Prospect Theory in International Relations: The Iranian Hostage Rescue Mission
Author(s): Rose McDermott
Reviewed work(s):
Source: Political Psychology, Vol. 13, No. 2, Special Issue: Prospect Theory and Political
Psychology (Jun., 1992), pp. 237-263
Published by: International Society of Political Psychology
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PoliticalPsychology,Vol. 13, No. 2, 1992
Relations:
ProspectTheoryin International
The IranianHostageRescueMission
Rose McDermott1
a descriptive
Thisarticleusesprospecttheory,
under
theory
ofdecision-making
risk,to examinethefailed rescuemissionof theAmericanhostagesin Iran in
is thatPresident
Carterwas ina domainoflossesboth
April1980. Theargument
at thetimeof thecrisis.In thiscontext,loss
and domestically
internationally
aversionpredisposedhimto take militaryrisksto secure the release of the
havebeenwillingtopursue.Thisarticle
hostagesthathe wouldnotordinarily
between
also discussestherelationship
riskin theoptions
politicaland military
thatwereconsideredat thetime.
KEY WORDS: risk;loss aversion;domainofgains/losses;
Presidecision-making;
prospect
theory;
dentCarter;Iranianhostagecrisis.
INTRODUCTION
The renewedcontroversy
theinvolvement
of theReagancamsurrounding
in
the
Iranian
crisis
fuels
new
interest
in
the
oftheCarter
activities
paign
hostage
administration
to securethehostages'release.Afterexhausting
all diplomatic
channelsforachievingthisgoal foroversix months,
President
Carterundertook
a dramatic
in
rescue
of
1980.
Carter's
action
was notonly
military
attempt April
to
his
humanitarian
in
world
completelycontrary
emphasis
politicsbutwas a
from
a
as
well.
military
highlyriskyprospect
standpoint
How can Carter'sactionsbe explainedin lightof his predilection
forthe
ofconflict?
How is itpossibleto understand
thenatureofthe
peacefulresolution
risksCarterwas willingto run,bothmilitarily
and politically,
in orderto force
thereleaseofthehostagesfromIraniancontrol?
Thisarticlearguesthatprospect
'New School forSocial Research,313 West4thSt., New York,New York10014.
237
@ 1992 International
0162-895X/92/0600-0237$06.50/1
Societyof PoliticalPsychology
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238
McDermott
theseseeminglyanomalousand
theoryprovidesthe best way to understand
eventsin theCarteradministration.
incomprehensible
Prospecttheoryencompassestwo elements.The firstis a framing
phase,
is receivedandprocessedin a waythatplacesemphaduringwhichinformation
sis on particular
or notittakesplace in a
aspectsof a problem,suchas whether
of gainsor losses. Gainsor losses arejudgedrelativeto thereference
situation
circumpoint.In mostcases, thisis thestatusquo. However,in manyimportant
stances,a leaderwillrefuseto accepta newstatusquo as thereference
pointand
thuswill clingto theold statusquo as the "appropriate"
reference
point.The
secondevaluativesegment
in
argues,inshort,thatpeopletendtobe risk-seeking
thedomainof losses and risk-averse
in thedomainof gains(Tversky
& Kahneman, 1984).
The applicationofprospecttheory
to anycase in theinternational
environa two-stage
mentthusnecessitates
to
analysis.The beginning
stagecorresponds
thefirst,editing,phaseof thetheory.
In thispart,theparticular
of
the
framing
relevantissuesand questionsare investigated
at a substantive
level in orderto
discerndifferences
in thepoliticalemphasesand goals of variousplayers.The
secondphaseconsistsof theevaluationphase,wherebythespecificdomainof
eitheracceptantor averse,is disgainsor losses, and relativeriskpropensity,
cussedand analyzed.
Thisprocessallowsfora comparison
betweenthepredictions
ofthetheory
and theoutcomesof actualevents.The criticalvariablehereis thesubjective
assessmentsof domainand risk. While theseare clearlytied to, and often
derivative
of,objectiveassessments,
theyare notalways,or necessarily,
totally
analogous.
The framing
andevaluationofPresident
Carter'sdecisionto underJimmy
take a rescuemissionof the Americanhostagesin Iran in Aprilof 1980 is
here.The hope is to use theflashlight
of prospecttheoryto help
investigated
illuminate
a case thatmightotherwise
proveinexplicable
usingmoredominant
in
science.
paradigms political
The failedrescuemissionof thehostagesis inexplicable
fromtheperspective of a structuralist
Structuralism
would
paradigm.
suggestthatit is highly
for
a
like
the
United
States
to
unlikely
superpower
get caughtin a hostage
with
a
small
like
Iran.
But
once
would
relationship
power
engaged,structuralism
in theinternational
predictthatthepowerdiscrepancy
systemwouldplayto the
advantageoftheUnitedStates.The UnitedStatesshouldhavebeenabletofinda
thehostages.However,
wayto use itspowerto coercetheIraniansintoreturning
theUnitedStatesdid notgo intoIranwitha largeshowof force;indeed,Carter
was widelycriticizedin thepressat thetimeforrendering
Americaimpotent
in
thefaceoftheIslamicstudents.
Whydidn'ttheCarteradministration
respondto
Iranwithmoredirectforcefromtheoutset?Structuralism
providesno adequate
response.
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Relations
Prospect
Theoryin International
239
The rescueattempt
tookplace at theverynadirofthecrisis,following
the
withIranianmoderateslike Bani-Sadrthrough
French
collapseof negotiations
a superbcase forinvesti(Sick, 1986). As a result,itoffers
legal intermediaries
ofprospecttheory
becauseittakesplaceexclusively
gationfromtheperspective
can offer
in thedomainof losses. Prospecttheory
bothexplanation
andanalysis
foran actionthatis seemingly
froma morestructural
incomprehensible
perspective.Indeed,no othertheorywouldpredictthisbehavioras accurately
as prospecttheory.
DOMAIN
One of the mostdramaticeventsthatoccurredduringCarter'stenureas
was theIranianhostagecrisis.On November
of
4, 1979,inthecontext
president
a broaderIslamicrevolution,
as manyas 3,000 Iranianstudents
seizedtheU.S.
embassyin Tehran,taking66 Americanshostagein theprocess.The students
themselves
undertook
thisattackas a symbolicgesture,and expectedthetakeoverto lastonlya matter
of days;theywerequitesurprised
whentheyreceived
thevociferous
oftheImamandproceededto settlein
blessingsandbenedictions
fora longerepisode thanoriginallyanticipated
(Sick, 1986). Thirteenof the
releasedon November18
hostages,all eitherblackorfemale,weresubsequently
and 19 (Sick, 1986). The remaining
532 were keptfor444 days untiltheir
20, 1980, abouttwo minutesintothe Reagan
negotiatedrelease on January
presidency.3
The Carteradministration
consistently
soughtto negotiatediplomatically
forthe releaseof the hostages,althoughtheysimultaneously
developedconfor
action
The
actual
rescuemission
(Brzezinski,
1985).
plans
tingency
military
itselftookplace on April24, 1980. This missionresultedin thedeathsof eight
Americansoldiers,withfouradditionalAmericaninjuries,and failedto bring
aboutthereleaseof anyof thehostages.
2Oneof thehostages,RichardQueen,was releasedon July11, 1980,formedicalreasonsthatwere
laterdiagnosedas multiplesclerosis.
claimedthattheReagancampaignwas independently
withthe
3GarySick has recently
negotiating
IranianRevolutionary
Counciloverthetimingof thehostages'release.He arguesthattheCarter
administration
was unawareoftheseillicitnegotiations
theexchangeofhostagesforarms
involving
See GarySick, "The ElectionStoryof the Decade," New York
throughIsraeli intermediaries.
incollaboration
withtheFinancialTimesofLondon,
Times,April15, 1991. ABC NewsNightline,
has conducteda seriesof investigations
on theseallegations.Althoughmuchof theevidencein
therearemanyindications
thatthebasisofhisargument
supportof Sick's claimsis circumstantial,
the base rate,muchof thediscussionhas
may be correct.In a classic case of underestimating
focusedon thewhereabouts
of WilliamCasey,Reagan'scampaignchief,andlaterheadoftheCIA.
The problemwiththisfocus is thatit failsto investigate
how frequently
Casey's locationwas
on his absencefromthepubliceye. To theextentthat
unknown;thereis no base rateinformation
havingan unknownlocationwas a rareeventforCasey,it becomesmorediagnosticinformation.
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240
McDermott
In applyingprospecttheoryto any case in the international
arena,it is
crucialto firstestablishtheoperativedomainas one of eithergainsor losses.
While it may be impossibleto actuallyget insidethe head of the relevant
it is possibleto use other
to assess his subjectiveperspective,
decision-maker
the mostlikelydomainof action.To take a simple
indicatorsto determine
wantedto knowwhether
a decision-maker
felthotor
example,ifan investigator
he couldlook at a thermometer
to makea
cold and wasn'table to ask directly,
was 100 degrees,chancesare thedecision-maker
bestguess. If thetemperature
read32 degrees,chancesarethepersonfeltcold. In a
felthot.Ifthethermometer
indicators
todetermine,
ingeneral,how
similarway,itis possibletouse external
a president
assessedhis domainof action.
ina domainoflossesatthetimeofthedecision
Carterwas clearlyoperating
a situation
to go ahead withtherescuemission,confronting
wherethingswere
to getworsewiththepassageoftime.Thisis obvious
bad andclearlycontinuing
fromeveryindicator:
Carterfaceda revolutionary
Islamicpowerthatrefusedto
frustrated
and hostileAmerican
negotiatedirectlywithhim, an increasingly
members
of Congress
amongnumerous
public,a growingsenseof desperation
aboutthesafetyandreleaseofthehostages,and
officials
andothergovernmental
Cartercouldonlyhaveseenhimdeclininginternational
prestigeandcredibility.
in a domainof losses, bothdomestically
and internationally.
selfoperating
On thedomesticfront,
Carter'spopularity
was decliningrapidly.One poll
fromJune1979,evenbeforethehostagecrisisbegan,reported
thatonly20% of
thepopulationapprovedof Carter'sforeignpolicy(New YorkTimes,June25,
to a Timepollconducted
1979). Moreto thepoint,according
duringthelasttwo
weeksof March,60% of theAmericanpublicfeltthatCarterwas too softon
Iran.
Moreover,Carter'sreelectioncampaignwas goingbadly.Duringthelast
weekof March,justpriorto therescuemission,Carterhad sustainedtwolarge
losses in theNew Yorkand Connecticut
to SenatorEdwardKennedy.
primaries
he
won
the
Wisconsin
on
that
1,
Although
primary April therewerepressreports
thatvictory
he usedthehostagecrisisto manipulate
byprematurely
announcing
release.Accordingto bothHamiltonJordan's
good newsabouttheirimpending
andJodyPowell'sreports,
thepresident's
statement
on April1 hadbeenprompted bywhatwas viewedas a genuinebreakthrough
inthenegotiations
andwas not
inWisconsinandKansasthatday.Indeed,thepollsprior
relatedtotheprimaries
to April I showedthepresident
witha solid 15-pointlead in Wisconsineven
was madeconcerning
beforetheannouncement
thehostages.
In addition,itwas thefirst
timethatCarterhadslippedbelowReaganinthe
electionpolls;Carterhadhelda 2 to 1 leadoverReaganinDecember.ByMarch,
Carterdid so "without
enthuhowever,almosthalfofthepeoplewhosupported
siasm." Moreover,81% of thepopulationsaid theyfeltthatAmericawas in
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ProspectTheoryin InternationalRelations
241
itwas timefora changein the
serioustrouble,andabout70% said theythought
(Time,April14, 1980).
presidency
withCongresswas deteriorating
as well. Presidential
Carter'srelationship
victorieson votesin Congressdeclinedfrom81.4 to 73.3 percentin theSenate
alone between1979 and 1980. Moreover,Republicansupportin theSenatefor
Carter'spositionsfellbelow 50% (Ornstein,1984).
PierreSalinger,whocoveredthehostagecrisisforABC NewsfromParis,
of thesituation:
providesa good summary
Otherfactorswereweighingon thePresident.Betterthananyone,Carterknewhowthe
in otherfields,ifonlybecauseit
efforts
hostagecrisishad paralyzedhis administration's
divertedhis own attention
and energiesso greatly.Politically,
he was twice
therefore,
wounded-firstbythecrisis,and againbyitsimpacton hisprograms.
His campaignfor
of theAmericanpublic.Whilehispoliticalfortunes
reelection
thefrustrations
registered
hadrisenafterthetakingofthehostages,he was beginning
toslipinthepollsandhadlost
in New Yorkto SenatorEdwardKennedy.Jimmy
a keyprimary
Carterwas now in the
midstof a fightforhis life,and itlookedas ifhe was losing.A military
optionthatfreed
altertheodds. (Salinger,1981)
thehostageswoulddramatically
It is significant
thatSalingernotesherethata military
optionthatfreedthe
all thelosses and perhapsevenrestoreor imhostagescould somehowrectify
provethepreviousstatusquo. In otherwords,it appearedthatthingswould
continuetogetworseunlesssomething
was activelydonetorectify
thesituation.
The view frominsidethe administration
was equallybleak, as National
SecurityAdvisorGarySick commented:
The imageofU.S. weaknessgenerated
ofhumiliating
setbacksandfrustrations
bymonths
was nothealthyforrelationswithallies or adversaries.In domesticpolitics,continued
to self-immolation
in thepolls butit risked
passivitynotonlycondemnedthePresident
a popularbacklashinfavorofforceswhoopposedeverything
VanceandCarter
generating
(Sick, 1986)
represented.
As Sick mentions,the international
impactof the hostagecrisiswas as
forCarteras werethedomesticpressures.Secretary
of StateCyrus
problematic
Vancehad had greatdifficulty
in trying
to gettheallies to cooperatewiththe
UnitedStates in joiningand enforcing
economicsanctionsagainstIran. For
a
U.N.
Council
resolution
Security
example,
againstIranhadbeenvetoedbythe
Sovietsearlierin theyear.Grievancesbrought
againstIranby theU.S. in the
WorldCourtwereslow to reachfruition.
Even aftertheIranianswereconvicted
in thisCourt,therewas no real mechanism
to enforcethepenaltiesimposed.
Moreover,Carterhad been warnedby PresidentAnwarSadat of Egyptthat
America's "international
standing"was being damagedby "excessivepas(Brzezinski,
1985).
sivity"
losses to personal
Thus, Carterwas man who had sustainedtremendous
national
and
international
interests
when
the
honor,
popularity,
hostageswere
taken.By thetimeof therescuemission,Carterwas a leaderreadyto takea
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McDermott
242
gambleto returnthingsto the statusquo, withthe hostagessafelyat home,
honorrestored,
andhispoliticalfortunes
nationalprideand international
turned
upward.He was not willingto definethe new statusquo as an acceptable
reference
pointbecause thatconcessionmightcost himhis reelection,
among
he was a manoperatingin the
othercalamities.In termsof prospecttheory,
domainof losses.
THE FRAMING OF OPTIONS
totheIranianhostagecrisis,itis necesIn seekingto applyprospecttheory
bytherelevant
players,inorder
saryto analyzetheoptionsthatwereconsidered
theperceivedrelativeriskinessof each. Assessments
of riskcan
to determine
of successfora particular
involveeithercalculationsof theprobability
choice
of each option.
and/ortheutility
forPresident
Carterbyhisadvisorsis an
The waytheseoptionswereframed
element.Accordingto GarySick, therewas a consensuswithinthe
important
on thehierarchy
of riskpresented
administration
by thevariousoptions.Risk
here meantboththe likelihoodof success as well as the costs and benefits
involved.The main disagreement
suramong advisorsand decision-makers
roundedwhichlevelof riskwas an acceptableone fortheUnitedStatesto take.
In theend,thechoicethatwas madewas thehighestlevelof riskthatPresident
Carterhimselfwas willingto accept(Sick, personalcommunication).
Fromtheoutset,fivebasic optionswereconsidered
forbringing
aboutthe
releaseof thehostagesand endingthediplomatic
stalemate.Fromthelowestto
thehighestlevel of risk,theseoptionswereto do nothing;
engagein minimal
and
undertake
a
rescue
minetheharbors;
sanctions;
mission;
political diplomatic
and engagein an all-outmilitary
strike.
The relativebenefits
andrisksinvolvedin each optionwillbe discussedin
turn.As NationalSecurity
AdvisorZbigniewBrzezinski(1990) comments,
it is
crucial to keep in mindthe distinction
betweenmilitaryand politicalrisks
thisanalysis.In manycases, theserisksareinversely
related.Morethroughout
betweendomesticand international
costs and
over,thereis oftena trade-off
benefitsas well.
The firstoptionwas to do nothing
andwaitfortheinternal
situation
in Iran
to stabilizeand resolvethe crisisby itself.This was the optionthatVance
The strategy
herewas to continuewithpoliticalandmilitary
supported.
pressure
butnotto offeranynew initiatives
untilaftertheIranianshad formulated
their
new politicalsystemintoa coherent
structure.
The benefitof thisstrategy
was
thatit did notriskantagonizing
theIraniansanyfurther.
In Vance'sview,this
harm.
approachwas mostlikelyto protectthehostagesfromfurther
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Relations
Prospect
Theoryin International
243
The politicalrisksof thispolicyfroma domesticperspective
are obvious.
and be accusedof beingpushed
Carterwouldbe chargedwithineffectiveness
thepersonalsenseof angerat the
aroundby theAyatollah.More importantly,
was runningveryhighat the time. Fromthe
Iraniansin the administration
ofcentraldecision-makers,
itwas virtually
toconceiveof
impossible
perspective
international
humiliation
in
deliberate
the
face
of
such
abominable
accepting
in
In
Iranianactionwithout
there
a univerwas
short,
doingsomething response.
sal sensethatthesituation
was intolerable.
and
frustration
addedto
Deep anger
or politicalreasonwhytheUnitedStates
thebeliefthattherewas no strategic
shouldallow itselfto be pushedaroundbya third-rate
fanatical
religiousstatein
risksofdoingnothing
theMiddleEast. Thus,whilethemilitary
wererelatively
low,thedomesticpoliticalriskswerehigh.
The secondoptionwas to up theanteslightly
butonlythrough
diplomatic
means.This meantbreakingpoliticaland economicrelationswiththeIranians,
of military
sales, expellingIraniancitizens
placingan embargoon shipments
fromtheUnitedStatesand so on. Everyoneassumedthatthesethingswouldbe
andtheywerenotregarded
as particularly
done,as theyall wereeventually,
risky
fromeithera politicalor a military
In
these
actions
amounted
to
standpoint. fact,
moreshow thansubstance.The real goal in undertaking
theseactionswas to
bringpressureon theEuropeansto join in thesanctionsagainstIran.
Thispolicyamounted
to a balancingactbetweenAmericaninterests
inIran
withreluctant
and U.S. relationships
allies.
The
measures
European
diplomatic
successfulingainingEuropeancooperation.
weresomewhat
However,European
to theAmericanpositionwas morea resultoftheimplicit
accommodation
threat
of the use of U.S. military
forcethanof genuineinterest
in sanctioning
the
Iranians.Aftertherescuemissiontookplace, theEuropeansfeltbetrayed,
aldid serveas a good cover forthe rescue
thoughthesediplomaticinitiatives
missionpreparations.
The thirdoptionthatwas seriously
considered
was therescuemissionitself.
This was reallyan intermediate
in
terms
of politicalriskiness,
butit was
option
theriskiestoptionthatcouldbe takenmilitarily
without
engagingin an outright
act of war.The missionwas intended
to workby stealth,and thegoal was to
minimizecasualtiesand bringaboutthereleaseof thehostages.Everyoneinittobe a cleverandcarefully
volvedintheplanning
considered
outplan.
thought
Eventhosewhonowhavethebenefit
ofhindsight,
suchas Sick andBrzezinski,
considerthe plan to have been subtle, sophisticated,
and likely to have
succeeded.
understood
theseriousmilitary
Accordingto Sick, all thedecision-makers
risksinvolvedin undertaking
themission,butit stilloffered
theonlyreal possibilityof rescuingmostof the hostagesalive. The plannersknewthatthe
possibilityof success was not 100%, but theybelievedthatthe riskswere
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244
McDermott
manageable.In otherwords,therisksherewereseen as beingmoreaboutthe
of militarysuccess thanabout the politicalcosts and benefitsof
probability
themission,whichseemedmoreacceptable.
undertaking
The key factorhere is thatthe rescuemissionwas the best balanceof
risk.Ifitworked,thehostageswouldbe free,Carterwould
politicalandmilitary
would be salvaged. Thebe a hero, and America'sinternational
credibility
to
a
to
would
have
amounted
return
theold statusquo as the
a
success
oretically,
the
riskswereadmitthat
reference
However,
military
everyoneagreed
point.
of
success
low.
and
the
relatively
probability complete
tedlyhigh,
was
to
minimize
these
risks
However,military
planning designed
military
was to enterIranon a holidayweekend;the
as muchas possible.The strategy
rescuerswereto hithardand quicklyundercoverof darkness.The American
andno oneexpectedenoughnoise
bylargegrounds,
embassyitselfis surrounded
wouldtraveloutsidethecompoundto arousesuspicion,especiallywiththeuse
of silencerson all weapons.The rescuersknewwherethehostageswerebeing
to be unprepared
and
held withinthebuilding,and theyexpectedthestudents
no one discussedIranianlossesopenly,therewas
unskilledin combat.Although
of Iranianstudents
thatlargenumbers
wouldbe killedin the
everyexpectation
courseof the mission.However,therisksto Americansoldiersand hostages
was madeto minimizetheselosses. Thus,
weremorespecific,and everyeffort
attractive
therescuemissionseemedto be a particularly
optionwhenthealterthesituation
nativeswereperceivedto amountto eitherletting
continue
to fester
or to go to all-outwar.
The fourth
comoptionwas to minetheharborsor to otherwise
interrupt
merce.Thiswas seentobe politically
of
quiteriskybecauseitwas theequivalent
an actofwar.The UnitedStateshadno intention
ofdeclaringwarbutwantedto
preventships fromgoing into Iran withouthavingto physicallystop them.
a passive sea blockade,and if well publicized,most
Miningwouldconstitute
theminedarea. The goal was to
shipswouldn'ttryto runtheriskof entering
have a significant
negativeimpacton Iran'sexportsand imports.
Miningtheharborswas viewedas a sharpescalation.The fearwas thatthe
IranianswouldinvitetheSovietsintotheregiontohelpwithmine-sweeping
and
thatthisofferwouldprovidetheSovietswithan openingin theregionthatthe
UnitedStateswantedto prevent.
butnot
Thus,miningwas seenas a significant,
an overwhelming,
international
risk.This optionwas certainly
viewedas manageable froma military
perspective.
Usingmineswithautomaticself-destruct
mechanisms
wouldallow someflexibility
and thisoptionwas seriouslyconsidered.However,therewas a military
riskofrepeatedly
losingplanesandshipsin
such an action,and theotherpoliticalrisksinvolvedby inflaming
theregion
were seen to be quite highas well. Most importantly,
thisoptionwould do
to further
theprimary
nothingdirectly
goal of releasingthehostages.
The lastoptionavailablewas an all-outmilitary
attack.Thiswas extremely
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Relations
Theoryin International
Prospect
245
and was neverseriously
standpoint
riskyfrombotha politicaland a military
considered.As withthepreviousoption,themainreasonthisoptionwas abanto getthehostagesback. It wouldinflamethe
donedwas becauseitdid nothing
entireregionand escalatethe crisiswithoutdoinganything
directlyto bring
aboutthereleaseofthehostages.Basically,thisoptionwas rejectedeverystepof
thewaybecausetheadverseconsequencesweretoogreat,andtherisksweretoo
and internationally.
domestically
highbothpoliticallyand militarily,
more
the
The mostimportant
pointregarding optionsthatwerepolitically
neither
offered
the
chance
to
return
is
that
one
the
mission
the
rescue
than
risky
statusquo by briningaboutthereleaseof thehostages.
to theformer
situation
than
risksoftherescuemissionmighthavebeengreater
Thus,whilethemilitary
risks
of
a
strike
have
domestic
and
the
the
harbor,
might
punitive
political
mining
solutionto thecentralissue
an immediate
beenless risky,neither
optionoffered
of contention.
the principaldecision-makers
As mentioned,
agreedon the optionsthat
andpoliticalrisk.However,it
wereavailableandtheirrelativelevelsofmilitary
or tolerancelevel,
is also truethateach advisorpossesseda different
threshold,
to Carterin
forwhatwas acceptable.As a result,each framedhis arguments
are
addressed
below.
These
different
perspectives
ways.
quite
Framing
withPrimeMinister
It was thecollapseoftheadministration's
negotiations
decisionto undertake
Bani-Sadron April1 thatled to Carter'ssubsequent
the
of undertaking
rescuemission(Jordan,1982; Powell, 1984). The possibility
a
in
to
the
crisis
was
raised
a
hostage
military
option response
coupleofdaysafter
the embassy was taken in Novemberof 1979. Under the instigationof
ofDefenseHaroldBrown,theJoint
ChiefsofStaff
Brzezinski,
Secretary
through
a Joint
TaskForceandbeganplanningfora rescueattempt
at
(JCS) puttogether
thattime. It was not seriouslyconsideredas an option,however,untilthe
withtheIranians.
followingApril,afterthecollapseof directnegotiations
Because of thenumberof memoirsand officialdocuments
thatare availofdifferent
thatwerepresentable, itis possibletoexaminea number
arguments
ed to President
Carterpriorto hisdecisionto go aheadwiththerescuemission.
thatwillbe examinedarethoseespousedbySecretary
The mainperspectives
of
StateCyrusVance,NationalSecurityAdvisorZbigniewBrzezinski,and presidentialassistantHamiltonJordan.In theend, Secretary
of StateCyrusVance
resignedoverthisepisode,becausehe believedthatthemissioncouldnotwork
and shouldbe pursuedbecauseit was too dangerous.
affected
Prospecttheoryarguesthatchoicecan oftenbe substantively
by
in theframing
trivialmanipulations
and construction
of availableoprelatively
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246
McDermott
tions.Forexample,codinghelpsdefinethereference
point,andthepresentation
of optionsdefinestheuniverseof contingencies
thatare considered.
One notableaspectof theIranianrescuemissioncase is thateach advisor
historical
drewon different
analogiesto makehis pointand presshis position.
These analogiesoffereda framefordefiningthe reference
point,as well as
individualadvisorsaboutappropriate
coursesof actionin a given
instructing
situation.Such historical
as Jervissuggests:
analogiescan be quiteinfluential,
Whatone learnsfromkeyeventsin international
is an important
factorin deterhistory
of incominginformation.
miningtheimagesthatshapetheinterpretation
...
Previousinternational
eventsprovidea statesman
witha rangeof imaginablesituations
and allowhimto detectpatterns
andcausal linksthatcan helphimunderstand
hisworld.
(Jervis,1976)
In thiscase, each advisor,working
froma different
script,foresawa differentprobableoutcomebased on his chosenhistoricalanalogy.In some sense,
theseanalogiesoffered
aboutthemostlikelyoutcomeof eventsfor
predictions
each advocate.Conclusionsreachedandthepoliciespromoted
variedaccording
to thesimilarities
thateach advisorsaw betweenpresent
andpastevents.Thereto examinetheseanalogiesand theirproponent's
adviceto
fore,it is important
Carter.
One advisorwhoseanalogiesaffected
his advice to PresidentCarterwas
of
Vance
State
Vance.
was
Secretary
Cyrus
adamantly
opposedto therescue
anda politicalstandpoint.
The
mission,seeingitas tooriskyfrombotha military
finaldecisionto attempt
therescuemissionwas madebyCarterandhisprincipal
advisorson April 11 in a meetingthattookplace withoutVance(Brzezinski,
fromwhateveryone
involved
1985; Vance,1982;Carter,1983). Uponhisreturn
describedas a "well-earned"vacation,Vanceexpressedshockandconcernthat
sucha momentous
decisionhadbeenmadewithout
hisinput.As a result,another
of
the
was
on
called
at
whichtimeSecretary
Vance
15,
meeting
principals
April
outlinedhis objections.At thatmeeting,Vance:
pointedout thatwe had madesubstantial
progressin gainingalliedsupportforeffective
sanctions... [I] pointedoutfurther
thattheformation
oftheMajlis,to whichKhomeini
overthehostagecrisis,couldbe a majorsteptowarda functioning
had givenjurisdiction
withwhomwe couldnegotiate
in Iran. . . Eveniftheraidweretechnically
government
successful,the missionwas almostcertainto lead to a numberof deathsamongthe
in mymindfora rescue
hostages,not to mentionthe Iranians.The onlyjustification
was thatthedangerto thehostageswas so greatthatitoutweighed
therisksof a
attempt
military
option.I did notbelievethatto be thecase.
I reminded
thegroupthateveniftherescuemissiondid freesomeof theembassystaff,
theIranianscouldsimplytakemorehostagesfromamongtheAmerican
stillin
journalists
Tehran.We wouldthenbe worseoffthanbefore,andthewholeregionwouldbe severely
inflamed
in thewholeregionwouldbe inflamed
byouraction.Ournationalinterests
by
ouraction.Finally,I saidtherewas a realchancethatwe wouldforcetheIraniansintothe
armsof theSoviets.(Vance, 1983)
In spiteofVance'sobjections,
thedecisiontogo aheadwiththemissionwas
reaffirmed.
At thistime,Secretary
Vancetendered
his resignation
to President
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Relations
Prospect
Theoryin International
247
Carter,who waitedto announceVance'sdecisionuntilaftertherescuemission
of principle:
had takenplace. Vanceexplainshis decisionto resignas a matter
I had disagreedwithpolicydecisionin thepast,butacceptingthatmenof forceful
views
wouldinevitably
tothePresident
disagreefromtimetotime,hadacquiescedoutofloyalty
thehostagesbyforcefrom
knowingI couldnotwineverybattle.The decisionto extract
thecenterof a cityof overfivemillion,morethansix thousandmilesfromtheUnited
terrain
was different:
I was
States,whichcould be reachedonlyby flyingoverdifficult
convincedthatthedecisionwas wrongandthatitcarriedgreatrisksforthehostagesand
forournationalinterests
...
[I] knewthatI could not honorablyremainas Secretaryof StatewhenI so strongly
decisionthatwentagainstmyjudgment
as to whatwas best
disagreedwitha Presidential
forthecountry
and forthehostages.Even ifthemissionworkedperfectly,
and I did not
believeit would,I wouldhaveto say afterward
thatI hadopposedit,givemyreasonfor
Thatwouldbe intolerable
forthePresiopposingit, and publiclycriticizethePresident.
dentand me. Thatday,I toldCarterI wouldhaveto resignifthemissionwentforward.
(Vance, 1983)
Vancewas closestto President
Of all his advisors,Secretary
Carter,both
personallyand ideologically(Sick, 1986; Carter,1982). Indeed,bothVance's
Vance'sresignation
andCarter'saccountsoftheinteraction
arequite
surrounding
of thekindof tragedy
associatedwitha failed
movingand almostreminiscent
love affair.It is thusparticularly
thatPresidentCarterdecidedto
significant
overrideVance'sarguments
and pursuethemilitary
optionwhenhe knewthat
Vanceobjectedstrongly
enoughto resignoverit.
thehostagecrisisthattheUnitedStates
Vancearguedthroughout
Secretary
in orderto gainthereleaseof thehostages
shoulduse patienceand negotiation
concernwas thelivesandsafety
ofthehostagesand,inthe
safely.His overriding
eventof the rescuemission,the lives of the Americansoldiersas well. He
framedoptionsin termsof mortality,
and everything
was evaluatedin termsof
actionwouldlead to thedeathof a humanbeing.
thelikelihoodthata particular
He also appearedto be moreconcerned
aboutgainingandkeepingthesupport
of
theEuropeanallies thanotheradvisors.
In termsof theoptionspresented
forriskwas
earlier,Vance'sthreshold
at
the
More
first
he
wanted
to
do
andwaitfor
stage.
really
specifically,
nothing
in Iranto settledown.He believedthatoncethishappened,
situation
theinternal
the Iranianswould no longerhave use forthe Americanhostagesand would
releasethemvoluntarily
without
additional
fromtheU.S. FromVance's
pressure
that
to
America
do
anything
might
perspective,
bringaboutthehostages'release
in themeantime
couldonlyserveto further
theIraniansandthusrisk
antagonize
theultimatesafetyof thehostages.He also thought
thatmilitary
actionwould
alienatetheEuropeanallies he had workedso hardto reassure.He thussaw a
rescue mission as unacceptablyriskyfromboth a political and military
standpoint.
It is significant
to notethatthe AgnusWardincidentwas the historical
analogyfromwhichVanceoperated.As Vancerecalls:
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McDermott
248
wouldbe released
I also believedthatthehostages
safelyoncetheyhadservedtheir
inIran.I found
forthisconclusion
inwhathadhappened
intwo
support
purpose
political
caseswhere
Americans
wereheldhostage.
similar
TheyweretheAgnusWardincident,
ofourconsular
staff
inMukden
attheendofWorld
WarII, andthe
theseizure
involving
similarities
totheseizure
inIran,as is
caseoftheUSS Pueblo.TheWardcasehadmany
clearfrom
thememorandum
oftheJoint
Chiefs
ofStaff
toPresident
Truman
recommendforce.I hadsenta copyof thismemorandum
to the
ingagainsttheuse of military
weretaken.I was convinced
as timepassedthe
afterthehostages
President
shortly
diminished.
harmtothehostages
ofphysical
chances
(Vance,1983)
Thus, Vanceused theWardand Puebloanalogiesto supporthis viewthat
as longas theUnited
thehostageswouldremainsafeand be releasedunharmed
in action,andwillingto negotiate.
In otherwords,
Stateswas patient,restrained
Vance thoughtthatthe new statusquo, while not optimal,was nonetheless
acceptableas longas no one was killed.He fearedthatAmericanactionwould
lead to theloss of lifeand thuswas notan advisablecourseof action.So, for
Vance,anyactionthattheUnitedStatestookwouldbe tomakea gainandnotto
preventa loss.
andthuspolitiVancebelievedanyrescuemissionwas doomedto military,
of
the
risk
of
from
the
outset
because
deaths,yethe refusedto
cal, failure
high
cametrue.Rather,he was thefirstto offer
Carterthe
gloatwhenhispredictions
condolencesfollowingthe announcement
of thefailedmission
mostheartfelt
(Jordan,1982).
Vancehad held swayin mostof theearlyforeignpolicydecisionsof the
Carteradministration.
However,he was not the only seniormemberof the
team; Brzezinskiwas equallyimportant
decision-making
politically.Thereis
littledoubtthatBrzezinski'sopinionwas takenquiteseriously
byCarter.Indeed,
his importance
to the presidentin quite compelling
Gary Sick characterizes
fashion:
ofCyrusVance....
Brzezinski
wastheveryantithesis
Thisrestless
andpersistent
offresh
madeBrzezinski
a
energy
pursuit
approaches
natural
alteregotoJimmy
Carter's
activism.
thetwomenwerepsychologically
Although
andnever
became
eachother
in
close,they
verydifferent
really
personally
complemented
wasdissatisfied
with
as they
wereandwasdetermined
to
veryspecialways.Carter
things
usehisPresidency
togenerate
Brzezinski
newideasata dazzling
rateand
change.
sparked
refusedto be constrained
by thestatusquo in devisinghis strategies.
AlthoughCarter
moreofBrzezinski's
ideasthatheaccepted,
heobviously
valuedthe
rejected
probably
irreverent
inventiveness
thatBrzezinskibrought
to anysubject.(Sick, 1986)
Accordingto GarySick, thereal shiftin Carter'spolicyallegiancefrom
VancetoBrzezinski
cameaftertheSovietinvasionofAfghanistan
inlate1979.It
is clear fromCarter'smuch-publicized
statements
thathe was deeplyshocked
and personallyoffended
by theSovietaction.Indeed,it was afterthe Soviet
invasionof Afghanistan
thatVanceannouncedthathe wouldnotstayin office
thiseventthatCarter'spolicychangedfrom
beyondtheelection.Itwas following
an emphasison patienceandnegotiation
toonebasedmoreon confrontation
and
Indeed,a changein frameat thistimefromgainsto lossesregardcompetition.
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Relations
inInternational
Prospect
Theory
249
in a noticeablechangeinpolicyfromappeaseresulted
ingU.S.-Sovietrelations
It was withinthiscontextthatthedecisionabouttherescue
mentto deterrence.
missionwas made (Sick, 1986).
forceinthedecisiontoproceedwiththemission.
Brzezinskiwas a powerful
However,Brzezinskihadquitea different
agendathanVance.His frameencompassednationalpowerand prestigeas well as thehostages'welfare.As Harold
Saunders,AssistantSecretaryof State forNear East and SouthAsia, notes,
withnationalinterest
andhonor,whileCy
"Zbig Brzezinskiwas moreconcerned
Vanceemphasizedhumanevalues" (Saunders,1985). In short,Vancewas the
idealistto Brzezinski'smoreclassicalrealistposition.
rescuemissionfromtheoutset,
Brzezinskifavoredsome kindof military
riskswereinvolvedin therescue
eventhough,likeVance,he knewthatmilitary
mission:
butwe also had
My viewwas thatcasualtiesin therescuemissionwouldbe unavoidable;
thattheattempt
to face thepossibility
(Brzezinski,1982)
mightfailaltogether.
was thatBrzezinskiwas morewillingto accepttheserisks
The difference
thanVanceandsaw themas moreunavoidable
(Brzezinski,1985).His threshold
of riskon the list of optionswas thehighestof thecentraldecision-makers.
raidagainstIran,in the
Indeed,he wentso faras to supporta punitivemilitary
faceofuniversalopposition.Brzezinskiwas also theone whobegantoplanfora
secondrescuemission,two days afterthefirstfailure(Brzezinski,1985). As
was broaderthanthelivesandsafetyofthehostages:
noted,Brzezinski'sinterest
I feltthatthequestionof thelivesof thehostagesshouldnotbe ouronlyfocus
In effect,
ourvitalinterests.
I
butthatwe shouldexamineas wellwhatneededto be doneto protect
was painfully
awarethatat somepointperhapsa choicebetweenthetwomightevenhave
to be made. (Brzezinski,1985)
Indeed,it was BrzezinskiwhophonedBrownon November6 to gettheJCSto
workon a rescuemission.Brzezinskiwas theonewhoquestioned
whether
ornot
themissionshouldgo ahead withfivehelicopters
afterthehydraulic
leak was
discoveredin thecrucialsixthduringthecourseof therescuemissionitself.
on thiseventprovidessingular
intotheconscious
Indeed,hiscommentary
insight
of
to
influence
a decision-maker:
use framing
I stoodin front
to hisdeskwithmymindracing:ShouldI pressthepresident
to go ahead
withonlyfivehelicopters?
HereI was, alonewiththePresident.
PerhapsI couldconvince
togo in a daringsinglestrokeforthebigprize,totake
himto abandonmilitary
prudence,
thehistoricchance.And at thesametime,a contrary
flashedthrough
thought
mymind:
wouldI notbe abusingmyofficeby pressingthismanintosucha quickdecisionafter
monthsof meticulousplanning?WouldI notbe givingintoa romantic
idea?
I had decidedto urgegoingaheadwithfiveonlyifColonelBeckwithwas prepared
to do
thefieldcommander's
concurrence.
it,butnotto pressforit without
(Brzezinski,1985)
In thissequence,Brzezinskidemonstrates
a consciousawarenessofan advisor's
a decision-maker,
evenone so powerful
as the
abilitytopersuadeandmanipulate
theframing
of options.
through
president,
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250
McDermott
The evidencesuggeststhatBrzezinskihada greatimpacton Carter'sthinkwith
regardto thehostagerescuemission.In the memohe wroteto the
ing
thedaybeforeCarterapprovedthemission,afterdemonstrating
much
president
Brzezinski
reluctance
earlier,
argued:
is done to changethenatureof thegame, we mustresign
In short,unlesssomething
thesummer
or even
of thehostagesthroughout
ourselvesto thecontinued
imprisonment
Americans
andconsiderthe
later.However,we haveto thinkbeyondthefateofthefifty
ofa protracted
effects
andinternational
deleterious
stalemate,
growingpublicfrustration,
of theU.S. (Brzezinski,1985)
humiliation
froma different
started
setofassumptions
Thus,itis evidentthatBrzezinski
that
would
worse
withoutdrastic
believed
thanVance. Brzezinski
get
things
the
At
the
while
Vance
believed
the
Americanaction,
exactly opposite.
meeting
followingday,Brzezinskiarguedthat
therescueas earlyas possiblebecausethenightsaregetting
We oughtto attempt
shorter;
backwithus, so thatwe wouldhavebargaining
thatwe shouldconsidertakingprisoners
leveragein theeventthattheIraniansseizedotherAmericansas hostages;and thatwe
strikein the event the rescue failed.
should considera simultaneousretaliatory
(Brzezinski,1985)
to notethatBrzezinskiwas influenced
It is interesting
by a quitedifferent
for
Brzezinski's
model
the
than
Vance.
rescue
missionwas the
historical
analogy
a smallerAmerican
Israeliraid on Entebbe.One of thereasonshe supported
forcegrewout of thisexperience:
helicopter
thatthemissionshouldhave been composedof, say,
Some have arguedsubsequently
themissionas a resultofthe
butiftheIranianshaddiscovered
twiceas manyhelicopters;
theirairspace,we all would have doubtlessbeen
size of the air armadapenetrating
withunwillingness
to go in hard
excessiveAmericanredundancy,
chargedwithtypically
and lean-the way,forexample,theIsraelisdid at Entebbe.(Brzezinski,1985)
Brzezinski
was quite
Indeed,duringtheoperational
aspectsoftheplanning,
awareofa secondpowerful
analogywiththeBay ofPigs.He was carefultosteer
Carterclearof themistakesthatKennedyhad madeat thattime.As Brzezinski
describesit:
withthemilitary
He andI hadearlierdiscussedJohnKennedy'sinterference
for
planning
to makecertainthathis
theBay of Pigs operation,and Carterwas clearlydetermined
withthemission'schancesof success. (Brzezinski,
personalconcernsdid notinterfere
1985)
The Bay of Pigs analogyindeedbecamequitea salientanalogyforCarter.
Accordingto Sick,
JohnF. Kennedywas widelycriticized,
on
circles,forinsisting
especiallywithinmilitary
civiliancontrolovermilitary
operationsin theCuban MissileCrisisdownto themost
it was due to his disastrous
minutedetail.[LaterSick notes:"presumably
experienceat
theBay of Pigs thatled President
Kennedyto insiston civiliancontrolof everydetail
was similarly
forasserting
criticized
duringtheCubanMissilecrisis."]LyndonJohnson
in Vietnam.Jimmy
Carter
Presidential
controldownto theunitlevelduringoperations
to avoidtheseextremes.(Sick, 1985)
consciouslyattempted
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Relations
Theoryin International
Prospect
251
Brzezinski'shistorical
toCarter'sconscious
analogiesmayhavecontributed
for
the
rescue
decisiontogivecontroloftheoperational
missionovertothe
plans
hurt
for
This
have
chances
the
success
of the mission
strategy
may
military.
becauseproblemswiththechainof commandthatmighthaveemergedearlier
civiliancontroldidn'tbecome salientuntilthe executionof the
withstricter
ironicgiventhatCarterrequesteda
missionitself.(This analogyis particularly
the
of
copy Kennedy'sspeechfollowing Bay of PigsdebaclefromCodyPowell
afterthe failureof therescuemission,in orderto help himpreparehis own
speechforthepublic.See Jordan,1982.)
advisorto Carterduringthehostagerescuemission,at
A thirdimportant
leastpartlybecause of his emphasison domesticpoliticalconsiderations,
was
advisor.His memoirsseem to be the most
HamiltonJordan,the presidential
ofbookswritten
candidoftheplethora
byCarteradministration
psychologically
officials.For example,Jordanwroteof Brzezinski'scomments,
followingthe
April 15 meetingduringwhichVance raisedhis objections,that "Cy is the
ultimateexampleof a good man who has been traumatized
by his Vietnam
was obviouslymadein reference
to
experience"(Jordan,1982). This comment
of thearmyand deputysecretary
Vance's servicebothas secretary
of defense
duringtheVietnamwar.
is quiteopenabouthisangerat Vancefornotbelievingearly
In fact,Jordan
would
thattherescue
succeed,and also forabandoningCarterin his timeof
needafterithadfailed.His bookseemslessaffected
inthis
greatest
byhindsight,
way,thantheothers.
Jordantendedto framethingsin termsof its impacton the reelection
basedon howparticular
actionswouldaffect
the
campaign.He madearguments
Jordan'sperspective
is interesting
president'sdomesticappeal and popularity.
wereirrelespeciallyin lightofBrzezinski'sclaimsthatdomesticconsiderations
evantto Carterduringthistime:
therewas neveranyexplicitdiscussionof therelationship
between
Perhapssurprisingly,
whatwe mightdo in Iranand domesticpolitics:neitherthePresident
norhis political
advisoreverdiscussedwithme thequestionof whether
one or anotherof our Iranian
optionswouldhave a betteror worsedomesticpoliticaleffect.(Brzezinski,1985)
in theway bestexemplified
lacks self-awareness
This recollection
by the
storyofthemanwhodidn'tlikepartiesbecausehe hadneverbeento one where
In otherwords,it is difficult
forsomeoneto discount
he wasn'tin attendance.
fortheimpactof hisownpresenceon a situation.
No one mayhave
sufficiently
talkedaboutdomesticpoliticsaroundBrzezinskiperhapsbecausetheyknewhe
wasn't concernedabout the subject.Nonetheless,it is clear fromJordan's
memoirsthatthe reelectioncampaignwas farfroman insignificant
concern
givenCarter'spledgenottocampaignon theroad
duringthisperiod,particularly
because of thecrisis.
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252
McDermott
Jordan
therescuemissionas follows:
presentshis own hopesconcerning
As I listenedto GeneralPustay'spresentation
(on March24, 1980), I began to be
convincedthatmaybeitwouldwork.Aftermonths
ofwaitingandhoping,negotiating
and
failing,herewas a way to go in and snatchourpeopleup and havethewholedamned
and thenation.It would
thingover! Not to mentionwhatit woulddo forthePresident
andourpoliticalopponents
thatCarterwas notan indecisiveChief
provetothecolumnists
Executivewhohadfailedtoact. Itwouldbolstera worldcommunity
thatwas increasingly
skepticalaboutAmericanpower.A daringmissionwouldrightthegreatwrongdoneto
ourcountry
and itscitizens.(Jordan,1982)
Jordan's
sentiments
areparticularly
notablefortheiremphasison righting
a
to
back
or
somehow
to
or
restore
the
former
status
normal,
wrong,
trying get
quo
as theappropriate
reference
point.Once again,thegoal of recoupingall of the
losses in one greatdaringgambleemerges
personal,national,and international
as highlyappealing,frombotha politicalas wellas a psychological
standpoint.
This is exactlywhatprospecttheorywouldpredictin sucha situation.
THE DECISION
of course,was President
The mostimportant
Carterhimdecision-maker,
are
not
self. Carter'smemoirs,althoughcontaining
notablefor
diaryentries,
It
is
oremotional
theirlevelofcognitive
evident
introspection. painfully
throughthatCarterwas a manwhodeeplyexperienced
thepersonalburden
out,however,
He emergesas a sincerely
of his globalresponsibilities.
kind
moral,genuinely
and caringman whose leadershipabilitieswere seriouslychallengedby the
of thecriseshe faced.Giventhecomplexity
of theproblem,and the
enormity
Carter
it
is
of
that
to understand
howhe
received, challenging
diversity opinions
therescuemission.
reachedthedecisionthathe madeconcerning
intohowall theinformation
and
A framing
analysisallowsan examination
a
situation
that
Carter
faced
President
Carter.
clearly
by
optionswereassimilated
thepresimilitated
effect;4
groupthink-type
againsttheimpactof a deleterious
framesthathis advisors
dent'smindsetcan be examinedin lightofthedifferent
of broader
presented.His mindsetis assumedto includehis own perception
domesticand geopoliticalconsiderations.
ProspectTheorywouldpredictthat,in thedomainof losses,Carterwould
thesituation
to theformer
statusquo.
opt fora riskygamblethatmightreturn
effect,see IrvingJanis(1982), who describesthephenomenon
4Formoreon the Groupthink
of
as a "quickandeasywaytorefertoa modeofthinking
thatpeopleengagein whenthey
groupthink
aredeeplyinvolvedin a cohesiveingroup,
whenthemembers'strivings
forunanimity
override
their
motivation
torealistically
courseofaction"(p. 9). Thisclearlydidn'thappenin
appraisealternative
theCarteradministration,
as evidencedbythedrasticdifferences
inopinionsespousedbyVanceand
Brzezinski,amongothers.The reasonsforthisare no doubtmanybutare certainly
due in partto
betweentheseparticipants,
as wellas thepersonalstylesof some
deeplyheldpersonalanimosities
suchas Brzezinski,who did notshyawayfromconfrontation.
participants,
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Relations
ProspectTheoryin International
253
of
Such a riskygambleis characterized
by a situationwheretheprobability
other
but
the
of
the
outcome
successis lowerthanthatoffered
by
utility
options,
is higher.Iftherescuemissionhadbeena success,Carterwouldhavegainedthe
andthevotesof
releaseofthehostages,therespectofhisalliesandadversaries,
In otherwords,he couldhaverecoupedall hislosses,andmade
hisconstituency.
thispossibility.
some gainsas well. No otheroptionavailableoffered
Whatis surprising,
however,giventhe debateamonghis advisors,was
inthelikelihoodoftheplan'ssuccess.Evenafterthemission
Carter'sconfidence
failed,he insistedon itsviabilityin theApril24-25 diaryentry:
The cancellationof our missionwas caused by a strangeseriesof mishaps-almost
The operationitselfwas well planned.The men werewell
completelyunpredictable.
of success,becauseno Iranianalarmwas raiseduntil
trained.We had everypossibility
twoor threehoursafterourpeopleleftIran. (Carter,1982)
confidenceis surprising
because of the complexity
Carter'sretrospective
and
as
low
estimates
of
of
the
task
as
well
the
success
offered
the
JCS
enormity
by
and otherspriorto themission.At thispoint,however,Carter'sconfidence
is a
centralissue becauseitclearlyhelpedto promotehis decisionto go aheadwith
themission.
andmotivational,
forthis
Thereareseveralpossiblereasons,bothcognitive
a
it
could
have
been
classic
of
case of
Fromthecognitive
confidence.
point view,
that
think
the
which
demonstrates
of
theconjunctive
people
probability
fallacy,
of a numberof smaller
totalsuccessforan eventthatrequiresthecombination
eventsis greaterthanthe likelihoodthatany one of thoseeventsalone will
succeed.Thisnotionis psychologically
appealingbecausepeoplethinktheposof
different
of
a
number
is greater
of
one
thanthe
thingshappening
sibility any
fail
to
all
realize
that
the
one
of
those
events
of
chance only
thingsoccurring;
they
occur
for
the
event
to
In
must
succeed.
events
in thecumulative
larger
sequence
success
is
as
as
the
such
a
least
combination,
only likely
complete
requiring
if
one
link
the
entire
chain
fails
is
because
as
That
well.
event.
fails,
likely
fortheoverconThe conjunctive
explanation
fallacyprovidesa compelling
of
shuttle
in
failure
the
of 1986,
to
the
fidencethatled
space
Challenger January
In
the
Iranian
Carter
have
that
the
number
of
forexample.
situation,
may
thought
of success
contingency
plansand back-upsuppliesensureda higherprobability
ofcontingencies
thathadto
thanwas realistic,especiallygiventhesheernumber
to
work.
in
order
for
the
entire
succeed
plan
of Jervis'sargument
This typeof confidenceis also reminiscent
thatan
of consistency
oftenleadsto theavoidanceof valuetrade-offs.
irrational
pursuit
As Jervisnotes,
bymanylogicallyindepen[P]eoplewhofavora policyusuallybelievethatitis supported
to one value, he is likelyto
dentreasons.Whena personbelievesa policycontributes
to severalothervalues,eventhoughthereis no reasonwhy
believethatitalso contributes
in sucha neatand helpfulmanner.This wouldnotbe
theworldshouldbe constructed
if in orderto agree witha proposition
a personhad to affirm
a numberof
irrational
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254
McDermott
Butoftenthepersonholdsa number
ofbeliefs,eachofwhichwould
necessaryconditions.
tojustifyhis policypreference.
be sufficient
(Jervis,1976)
This avoidanceof value trade-offs
characterized
the positionsof both
BrzezinskiandVanceas wellas Carterin thecase oftherescuemissionin Iran.
Vance believedthemissionwas likelyto fail,wouldalienateEuropeanallies,
inflametheIslamicworld,resultin moreAmericanhostagesbeingtaken,and
throwtheIraniansintotheSovietcamp,although
theseviewswerenotlogically
related.BrzezinskiandCarterbelievedthemissionwouldsucceed,engender
the
howeversubdued,ofalliedandArableaders,wouldnotlead toSoviet
gratitude,
infiltration
of thearea, and notharmotherAmericansin theregion.
Otherpossibleexplanations
forCarter'sconfidence
are moremotivational
in nature.One mightbe simplewishfulthinking.
Cartermayhavebelievedthat
themissionwouldsucceedbecausehe wantedit to succeed.However,thereis
evidenceto refutethisview.Carterwas awareof themilitary
risksinvolvedin
to
rescue
the
because
Vance
had
hostages
attempting
objectedto the mission
of
on
the
the
of
failure
and lostlives. Given
highprobability
precisely
grounds
Carter'sawarenessoftherisksinvolved,itis difficult
to sustainan argument
that
he believedit wouldsucceedsolelybecausehe wantedit to work.
Another
forconfidence
in theplanafterthedecisionwas made
explanation
have
had
to
do
with
This
that
may
justification. is similarto thephenomenon
occursindissonanceexperiments,
whenthe"spreading
of
the
alternatives
apart"
makesthechosenoptionmuchmoreattractive
thantherejectedone, no matter
how close in value theywereevaluatedpriorto actualchoice(Festinger,
1957;
Festigner& Carlsmith,1959; Wicklund& Brehm,1976). In thisway,dissonancereduction
worksto justifythesuperiority
of thechosenoptionafterthe
decision.This helpsto reduceregret,
evenlongafterthedecisionhas provedto
be suboptimal.
in thelikelihoodofthemission'ssuccess,even
Carter'sbeliefperseverance
afteritsfailure,is also highlyreminiscent
ofthefindings
ofFestinger,
Riecken,
andSchacter(Festigner
et al., 1956).Theytellthestoryofa religiouscultled by
a womanwhopreachedand preparedall herfollowers
fortheimminent
end of
theworld.Proselytizing
forthegrouptookplace onlyaftertheoriginalpredictionshad failedto come true.Festinger,
et al. suggestedthatsuchpost-failure
beliefis generated
tojustifyall thecostsincurred
inespousingtheoriginalbelief
consensual
system.Moreover,proselytizing
provides
realitytestingforsuch
beliefs.It is plausibleto arguethatCarterwas affectively
motivated
tobelievein
thelikelihoodof themission'ssuccess,evenafteritsfailure,in orderto justify
thelives lostin itspursuit.
intheprobability
Carter'sconfidence
ofsuccessis important
becauseitflies
in thefaceoftheestimated
both
in
terms
of livesandmaterial
risk,
lost,as well
as estimates
ofthelikelihoodthatthehostageswouldbe released.Thisis impor-
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Relations
Theoryin International
Prospect
255
thanmoreobjecwhichwas greater
tantbecauseit is preciselythisconfidence,
tiveestimatesof thelikelihoodof success,thatallowedCarterto decideto go
the risk,but had
ahead witha missionhe knewto be risky.He understood
of restoring
the
confidencethatit was worthtakingbecauseof thepossibility
statusquo as reference
former
point.
to assimilateand integrate
the
In makinghis decision,Carterattempted
him
his
advisors.
He
not
offered
to
have
been
had
been
that
may
by
opinions
ofthewayinwhichthisadvicewas skewedbythewayinwhich
aware,however,
fromhis own.
of theoperativedomaindiffered
theirassessments
Vancedidnotsee himself
as beingso obviously
In termsofprospecttheory,
he did notthinkthat
in thedomainof losses. As is clearfromhis statements,
unless
America
took
worse
would
positivestepstoprevent
getdrastically
things
thathappening.As his earlierquotesindicate,he believedthatas longas the
UnitedStateswas patientanddidnotuse force,thingswouldresolvethemselves
over time.Moreover,Vance did not see theentire
in America'sbest interest
did.Thus,
as
inquitethesamewayas Brzezinski
situation
deteriorating
political
whileVanceknewthingswereworsethantheyhadbeenbeforethehostageswere
the hostage
taken,he seemed to have acceptedand indeed "renormalized"
in
"reference
a
that
as
a
new
status
situation
Brzezinski,
Jordan,
quo
point"
way
ofthingsin termsof
andCarterdid not.Thismayhavebeenbecausehe thought
liveslost,andsinceno liveshadbeenlostpriortotherescuemission,he saw the
neutral.Thushe was notprepared
as stillbeingrelatively
to takerisks,
situation
himself
as
in
the
of
he
did
not
see
domain
losses.
because
acting
an entirely
different
Brzezinskiperceivedhimselfas confronting
situation.
and
the
to
be
in
the
realmof seriouslosses.
He clearlyviewedhimself
country
Again, thismay be because he framedthingsin termsof threatsto national
prestigeand honor,ratherthanin termsof lives lost. The UnitedStateswas
ina worsesituation
tothesevaluesthanithadbeenbeforethe
according
certainly
hostagesweretaken.Thus,in a classiccase of loss aversion,he did notassimilate his losses quicklyor easily.Rather,Brzezinskiwas preparedto takegreat
to theformer
statusquo and to increaseAmerica'sstandingby
risksto return
aboutthereleaseof thehostages.He believedthatthesituationwas
bringing
worseunlessAmericatookdrasticactionto prevent
boundto get significantly
deterioration
further
rightaway.As a result,BrzezinskiarguedagainstVance's
Moreover,Brzezinskibelievedthemissionwouldsucceed,albeit
predictions.
withcasualties:
A verycomprehensive
reviewof therescueplan by Brown,Jones,and myselfin midMarchled me to theconclusionsthattheplanhad a reasonably
goodchanceof success,
thoughtherewouldprobablybe casualties..
theadmittedly
feasiblerescuemission...
[W]e could undertake
riskybutincreasingly
Withthepassageof time,we wereall becomingmoreconfident
thatpossiblekinkswere
of success was increasbeing workedout of the rescueplan and thatthe probability
ing . . . (Brzezinski,1982)
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256
McDermott
By and large,CarteragreedwithBrzezinskiandtookissuewithalmostall
of Vance's concerns.Indeed,in responseto Vance's objectionson April 15,
Carterreplied:
and am notunconcerned
abouttheirwelfare.Butmyobligationis to those
I understand
me, you,and ourcountry!.
hostages,who represent
. rescue
.
I disagreewithyourassessmentof thereactionto the
mission.It if works,our
the
will
breathe
a
of
relief
that
it'soverandthattheywon'thave
all over world
friends
sigh
sanctions.The Moslemcountries
to imposefurther
for
maymakea fewpublicstatements
butyouknowas wellas I do thattheydespiseandfearKhomeini
thesakeofIslamicunity,
at himbehindhis back. (Jordan,1982)
and will be snickering
Carterwas also in therealmof losses,althoughnotto thesameextentas
concernwas reallythesafetyofthehostages,more
Brzezinski.Carter'sprimary
ofAmerica.Indeed,Carterdescribed
thantheinternational
thisgoal ina
prestige
diaryentryof November10:
We wantittobe quick,incisive,surgical,no loss ofAmerican
lives,notinvolveanyother
of theIranianpeoplethemselves,
minimalsuffering
to increasetheirrelianceon
country,
sureof successand unpredictable.
(Carter,1982)
imports,
thecrisis,and,in fact,therescue
Carterkepttheseas hisbasicgoals throughout
missioncameclosertomeeting
thesespecificgoalsthananyoftheotheroptions.
thatCarter'sexplicitgoal was tobringthehostages
It is clearfromhiscomments
home,nottopunishtheIranians.Thisis atleastpartofthereasonwhytherescue
of success,was chosen
mission,eventhoughmoreriskyin termsof probability
overtheothermilitary
a punitive
options,suchas miningtheharbororlaunching
of riskon theearlierlistof optionswas at the
strike.In fact,Carter'sthreshold
level of therescuemissionitself.He was a man who foundtheuse of force
to freethehostages.However,he
He feltpressureto do something
repugnant.
could notbringhimselfto engagein an act of warsuchas miningtheharbors,
especiallyifitwoulddo littleto directly
bringaboutthereleaseofthehostages.
thefinalcollapseof
Thus,Cartermadea decisionon April11, following
on April 1, to proceedwitha rescuemissionhe believedwould
negotiations
succeedin releasingthehostageswithout
theIslamic
allies,inflaming
alienating
in thetakingofadditional
world,pushingIranintotheSovietcamp,orresulting
Americanhostages.In otherwords,he took a gamblehe understood
to be
in
order
to
a
chance
at
losses
and
remilitarily
risky
grab
recoupingprevious
the
earlier
status
establishing
quo.
Riskiness
ofChosenOption
The relativeriskinessof undertaking
therescuemissionis bestevaluated
relativeto theotheroptionsconsidered
atthetime.Theseincludethediplomatic
and military
optionsdiscussedabove. By April,almostall political,economic
and diplomaticsanctionspossiblehad beenunilaterally
imposedon theIranian
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Relations
Theoryin International
Prospect
257
andstudents
bytheU.S. TheseincludedexpellingIraniandiplomats
government
fromtheU.S.; breakingdiplomaticrelations;imposingan embargoon all exportedmaterial,includingweaponspaid forby the shahbutneverdelivered;
in Iran
freezingIranianassets in the U.S.; and makingfinancialtransactions
in
order
to
U.S.
the
from
there.
citizens,including press,
illegal
prevent
traveling
Fromthestart,Carterbelievedthatmilitary
should
be
options
only pursued
if therewas an immediatethreatto the hostages'lives, if, forexample,the
or ifall negotiatIraniansputthemon trialandcondemned
them,as threatened,
This
of
in
channels
failed.
failure
is
fact
what
occurred
in April
negotiations
ing
of 1980.
At thattime,therescuemissionwas theoptionthatoffered
thegreatest
of
all
losses
and
to
the
status
returning
prospect recouping previous
quo that
existedbeforethehostageshadbeentakenin November.It was understood
that
a rescuemissionwerehigh,especiallyif it
the politicalrisksof undertaking
Brzezinski
andCarterfeltthatdoingnothing
failed.However,as mentioned,
was
the
evenmoreriskypolitically,
criticisms
of
especiallygiven widespread
presithatwerefloating
aroundthepressat thetime.Everyone
dentialincompetence
believedthata successfulmissioncouldredeemall losses.However,thepolitical
to assess in advance.Unfortunately,
riskof a failedmissionwas difficult
the
outcomeof eventsprovedjust how politicallyriskya failedmissioncould be:
Carterlosttheelection;thehostagesweredispersedall overIranandnotreleased
foranotherninemonths;and America'sinternational
staturediminished
even
further.
itis clearfromtheprincipals'
Froma military
memoirs
thatthe
perspective,
tobe theriskiest
rescuemissionwas understood
considoptionthatwas seriously
ered,bothin termsof likelihoodof success,as well as in termsof lives and
materialthatcould be lost.
The military
itselfknewofthehighrisksitwas undertaking
inplanning
the
rescuemission.Indeed,theJCS reporton themissionstatesexplicitly
that"the
rescuemissionwas a highriskoperation.Peopleand equipment
werecalledon
to perform
at the upperlimitsof humancapacityand equipmentcapability"
of
(U.S. DefenseDept., 1980).Indeed,AdmiralHollowayjudgedthelikelihood
successto havebeen about60% to 70% (Ryan,1985).
HamiltonJordan
tellsa storyabouta queryfromtheJCS'sGeneralJones-to
CharlesBeckwith,the man who eventuallyled the mission,at the outsetof
of successandtherisksinvolved;
planning.Beckwithwas askedtheprobability
he responded,"'Sir,' I said, 'theprobability
of successis zeroandtherisksare
high.'" (Jordan,1982).
However,as mentionedearlier,the confidenceof the principalsin the
successof therescuemissionincreasedafterthedecisionwas made.Evenafter
Brownratestheprobability
themissionfailed,Secretary
of successas highas
70%, arguingthatthemissionwas well-planned
(Jordan,1982).
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258
McDermott
to note,however,thattheintelligence
estimates
of success
It is interesting
by the military
may have been lowerthanunderstood
planners.Salingerdescribesan alleged CIA reportgiven to StansfieldTurneron March 16 that
evaluatedtheprospectsforrescuemissionsuccessas follows:
ofloss amongtheAmembassy
6. The estimated
percent
hostagesduringeachofthefive
majorphaseswas:
(a) Entry/Staging
Assumesno loss of cover
:0%
:20%
(b) Initialassault
loss of thoseunderStateFSR and FSS coverand others
Assumes. . . immediate
:25%
(c) Location/Identification
Loss of Statepersonnelbeforefullsuppression
of resistanceProblemaccentuated
since Amembassyhostagenotcollocated
:15%
(d) Evacuationto RH-53D's
Assumesloss fromsnipers,insideand outsideAmembassy
compound,and fromAT
and Apersmines.
to C-130s
(e) Transfer-RH-53s
of sitesecurity
Assumemaintenance
: 0%
7. The estimateof loss rateof 60% fortheAmembassyhostagesrepresents
thebest
estimateof CA and M & P staff.
8. It is presumedto be equallylikelythattheAmembassy
rescueattempt
wouldbe a
hostagesrescued),as itwouldbe a complete
completesuccess(100% of theAmembassy
failure(0% of theAmembassyhostagesrescued)
9. Of specialnoteis thefactthatno analogouslarge-scalerescueattempts
havebeen
mounted
in heavilypopulatedurbanareaswithin
hostileterritory
duringthepast 15 years.
The onlyroughlysimilarattempts
(Son Toy-Nov. 1970; Mayaguez-May 1975; Entebbe-July 1976) were all made in lightlypopulatedruralareas of hostileterritory
(Salinger,1981).
The storyof thissupposedlysecretreportwas originally
leakedto George
Wilsonat theWashington
Post in August1980butwas deniedbyFrankCarlucci, thendeputydirectorof theCIA. Accordingto JodyPowell,Carlucci'srein the
sponseto Wilsonwas as follows:"I have been unableto findanything
document
that
is
either
accurate
or
which
CIA
memoalleged
approximates
any
randumwe prepared."Wilsonrefusedto printthestory,
buta similarone was
publishedby JackAndersonseveralmonthslater(Powell, 1984).
However,a Timereporttheweekaftertherescuemissionstatedthat
deniedreports
in Washington
of a CIA estimatethat
Pentagonofficialshave adamantly
60% of the53 hostageswouldprobablyhavebeenkilledin therescueattempt.
ButTime
has learnedthatinitialcasualtyestimates
onceranas highas 200 fatalities,
both
including
oflosingfrom
hostagesand rescuers.The finalplandid, indeed,envisionthepossibility
15 to 20 hostages.(Time,May 12, 1980)
or nottheCIA document
Whether
was a forgery,
thequestionof historical
is
albeit
in
a
different
context.The factofthe
analogy againhighlighted,
slightly
matter
is thatrescueraidshavea highhistorical
(base rate)failurerate;theIran
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Relations
Prospect
Theoryin International
259
rescuemissionmayofferan almostclassicalexampleof therepresentativeness
in lightof a
in foreignpolicy,wherebase rateswereunderestimated
heuristic
salientsuccessfulcase. In thisinstancethatnotablecase was Entebbe,a rescue
terrain.
raid whichwas successful,althoughit tookplace in quitea different
thehistorical
trackrecordis dismal
In thecase ofAmericanrescueattempts,
atbest.The Son Toyraidon a Vietnamese
prisoner-of-war
camp,whichincluded
in theIranmission,failedbecausetheprisoners
soldierswho laterparticipated
had been movedto anotherlocationpriorto thearrivalof therescueteam.The
whotooknineIsraeliathleteshostagesduringthe 1972
raidon thePalestinians
MunichOlympicsresultedin thedeathsofall thehostagesandfiveoftherightThe 39 hostagesintheMayaguezincident
wereindeedfreed,but
wingterrorists.
itappearsthattheirreleasewas underway
to
the
rescue
mission.5Evenso,
prior
thatmissioncost thelives of 41 Americansoldiers,and woundedanother50.
Another
similarcase, thatoftheHammelburg
raidto releaseprisoners
relatively
of war in GermanyduringWorldWar II was onlypartlysuccessfulas well
becausefighting
withGermanforcessubsequent
to theraidwas heavy.
In fact,EntebbeandMogadishustandas relativeanomaliesinthehistory
of
thesekindsof missions,bothfortheirsuccessandtheirlackof casualties:three
werekilledat Entebbe;andthreeterrorists
were
hostagesand one Israeliofficer
killedby theWestGermansin Somalia. The keyto boththesesuccessfulraids
was totalsurprise
combinedwitha relatively
isolatedareaof attack.In spiteof
Entebbe
was
theoperative
thecriticalgeographical
differences,
analogyformost
oftheprincipals
involvedintheIranianrescuemission(Christopher
etal., 1953;
Time,May 5, 1980; Ryan,1985).
THE IRANIAN RESCUE MISSION
The actualoutcomeof thedecisionto rescuethehostagesin Iranhighlights
riskthatwas involvedintheundertaking.
therealityofthehugemilitary
Indeed,
of
theoverwhelming
the
is
a
critical
of
assessment
of
complexity
plan
part any
theriskinvolvedin thedecisionto undertake
therescuemission.
The rescueattempt,
codenamedOperationEagle Claw (theplanningphase
was called Rice Bowl), was a highlycomplexundertaking
(Ryan, 1985; U.S.
DefenseDept., 1980).Theplanwas foreightRH-53Dhelicopters
tobe launched
carrier
NimitzfromtheArabiansea andfly600 milestoa landing
offtheaircraft
fielddesignatedas DesertOne, neara towncalledTabas.Thesehelicopters
had
to flyundertotalradiosilenceat a low altitudeto avoidIranianradardetection,
and verylimitedinertialguidance.At thedesigusingonlyvisualnavigation,
natedsite,thehelicopters
wereto meetwithsixC-130transport
planesthatwere
to RobertJervisforclarification
on thespecificsof thismission.
5Jam grateful
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McDermott
260
to flyin fromMasirahIsland,offthecoastof Oman.ThreeC-130scarriedthe
assaultforceof about120 men;theotherthreecarriedfuelforthehelicopters.
theC-130sweretorefuelthehelicopters,
Aftermeeting,
transfer
thespecial
tobase. The helicopters
mentothem,andreturn
werethentoflyon to
operations
of Tehran,calledDesert
anotherlocationin thehillsabout100 milessoutheast
Two, wherethemenweregoingto hide out duringtheday untilthesurprise
attackon theembassy,whichwas plannedforthefollowing
night.Local sympato the embassy.Afterthe ground
thizershad arrangedgroundtransportation
weregoingtopickup thesoldiersandthe
attackon theembassy,thehelicopters
fromtheembassycompound,
hostagesat a stadiumacrossthestreet
flythemtoa
and flythemout of thecountry
on
nearbyabandonedairfield,at Manzariyeh,
C-141s thatwereto meetthemthere.Each phasewas timedto coincide.
to be risky,
bothin termsofthe
Everystageoftheplanwas acknowledged
of success,as well as thelikelihoodof livesand materiallost. The
probability
the aircraft
intothe countrywithoutdetectionwas
initialphase of inserting
of therescueteamto be themostdifficult
consideredby members
aspectof the
plan (Jordan,1982). The advancedstagesof theplan nevercame to fruition
because the missionwas abortedat DesertOne because therewere too few
to carryouttherestof themission.Planners
helicopters
judgedthatthemission
in orderto completethe task; eight
requireda minimumof six helicopters
wereconsidered
redundant
forthesuccessof
byall to be sufficiently
helicopters
themission.However,thisnumber
provedto be inadequateandthemissionwas
abortedbecauseonlyfiveoperational
reachedDesertOne.
helicopters
in the
Followingthedecisionto abortthemission,theaccidentthatresulted
Americancasualtiesoccurred.A helicopter
was refueling
forthereturn
flight,
kickedup a blindingamountof sand,and accidentally
flewintothenose of a
C-130 and instantly
exploded.Eightmenwerekilled,fourwerebadlyburned,
andtherestwerequicklyevacuated,leavingsix helicopters,
threewithsensitive
classifiedmaterial,
on thegroundfortheIranianstofind.The Iranianpolicelater
bombedthesehelicopters
and tookpicturesof themforpropagandapurposes.
Evidencesuggests,however,thattheIranianswerenotawareof theattempted
of it by theCarteradministration
at I
mission,or of itsfailure,untilinformed
a.m. Washington
timeon April26 (Carter,1982).
CONCLUSIONS
The failureof therescuemissionin Iranin Aprilof 1980 was a tragedy
whosefailureweighedheavilyon theprincipledecision-makers
involvedin its
and
execution.
While
Carter
not
have
believed
thatthe costs
planning
may
associatedwiththemissionwerehigh,he was wrongobjectively.
The failureof
therescuemissiondid makethingsworseforhim.Froma politicalstandpoint,
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Relations
Prospect
Theoryin International
261
inthepressfor
thefailurecostCartervaluablepoliticalcapital.He was criticized
a
well
as
for
not
movefromthe
as
making stronger
military
inadequateplanning,
more
start.Moreover,thefailureof themissionmade anysubsequentattempt
In short,Carter'splanfailedto releasethehostagesandreaffirmed
difficult.
his
of
From
a
more
domestic
the
image impotence.
personalperspective,
growing
difficult
forPresident
deathof the eightAmericansoldierswas particularly
issuedon April26, President
CarteracceptedfullresponsiCarter.In a statement
bilityfortheepisode:
Our rescueteamknew,and I knew,thattheoperationwas certainto be dangerous.We
were all convincedthatif and whentherescuephase of theoperationhad been commenced,it had an excellentchanceof success.Theywereall volunteers;
theywereall
highlytrained.. . . (Carterand Trimble,1989)
therescuemissioninIranwas madeduringa time
Thedecisiontoundertake
fortheCarteradministration.
of extremedifficulty
Indeed,thereis no question
ingeneralandfor
thatittookplaceduringa domainofloss fortheadministration
This was trueon botha domesticand on an international
Carterin particular.
level.The takingofthehostageswas a severeblowtoAmerican
power,prestige,
scene.The lackofalliedandU.N. support
on theinternational
andcredibility
for
an insult.Moreover,
Carterwas facingan increasingly
sanctionswas considered
arduousreelectioncampaignat home.In a classicexampleof operating
in the
domainof losses, it seemedthathe had littleto lose in launchingtherescue
to gain shouldit succeed. In fact,had the mission
missionand everything
becauseitis easilyconceivablethat
succeeded,history
mightlookquitedifferent
on thecrestof popularity
thatwouldcertainly
Cartercouldhavewonreelection
have followedsucha courageousrescue,successfully
completed.
The choice of therescuemissionwas indeedtheriskiestmilitary
option
ofsuccessas wellas
considered.Thisis truebothintermsoflikelihood
seriously
in termsof personneland materialcosts. Othermilitary
optionswere unielittleprobability
ofsuccessfor
quivocallyrejectedbyCarterbecausetheyoffered
Carterfelt
releasingthehostagesand involvedovertactsof war.Nevertheless,
to return
thehostageshome.
thathe had to do something
Ex postfacto,an analystcan see thatthebestoptionhad beenoffered
by
Vance. The hostageswerereleasedessentially
unharmed
Secretary
by theIranianswhentheyno longerservedanyfunction.
Once therevolutionary
governmentwas secure,thehostageswereallowedto leave,although
theremayhave
been some otherfactorsinvolvedin releasingthemonlya fewminutesafter
thepresident.
Carterwas no longerofficially
However,Carterwas clearlyunawareoftheseotherfactors.In somesense,Carterreceivedthe"right"adviceto do nothing-fromVance;he choseto ignoreit,however,and takethemore
riskymilitary
option.Even ifhe didn'tthinkof therescuemissionas risky,he
itwas moreriskythanotheroptionsthatwereavailableto
knewthatobjectively
him.He knewthemissioncarriedgreater
coststhantheotheroptions;it
potential
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262
McDermott
also promisedgreater
benefits.
In thissense,he tookthegamblein an attempt
to
win theprize.
foranyoftheparticipants
thecrisis,itwas difficult
toassessthe
Throughout
risks.This was especiallythe case because
balance of politicaland military
nationaland international
relatedas were
politicalriskswereoftenas inversely
risks.
it
is
clear
that
and
Carter
made a riskNonetheless,
military
political
He
had
other
choices
that
were
both
less
choice.
militarily risky,like
seeking
or
less
like
additionalindirect
the
harbors,
risky,
seeking
politically
mining
he
took
the
one
channels.
thatoffered
a
However,
gamble
negotiating
diplomatic
chance of recoupingall the losses he had previouslysustainedto regainthe
formerstatusquo. Had he succeeded,the payoffwould certainly
have been
of
success
was
the
the
and
mission
failed.
low,
However,
probability
great.
not
have
Whileotheroptions,suchas negotiating,
offered
the
same
may
potenin theend.
tialpayoff,theyprovedmorelikely,and moreprofitable,
consistent
This findingis perfectly
based on
with,and even predictable,
which
makes
little
Moreover,
prospecttheoryprovidesinsight
prospecttheory.
no
other
would
sensefroma structural
Indeed,
perspective.
theory
predictsuch
in
a
bad
situation.
to
his
inclinations
behavior
risky
Contrary
againsttheuse of
missionto rescuethehostages.He saw himself
force,Carterordereda military
a bad situationand tooka seemingly
irrational
confronting
gamblein orderto
his
losses
and
the
status
Thus
the
failedrescueofthe
regain previous
quo.
recoup
in
Iran
a
illustration
of
the
ofprospect
hostages
provides superb
operation
theory
in theinternational
realm.
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