Shell Nigeria
dodging responsibilities
A briefing note on Shell Nigeria's recent affairs regarding unpaid compensation for oil
spills, involvement with corruption and the selling of onshore oilfields.
This document has been produced with the financial assistance of the European
Union. The contents of this document are the sole responsibility of
Milieudefensie and can under no circumstances be regarded as reflecting the
position of the European Union.
1
Shell Nigeria dodging responsibilities
Nigeria is important for Shell. Some 10% of its oil and gas is produced there. Nigeria is also
a real headache for Shell. Since the beginning of the 90’s Shell has been permanently
involved in human rights and environmental abuses in Nigeria.
This briefing note sums up Shell Nigeria’s latest large cases with regard to human rights
and the environment:
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the hundreds of USD million to be paid for the clean-up of Ogoniland following the
UNEP report,
its involvement in the USD 1 billion corruption case on oil block OPL 245,
the pending USD 3.6 billion claim for the Bonga spill in 2011,
the USD 84 million settlement of the Bodo oil spills in 2008,
its divestments onshore causing local discontent.
The briefing note also provides an overview of the continuing oil spills and gas flares.
Shell’s presence in Nigeria
Nigeria is the second most important country to Shell, after the USA. In 2014 Nigeria
represented 10% of Shell’s oil and gas production worldwide. Shell is by far the biggest
private oil company in Nigeria.1
The Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Ltd (SPDC, Shell interest 30%) is the
operator of a joint venture with the governmental Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation
(NNPC, 55%), Total and Eni (10%, 5%). At present, SPDC holds at least 22 Oil Mining Leases
(OMLs) in the Niger Delta. Moreover, it controls the major Trans Niger pipelines, the Bonny
Export Terminal, and the Afam gas power plant. Most of the onshore OMLs expire in 2019,
while most shallow-water offshore leases were recently renewed for a period up to 2034. 2
Shell Nigeria Exploration and Production Company (SNEPCo, 100% Shell-owned) hold
interests in a number of offshore licences. The main one is the Shell-operated deep water
field Bonga (Shell interest 55%). Bonga produces oil at a maximum capacity of 250,000
barrels per day. Deep water fields produce some 40% of Nigeria’s oil, which production
stands at 2 million barrels a day.3
Shell also holds a 25.6% interest in the company Nigeria Liquefied Natural Gas Ltd (NLNG)
that exports LNG around the world.4 SPDC mainly supplies gas to NLNG through its
onshore Gbaran-Ubie and Soku projects.5
The onshore activities by SPDC are still the core of Shell’s oil and gas production in Nigeria,
even though SPDC has been divesting from some of its onshore interests since 2010. The
country chair of Shell companies in Nigeria and managing director of SPDC, Osagie
Okunbor, recently said the following about Shell’s aims for the future: “Our strategy is to
invest a lot more in gas, for domestic consumption and export. We want to grow our deep
water and constrain our onshore oil production.” 6
Figure 1: Oil Mining Leases of SPDC in the Niger Delta7
2
The Bodo spills in 2008
In 2008 SPDC caused two massive oil spills from its pipelines near the city of Bodo,
Ogoniland. During the first spill, at least 260,000 litres (1,640 barrels) of oil leaked into the
surrounding swamp and creek. The second pipeline spill was even larger than the first one.
The first spill was caused by a “weld defect”. The second spill was a result of natural
corrosion. The spills destroyed thousands of hectares of mangrove swamp.
In April 2011 the Bodo community took their claims for damages to a UK court. Soon after
this, SPDC agreed to formally accept liability for the spills and conceded to the UK’s
jurisdiction. The UK-based law firm Leigh Day, representing the Bodo community, noted
Shell’s swift response once the case was brought to the UK: “This is one of the most
devastating oil spills the world has ever seen and yet it had gone almost unnoticed until we
received instructions to bring about a claim against Shell in this country.” 8
Court documents, disclosed in November 2014, showed that Shell knew for years that its oil
pipelines were in a very poor condition and likely to leak. In addition, Shell had
underestimated the spill volumes.9
On 7 January 2015 SPDC agreed to a compensation package of GBP 35 million (USD 54
million) for individual compensation of 15,600 Nigerian fishermen and their community.
Another GBP 20 million (USD 30 million) payment would be made for the general benefit of
the Bodo community.10
On 2 May 2015 SPDC and the leaders of the Bodo community had also agreed on the
clean-up of oil spills in their living environment, after mediating by the Dutch Government.
3
The Dutch minister for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation Liliane Ploumen said:
“It is extremely positive that the Netherlands could play this role in Bodo. We hope that this
model can be used in other parts of the Niger Delta where oil spills have led to pollution, to
spark a dialogue that contributes to solutions acceptable to all the parties involved. This is
the way to remedy the wrongs done to the people there”. 11
Photo: Shell stopping the first 2008 oil spill in Bodo, Ogoniland, November 2008
© CEHRD
The UNEP Ogoniland report and its follow-up
failure
As requested by the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) the United Nations Environment
Programme (UNEP) has conducted a scientific assessment to determine the environmental
and public health impacts of oil contamination in Ogoniland, and options for remediation.
The assessment began late 2009 and the final report was released in August 2011. 12 Oil
production by SPDC in Ogoniland started in the beginning of the 60’s.
According to the final UNEP report most members of the current Ogoniland community
have lived with chronic oil pollution throughout their lives. 13 The UNEP report found serious
and systemic failures in Shell’s clean-up of oil spills. Where Shell records showed complete
remediation, the pollution at 10 out of 15 investigated sites exceeded Shell (and
governmental) remediation closure values. The contamination at eight of these sites had
migrated to the groundwater.14 With regard to the control and maintenance of oil
infrastructure UNEP observed that: “While no oil production has taken place in Ogoniland
since 1993, the facilities themselves have never been decommissioned. Some oil pipelines
4
carrying oil produced in other parts of Nigeria still pass through Ogoniland but these are not
being maintained adequately.”15
The oil pollution had seriously affected people and nature. For example, hydrocarbon
contamination was found in water taken from 28 wells at 10 communities adjacent to
contaminated sites. At seven wells the samples showed pollution that was 1,000 times
higher than the Nigerian drinking water standard. Local communities were aware of the
pollution but some people continued to use the water for drinking, bathing, washing and
cooking. They had no alternative.16
UNEP proposed that an Environmental Restoration Fund for Ogoniland would be set up,
with an initial capital injection of USD 1 billion contributed by the oil industry and the
government, to cover the first five years of the clean-up job. 17 In a report published August
2014, the NGOs Friends of Earth Europe, Amnesty International, Environmental Rights
Action, Platform and CEHRD stipulated that no progress had been made three years after
the UNEP report.18
SPDC has reported action to implement the recommendations directed to it by the UNEP
report, such as the re-remediation of the 15 sites mentioned above, reviewing its clean-up
practices to align with international best practice, and engaging more than 500 community
youths in unarmed surveillance activities along sections of the Trans Niger pipelines in
Ogoniland. However, in 2013 SPDC also identified 125 additional Ogoniland sites in need of
remediation19 and the core UNEP recommendations still have to be followed up. These
include a massive clean-up of Ogoniland and an obligation to bring the oil infrastructure to
adequate standards.
In August 2015 the new Nigerian president Muhammadu Buhari announced to establish the
Ogoni Environmental Restoration Fund, in which “stakeholders” initially would have to
deposit USD 10 million.20 This is 1% of the initial capital injection of USD 1 billion UNEP had
recommended, so as of today there is still very little progress. As a president candidate
Buhari has pledged that, when he would become president, he would commit himself and
his administration “to the protection and regeneration of the environment in the Niger Delta
and to ensure that oil companies comply with global best practices on environmental
protection.” He also stated that “in many years of oil exploration, the Niger Delta has
become perhaps, the world’s worst eco-system.”21
However, Amnesty International stated: “President Buhari’s initiative will fail, and the Ogoni
people will continue to suffer, as long as Shell fails to make significant changes to the way it
approaches oil spill clean-up.”22 In July to September 2015 Amnesty International and
CEHRD conducted field research in Ogoniland in the Niger Delta. The field work focused on
four sites at which major oil spills had occurred. These sites were previously examined by
the UNEP. In all sites the field researchers still found visible oil pollution, and this pollution
could not have been from other spills. The researchers concluded that, based on all of the
available evidence, Shell’s public claims to have cleaned up and remediated specific sites,
and the company’s broader claims that it has addressed the pollution documented by UNEP,
are false.23
5
The Bonga oil spill in 2011
In December 2011 Shell’s subsidiary SNEPCo caused the largest oil spill in Nigeria since
1998.24 Satellite imagery showed an oil slick covering 923 square kilometres of ocean. 25 The
leak occurred at SNEPCo’s Bonga field, 120 kilometres off the Nigerian coast. SNEPCo
estimated that some 35,000 barrels (equivalent to 5.6 million litres) of oil were spilled. It
claims that, as a result of rapid response, almost no oil reached shore. 26
In July 2012 Nigeria's National Oil Spill Detection and Response Agency (NOSDRA)
recommended that SNEPCo should pay a fine of USD 5 billion because of the spill. Shell
believed there was “no basis in law for such a fine”. 27 In November 2014 the Environment
Committee of Nigeria’s House of Representatives put the amount to be paid by Shell at
USD 3.6 billion. The committee decided to adopt a damage assessment report submitted by
NOSDRA, and noted that SNEPCo had “tactically rebuffed” several meetings on the issue.
The NOSDRA report specified losses of income and other damages totalling USD 1.8 billion.
In addition, a punitive damage of the same amount was added. 28
Fishermen, of the coastline Bayelsa and Delta states, want to be compensated for their loss
of income. In April 2015 the Niger Delta coordinator of the Artisan Fishermen Association
of Nigeria (ARFAN) said: “When the spill occurred the regulator directed us to suspend
operations to avoid catching contaminated fishes. We complied and withdrew from fishing
activities till cleaning-up was completed. Many of our members have been thrown out of
business following that incident, which wiped out generations of fish from the waters.” 29
The paramount ruler of the Olobia community in Bayelsa State reported in April 2015 that,
after eliminating frivolous claims, fishermen of 350 communities were identified as victims
of the Bonga spill.30 In recent months the fishermen have continued to bring forward their
case.31 Late November they have requested President Muhammadu Buhari, the National
Assembly and the British and Netherlands governments to prevail on Shell. 32
Shell has refuted claims for compensation related to shoreline impact. 33 NOSDRA has stated
both that “adequate containment measures were put in place to combat the Bonga oil spill”,
and that “the people could not fish after a long period after the spill.” 34
Figure 2: Bonga spill satellite imagery of 21 December 201135
6
Analysis of recent oil spills by SPDC
Since 2011 SPDC discloses information on oil spills from its facilities. 36 Analysis of these spill
data shows that the total volume of oil spilled from SPDC facilities amounted to 13.5 million
litres in the period 2011 - 2014.37 There were 804 spills recorded by SPDC in this period,
which stands for at least one spill every two days.
SPDC’s records of spills have been disputed by Amnesty International and Friends of the
Earth, especially with regard to the leadership of the dependent company/government of
spill investigations, and underestimates of spilled amounts. 38
Figure 3: Oil spills as recorded by SPDC over the period 2011-2014
4,5
210
4
205
3,5
3
200
2,5
Volume spilled (million litres)
2
195
Amount of spills recorded
1,5
1
190
0,5
185
20
11
20
12
20
13
20
14
0
In its Sustainability Report over 2014 Shell highlighted Ogoniland as a key problem with
regard to its spill prevention and response. According to Shell, pipelines traversing
Ogoniland are being subjected to some of the highest rates of oil theft and sabotage in
recent years.39 According to Shell’s oil spill data this problem is decreasing. In the period
January 2015 - 30 September 2015 there were 26 oil spills with a total of 1,700 barrels
leaking from pipelines traversing Ogoniland. In 2013 and 2014 the spillage amounted to
11,600 and 7,400 barrels respectively.40
By focusing on Ogoniland Shell shifts the attention away from the fact that spill occurrences
from its facilities are spread throughout its entire operations in the Niger Delta. Pipelines
traversing Ogoniland made up 32% of the volume of oil spilled and 18% of the spills
recorded in the period 2011-2014.41
Ogoniland covers a few per cent of SPDC’s operation area in the Niger Delta. A scientific
assessment like the UNEP report has not been conducted for by far most parts of the Niger
Delta, where SPDC has operations. Outside Ogoniland, little is known yet about SPDC’s
legacy sites, and issues such as drinking water pollution.
7
A recent example shows how oil spills continue to cause long-term oil pollution. On 3 June
2015 a spill was reported to SPDC from the 20'' Kolo Creek-Rumuekpe Pipeline at Odau
(Bayelsa state). According to the Joint Investigation Report, published soon after the Joint
Investigation Visit on 24 and 25 June 2015, there were 306 barrels of oil spilled into the
environment. SPDC claims that recovery of the spilled volume commenced on 4 August
2015 and was completed on 1 September 2015. Clean-up of residual impacted area is
planned for completion in January 2016.42 However, the major spill has been spreading to
Oruma in Bayelsa State, the community with a 2005 spill pending in Dutch court. It
massively impacted swamps/ponds and rivulets there. According to Friends of the Earth
Nigeria (ERA) the leadership of Oruma has continued to cry out, and ERA has led the
Bayelsa State Ministry of Environment Officials and journalists to the site and made related
calls on Shell to effect clean-up. So far, five months after the spill occurred, Shell has not
commenced any clean-up in Oruma.43
Justice after 32 years
The Nigerian legal system is notoriously slow with regard to cases on oil spill damages
brought forward by communities. For example: on 5 June 2015 the Nigerian Supreme
Court ordered SPDC to pay the sum of NGN 30 million (equivalent to USD 152,000) to
four communities in Delta State. The court found the company culpable for an oil spill
that adversely affected the communities about 32 years ago. Leaders of the communities
had dragged the oil company before a High Court in 1983. In a judgment delivered in
1997 the High Court adjudged the matter in favour of the communities. SPDC took the
matter before the Court of Appeal in Benin City. The appellate court affirmed the
decision of the trial court in 2000. SPDC approached the Supreme Court, which dismissed
the appeal as grossly lacking in merit.44
Corruption case: oil block OPL 245
In December 2011 the Nigerian government awarded the Nigerian deep offshore oil block
OPL 245 to SNEPCO and Nigeria Agip Exploration (part of the Italian Eni S.p.A.). Agip would
operate the block, containing the giant Zabazaba and Etan oil fields. 45
Court documents from a March 2012 New York case reveal that Shell and Eni paid a total
sum of USD 1.1 billion to the Nigerian Government. At the same time, precisely the same
amount was agreed to be paid by the Nigerian Government to the company Malabu Oil and
Gas (Malabu). Additionally, a signature bonus of USD 210 million was paid by Eni and Shell
to the Nigerian Government.46 The money paid to Malabu was funnelled into a series of
bank accounts, and channelled to Nigerian officials and intermediaries who helped secure
the sale.47
Malabu was secretly owned by Dan Etete, a former Nigerian oil minister who is also a
convicted money launderer. Etete had awarded the oil block to his own company, while
being Minister of Petroleum Resources during the regime of the corrupt dictator General
Abacha.48
In June 2015 the Nigerian Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) re-opened
the case, after a new post-election administration was installed. Etete was questioned twice,
and a close associate of Mr. Etete was interrogated at the end of November 2015. 49 Italian
corruption prosecutors are presently investigating the role of Eni, which denies all
8
wrongdoing.50 The Italian prosecutor believes that the former Eni CEO Paolo Scaroni and
the present CEO Claudio Descalzi “have organized and directed the illegal activity.” 51 In
2014 USD 190 million of the funds channelled to Malabu was frozen in the UK and
Switzerland at the request of Italian authorities.52 Late November there was a hearing in a
UK court, on an appeal by Mr. Etete on USD 85 million of funds frozen in the UK. 53
Shell has consistently used the same answer in response to media enquiries: “Shell
companies have acted at all times in accordance with both Nigerian law and the terms of the
OPL 245 resolution agreement with Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN). We are open
and transparent about all payments made by Shell companies to the FGN and how much
they were.”54 The real question is of course to what extent Shell knew or easily could have
known that this deal was surrounded by bribes and corruption.
Testimony was heard during UK High Court proceedings that managers from Shell
negotiated directly with Etete over “iced champagne”. 55 The Attorney General of Nigeria has
confirmed in July 2012 that Shell and Eni “agreed to pay Malabu through the federal
government acting as an obligor”, that Shell were aware of the structure of the transaction
and the role of the FGN was solely as “obligor”. 56 A former fixer for Malabu has stated that
the deal was structured to be a “safe-sex transaction”, with the government acting as a
“condom” between the buyers and seller. 57
In 2014 and 2015, during Shell’s Annual General Meeting (AGM), Global Witness addressed
Shell’s board and its shareholders, stating that Shell shareholders deserve to know that they
are at risk from the billion dollar Nigerian oil scandal, and that the deal is being investigated
in several countries and could be cancelled altogether. 58 Shell-CEO Ben van Beurden replied
by stating the following during the 2015 AGM: “We have always been very clear about this,
the transaction does not entail any risk”.59 In the meantime, Nigeria and its population of
over 180 million people were deprived of USD 1.1 billion, equivalent to 80% of Nigeria’s
federal health budget.60
Gas flares
The crude oil under Niger Delta’s land is often found mixed with natural gas. In Nigeria
much of this associated gas is flared in the open air. Rushing for oil cash, Shell and the
Nigerian government were only interested in oil pipelines in the 1960s and 1970s. No
infrastructure was built to utilize the valuable natural gas.
SPDC vowed in 2007 “to shut down production from any fields where there is no prospect
of a solution for gathering the associated gas by 2009.” 61 This did not happen. In 2014,
greenhouse gas emissions due to gas flaring in the Niger Delta amounted to 11% of Shell’s
upstream emissions worldwide.62 Due to the flares Shell’s oil from onshore Nigeria comes
with a high climate impact, compared to the production of conventional oil. 63
Shell’s Sustainability reports over 2013 and 2014 show no progress on ending gas flares in
Nigeria, and no priority felt to this regard.64 Before 2006 and in the period 2010-2012 gas
gathering equipment was installed by SPDC. The flaring has gone down with almost 60%
per barrel of oil produced.65 Shell is not transparent as to how it will eliminate the remaining
flares, still covering more than 40% of its oil production.
Ten years ago Friends of the Earth Nigeria characterized gas flaring in Nigeria as “a human
rights, environmental and economic monstrosity”. In November 2005, a federal high court in
9
Benin ruled that gas flaring is a “gross violation” of the Nigerian constitution. Much of the
gas is flared within the close vicinity of communities. These communities never experience
silence and darkness. Their corrugated roofs corrode more quickly, the walls of their houses
crack due to ground vibrations, and the flares increase lung and heart related diseases. 66
The recent sale of oilfields by Shell Nigeria
Late 2009 it was revealed that Shell looked for buyers of its onshore oilfields in Nigeria. 67
Consequently, the company sold eleven of its Oil Mining Leases (OMLs) in the Niger Delta
in the period 2010-2015, while the completion of sale #12 is pending. Shell has cashed in at
least USD 5 billion from the divestments, which included a core pipeline and an airport.
Shell wants to sell more Oil Mining Leases, but it is unclear which ones. In August 2014 a
Shell spokesman stated: “We have signed sales and purchase agreements for some of the oil
mining leases, but not all that we are seeking to divest.” 68 Shell had been following “a
strategy of selective divestments of its onshore portfolio, concentrating the operating
footprint into a smaller, more contiguous area.” 69
It is not clear what agreements Shell has made with the buyers of its Oil Mining leases, and
whether the buyers have also accepted liability for oil spill legacies. Shell’s recent sale of
OML 29 has caught the anger of communities in the Nembe Local Government Areas of
Bayelsa State. The sale had been conducted without prior consent and or consultation of
the communities. In May 2015 youth shut down two flow stations. In June 2015 the elders
and traditional rulers sent a protest letter to President Muhammadu Buhari. The
communities brought forward “the devastated and degraded environment that has been
unwittingly left behind to our detriment” and the “memoranda of understanding that
ensured the provision of amenities to the community and contracts to local contractors.”
They demand that Shell and the new owner will consult them to tie all loose ends of the
sale. Moreover, in light of the Nigerian Content development policy of the central
government, they want to participate as stakeholders in the indigenous companies. 70 The
Nembe community has presently filed a suit against the federal government and SPDC,
among other. The matter first came up at the Federal High Court in Yenagoa on 18
November 2015.71
10
Table 1: Divestments by SPDC since 2010
Oil Mining Lease
Sale
completed
OML 29 and Nembe
Creek Trunk Line72
March 2015 Aiteo Eastern E&P
OML 1873
March 2015
New owner
Eroton Exploration &
Production
Shoreline Energy
March 2015
International
Newcross Exploration
Nov 2014
and Production
Shoreline Natural
Nov 2012
Resources
Pending
Crestar Integrated
court case
Natural Resources
Warri airport74
OML 2475
OML 3076
OML 2577
OML 3478
Sept 2012
OML 4079
Sept 2012
OML 2680
Dec 2011
OML 4281
82
OML 4, 38 and 41
ND Western
Cash
received by
Shell (USD
million)
Production (barrels of oil
equivalent per day)
1,700
43,000
737
14,000
Not
disclosed
Not applicable
600
13,000
567
35,000 (oil and condensate)
333
Not disclosed
400
15,000 (oil and condensate);
300 million scf of gas daily
Elcrest Exploration and
102
Production Nigeria
FHN26 Limited, an
98
affiliate of Afren plc
was shut down
6,000
Dec 2011
Neconde Energy
390
15,000
July 2010
Seplat Petroleum
227
was shut down
5,154
11
1Shell, Financial and Operational Information 2010–2014, April 2015, page 69, http://bit.ly/1Jm2ZM4
2Shell, Financial and Operational Information 2010–2014, April 2015, page 21, http://bit.ly/1Jm2ZM4
3Shell, Shell commences production from Bonga Phase 3 project in Nigeria”, 5 October 2015, http://go.shell.com/1LRFQmy Shell in
Nigeria, Unlocking Nigeria’s potential in deep water, April 2015, http://bit.ly/1Reonmr
Oil industry conversions, http://bit.ly/1NfFsLM
4Shell, Sustainability report 2014, page 37, http://bit.ly/1eJmK3d
5Shell, Financial and Operational Information 2010–2014, April 2015, page 21, http://bit.ly/1Jm2ZM4
6New Telegraph, Shell deepens Nigeria’s gas investment in new forecast, 6 October 2015, http://bit.ly/1L5Isr7
7Figure adapted from figure by Shell and additional Shell information. Source: Shell, SPDC completes sale of the seventh
Nigerian Oil Mining Lease, 5 September 2012, http://bit.ly/1HbCUwW
8BBC, Ogoniland oil spills: Shell admits Nigeria liability, 3 August 2011, http://bbc.in/1FWIDIs
9Amnesty International, Court documents expose Shell’s false claims on Nigeria oil spills, 13 November 2014,
http://bit.ly/1hIJReZ
10Amnesty International, The True Tragedy: Delays and failures in tackling oil spills in the Niger Delta, November 2011,
http://bit.ly/1KlB7rv
Law firm Leigh Day, The Bodo community has been devastated by two massive oil spills, http://bit.ly/1eQf4MxShell Global,
Shell’s Nigerian subsidiary agrees £55 million settlement with the Bodo community, 7 January 2015, http://bit.ly/1EXwpIm
BBC, Shell agrees $84m deal over Niger Delta oil spill, 7 January 2015, http://bbc.in/1yyRN9w
11Government of the Netherlands, Dutch mediation in Niger Delta proves successful, 2 May 2015, http://bit.ly/1BKxJOw
12United Nations Environment Programme, UNEP Ogoniland Oil Assessment Reveals Extent of Environmental Contamination and
Threats to Human Health, 4 Augustus 2011, http://bit.ly/1SX1ir9
13UNEP, Environmental Assessment of Ogoniland, August 2011, page 10, http://bit.ly/1SX1ir9
14UNEP, Environmental Assessment of Ogoniland, August 2011, http://bit.ly/1SX1ir9
15UNEP, Environmental Assessment of Ogoniland, August 2011, http://bit.ly/1SX1ir9
16UNEP, Environmental Assessment of Ogoniland, August 2011, http://bit.ly/1SX1ir9
17UNEP, Environmental Assessment of Ogoniland, August 2011, http://bit.ly/1SX1ir9
18Friends of Earth Europe, Amnesty International, Environmental Rights Action, Platform and the Centre for Environment, Human
Rights and Development (CEHRD), No progress: an evaluation of the implementation of UNEP's environmental assessment of
Ogoniland, three years on, 4 August 2014, http://bit.ly/1TYsK8l
19Shell, Frequently asked questions on the UNEP environmental assessment of Ogoniland, http://bit.ly/1JsfOoa
20The Punch, Ogoniland clean-up: Buhari plans implementation of UNEP report, 5 August 2015, http://bit.ly/1WN3diL This
Day, Buhari Approves Measures to Speed up Cleaning of Ogoniland, 6 Aug 2015, http://bit.ly/1JSwKyl
21Sahara Reporters, Plan For Change: Buhari Announces ‘Covenant With Nigerians’ , 26 March 2015, http://bit.ly/1FV1sw6
22Amnesty International, Nigeria: Shell must match government’s commitment to clean oil spills, 6 August 2015,
http://bit.ly/1MSpZ5DAmnesty International, Bund für Umwelt und Naturschutz Deutschland (BUND), Centre for Environment,
Human Rights, and Development (CEHRD), Environmental Rights Action / Friends of the Earth Nigeria, Friends of the Earth
Europe, Milieudefensie, National Coalition on Gas Flaring and Oil Spills in the Niger Delta (NACGOND), Platform, Nigeria: Joint
open letter to President Buhari on UNEP report, 4 August 2015, http://bit.ly/1MDod9D
23Amnesty International and CEHRD, report “Shell’s false claims about oil spill response in the Niger Delta”, 3 November 2015,
http://bit.ly/1YXjaUJ
24Reuters, UPDATE 1-Nigeria coast braces for biggest oil spill in 13 yrs, 22 December 2011, http://reut.rs/1LtQLR9
25Skytruth, Shelling out the Oil in Waters off Nigeria: Radar Satellite Image, 21 December 2011, http://bit.ly/1dkQu55
26Shell, Sustainability report 2011, page 20, http://bit.ly/1QS3NMB. One barrel is 159 litre.
27BBC, Shell urged to pay Nigeria $5bn over Bonga oil spill, 17 July 2012, http://bbc.in/1LJWdx6
Shell Nigeria, SNEPCo Response on the Bonga Oil Spill, http://bit.ly/1M757Vh
28Huffington Post, Nigeria Parliament: Shell Should Pay $3.6 Billion For 2011 Bonga Oil Spill, 27 November 2014,
http://huff.to/1MocecE
The Punch, Bonga: Reps panel wants Shell to pay $3.6bn damages, 26 November 2014, http://bit.ly/1HkgpI2
29News24 Nigeria, Fishermen appeal to Buhari to pay Bonga oil spill compensation, 20 April 2015, http://bit.ly/1H3KQQZ
30The Punch, 168,000 fishermen affected by 2011 Bonga spill – Monarch, 7 April 2015, http://bit.ly/1LLBGbi
31Nigerian Newslive, Bonga oil spill: ARFAN laments delay in compensation payment, 19 September 2015,
http://bit.ly/1OXVZHlThe Nigerian Guardian, Bonga oil spill: Shell faces more community grievances, as N3.6 billion fine
intrigues linger, 30 September 2015, http://bit.ly/1Gw3H3F
The Nation, Ilaje coastal communities seek compensation from Shell, 24 September 2015, http://bit.ly/1jNVy5H
This Day, Oil Spill: Ilaje Coastal Communities Demand Compensation from Shell, 22 October 2015, http://bit.ly/1mccpQW
32Vanguard, Nigeria: 2011 Bonga Spill - Prevail On Snepco to Pay U.S.$3.3 Billion Compensation, Victims Beg FG, Britain, 24
November 2015, http://bit.ly/1OjLWHz
33BBC, Shell urged to pay Nigeria $5bn over Bonga oil spill, 17 July 2012, http://bbc.in/1LJWdx6
Shell Nigeria, SNEPCo Response on the Bonga Oil Spill, http://bit.ly/1M757Vh
34BBC, Shell urged to pay Nigeria $5bn over Bonga oil spill, 17 July 2012, http://bbc.in/1LJWdx6
35Skytruth, Shelling out the Oil in Waters off Nigeria: Radar Satellite Image, 21 December 2011, http://bit.ly/1dkQu55
36SPDC, Spill Incident Data, http://bit.ly/1IyeeLz
37SPDC reports in barrels, one barrel is 159 litre.
38Amnesty International, Bad Information. Oil spill investigations in the Niger Delta, November 2013, http://bit.ly/1eSRdfq
Amnesty International and Friends of the Earth, OECD complaint, Misleading disclosure by Shell on oil spills in Nigeria, 25 January
2011, http://bit.ly/1QXTZRf
Amnesty International and Friends of the Earth, OECD complaint, Human Rights and Environmental violations by Shell Nigeria, 30
December 2011, http://bit.ly/1edA9zK
39Shell, Sustainability report 2014, pages 36 and 37, http://bit.ly/1eJmK3d
40SPDC, Spill Incident Data, http://bit.ly/1IyeeLz
4128" and 24" Bomu - Bonny pipelines, 28" Nkpoku - Bomu pipeline, 24" Nkpoku - Bomu pipeline, 36" pipeline from Nkpoku
onwards. SPDC, Spill Incident Data, http://bit.ly/1IyeeLz
42Shell Nigeria, Joint Investigation Report, incident no: 1413753, 25 June 2015, http://bit.ly/1XYIEnESPDC, Spills data for June
2015, http://bit.ly/1XYK2qd (accessed on 10 December 2015)
43Premium Times, Bayelsa community accuses Shell of abandoning oil spill, 19 July 2015, http://bit.ly/1lwUV1D
E-mail Environmental Rights Action, 4 December 2015.
44Vanguard, Oil spillage: S-Court orders Shell to pay N30m to four communities in Delta, 6 June 2015, http://bit.ly/1LBLRST
45Reuters, UPDATE 2-Shell, Eni buy huge Nigeria offshore oil block, 7 December 2011, http://reut.rs/1SUtSbI
Eni, Congo field trip, 6 October 2011, page 37, http://bit.ly/1LOldmY
46Global Witness, Shell’s obscure payments kill its case for weak US and EU transparency laws, 20 May 2012, http://bit.ly/1dqh5gX
Supreme Court, New York County, Matter of International Legal Consulting Ltd. v Malabu Oil & Gas Ltd., 15 March 2012,
http://bit.ly/1dqia8o
47Reuters, Large part of Eni's Nigerian oil deal cash went on bribes -Italian prosecutors, 1 October 2014, http://reut.rs/1HoQRYt
48Global Witness, Shell’s Nigeria investments at risk from corruption scandal, investors warned, 19 May 2014, http://bit.ly/1EVL1I8
Global Witness, The Scandal of Nigerian Oil Block OPL 245, 25 November 2013, http://bit.ly/1IgVSnH
49Premium Times, EFCC grants ex-Minister Etete bail over $1.1 bn Malabu fraud, 25 June 2015, http://bit.ly/1LvMfBu
Premium Times, EFCC reopens investigation, quizzes Etete over dubious $1.1 billion Malabu oil deal, 20 June 2015,
http://bit.ly/1GTW2y6
Premium Times, The N155billion Malabu Scam: EFCC quizzes Jonathan’s associate who helped distribute ‘slush fund’, 30 November
2015, http://bit.ly/1Y1ltDV
50Eni, 31/05/2015, Eni: investigation into OPL245 case, audit conducted by independent US law firm did not find evidence of illegal
conduct, 31 May 2015, http://bit.ly/1Hof417
51La Repubblica, Sms, e-mail, cene in hotel di lusso, 13 September 2014, http://bit.ly/1LCKsvs
La Repubblica, "Eni, tangenti per i politici italiani". Scaroni: contro di me solo falsità, 8 October 2014, http://bit.ly/1IDgYr2
La Repubblica, Il grande accusatore Eni. Il rais nigeriano mi disse: "Descalzi è ai miei ordini", 7 October 2014, http://bit.ly/1GU7Hgr
52The Corner House, Secrecy order lifted on legal challenge to corrupt Nigerian oil deal (OPL 245), 7 November 2014,
http://bit.ly/1smnk6S
Global Witness, Re: Common and Dotun Oloko, $190m frozen in UK and Switzerland in OPL 245 bribery case as Eni CEO is named as
suspect, 11 September 2014, http://bit.ly/1GJkaBj
53Leadership, Malabu: Dan Etete To Appeal Freezing Of $85m In UK Court, 20 November 2015, http://bit.ly/1QeGKuA
54Bloomberg, Nigerian Lawmakers Want Shell, Eni Oil Award Revoked, 19 July 2013, http://bloom.bg/1eSOuT6
Financial Times, Eni chief executive under investigation over $1bn Nigerian oil deal, 11 September 2014, http://on.ft.com/1LwtxK3
OneWorld, Witwassen met hulp van Shell, 30 January 2015, http://bit.ly/1LHR88K
55Email from John Copleston of Shell to Ednan Ageav read out in court. UK High Court, Queen’s Bench Division, Commercial Court,
Case 2011 FOLIO-792, Energy Venture Partners Versus Malabu Oil and Gas, Transcript of Hearing 28/11/2012. As referenced in:
Global Witness, report “Shell and Eni’s Misadventures in Nigeria”, November 2015, http://bit.ly/1TzLkSb
56The Corner House, witness statement of Nicholas Hildyard, Co-Director of Corner House Research, to the High Court of Justice,
Queen’s bench division, administrative court, 10 December 2013, http://bit.ly/1F9Pszo
57The Economist, Safe sex in Nigeria, 15 July 2013, http://econ.st/VNqMNS
58Global Witness, Shell’s Nigeria investments at risk from corruption scandal, investors warned, 19 May 2014, http://bit.ly/1EVL1I8
Global Witness, Shell shareholders at risk from billion dollar Nigerian oil scandal, says Global Witness, 19 May 2015,
http://bit.ly/1NlU2V6
59OneWorld, Nieuw onderzoek naar omstreden oliedeal van Shell in Nigeria, 23 June 2015, http://bit.ly/1P0EVjU
(quote translated from Dutch)
60Premium Times, Download: Nigeria 2015 Budget Proposal the Jonathan govt does not want Nigerians to see, 18 February 2015,
http://bit.ly/1OSPVxL As referenced in: Global Witness, report “Shell and Eni’s Misadventures in Nigeria”, November 2015,
http://bit.ly/1TzLkSb
61Shell Nigeria, Shell Nigeria Annual Report 2006, http://bit.ly/1HjGHs8
62Shell, Greenhouse gas emissions, http://bit.ly/11nSS5X
Shell, Sustainability report 2014, page 37, http://bit.ly/1eJmK3d
63Adam R. Brandt, Department of Energy Resources Engineering, Stanford University, USA, Upstream greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions from Canadian oil sands as a feedstock for European refineries, 18 January 2011, page 37, http://bit.ly/1EL8dQw (107.3
grams of CO2 per mega joule, versus 87.1 grams).
64Shell, Sustainability report 2014, page 37, http://bit.ly/1eJmK3d
Shell, Sustainability report 2013, page 23, http://bit.ly/RS27pA
65Shell, Sustainability report 2014, page 37, http://bit.ly/1eJmK3d
Shell, Sustainability reports 2009-2013.
66Climate Justice Programme and Environmental Rights Action / Friends of the Earth Nigeria, Gas flaring in Nigeria: a human rights,
environmental and economic monstrosity, June 2005, http://bit.ly/1LHraC3
Federal High Court, Benin judicial division, Suit no. FDC/B/CS/53/05, Mr Jonah Gbemre (for himself and as representing Iwherekan
Community in Delta State, Nigeria) versus Shell Petroleum Development Company Nigeria Ltd., Nigerian National Petroleum
Corporation and the Attorney General of the Federation, 14 November 2005.
Friends of the Earth Netherlands, Royal Dutch Shell and its sustainability troubles, May 2011, http://bit.ly/1BFfSOl
67Sunday Times, Shell plans £3bn sale in Nigeria, 20 December 2009, http://thetim.es/1IeIXBJ
68Reuters, UPDATE 2-Shell sells some Nigerian onshore oil fields, 27 August 2014, http://reut.rs/1qAvLOa
69SPDC, SPDC sets out its future intent for Nigeria, 21 June 2013, http://bit.ly/1J7uIgE
70Leadership, Bayelsa Community Writes Buhari Over Shell’s Secret Sale of Oil, Gas Reserves, 26 June 2015,
http://bit.ly/1LhYpOtSahara reporters, Nembe Youth Shut Down Shell Flow Stations In Bayelsa, 22 May 2015,
http://bit.ly/1hqAfp1
71The Authority, Oil spill: Community sues AGF, ministry, SPDC, others, 27 November 2015, http://bit.ly/1Z0PQg7
72Shell Global, SPDC completes sale of oil mining lease 29 and Nembe Creek Trunk Line in Nigeria, 25 March 2015,
http://bit.ly/1cIvogy
73Shell Global, SPDC completes sale of oil mining lease 18 in Nigeria, 20 March 2015, http://bit.ly/1FO5oaR
74The Punch, Shell sells Warri airport to indigenous oil firm, 17 June 2015, http://bit.ly/1KaPpcT
75Shell Global, SPDC completes sale of oil mining lease 24 in Nigeria, 20 November 2014, http://bit.ly/1JG8iEo
76Shell, SPDC completes 8th Nigerian Oil Mining Lease sale, 9 November 2012, http://bit.ly/1CqIAxF
Shoreline Natural Resources, Website, http://bit.ly/1GzXouy
77James Bay Resources, James Bay Announces That The Nigerian High Court Reaffirmed Crestar Injunction On OML25, 9 March
2015, http://bit.ly/1CsE41m
Daily Independent, Why NNPC stopped sale oil block to Crestar, 18 November 2014, http://bit.ly/1eFIbCr
The acquisition price was USD 500 million. Shell’s stake: 30/45 of this amount.
78Shell, SPDC completes sale of the seventh Nigerian Oil Mining Lease, 5 September 2012, http://bit.ly/1HbCUwW
79Shell, SPDC completes sale of Nigerian oil mining lease, 3 Sep 2012, http://bit.ly/1ddXXCV
80Shell, Shell sells stakes in Nigerian oil leases, 1 December 2011, http://bit.ly/1Gm9lov
81Shell, Shell sells stakes in Nigerian oil leases, 1 December 2011, http://bit.ly/1Gm9lov
82Shell, Shell sells Nigeria assets to consortium led by local companies, 29 January 2010, http://bit.ly/1HbxOTe
Seplat Petroleum, OMLs 4, 38 & 41, http://bit.ly/1SHsKI8
Seplat Petroleum Development Company, Presentation of Chairman Dr A.B.C Orjiako to the Oil Council World Assembly, 20
November 2013, http://bit.ly/1GFnoYu
The acquisition price was USD 340 million. Shell’s stake: 30/45 of this amount.