 1998).
Latino immigrants began to inhabit Arkansas beginning in the 1980s, although there have been
transient communities of Latinos in the state due to seasonal agricultural work since the 1890s
(Leidermann 2007; Capps et al. 2007). As the poultry industry in the northwestern and southeastern
regions of Arkansas grew, demand for unskilled, cheap labor increased. These jobs are largely filled by
Latino immigrants.
Arkansas did not initially institute universal segregation, which partially contributed to the upward
economic and social mobility of some blacks (specifically in cities like Little Rock). As the status of
whites declined, however, in the face of this black mobility (particularly beginning at the end of the 19th
century), whites increasingly called for solidification of white power status and racial segregation (Graves
1989:436). Little Rock has a history of both relative integration (from the 1870s to 1890s/1900s) and
fierce segregation (particularly from the turn of the 20th century on). Public schools were widely
segregated almost immediately after the end of the Civil War, though there had been some peaceful
integration before 1957, as seen with the state university, some medical and law schools, as well as some
McClain et al., Black and White Americans
16
small colleges. Public transportation became segregated under Jim Crow laws, though the bus system
was integrated before 1957. Some of the race relations problems in Little Rock came out of the relative
independence of the city’s black community. This independence allowed for some black economic
mobility, which was not acceptable to many whites (especially lower class whites) (Graves 1989).
Black independence also created increased tensions between blacks and white. These tensions
came to a head with the forced integration of Central High School in September 1957. The struggle
between Governor Orval Faubus and President Eisenhower over the use of federal troops created more
tensions as the state National Guard was used to keep the nine black students out on one day and ordered
to support and protect their integration the next. Although Federal troops were eventually called in to
enforce the integration of the school and their failure to protect black students from attacks by some white
students served to encourage more anti-integration behavior (Kirk 2002).
Data
The analyses in this paper are based on two surveys--The 2003 Durham Survey of Intergroup
Relations (DSIR) (n=500) and the 2007 Three City Survey of Intergroup Relations (TCSIR). The cities
surveyed in the 2007 data are a resurvey of Durham, NC with the addition of Little Rock, AR and
Memphis, TN. Both surveys were conducted specifically for our project by the Center for Survey
Research of the University of Virginia using a Computer-Aided Telephone Interviewing (CATI) system,
employing random digit dialing (RDD) and dialing of directory-assisted Hispanic surname sample.6 The
2003 survey was conducted from May 4 through June 22, 2003 and interviews were conducted in both
English and Spanish (32 percent of the interviews were conducted in Spanish, which translates into 95.8
percent of the Latino sample opting to be interviewed in Spanish).7 A race/ethnicity quota was
6
We recognize the problems associated with drawing a sample from a listing of Hispanic surnames, for
example, missing Hispanics with non-Hispanic last names, and those married to non-Hispanics. We also
acknowledge that some Latino immigrants might not have phones in their homes. Given the receny of the Hispanic
population in Durham and the high proportion of immigrants, however, we choose the sampling frame that would
give us the highest probabilities of getting to a Latino respondent.
7
We had the questionnaire translated by a Spanish-language organization in Chapel Hill, NC. In order to
check the translation and to ensure that it tracked the English-language version, the survey organization drew a small
McClain et al., Black and White Americans
17
implemented to achieve a minimum of 150 whites, 150 blacks, and 150 Latinos; the remaining 50
respondents were not under this quota restriction and represent a number of racial/ethnic backgrounds.
Interviews were completed with 500 residents of the City of Durham for an overall response rate of 21.6
percent.8 The sample of 500 consists of 160 whites (32 percent), 151 blacks (30 percent), 167 Latinos (34
percent), 6 Asians (1.2 percent), 12 who designated their race as Other (2.4%), and 1 respondent (0.2
percent) who did not indicate a racial category.9
The 2007 surveys in Durham, Memphis and Little Rock were conducted from April 6, 2007 to
October 27, 2007 and interviews were conducted in both English and Spanish (more than 90 percent of
the Latino sample in all three cities opted to be interviewed in Spanish). Again, a race/ethnicity quota
was implemented to achieve a minimum of 300 whites, 300 blacks, and 300 Latinos in each city, with the
ability to pick up other respondents not under this quota in the random digit dialing process. Interviews
were completed with 977 residents of Durham, 825 residents of Little Rock and 978 residents of
Memphis.10
sample of Latinos in Durham for the sole purpose of checking the translation. As a result, changes were made to the
translation. The revised Spanish-language version was then pretested on another small sample of Latinos in
Durham.
8
A total of 4208 phone numbers were attempted in the course of the survey and a total of 14,014 call
attempts were made. The American Association for Public Opinion Research (AAPOR) rate was calculated using
the full call history of each number that was recorded automatically by the CATI software. The response rate was
calculated according to AAPOR suggested formula RR3, with e1= .50 and e2 = .78. We estimated e1 and e2 based
on an analysis of residency rates and the occurrence of out-of-area households in our sample. Partial interviews are
not counted in the numerator of the RR3 formula.
9
Due to the use of the Hispanic surname sample and racial/ethnic quotas, sampling error is more difficult to
calculate. The sample may be viewed as part of two separate populations. Within the RDD sample, the source of
276 completions, the probability of selection is known and the margin of error is + 5.9 percent. Within the surname
oversample, providing 244 completed interviews, all households listed under a resident with a Hispanic surname
were attempted; however, Hispanics were included in RDD calling and non-Hispanics were included in the
oversample. Non-Hispanics with Hispanic surnames had a greater chance of selection than non-Hispanics in the
RDD sample who do not have Hispanic surnames. If we assume this to be a more or less random occurrence, then
the margin of error for each of the three-racial/ethnic groups is roughly 8 percent.
10
Interviewing in Little Rock proved particularly problematic as it was difficult to get blacks and Latinos to
participate in the survey. We realized, after the fact, that our survey was in the field in Little Rock during the 50th
anniversary of the integration of Central High School. It is possible that the publicity surrounding the anniversary
made individuals reluctant to talk about race and intergroup relations. CSR was successful in getting the full quota
of blacks, but was not successful in filling the quota on Latinos. Thus, the size of the Latino sample is Little Rock is
less than in the other two cities.
McClain et al., Black and White Americans
18
In Durham, the sample of 977 consists of 317 whites (32.4 percent), 318 blacks (32.5 percent),
316 Latinos (32.3 percent), 23 Asians (2.4 percent), 21 who designated their race as Other (2.1 percent).
In Little Rock, the sample of 825 consists of 348 whites (42.2 percent), 315 blacks (38.2 percent), 127
Latinos (16.6 percent), 13 Asians (1.6 percent), 13 who designated their race as Other (1.6 percent), and 2
respondents (0.2 percent) who did not indicate a racial category. In Memphis, the sample of 978 consists
of 327 whites (33.4 percent), 338 blacks (34.6), 312 Latinos (31.9 percent), 4 Asians (.4 percent), and 13
who designated their race as Other (1.3 percent).11
Results
To examine the extent to which African Americans in three southern cities perceive the
substantial growth in the Latino population as a threat to their economic well-being, we replicated the
models from “Black Americans and Latino Immigrants in a Southern City” (McClain et al. 2007) using
data obtained from the Durham/Little Rock/Memphis Interethnic Conflict Survey (TCSIR). This also
allowed us to see if the results from McClain et al. (2007) still hold for a larger southern context. First,
combining data from all three cities, we predicted an ordered logit model with respondents’ perceptions of
the effect continued immigration will have on the economic opportunities of their racial group as the
dependent variable. Our predictors were income, contact with Latinos12, the extent to which respondents
held stereotypic views of Latinos13, linked fate (i.e., the belief than what happens to other members of
11
A total of 28,209 phone numbers were attempted in the course of the survey in the three cities and a total
of 150,444 call attempts were made. The American Association for Public Opinion Research (AAPOR) rate was
calculated using the full call history of each number that was recorded automatically by the CATI software. The
response rate was calculated according to AAPOR suggested formula RR4, with e1= .189 and e2 = .945. We
estimated e1 and e2 based on an analysis of residency rates and the occurrence of out-of-area households in our
sample. Partial interviews are not counted in the numerator of the RR4 formula.
12
Contact with Latinos is measured using an index of two variables: one measuring social contact with Latinos, and
the other measuring respondents’ perceptions of the number of Latinos in their neighborhood. The social contact
question was worded: “In your social life, including your friends and people you know from Church and other social
activities, do you have a lot of contact with Latinos, some contact with Latinos, little contact with Latinos, or no
contact with Latinos at all?” The neighborhood question was worded: “What about where you live? In your
neighborhood how many of the residents are Latino: all of the residents, most of the residents, some of the
residents, a few of the residents, or none of the residents?” We collapsed the categories “all of the residents” and
“most of the residents” into one category to create a four-point scale, which was necessary to index it with the fourpoint social contact question.
13
Stereotypic views of Latinos are measured using an index composed of three stereotype questions. The questions
McClain et al., Black and White Americans
19
your group will have something to do with your own life)14, years of schooling, age, gender15, and a
dummy variable for race16. Interestingly, the results were very similar to those from McCain et al. (2007),
which used the Durham Survey of Intergroup Relations (DSIR). (See Table 2.)
[Insert Table 2 about Here]
As with McCain et al. (2007), contact with Latinos, having stereotypic views of Latinos, years of
schooling, and race all had statistically significant relationships to respondents’ perceptions of the effect
increased immigration will have on their racial groups’ economic opportunities, and the relationships
were also all in the same direction that they were in McClain et al. (2008). In the TCSIR data, however,
and unlike what was found in McCain et al. (2007), linked fate also had a statistically significant
relationship to perceptions about the economic effects of increased immigration. Respondents who had
more contact with Latinos and those with more education were more likely to feel that continued
immigration would result in their racial group having more economic opportunities. Those who held
more stereotypic views of Latinos and respondents with linked fate were more likely to feel that increased
immigration would lead to fewer economic opportunities for members of their racial group. African
Americans were also more likely (over 50% more likely) to feel that increased immigration would lead to
fewer economic opportunities for members of their racial group.
We found similar trends when we examined each city separately. The difference between Black
and White respondents’ perceptions of the effect continued immigration would have on the economic
opportunities of their racial group was most pronounced among those in Little Rock. Blacks in Little
Rock were around 90% more likely than whites to feel that continued immigration would lead to fewer
economic opportunities for members of their racial group. Blacks in Durham were around 60% more
are: Q1) For Latinos, do you think work hard describes: almost all Latinos, most Latinos, some Latinos, few Latinos,
almost no Latinos; Q2) For Latinos, do think Ait is easy to get along with them@ describes: almost all Latinos, most
Latinos, some Latinos, few Latinos, almost no Latinos; Q3) For Latinos, do think Ayou can trust them@ describes:
almost all Latinos, most Latinos, some Latinos, few Latinos, almost no Latinos.
14
The question measuring linked fate was worded: Do you think what happens generally to (respondent’s racial
group) in this country will have something to do with what happens in your life?
15
Gender was coded such that female was set equal to 1 and male was set equal to 0.
16
Black was set equal to 1 and all other racial groups were set equal to 0.
McClain et al., Black and White Americans
20
likely and blacks in Memphis were roughly 25% more likely than whites to feel that continued
immigration will lead to fewer economic opportunities for members of their racial group.
[Insert Table 3 about Here]
Given the fact that African Americans were more likely to feel that increased immigration would
contribute to a decrease in blacks’ economic opportunities, we decided run a separate ordered logit model
on African Americans alone to examine the factors that predict these attitudes. Our dependent variable
was perceptions of the effect continued immigration would have on blacks’ economic opportunities, and
our predictor variables were income, contact with Latinos, stereotypic views of Latinos, linked fate, years
of schooling, age, and gender. The results are presented in Table 4. Among our predictors, income, the
extent to which Black respondents held stereotypic views of Latinos, and linked fate were statistically
significant, though linked fate appeared to have the strongest relationship to the dependent variable.
African American respondents with higher incomes and those with more stereotypic views of Latinos
were slightly more likely to feel that continued immigration would lead to fewer economic opportunities
for African Americans. African Americans with linked fate were around 70% more likely than those
without linked fate to feel that continued immigration would contribute to blacks having fewer economic
opportunities.
[Insert Table 4 about Here]
A more nuanced picture emerged when we examined blacks’ perceptions of whether increased
immigration would contribute to a decrease in blacks’ economic opportunities for each city separately.
(See Table 5.) For blacks in Durham, our model did not predict incredibly well. Black Durham residents
with more stereotypic views of Latinos and younger blacks in Durham both appear only slightly more
likely to feel that continued immigration will lead to blacks having fewer economic opportunities. The
model predicted a little better for Little Rock and Memphis, though linked fate was the only statistically
significant predictor for Little Rock, and only linked fate and stereotypic views of Latinos were
significant for Memphis. Blacks in Little Rock with linked fate are more than twice as likely as those
without linked fate to feel that continued immigration would lead to blacks having fewer economic
McClain et al., Black and White Americans
21
opportunities. Blacks in Memphis with more stereotypic views were only slightly more likely than those
with few stereotypic views to feel that continued immigration would lead to blacks having fewer
economic opportunities, and blacks in Memphis with linked fate were twice as likely as those without
linked fate to feel that continued immigration would lead to blacks having fewer economic opportunities.
[Insert Table 5 about Here]
To examine perceived economic threat from Latinos among African Americans further, we
examined the extent to which African American respondents felt blacks were losing jobs to Latinos.
Close to 42% of the African American respondents in the TCSIR agreed with the statement that Hispanics
are taking jobs from blacks, whereas around 49% disagreed, and around 9% neither agreed nor disagreed.
To understand the factors that predict whether African American respondents feel that Latinos are taking
jobs from blacks, we ran a logit model using the same predictors as the previous model. The results are
presented in Table 6. Income, stereotypic views of Latinos, and linked fate all had statistically significant
relationships to feeling that Latinos are taking jobs from blacks. Those with higher incomes appear less
likely to feel that Latinos are taking jobs from blacks, while those with more stereotypic views of Latinos
appear more likely to feel that Latinos are taking jobs from blacks. As with the previous model, linked
fate seems to have the strongest relationship to our dependent variable; black respondents with linked fate
are about 30% more likely to feel that blacks are losing jobs to Latinos.
[Table 6 about Here]
When we ran the logit model predicting whether blacks felt they were losing jobs to Latinos on
each city separately, we found subtle differences among the three cities. (See Table 7.) In Durham, only
stereotypic views of Latinos and educational attainment were statistically significant predictors of
whether Black respondents felt Latinos were taking jobs from blacks. Blacks in Durham with more
stereotypic views of Latinos were only slightly more likely than those with few stereotypic views to feel
that Latinos are taking jobs from blacks, and blacks in Durham with sixteen years or more of education
were slightly less likely than blacks with 12 or fewer years of education to feel that Latinos are taking
jobs from blacks.
McClain et al., Black and White Americans
22
[Insert Table 7 about Here]
In Little Rock, income and linked fate were statistically significant predictors of whether Black
respondents felt Latinos were taking jobs from blacks. Blacks in Little Rock with higher incomes (i.e.,
those make over $65,000 a year) were slightly less likely than those with lower incomes (i.e., making
$35,000 or less) to feel that Latinos are taking jobs from blacks. However, blacks in Little Rock with
linked fate were more than twice as likely as those without linked fate to feel that Latinos are taking jobs
from blacks.
In Memphis, only contact with Latinos had a statistically significant relationship to blacks’
perceptions of whether Latinos were taking jobs from blacks. Blacks in Memphis with a lot of contact
with Latinos were roughly 7% less likely than those with the least contact with Latinos to feel that
Latinos are taking jobs from blacks.
Given that black respondents seemed to perceive a greater economic threat from Latinos, next we
examined whether blacks were more concerned than whites about immigration. Based on univariate
analysis of a question that asked how concerned respondents were about the rapid growth in the Latino
population, around 55% of the black respondents reported being concerned “somewhat” or concerned “a
great deal”. To understand the factors that predict concern over the rapid growth in the Latino population,
we ran an order logit model with income, contact with Latinos, stereotypic views of Latinos, linked fate,
years of schooling, age, gender, and race as predictors. We also included interactions between race and
income, race and linked fate, and race and stereotypic views of Latinos to see if blacks’ concerns over
rapid growth in the Latino population were uniquely affected by income, linked fate, or Latino
stereotypes. The results are presented in Table 8. According to our results, stereotypic views of Latinos,
years of schooling, age, and gender all had statistically significant relationships to concern over rapid
growth in the Latino population. Those with more stereotypic views of Latinos seemed to be more
concerned over rapid growth in the Latino population, as did older respondents. Women and respondents
with higher levels of education seemed to be less concerned. Interestingly, while our dummy variable for
race was not statistically significant, which implies that there is no discernible difference between blacks
McClain et al., Black and White Americans
23
and whites in their level of concern about rapid growth in the Latino population, two of our interaction
terms were statistically significant.
Our interaction between race and income was marginally significant, which could be an
indication that blacks with higher incomes are a bit more concerned about rapid growth in the Latino
population. We might say that the significance of the interaction term seems to suggest that income, if it
has any effect at all (and it is not clear that it does have a real effect given it marginal statistical
significance), has an effect for blacks concern about the growth in the Latino population that is opposite
the effect for whites. Based on the sign of the coefficient for income and the sign and significance of the
coefficient for the race-income interaction, it appears that as whites’ incomes increase, their concern
about the growth in the Latino population decreases. For blacks, on the other hand, as their income
increases, so, too, does concern over the growth in the Latino population.
Also, the interaction between race and linked fate is statistically significant, which could be an
indication that blacks with linked fate are more concerned about Latino population growth. The
significance of the interaction term, despite the insignificance of either race or linked fate by themselves,
might suggest that linked fate is an important predictor of concern about the growth in the Latino
population, but for blacks only. We actually test (and confirm) this later, in Table 9, when we include
linked fate in our model predicting blacks’ concern about rapid growth in the Latino population and find
that linked fate is statistically significant.
[Insert Table 8 about Here]
When we ran the model on each city separately, we identified a few subtle differences among the
cities, one of which was that, contrary to our expectations, blacks in Memphis were about 45% less likely
than whites to be concerned about rapid growth in the Latino population. (See Table 9.) To explore these
results further, we separated the black and white respondents and ran ordered logit models predicting
concern over rapid growth in the Latino population separately for each group and then separately for
blacks and whites for each city.
[Insert Table 9 about Here]
McClain et al., Black and White Americans
24
In the pooled model (i.e., the model that includes all cities), for African American respondents,
income, stereotypic views of Latinos, linked fate, a belief that Latinos are taking jobs from blacks, years
of schooling, and age all have statistically significant relationships to concern over rapid growth in the
Latino population. (See Table 10.) Black respondents with more stereotypic views of Latinos, those with
linked fate, and those who feel that Latinos are taking jobs from blacks were all more likely to be
concerned about the rapid growth in the Latino population. Older African American respondents and
those with higher incomes also appeared to be a bit more concerned over Latino population growth.
Those with more education, however, appeared to be slightly less concerned. The strongest relationships
between the statistically significant predictors and concern over growth in the Latino population among
those observed for Black respondents in the pooled model were with linked fate and the belief that
Latinos are taking jobs from blacks. Blacks with linked fate were about 75% more likely to feel
concerned about rapid growth in the Latino population. Those who feel that Latinos are taking jobs from
blacks were about 10% more likely to be concerned about rapid growth in the Latino population.
[Insert Table 10 about Here]
Running the model predicting blacks’ concern about rapid growth in the Latino population for
each city separately revealed differences across the cities that were not apparent in the pooled model.
(See Table 11.) Interestingly, income was not a statistically significant predictor of blacks’ concern about
Latino population growth for any of the individual cities, though it was statistically significant in the
pooled model. Also, the belief that Latinos are taking jobs from blacks was the only statistically
significant predictor from the pooled model that was significant in the models for each individual city. In
Durham, stereotypic views of Latinos and educational attainment were the only other statistically
significant predictors of Black respondents’ concern about rapid growth in the Latino population. Blacks
in Durham with more stereotypic views were slightly more likely than those with few stereotypic views to
be concerned about rapid growth in the Latino population, and those with sixteen years or more of
education were slightly less likely than those with 12 or fewer years of education (about 4% less likely) to
be concerned about rapid growth in the Latino population. Blacks in Durham who reported feeling that
McClain et al., Black and White Americans
25
Latinos are taking jobs from blacks were about 8% more likely to be concerned about rapid growth in the
Latino population.
[Insert Table 11 about Here]
Among black respondents in Little Rock, those who felt that Latinos are taking jobs from blacks
were about 12% more likely than those who do not feel Latinos are taking jobs from blacks to be
concerned about rapid growth in the Latino population. Older blacks in Little Rock were only slightly
more likely than younger blacks to be concerned about rapid growth in the Latino population. However,
blacks in Little Rock with linked fate were almost twice as likely as those without linked fate to be
concerned about rapid growth in the Latino population. Thus, among blacks in Little Rock, linked fate
appeared to be the strongest predictor of concern about Latino population growth.
Linked fate also appeared to be the strongest predictor of concern about Latino population growth
for blacks in Memphis. Blacks in Memphis with linked fate were nearly 70% more likely than those
without linked fate to be concerned about the rapid growth in the Latino population. Also, as with
Durham and Little Rock, blacks in Memphis who reported feeling that Latinos are taking jobs from
blacks were slightly more likely to be concerned about rapid growth in the Latino population. But, unlike
Durham and Little Rock, contact with Latinos was a statistically significant predictor of concern about
Latino population growth. Blacks in Memphis with more contact with Latinos appeared less likely to be
concerned about rapid growth in the Latino population. Lastly, blacks in Memphis with more stereotypic
views of Latinos were slightly more likely than those with the fewest stereotypic views to be concerned
about rapid growth in the Latino population.
In the pooled model for White respondents, contact with Latinos, stereotypic views of Latinos, a
belief that Latinos are taking jobs from whites, years of schooling, age, and gender all had statistically
significant relationships to concern over rapid growth in the Latino population. (See Table 12.) Whites
with more stereotypic views of Latinos, those who feel that Latinos are taking jobs from whites, and older
whites all seemed to be more concerned about rapid growth in the Latino population. White respondents
who have more contact with Latinos also seemed to be a bit more concerned about Latino population
McClain et al., Black and White Americans
26
growth. White female respondents and those with more education appeared to be less concerned about
rapid growth in the Latino population. The strongest predictors seemed to be a belief that Latinos are
taking jobs from whites and gender. White respondents who feel that Latinos are taking jobs from whites
were about 15% more likely to be concerned about Latino population growth, and women were about
33% less likely to be concerned about rapid growth in the Latino population.
[Insert Table 12 about Here]
When the model predicting White respondents’ concern about Latino population growth was run
for each city separately, again, we identified differences among the cities. (See Table 13.) Interestingly,
gender, which was the strongest predictor in the pooled model, was only statistically significant for Little
Rock. The belief that Latinos were taking jobs from whites, on the other hand, was significant for all
three cities, as was age. In Durham, whites who reported feeling that Latinos are taking jobs from whites
were about 5% more likely to be concerned about rapid growth in the Latino population, and older whites
in Durham appeared to be slightly more likely than younger whites to be concerned about rapid growth in
the Latino population. Among whites in Durham, stereotypic views of Latinos and educational
attainment also had statistically significant relationships to concern about Latino population growth.
Those with more stereotypic views of Latinos were about 7% more likely than whites in Durham with the
least stereotypic views of Latinos to be concerned about rapid growth in the Latino population. Also,
whites in Durham with 16 years or more of schooling were slightly less likely than those with 12 years of
schooling or less to be concerned about rapid growth in the Latino population.
[Insert Table 13 about Here]
For whites in Little Rock, in addition to gender, stereotypic views of Latinos, believing that
Latinos are taking jobs from whites, educational attainment, and age all had statistically significant
relationships to concern about Latino population growth. Whites in Little Rock with more stereotypic
views of Latinos were about 10% more likely than those with the least stereotypic views of Latinos to be
concerned about rapid growth in the Latino population, and those who reported feeling that Latinos are
taking jobs from whites were about 12% more likely to be concerned about rapid growth in the Latino
McClain et al., Black and White Americans
27
population. Whites in Little Rock with 16 years or more of schooling were slightly less likely than those
with 12 years of schooling or less to be concerned about rapid growth in the Latino population, while
older whites in Little Rock appeared a bit more likely than younger whites to be concerned about rapid
growth in the Latino population. Gender was the strongest predictor of concern about Latino population
growth among whites in Little Rock, with men being about 86% more likely than women to be concerned
about rapid growth in the Latino population.
For whites in Memphis, age and the belief that Latinos are taking jobs from whites were the only
statistically significant predictors of concern about rapid growth in the Latino population. Whites in
Memphis who reported feeling that Latinos are taking jobs from whites were about 24% more likely to be
concerned about rapid growth in the Latino population, and older whites in Memphis appeared a bit more
likely than younger whites to be concerned about rapid growth in the Latino population.
Discussion
We began with two hypotheses suggesting that Southern Black Americans would perceive an
economic threat from Latino immigrants and that they would be more concerned about immigration than
their White Southern counterparts. Our results suggest a confirmation of both hypotheses with some
nuanced differences among our three cities. In general, blacks perceived a loss of economic opportunity
from Latino immigration. Individual city results suggest that city context plays a role in how concerned
blacks are about immigration. Blacks in Little Rock, where blacks are a minority of the population, are
the most concerned about a loss economic opportunity from Latino immigration. Blacks in Durham,
where they are equal in population proportion with whites, are concerned, but not to the extent as blacks
in Little Rock. Blacks in Memphis, where blacks are a majority of the population, are the least concerned
among the three cities. Blacks who are well entrenched making up the majority of their cities’
population, feel less of a threat from Latino newcomers. In a city such as Little Rock, where blacks are
less established and hold less economic and political power, they proved to be more concerned with
Latino immigration, as their social position is more easily threatened than that of blacks in Memphis or
McClain et al., Black and White Americans
28
Durham. Despite these contextual differences, in all three cities, blacks are more concerned than whites
about a loss of economic opportunity.
We found a perception among blacks that Latinos are taking their jobs, but the factors that
contribute to that perception differed across the three cities with no similar predictors across the cities.
Blacks in Durham holding negative stereotypes of Latinos were likely to perceive Latinos as taking jobs
from blacks, while blacks in Little Rock with higher incomes were less likely than lower income blacks to
perceive that Latinos are taking jobs from blacks. In Memphis, blacks with more contact with Latinos
were not as likely as those with no contact to believe that Latinos are taking jobs from blacks. What these
disparate results suggest is that no generalized factors appear to contribute to blacks’ perceptions of job
loss to Latinos across all three cities. This might also suggest that city context might play a role in the
perception of attitudes on the question of what amounts to economic competition between blacks and
Latinos. Clearly, we need further testing to tease out the effects of city context on blacks attitudes toward
Latino immigrants, but these results are quite suggestive.
Conclusion
Each of the examined cities has a very different racial history as well as varied contemporary
racial contexts. Consequently, we should expect to find variations in attitudes among black and white
Americans among the three cities. Nevertheless, we have found strong themes and commonalities as well.
In general, the notion of linked fate among African Americans is a key element to black attitudes about
Latino immigration’s effects on economic wellbeing and overall concern about population growth. We
also found that negative stereotypes play a significant role in shaping both black and white attitudes about
Latinos. Perhaps, what is more impressive and interesting is that which we did not find: contact with
Latinos did not have an effect on either feelings concerning the population growth of Latinos or their
effects on the economic wellbeing of black and white Americans. Our findings based on the linked fate
variable are not surprising. If we consider that income is less important than race in shaping black racial
and political attitudes (Dawson 1994), it would follow that income would not be as strong a predictor as
linked fate in predicting black attitudes toward Latino immigration. The continuing significance of race
McClain et al., Black and White Americans
29
and racial solidarity among Southern blacks despite a changing racial demographic is certainly an
important finding.
Perhaps these findings suggest that the South represents what we might call a “new race politics,”
(Junn and Haynie, 2008) whereby we have to reconsider the ways in which standing theories apply to an
America with ever-changing demographics due to immigration. Here, we find, for example, that the
theories of group consciousness and linked fate (Dawson 1994; Rogers and Chong 2005) are
corroborated, while contact theory (Allport 1954) has yet to be realized in a racialized social system
(Bonilla-Silva 1997). As such, it seems that we may raise more questions than we can answer Social
scientists have traditionally attempted to make broad and sweeping claims, but here we see that context
matters—be it over time or, as shown here, due to location—and needs to be considered more carefully
and more seriously.
McClain et al., Black and White Americans
30
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McClain et al., Black and White Americans
Table 1. Durham, Memphis and Little Rock Population CharacteristTCSIR, 2006
Durham
City population
Raw Total
201,204
Percentage of Durham
100%
non-Hispanic Whites
80,189
39.9%
African Americans
83,170
41.3%
Hispanics/Latinos
25,209
12.5%
17,615
733
112
276
5,000
862
611
8.8%
0.4%
0.06%
0.1%
2.5%
0.4%
0.3%
Asians
8,916
4.4%
Male
97,785
48.6%
Female
103,419
51.4%
Memphis
City population
643,122
100%
non-Hispanic Whites
196,016
30.5%
African Americans
408,480
63.5%
Hispanics/Latinos
30,356
4.7%
22,542
792
929
120
4,556
271
1,136
3.5%
1.2%
0.1%
0.02%
0.7%
0.04%
0.2%
9,499
1.5%
Male
307,737
47.9
Female
335,385
52.1%
Mexican
Puerto Rican
Cuban
Dominican
Central American
South American
Other
Mexican
Puerto Rican
Cuban
Dominican
Central American
South American
Other
Asians
Little Rock
City Population
187,535
100%
Non-Hispanic Whites
93,947
50.1 %
Non-Hispanic African-Americans
78,516
41.9%
Hispanics/Latinos
8,748
4.7%
Non-Hispanic Asians
4,442
2.4%
Male
90,618
48.3%
1
36
McClain et al., Black and White Americans
Female
96,917
37
51.7%
Notes: Data obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau, 2006 American Community Survey. Data may not total 100%
due to rounding. Hispanics/Latinos can be of any race.
1
No figures for individual ethnic groups within the Latino population were provided by the U. S. Census in the 2006
population update
McClain et al., Black and White Americans
38
Table 2: Ordered Logit Results for Effects Continued Immigration Will Have On the Economic
Opportunities of R’s Racial Group (Black and White respondents)
DSIR Data(2003)
(Published in Du Bois Review)
Coefficients
Standard Errors
TCSIR Data
(All cities combined, 2007)
Coefficients Standard Errors
Income
Contact with Latinos
Latino Stereotypes
(Higher values indicate more
negative feelings toward
Latinos.)
Linked Fate
Years of Schooling
Age
Gender
Black
0.0428
0.1119*
-0.0957*
0.0450
0.0676
0.0547
0.0065
0.0346
-0.1485***
0.0236
0.0400
0.0295
-0.3338
0.0746***
-0.0103
-0.0861
-0.5525**
0.2201
0.0288
0.0078
0.2106
0.2389
-0.4445***
0.0490***
-0.0061*
0.0615
-0.4581***
0.1252
0.0186
0.0037
0.1095
0.1189
N
Chi-Squared
Pseudo R2
327
31.59***
0.0333
*** p<.01 (two-tailed test)
** p<.05 (two-tailed test)
Variables
1218
88.65***
0.0280
* p<.10 (two-tailed test)
Notes: The dependent variable is coded from 1 to 5, where 1 indicates feeling that R’s racial
group will have “a lot less” economic opportunity and 5 indicates feeling that R’s racial group
will “probably have a lot more” economic opportunity if immigration continues at its present
rate.
McClain et al., Black and White Americans
39
Table 3: Ordered Logit Results for Effects Continued Immigration Will Have On the Economic
Opportunities of R’s Racial Group by City (Black and White respondents), 2007
Coefficients
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)
Variables
Durham
Income
Contact with Latinos
Latino Stereotypes
(Higher values indicate more
negative feelings toward Latinos.)
Linked Fate
Years of Schooling
Age
Gender
Black
N
Chi-Squared
Pseudo R2
Little Rock
Memphis
-0.0120
(0.0411)
0.0992
(0.0683)
-0.1300***
(0.0483)
0.0121
(0.0407)
0.1193
(0.0745)
-0.1351**
(0.0549)
0.0290
(0.0426)
-0.0715
(0.0711)
-0.1887***
(0.0525)
-0.2922
(0.2109)
0.0871***
(0.0311)
0.0029
(0.0064)
-0.1360
(0.1897)
-0.5843***
(0.1959)
-0.7105***
(0.2285)
0.0214
(0.0320)
-0.0052
(0.0062)
0.3749*
(0.1921)
-0.6552***
(0.2152)
-0.3706*
(0.2181)
0.0296
(0.0347)
-0.0143**
(0.0065)
-0.0430
(0.1924)
-0.2040
(0.2188)
409
40.51***
0.0375
424
34.90***
0.0328
385
31.53***
0.0312
McClain et al., Black and White Americans
40
Table 4. Ordered Logit Results for Effect Continued Immigration Will Have on Blacks’
Economic Opportunities (Black respondents only)
DSIR Data(2003)
(Published in Du Bois Review)
Coefficients
Standard Errors
TCSIR Data
(All cities combined, 2007)
Coefficients Standard Errors
Income
Contact with Latinos
Latino Stereotypes
(Higher values indicate more
negative feelings toward
Latinos.)
Linked Fate
Years of Schooling
Age
Gender
-0.0089
0.0262
-0.2692***
0.0885
0.1122
0.1009
-0.0627*
0.0612
-0.1398***
0.0350
0.0540
0.0404
-0.5124
0.0048
-0.0142
-0.2187
0.4561
0.0954
0.0147
0.4160
-0.5814***
0.0256
-0.0000
0.0935
0.1631
0.0275
0.0052
0.1591
N
Chi-Squared
Pseudo R2
94
11.41
0.0430
*** p<.01 (two-tailed test)
** p<.05 (two-tailed test)
Variables
603
31.84***
0.0192
* p<.10 (two-tailed test)
Notes: The dependent variable is coded from 1 to 5, where 1 indicates feeling that R’s racial
group will have “a lot less” economic opportunity and 5 indicates feeling that R’s racial group
will “probably have a lot more” economic opportunity if immigration continues at its present
rate.
McClain et al., Black and White Americans
Table 5 Ordered Logit Results for Effect Continued Immigration Will Have on Blacks’
Economic Opportunities by City (Black respondents only), 2007
Coefficients
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)
Variables
Durham
Income
Contact with Latinos
Latino Stereotypes
(Higher values indicate more
negative feelings toward Latinos.)
Linked Fate
Years of Schooling
Age
Gender
N
Chi-Squared
Pseudo R2
Little Rock
Memphis
-0.0465
(0.0585)
0.0522
(0.0910)
-0.1090*
(0.0653)
-0.0633
(0.0596)
0.1650
(0.1041)
-0.1003
(0.0772)
-0.0639
(0.0689)
0.0375
(0.0940)
-0.2199***
(0.0728)
-0.3053
(0.2811)
0.0578
(0.0446)
0.0164*
(0.0092)
-0.0495
(0.2745)
-0.8084***
(0.2803)
-0.0076
(0.0457)
-0.0066
(0.0084)
0.3440
(0.2960)
-0.6855**
(0.3066)
0.0271
(0.0573)
-0.0085
(0.0097)
-0.0145
(0.2842)
205
9.50
0.0169
202
17.35**
0.0318
196
17.71**
0.0323
41
McClain et al., Black and White Americans
42
Table 6: Logit Results for Whether Latinos are taking Jobs from Blacks (Black respondents only)
DSIR Data(2003)
(Published in Du Bois Review)
Coefficients
Standard Errors
TCSIR Data
(All cities combined, 2007)
Coefficients Standard Errors
Income
Contact with Latinos
Latino Stereotypes
(Higher values indicate more
negative feelings toward
Latinos.)
Linked Fate
Years of Schooling
Age
Gender
-0.2361*
-0.2006
0.2186*
0.1238
0.1500
0.1246
-0.1045**
-0.0762
0.1835***
0.0423
0.0628
0.0474
0.7055
-0.1300
0.0384*
0.2779
0.5894
0.1342
0.0198
0.5420
0.4088**
-0.0409
0.0043
-0.1064
0.1966
0.0337
0.0060
0.1888
N
Chi-Squared
Pseudo R2
85
19.11***
0.1630
*** p<.01 (two-tailed test)
** p<.05 (two-tailed test)
Variables
559
41.06***
0.0537
* p<.10 (two-tailed test)
Note: The dependent variable is coded such that 0 indicates disagreement with the statement “Hispanics are taking
jobs from blacks”, and 1 indicates agreement with the statement.
McClain et al., Black and White Americans
Table 7. Logit Results for Whether Latinos are taking Jobs from Blacks by City (Black
respondents only), 2007
Coefficients
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)
Variables
Durham
Income
Contact with Latinos
Latino Stereotypes
(Higher values indicate more
negative feelings toward Latinos.)
Linked Fate
Years of Schooling
Age
Gender
N
Chi-Squared
Pseudo R2
Little Rock
Memphis
-0.0601
(0.0730)
-0.0758
(0.1072)
0.2797***
(0.0845)
-0.1683**
(0.0760)
0.0601
(0.1195)
0.0883
(0.0855)
-0.0999
(0.0812)
-0.2234*
(0.1157)
0.1361
(0.0830)
0.3533
(0.3472)
-0.1036*
(0.0599)
0.0089
(0.0105)
-0.1039
(0.3231)
0.9075***
(0.3454)
0.0035
(0.0565)
0.0111
(0.0103)
0.2087
(0.3560)
0.0640
(0.3602)
-0.0503
(0.0669)
-0.0062
(0.0116)
-0.4260
(0.3306)
194
26.09***
0.0981
182
16.57**
0.0664
183
14.11**
0.0566
43
McClain et al., Black and White Americans
44
Table 8: Ordered Logit Results for How Concerned R is About Rapid Growth in Latino
Population (Black and White respondents)
DSIR Data (2003)
(Published in Du Bois Review)
Coefficients
Standard Errors
TCSIR Data
(All cities combined, 2007)
Coefficients Standard Errors
Income
Contact with Latinos
Latino Stereotypes
(Higher values indicate more
negative feelings toward
Latinos.)
Linked Fate
Black
Years of Schooling
Age
Gender
Black*Income
Black*Linked Fate
Black*Latino Stereotypes
-0.0842
0.0200
-0.0251
0.0514
0.0674
0.0692
-0.0151
-0.0264
0.1969***
0.0304
0.0395
0.0417
0.6315**
-1.5758
-0.0667**
0.0136*
0.3019
0.0765
-0.6228
0.2776**
0.2737
1.0742
0.0277
0.0076
0.2086
0.0920
0.4983
0.1135
0.2145
-0.8765
-0.0849***
0.0186***
-0.1817*
0.0833*
0.5448**
-0.0042
0.1843
0.5428
0.0187
0.0035
0.1076
0.0432
0.2465
0.0575
N
338
1236
Chi-Squared
145.62***
Pseudo R2
39.43***
0.0436
*** p<.01 (two-tailed test)
** p<.05 (two-tailed test)
Variables
.0429
* p<.10 (two-tailed test)
Note: The dependent variable is coded from 0 to 4, where 0 indicates “not at all” concerned
about rapid growth in the Latino population, and 4 indicates being concerned “a great deal”.
McClain et al., Black and White Americans
Table 9: Ordered Logit Results for How Concerned R is About Rapid Growth in Latino
Population by City (Black and White respondents), 2007
Coefficients
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)
Variables
Durham
Income
Contact with Latinos
Latino Stereotypes
(Higher values indicate more
negative feelings toward Latinos.)
Linked Fate
Black
Years of Schooling
Age
Gender
Black*Income
Black*Linked Fate
Black*Latino Stereotypes
N
Chi-Squared
Pseudo R2
Little Rock
Memphis
0.0686
(0.0566)
-0.1170*
(0.0697)
0.2582***
(0.0722)
-0.0035
(0.0531)
0.0246
(0.0724)
0.2142***
(0.0778)
-0.0952*
(0.0519)
-0.1050
(0.0704)
0.1114
(0.0714)
0.0201
(0.3172)
-0.8494
(0.9897)
-0.1501***
(0.0330)
0.0202***
(0.0061)
0.1170
(0.1924)
-0.0075
(0.0777)
0.5093
(0.4291)
0.0685
(0.1007)
0.3736
(0.3511)
0.1777
(0.9871)
-0.0819**
(0.0327)
0.0232***
(0.0062)
-0.4394**
(0.1892)
0.0464
(0.0753)
0.5711
(0.4458)
-0.1145
(0.1059
0.3299
(0.3102)
-1.7009*
(0.9125)
-0.0460
(0.0336)
0.0118*
(0.0063)
-0.1841
(0.1888)
0.1526*
(0.0781)
0.5612
(0.4336)
0.0541
(0.0988)
412
95.70***
0.0861
429
48.39***
0.0414
395
37.42***
0.0343
45
McClain et al., Black and White Americans
46
Table 10. Ordered Logit Results for How Concerned R is About Rapid Growth in Latino
Population (Blacks only)
Variables
DSIR Data (2003)
(Published in Du Bois Review)
Coefficients Standard Errors
TCSIR Data
(All cities combined, 2007)
Coefficients Standard Errors
Income17
Contact with Latinos
Latino Stereotypes
(Higher values indicate more
negative feelings toward Latinos.)
Linked Fate
Latinos Taking Jobs from Blacks
Years of Schooling
Age
Gender
-0.0531
0.2873***
0.1200
0.1053
0.0759**
-0.0734
0.1395***
0.0360
0.0554
0.0420
-0.0535
1.0807**
-0.0072
0.0067
0.0543
0.4762
0.4234
0.0947
0.0160
0.4132
0.6519***
0.4329***
-0.0479*
0.0147***
0.0971
0.1684
0.0636
0.0290
0.0051
0.1618
N
Chi-Squared
Pseudo R2
92
21.96***
0.0912
*** p<.01 (two-tailed test)
** p<.05 (two-tailed test)
606
111.72***
0.0674
* p<.10 (two-tailed test)
Note: The dependent variable is coded from 0 to 4, where 0 indicates “not at all” concerned
about rapid growth in the Latino population, and 4 indicates being concerned “a great deal”.
17 Income was not included in this model in McClain et al. (2007). We include it in the updated model using the
TCSIR data because we found a statistically significant relationship between our interaction between race and
income and concern over rapid growth in the Latino population (see Table 5).
McClain et al., Black and White Americans
Table 15. Ordered Logit Results for How Concerned R is About Rapid Growth in Latino
Population by City (Blacks only), 2007
Coefficients
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)
Variables
Durham
Income
Contact with Latinos
Latino Stereotypes
(Higher values indicate more
negative feelings toward Latinos.)
Linked Fate
Latinos Taking Jobs from Blacks
Years of Schooling
Age
Gender
N
Chi-Squared
Pseudo R2
Little Rock
Memphis
0.0790
(0.0631)
-0.0441
(0.0954)
0.2599***
(0.0763)
0.333
(0.0629)
-0.0761
(0.1073)
0.0634
(0.0744)
0.0745
(0.0677)
-0.2231**
(0.0978)
0.1240*
(0.0746)
0.4321
(0.2973)
0.4250***
(0.1145)
-0.1153**
(0.0522)
0.0136
(0.0089)
0.3793
(0.2771)
0.7482***
(0.2858)
0.4771***
(0.1122)
0.0018
(0.0470)
0.0227**
(0.0089)
-0.1911
(0.3040)
0.8422***
(0.3161)
0.3620***
(0.1096)
-0.0488
(0.0577)
0.0047
(0.0096)
0.0817
(0.2901)
206
54.31***
0.0990
204
39.50***
0.0710
196
37.04***
0.0689
47
McClain et al., Black and White Americans
48
Table 12: Ordered Logit Results for How Concerned R is About Rapid Growth in Latino
Population (Whites only)
DSIR Data (2003)
(Published in Du Bois Review)
Coefficients
Standard Errors
TCSIR Data
(All cities combined, 2007)
Coefficients Standard Errors
Income
Contact with Latinos
Latino Stereotypes
(Higher values indicate more
negative feelings toward Latinos.)
Linked Fate
Latinos Taking Jobs from Whites
Years of Schooling
Age
Gender
-0.1660**
-0.0685
0.2839**
0.0790
0.1494
0.1218
0.0162
0.1022*
0.1647***
0.0326
0.0593
0.0438
0.6274
1.2923***
-0.1119*
0.0148
0.8738**
0.4513
0.5031
0.0671
0.0124
0.4117
0.1825
0.5589***
-0.0731***
0.0239***
-0.4721***
0.1945
0.0794
0.0269
0.0051
0.1549
N
Chi-Squared
96
39.29***
0.1526
Variables
Pseudo R2
607
149.73***
0.0896
McClain et al., Black and White Americans
Table 13 Ordered Logit Results for How Concerned R is About Rapid Growth in Latino
Population by City (Whites only), 2007.
Coefficients
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)
Variables
Durham
Income
Contact with Latinos
Latino Stereotypes
(Higher values indicate more
negative feelings toward Latinos.)
Linked Fate
Latinos Taking Jobs from Whites
Years of Schooling
Age
Gender
N
Chi-Squared
Pseudo R2
Little Rock
Memphis
0.0755
(0.0597)
-0.1139
(0.1069)
0.2079***
(0.0774)
0.0486
(0.0571)
0.0931
(0.1044)
0.1915**
(0.0824)
-0.0579
(0.0568)
0.1318
(0.1105)
0.0893
(0.0760)
-0.1112
(0.3320)
0.3942***
(0.1477)
-0.1514***
(0.0485)
0.0253***
(0.0089)
-0.2637
(0.2866)
0.3536
(0.3714)
0.5297***
(0.1324)
-0.1108**
(0.0505)
0.0209**
(0.0092)
-0.7654***
(0.2611)
0.4710
(0.3358)
0.7842***
(0.1473)
-0.0049
(0.0452)
0.0259***
(0.0093)
-0.4000
(0.2775)
198
64.84***
0.1205
219
57.58***
0.0967
190
53.79***
0.1022
49