IMT Institute for Advanced Studies, Lucca
Lucca, Italy
A MAIN GERMAN QUESTION
The Evolution of the FRG’s Multilateral Policy of
Détente in a Decade of Major Crises and
Changes, 1975-1985
PhD Program in Political Systems and Institutional Change
XXVI Cycle
By
Paola Varotto
2015
The dissertation of Paola Varotto is approved.
Program Coordinator: Prof. Giovanni Orsina, LUISS Guido Carli
Supervisor: Prof. Antonio Varsori, University of Padua
Tutor: Dr. Lucia Bonfreschi, LUISS Guido Carli
Tutor: Dr. Maria Elena Cavallaro, LUISS Guido Carli
The dissertation of Paola Varotto has been reviewed by:
Prof. Wilfried Loth, University of Duisburg-Essen
Prof. Federico Romero, European University Institute
IMT Institute for Advanced Studies, Lucca
2015
Contents
Vita and Publications
x
Abbreviations
xi
Abstract
xiii
Introduction
1
Object and arguments of the thesis
3
Defining the time period: years of crises, years of changes
6
Defining the context: West German foreign policy between
continuity and change
11
Elements of continuity
11
The constitutional moment of Bonn’s Eastern policy
14
In the name of responsibility
15
Literature review and contribution of the work
17
Approach and Sources
24
Structure of the work
26
v
Chapter 1
The Seminal Moment in Helsinki: Laying the Foundations for a
Multilateral Policy of Détente (1975-1976)
29
Introduction
29
The Helsinki CSCE as a “curious diplomatic enterprise”
34
Assessing the West German victory in Helsinki
38
Fostering human and security aspects of détente
40
Involving the U.S. in European détente
42
Coordinating with the West and multilateralising national
interests
45
Keeping the German question out, keeping the German question
open
47
Puzzling the West German victory in Helsinki
53
A concerted Western strategy for the process of
implementation
62
Time for a first assessment of the CSCE
67
Chapter 2
Putting the FRG’s Realistic Policy of Détente to the Test: West
German Diplomacy at the First CSCE Follow-up Meeting in
Belgrade (1977-1978)
70
Introduction: Domestic and international developments
paving the way to the first CSCE follow-up meeting in
Belgrade
70
Fostering a Western common concept of détente
76
Fostering a Western common agenda for Belgrade
80
Clashing visions and strategies of détente
85
vi
Pursuing transatlantic harmony in public policy
91
The Belgrade CSCE at its start: reviewing existing divergences
97
Dealing with the German political implications of the Belgrade
CSCE
104
Drafting the conference final document: a West German
miscalculation
107
The “Western struggle” for a final document
112
Dealing with a big disappointment: the West German
assessment of the first CSCE follow-up meeting in Belgrade
117
Conclusions: Some important lessons for the FRG’s realistic
policy of détente
121
Chapter 3
The “Return of Military Security” and the “Return of the Cold
War”: Adjusting the FRG’s Realistic Policy of Détente to
International Changing Conditions (1978-1980)
126
Introduction: Dealing with the legacy of Belgrade on the way
to Madrid
126
New challenges for East-West relations in the field of military
security
132
New opportunities for East-West relations in the field of
military security
137
Adjusting the FRG’s CSCE policy to new conditions: the
preparation of a balanced agenda for Madrid
141
Adjusting the FRG’s CSCE policy to times of crises: the
influence of Afghanistan and Poland
145
Afghanistan
146
Poland
150
vii
Rethinking a realistic policy of détente in the times of the
Afghan and Polish crises
Chapter 4
For the Sake of Poland, For the Sake of Détente: the
Implementation of a Realistic Policy of Détente at the Second
Follow-up Meeting in Madrid (1980-1983)
154
159
Introduction: Changing political landscapes in the West at the
beginning of the new decade
159
“Looking behind to go ahead”: reviewing the state of
multilateral détente in Madrid
162
Continuing European détente in the advent of the Reagan Era
167
Negotiations at the Nullpunkt: the West German dilemma
between hypotheses of adjournment and risks of isolation
169
Because of Poland, for Poland’s sake: the impact of the Polish
crisis on the further unfolding of the Madrid CSCE
174
Because of Poland...
174
... for Poland’s sake
181
“No business as usual”: dealing with the consequences of the
Polish crisis at the Madrid CSCE
185
Change and continuity: the new West German federal
government dealing with the last moves of the Madrid CSCE
191
The Madrid CSCE at its conclusion: matters of détente,
matters of security
201
Assessing the second CSCE follow-up meeting in Madrid:
security needs, good intentions and foreign political ambitions
207
viii
Chapter 5
The “Return of the Superpowers” and the “Return of the Past”:
A Reappraisal of the Process of Multilateral Détente Ten Years
after Helsinki (1984-1985)
213
Introduction
213
The FRG’s aspirations at the Conference on Confidence and
Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Stockholm
216
New ways for cooperation on security: the restart of the
superpower dialogue in the mid-Eighties
224
A symbolic year: commemorating the common past, looking
to the common future
229
Celebrating ten years of European détente: a final reappraisal
235
Conclusions
240
Assessing the meaning of the FRG’s CSCE policy in the years
1975-1985
240
Ideal inspiration
241
Vital national needs
243
Foreign political ambitions
244
Assessing the trajectory of the FRG’s CSCE policy in the years
1975-1985
Bibliography
247
251
ix
Vita and Publications
May 9, 1985
Born, Padua (Italy)
July 2007
Bachelor Degree in European Politics
and Integration
Final mark: 110/110 cum laude
University of Padua
Padua (Italy)
February 2010
Master Degree in International Politics
and Diplomacy
Final mark: 110/110 cum laude
University of Padua
Padua (Italy)
October 1, 2012 –
September 30, 2013
Visiting Research Student, Humboldt
University of Berlin – Department of
History – Chair of History of Western
Europe and Transatlantic Relations
Berlin (Germany)
Max Chrambach, Konstantin Freytag-Loringhoven, Isabella Lehner and
Paola Varotto, “From entranching to overcoming the Iron Curtain. The
changing goals of Western cultural diplomacy in the first phase of the
Cold War (1945-1975)”, in Zeitgeschichte 6 (2011), From Cold War to
Détente, pp. 384-408. ISSN 0256-5250
x
Abbreviations
AA
Auswärtiges Amt
AAPD Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik
Deutschland
CBMs Confidence Building Measures
CDE
Conference on Disarmament in Europe
CDU
Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands
CPSU Communist Party of the Soviet Union
CSCE
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
ČSSR
Československá Socialistická Republika
CSU
Christlich-Soziale Union
EEC
European Economic Community
ECE
Economic Commission for Europe
EPC
European Political Cooperation
FDP
Freie Demokratische Partei
FRG
Federal Republic of Germany
GDR
German Democratic Republic
IISS
International Institute for Strategic Studies
INF
Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces
LRTNF Long-Range Theatre Nuclear Forces
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
MBFR Mutual Balanced Force Reduction
MfS
Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (STASI)
xi
NNAs Neutral and Non-Aligned Countries
PA AA Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes
RAF
Rote Armee Fraktion
SALT
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
SDI
Strategic Defense Initiative
SED
Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands
SPD
Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands
START Strategic Arms Reduction Talks
TNFs
Theatre Nuclear Forces
U.K.
United Kingdom
UN
United Nations
U.S.
United States
USSR
Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics
xii
Abstract
This thesis investigates the evolution of the FRG’s multilateral policy of
détente between 1975 and 1985. During this decade Cold War relations went
through major crises and changes which affected directly political balances in
Europe. This work investigates how Bonn’s federal government – and the
Auswärtiges Amt in particular – rethought its détente strategy after the
conclusion of the first Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
(CSCE) in Helsinki in order to adapt it to changing international conditions. It
highlights the increasing importance of the CSCE process within the West
German broader international strategy towards the Western allies and the
Eastern partners.
The FRG’s CSCE policy during the first half of the Seventies has commonly
been described as a completion or multilateral guarantee of Bonn’s bilateral
Eastern policy (Ostpolitik). Its development after the 1975 signing of the
Helsinki Final Act has been largely overlooked by historical research. This
thesis aims at offering a new interpretation of its later evolution. It argues that
the CSCE process affirmed itself after 1975 as a FRG’s priority foreign political
domain. Undoubtedly, Bonn’s efforts to rescue multilateral détente in the late
Seventies-early Eighties were directed to shelter the prosecution of its bilateral
cooperation with the East from escalating Cold War tensions. However,
pursuing a proactive CSCE policy became increasingly important per se.
Indeed, the series of conferences on security and cooperation in Europe offered
the adequate diplomatic framework wherein Bonn could chase its national
interests and foreign political ambitions, in years in which the FRG was called
to greater international responsibilities and was trying to emerge as a more
influent political actor on the global stage.
Based on a foreign policy-centred approach, this thesis is the result of the
careful investigation of a wide range of primary sources from the Political
Archive of the German Federal Foreign Office, as well as of newspapers articles
from the Seventies and Eighties. The work offers a contribution to the study of
West German foreign policy and Cold War history during the decade which
paved the way to the important transformations of the late Eighties.
xiii
“It is therefore once again a duty of responsible observers at this moment in history to
focus their minds on the Germans. What are they, really (eternal question)?
Luigi Barzini, The Europeans, 1983
Introduction
In 1983 Italian journalist Luigi Barzini observed: “The future of
Europe appears largely to depend today once again, for good or evil,
whether we like it or not, as it did for many centuries, on the future of
Germany. It is still, as Madame de Staël wrote, ‘le cœure de l’Europe’.1 [...]
It is therefore once again a duty of responsible observers at this
moment in history to focus their minds on the Germans. What are they,
really (eternal question)? What do they fancy they are? Where are they
going, wittingly or unwittingly? Where do they think they are going?”. 2
As Barzini’s interrogatives suggest, a German question continued to
exist and affect European affairs in the early Eighties. What historians
of the Cold War traditionally refer to by using the formula “German
question”, represented the cornerstone of the postwar settlement of
Europe. It was, first, about the postwar division of the German nation
and the management of peace in Europe; second, about the creation of
two separate German states – the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG)
and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) – belonging to different
and competing systems in the centre of Europe, where the dividing line
1 L. Barzini, The Europeans (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), p. 69.
2 Ibid., p. 107.
1
between the opposite Cold War blocs run.3 As a tight bipolar system
came into being in world affairs, Germany’s division became strictly
dependent on East-West dynamics: i.e. any transformation of the Cold
War status quo in Europe implied a redefinition of the German question
and vice versa. A number of other aspects contributed, moreover, to
shape the German question: constraints to the German power, material
and psychological limits to the sovereignty of both German states,
security needs, questions of uncertain borders, enduring memories of
the recent past and enemy images evoking deep-seated fears
(Feindbilder).4
For the Federal Republic of Germany dealing with the German
question meant foremost, in the course of the Cold War decades,
coping with its peculiarity within the Western front. This implied, in
the specific, finding a way of living in direct contact with the
cumbersome presence of occupying forces, the Iron Curtain and the
Berlin Wall; handling the peculiar needs and worries deriving from its
geopolitical position in the middle of the continent (Mittellage) and on
the East-West border (Randlage); striking a balance between the
presumption of being the only legitimate representative of a
(temporary) divided nation and the need of finding concrete ways of
living together with the other German state; finding a solution to the
dilemma of whether giving up maintaining contacts with the Germans
living in the East or pursuing dialogue with the authorities of a not
recognised country, the GDR,5 and of the enemy bloc; dealing with the
3 For a definition of the Cold War German question both as “Central European question”
and “central European question”, see: T. Garton Ash, In Europe’s Name. Germany and the
Divided Continent (New York: Random House, 1993), pp. 1-13.
4 For an insightful analysis of the historical meaning, dimensions and implications of the
German question, see: E. Collotti, Dalle due Germanie alla Germania unita (Torino: Giulio
Einaudi Editore, 1992); I. Geiss, Die deutsche Frage 1806-1990 (Mannheim, et al.: B.I.Taschenbuchverlag, 1992); W. R. Smyser, From Yalta to Berlin. The Cold War Struggle over
Germany (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999); D. Verheyen, The German question. A
Cultural, Historical, and Geopolitical Exploration (Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford: Westview
Press, 1991).
5 The recognition of the GDR as international sovereign state on the same level as the
FRG was prohibited by West German postwar constitution, the Basic Law.
2
burdens and the legacies of the German power’s past aggressiveness.
Last but not least, it meant learning to develop a new foreign political
identity and finding a more certain collocation in international politics.
Object and arguments of the thesis
This thesis investigates the evolution of the West German
multilateral policy of détente (Entspannungspolitik) – as it was
implemented within the framework of the Conferences on Security and
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) between 1975 and 1985 – by
contextualizing its pursuit in the broader changing international
scenario. Indeed, during this decade Cold War relations went through
major crises and transformations which affected directly the political
balances in the European continent. With regard to East-West relations,
the new era of bipolar dialogue inaugurated at the end of the Sixties
reached its peak in 1975, as thirty-five heads of state and government
from Europe, the U.S. and Canada gathered in Helsinki to sign the final
accords from the first Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe. During the first half of the Seventies relations between the two
Cold War blocs had profited from the convergence between the
different projects of superpower détente and European détente.6 As the
relationship between Washington and Moscow deteriorated
dramatically after 1975, Western Europeans were confronted with the
question of how to continue East-West dialogue in a context of
renewed Cold War confrontation (i.e. the so-called “Second Cold
War”). Defending the achievements of détente was particularly
6 For an analysis of the different meaning of European détente and superpower détente and
of their interaction, see: J. Hanhimäki, “Détente in Europe, 1962-1975” in The Cambridge
History of the Cold War. Volume II: Crisis and Détente, eds. M.P. Leffler and O.A. Westad
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 198-218; I. M. Wall, “The United
States and two Ostpolitiks: de Gaulle and Brandt”, in The making of Détente. Eastern and
Western Europe in the Cold War, 1965-1975, eds. W. Loth and G.H. Soutou (London and
New York: Routledge, 2008), pp. 133-150; G.M. Mattox, “The United States Tests
Détente”, in The Strategic Triangle. France, Germany and the United States in the Shaping of
the New Europe, eds. H. Haftendorn, G.H. Soutou, S.F. Szabo, S.F. Wells Jr. (Washington
D.S.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2006), pp. 261-285.
3
important to the FRG: given its special geopolitical position, it was the
European country which benefited the most from improved relations
with its Eastern neighbours and suffered the most under the
consequences of a new international confrontational course.
The general assumption of this thesis is that the years under study
represented a fundamental formative period for West German foreign
policy. The evolution of the West German multilateral policy of détente
is studied as an important part of a broader process of definition and
implementation of a more assertive foreign policy which could better
fit the FRG’s undisputed economic strength without otherwise fuelling
perennial fears of rising German power. During the decade of the
Seventies, indeed, the West German economic stability against a
background of diffuse crisis enhanced the country’s relative weight
within an international system growingly dominated by economic
issues and interdependence.7 Moreover, the successes of the new policy
of dialogue with the East (Ostpolitik) implemented by the social-liberal
coalition government of charismatic and popular Chancellor Willy
Brandt encouraged the West German ambition to take more effective
foreign political initiatives. Boosted by these developments, foreign
policy returned to be a federal government’s top priority, after
domestic politics had been in the foreground for years.8 As it has
traditionally been stressed, the “economic giant” aimed at overcoming
its position of a “political dwarf” on the international stage. Truly, in
the course of the Seventies West German diplomacy went through an
important learning process as the FRG was called upon to take greater
international responsibilities.
The present work argues, first, that the CSCE framework
represented – for a series of reasons which will be analysed in the
course of this dissertation – the foreign political domain where this
evolution of Bonn’s international action was more evident,
7 W. Jäger, W. Link, Republik im Wandel, 1974-1982: Die Ära Schmidt. Geschichte der
Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Stuttgart: 1987, DVA), p. 276.
8 R. Zundel, “Mitspieler oder Spielmacher? Bonns neue Rolle in der Außenpolitik“, in Die
Zeit, Nr. 30/1975, 18.07.1975.
4
notwithstanding some hindrances and setbacks; second, that the West
German federal government – especially the Foreign Office
(Auswärtiges Amt) – invested a great deal of efforts into the CSCE
process, as it offered an adequate field to implement a proactive and
comprehensive détente policy which allowed fostering the country’s
own vital interests. The mechanism of follow-up conferences set out in
the Helsinki Final Agreement provided a permanent multilateral
diplomatic forum where Bonn could best chase its national and
international interests and foreign political ambitions, in years in which
the FRG was expected to shoulder greater international responsibilities
and was trying to emerge as a more influential political actor on the
global stage.
This research focuses in particular on the diplomatic strategy
deployed by Bonn’s Foreign Office to chase, reinforce and safeguard
the multilateral policy of dialogue with the East within the framework
of the CSCE follow-up meetings. It analyses how the Auswärtiges Amt
rethought and revised its détente strategy after the 1975 conclusion of
the first CSCE in Helsinki in order to adapt it to changing international
conditions. This dissertation advances the argument that the FRG’s
multilateral détente policy underwent a major qualitative change
during the years between 1975 and 1985, by taking increasingly the
shape of a realistic, flexible and countercyclical policy. The major episodes
of East-West crises of the decade – i.e. the renewed superpower nuclear
competition, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the exacerbation of
the Polish crisis – challenged seriously the prosecution of the process of
détente; however, they turned into important occasions of foreign
political refection and stimulated the transformation of the West
German multilateral détente strategy. The analysis of this evolution
shows, moreover, the increasing importance the CSCE process gained
within the FRG’s overall spectrum of international action. The pursuit
of multilateral détente affirmed itself, in the course of the years 19751985, as a well-established issue in the West German political agenda: it
became largely accepted by those domestic political forces which had
originally firmly opposed it and survived nearly unchanged the major
5
political turn of the early Eighties, i.e. the return to power of the
Christian Democratic Party (CDU/CSU).
The present work confirms the existence of a strict intertwining
between Bonn’s bilateral Eastern policy and multilateral détente policy.
They were undoubtedly linked by a relationship of functional
interdependence. As it emerges with evidence from the analysis of this
dissertation, the continuation of the CSCE process contributed
importantly to safeguarding at the multilateral level both the
achievements and the working conditions of Bonn’s bilateral dialogue
with East Berlin and the other Eastern capitals. However, the view
according to which the West German CSCE policy would represent a
mere multilateral completion of Ostpolitik is challenged: indeed, its
pursuit gained growing value per se, as well, within the Auswärtiges
Amt’s comprehensive international strategy.
Defining the time period: years of crises, years of changes
The first aim of this dissertation is to contextualize the evolution of
the West German policy of multilateral détente in the broader
transforming Cold War scenario of the late Seventies-early Eighties. As
the FRG’s foreign political decisions were profoundly affected by
international circumstances, it is useful to review briefly the main
developments marking the decade under study.
The years between the mid-Seventies and the mid-Eighties were
marked by serious crises, several returns and a number of major
transformations. After the postwar economic boom and revolutionary
spirit of the late Sixties, the Seventies represented a decade of
“diminished expectations”, according to the definition used by Tony
Judt.9 These years were characterised by diffuse sentiments of crisis,
pessimism and preoccupation. Western democracies were faced with
the return of monetary inflation and economic recession; declining
9 T. Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945 (New York: The Penguin Press, 2005), p.
453.
6
growth rates were flanked by raising unemployment; social discontent
grew in parallel with mounting social problems and protests against
the establishment turned to violent confrontation in some countries –
particularly Italy and West Germany – where terrorist groups
intensified their open challenge to the stability of the democratic
system in the late Seventies.10 The overall impression that the West had
entered an age of crisis it was incapable to handle with led, as Judt
analyses, “to much nervous talk of the ‘ungovernable’ condition of
Western societies. Such anxieties proved overwrought: under stress, the
institutions of Western Europe showed more resilience than many
observers had feared. But there was no return to the optimism – or the
illusions – of the first postwar decade.” 11 Economic downfall and social
discontent undermined the broad consensus which had embraced the
Keynesian model and traditional political parties throughout the
postwar decades. As a consequence, political landscapes underwent a
process of fragmentation and the free-market ideology fostered by
neoclassical economics gained a foothold almost everywhere in
Western Europe.12
With regard to international relations, the time period which spans
between the second half of the Seventies and the first half of the
Eighties has been traditionally depicted by historians as an age marked
by multiple crises. Commenting on these years, West German
Chancellor Helmut Schmidt talked about a “double crisis” which the
world (and the FRG) entered between the late 1970s and the early
1980s.13 This “double crisis” involved, first, the strong escalation of
10 For a comparative historical analysis of West German Rote Armee Fraktion and Italian
Brigate Rosse, see: R. Lucchesi, RAF und Rote Brigaden – Deutschland und Italien von 1970 bis
1985 (Berlin: Frank & Timme, 2013).
11 T. Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945, p. 453.
12 For an historical account of the ideological-intellectual turn of the early Eighties and
the advent of the liberal era, see: J.W. Müller, “The Cold War and the intellectual history
of the late twentieth century”, in The Cambridge History of the Cold War. Volume III:
Endings, eds. M.P. Leffler and O.A. Westad (Cambridge et al.: Cambridge University
Press, 2010), pp. 1-22; and G. Arrighi, “The world economy and the Cold War, 19701990”, ibid., pp. 23-44.
13 H. Schmidt, Freiheit Verantworten (Düsseldorf, Vienna: Econ Verlag, 1983), p. 7.
7
tensions between the two blocs, which raised citizens’ fears and worries
over the chance to preserve peace and the possible explosion of a
nuclear conflict; second, the economic stagnation regarding the whole
industrialised world, which led to recession and the rise of
unemployment in many countries and raised worries about the return
of a possible second, big global depression.
In the course of these years of international crises superpower
détente collapsed, causing the stalemate of bilateral arm talks and
undermining seriously the conditions for the prosecution of European
détente.14 The worsening of U.S.-Soviet relations was boosted by the
return of military confrontation outside Europe (so-called “proxy wars”
between the superpowers in Africa), growing Soviet military
interventionism (Soviet invasion of Afghanistan), and renewed military
competition in Europe (dispute over missiles). It was aggravated by the
rigidity of the last years of Brezhnev’s leadership, by Carter’s dogmatic
human rights campaign and by Reagan’s assertive policy of strength.
Security issues returned to be at the centre of Western European – and
especially West German – worries, as the deployment of Soviet newgeneration missiles in Eastern Europe and Moscow’s military
intervention in Afghanistan were interpreted as threatening signals of
the USSR’s willingness to return to a renewed aggressive international
course. The transatlantic relationship, as well, was confronted with
major difficulties and tensions in the course of the decade under study:
the lacking transatlantic entente over a number of international issues
significantly contributed to reinforce the impression of a steady state of
crisis in the Alliance.15 The outburst of the second oil crisis, which was
14 For an overall analysis of the most important aspects of the crisis of détente in the late
Seventies and Early Eighties, see: L. Nuti, ed., The Crisis of Détente in Europe. From Helsinki
to Gorbachev, 1975-1985 (London and New York: Routledge, 2009).
15 Amongst the large number of historical analyses of the state of transatlantic relations
in the late Seventies-early Eighties, see: M. Gilbert, “Gli anni Settanta: un decennio di
tensione e disattenzione nelle relazioni transatlantiche”, in Le crisi transatlantiche.
Continuità e trasformazioni, eds. M. Del Pero, Mario, F. Romero (Roma: Edizioni di Storia e
Letteratura, 2007), pp. 45-64; L. Nuti, “Gli anni Ottanta: le relazioni transatlantiche
durante la Presidenza Reagan”, ibid., pp. 85-110; K.K. Patel, K. Weisbrode, eds., European
Integration and the Atlantic Community in the 1980s (New York: Cambridge University
8
mainly caused by the wave of panic that the 1979 overthrow of the
Shah in Iran produced in the oil markets, had tremendous large-scale
consequences for international economies.16 Whereas during the
Seventies there had been many talks about the “crisis of the West”, it
was the traditional reputation of the Soviet strength that began to
crumple at the end of the decade. The East bloc was increasingly
confronted with internal ideological challenges coming from the eurocommunist movement, dissident groups and supporters of a
liberalisation of Eastern socio-political systems; with economic
hardship and stagnation; with its own incapability to cope adequately
with the renewed East-West rivalry in the field of arms race. The
outburst of the Polish crisis in the early 1980s became the emblem of
the poor health conditions of the whole Soviet bloc.
The “years of crises” entailed, however, significant transformative
aspects, whose importance has been often overshadowed by their
negative denotation. All these episodes of crisis were mainly late
consequences of older scleroses and unsolved problems inherited from
the previous years. They urged and boosted processes of
transformations, redefinitions and pursuit of innovative solutions.
Hence, the time span under study in this work was also a time of
radical redefinition of the postwar order and of major transition to a
new social-cultural age. The “conservative revolution” promoted by the
tandem Reagan-Thatcher in the early Eighties – paralleled by its West
German version, namely the “spiritual-moral turn” (geistig-moralische
Wende) announced by Christian Democratic leader Helmut Kohl –
spread across the Western bloc. Political landscapes in Western Europe
underwent similar processes of fragmentation and new political
groupings started to challenged the monopoly of traditional political
parties. The list of large-scale transformations marking this process of
renovation includes also: the advent of postmodernism in many fields
Press, 2013); M. Schultz, T.A. Schwartz, eds., The Strained Alliance: US-European Relations
from Nixon to Carter (Cambridge and Washington: Cambridge University Press and
German Historical Institute, 2010)
16 G. Garavini, After Empires. European Integration, Decolonization & the Challenge from the
Global South, 1957-1986 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 246.
9
of human activities, a concept which insisted on the idea of breaking
with the past and whose vagueness was paralleled by immediate widespread popularity;17 and the onset of globalization and of the
technologic revolution which prompted a dramatic acceleration of
interdependence. With regard to the novelties in the realm of
international politics, the growing economic interdependence urged the
start of a new season of regular summits amongst the leaders of the
most industrialised nations, which began in November 1975 in
Rambouillet;18 a process of radical economic reforms started in China in
1978, prompting growing economic growth and opening to the world;
dictatorships came to an end in Portugal, Spain and Greece and were
followed by parallel processes of transitions in all three countries and
by the ensuing EC’s enlargement to the South;19 the development of
new energetic sources received significant impulse on the wave of the
second oil shock and ecological issues became crucial items of political
and public debate, involving the active commitments of governments 20;
peace movements burgeoned in Western societies and their demands
directly questioned the validity and the sustainability of the bipolar
international order, urging an overall rethinking of the whole Cold War
system.21
All these episodes of crisis and change compose the broad
background against which this study unfolds. A large part of them will
be addressed in the ensuing chapters: they will be analysed through the
lenses of their impact on and interaction with the main research
17 Philosophical manifesto of post-modernism was the work of French philosopher JeanFrançois Lyotard La conditione postmoderne, published in 1979.
17 N. Ferguson Niall, C. Maier, S. Charles, E. Manela, D.G. Sargent, eds., The Shock of the
Global. The 1970s in Perspective (Cambridge, MA; London: 2010); H. James, Rambouillet, 15.
November 1975. Die Globalisierung der Wirtschaft (München: DTV, 1997).
19 For an historical account of the EC’s role in Southern Europe after the end of the
dictatorships, see: M. Del Pero, V. Gavìn, F. Guirao, A. Varsori, eds., Democrazie. L’Europa
meridionale e la fine delle dittature (Milano: Le Monnier, 2010).
20 An example for this trend is represented by U.S. President Carter’s project for the
development of solar energy.
21 The requests of the West German peace movements in the FRG alimented renewed
fears of pan-Germanism and neutralization, raising a large public debate in the FRG.
10
question of this work. By coping with major crises and transformations,
Western national states were urged to make sense of themselves, both
with regard to their domestic transformations and their changing
international tasks. This process of rethinking was particularly evident
in the case of the FRG, which went through a process of profound
revision of its national and international identity.
Defining the context: West German foreign policy between
continuity and change
The second aim of this dissertation is to place the analysis of the
evolution of the West German CSCE policy in the years 1975-1985
within the broader process of transformation of West German foreign
policy. Détente policies provided an important field where the
Auswärtiges Amt could carry out its attempts to play a more dynamic
and assertive role in the international arena. It is therefore important to
introduce briefly the foreign political context underpinning the
implementation of Bonn’s CSCE policy after 1975, i.e. to highlight the
main characteristics marking West German foreign policy in the midSeventies.
Elements of continuity
As Helga Haftendorn has claimed, West German foreign policy was
a curious construction, subject to a “double containment”, i.e. affected
by the burden of past horrors as well as by the East-West
confrontation.22 Structural and psychological limits continued to restrict
the room of manoeuvre of West German foreign policy in the years
wherein the FRG committed itself to playing a more assertive
international role.
The country’s geopolitical position steadily affected its national
interests and needs, amongst those security issues remained in the
22 H. Haftendorn, Deutsche Außenpolitik zwischen Selbstbeschränkung und Selbstbehauptung
(Stuttgart, München: DVA, 2001), p. 10.
11
foreground. The FRG continued to depend on the Western Alliance –
especially on the U.S. – for the tutelage of its security needs. The
coordination with the Western partners remained essential even
though sometimes difficult. In particular the special relationship with
the bigger ally, i.e. the U.S. administration, was carefully cultivated by
Bonn’s federal government notwithstanding frequent divergences and
mutual incomprehension. Dealing with the East continued to be a
delicate affair even after the major shift introduced by the launch of
Brand’s new Ostpolitik: the FRG’s Eastern initiatives remained under
scrutiny by the Western allies.23 Questions concerning the state of the
inner-German dialogue and the situation of Berlin continued to be
object of regular discussion between Bonn and its allies.24 With the
cumbersome presence of its wall and the Four Powers’ enduring duties
regarding its destiny,25 the former capital of the German Reich
23 As U.S. Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Hartmann explained to the head of
the political department of the Auswärtiges Amt, van Well, in December 1975, the three
powers “strongly recommended” to the West German federal government to inform
them “more extensively and more regularly” about its talks and negotiations with the
GDR. It was, indeed, important that they could gain knowledge in due time of questions
affecting them closely. See: Ministerialdirektor van Well, z.Z. Brüssel, an das Auswärtige Amt,
12.12.1975, in AAPD, 1975, vol. II, doc. 382, p. 1801. The request of more exhaustive and
regular consultations had been already directed to the FRG by the three powers in June
1975, as they had complained about the reticence of the new Schmidt/Genscher
government in providing information about its moves towards East Berlin: see
Aufzeichnung des Staatssekretärs Gehlhoff, 2.06.1975, in , 1975, vol. I, Doc. 144, p. 661.
24 One important permanent forum of discussion on German-German and Berlin
questions was provided by the routine of regular meetings of the foreign ministers of the
FRG, the U.S., the U.K. and France, which traditionally took place in conjunction with the
gatherings of NATO Council of Ministers. The coordination between the Bundesrepublik
and the three Western partners was two-way: on the one hand, Bonn was offered the
possibility to be involved and have voice in the decisions regarding Berlin – for whose
status the three powers shared the responsibility with the Soviet Union; on the other
hand, Bonn was asked to involve the Western partners in the pursuit of its bilateral
relations with the GDR.
25 The rights and responsibilities of the Four Powers – France, the U.K., the U.S. and the
USSR – over the future of the former German capital and of Germany as a whole were
reconfirmed in the 1971 Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin. For the text of the
agreement, see: J. Nawrocki, ed., Die Beziehungen zwischen den beiden Staaten in
Deutschland: Entwicklungen, Möglichkeiten und Grenzen (Berlin: Holzapfel 1986).
12
embodied that persistent interweaving of two world wars’ legacies,
Cold War dynamics, and symbolic and everyday repercussions of the
East-West division, which continued to shape the complexity of the
German question. The Four Powers’ responsibility for Berlin and
Germany as a whole represented the counterweight to Bonn’s
economic predominance in Europe.26 Fears of a return of the “German
power”,27 worries about the re-emergence of the neutrality-option for
the FRG28 and suspicion about inner-German rapprochement continued
to influence the European partners’ hearts and minds. 29
All these factors represented elements of continuity marking the
unfolding of West German foreign policy – even though with different
nuances – throughout the whole duration of the Cold War. As it will
emerge from the analysis in the course of the next chapters of the
present work, these restrictions affected the conduction of the West German
CSCE policy and were consciously taken into account by the Auswärtiges
Amt when formulating and implementing its détente strategy.
26 Botschafter Freiherr von Braun, Paris, an das Auswärtige Amt, 9.02.1976, in AAPD, 1976, I,
Doc. 43, p. 186.
27 See, for instance: K.P. Schmid, “Wenn Debré an Deutschland denkt. Angst vor Bonns
Übergewicht in Europa“, in Die Zeit, 33/1975, 8.08.1975.
28 Worries about the return of the “neutrality option” for Germany’s settlement were
alimented by the growing popularity of protests against the NATO double-track decision
of West German pacifist and anti-nuclear movements in the early Eighties: their requests
challenged indeed the validity of the bipolar order. Bonn’s attempts to safeguard the
dialogue with the East in times of renewed bipolar confrontation were target of the
Western partners’ suspicions as well. As stressed in a cablegram sent from Brussels to the
Foreign Office in Bonn, there was some fear in the Western Alliance that the FRG’s efforts
to continue its Ostpolitk would make the federal government hostage of the Eastern
requests. See: Botschafter Wieck, Brüssel (NATO), an das Auswärtiges Amt, 16.02.1981, in
AAPD, 1981, vol. I, doc. 42, p. 237.
29 Emblematic of those suspicions was the statement of Italian Foreign Minister Giulio
Andreotti, who in 1984 claimed that: “Everybody agrees that the two Germanys should
have good relations. It should be clear, however, that pan-Germanism is something that
must be overcome. There are two German states and two German states must remain”.
See: J.M. Markham, “For both East and West two Germanys is better”, in The New York
Times, 23.09.1984.
13
The constitutional moment of Bonn’s Eastern policy
Besides the existing elements of continuity, West German foreign
policy had undergone a major transformation during the first half of
the Seventies, which paved the way to its following developments. The
real turning point had been marked by the return to power of the Social
Democrats of the SPD in 1969 – in coalition with the Free Democratic
Party (FDP) – for the first time since the era of the Weimar Republic.
New Chancellor Willy Brandt brought along the experience he had
collected by serving three years as foreign minister in Kiesinger’s
coalition government (1966-1969) and devised together with his
collaborator Egon Bahr a new approach to relations with the GDR, the
Soviet Union and the other Eastern countries.
Bonn’s new Eastern policy was inspired by the idea of “change
through rapprochement” – Wandel durch Annährung – which
overturned Adenauer’s traditional conception of relationship with the
Soviet bloc: the solution to the German question was no more the
precondition for a normalisation of relations with the Eastern countries,
but rather a policy of dialogue and multiple contacts with the East
would lay the favourable grounds for the overcoming of Germany’s
and Europe’s division.30 Within few years since its start, West German
Ostpolitik reached a series of important diplomatic achievements: a
complex of agreements – the so-called Eastern Treaties – were signed
with Moscow and Warsaw (1970), East Berlin (1972) and Prague (1973);
the signing of the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin was attained in
1971; the ratification of the Basic Treaty with the GDR by the Bundestag
in 1973 paved the way to the de facto normalisation of relations with
East Berlin, to the exchange of “Permanent Representatives” between
the two German states, to the participation of both countries in the
CSCE in Helsinki and to a new season of regular inner-German
contacts. The “age of Treaties” marked the constitutional moment of
the FRG’s relations with the Eastern bloc: it set the ground for their
ensuing developments and provided the irreversible foreign political
30 T. Judt, Postwar, p. 497.
14
legacy inherited by Chancellor Helmut Schmidt after the resignation of
his predecessor in 1974.
The conduction of bilateral relations with the Eastern countries was
flanked by the pursuit of negotiations for a Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe at a multilateral level. They were both
constituents of the same détente project directed to the future aim of
building a new order of peace and overcoming bipolar division on the
European continent through the steady multiplication of East-West
diplomatic, economic and human contacts. Hence, Eastern policy, innerGerman dialogue and multilateral détente were integral part of the same
foreign political project which established progressively itself as a deep-seated
West German foreign political paradigm; their mutual interactions are
object of analysis of the following chapters.
In the name of responsibility
According to Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, it was only in the
Seventies that the FRG discovered its interest for world politics.31 In the
course of the decade the country was called upon to take on greater
international responsibilities. This was a consequence, in part, of the
success of the German model (Modell Deutschland): the FRG affirmed
itself as an example of relative economic, social and political stability
against a background of diffuse crisis.32 It was a consequence, too, of
the successful achievements of Bonn’s Ostpolitik and of the age of
Treaties. The 1972 Basic Treaty between the FRG and the GDR opened
the door to the full participation of both German states in international
organisations and diplomatic forums. On 18 September 1973 the FRG
and the GDR became full members of the United Nations (UN): after
many years of participation as an observer country, 33 the achievement
31 H. Schmidt, Außer Dienst. Eine Bilanz (München: Siedler, 2008), p. 92.
32 W. Jäger, W. Link and J. Fest, Republik im Wandel, 1974-1982: Die Ära Schmidt. Geschichte
der Bundesrepublik Deutschland.
33 The FRG had obtained the status of observer country in 1955: not defined in legal
terms, the observer status represented a fundamental informal device to overcome the
formal obstacles to the West German full membership and permitted to the FRG to enjoy
a meaningful relationship to the UN’s work. See: A.G. Mower, “Observer countries:
15
of the aim of the full membership marked for the FRG the symbolic
completion of its long process of postwar international emancipation.
The West German first experience as non-permanent rotating member
of the UN Security Council in the years 1977-1978 enhanced drastically
Bonn’s possibilities to play a role of responsibility in world affairs and
faced West German diplomacy with new important tasks. 34
In 1977 West German Foreign Minister Genscher claimed in front of
the federal Parliament – the Bundestag – that: “quoting Max Weber:
foreign policy requires ethics of responsibility and not ethics of
conviction. [...] We [the West Germans] share the responsibility
towards what happens in the world”.35 The term “responsibility”
became the keyword of West German foreign policy during the second
half of the Seventies.36 References to the concept recurred frequently in
public speeches, interviews and analyses in these years. Its repetition
served a double purpose: first, to support the FRG’s ambitions to play a
more influential role on the international stage; second, to make a clean
break with Germany’s past irresponsible Machtpolitik which had
dragged Europe into two world wars. The assumption of greater
responsibilities in foreign policy was oriented both towards the
present/future (by Bonn’s engagement in the fields of détente, UN
policies, human rights, North-South relations, development policies
towards the Third World, in the stabilisation of the processes of
democratisation in Southern Europe, in the creation of an European
Political Community) and towards the past (by dealing with the
international repercussions of Germany’s recent history, particularly
Quasi Members of the United Nations”, in International Organization, 20.2, Spring 1966, p.
266.
34 For a detailed analysis of the West German experience in the UN Security Council, see:
C. Freuding, Deutschland in der Weltpolitik. Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland als nichtständiges
Mitglied im Sicherheitsrat der Vereinten Nationen in den Jahren 1977/78, 1987/88 und 1995/96
(Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2000).
35 Vorbereitung der Bundestagsdebatte zur Regierungserklärung (außenpolitischer Teil),
17.01.1977, in PAAA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.395.
36 To the popularity of the term contributed the publication in 1979 of the renown essay
“The imperative of responsibility” (Das Prinzip Verantwortung) by West German
philosopher Hans Jonas.
16
with the emergence of public discussions about Nazi crimes and
Holocaust37).
Given the peculiar characteristics of West German foreign policy,
multilateral cooperation provided the adequate framework wherein the
FRG could pursue greater international responsibilities and expand its
room of manoeuvre. In the course of the Seventies West German learnt,
indeed, to make a more conscious and effective use of the possibilities
offered by multilateralism.38 Bonn tried to take proactive initiatives
within the major forums of international cooperation at its disposal –
the G7 summits, the EEC, the UN, and the CSCE. Hence, multilateral
détente represented an important field where West German diplomacy could
take more assertive international initiatives within the framework of a vaster
policy of growing international responsibility.
Literature review and contribution of the work
The prosecution and development of the FRG’s multilateral policy
of détente after the 1975 signing of the Helsinki Final Act have been
largely ignored by historical research on the Cold War. A number of
reasons have contributed to the lack of publications addressing this
subject.
37 The acclaimed American television series “Holocaust”, first broadcasted on the U.S.
NBC television in 1978 and aired on German television in 1979 marked the global return
of Holocaust and boosted a public debate in the FRG on issues of Nazi crimes and
German responsibilities towards the past. See, amongst the numerous newspaper articles
on this subject: “Holocaust: Die Vergangenheit kommt zurück”, in Der Spiegel, 5/1979,
29.01.1979; D. Strothmann, “Wie eine Schrift an der Wand. Alles gesehen, nichts gewusst
– war das möglich?“, in Die Zeit, 06/1979, 2.02.1979; J. H. Schoeps, “Kein Ausweg aus der
Schuld? Die „Holocaust“-Serie und ihre Wirkung auf die Deutschen“, in Die Zeit, 47/1982
19.11.1982. The West German Foreign Office as well was compelled to deal with the
public and international consequences of the debate on Holocaust stimulated by the TV
series. See: NBC-Fernsehserie “Holocaust”, 12.04.1978, in PA AA, NEWYGK, Bd. 23.207.
38 “The rapid West German learning process in the use of multilateralism” is a central
theme of Hakkarainen’s book on the formative years of the West German CSCE policy;
see: P. Hakkarainen, A State of Peace in Europe. West Germany and the CSCE, 1966-1975
(Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2011).
17
First, the investigation of the West German multilateral policy of
détente has suffered from the same destiny of the study of the CSCE
process. The historical significance of the European détente endeavour
was neglected for years by historiography on the Cold War and
International Relations. With the exception of Wilfried Loth’s work
“Helsinki, 1. August 1975. Entspannung und Abrüstung” published in
1998,39 the years between 2005 and 2010 saw a relative revival of the
CSCE process.40 All these works focus on the origins of the Conference
on Security and Cooperation in Europe, on the diplomatic preparation
of the first conference in Helsinki and on the significance of the
Helsinki Accords. Only in recent times, the international developments
marking the era of crisis of détente have attracted a considerable
amount of historical interest: within the blooming of publications on
the so-called Second Cold War, few studies on the later developments
of the CSCE process have got a little space as well.41 A very limited
39 W. Loth, Helsinki, 1. August 1975. Entspannung und Abrüstung (München: Deutscher
Taschenbuch Verlag, 1998). The German historian has analysed the CSCE process against
the vaster framework of the development of détente throughout the whole duration of
the Cold War in his work: W. Loth, Overcoming the Cold War. A History of Détente, 19501990 (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave, 2002).
40 Amongst the most notable publications, see: O. Bange and G. Niedhart, eds. Helsinki
1975 and the transformation of Europe (New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2008); J.M.
Hanhimäki, “Détente in Europe, 1962-1975”, pp. 198-218; W. Loth and G.H. Soutou, eds.,
The making of Détente. Eastern and Western Europe in the Cold War, 1965-1975; C. Meneguzzi
Rostagni, ed. The Helsinki Process: A Historical Reappraisal (Padova: Cedam, 2004); A.
Romano, From Détente in Europe to European Détente. How the West Shaped the Helsinki
CSCE (Bruxelles: Peter Lang, 2009); P. Villaume and O.A Westad, eds., Perforating the Iron
Curtain. European Détente, Transatlantic Relations and the Cold War, 1965-1985,
(Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press, 2010); A. Wenger, V. Mastny, and C. Neunlist,
eds., Origins of the European Security System: The Helsinki Process Revisited, 1965-75
(London: Routledge, 2008).
41 See, for instance: S. Savranskaya, “Human rights movement in the USSR after the
signing of the Helsinki Final Act, and the reaction of the Soviet authorities, in The crisis of
Détente in Europe: From Helsinki to Gorbachev, 1975-1985, ed. L. Nuti, pp. 26-40; D. Selvage,
“The politics of the lesser evil: the West, the Polish crisis, and the CSCE review
conference in Madrid, 1981-1983”, ibid., pp. 41-54; T. Fischer, “The N+N as Catalysts of
the CSCE Process, 1972-1983”, in Perforating the Iron Curtain. European Détente,
Transatlantic Relations and the Cold War, 1965-1985, eds. P. Villaume and O.A Westad, pp.
143-178; A. Romano “More Cohesive, Still Divergent: Western Europe, the United States,
18
number of works have been devoted to the analysis of the CSCE review
meetings in Belgrade (1977-1978) and Madrid (1980-1983): they are
collective volumes, whose case studies offered a detailed view on the
diplomatic unfolding of both follow-up conferences.42 By providing
separate analyses of single aspects of the CSCE review conferences they
lack, notwithstanding their accuracy, a comprehensive historical
account of the vaster evolution of the process as a whole.
Second, the historical analysis of West German diplomatic efforts
within the process of multilateral détente in the years 1975-1985 has
been affected by the general trends regarding the study of Germany’s
Cold War history. Scholars have predominantly focused their attention
on two periods/topics: i.e. on the developments of the postwar time
which brought to the formation of two separate German states in
1949;43 and on the major turning point marked by the return to power
of Social Democrats and the launch of Brandt’s new Ostpolitik.44
and the Madrid CSCE Follow-Up Meeting”, European Integration and the Atlantic
Community in the 1980, eds. K.K. Patel, K. Weisbrode, (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2013), pp. 39-58.
42 V. Bilandžić, D. Dahlmann, and M. Kosanović, eds., From Helsinki to Belgrade. The first
CSCE follow-up meeting and the crisis of détente (Bonn: University Press, 2012); H. Altrichter
and H. Wentker, eds., Der KSZE-Prozess. Vom Kalten Krieg zu einem neuen Europa, 1975 bis
1990 (Munich: Oldenbourg Verlag, 2011); M. Peter and H. Wentker, eds., Die KSZE im
Ost-West-Konflikt. Internationale Politik und gesellschaftliche Transformation 1975-1990
(Munich: Oldenbourg, 2012).
43 Noteworthy works on post-war Germany and the German question during the first
Cold War period are: W.G. Gray, Germany's Cold War. The Global Campaign to Isolate East
Germany 1949-1969 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003); N.
Lewkowicz, The German question and the origins of the Cold War (Milano: IPOC, 2008); W.
Loth, Stalin’s Unwanted Child: The Soviet Union, the German Question and the founding of the
GDR (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998).
44 Amongst the most recent and remarkable contributions on Ostpolitik and its various
aspects, see: G. Bernardini, Nuova Germania, antichi timori: Stati Uniti, Ostpolitik e sicurezza
europea (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2013); C. Fink and B. Schäfer, Ostpolitik, 1969-1974: European
and global responses (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); H. Haftendorn,
“German Ostpolitik in a Multilateral Setting”, in The Strategic Triangle. France, Germany
and the United States in the Shaping of the New Europe, eds. H. Haftendorn, G.H. Soutou,
and S.F.Wells jr, pp. 209-228; A. Hofmann, The Emergence of Détente in Europe. Brandt,
Kennedy and the Formation of Ostpolitik (London: Routledge, 2007); G. Niedhart,
“Ostpolitik and its impact on the Federal Republic’s relationship with the West”, in The
19
Moreover, a large part of works on Cold War Germany has been
affected by the cumbersome presence of the revolutionary events of the
years 1989/1990 which led to the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse
of the Soviet Union. With particular regard to Bonn’s policy of dialogue
with the East,45 there has been an overwhelming flood of historical
studies on the formative Brandt years, which have insightfully gone
through a variety of different aspects and implications – domestic,
bilateral, international – of Ostpolitik. This burgeoning has been
paralleled by a relative scarcity of works on the ensuing developments
during the years of the Schmidt administration and the first years of the
Kohl administration. Analyses addressing this subject tend to
concentrate on mere bilateral aspects – mostly at the level of GermanGerman, West German-Soviet, West German-American relations –,
neglecting the significance of their large-scale interactions with the
broader international dynamics and Cold War developments. This lack
of studies can probably be explained, first, by the widespread idea that
Ostpolitik was characterised by lesser ideal inspiration and smaller
realisations after Brandt’s resignation; second, by the pronounced
technical character marking inner-German bilateral negotiations after
1973; and third, by the common impression that the West German
Chancellery’s attention was devoted in these years to other foreign
political domains (management of international economy, security
issues, transatlantic relations, crisis management). Studies on the
realisations of West German foreign policy during the decade have
been mostly written by contemporary commentators and policy
analysts; they have been subject of diplomats’ and politicians’ memoirs;
they have been included into general handbooks addressing West
making of Détente. Eastern and Western Europe in the Cold War, 1965-1975, eds. W. Loth and
G.H. Soutou, pp. 117-132; M.E. Sarotte, Dealing with the Devil. East Germany, Détente and
Ostpolitik (Chapell Hill, London: The University of North Carolina Press, 2001); A.
Wilkens, “New Ostpolitik and European Integration: concepts and policies in the Brandt
era”, in European Integration and the Cold War: Ostpolitik-Westpolitik, 1965-1973, ed. P.
Ludlow (London et al.: Routledge, 2007).
45 Bonn’s policy of dialogue with the East is meant here in a broad sense by referring
both to its bilateral dimension (Deutschlandpolitik and Ostpolitik) and multilateral
dimension (Entspannungspolitik).
20
German foreign policy on its whole.46 They undoubtedly provide a
large amount of interesting information and standpoints; they are
however deficient in historical approach.
Third, the idea that West German initiatives in the field of the CSCE
represented merely a multilateral coverage of Bonn’s bilateral Ostpolitik
and Deutschlandpolitik has contributed to overlook their original
aspects. The most notable and comprehensive analysis of the evolution
of a West German distinct CSCE policy has been offered by Petri
Hakkarainen in his valuable work “A State of Peace in Europe. West
Germany and the CSCE, 1966-1975”. The Finnish historian focuses on the
use that the Brandt/Scheel government made of the CSCE during its
first years of negotiations in order to achieve the priority goals of the
Eastern Treaties and of Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin. In his
analysis he put a particular stress on the process of “Europeanization”
that Bonn’s Ostpolitik went through in Helsinki.47 Another important
contribution to the formative years of Bonn’s CSCE policy is provided
by Senoo Tetsuji in his work devoted to Bahr’s conception of the CSCE
as intermediate step for a construction of new European order and for
the overcoming of Europe’s and Germany’s division.48 The
46 One of the most comprehensive account of the FRG‘s political history is provided by
the six volumes of the collection Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, edited by Karl
Dietrich Bracher; an important section of each volume is dedicated to the analysis of West
German foreign policy during the respective period under study. With regard to the
years of the Schmidt and Adenauer administration, see respectively: W. Jäger, W. Link
and J. Fest, Republik im Wandel, 1974-1982: Die Ära Schmidt. Geschichte der Bundesrepublik
Deutschland; A. Wirsching, Abschied vom Provisorium: 1982-1990 (München: DVA, 2006);
Creuzberger, Westintegration und Neue Ostpolitik. Die Außenpolitik der Bonner Republik
(Berlin: be.bra Verlag, 2009); Lappenküper, Ulrich, Die Außenpolitik der Bundesrepublik
Deutschland 1949 bis 1990 (München: Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag, 2008); H.
Haftendorn, Deutsche Außenpolitik zwischen Selbstbeschränkung und Selbstbehauptung.
47 P. Hakkarainen, A State of Peace in Europe. West Germany and the CSCE, 1966-1975; see
also: P. Hakkarainen, “From Linkage to Freer Movement: the FRG and the Nexus
between Western CSCE Preparations and Deutschlandpolitik, in Origins of the European
Security System: The Helsinki Process Revisited, 1965-1975, eds. A. Wegner, V. Mastny and
C. Neunlist (London: Routledge, 2008), pp. 237-258.
48 S. Tetsuji, Ein Irrweg zur deutschen Einheit? Egon Bahrs Konzeptionen, die Ostpolitik und
die KSZE 1963-1975 (Frankfurt am Main: Lang, 2011).
21
investigation of the later evolution of the West German CSCE strategy
is limited to two contributions by German historians Matthias Peter
(focus on the FRG)49 and Oliver Bange (focus on the parallel strategies
of the FRG and the GDR)50 published within two collective volumes
dedicated to continuation of the process of multilateral détente after
Helsinki.
Building upon the existing literature, the present dissertation
intends to offer a vaster picture of the evolution of Bonn’s CSCE policy
over the decade 1975-1985 as a West German priority foreign political
domain. By challenging the view according to which the West German
initiatives in the field of multilateral détente should be interpreted as a
mere multilateral completion or protection of the achievements and
possibilities of the bilateral dialogue with the East, the investigation
aims at highlighting their original significance, too, against the
background of the changing Cold War dynamics. Undoubtedly, Bonn’s
efforts to rescue multilateral détente in the late Seventies and early
Eighties were directed to preserve the prosecution of its bilateral
cooperation with the East – and the concrete achievements of the innerGerman dialogue in particular – in face of the escalating Cold War
tensions. However, pursuing a proactive CSCE policy became
increasingly important per se. Quite significantly, Hans-Dietrich
Genscher, who leaded the West German Foreign Office from 1974 until
1992, when looking back at the long years of his office has defined the
CSCE process as “the heart of Bonn’s foreign policy strategy in the last
49 M. Peter, “Konferenzdiplomatie als Mittel der Entspannungspolitik: Die KSZE-Politik
der Regierung Schmidt/Genscher, 1975-1978”, in Der KSZE-Prozess. Vom Kalten Krieg zu
einem neuen Europa, 1975 bis 1990, eds. H. Altrichter and H. Wentker, pp. 15-28; M. Peter,
“Sicherheit und Entspannung. Die KSZE-Politik der Bundesregierung in den
Krisenjahren 1978–1981”, in Die KSZE im Ost-West-Konflikt. Internationale Politik und
gesellschaftliche Transformation 1975-1990, ed. M. Peter and H. Wentker (Munich:
Oldenbourg, 2012), pp. 59-82.
50 O. Bange, “An intricate Web. Ostpolitik, the European Security System and German
Unification”, in Origins of the European Security System: The Helsinki Process Revisited, 196575, eds. A. Wenger, V. Mastny, and C. Neunlist, pp. 39-52; O. Bange, “’Keeping Détente
Alive’. Inner-German Relations under Helmut Schmidt and Erich Honecker”, in The
Crisis of Détente in Europe. From Helsinki to Gorbachev, 1975-1985, ed. L. Nuti, pp. 230-243.
22
fifteen years of Cold War’s East-West relations”.51 Hence, the findings
of this research suggest looking with greater attention at the interaction
between the complex of Deutschlandpolitik-Ostpolitik-Entspannungspolitik
and at the attempts of pursuing an overall more autonomous foreign
policy by the FRG.
By investigating the process of transformation, adjustment and
implementation of a West German realistic policy of détente in the
specific field of the CSCE, the present work aims at highlighting its
peculiar significance within the broader process of assertion of a more
influential West German foreign policy. Second, it intends to enrich the
understanding of these transitional years in the history of the
Bundesrepublik. Third, it wishes to contribute to a more accurate
interpretation of the late Cold War developments which paved the way
to the end of Germany’s and Europe’s division.
Furthermore, this dissertation adds to the slowly increasing number
of studies by Italian scholars on German postwar history, which has
been relatively overlooked in Italy for years: 52 the author hopes to
contribute to the consolidation of this growing trend and to the
deepening of the understanding of Germany’s recent history in her
country of origin.
Finally, considering that the signing of the Helsinki Final Act has
celebrated this year its round anniversary, namely the fortieth; that
primary sources on the development of the CSCE process after Helsinki
have been becoming increasingly accessible to scholars in the last few
years under the thirty-year rule; and that recent international
developments in Europe urge to rediscover the historical roots of the
policy of dialogue with the Soviet Union and the past experience of
détente in times of serious East-West tensions, new publications on the
51 P.G. Kielmannsegg, Das geteilte Land. Deutsche Geschichte, 1945-1990 (München:
Pantheon, 2007), 224; H.D. Genscher, Erinnerungen, (Berlin: Siedler, 1997), p. 300.
52 This point has been made by historian Antonio Varsori in his introduction to
Bernardini’s work Nuova Germania, antichi timori. Stati Uniti, Ostpolitik e sicurezza europea.
23
topic of the CSCE are to expect – which the present work aims at
adding to.
Approach and Sources
This dissertation treats of the West German policy of détente as it
was devised, adjusted and implemented at the multilateral level by the
Auswärtiges Amt. Therefore, it adopts an historical approach mainly
centred on the investigation of national foreign policy, which however
takes a careful look at the domestic implications of foreign political
decisions and their interweaving with broader international
developments. Investigating such interconnections is particular
important in the case of the FRG’s détente policy due to some
peculiarities which characterised it. First, the policy of East-West
dialogue strongly affected West German vital national interests.
Second, West Germans were particularly mindful of the process of
détente and sensitive to its development, as a large part of its
achievements touched directly their everyday lives: hence, public
expectations represented a factor that the West German Foreign Office
had to take into due account when conducting its CSCE policy. Third,
the enduring limitations to the country’s sovereignty and the openness
of the German question made Bonn’s pursuit of East-West dialogue
more exposed to international instabilities and uncertainties.
Whereas the conduction of inner-German relations and of bilateral
relations with the Eastern countries was marked by the political
imprint of the Chancellery, decisions in the field of the CSCE were
predominantly made by the Auswärtiges Amt under the stable and longlasting guidance of Foreign Minister Genscher. This was partly due to
the nature of the CSCE process: as a broad, semi-permanent
multilateral framework, it involved the expertise of diplomats used to
long and strenuous negotiations. Moreover, Genscher’s special interest
in the CSCE and the multilateral policy of détente contributed to the
great efforts invested by West German diplomacy into this foreign
policy field. Hence, the investigation of the evolution of Bonn’s CSCE
24
policy in the years 1975-1985 offers a glance not only at the process of
international emancipation of the FRG within the international arena,
but at the process of relative emancipation of the Auswärtiges Amt from
the Chancellery within the realm of East-West policies.
For these reasons, the thesis is based on the investigation of a wide
range of primary sources – namely strategic papers, internal analyses,
diplomatic papers, reports of ambassadors, speeches and interviews –
from the Political Archive of the German Federal Foreign Office –
Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes (PA AA). During the long
months of research, it has been possible to analyse a large amounts of
archival materials, many of those have been disclosed only in recent
times. The research is focused on the investigation of the following
records:
-
-
-
-
the records of the Office of the Minister (B1), of the Office of the
State Secretaries (B2) and of the Planning Staff (B9), which
provide a vast load of information about the planning of Bonn’s
détente strategies, the internal and diplomatic preparation of the
CSCE meetings, the evaluation of their unfolding and results, as
well as about the continuous work of analysis of international
developments carried out by the officers of the Foreign Office;
the records devoted to the relations with the U.S. (B32;
NEWYGK), France, Belgium, Netherlands and Austria (B24),
which offer a detailed picture of the “Western dimension” of
Bonn’s foreign policy;
the records dedicated to the relations with the Eastern countries
(B42) and to the discussion of foreign political issues with the
GDR (B38), whose materials have consented the investigation of
the diplomatic initiatives undertaken towards the East in the
field of multilateral détente, as well as of Bonn’s assessments of
ongoing developments within the Soviet bloc;
the record of the Press Office (B7), which collect speeches,
interviews, articles, public appearances of the foreign minister
and his collaborators.
25
On their whole, this variety of archival documents provides a
comprehensive picture of the development of the FRG’s multilateral
détente policy during the decade between 1975 and 1985, by disclosing
useful details about the load of conceptual and diplomatic work
accomplished by West German officers and diplomats. The parallel
analysis of bilateral talks and negotiations with both the Western allies
and the Eastern countries highlights the coherence underpinning the
arguments and ideas put forward by Bonn when discussing about
détente with its different partners. The frequent references to the
process of European détente in the course of bilateral talks and public
speeches confirm the crucial importance the CSCE process had for West
German foreign policy in these years. Moreover, public contributions,
speeches and interviews contribute to the understanding of the public
and domestic side of the international pursuit of détente.
Research in the archive of the German Foreign Office has been
supported by the examination of published sources, in particular of the
West German diplomatic documents included in the collection "Akten
zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland”. In addition,
research activities conducted at the Newspaper Archive in Berlin
Westhafen – Zeitungsabteilung der Staatsbibliothek – have provided a vast
amount of newspaper and magazine articles from the Seventies and
Eighties (from Der Spiegel, Die Zeit, the F.A.Z., Welt am Sonntag). They
represent a valuable insight into the mood and the perception trends of
the West German public opinion, by enriching the understanding of
Zeitgeist.
Structure of the work
With regard to the structure, the dissertation is divided into five
main chapters, organised chronologically.
In Chapter 1 the analysis moves from the seminal moment marked
by the signing of the Helsinki Final Act, whose legacies influenced
significantly the following developments of the FRG’s CSCE policy.
The problems linked to the Helsinki Agreement’s implementation
26
process began to depict the landscape wherein the first review
conference of Belgrade would unfold.
Chapter 2 focuses on the theoretical definition of the concept of
“realistic détente” by the West German Foreign Office and its tempted
implementation at the first CSCE follow-up meeting of Belgrade. The
Belgrade CSCE represented a severe test and an important learningstep for West German multilateral diplomacy, which was confronted
with disappointing results and urged to reflect on its miscalculations.
Both the lessons learnt at Belgrade and the changing climate of EastWest relations urged the Auswärtiges Amt to start an internal reflection
aimed at rethinking its détente policy for the following years.
Chapter 3 marks the ideal centre of the dissertation: it shows how
issues of military security played a pivotal role in diplomatic and
public debates in the time interval between Belgrade and Madrid.
These debates interacted with the preparation of the second CSCE
follow-up meeting, by influencing importantly the formation of the
conference agenda and the partial revision of the West German CSCE
strategy.
To the long unfolding of the Madrid CSCE is dedicated Chapter 4.
The conference works were beset by two major international crises: the
Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979 and the
open challenge launched by oppositional groups to the governing elite
in Poland, which unfolded in the course of 1980-1981 and pivoted in
December 1981 as martial law was imposed by General Jaruzelski.
West German diplomatic efforts at the turn of the decade were directed
to protect the process of détente from the return of East-West
confrontation: Bonn’s CSCE policy in times of crisis gained flexibility
and pragmatism and asserted itself as an anti-cyclical policy.
In Chapter 5, after investigating the West German contributions to
the first phase of the Stockholm’s Conference on Disarmament, the
analysis turns to assess the state of the CSCE process ten years after
Helsinki: 1985 was a year of important anniversaries, whose
celebrations revealed the persistence of past legacies affecting the
conduction of West German foreign policy. As European détente
27
celebrated the tenth anniversary in 1985, a new major shift was taking
place on the international stage, marked by Gorbachev’s seizure of
power in the Soviet Union and the ensuing restart of the superpower
dialogue.
28
“Entspannungspolitik bedarf des langen Atems”53
Per Fischer, Head of the West German delegation at the First CSCE Follow-up
Meeting in Belgrade
Chapter 1
The Seminal Moment in Helsinki: Laying the
Foundations for a Multilateral Policy of Détente
(1975-1976)
Introduction
The first Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe reached
its final stage at the end of July 1975, after two years and a half of
intense negotiations in Geneva and Helsinki. On 1 August the heads of
state and government of the thirty-five participant states gathered in
the Finnish capital to sign the conference final document, i.e. the socalled Helsinki Final Act, fruit of laborious compromise.54 The CSCE
was the first and most resounding achievement of the multilateral
process of European détente. Its convening had been the result of a
long formation process. After the first embryonic proposal for a PanEuropean Conference on Security issued by Soviet Foreign Minister
53 “The policy of détente requires a long breath” [transl.]
54 For a detailed analysis of the unfolding of negotiations which brought to the signing of
the Helsinki Final Agreement and for a historical assessment of the first CSCE at
Helsinki, see: H. Altrichter and H. Wentker, eds. Der KSZE-Prozess. Vom Kalten Krieg zu
einem neuen Europa, 1975 bis 1990; O. Bange and G. Niedhart, eds. Helsinki 1975 and the
transformation of Europe; J.M. Hanhimäki, “Détente in Europe, 1962-1975”, pp. 198-218; W.
Loth, Helsinki, 1. August 1975. Entspannung und Abrüstung; C. Meneguzzi Rostagni, ed.
The Helsinki Process: A Historical Reappraisal; A. Romano, From Détente in Europe to
European Détente. How the West Shaped the Helsinki CSCE; A. Wenger, V. Mastny, and C.
Neunlist, eds., Origins of the European Security System: The Helsinki Process Revisited, 196575.
29
Molotov in 1954, the idea of creating an East-West forum to discuss
security issues in Europe had been relaunched by the Warsaw Pact
through in its 1969 Budapest Appeal. A series of new conditions had
encouraged the Western Alliance’s decision to accept, this time, the
Eastern invitation to cooperation. First, unlike older proposals, the
Budapest Appeal did not preclude the participation of the U.S. and
Canada, allowing Western Europeans to open to cooperation with the
Eastern bloc by preserving the unity of the Alliance. Second, a new
interest for a policy of East-West dialogue had begun to spread across
Western Europe in the course of the Sixties: the promotion of political
détente had been included amongst the future tasks of the Western
Alliance in the 1967 Harmel Report.55 Third, the U.S. defeat in Vietnam
on the one hand and the Soviet crackdown on Czechoslovakia
paralleled by the deterioration of the Sino-Soviet relations on the other
hand prompted the superpowers to turn to mutual cooperation and
dialogue.56 Last but not least, the FRG’s unprecedented drive to
intensify diplomatic relations with Eastern Europe fostered by Social
Democratic Chancellor Willy Brandt’s through his new Ostpolitik
project urged the Western allies not to stand aside watching.57
Notwithstanding these new favourable conditions and the
widespread cooperative spirit informing East-West relations in the
55 A. Varsori, “Gli anni Sessanta: La crisi della NATO”, in Le crisi transatlantiche.
Continuità e trasformazioni, eds. M. Del Pero and F. Romero, p. 43.
56 R.D. Schulzinger, “Détente in the Nixon-Ford years”, The Cambridge History of the Cold
War. Volume II: Crisis and Détente, eds. M.P. Leffler and O.A. Westad (Cambridge, et al.:
Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 373-394; S. Savranskaya and W. Taubman, “Soviet
foreign policy, 1962-1975”, ibid., pp. 134-157; S. Radchenko, “The Sino-Soviet split”, ibid.,
pp. 349-372.
57 For the assertion of Bonn’s new Eastern policy, see: A. Baring and M. Görtemaker,
Machtwechsel. Die Ära Brandt-Scheel (München: Dt. Taschenbuch Verl., 1984); C. Fink and
B. Schäfer, eds. Ostpolitik, 1969-1974: European and global responses; H. Haftendorn,
Deutsche Außenpolitik zwischen Selbstbeschränkung und Selbstbehauptung; H. Haftendorn, ,
“German Ostpolitik in a Multilateral Setting”, in The Strategic Triangle. France, Germany
and the United States in the Shaping of the new Europe, eds. H. Haftendorn, G.H. Soutou and
S.F. Wells, pp. 209-228; A. Hofman, The emergence of détente in Europe: Brandt, Kennedy and
the formation of Ostpolitik (London: Routledge, 2007); M.E. Sarotte, Dealing with the Devil.
East Germany, Détente and Ostpolitik, 1969-1973.
30
early Seventies, the achievement of a diplomatic agreement in Helsinki
was not taken for granted. During the long months of CSCE
negotiations the participants’ divergent interests and views clashed and
risked many times to compromise a fruitful conclusion of the
conference. It is not surprising, hence, that the signing of the Helsinki
Final Act was welcomed as a success – even though for respectively
different reasons – by political elites both in the East and the West.
More varied were public reactions towards the conference’s outcome.
While some looked with preoccupation at the possible repercussions of
the dialogue with the traditional enemy or were simply sceptical about
what had been achieved in Helsinki,58 for others Helsinki represented
the first realisation of that “spirit of détente” which would usher in a
new era of East-West peaceful cooperation.59
The Helsinki CSCE represents a divisive matter of historical analysis
as well. Historians have disagreed about the significance of the
conference, especially with regard to the late developments of the Cold
War and to its conclusion. Amongst others, Jussi Hanhimäki has
defined the signing of the Helsinki Accords as a seminal moment in
Europe’s Cold War.60 Similarly, the creation of the CSCE has been
assessed as a major landmark in the Cold War era by Akira Iriye in his
work dedicated to the rise of the global community in the postwar
decades.61 However, a large part of historical research in the field of
Cold War and International Relations overlooked the Helsinki
endeavour for years. The 1975 signing of the Helsinki Final Act was
traditionally considered as the peak and the end of the détente era; the
significance of its following developments was clouded by the
cumbersome presence of the returning bipolar confrontational course
58 French publicist Raymond Aaron stigmatised the CSCE as a “comedy”: “Never before
a conference had lasted so long and involved so many diplomats, to reach at the end such
poor and ridiculous results”. See: C. Bertram, “Ein Schliengerkiel für die Entspannung.
Bilanz und Ausblicke zehn Jahre nach Helsinki”, in Die Zeit, 31/1985, 26.07.1985.
59 For an overview of Western public reactions towards the results of the CSCE in
Helsinki, see: A. Romano, From Détente in Europe to European Détente, pp. 32-37.
60 J.M. Hanhimäki, “Détente in Europe, 1962-1975”, p. 212.
61 A. Iriye, Global Community. The role of international organizations in the making of the
contemporary world (Berkley et al.: University of California Press, 2002), p. 136.
31
marking the advent of the so-called “second Cold War”. One possible
reason for this common disinterest has been identified by Angela
Romano in the “disproportion between efforts and achievements”
marking the CSCE negotiations, which lasted for many months,
involved large delegations from a great number of countries and ended
with the signature of solemn but not legally binding documents. 62 The
negative accounts of the Helsinki endeavour by some outstanding
contemporary commentators did probably contributed to influence the
trends of the following historical research, too. The pronounced
compromise character of the Helsinki Final Act did certainly open the
way to ambiguities and misinterpretations which emerged with
evidence in the aftermath of the conference. The (dis)proportion
pointed out by Romano appears, however, more varied if we look more
closely at the specific expectations, efforts and achievements of the
individual CSCE participant countries.
The assessment of the historical significance of the Helsinki CSCE
assumes a peculiar meaning in the case of the Federal Republic of
Germany. The FRG was the engine of European détente and one of the
leading actors of the CSCE. Great efforts were invested by Bonn into
multilateral negotiations; they were rewarded by the inclusion of
specific West German interests in the conference final act. 63 West
Germans had greatest interests in a positive conclusion of the
conference and most reasons to be satisfied for the compromise
achieved in Helsinki.64 The CSCE was, in a way, as it will be analysed
in the course of this work, largely a (West) German question. Even
though its role within the overall unfolding of the following Cold War
developments had not to be overrated, the Helsinki Final Act did mark
62 A. Romano, From Détente in Europe to European Détente, p. 17.
63 The FRG’s role in fostering the inclusion of human issues in the CSCE negotiation
agenda has been analysed in detail by Sara Lamberti Moneta in her dissertation. See: S.
Lamberti Moneta, Helsinki Disentangled (1973-75): West Germany, the Netherlands, the EPC
and the Principle of the Protection of Human Rights, PhD thesis (University of Trento: 2012).
64 For an insightful analysis of West German diplomatic work at negotiations in Geneva
and Helsinki, see: P. Hakkarainen, A State of Peace in Europe. West Germany and the CSCE,
1966-1975.
32
a fundamental watershed for West German foreign policy. In the years
ensuing the signing of the Helsinki Accords, the CSCE became indeed a
foreign policy priority for the Bundesrepublik. CSCE matters were
constantly addressed by the diplomatic work of the West German
Foreign Office, the Auswärtiges Amt, in the years between 1975 and
1985. During the months of preparation of the follow-up conferences in
Belgrade and Madrid, the CSCE was central item of analyses within the
West German Foreign Office, of debates within the Western Alliance
and negotiations with the Eastern countries. This persistent attention
contributed to reinforce the processual nature of the CSCE, whose
possibility of continuation had been provided by the Helsinki Final Act
through the inclusion of the mechanism of review conferences.
Notwithstanding setbacks and moments of disappointment, the CSCE
established itself for Bonn as a continuous forum of East-West
multilateral dialogue.
In this chapter, the analysis moves from a brief review of the main
elements of novelty marking the diplomatic endeavour of the first
CSCE, in order to focus on the main achievements reached by West
German diplomacy at Helsinki. The successful outcome of the
conference contributed to reinforce Bonn’s confidence in its foreign
political means. Besides offering the adequate framework to
multilateralise the aims and contents of Bonn’s Ostpolitik, the CSCE
asserted itself after 1975 as a foreign political priority per se. The
perception of a West German victory at Helsinki was puzzled by the
uncertainties and setbacks of the ensuing implementation process. The
problematic unfolding of the implementation process unveiled, indeed,
the existence of conceptual divergences and ambiguities sealed in the
Helsinki Accords. As Eastern countries adopted more pronounced
ideological and defensive stances on the CSCE in the wake of Helsinki,
the West German Foreign Office directed its diplomatic efforts to
reinforce coordination within the Western caucus, put pressure for
implementation on the Soviet bloc countries and observe carefully the
ongoing developments in the Eastern bloc.
33
The Helsinki CSCE as a “curious diplomatic enterprise”
Looking at the developments of the first three Cold War decades,
the CSCE appears as an unprecedented event. The peculiar character of
the conference was highlighted by the contemporary analysis
published in the West German journal of international politics EuropaArchiv, where the CSCE was defined as “the most curios diplomatic
enterprise of the century”.65 Several factors contributed to its
uniqueness in the postwar international history.
A first element of novelty consisted in the composition of the
conference: with its thirty-five participants, the CSCE was the first PanEuropean multilateral meeting since World War II. 66 Whilst European
in its name and in its aims, the CSCE encompassed a vast geographical
area, in which the conceptual borders of the Western bloc coincided
with the borders of the Western Alliance, including the U.S. and
Canada. The involvement of the group of European neutral and nonaligned countries (NNAs) was intended to open European cooperation
to the demands of the non-aligned movement and to overcome a strict
bipolar logic.67 Both aims remained largely unrealised: the nature and
the functioning of the CSCE, as in Helsinki as in the course of the
following review meetings, never managed to overcome the
predominant East-West logic. Bipolarity informed Helsinki’s
conference aims, negotiation issues and alliance schemes. Indeed, the
conference was since its origins – and continued to be in its following
developments of the Seventies and the Eighties – a product of the Cold
War. The CSCE provided evidence for the fact that Cold War was still
ongoing in Europe, notwithstanding the temporary cooperative spirit
marking East-West relations; and that Europe still remained a main
65 C. Bertram, “Ein Schlingerkiel für die Entspannung. Bilanz und Ausblick zehn Jahre
nach Helsinki”, in Die Zeit, 26.07.1985.
66 J.M. Hanhimäki, “Détente in Europe, 1962-1975”, p. 212.
67 For the analysis of the role played by NNA countries at the CSCE, see: T. Fischer,
Neutral Power in the CSCE. The N+N States and the Making of the Helsinki Final Accords 1975
(Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2009); and T. Fischer, “Bridging the Gap between the East and the
West. The N+N as Catalysts of the CSCE Process, 1972-1983”, pp. 143-178.
34
stage of bipolar confrontation, notwithstanding the trends of
globalisation marking the recent Cold War developments. 68
Second, peculiar were the meaning and the structure of the Helsinki
Accords. Their signing marked a founding moment for East-West
relations. Similarly to a constitutional Charta, the conference final
agreement addressed, indeed, both the rules of the game and the
contents of cooperation in Europe. Werner Link has defined the CSCE
as a replacement for a European peace conference and the Helsinki
Final Act as the replacement for a European peace treaty.69 The West
German Foreign Office ventured to compare the role of the conference
to the 1815 Congress of Vienna: Helsinki marked the first attempt in the
postwar era to define common rules and principles of interstate
behaviour for a modus vivendi on the European continent. 70 The opening
declaration of principles, which sealed the participants’ commitments
to the respect of some shared rules in the conduction of their mutual
relations, was followed by a series of substantial recommendations for
cooperation. These were grouped in three main areas, also known as
the Helsinki’s three Baskets. Basket I contained arrangements of
political nature in the field of traditional security, with the main focus
on the so-called confidence-building measures (CBMs): the signing
states committed themselves to announcing their military manoeuvres
and to inviting other participant states to attend as observers. Basket II
dealt with issues of cooperation in the economic, scientific and
technical fields and in the area of environmental protection. Basket III
focused instead on the human dimension of cooperation, encompassing
68 The unfolding of bipolar confrontation on the global scale, i.e. in the Third World, has
been insightfully analysed by Norwegian historian Odd Arne Westad (O.A. Westad, The
Global Cold War: Third World interventions and the Making of our Times (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2006)). On the process of globalization of the Cold War
during the Seventies, see also M. Guderzo and B. Bagnato, eds. The Globalization of the
Cold War. Diplomacy and local confrontation, 1975-1985 (London et al.: Routledge, 2010)
69 W. Link, “Außen- und Deutschlandpolitik in der Ära Schmidt, 1974-1982”, in
Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Band 5/II: Republik im Wandel, 1974-1982. Die Ära
Schmidt, eds. W. Jäger and W. Link, p. 297
70 Eingangserklärung des Herrn Bundesministers auf dem Madrider KSZE-Folgetreffen. Erster
Entwurf, 23.10.1980, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 132.506.
35
a series of commitments concerning the facilitation of human contacts,
information and cultural cooperation.71
Third, the Helsinki Final Act contained the grounds to consolidate
the CSCE as a process. Basket IV ensured the continuation of the CSCE,
by calling for follow-up meetings to verify the implementation of the
Helsinki Final Act and eventually negotiate its further improvement.
The mechanism of review conferences granted a certain degree of
continuity without institutionalisation. This had been a Western
request: rejecting the Soviet proposal for the creation of a permanent
body – which might turn into an instrument to merely freeze what had
been achieved in Helsinki72 – Western Europeans aimed at shaping
East-West cooperation as a continuous but dynamic process. All thirtyfive delegations decided to meet again two years later in Belgrade in
order to evaluate the implementation of Helsinki’s provisions and
discuss new possible ways of East-West cooperation. Hence, the
Helsinki Final Act introduced an important element of novelty in EastWest relations by opening a new season of conference diplomacy. The
Helsinki CSCE was ensued by three follow-up meetings in Belgrade
(1977-1978), Madrid (1980-1983) and Vienna (1986-1989); a Conference
on Security and Confidence Building Measures and Disarmament in
Europe in Stockholm (1984-86); and plenty of meetings of experts on
issues of peaceful arbitration, economic cooperation, cultural exchange
and human rights. The diplomatic work pursued during and in
preparation of these meetings took the shape of a thick weave of
bilateral and multilateral negotiations which multiplied the occasions
for contact and gathering. As the West German Foreign Office observed
in the fall of 1975, from the clauses of Basket IV derived a series of new
71 The integral text of the Helsinki Final Act is available on the website of the
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) at the link
http://www.osce.org/mc/39501?.
72 According to Young, Moscow had used the process of multilateral détente mainly to
try to freeze the nuclear parity with Washington, secure technology transfers, and
legitimise its sphere of influence over Eastern Europe. See J.W. Young, “Western Europe
and the end of the Cold War, 1979-1989”, p. 291.
36
diplomatic tasks and possibilities which all participants, both in the
West and in the East, were faced with.73
Fourth, even though the dispositions of the Helsinki Act lacked
legal binding force, they had high political value. The political
significance of Helsinki’s commitments was confirmed by the decision
of most delegations to be represented by their respective heads of state
and government at the signing ceremony. Being the Helsinki Final Act
an agreement reached on the basis of free and good will, everything
concerning its implementation was left to the willingness of the signing
countries. Arguing that the Helsinki Accords restrained the foreign
policy choices of its participants in the years to come would be
exaggerated. The fulfilment of its commitments posed, however, a
question of mutual trust and introduced an additional element of
reciprocal control. If political leaders were interested in continuing
East-West dialogue in Europe, they should, at least publicly, confront
themselves with the commitments made in Helsinki.
Last, to the peculiar character of the Helsinki Final Act contributed
also its unusual public relevance compared to other international
agreements. All member states committed themselves to publishing
and distributing the text of the document. The fulfilment of the
Helsinki’s commitments became an issue of public diplomacy. The
relationship between the CSCE Final Act and the public opinion
developed in the aftermath of Helsinki at three different levels. First,
the commitments sealed in the Helsinki Accords became an
authoritative reference for European citizens who could appeal to them
in order to legitimise their requests to their leaders. This practice took
place most of all in Eastern Europe, were dissidents used the Helsinki
provisions in the field of human rights and human contacts to
challenge directly their governments. In the wake of the conference,
Helsinki monitoring groups were founded in the Soviet Union and
similar groups were formed in other Eastern European countries. 74 As
73 Stand der Ost-West Beziehungen nach Helsinki, 24.11.1975, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv,
Bd. 178.581.
74 J.M. Hanhimäki, “Détente in Europe, 1962-1975”, p. 232.
37
highlighted by Nye, the Helsinki Final Act legitimized discussions on
human rights behind the Iron Curtain and had consequences that were
unforeseen by those who signed it.75 Second, the public meaning of the
Helsinki Final Act coincided with its instrumental, propagandistic use
towards public opinions. Governments in both blocs used the
document – or, more correctly, their respective or partial interpretation
of the document – to gain public support for their own international
strategies and foreign policy decisions. As it will be analysed in the
next chapters, this was the case, for instance, of the U.S. administration
under President Jimmy Carter, who would appeal to the provisions of
the Helsinki Agreement to pursue its public struggle for human rights;
or the case of the West German federal government, which at the turn
of the decade would need concrete détente improvements to present to
the national public opinion in order to counterbalance unpopular
decisions in the field of military security. Third, the public resonance of
the CSCE was used by the advocates of détente – in particular by
Bonn’s diplomacy – as a tactical tool to persuade its allies and Eastern
counterparts, when necessary, to continue cooperation.
Assessing the West German victory in Helsinki
In the direct aftermath of Helsinki, sentiments in the Bundesrepublik
featured a mix of enthusiasm and prudence towards the outcome of the
CSCE. Expectations that Helsinki would open new possibilities and
scenarios opened for East-West cooperation were widespread, but, as
Chancellor Schmidt warned few days after the conclusion of the
conference, excessive enthusiasm should be toned down: big changes
were not to be expected in the imminent future. According to Schmidt,
the prosecution and improvement of détente rather depended “on the
possibility to take concrete steps forward, starting from the common
75 J.S. Nye, Soft Power. The means to success in world politics (New York: Public Affairs,
2004), p. 118.
38
foundations we have laid together, which can do justice to the hopes of
people”.76
However, there were many good reasons for the West German
federal government to be satisfied with the outcome of the Helsinki
CSCE. The West German delegation had invested great diplomatic
efforts in multilateral negotiations, as it has been insightfully analysed
by Hakkarainen in his work dedicated to the West German role in the
first seminal phases of the process of multilateral détente. 77 Bonn’s
efforts were paid off by some important achievements which
responded to West German primal interests and were perceived, as a
consequence, as important national victories. The perception that the
Helsinki CSCE had been a successful endeavour contributed to enhance
Bonn’s confidence in its diplomatic possibilities and means. It probably
reinforced also the decision of the West German Foreign Office to focus
on the pursuit of a proactive multilateral policy of détente in the years
to come: after Helsinki the CSCE process asserted itself as a priority
field of action of Bonn’s diplomacy.
In May 1972 the Auswärtiges Amt had drafted a document which
provided the guidelines for the course the West German delegation
would pursue at the CSCE negotiations.78 The paper identified some
core interests which the West German diplomatic action would focus
on: first, elaborating some common principles for the reinforcement of
the international legal grounds of peaceful coexistence in Europe;
second, intensifying human contacts, exchanges of information and
economic cooperation between the blocs; third, creating forms of
76 M. Rakowski, “Kein ‚großer Zirkus‘. Eine politische Stimme zu Helsinki“, Die Zeit,
8.08.1975.
77 P. Hakkarainen, A State of Peace in Europe. West Germany and the CSCE, 1966-1975. For
an insightful analysis of the initial development of a West German CSCE strategy and its
interaction with the emergent Ostpolitik, see also: O. Bange, “An intricate Web. Ostpolitik,
the European Security System and German Unification”, pp. 39-52; P. Hakkarainen,
“From Linkage to Freer Movement: the FRG and the Nexus between Western CSCE
Preparations and Deutschlandpolitik”, pp. 237-258; S. Tetsuji, Ein Irrweg zur deutschen
Einheit? Egon Bahrs Konzeptionen, die Ostpolitik und die KSZE 1963-1975.
78 Bundesminister Genscher an Staatssekretär Frank, Bundespräsidialamt, 7.07.1975, in AAPD,
1975, vol. II, doc. 191, p. 886.
39
interaction between political and military security; fourth, protecting
the interests of the city of Berlin, which should not become object of
negotiations; fifth, preserving the cohesion of the Western Alliance.79
All those conference aims were the extension of the FRG’s main
national and international interests. They all addressed the main
dimensions of the German question at the beginning of the Seventies. If
we look at the outcome of the conference, we can observe that all West
German conference aims were, in principle, achieved. Hence, the
experience of Helsinki encouraged Bonn’s idea that the CSCE provided
an adequate stage for the FRG to successfully pursue its own foreign
policy interests at the multilateral level.
Fostering human and security aspects of détente
In the declaration on the CSCE issued in front of the federal
Parliament, the Bundestag, on 27 July 1975, the West German federal
government confirmed its intention to use the chance offered by the
CSCE “for the sake of the peoples living in divided Germany and in
divided Europe and for the sake of peace in the continent”. 80 The
statement was the answer to the harsh criticisms coming from the
opposition of the Christian Democratic Union and Christian Social
Union (CDU/CSU), which strongly opposed the new policy of dialogue
with Eastern Europe and the signing of the Helsinki Final Act.81 Beyond
rhetoric, the inclusion of a “human chapter” in the Helsinki Final Act
was a first important achievement for Bonn. Basket III was considered
as the operative extension of the recognition of individual and
collective human rights, sealed in the inclusion of Principle VII
(“Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the
freedom of thought, conscience, religion and belief”) and VIII (“Equal
rights and self-determination of peoples”) in the preamble of the Final
Act. The FRG had been, together with the Netherlands, the first
advocate of human contacts within the EPC, struggling to make them
79 Ibid., pp. 886-887.
80 P. Hakkarainen, A State of Peace in Europe, p. 233.
81 W. Link, “Außen- und Deutschlandpolitik in der Ära Schmidt, 1974-1982”, p. 299
40
accepted as a common Western interest.82 Human contacts represented
indeed a West German vital national interest: as long as millions of
Germans still lived beyond the Iron Curtain, in the GDR and in the
other Eastern countries, enhancing their possibilities of contacts with
the West represented a tangible improvement in their everyday lives.
As Hakkarainen highlights, “Basket III was not a symbolic tool to be
used for propaganda purposes. [...] It was precisely due to
Deutschlandpolitik reasons that improving contacts between people was
one of the main ideas of West German CSCE policy.” 83 Multiplying
human contacts amongst European citizens would, moreover,
contribute to that progressive rapprochement between the East and the
West: this was the ideal aim and theoretical ground of the paradigm of
“change through rapprochement” which represented the cornerstone of
the Social Democratic new Ostpolitik, as it had been conceived and
pursued by Brandt’s coalition government since the end of the Sixties
and as it had been inherited and continued under his successor Helmut
Schmidt since 1974.
Contributing to the progressive reinforcement of the mutual trust
necessary to construct a safer and peaceful atmosphere in Europe was
also the ideal purpose of the confidence-building measures included in
Basket I. Similarly to human contacts, CBMs were consistent with
Bonn’s ideal aims and concrete interests. Indeed, the West German
federal government attributed great importance to the provisions of
Basket I.84 Because of the country’s geopolitical situation and its
dependence on the allies for the provision of its own security, the FRG
supported any initiatives in the field of security which contributed to
make East-West relations more relaxed, transparent, calculable and less
subject to the monopoly of the superpowers. The incorporation of
82 P.G. Kielmannsegg, Das geteilte Land. Deutsche Geschichte, 1945-1990, p. 223. The
Helsinki CSCE had been assessed by the speaker of the CDU at the Bundestag as an empty
show; see: C. Bertram, “Ein Schliengerkiel für die Entspannung. Bilanz und Ausblicke
zehn Jahre nach Helsinki”, in Die Zeit, 31/1985, 26.07.1985.
83 P. Hakkarainen, A State of Peace in Europe, p. 233.
84 Antwortentwurf zur Kleinen Anfrage der SPD/FDP-Fraktion über die „Verwirklichung der
KSZE-Beschlüsse, 20.05.1976, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.665.
41
military aspects of security within multilateral détente should be
completed, according to the West German idea, by favouring the
beneficial interaction between the CSCE and its military side, namely
the Conference on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR),
whose preliminary talks had started in 1973 in Vienna. The aim of
integrating both frameworks worked only partially: as CSCE and
MBFR negotiations were pursued in parallel, the first rapidly overtook
the second. Negotiations in Vienna proceeded through the years at a
very slow pace, were subject to frequent interruptions and susceptible
to the mood swings of the relationship between the superpowers.85 No
significant achievement was accomplished on the front of the MBFR
and the planned conference in Vienna parallel to Helsinki was never
realised.
Involving the U.S. in European détente
Preserving the unity of the Western Alliance had been one of West
German main goals at the negotiations for the first CSCE. Bonn
achieved two important results in Helsinki on this front: first, the
involvement of the U.S. in the affairs of European détente; second, the
multilateralisation of its own conference aims through the coordination
within the Western caucuses.
Washington had never hidden its scarce enthusiasm and a certain
degree of annoyance for the European endeavour of the CSCE. The U.S.
détente project devised by State Secretary Henry Kissinger was
directed to reach a balance of power with the Soviet Union, reduce the
costs of superpower competition and freeze the bilateral status quo. By
trying to take advantage of some elements of Soviet weakness – namely
its problematic relationship with China – the U.S. administration aimed
at finding a solution to its own weaknesses after the debacle in
85 For the analysis of the interactions between MBFR and CSCE negotiations, see: C.
Bluth, “Détente and Conventional Arms Control: West German Policy Priorities and the
Origins of MBFR”, in German Politics, 8, 1999, 1, pp. 181-206; and H. Haftendorn, “The
Link between CSCE and MBFR: Two Sprouts from one Bulb”, in Origins of the European
Security System: The Helsinki Process Revisited, 1965-75, eds. A. Wenger, V. Mastny, and C.
Neunlist, pp. 237-258.
42
Vietnam.86 Within the U.S. overall international strategy, the CSCE
represented a less important “European thing” which Washington
desired to conclude quickly, trying to avoid any confrontation with the
Soviet Union which could endanger the unfolding of the superpower
dialogue.87 The American delegation at the CSCE had showed little
interest in the negotiations in Geneva and had left the lead of the
initiative to the group of the Community’s country, i.e. the EC-Nine.88
Not only were the aims and the language of European détente alien to
the U.S. administration, but Washington seriously feared that the CSCE
would end up with a final imbalanced outcome in favour of the East.
Undoubtedly, the Soviet acceptance of the U.S. participation in the
CSCE had had the meaning of an implicit recognition of the U.S. role of
responsibility over the Western part of Europe. But it was only the
Soviet availability to make some concessions on human rights and
human contacts which finally convinced the U.S. administration that
the final conference outcome was far more favourable to the West than
expected during negotiations.89 A shift occurred in Washington’s
assessment of the CSCE after Helsinki: the U.S. Congress approved the
Final Act and the Ford Administration started to engage itself for its
implementation.
In the analysis of the state of East-West relations after Helsinki
drafted by the West German Foreign Office in September 1975, the
changing attitude of the U.S. administration towards the CSCE was
identified as one major aspect of novelty. Ford’s speech at the signing
ceremony in Helsinki marked indeed, in Bonn’s view, the return of the
86 J.W. Young, “Western Europe and the end of the Cold War, 1979-1989”, p. 291.
87 G. Lundestad, “The European role at the beginning”, in The last decade of the Cold War.
From conflict escalation to conflict transformation, ed. O. Njølstad (London and New York:
Frank Cass, 2005), p. 57.
88 Stand der Ost-West Beziehungen nach Helsinki, 24.11.1975, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv,
Bd. 178.581.
89 Gespräch zwischen Bundesminister Ehmke und Sonnenfeldt, 11.09.1975, in PA AA,
Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.581; and Stand der Ost-West Beziehungen nach Helsinki, 24.11.1975,
in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.581.
43
U.S. to the role of leader of the Western bloc. 90 Washington’s more
convinced involvement in the CSCE was perceived as an important
step towards a greater American engagement in the process of
European détente.91 The U.S. possible decoupling from European
affairs had traditionally been a main source of worry for federal
governments in Bonn. With the launch of Brandt’s Ostpolitik, the
question of the U.S. involvement had assumed the new meaning of
Washington’s necessary backing to West German initiatives of dialogue
with the East.92 As the Helsinki Final Act opened a new front of
multilateral détente wherein Bonn’s federal government aimed at
playing an active role, the U.S. backing was determinant. From the
analysis paper of the Auswärtiges Amt emerged a certain degree of
confidence that the American commitment to the CSCE would
reinforce the West’s position in East-West cooperation after Helsinki.
Bonn’s optimism can appear fallacious and somewhat naïf, particularly
if assessed against the background of the following developments the
CSCE process, the transatlantic relationship and East-West relations
would go through. West German confidence was undoubtedly
nourished by the gust of enthusiasm surrounding the signing of the
Helsinki Final Act. It has to be observed, however, that a convergence
of interests between the projects of U.S. and European détente was in
place in the months after Helsinki. Their respective conceptual
constructions and ultimate goals remained different. But their
interaction was more complex than the traditional view of a
pronounced contraposition between superpower détente and European
détente seems to suggest: the two processes run in parallel, diverged
and found occasions of entente, depending on specific interests and
international junctures.
90 Aufzeichnung des Vortragenden Legationsrat Gehl, 24.09.1975, in AAPD, 1975, vol. II, doc.
282, p. 1305.
91Gespräch des Staatssekretärs Gehlhoff mit dem Generalssekretär im französischen
Außenministerium de Courcel, 21.07.1975, in AAPD, 1975, vol. II, doc. 213, p. 985.
92 The relationship between Brandt’s government and the U.S. administration in the
years of formation of the new Ostpolitik had been well analysed by Italian historian
Giovanni Bernardini (G. Bernardini, Nuova Germania, antichi timori: Stati Uniti, Ostpolitik e
sicurezza europea).
44
Coordinating with the West and multilateralising national
interests
Besides the U.S. involvement in the dynamics of European détente,
the coordination with the other Western partners – both within the
group of the EC-Nine and NATO – was a matter of satisfaction for
Bonn. The CSCE negotiations had been the first test for the new born
mechanism of coordination amongst the foreign policies of the ECNine, i.e. the European Political Cooperation (EPC), and for the
coordination between the EPC and NATO frameworks.93 Preparing the
Helsinki CSCE had been one of the most important operative tasks of
the EPC.94 Cooperation amongst the EC-Nine was pursued at different
levels: amongst national delegations in Geneva and Helsinki, within
the committee of political directors and at the regular meetings of
foreign ministers.95 A representative of the European Commission
participated in negotiations in Geneva and spoke for the Nine when the
Community’s common interests were at stake.96 All Western proposals
were first voted within the CSCE ad hoc group and then communicated
to the NATO group, where they were rediscussed and adjusted
according to the aims of the whole Alliance.97 During negotiations in
Geneva and Helsinki and then after 1975, the FRG managed to obtain
the inclusion of its main requests in the fields of human contacts and
movements – concerning particularly issues of family reunification,
93 The decision to create a system of cooperation on foreign policy was agreed by the
EC’s heads of state and government at the 1969 The Hague Summit within the
framework of a broader relaunch of the process of European integration. The so-called
“Davignon-Report” of October 1970 established the system of European Political
Cooperation (EPC). See: M. Gilbert, European Integration. A Concise History (Lanham:
Rowman & Littlefield, 2012).
94 A. Romano, “The main task of the European Political Cooperation: Fostering détente
in Europe”, in Perforating the Iron Curtain. European Détente, Transatlantic Relations and the
Cold War, 1965-1985, eds. P. Villaume and O.A. Westad, pp. 123-142.
95 For a description of the functioning of the EPC see D. Möckli, European Foreign Policy
during the Cold War: Heath, Brandt, Pompidou and the Dream of Political Unity (London: I.B.
Tauris, 2008).
96 Sitzung des Auswärtigen Ausschusses am Mittwoch, dem 9.2.1977. Hier: Die EPZ im
Hinblick auf das Belgrader Treffen, 8.02.1977, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.688.
97 W. Link, „Außen- und Deutschlandpolitik in der Ära Schmidt, 1974-1982“, p. 297.
45
working conditions of journalists and convening of a scientific forum –
in the list of Western proposals. To this purpose, the West German
diplomacy had skilfully used the mechanism of coordination between
the EPC and NATO, obtaining first the EC partners’ support to its
proposals in order to achieve joint positions for the ensuing discussion
within NATO.98 Thanks to the mechanism of the EPC, Bonn managed
to transform primary West German interests into shared Community’s
aims. It is not a coincidence that the FRG had been, since the relaunch
of the project of European Integration in 1969, one of the most
convinced advocates of the idea of coordinating the EC members’
foreign policies by supporting more ambitious federalist stances. 99 As
the EC partners had discussed how to coordinate their conducts at the
CSCE negotiations, the French had initially opposed to use the EPC
framework for the pursuit of East-West dialogue. Paris’ resistance
reflected the fear that a multilateral Western action would limit and
weaken its deep-seated bilateral diplomacy towards the Soviet bloc.100
Whereas France tried to avoid embedding its foreign policy at the
multilateral level, multilateralism was instead for the FRG a question of
necessity.
It was at the CSCE negotiations that West German international
interests with regard to East-West cooperation became fully
multilateralised. As highlighted by Hakkarainen, the CSCE provided
West German diplomacy with “unprecedented opportunities to utilise
multilateral mechanism to pursue its national interests” 101. The
successful coordination within the Western Alliance displayed at the
negotiations in Geneva did mark a watershed for the FRG’s foreign
policy. Even though Bonn’s multilateral action was displayed on
multiple stages – at the EC, at the UN, at the new-born economic
summits of leading advanced economies, whose season was
98 P. Hakkarainen, A State of Peace in Europe, p. 252.
99 See: L. Ferrari, Speaking with a Single Voice. The Assertion of the EC as a Distinctive
International Actor, 1969-1979 , PhD thesis (Lucca: IMT Lucca, 2015), p. 32.
100 Aufzeichnung des Vortragenden Legationsrat Gehl, 24.09.1975, in AAPD, 1975, vol. II,
doc. 282, p. 1305.
101 P. Hakkarainen, A State of Peace in Europe, p. 8.
46
inaugurated in November 1975 at Rambouillet – the CSCE represented
a central stage to pursue multilateralism due to the centrality of EastWest dialogue within the West German foreign political complex. For
this reason the coordination within the Western caucuses experienced
at the Helsinki CSCE was, notwithstanding some problems and flaws,
assessed very positively by the West German Foreign Office in the
aftermath of the conference. When pointing out that, not only had the
CSCE confirmed the unity of the Western Alliance, but it had provided
a factor of further Western integration too,102 the Auswärtiges Amt was
also implicitly addressing the successful integration of its own foreign
policy aims into the framework of Western interests.
The West German call for improving cooperation within the
Western caucuses is a recurrent theme in the strategic papers of the
Auswärtiges Amt. This constitutes one element of continuity in the
unfolding of West German CSCE policy. Bonn committed itself to
coordinating its CSCE aims with the Western partners both during the
preparation of the CSCE follow-up meetings and during negotiations in
Belgrade, Madrid and Stockholm. Preserving the West’s unity at the
CSCE would remain a West German priority also in times of major drift
within the Alliance. In the months ensuing the signing of the Helsinki
Final Act, Bonn’s Western political efforts were directed to the task of
agreeing a common Western strategy with regard to the process of
implementation and review of Helsinki’s commitments.103
Keeping the German question out, keeping the German question
open
In West German foreign policy the commitment to Western
coordination was one face of the coin, the commitment to the dialogue
with the East the other. The CSCE provided Bonn with the opportunity
to merge its Westpolitik and Ostpolitik into the same multilateral
framework. In no other Western European country were the pursuit of
102 Bundesminister Genscher an Staatssekretär Frank, Bundespräsidialamt, 7. 07.1975, in
AAPD, 1975, vol. II, doc. 191, p. 887.
103 Antwortentwurf zur Kleinen Anfrage der SPD/FDP-Fraktion über die Verwirklichung der
KSZE-Beschlüsse, 20.05.1976, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.665.
47
dialogue with the East and the coordination with the Western Alliance
as strictly interwoven as in the West German case. Multilateralising the
couple Ostpolitik-Westpolitik served a double purpose. On the one hand,
Western partners were reassured, as the CSCE provided them with
possibilitis to embed and monitor Bonn’s bilateral initiatives; on the
other hand, the CSCE widened the FRG’s international room of
manoeuvre, by offering West German diplomacy an additional stage to
pursue its national interests. The main contents of Bonn’s Ostpolitik –
economic cooperation, human contacts, and security issues – were
multilaterally sealed in Helsinki.
Besides being one of the propulsive forces of the CSCE, the FRG
constituted its geopolitical centre as well. The CSCE was a product of
the Cold War and divided Germany was the symbolic epicentre of the
conference. Quite significantly, the most famous picture of the signing
ceremony in Helsinki portrays the leaders of the two German states,
West German Chancellor Schmidt and East German General Secretary
of the Socialist Unity Party (SED) Honecker talking friendly while
sitting close to each other at the centre of the conference room. Albeit
the German question was symbolically intrinsic to the CSCE – and
several provisions of the Helsinki Final Act addressed issues strictly
related to the German question – the West German diplomacy worked
on keeping the specific aspects concerning inner-German relations out
of the CSCE negotiation table. The 1972 signing of the Basic Treaty with
the GDR – part of the complex of the so-called Eastern Treaties
including also the 1970 agreements with Moscow and Warsaw –
opened a new season of inner-German relations. The inner-German
relations were characterised by peculiarities which did not allow
framing them as normal international relations between sovereign
states. Both the peculiar nature and the fragility of the inner-German
relationship convinced Bonn of the opportunity to avoid them to
become item of multilateral negotiations. This aim was achieved in
Helsinki and remained a trademark of Bonn’s following CSCE policy.
The state of inner-German relations represented a frequent issue of
Bonn’s bilateral informal talks with the Western partners and the
Eastern countries. Inner-German issues were discussed by the FRG and
48
the GDR in the margins of the conference in Helsinki, Belgrade and
Madrid. But the specific contents of the inner-German dialogue were
not multilateralised. Similarly, after the 1971 signing of the
Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin, the rights and responsibilities of
the Four Powers over the German capital and Germany as a whole
were not item of debate at the CSCE.
If the specific aspects of the inner-German relationship were to be
excluded from multilateral negotiations, there was an issue which
addressed the heart of the German question and whose inclusion in the
conference final act West German diplomacy struggled for: i.e. the
recognition of the possibility to change peacefully national borders in
Europe. The West German delegation made the successful conclusion
of the CSCE dependent on its inclusion in the list of principles of
European détente: its mentioning in the Preamble of the Helsinki Final
Act represented Bonn’s most important diplomatic victory at the CSCE
negotiations.104
The issue of borders had always been a central dimension of the
German question.105 In the history of Europe, the borders of the
German nation had represented an object of dispute with Germany’s
neighbouring countries, by alimenting geo-political instability at the
centre of the continent. Germany’s division had been the resulted of the
defeat of WWII and had been consolidated by the ensuing Cold War
developments, asserting itself as the cornerstone of Europe’s bipolar
settlement. Any solution to the German question would inevitably pass
through the modification of the inner-German border. Consequently,
any discourse regarding the possible change of borders in Europe
addressed, directly or indirectly, the German question. Issues related to
borders in Europe – their inviolability, their securing, the conditions for
their modification – could not but be at stake at a conference whose
mandate consisted not only in favouring cooperation amongst its
participants, but also laying the grounds to safeguard security on the
104 Drahterlaß des Ministerialdirigenten Meyer-Landrut, 7.07.1975, in AAPD, 1975, vol. II,
doc. 193, p. 893.
105 E. Collotti, Dalle due Germanie alla Germania unita, p. xi.
49
continent. The Soviet Union had not hidden its main interest in
obtaining through the CSCE the definitive recognition of Europe’s
territorial order as it had come out from WWII. 106 To the Soviets and
their allies – in particular to East Germans – it was important to attain
in Helsinki a sufficient multilateral guarantee over the territorial status
quo in Europe. This would neutralise those ambivalent elements
regarding the issue of borders contained in the bilateral treaties signed
with the FRG. Such ambiguities undermined, indeed, the full and
incontestable recognition of the existence of two German states: the
possibility for the FRG to issue unilateral declarations on “German
unity” conceded by the Moscow Treaty and the Basic Treaty; the
reference, contained in the Quadripartite Agreement, to the rights and
responsibilities of the Four Powers over Germany as a whole; and the
inclusion in the Moscow Treaty of a logic connection – the so-called
“bridge sentence” – between the recognition of the principle of
inviolability of frontiers and the preceding commitment to the principle
of renouncing the use of force.107
The same duality of interests sealed in the Eastern treaties was
reproduced also in the list of guiding principles for the East-West
modus vivendi in Europe of the Helsinki Final Act’s Preamble. The West
German federal government needed a compensation for the recognition
of the inviolability of frontiers in Europe the Eastern countries longed
for: namely, inviolability had not to exclude the possibility for their
change under certain conditions. Hence, the West German delegation
directed its diplomatic efforts to avoid that the Helsinki principles
might prejudice the possibility for a future change of the inner-German
border, i.e. the possibility for a future solution to the German
question.108 To this purpose, Bonn’s Foreign Office demanded the
fulfilment of a series of requirements which would allow shaping the
Helsinki Principles according to its (inter)national interests. First, the
106 The principle of inviolability of frontiers figured amongst the seven principles
contained in the Prague Declaration issued by the Warsaw Pact on 25 and 26 January
1972.
107 Delegation of the FRG, 26.02.1976, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.689.
108 Ibid.
50
principle of inviolability of frontiers had to be tied to the principle of
renouncing the use and threat of force. Second, the possibility of their
peaceful change should be explicitly mentioned in the Preamble of the
Final Act. Third, all principles should have equal rank and their
interpretation should take into account the other principles. Fourth, the
declaration of principles should not have a legally binding character,
i.e. it would not be subject to the principle of “lex posterior derogate lex
priori”.109 The vital importance of all parties’ interests at stake dragged
on negotiations on the principle of inviolability of frontiers until the
very end of the conference and forced delegations to make hard
concessions.110 The final outcome was a compromise that was
satisfactory for the FRG. The principle of inviolability of frontiers was
placed where the West German delegation wanted it – i.e. after the
principle of renouncing the use and threat of force. Despite the lack of
an explicit bridge sentence connecting both principles, an implicit tie
between them was secured by their positioning. The equal rank of all
principles was implied by declaring that “all principles are of primary
significance”.
Most importantly, the West German delegation had managed to
obtain the inclusion in the Helsinki Final Act of the following floating
formulation: “The participating states consider that their frontiers can
be changed, in accordance with international law, by peaceful means
and by agreement”. The option of the peaceful change of existing
national borders was directly connected with the “state of peace in
Europe” that the FRG aimed at creating through the pursuit of its
détente policy.111 Conservative aspects of the Helsinki Final Act had
been counterbalanced by the introduction of a dynamic element of
change which was consistent with the ideal horizon of West German
Ostpolitik and Entspannungspolitik. As the West German federal
government declared in front of the Bundestag, inviolability of frontiers
meant that changes of borders imposed through coercion were
109 Ibid.
110 A. Romano, From Détente in Europe to European Détente, p. 38.
111 P. Hakkarainen, A State of Peace in Europe, p. 232.
51
forbidden; this not excluded, however, the possibility itself of change
under peaceful conditions.112 Even though Germany’s division was not
explicitly mentioned in the Helsinki Final Act, it represented the first
implicit target of the clause on the peaceful change of frontiers. As
Hakkarainen has highlighted, the recognition of the possibility of a
peaceful change of frontiers in Europe had the meaning to leave a small
back door open to the future solution to the German question.113
The West German federal government did not hide the German
political relevance of the “peaceful change of frontiers” in the aftermath
of Helsinki. The link between the dynamic elements of the CSCE
process and the possibility for a future German reunification was
repeatedly mentioned in public statements and official speeches since
the summer of 1975. It was an answer to those in the FRG who saw in
the outcome of the CSCE an additional multilateral recognition of the
division of their nation. Hence, the Helsinki Final Act provided the
West German federal government with an additional tool to address
publicly the issue of the future solution to the German question. The
CSCE marked, indeed, a multilateralisation of the public discourse on
the German reunification. Whilst references to the future overcoming of
Germany’s division almost disappeared from the contents of the
bilateral Ostpolitik, the CSCE process offered the fertile ground for
reiterating the discourse on German reunification, by framing it within
the broader discourse on the long-term goals of European détente.
To sum up, the Ostpolitik of the West German federal government
became fully multilateralised at Helsinki. Once set in place, the CSCE
provided the main framework which entangled Bonn’s bilateral
Eastern policy, completed it, solved its main imminent problems – i.e.
coordinating Ostpolitik and Westpolitik and keeping open the public
discourse on German reunification – and long-term problems – i.e.
providing, at least in principle, for the possible solution to the German
question.
112 Antwortentwurf zur Kleinen Anfrage der SPD/FDP-Fraktion über die „Verwirklichung der
KSZE-Beschlüsse, 20.05.1976, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.665.
113 P. Hakkarainen, A State of Peace in Europe, p. 232.
52
Puzzling the West German victory in Helsinki
The dispute over the principle of inviolability of frontiers provided
evidence for profoundly divergent interests and aims with which the
Eastern and Western countries approached the CSCE. As Garton Ash
has highlighted, whilst the Helsinki Accords represented for the East
the “sealing of Yalta”, they marked in the Western view the starting of
a process aimed at “overcoming Yalta”. 114 As multifaceted document,
result of laborious mediations and mutual concessions, the Helsinki
Final Act had inevitably the character of a compromise. Its provisions
contains ambiguities which opened the way to different interpretations
in the East and the West. It is not surprising, hence, that initial
triumphalism surrounding the successful conclusion of the conference
was soon replaced by growing uncertainties when the CSCE
participant states moved to the phase of the implementation of the
Helsinki Accords.
Internal papers of the Auswärtiges Amt reveal Bonn’s awareness that
the implementation path would be long and insidious. An internal
analysis drafted in September 1975 highlighted that both the Western
and the Eastern countries would be faced with difficulties when
compelled to put into practice the commitments made in Helsinki.115
Bonn looked with particular attention to the ongoing developments
beyond the Iron Curtain. The first implementation steps undertaken by
the Soviet bloc’s countries with regard to the publication of the
Helsinki Accords were less coordinated than expected. Few months
after its signing, the text of the Helsinki Final Act had been published
in the USSR, the GDR, the CSSR and Romania, whilst Poland, Hungary
and Bulgaria remained inactive. 116 It was evident that the
implementation of Helsinki’s substantial provisions, particularly in the
114 T. Garton Ash, In Europe’s Name. Germany and the Divided Continent, p. 223.
115 Aufzeichnung des Vortragenden Legationsrats Gehl, 24.09.1975, in AAPD, 1975, vol. II,
doc. 282, pp. 1301-2.
116 Stand der Ost-West Beziehungen nach Helsinki, 24.11.1975, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv,
Bd. 178.581.
53
fields of Basket III, would represent a great challenge for the Eastern
European leaders. The Auswärtiges Amt suggested, therefore, that the
West should necessarily display as much patience during the
implementation process as it did during negotiations. Once the
“constitution” of European détente had been signed, a double problem
of implementation and interpretation arouse. It was easily predictable
that the constitutional principles of the East-West modus vivendi would
be object of divergent interpretations in the two blocs. Despite its
compromise character, the declaration of principles reflected to the
largest extent Western ideas of détente: it was to expect, hence, that
Eastern countries would take on a defensive attitude in the aftermath of
the conference. Bonn expected that its main diplomatic achievement,
i.e. the clause on the peaceful change of frontiers, would be ignored or
challenged by the Soviet bloc by adopting selective interpretations of
Helsinki’s principles and focusing on the respect of the participants’
respective “laws, traditions and customs”. 117 Predictably, the appeal to
the principle of non-intervention in internal affairs (Principle VI) would
be used to hinder any Western imitative directed to the enforcement of
the dynamic aspects of the CSCE. As West German State Secretary
Gehlhoff discussed with his French colleague De Courcel few days
before the signing ceremony in Helsinki, particularly West German
détente initiatives would be probably condemned as attempts to
pursue the German reunification in violation of Helsinki’s principles.118
West German predictions were well-founded. Eastern and Western
delegations in Helsinki had limited themselves to sharing a general
interest in finding some common rules which would stabilise their
mutual relations. A shared vision of the meaning and aims of the
project of European détente was never developed: the existence of this
core misunderstanding was well shown by the divergent arguments
used by the two blocs to claim their respective victory at the CSCE.
Political leaders both in the East and in the West presented to their
117 Aufzeichnung des Vortragenden Legationsrats Gehl, 24.09.1975, in AAPD, 1975, vol. II,
doc. 282, pp. 1301-2.
118 Gespräch des Staatssekretärs Gehlhoff mit dem Generalssekretär im französischen
Außenministerium de Courcel , 21.07.1975, in AAPD, 1975, vol. II, doc. 213, p. 985.
54
public opinions different assessments of Helsinki’s achievements that
could suit their own international and national interests best.
Particularly in the Eastern bloc the Helsinki Final Act was largely used
as tool of ideological struggle. The Soviet commitment to the CSCE
provided Eastern leaders with additional arguments to reinforce the
USSR’s image as a peaceful power. On the other side, any Western
criticism directed towards the Eastern countries in the aftermath of the
conference was publicly blamed for being contrary to the letter and
spirit of Helsinki.119 The West’s decision to make a compromise with
the East over rules for the bipolar modus vivendi was used as a tool of
Eastern propaganda in support of the argument of the West’s endemic
crisis and growing weakness.
Eastern victorious claims levered up some aspects of the Helsinki
Final Act which the Soviet bloc had good reasons to believe to be the
main beneficiary of. The Helsinki Accords provided indeed the Soviet
Union and its allies with the international prestige ad tutelage they had
long sought. In particular, Principles I (“The participating States will
respect each other’s sovereign equality and individuality as well all the
rights inherent in and encompassed by sovereignty, including in
particular the right of every State to juridical equality, to territorial
integrity”) and VI (“The participating states agree to refrain from any
intervention, direct or indirect, individual or collective, in the internal
and external affairs falling within domestic jurisdiction of another
participating State, regardless of their mutual relations”) meant for
Moscow the confirmation of Potsdam’s settlement of Europe and the
definitive guarantee of the inviolability of the Soviet sphere of
influence. The parallelism between 1945 Potsdam conference and 1975
CSCE was recurrent in Eastern assessments: both conferences shared
the common aim of defining Europe’s clear-cut geopolitical settlement
and providing for the tools of its securing.120 The German question
could be considered in the Eastern view as definitively closed: as a
119 Runderlaß des Ministerialdirektors van Well, 24.05.1976, in AAPD, 1976, vol. I, doc. 152,
p.687 (footnote).
120 Stand der Ost-West Beziehungen nach Helsinki, 24.11.1975, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv,
Bd. 178.581.
55
signing country of the Helsinki Final Act, the GDR had achieved at the
CSCE that multilateral acknowledgement of its existence as sovereign
country and its equality with the FRG which marked the culmination of
the recent process of international recognition started with the signing
of the 1972 Basic Treaty with Bonn. On the whole the Helsinki Final Act
provided the Soviet Union with a multilateral reassurance against its
endemic geopolitical insecurity. As Tony Judt put it: “not only were the
political division of post-war Europe now officially and publicly
accepted, and the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the GDR and
other satellite regimes officially conceded; the Western powers had for
the first time foresworn all ‘armed intervention or threat of such
intervention against another participating State’”. 121
According to Moscow’s conservative idea of détente, in the
aftermath of Helsinki the stress was put predominantly on the static
aspects of the Final Act. As West German Ambassador at NATO Krapf
reported in September 1975, a restrictive interpretation of the Helsinki
Final Act was being propagated by Eastern mass-medias. The Eastern
interpretation displayed the following characteristics: a pronounced
stress was put on the significance of the Helsinki Accords in
recognising the validity of the principle of peaceful coexistence and
contributing to the prosecution of international class confrontation; the
clause of the “peaceful change of national borders” was not mentioned;
hierarchical distinctions were introduced amongst Helsinki’s principles
and baskets, by ascribing to them different degrees of importance; the
implementation of the multilateral commitments of the CSCE was
made independent by the pursuit of bilateral relations between the
conference’s participants.122
According to the analysis of the West German Foreign Office, the
East’s restrictive approach to the implementation and interpretation of
the Helsinki Final Act revealed the emergence, in the aftermath of the
121 T. Judt, Postwar. A History of Europe since 1945, p. 501.
122 Botschafter Krapf, Brüssel (NATO), an das Auswärtige Amt, 19.09.1975, in AAPD, 1975,
vol. II, doc. 275, p. 1278.
56
conference, of a more general defensive attitude towards détente. 123
Whereas during negotiations in Geneva and Helsinki Brezhnev had
shown a less ideological attitude – by renouncing to frame
developments on the front of the CSCE into the Soviet ideology and
interpreting them rather as the result of all participants’ common
efforts for dialogue – a shift towards more pronounced ideological
stances occurred in the Soviet CSCE strategy in the months ensuing the
signing of the Final Act. This renewed ideological turn unveiled in
Bonn’s view a certain degree of unsafeness and weakness of the Eastern
bloc.124
Besides anti-Western press campaigns, matters of greater concern
for Bonn were some worrisome signals coming from East Berlin. On 7
October 1975 a Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Support
was signed between the Soviet Union and the GDR. 125 Its signing
confirmed that the principle of “peaceful coexistence between states
with different social systems” was valid only for the Eastern countries’
external relations with the West. 126 With regard to intra-bloc relations,
the Brezhnev Doctrine remained in place and overrode the application
of the Helsinki’s principles.127 Few weeks before the signing of the
treaty with Moscow, SED General Secretary Honecker had publicly
addressed the question of the implementation of Basket III with words
which left little room for West German hopes to improving human
contacts with East Germans. As Honecker cleared up while speaking in
front of East German soldiers of the National People’s Army (NVA) in
September 1975, the GDR would not tolerate any openings
representing disguised attempts to introduce espionage, sabotage or
123 Aufzeichnung des Vortragenden Legationsrat Gehl, 24.09.1975, in AAPD, 1975, vol. II,
doc. 282, p. 1301.
124 Stand der Ost-West Beziehungen nach Helsinki, 24.11.1975, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv,
Bd. 178.581.
125 Gespräch des Bundesministers Genscher mit dem jugoslawischen Außenminister Minić,
3.11,1975, in AAPD, 1975, vol. II, doc. 329, p. 1528.
126 Antwortentwurf zur Kleinen Anfrage der SPD/FDP-Fraktion über die „Verwirklichung der
KSZE-Beschlüsse, 20.05.1976, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.665 .
127 Runderlaß des Ministerialdirektors van Well, 24.05.1976, in AAPD, 1976, vol. II, doc. 152,
p. 687 (footnote).
57
ideological diversion in the country under the cloak of “freedom of
information” and “human contacts”.128 In December 1975
correspondent of the West German magazine Der Spiegel Jörg R. Mettke
was expelled by the GDR; his expulsion was followed a year later by a
similar measure taken by East German authorities against
correspondent of West German television channel ARD Lothar Loewe
who had often denounced the shootings of East German citizens at the
inner-German border.129 In both cases, expulsions were justified by East
German authorities as necessary measures to contrast defamation of the
country’s organs and leaders. 130 In response to the increasing
permeability of the East-West border which the signing of the Helsinki
Agreements had further encouraged, East Berlin pursued a strategic
course which merged the continuation of the policy of ideological
demarcation from the FRG (Abgrenzungspolitik) launched by Honecker
in 1971 with efforts to impose restrictive interpretations of Helsinki´s
provisions. The GDR was the country in the Eastern bloc which was
most exposed to the detrimental consequences of a rapprochement
with the West which ultimately aimed at changing the European
geopolitical settlement. Whilst the Helsinki Accords had provided the
East German state with international prestige and a consolidation of
profitable economic cooperation with the West, decisions in the field of
human contacts contained hidden dangers which might undermine the
existence of the socialist model itself in the long-run. Ideological
competition flanked diplomatic cooperation within East Berlin´s
Westpolitik. Quite significantly, East German Minister for State Security
(STASI) Mielke spoke of the necessity to pursue a “harsher form of
class struggle” after Helsinki.131
128 Aufzeichnung des Vortragenden Legationsrat Gehl, 24.09.1975, in AAPD, 1975, vol. II,
doc. 282, p. 1304 (footnote).
129 Aufzeichnung des Ministerialdirektors van Well, 22.12.1976, in AAPD, 1976, vol. II, doc.
376, pp. 1712-1715.
130 H. Potthoff, Im Schatten der Mauer. Deutschlandpolitik 1961 bis 1990 (Berlin: Propylän,
1999), p. 141.
131 H.A. Winkler, Geschichte des Westens. Band III: Vom Kalten Krieg zum Mauerfall
(München: C.H. Beck, 2014), p. 339.
58
Notwithstanding existing nuances of standpoints from country to
country, the Soviet bloc as a whole adopted a common approach
towards the Helsinki Final Act that the Auswärtiges Amt summarised as
it follows: discretionary interpretation of the Declaration of Principles,
with the purpose of conserving the status quo of Europe’s settlement;
and restrictive approach towards the implementation of Basket III,
directed to the protection of Eastern European societies from external
influences.132 As the GDR’s Ministry for State Security had foreseen,
Basket III turned out to be the greatest challenge for Eastern leaders.
Some steps to implement Helsinki’s commitments in the human field
were made in the East: for instance, transit taxes were lowered, more
working visas for Western journalists and more authorisations to the
import of films and books from the West were conceded. As Peter has
highlighted, concessions of this sort were made by the Eastern leaders
with the main purpose of providing the impression that they were
committed to fully implementing all parts of the Final Act.133 Western
requests for the fulfilment of additional provisions in the field of
human contacts were steadily parried by the Eastern leaders by
appealing to the principle of non-intervention in internal affairs.
Principle VI – conceived by the West with the aim of banning external
coercive interventions in the domestic jurisdiction of the (Eastern)
participant countries, particularly thinking back to the past experiences
of 1956 Hungary and 1968 Prague – was indeed largely used in the
Soviet bloc to hinder Western demands for greater circulation of
persons, ideas and information.134 The weight of Basket III’s clauses had
been somewhat underestimated during negotiations by the Eastern
132 Stand der Ost-West Beziehungen nach Helsinki, 24.11.1975, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv,
Bd. 178.581.
133 M. Peter, “Konferenzdiplomatie als Mittel der Entspannungspolitik: Die KSZE-Politik
der Regierung Schmidt/Genscher, 1975-1978“, p. 19.
134 This was the essence of the Eastern delegations’ struggle for adopting the terms
“interference” instead of “intervention”, “internal affairs” instead of “domestic
jurisdiction” and “respect of the respective political, economic, and cultural traditions
(list to which they added also the sentence “[respect of the respective] systems of law and
regulations”) in the Helsinki Final Act. See Delegation of the FRG, 26.02.1976, in PA AA,
Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.689.
59
delegations which had held them to be declarations of intents directed
to pleasing Western public opinion rather than enforceable clauses.
What they had not fully foreseen was, most importantly, that the
commitments made in Helsinki with regard to human rights and
human contacts would turn into a significant tool for domestic
pressure. In the months after Helsinki, Eastern European leaders were
faced with a largely unexpected burgeoning of circles, groups,
organisations, initiatives of dissidents and citizens demanding the
fulfilment of Helsinki’s obligations in the human field.135 The Helsinki
Final Act became the most important weapon at disposal of dissidents
and citizens in Eastern Europe – organised as “Helsinki movements” –
to legitimise their demands for liberalisation of their societies.
At the beginning of 1976 the West German ambassador in Moscow
reported the existence of serious worries in the USSR about the
“euphoria for liberalisation” that the Helsinki process might
generate.136 Indeed, demands for reforms of socialist societies increased
in the first months of 1976 during the preparation of the Conference of
Communist and Workers’ Parties in Europe. The unfolding of the
conference’s preparation was strictly intertwined with the
developments on the front of the CSCE. To Helsinki groups’ requests
for liberalisation added the demands for reforms coming from some
Western communist parties. The alternative “euro-communist project”
had taken a more defined shape in the mid-Seventies. The Italian
Communist Party (PCI) had launched, with the support of the French
and the Spanish communists, a call for a more modern, efficient and
human form of socialism resting upon the acceptance of political
pluralism and democratic rules.137 The euro-communist theses
challenged the compactness of the socialist movement, by aiming at
realising a new form of “socialism with a human face” in Western
135 T. Judt, Postwar. A History of Europe since 1945, p. 502.
136 Westeuropäische KPen – Analyse und Empfehlungen,12.01.1976, in PA AA,
Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.581.
137 For an insightful analysis of the origins and unfolding of the euro-communist project
of the PCI, see S. Pons, Berlinguer e la fine del comunismo (Torino: Giulio Einaudi Editore,
2006).
60
Europe as an alternative to the model of real socialism governing
Eastern European societies.138 It became soon clear to the Soviet
leadership that the upcoming Conference of European Communist and
Workers’ Parties in East Berlin would inevitably turn into a terrain of
direct confrontation between the Soviet orthodoxy and the eurocommunist alternative.139 After the Chinese schism and the uncertain
developments of Portugal’s transition, the USSR feared that Eurocommunism could create another Mediterranean front within the
communist movement, able to endanger the Soviet undisputed
leadership.140 Moreover, memories of the 1968 Prague Spring were still
very vivid: there was some fear that the euro-communist demands
might spread to East European parties and societies, particularly
amongst the young generations, whose liberalisation requests had been
encouraged by the signing of the Helsinki Final Act. The conference in
East Berlin, which initially scheduled for the immediate aftermath of
Helsinki with the mandate of working out a common position of the
communist movement on the prosecution of East-West détente, was
postponed to the summer of 1976.141
The West German Foreign Office observed with great attention the
ongoing developments in the Soviet bloc between the second half of
1975 and the first half of 1976. The preparation of the Conference of
Communist and Workers Parties in Europe was assessed in Bonn as the
main reason of Soviet ideological and defensive attitude towards the
CSCE process.142 From the papers of the Auswärtiges Amt emerg the
West German awareness of the precariousness marking the
achievements reached in Helsinki. Moscow’s difficulties and worries
contained indeed an element of potential danger for the prosecution of
138 Westeuropäische KPen – Analyse und Empfehlungen,12.01.1976, in PA AA,
Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.581.
139 Staatssekretär Gaus, Ost-Berlin, an das Auswärtige Amt, 1.07.1976, in AAPD, 1976, vol. II,
doc. 215, p. 1003.
140 Westeuropäische KPen – Analyse und Empfehlungen, 12.01.1976, in PA AA,
Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.581.
141 Aufzeichnung des Vortragenden Legationsrat Gehl, 24.09.1975, in AAPD, 1975, vol. II,
doc. 282, p. 1302.
142 Ibid.
61
East-West cooperation. There were the margins, however, to use such
elements of weakness to the Western advantage in order to force the
Soviet bloc to implement Helsinki’s commitments and make further
concessions. In the aftermath of Helsinki the CSCE process looked open
to possible future developments in different directions. The goal of
shaping its prosecution according to West German interests faced
Bonn’s CSCE policy with some tasks: continuing to analyse carefully
political developments beyond the Iron Curtain; pursuing good
bilateral relations with the East and using them to foster the full
implementation of the Helsinki Final Act; and, most importantly,
refining an effective concerted Western strategy.
A concerted Western strategy for the process of implementation
The uncertainties marking the first phases of Helsinki’s
implementation track raised questions in Bonn about which direction
the CSCE process could and would take after Helsinki’s seminal act.
The Eastern bloc’s selective approach towards the interpretation and
the implementation of the Final Act’s provisions compelled the
Western Alliance to respond with adequate, concerted initiatives.143
West German diplomatic efforts were directed, in the second half of
1975 and throughout 1976, to fostering a comprehensive and balanced
implementation of all chapters of the Helsinki Final Act in concert with
the Western partners.
As the members of the EC-Nine’s newly-established working group
on the CSCE confirmed on 12 September 1975 in Venice: “Cornerstone
for a successful implementation of the Helsinki Final Act is the
coordination within the frameworks of the EPC and NATO. The West
will prepare carefully for Belgrade and advance concrete proposals, in
order not to lose the initiative”.144 The traditional EPC’s voting
mechanism had been replaced in September 1975 through the
143Ibid., p. 1305.
144 Bericht der Arbeitsgruppe über Fragen im Zusammenhang mit der Durchführung der
Schlusskarte der KSZE, 10.10.1975, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.581
62
establishment of a working group with an extensive mandate in the
field of East-West dialogue, with the purpose of reinforcing political
coordination amongst the EC-Nine with regard to détente policies.145 Its
tasks mainly focused on the implementation of the Helsinki Accords:
the working group was in charge of monitoring the CSCE participants’
respective implementation efforts; it should deal with the multilateral
implementation of Helsinki’s provisions within the competent
multilateral frameworks (ECE, UNESCO, etc.); and it was intended to
favour the exchange of information amongst the Nine with regard to
their bilateral Eastern policies.146 The FRG fostered the idea of
establishing an “information pool” on the implementation of the Final
Act also within NATO.147 Similarly to the EC-Nine’s working group,
NATO’s “information pool” would be entrusted with the main task of
improving coordination through a continuous exchange of information
amongst the Western partners, both at the bilateral and multilateral
level.148 In the aftermath of Helsinki, Bonn fostered with conviction any
initiative directed to reinforcing and institutionalising the foreign
political cooperation within both Western caucuses. The West German
commitment to the consolidation of a Western concerted détente policy
remained still valid after the FRG had obtained the official multilateral
legitimisation of its Eastern policy at the Helsinki CSCE. As the CSCE
process gradually asserted itself as a major West German foreign policy
priority per se, the multilateral coordination with the Western Alliance
took on new significance for Bonn.
The FRG’s insistence on improving Western coordination in the
field of East-West dialogue collided with France’s reluctance. The
pursuit of the special relationship between Bonn and Paris was one of
the cornerstones of the FRG’s international action in the years of the
145 Aufzeichnung des Vortragenden Legationsrat Gehl, 24.09.1975, in AAPD, 1975, vol. II,
doc. 282, p. 1306.
146 Ibid.
147 Botschafter Krapf, Brüssel (NATO), an das Auswärtige Amt, 19.09.1975, in AAPD, 1975,
vol. II, doc. 275, p. 1278.
148 As stated in the decision of NATO council on 19 September 1975: see AAPD, 1975,
vol. II, doc. 275, pp. 1275-1278.
63
Schmidt government. Its burgeoning was largely due to the personal
bonne entente of the West German Chancellor with French President
Giscard d’Estaing.149 However, it turned out to be more problematic
when issues of détente and security policies were at stake.150 In these
areas Paris was willing to preserve its autonomous sphere of action. 151
As West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt has highlighted in his
memoirs, the contradiction between the French and West German
security policy interests could never be solved. 152 With regard to the
dialogue with the East, France was jealous of its tradition of good ties
with Moscow – the politique à l’Est – started by Charles De Gaulle in
early 1964.153 And after all, Paris had never hidden a certain annoyance
towards the conduction of détente as a NATO policy under the U.S.
leadership.154 As West German Ambassador at the NATO headquarters
Krapf reported to the Auswärtiges Amt, France´s bilateral Eastern policy
had returned to be in the foreground of the country’s overall détente
strategy after Helsinki.155 At the meeting of the NATO Council on 19
September 1975, the French ambassador openly expressed scepticism
towards the U.S. proposal of conducting regular consultations on the
implementation of the Helsinki Accords within the Atlantic Alliance:
being the CSCE concluded, there was no need for further multilateral
consultations.156 With the exclusion of France, the U.S. proposal
encountered the favour of all other NATO’s countries. The positive
149 To the “bonne entente” with France, Helmut Schmidt has dedicated a chapter of his
memoirs. See: H. Schmidt, Die Deutschen und ihre Nachbarn. Menschen und Mächte II
(Berlin: Siedler, 1990), pp. 153-297.
150 For an analysis of the friendship and political entente between Helmut Schmidt and
Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, see: M. Waechter, Helmut Schmidt und Valéry Giscard d’Estaing.
Auf der Suche nach Stabilität in der Krise der 70er Jahren (Bremen: Edition Temmen, 2011).
151 Implementierung der KSZE-Schlusskarte, 25.09.1975, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv,
178.581.
152 H. Schmidt, Die Deutschen und ihre Nachbarn. Menschen und Mächte II, p. 284.
153 F. Bozo, “France, “Gaullism“, and the Cold War“, in The Cambridge History of the Cold
War. Volume II: Crisis and Détente, eds. M.P. Leffler and O.A. Westad, p. 170 .
154 Ibid., p.174.
155 Botschafter Krapf, Brüssel (NATO), an das Auswärtige Amt, 19. 09.1975, in AAPD, 1975,
vol. II, Doc. 275, p. 1276.
156 Ibid., p. 1277.
64
moment of transatlantic convergence over détente continued during
the fall of 1975. Consultations within NATO focused on some
problematic aspects of the implementation of Helsinki’s provisions in
the field of security. Their manifold tasks included: the regular
exchange of information about the implementation steps taken by the
Soviet bloc, with particular regard to CBMs and the interconnected
field of MBFR; the careful analysis of all agreements signed both at the
bilateral and multilateral level within the CSCE framework; regular
consultations about the conduction of more targeted public policies and
public relations, with the aim of reinforcing the image of NATO’s role
as main actor of détente, in response to Eastern propagandistic antiWestern campaigns. 157
According to Bonn’s viewpoint, the main political task the Alliance
had to cope with in order to enhance its relative weight within the
process of implementation of Helsinki’s commitments was twofold:
strengthening internal coordination and putting pressures on the
Eastern countries. The area of confidence-building measures offered
best chances to pursue this dual strategy.158 Basket I’s CBMs were the
quintessence of the trends marking the implementation process in the
aftermath of Helsinki: they were subject to divergent interpretations in
the West and in the East; they were used for propagandistic purposes;
and their implementation featured mixed results. The West German
federal government fostered an extensive interpretation and a full
implementation of the dispositions of the Helsinki Accords in the field
of CBMs. Bonn’s special interest in Helsinki’s Basket I was not
surprising, considering that most of NATO’s military manoeuvres took
place on its national territory.159 But it was fuelled also by another
reason: namely, focusing on the implementation of Helsinki’s “security
chapter” served to support the idea that security and political aspects
of détente were closely interwoven within the CSCE. Against the Soviet
attempts to impose a clear-cut separation between political détente and
157 Ibid., p. 1276.
158 M. Peter, “Konferenzdiplomatie als Mittel der Entspannungspolitik: Die KSZE-Politik
der Regierung Schmidt/Genscher, 1975-1978”, p. 20.
159 Ibid.
65
military détente, the importance of pursuing a balanced
implementation of all aspects of the CSCE, was unceasingly repeated in
West German strategic analyses, public statements and diplomatic
talks.
According to the commitments made in Helsinki, Bonn announced
two military manoeuvres taking place on its territory in the summer of
1975 – “Grosse Rochade” in August and “Certain Track” in September
of the same year. All CSCE countries were invited to send observers:
fifteen governments answered positively to the West German
invitation, none of whom belonging to the Eastern bloc.160 No
manoeuvres were instead signalised by the Warsaw Pact’s countries. A
propagandistic campaign was rather started by the Eastern countries
blaming NATO for violating the spirit of détente by conducting
military manoeuvres in the direct aftermath of the conference
conclusion. In the case of CBMs, similarly as in other fields of the
CSCE, the implementation game between the East and the West was
played both in the field of concrete realisations and public receptions.
As West German Ambassador Krapf analysed in September 1975,
Western initiatives should not be limited to putting pressure on the
Warsaw Pact’s countries for fully implementing Helsinki’s dispositions
on security matters. They should rather be flanked by adequate public
answers to Soviet attacks. It was necessary, hence, to collect more
information about military manoeuvres in the Eastern countries in
order to evaluate them together with the NATO partners and pursue
then a targeted press and information policy directed to counteracting
Soviet propaganda.161
The USSR gave first notice of a military exercise in Transcaucasia
only in January 1976.162 Only five of all CSCE signing countries were
invited to observe, namely Turkey, Greece, Bulgaria, Romania and
160 Antwortentwurf zur Kleinen Anfrage der SPD/FDP-Fraktion über die „Verwirklichung der
KSZE-Beschlüsse, 20.05.1976, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.665.
161 Botschafter Krapf, Brüssel (NATO), an das Auswärtige Amt, 19.09.1975, in AAPD, 1975,
vol. II, doc. 275, 1278, p. 1278.
162 Drahterlaß des Vortragenden Legationsrats I. Klasse Ruth, 15.01.1976, in AAPD, 1976, vol.
I, doc. 9, p. 38.
66
Yugoslavia, i.e. the countries confining with the exercise area. 163 A
second Warsaw Pact’s military manoeuvre was announced by Hungary
in April 1976. 164 It was a poor result, against the seven military
manoeuvres notified by NATO in the months between the summer of
1975 and the spring of 1976. Eastern European countries had chosen the
way of a “minimal implementation”. As the West German Foreign
Office observed, they had decided to give no notice of manoeuvres
involving less than 25,000 men; not to respond to invitations to send
their observers to manoeuvres held by members of the Western
Alliance; and to invite to attend their manoeuvres under the guise of
observers only representatives of neighbouring states.165
Time for a first assessment of the CSCE
Six months after the signing of the constitutional act of the CSCE,
West German MPs of the majority fractions of SPD and FDP presented
a parliamentary enquiry, in which they asked for elucidations on the
state of Helsinki Final Act’s implementation and on the federal
government’s expectations for the first follow-up conference in
Belgrade.166 It was time for the federal government to make a first,
interim assessment of what had been achieved so far on the front of the
CSCE. The answer to the parliamentary enquiry came in May 1976.
Hence, according to the federal government, the implementation path
displayed mixed results.167 Unlike in the case of CBMs, Basket II – and
particularly economic cooperation – was the field where most concrete
improvements ensued the signing of the Helsinki Accords. Facilitations
to East-West trade and business had been introduced. Several Western
163 Antwortentwurf zur Kleinen Anfrage der SPD/FDP-Fraktion über die „Verwirklichung der
KSZE-Beschlüsse, 20.05.1976, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.665.
164 Antwortentwurf zur Kleinen Anfrage der SPD/FDP-Fraktion über die „Verwirklichung der
KSZE-Beschlüsse, 20.05.1976, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.665.
165 Main themes and catalogue of main points for Belgrade, 14.09.1977, in PA AA,
Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.395.
166 Antwortentwurf zur Kleinen Anfrage der SPD/FDP-Fraktion über die „Verwirklichung der
KSZE-Beschlüsse, 20.05.1976, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.665.
167 Ibid.
67
enterprises had obtained the authorization to open foreign
representations in the Soviet bloc. In February 1976 COMECON’s
countries accepted the invitation to negotiation advanced by the EEC in
November 1974: a significant development whose way had been paved,
according to the West German federal government, by the signing of
the Final Act.168 Positive developments were paralleled, however, by
Eastern pronounced reluctance to mention explicitly the Helsinki Final
Act in negotiations, talks, protocols, and agreements.169
Encouraging steps had been made in some fields of Basket III as
well, with particular regard to the matter of family reunification. The
number of Eastern citizens visiting their families in the West or
obtaining permissions to leave their countries for family reasons
increased steadily after the signing of the Helsinki Accords. Some
concrete measures, as the decision of decreasing fees for passports and
visit permissions, were also welcomed in Bonn as small but positive
steps in the direction of favouring the multiplication of East-West
human contacts. Small facilitations were also introduced on the front of
working conditions of Western accredited correspondents in the Soviet
bloc’s countries. A cultural agreement had been signed by the FRG
with Bulgaria in November 1975, a similar agreement was under
negotiation with Poland and promising conditions existed for opening
negotiations on cultural matters also with Hungary and
Czechoslovakia.170
In all fields of the Helsinki Accords, encouraging developments
were opposed by uncertainties and reluctant stances. Eastern proofs of
168 A beneficial contribution that COMECON’s countries preferred, however, to neglect.
See: Antwortentwurf zur Kleinen Anfrage der SPD/FDP-Fraktion über die „Verwirklichung der
KSZE-Beschlüsse, 20.05.1976, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.665. For an analysis of
the economic relations between the EEC and COMECON, see A. Romano, “Untying Cold
War knots: the EEC and Eastern Europe in the long 1970s”, in Cold War History, Volume
14, Issue 2, April 2014, pp. 153-173.
169 Protokollnotizien „Sitzung der Interministeriellen Arbeitsgrupp KSZE im Auswärtigen Amt
am 23. November 1976“, 30.11.1976, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.665.
170 Antwortentwurf zur Kleinen Anfrage der SPD/FDP-Fraktion über die „Verwirklichung der
KSZE-Beschlüsse, 20.05.1976, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.665.
68
good will were counterweights by attempts to curb cooperation at
minimal levels. By assessing the first results of the implementation
process ten months after the signing of the Final Act, the West German
federal government was faced with the perennial question about the
glass being half full or half empty. Notwithstanding the difficulties and
ambiguous trends which emerged during the first months of
implementation, Bonn approached Belgrade with a great deal of
confidence in the potential for improvement inherent in the CSCE
process. As Genscher stated in front of the Bundestag, the CSCE
represented a chance: “nothing more, but nothing less too”.171 The West
German federal government remained convinced that the Helsinki
Final Act represented a forward-looking program: processes of change
within Eastern societies and in East-West relations could not but be
slow and gradual. No radical and rapid transformations were to expect
in the short run, as it was unceasingly repeated by Genscher and his
officers in official documents and public statements.
One year after the signing of the Helsinki Final Act, former WestGerman Chancellor and father of Bonn’s new Eastern policy Willy
Brandt, interviewed by Bonn’s correspondent of the Soviet newspaper
Prawda and asked to assess the role of the CSCE, observed that the
influence of the conference on international politics had been more
limited than expected. It was however undoubted, continued Brandt,
that uncertainties in international affairs would be much more
dangerous if not contrasted by the presence in Europe of stabilising
factors as the CSCE.172
171 „Helsinki nicht unterschätzen, sondern nutzen“, 27.08.1976, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv,
Bd. 178.665.
172 Drahterlass, 30.07.1976, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.665.
69
“Wenn die eine Seite der anderen Seite, die an der Brücke weiterbauen will, keine
Antwort auf die Frage gibt, wie es weitergehen soll, dann bleibt die Brücke unvollendet
und erreicht das gegenüberliegende Ufer nicht. Wir sind nicht dafür, dass Brücken
abgerissen werden – im Gegenteil: wir wollen, dass Mauern durchlässigen werden.“173
Dispatch of the West German delegation at the First CSCE Follow-up Meeting
in Belgrade, November 3, 1977
“Is not peace in the last analysis a matter of human rights?”
Arthur Goldberg quoting J.F. Kennedy, inaugural address of the U.S.
delegation at the First CSCE Follow-up Meeting in Belgrade, November 4, 1977
Chapter 2
Putting the FRG’s Realistic Policy of Détente to
the Test: West German Diplomacy at the First
CSCE Follow-up Meeting in Belgrade (1977-1978)
Introduction: Domestic and international developments paving
the way to the first CSCE follow-up meeting in Belgrade
According to the third article of Helsinki Final Act’s Basket IV
dedicated to the “Follow-up to the Conference”, all thirty-five
participant states of the CSCE would meet again in 1977 in Belgrade to
review and improve the process of European détente. The preparation
of the first CSCE follow-up meeting unfolded within an international
173 “If the one side gives no answer to the other side’s questions about how to continue
to construct the bridge, the bridge will remain uncompleted and will never reach the
other shore. We are not for destroying bridges – on the contrary, we want walls to
become permeable” [transl.]
70
context marked by the progressive deterioration of East-West
cooperation. Whilst Europeans were celebrating the triumph of détente
on their continent, the superpowers continued their confrontation in
the Third World, by fighting proxy wars in Angola (1975-76) and
Ethiopia (1977-78).174 During 1976 the language of détente lost
popularity in the United States, where the political debate was
dominated by the ongoing presidential election campaign during
which the grounds for a major foreign political turn were laid. In the
meanwhile, the Soviet Union started stealthily a program of renovation
of its nuclear arsenals on the European continent. The beginning in the
mid-Seventies of what historians have referred to as the “crisis of
détente” unfolded slowly and regarded in the first place and foremost
the relationship between the superpowers.
A great hint to the deterioration of the U.S.-Soviet diplomatic ties
was given by the unexpected change of power in Washington. Whilst
1976 federal elections in the FRG largely reconfirmed the ruling
government of Schmidt/Genscher, testifying to the existence of a broad
popular support for West Germany’s successful economic model – the
Modell Deutschland – and for the recent achievements of the federal
government’s policy of détente, American electors opted for a political
change.
The idea underpinning Kissinger’s foreign political project in the
Nixon and Ford years was that superpower détente served the purpose
of managing reduced bipolar competition in times of perceived
American declining hegemony. 175 According to Zubok, the declining
phase of détente in the United States had begun in 1975 independently
from specific international developments, when the concept became
increasingly target of criticism of politicians both in the Republican and
174 For an analysis of the conflicts in the Horn of Africa, see O.A. Westad, The Global Cold
War: Third World interventions and the Making of our Times (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2006).
175 For an account of the years of the “American crisis”, see: F. Romero, Storia della guerra
fredda. L’ultimo conflitto per l’Europa (Torino: Einaudi, 2009), pp. 227-238 .
71
Democratic ranks.176 The rejection of Nixon-Kissinger’s overall foreign
and domestic political agenda was at the core of the program of moral
regeneration launched by Ford’s opponent Jimmy Carter. Carter’s
promises of renewal, which originated from the desire to break with
the years of disillusionment that had followed the Vietnam War and
the Watergate scandal, brought the former governor of Georgia to win
the presidential elections in November 1976.
The promised turn concerned the contents and style of U.S. foreign
policy too.177 Carter’s inauguration in January 1977 was marked by the
announcement of the pursuit of a new international policy course,
which aimed at enhancing transparency, morality, commitment to
disarmament and centrality of human rights in foreign policy. 178 It was
with regard to the last aspect in particular that Carter showed
immediately the seriousness of his intentions. A series of resounding
initiatives in support of Soviet dissidents were taken by the new
American administration during its first months of activity. Carter’s
idea of dealing with Moscow through a more open diplomacy was
limited foremost to the practice of denouncing publicly ongoing
violations of human rights perpetrated by Soviet authorities. According
to Wilfried Loth, three main factors were behind Carter’s human rights
struggle: first, the idea of a mission that the U.S. President was entitled
to, in order to extend the values of democracy and relaunch the U.S.
image in the world; second, the strategic vision of his Security Adviser
Zbigniew Brzezinski who aimed at destabilising the Soviet domination
176 V.M. Zubok, A failed empire. The Soviet Union and the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev
(Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2009), p. 228.
177 F. Romero, Storia della Guerra fredda. L’ultimo conflitto per l’Europa (Torino: Giulio
Einaudi Editore, 2009), p. 266.
178 As President Carter explained to British Prime Minister Callaghan, French President
Giscard d’Estaing and West German Chancellor Schmidt on occasion of their talks in the
margins of London’s G7 summit in May 1977, his human rights campaign was necessary
to restore the moral grounds of American politics after the Watergate scandal. By
pursuing this aim, he admitted to have underestimated possible Soviet reactions. See
Aufzeichnung des Ministerialdirektors Ruhfus, Bundeskanzleramt, 3.06.1977, in AAPD, 1977,
vol. I, doc. 145, p. 756.
72
over Eastern Europe;179 and third, the exploitation of the international
human rights campaign for domestic purposes. 180 Washington’s
assertiveness on human rights contributed to push this issue to the top
of the international agenda in the course of 1977, as the Western
Alliance was busy with the preparation of the CSCE follow-up meeting
in Belgrade. The cumbersome presence of human rights issues
complicated the achievement of a Western agreement over the future
direction of the process of détente, boosted mutual mistrust between
the superpowers and had important repercussions on the unfolding of
the Belgrade CSCE.
The West German federal government looked with concern at the
new developments in the U.S. administration’s international strategy.
The continuation of East-West détente required a certain degree of
international stability that the redefinition of the cornerstones of the
superpower dialogue seemed to endanger. The cooling-off of SovietU.S. relations added to other factors of instability which complicated
the background against which Bonn’s Ostpolitik and Entspannungspolitik
moved in the second half of the Seventies. The troubled
implementation of the Helsinki Final Act in the Eastern bloc had been
paralleled by a renewed stronger ideological turn in Soviet foreign
policy. Moscow was providing large support to Communists in
Portugal where a difficult process of transition to democracy was
ongoing and had got wide-ragingly involved in the Angolan civil war.
New initiatives in the field of rearmament were undertaken by the
179 As West German Secretary of State van Well reported to Genscher, from his talk with
the U.S. National Security Advisor – which occurred in Washington on the eve of the
inauguration of follow-up meeting in Belgrade – emerged a pronounced difference with
the foreign political conceptions of Brzezinski’s predecessor Henry Kissinger: neither the
maintenance of the status quo, nor the balance of power or the strategic parity were
priorities for Brzezinski, who rather aimed at peaceful change, historic turn, and
disappearance of communism in Western and in Eastern Europe. On this point, see:
Staatssekretär van Well an Bundesminister Genscher, z.Z. New York, 28.09.1977, in AAPD,
1977, vol. II, doc. 262, pp. 1271-1273.
180 W. Loth, “Der KSZE-Prozess 1975-1990: eine Bilanz” in Die KSZE im Ost-WestKonflikt. Internationale Politik und gesellschaftliche Transformationen 1975-1990, eds. M. Peter
and H. Wentker, p. 324.
73
Warsaw Pact which started the replacement of its old intermediaterange nuclear weapons stationed in Eastern Europe by more modern
SS-20 missiles. Inner-German relations were going through difficult
moments due to Moscow’s rigid Berlin policy, East Berlin’s repressive,
domestic political course and repeated incidents at the inner-German
border.181
By assessing which possible scenarios and diplomatic tasks West
German foreign policy would be faced with in the course of 1977, the
Auswärtiges Amt maintained, however, its confidence in the
opportunity of continuing European détente. The validity of the
process initiated by the Helsinki CSCE seemed to find confirmation in
some encouraging developments taking place on the front of East-West
cooperation. The number of permits to leave the country conceded by
Soviet authorities within the framework of family reunification had
noticeably grown. Bonn’s improved relations with Poland had borne
their fruits as well: after the signing of bilateral agreements regulating
mutual cooperation in various fields in 1975-1976, a growing number of
Germans living in the neighbouring country had got the possibility to
leave for the FRG (23.306 in 1976 against 7.041 in 1975). Economic
relations with all Eastern countries had improved, notwithstanding the
restrictions to trade exchange imposed by the poor solvency of the
Eastern partners.182 Bonn’s Ostpolitik had benefited from the favourable
intertwining of bilateral and multilateral initiatives since the summer of
1975. The good moment of détente marked by the conclusion of the
CSCE was utilised by the West German federal government to improve
bilateral relations with all Eastern countries. Between November and
December 1975 Schmidt and Genscher visited the USSR, Bulgaria and
Romania.183 CSCE issues continued to be object of discussions and
181 Sitzung des Auswärtigen Ausschusses des Bundestages am 28.01.1977, 28.01.1977, in PA
AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.381.
182 Sitzung des Auswärtigen Ausschusses des Bundestages am 28.01.1977, 28.01.1977, in PA
AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.381.
183 On the meeting between Genscher and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko on 12
November 1975, see Gespräch des Bundesministers Genscher mit dem sowjetischen
Außenminister Gromyko in Moskau, 12.11.1975, in AAPD, 1975, vol. II, doc. 339, pp. 1582-
74
analysis with the Eastern leaders throughout 1976:184 bilateral talks
offered to Schmidt and Genscher the occasion to reiterate the
importance of a prompt implementation of Helsinki’s commitments
and of a further development of the CSCE process.
Reinforced by the electoral victory in October 1976 and looking to
the upcoming appointment with the CSCE follow-up meeting in
Belgrade in October 1977, the West German federal government
worked on the continuation of multilateral détente in the course of the
year. The tasks deriving from the implementation of Helsinki’s
provisions and the preparation of the Belgrade CSCE stimulated a
conceptual reflection on the definition of a Western common concept of
détente. As it will be analysed at the beginning of this chapter,
Genscher’s concept of “realistic détente” contributed significantly to
the debate within the Western Alliance. The theoretical and strategic
preparation of the first CSCE follow-up meeting was faced with
increasing transatlantic divergences over the West’s foreign political
1584. On Genscher’s talks with Bulgarian Foreign Minister Mladenov and Schmidt’s talks
with General Secretary of the Bulgarian Communist Party Zhivkov on 25 November
1975, see Gespräch des Bundesministers Genscher mit dem bulgarischen Außenminister
Mladenow, 25.11.1975, in ibid. , Doc. 355, pp. 1674-1677; and Gespräch des Bundeskanzlers
Schmidt mit Staatsvorsitzenden Schiwkow, 25.11.1975, ibid. , Doc.356, pp. 1678-1688. For an
assessment of Genscher’s meetings with Romania’s Foreign Minister Macovescu and
President Ceausescu on 4-5 December 1975, see Gespräch des Bundesministers Genscher mit
dem rumänischen Außenminister Macovescu in Bukarest, 4.12.1975, ibid., Doc. 365, pp. 17251726 and Gespräch des Bundesministers Genscher mit Präsident Ceausescu in Bukarest,
5.12.1975, ibid., Doc. 369, pp. 1742-1753.
184 The CSCE was object of discussions, for instance, between Foreign Minister Genscher
and his Soviet and East German colleagues in October 1976 in New York, and during
bilateral West German-Polish talks in June. See respectively Gespräch des Bundesministers
Genscher mit dem sowjetischen Außenminister Gromycko in New York , 27.09.1976, in AAPD,
1976, vol. II, doc. 293, pp. 1341-1350; Gespräch des Bundesministers Genscher mit dem
Außenminister der DDR, Fischer, in New York, 7.10.1976, ibid., Doc. 300, pp. 1373-1375;
Deutsch-polnisches Regierungsgespräch, 9.06.1976, in AAPD, 1976, vol. I, doc. 181, pp. 829835. A delegation of the West German Senate, Bundesrat, travelled to Moscow in April,
where it discussed CSCE issues with Soviet Vice-Foreign Minister Kuznezov. See
Botschafter Sahm, Moskau, an das Auswärtige Amt, 30.04.1976, in AAPD, 1976, vol. I, doc.
124, pp. 567-572.
75
priorities, with particular regard to the international role of human
rights issues. Bonn’s efforts were directed, as the chapter investigates,
to fostering its conference aims within the Western Alliance and
protecting the transatlantic harmony in front of the eyes of the public
opinion. Whereas the CSCE preparatory meeting in the summer of 1977
displayed encouraging results, the main conference in Belgrade turned
soon, after its start in autumn, into an occasion for reviewing existing
divergences. After analysing West German diplomatic attempts to
attain substantial achievements by pursuing a “middle-course”
strategy at negotiations in Belgrade, the chapter ends by reviewing the
main lessons West German détente policy had to draw from the
disappointing outcome of the first CSCE follow-up meeting.
Fostering a Western common concept of détente
In the months which followed the conclusion of the CSCE in
Helsinki the West German federal government repeatedly argued – in
front of the Bundestag, in public statements on the press and on
occasion of bilateral meetings with other Western and European
leaders – that there was no reasonable alternative to the prosecution of
détente. The question of how to improve and shape further the process
of European détente was at the centre of the West German Foreign
Office’s attention throughout 1976. Once Bonn’s bilateral Ostpolitik had
been fully multilateralised at Helsinki, the CSCE policy asserted itself
as its inextricable completion. But it represented also the adequate field
wherein the Auswärtiges Amt could pursue its ambitions to play a
strategic role in the international – and especially European – arena.
Not only did the CSCE policy offered to the Foreign Office good
chances of diplomatic success – as the experience of negotiations in
Helsinki and Geneva had showed. It represented also one important
field where Genscher and his servants could chase their aspirations of
autonomy with respect to Schmidt’s Chancellery, which held the lead
76
of international initiative in other crucial fields – as Ostpolitik, innerGerman dialogue, economic cooperation.185
The great number of internal analyses and strategic papers of the
West German Foreign Office dedicated to issues of Entspannungspolitik
reveals Bonn’s interest in attaining a better definition of détente both
from the theoretical and the practical point of view. More precisely,
West German efforts were directed, first, to work out a Western
common concept of détente; and second, to decide which next strategic
steps the multilateral policy of détente should focus on, in preparation
of the upcoming first CSCE follow-up meeting in Belgrade.
To détente and its continuation was dedicated NATO’s Spring
Conference which took place in Oslo in May 1976.186 The Western
partners’ different definitions of détente were discussed at the meeting
of the Alliance’s foreign ministers. Whilst U.S. Secretary of State
Kissinger spoke of a strategy of “peace through strength” and French
minister of foreign affairs Sauvagnargues of a “sort of containment
through dialogue”, Genscher advocated his idea of a “realistic policy of
détente” (realistische Entspannungspolitik).187 The theoretical conception
of a realistic policy of détente served the purpose of contrasting the
critical views of those in the FRG who considered the foreign minister
of the Schmidt government as a “brakeman” of East-West dialogue.188
185 The conduction of Bonn’s CSCE policy was marked also by a personal element:
indeed, Genscher considered the CSCE as one of his policy domains. In his memoirs, the
CSCE policy is analysed as one of the “three columns” of the West German foreign policy
of responsibility. See H.D. Genscher, Erinnerungen, pp. 299-324.
186 Runderlaß des Ministerialdirektors van Well, 24.05.1976, in AAPD, 1976, vol. I, doc. 152,
pp. 684-689 ; and Aufzeichnung des Referats 201, 31.05.1976, ibid., Doc. 166, pp. 756-763.
187 Genscher had spoken of a West German “realistic policy of détente” (realistische
Entspannungspolitik) in the federal government’s declaration in front of the Bundestag on
25 July 1975. See H.D. Genscher, “Realistische Entspannungspolitik. Erklärung der
Bundesregierung zur Konferenz über Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in Europa,
abgegeben vom Bundesministerium des Auswärtigen vor dem Deutschen Bundestag am
25.07.1975”, in Deutsche Außenpolitik: ausgewählte Reden und Aufsätze, 1974-1985, ed. H.D.
Genscher (Stuttgart: Bonn Aktuell, 1985), pp. 77-95.
188 K. Seitz, “Einleitung”, in Deutsche Außenpolitik: ausgewählte Reden und Aufsätze, 19741985, ed. H.D. Genscher, p. XVI.
77
Realism was, moreover, a trademark of Schmidt-Genscher’s tandem:
Realpolitik became in the second half of the Seventies the social-liberal
coalition’s keyword and the antidote to multiple international and
domestic crises.
During NATO’s Spring Conference the West German foreign
minister stressed that a realistic détente policy was the only possible
strategy to follow. The potentiality of the CSCE process remained valid,
even though setbacks were to expect in the months and years to come.
Genscher’s “realistic détente policy” rested upon three cornerstones. 189
First, the existing interaction between the pursuit of security and
détente policies: Genscher’s formula originated from the need to find
an adequate answer to the Soviet idea that the tasks of political détente
had been completed for good at Helsinki and what remained for EastWest dialogue to deal with was merely a “policy of military détente”.
Second, the unity of action of the Western Alliance: the coordination
with its partners remained for the Bundesrepublik a question of principle
– i.e. anchoring its initiatives towards the East to the allies’ approval –
and of winning strategy – i.e. preventing The Soviet bloc from
distinguishing between countries more and less willing to cooperation
within the Western caucus and implementing a consequent divide et
impera strategy. Third, the understanding of détente as a continuous
and dynamic process: the stress on the processual nature of the CSCE
should compensate the West’s rejection of any form of
bureaucratisation which would lower its high political value and
openness to change. The three pillars of the conceptual construction of
Bonn’s “realistic détente policy” were elaborated by the Auswärtiges
Amt on the basis of the experience collected during negotiations in
Geneva and Helsinki. They all responded to the FRG’s vital foreign
policy needs. The concept that Genscher proposed to the Western allies
was, hence, the outcome of the process of reflections and
conceptualisation carried out in Bonn’s Foreign Office in the aftermath
of the Helsinki CSCE.
189 Runderlaß des Ministerialdirektors van Well, 24.05.1976, in AAPD, 1976, vol. I, doc. 152,
pp. 686-687 (footnote).
78
Genscher’s formulation contributed importantly to the debate on
détente within the EPC’s working group on the CSCE. As part of their
preparatory work for the first review conference of Belgrade, the ECNine agreed upon a rough common concept of détente. This included
the three dimensions of the West German realistic policy of détente and
completed them by recalling the principle of renouncing the use and
threat of force – with the aim of addressing openly the invalidity of
Brezhnev’s doctrine in the Soviet bloc – and the principle of the power
of individuals – a formulation encompassing both human rights and
human contacts. From a pragmatic viewpoint, détente dialogue was
conceived as a complex of flexible diplomatic tools which could be
used in different forms and at different levels according to
circumstances. Amongst the possible tasks that détente dialogue could
take, the Nine mentioned: the regulation of practical problems;
decisions on armament limitations; forms of partial cooperation; the
preservation of the modus vivendi; crisis management.190
The EC Nine’s working group on CSCE continued to work on the
refinement of a common concept of détente in the course of 1976. The
main ideas produced by the debate were summarised on 27 January
1977 in the strategic paper “Elements for a definition of détente”. In this
paper the EC-Nine postulated the principle of “geographic and
thematic indivisibility” of détente. Not only were détente commitments
in different areas bound together (“thematic indivisibility of détente),
but participant states committed themselves to conforming to détente
principles when acting in different geographic areas, i.e. outside
Europe too (“geographic indivisibility of détente”). The EC-Nine
advocated, moreover, the idea that cooperation should be strengthened
in those areas where East-West divergences did not impede to realise
concrete improvements; instead, some moderation was required when
dealing with more divisive issues – as highly ideological or military
questions – in order not to endanger the overall prosecution of
190 Arbeiten der KSZE-Arbeitsgruppe der EPZ. Hollaendischer Vorschlag einer Definition der
Entspannung, 2.07.1976, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.389.
79
cooperation.191 Hence, Western European countries developed an
operative concept of détente, which entailed clear indications about the
strategy they were intended to follow at negotiations in Belgrade. The
feasibility of such operational guidelines was put to a hard test at the
first CSCE follow-up meeting.
Fostering a Western common agenda for Belgrade
The definition of a common concept of détente was interwoven with
the identification of a joint agenda for the prosecution of the CSCE
process in Belgrade. Agreeing upon what the process of détente was
and what it meant implied to decide what concrete steps had to be
taken to shape its continuation. Bonn’s diplomatic efforts throughout
1977 were dedicated to both aims. The working out of the West’s
concerted strategy for conference was flanked by an accurate
preparation within the West German Foreign Office in coordination
with other federal ministries competent on specific aspects of the CSCE.
The Auswärtiges Amt led the activities of the inter-ministerial group in
charge of setting up the West German strategy, whose regular meetings
paced Belgrade’s preparation works.
Approximate indications for the mandate of the follow-up meetings
were contained in the provisions of Helsinki Final Act’s Basket IV.
According to its second article, the process initiated by the first CSCE
should be continued by proceeding, first, to a thorough exchange of
views on the implementation of Helsinki’s provisions; second, to
negotiations for deepening multilateral cooperation; and third, to an
eventual agreement on the future development of détente. 192 The first
CSCE follow-up conference had a dual mandate: its tasks were directed
both “towards the past” and “towards the future” – i.e. reviewing what
had been realised so far and negotiating further realisations. The
contents of the FRG’s preparatory works for the conference reflected
191 Runderlass des Vortragenden Legationsrat I. Klasse Engels, 2.02.1977, in AAPD, 1977, vol.
I, doc. 17, p. 101 (footnote).
192 The full text of the Helsinki Final Act is available at: http://www.osce.org/mc/39501?.
80
such duality of tasks as well. During 1976-1977 the West German
Foreign Office dealt, on the one hand, with the pursuit and the
assessment of the ongoing implementation process (as it had been
analysed in conclusion of the preceding chapter); on the other hand,
with the elaboration of concrete proposals to raise in Belgrade. 193
Bonn’s approach to the definition of Belgrade’s agenda rested upon
some general considerations. The detailed identification of the aims of
the conference would be largely dependent on the state of the Helsinki
Final Act’s implementation. If participant states would prove to have
already put in practice large part of Helsinki’s dispositions, the way
would be open for deepening and extending the contents of East-West
détente significantly. Otherwise, a serious debate over the reasons of
the impediments to the implementation would be inescapable. In
Bonn’s view, direct confrontations were however to be avoided in
Belgrade, as they would damage particularly the Bundesrepublik and
discredit the value of détente in front of the eyes of the public opinion.
To give new stimulus to negotiations, it was necessary to find some
matters which could attract the interest of all participants. All
proposals for deepening multilateral cooperation could not be detached
from the contents of the Helsinki Accords: the Final Act provided
indeed for the binding grounds for all further improvements.194
According to West German predictions, the CSCE follow-up
meeting in Belgrade would serve as a first test for the willingness of its
participants to continue cooperation.195 Bonn’s eyes were fixed on the
Eastern countries. After the early developments of the implementation
process had unveiled the serious difficulties the Eastern leaders were
faced with after the signing of the Helsinki Final Act, a question was
put to the attention of the West German Foreign Office: on which issues
should the West focus, in order to test the Soviet bloc’s commitment to
193 Protokollnotizen „Sitzung der Interministeriellen Arbeitsgrupp KSZE im Auswärtigen Amt
am 23. November 1976“, 30.11.1976, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.665.
194 Fortführung des multilateralen Entspannungsprozesses in Europa, 15.04.1976, in PA AA,
Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.389.
195 Antwortentwurf zur Kleinen Anfrage der SPD/FDP-Fraktion über die „Verwirklichung der
KSZE-Beschlüsse), 20.05.1976, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.665.
81
the continuation of multilateral détente? The field of confidencebuilding measures seemed to provide, again, the adequate answer to
West German diplomatic needs. As initiatives in this field coming from
the neutral and non-aligned countries were to expect in Belgrade, the
Western Alliance should be prepared to react united and to take a
proactive attitude.196 According to the instructions provided by the
Auswärtiges Amt to the West German representation at the NATO
quarters in July 1976, concrete proposals for the improvement and
extension of the existing provisions on CBMs stayed at the centre of
Bonn’s agenda for Belgrade.197 They encompassed the following tasks:
improving the criteria for the notification of military manoeuvres, by
anticipating the temporal deadline for announcements; extending the
obligation of notification to other categories of manoeuvres which had
been left out of Helsinki’s Basket II; putting into practice Basket II’s
dispositions concerning the announcement of big manoeuvres over
25,000 units; defining clearer rules for regulating manoeuvres’
observation.198
Besides being amongst the FRG’s priorities at the CSCE,199 CBMs
had benefited in Helsinki from the good cooperation with the
delegations of the NNA countries; they had moreover compelled the
Soviet bloc to get involved by addressing its traditional interest for
security. The Auswärtiges Amt aimed at replicating Helsinki’s
experience at the follow-up meeting in Belgrade, by forcing the Eastern
196 Vortragender Legationsrat I. Klasse Ruth an die Ständige Vertretung bei der NATO in
Brüssel, 5.07.1976, in AAPD, 1976, II, 218, p.1017.
197 KSZE-CBM. Hier: Hausbesprechung zur Vorbereitung auf Belgrad am 13.05.1977,
10.05.1977, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.688.
198 Militärische Aspekte der Sicherheit auf dem KSE-Folgetreffen in Belgrad. Hier:
Zwischenbilanz, 12.01.1978, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.770; Vortragender
Legationsrat I. Klasse Ruth an die Ständige Vertretung bei der NATO in Brüssel, 5.07.1976, in
AAPD, 1976, vol. II, doc. 218, p. 1014-1017.
199 In Bonn’s view, the CBMs had high political value and contributed concretely to the
improvement of security on the continent. Whilst the CSCE was not the adequate
framework to make decisions on limitations of military activities and on strictly military
questions, the development of CMBs should be instead a central object of negotiations in
Belgrade. See: Militärische Aspekte der Sicherheit auf dem KSE-Folgetreffen in Belgrad. Hier:
Zwischenbilanz, 12.01.1978, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.770.
82
countries to negotiate for the extension of Basket II’s existing
provisions. Bonn’s intentions to relaunch the initiative in the fields of
CBMs collided, however, with the growing scepticism of the
superpowers towards the CSCE. On the occasion of bilateral
consultations on CSCE with the USSR in June 1976, Bonn had
registered the Soviet contrariety to further negotiations in the fields of
CBMs. The distinction in principle made by Moscow between political
and military détente had concrete repercussions on the Soviet strategy
for the follow-up conference in Belgrade. In the Soviet view, after the
topic of CBMs had been completed for good in Helsinki, negotiations
on additional aspects of military détente should take place in Vienna.
Likewise, on the other side of the Atlantic, Washington expressed
reluctance towards Bonn’s proposal of extending the obligations of
notification to big military manoeuvres. 200
Whereas NATO was the adequate framework to elaborate concerted
initiatives on security aspects of détente, Bonn’s diplomacy worked
during the months of 1977 to collect the Western partners’ necessary
support to its proposals for Belgrade with regard to other issues and
within other caucuses as well. The coordination on the Western front
was displayed at a large scale. CSCE issues were discussed at all levels
at disposal of Bonn’s diplomacy, namely: within the EPC’s Working
Group on the CSCE; within the Committee of Permanent
Representatives at the EECs in Brussels and in coordination with the
Community’s institutions; within NATO’s Political and Economic
Committee; within the Group of the EC-Nine at the Economic
Commission for Europe (ECE) in Geneva; at UNESCO in Paris and at
its 1977’s annual conference in Nairobi; within the Council of Europe –
which had gradually turned into a useful forum of coordination with
the non-aligned countries; at the bilateral level through rounds of
consultations on the CSCE with Europe’s non-aligned and Eastern
countries.201
200 Vortragender Legationsrat I. Klasse Ruth an die Ständige Vertretung bei der NATO in
Brüssel, 5.07.1976, in AAPD, 1976, II, 218, pp. 1016-1017.
201 Fortführung des multilateralen Entspannungsprozess in Europa (Vorbereitung des KSZEFolgekonferenz in Belgrad 1977), 15.04.1976, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.389; and
83
Preparing the first CSCE follow-up conference continued to be one
important operative tasks of the EPC.202 The Nine’s possible strategies
to follow in Belgrade were discussed throughout 1976 and 1977 by the
representatives of the Working Group on the CSCE and of the EPC
Political Committee, and by the Nine’s heads of stated and
governments.203 On 27 January 1977 Working Group on CSCE
transmitted to NATO its report on the state of the preparation of the
Belgrade CSCE, according to the established procedure of coordination
between the smaller and the larger Western caucuses. The document
summed up the Nine’s guidelines for their conduct in Belgrade. They
reiterated their commitment to preserving the balanced and harmonic
nature of the Helsinki Final Act which remained the irrevocable
grounds for all next realisations.204 The foreign ministers of the Nine
charged the EPC Political Committee with the task of elaborating
substantial proposals for negotiations in Belgrade. Western initiatives
could eventually aim at opening new fronts in the CSCE cooperation,
without otherwise diverting the attention from the implementation of
Helsinki’s provisions.205 To the Nine’s January’s report, two additional,
important strategic papers followed in the course of 1977. In the first –
“Main Themes and Catalogue of Mains Points for Belgrade” 206 – the
Nine submitted a list of detailed proposals for the follow-up
conference. In the second – “Proposals for improving implementation”
Protokollnotizien „Sitzung der Interministeriellen Arbeitsgrupp KSZE im Auswärtigen Amt am
23. November 1976“, 30.11.1976, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.665.
202 The CSCE represented, according to Romano, the main task of the CSCE. This view
has been challenged by Ferrari, who argued that the preponderance of the CSCE policy
within the sphere of action of the EPC should not be overestimated. See, respectively, A.
Romano, “The main task of the European Political Cooperation: Fostering détente in
Europe”, pp. 123-142; and L. Ferrari, Speaking with a Single Voice. The Assertion of the EC as
a Distinctive International Actor, 1969-1979.
203 Sitzung des Auswärtigen Ausschusses am Mittwoch, dem 9.2.1977. Hier: Die EPZ im
Hinblick auf das Belgrader Treffen, 8.02.1977, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.688.
204 Sitzung des Auswärtigen Ausschusses am Mittwoch, dem 9.2.1977. Hier: Die EPZ im
Hinblick auf das Belgrader Treffen, 8.02.1977, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.688.
205 Ibid.
206 Main Themes and Catalogue of Main Points for Belgrade, 01.07.1977, in PA AA,
Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.688.
84
– the proposals of the Nine were reviewed and grouped into different
categories: first, the ones deriving directly from the Helsinki’s
provisions and therefore considered more likely to be put on the
negotiations table; second, the ones to raise as floating ideas during
negotiations, with the twofold aim of testing the other participants’
willingness to cooperate and offering narrow openings for the
unblocking of negotiations in difficult situations; third, the ones
destined for mere tactical uses, i.e. in order to contrast undesirable
Eastern requests.207 These two papers – which reflected the Nine’s will
to speak with a single voice in Belgrade – were a fruit of compromise
between two main opposite views. On the one hand, the British and the
Dutch advocated an assertive approach towards the focal issue of the
implementation of Helsinki’s dispositions on human rights in the
Soviet bloc. On the other hand, the majority of the Nine favoured more
pragmatic and balanced approaches to negotiations. A compromise
between these two standpoints was found by extending the
British/Dutch proposal for in-depth review debates to the whole
complex of the Helsinki Final Act. 208
Clashing visions and strategies of détente
Whilst coordination amongst the EC-Nine was proceeding at a good
pace, it was more difficult to find an agreement over a convergent
strategy for Belgrade with the U.S. new administration. In 1977 bilateral
relations between Bonn and Washington entered a phase of troubles
and misunderstandings. Mutual discord marked particularly the
personal relationship between U.S. President Jimmy Carter and West
German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt.209 The feeling that
administrations in Bonn and Washington were speaking different
207 Ibid.
208 Allgemeine Unterrichtung und zur Regelung der Sprache, 5.10.1977, in PA AA,
Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.689.
209 The troubled relationship between Carter and Schmidt has been insightfully analysed
by Klaus Wiegrefe in his book Das Zerwürfnis: Helmut Schmidt, Jimmy Carter und die Krise
der deutsh-amerikanischen Beziehungen (Berlin: Propylän, 2005).
85
languages concerned also the conduction of détente policy and the
diplomatic preparation of the first CSCE follow-up conference.
Transatlantic coordination with regard to the continuation of the
process of détente had suffered from the presidential election campaign
and the power change in Washington. As the Committee for Foreign
Affairs of the West German Bundestag observed, several crucial
questions concerning the Western strategy at the Belgrade CSCE were
still unanswered at the beginning of 1977.210 No decisions had been
made about what concrete initiatives NATO’s delegations would
undertake in Belgrade to relaunch East-West cooperation. There was
overall agreement only on some general points, limited to the part of
the conference’s mandate directed “towards the past”. First, Western
delegations should be firm on stressing their disappointment about the
incomplete implementation of the Helsinki Accords in the Eastern bloc.
Firmness should not degenerate, however, into sterile confrontation.211
Second, it had to be made clear that the process of implementation,
though gradual, should be pursued with continuity by all signing
countries.
With regard to this aspect, Bonn had recognised encouraging
signals coming from the Soviet bloc in Brezhnev’s speech held in Tula
on 18 January 1977, two days before Carter’s inauguration. The Tula
speech contained innovative passages regarding the Soviet security
doctrine which had the meaning of a positive signal of opening
towards possible cooperation sent by Brezhnev to the new U.S.
administration.212 Bonn hoped that Moscow’s implementation of a
more defensive security strategy would be paralleled by a less
ideological attitude towards cooperation in the field of security and
more generally towards the détente process.213 As Peter has
210 Sitzung des Auswärtigen Ausschusses des Bundestages am 28.01.1977, 28.01.1977, in PA
AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.381.
211 Ibid.
212 W.M. Zubok, A failed empire. The Soviet Union and the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev,
p. 255.
213 Sitzung des Auswärtigen Ausschusses des Bundestages am 28.01.1977, 28.01.1977, in PA
AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.381.
86
highlighted, the Soviet leadership feared – not without good reasons –
that relations with the new American administration would be
dominated by human rights issues.214
With regard to the Belgrade CSCE, there were good reasons to fear
that the upcoming review conference would turn into a stage of public
condemnation of Eastern violations of human rights. The development
of a growing drift between Bonn’s and Washington’s views of the
process of détente, with particular regard to human rights issues, were
observed and reported by the correspondents of the West German
press in the U.S.215 The public and political interest for human rights
pivoted in the West during 1977. It was not a novelty of the postHelsinki time: human rights issues had been a crucial item of debate at
the Helsinki CSCE as well.216 But what changed in the months
preceding the beginning of the follow-up meeting in Belgrade was the
prominent role that human rights issues took on in the international
political agenda. The acceleration of this trend was first due to a series
of resounding initiatives undertaken by Carter and his entourage in the
field of the promotion of human rights. Within the first months of the
Carter administration, the State Department protested publicly against
the arrests of Soviet dissidents Alexander Ginsburg and Juri Orlow,
initiators of the Helsinki-observer-group in Moscow;217 the President
sent personally a letter of support to Soviet dissident Sakharov and
welcomed at the White House Soviet dissident Vladimir Bukowski,
after his release from the Gulag; and the Congress created a special
committee in charge of observing the state of the respect of human
214 M. Peter, “Konferenzdiplomatie als Mittel der Entspannung. Die KSZE-Politik der
Regierung Schmidt/Genscher 1975-1978”, p. 23.
215 KSZE-Folgetreffen. Hier: Berichterstattung deutscher Korrespondenten in Washington,
20.06.1977, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.688.
216 On the EEC’s commitment to human rights at the CSCE in Helsinki see A. Romano,
From Détente in Europe to European Détente. Moreover, during the Seventies also the EEC
were increasingly involved with human rights protection outside of Europe, as it has
been well analysed in Ferrari’s PhD thesis (L. Ferrari, Speaking with a Single Voice. The
Assertion of the EC as a Distinctive International Actor).
217 Aufzeichnung des Botschafters von Staden, Washington, 2.03.1977, in AAPD, 1977, vol. I,
doc. 50, pp. 255-258.
87
rights in the Eastern European countries. 218 As an additional
confirmation of the new salience of human rights issues in international
affairs, Amnesty International was awarded the Nobel Prize for Peace
in 1977.219 Throughout the year plenty of initiatives for the promotion
of human rights were organised in Helsinki’s name in Europe. Seventyfive MPs of different Western European countries supported Romanian
dissident Goma and created the association “HAIG” (Helsinki
Agreements Implementation Group), whose main task consisted in
monitoring the respect of human rights in the Soviet bloc. Belgium’s
President Tindemans proposed the creation of a “pan-European court
for human rights”, in front of which the Soviet Union could be
indicted.220
Bonn’s possibilities to multilateralise and anchor its conference aims
within the Western Alliance – i.e. to shape a Western strategy for
Belgrade according to the West German idea of a “realistic détente
policy” – were strongly hindered by the U.S. activism on human rights.
It was clear to Bonn that the Carter administration would push the
human rights item to the top of its agenda for the CSCE. In its internal
analyses, the West German Foreign Office unceasingly stressed the
importance of taking a cautious approach to human rights issues in
Belgrade. Appeals to prudence were repeated both by Bonn’s
government and the EC-Nine during the diplomatic preparation of the
CSCE follow-up meeting.221 According to the Auswärtiges Amt, the
focus on moaning about human rights in Belgrade would prove to be a
counterproductive strategy. Theoretical discussions should be avoided
218 Gespräch des Bundeskanzlers Schmidt und des Bundesministers Genscher mit dem
amerikanischen Außenminister Vance, 31. März 1977, in AAPD, 1977, vol. I, doc. 82, pp. 413431.
219 “Können wir überhaupt noch helfen? SPIEGEL-Report über Erfolg und Grenzen des
Friedensnobelpreis-Trägers Amnesty International”, in Der Spiegel, Nr. 43/1977.
220 “Es gibt weder Sieger noch Besiegte”, in Der Spiegel, Nr. 24/1977.
221 Runderlass des Vortragenden Legationsrat I. Klasse Engels, 19.04.1977, in AAPD, 1977,
vol. I, doc. 94, p. 493; Bericht an die Minister über den Stand der Vorbereitung des KSZEFolgetreffens in Belgrad, 7.04.1977, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.688.
88
and replaced by a more pragmatic approach to negotiations. 222 The
West German government agreed in principle on the importance of
Principle VII; Bonn’s primal interest remained however directed to
safeguarding the possibility of obtaining further Eastern concessions in
the fields of visa policies, family reunification and human contacts –
areas in which the FRG led Western initiatives, by drafting and
negotiating proposals.223
Human contacts – conceived as an operative extension of the human
rights principle – represented for the Bundesrepublik the concrete
essence of the everyday coexistence with its Eastern neighbours.
Facilitating flows of visits, contacts, phone calls, letters, newspapers etc.
with millions of Germans living behind the Iron Curtain had certainly a
less powerful public impact than resounding denounces of human
rights violations regarding outstanding dissidents; however, they had
undeniably more direct repercussions on the lives of European citizens.
Quite significantly, during bilateral talks with Swedish Foreign
Minister Söder in April 1975, Genscher highlighted that it was more
important to got three people out of the East than to make of a fuss
about one single person for propagandistic purposes. 224 This argument,
which had been, was and would be repeatedly brought forward by the
Auswärtiges Amt, was used also to try to soften Washington’s
intransigency on human rights.
On occasion of London’s G7 summit in May 1977 human rights
issues were discussed in relation to the upcoming CSCE follow-up
meeting in Belgrade.225 Since the convening of the first economic
summit of the most industrialised countries in Rambouillet in
222 Fortführung des multilateralen Entspannungsprozess in Europa (Vorbereitung des KSZEFolgekonferenz in Belgrad 1977), 15.04.1976, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.389.
223 Fortführung des multilateralen Entspannungsprozess in Europa (Vorbereitung des KSZEFolgekonferenz in Belgrad 1977), 15.04.1976, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.389. Stand
der Vorbereitungen auf das KSZE-Folgentreffen in Belgrad, , 27.09.1977, in PA AA,
Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.395.
224 Gespräch des Bundesministers Genscher mit der schwedischen Außenministerin Söder,
15.04.1977, in AAPD, vol. I, doc. 90, p. 475.
225 Wirtschaftsgipfel in London, 07.05.1977, in AAPD, 1977, vol. I, doc. 112, pp. 582-583.
89
November 1975, the routine of the meetings of the Group of Seven had
turned into a platform of transatlantic coordination and foreign
political discussion of utmost importance.226 For the FRG it represented
the ideal multilateral forum to pursue its international interests and
have a voice in international affairs by levering the strength of its
economic preponderance. At the summit in London, the West German
Chancellor tried to convince the U.S. President of the opportunity to
pursue a moderate and pragmatic approach to human rights questions
in Belgrade, with the goal “not to destabilise systems but to improve
peoples’ concrete living conditions”. Schmidt provided some numbers
in support to his idea of the process of détente: the West German
federal government had contributed since Helsinki to achieve the full
implementation of human rights for about 65,000 citizens coming from
the Soviet Union, Romania, the GDR and other countries; similar
results were to expect for further 40,000 citizens in 1977 and 50,000 for
1978.227 Carter’s reassurances that the U.S. administration aimed at a
cooperative and not divisive conference in Belgrade and intended to
take constructive actions in order to accomplish the full
implementation of the Helsinki Final Act, sounded encouraging but
somewhat ambiguous.228 More assertiveness was shown by Carter’s
hardliner National Security Advisor Brzezinski, who chased away any
illusions about Washington’s second thoughts by explaining to West
German Ambassador in Washington von Staden that the U.S.
administration saw the question of human rights from a “more global”
point of view than Bonn’s federal government.229 Human rights issues
were the focal item of U.S.-West German consultations held on 9
September 1977 in view of the beginning of the Belgrade CSCE one
month later. Against Bonn’s hopes, the round of bilateral talks did not
shed light on how far the U.S. administration intended to pursue its
struggle for the respect of human rights in Belgrade. It gave the West
226 H. James, Rambouillet, 15. November 1975. Die Globalisierung der Wirtschaft.
227 Wirtschaftsgipfel in London, 07.05.1977, in AAPD, 1977, vol. I, doc. 112, pp. 583.
228 Ibid., p. 582.
229 Botschafter von Staden, Washington, an das Auswärtige Amt, 20.04.1977, in AAPD, 1977,
vol. I, 96, pp. 503-505.
90
German federal government to understand that the U.S. delegation at
the Belgrade CSCE would be likely to take two actions which both
displeased Bonn. First, a marked stress would be put on the
implementation of Principle VII. Second, the idea of naming single
cases of violations, particularly the ones of prominent dissidents,
during the review debate on the Helsinki Final Act was an option that
Washington did not disregard.230
The discrepancy between the standpoints of the U.S and the FRG –
together with the majority of the EC-Nine, which were instead in
favour of focusing negotiations on issues of human contacts and review
discussions on broader categories of violations and cases – remained
profound on the eve of the Belgrade CSCE. On 28 September 1977, few
days before the starting of the first follow-up meeting, the heads of
NATO’s delegations at the Belgrade CSCE met in Brussels to agree on
the guidelines for the West’s behaviour at the conference. The two
strategic papers drafted by the EC-Nine – “Main themes for Belgrade”
and “Proposals for the implementation of the Final Act” – were
approved.231 The decision represented a provisional agreement over the
main general strategic lines the Alliance intended to pursue in
Belgrade. But the details about the following concrete actions the
Alliance would take, as well as about the real intentions of the U.S.
delegation, remained largely undefined.
Pursuing transatlantic harmony in public policy
Notwithstanding West German-American divergences of views and
strategies, for the Bundesrepublik it remained vitally important to keep
the Americans involved in the CSCE process. The search for a
transatlantic entente over a Western common strategy for Belgrade
continued to be pursued by West German diplomacy as before as
230 Stand der Vorbereitungen auf das KSZE-Folgentreffen in Belgrad, 27.09.1977, in PA AA,
Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.395.
231 Stand der Vorbereitungen auf das KSZE-Folgentreffen in Belgrad, 27.09.1977, in PA AA,
Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.395.
91
during the follow-up meeting. Besides being a West German foreign
policy priority, protecting the transatlantic harmony became
increasingly a public political need as well. The public side of the West
German diplomatic preparation of the first CSCE follow-up meeting
consisted in avoiding any public dissent with the U.S. administration.
Even though divergences of foreign political views between Bonn and
Washington had grown throughout 1977, transatlantic harmony and
Western coordination needed to be defended in front of public
opinions. Particularly, it was necessary to convince the public opinion
that Bonn’s federal government agreed in substance with Washington
upon the importance of engaging in the struggle for the respect of
human rights in the Soviet bloc.
Handling carefully the public dimension of Belgrade’s preparation
responded to the need, first, of washing up perennial concerns that the
FRG would undertake a foreign political single-handed course in the
pursuit of East-West dialogue. Bonn’s international behaviour
remained under scrutiny in the U.S., especially since incomprehension
between Carter and Schmidt had become to emerge. Bonn’s critical
stances on Carter’s human rights policy, in particular, were object of
public discussion on the U.S. press.232 In June 1977 the West German
Foreign Office asked its ambassador in Washington to carry out
briefings with the German press correspondents in the U.S., in order to
take precautions against increasing trends of depicting Bonn and
Washington as drifting apart. Divergences of opinions should be
softened in the press coverage and German readers should get the
impression that Washington and Bonn shared an overall common
political line for the management of East-West dialogue.233 A month
later, as delegations of the CSCE participant states were in Belgrade to
prepare the conference, U.S. chief delegator Sherer blamed the West
German radio sender Deutschlandfunk for a reportage which “wrongly”
disclosed the existence of a profound disagreement between the U.S.
232 Bonner Kritik an Präsident Carters Menschenrechtspolitik, 7.07.1977, in PA AA,
Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.688.
233 Ibid.
92
and the West German delegations over human rights issues.234 Press
releases claiming the “isolation of the U.S. delegation” at the
preparatory meeting in Belgrade were paralleled by a report by Reuters
pointing the finger at the leanings to unilateralism of the West German
delegation, whose “fluctuating position” had been target of criticism of
the British newspaper The Times too.235
Pursuing an adequate public strategy responded, second, to Bonn’s
need to deal with the requests coming from the domestic political
opposition and public opinion. A special interest in the CSCE existed in
the FRG: the Bundesrepublik had been the only country in which the
CSCE had been item of parliamentary debate twice.236 Public
expectations on the contributions the CSCE follow-up meeting in
Belgrade would bring to the human rights cause could not be ignored.
The minority fractions of the CDU/CSU put pressure on the federal
government for greater commitment to human rights. After having
strongly opposed the signing of the Helsinki Final Act, the CDU/CSU
pretended that Schmidt and Genscher followed Carter’s example of
foreign political morality and adopted an offensive stance on human
rights towards the Eastern countries as a precondition for the
continuation of East-West cooperation.237 CDU/CSU’s insistence aimed
at putting the federal government in a difficult position by pushing
human rights issues to the top of the political agenda. It would not be
easy, indeed, to justify in front of the public opinion the reasons of the
FRG’s minor commitment to human rights compared to other Western
partners. The Auswärtiges Amt assessed the existence of concrete risks
that West German aims and intentions would be misunderstood by the
234 Erklärungen des amerikanischen Delegationsleiters beim KSZE-Vorbereitungstreffen in
Belgrad, 7.07.1977, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.688.
235 Aufzeichnung des Ministerialdirigenten Meyer-Landrut, 04.08.1977, in AAPD, 1977, vol.
II, 208, p. 1047.
236 Gespräch des Bundesministers Genscher mit dem amerikanischen Außenminister Haig in
Washington, 09.03.1981, in AAPD, 1981, vol. I, doc. 61, p. 340.
237 „Und das soll nicht Mitte sein? Der stellvertretende CDU-Vorsitzende Alfred Dregger
über den Kurs der Opposition“, in Der Spiegel, Nr. 25/1977; Weißbuch der CDU/CSUFraktion „Über die menschenrechtliche Lage in Deutschland und der Deutschen in Osteuropa“,
09.11.1977, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.689.
93
domestic public opinion and the allies.238 The Helsinki Final Act had
raised great public expectations which played increasingly a focal role
in the following developments of European détente. The
unprecedented public interest in the CSCE negotiations, which marked
the process of European détente since Helsinki onwards, faced all
governments with new tasks in the realm of international public policy.
On the basis of the experiences collected during the diplomatic
preparation of the first CSCE follow-up meeting, the West German
Foreign Office decided, in coordination with the Chancellor’s office, to
embark in Belgrade on a strategy of balance which would mediate
between different needs and thrusts. First, it was necessary to strike a
balance between satisfying public expectations and avoiding excessive
confrontations able to endanger the positive outcome of the
conference.239 On the operational side, it meant to show firmness on
Eastern responsibilities for the lacking implementation and violations
of the Helsinki Final Act, by circumscribing them, however, to the first
phase of the conference dedicated to review debates. Second, a middle
course had to be undertaken between questions of principle – i.e. the
need to preserve the credibility of the CSCE process – and pragmatic
interests – i.e. achieving concrete improvements in East-West
cooperation – both during review debates and substantial negotiations.
Human issues in particular needed to be discussed, after having
restated the importance of the principles underlying them, within the
framework of concrete actions in the fields of Basket III. 240 Third,
intermediation had to be pursued between the divergent positions of
the Western allies, particularly between the American and the French.
Whereas the first mainly aimed at realising in Belgrade an exhaustive
and comprehensive review of the implementation of Helsinki’s
provisions, by focusing particularly on the state of human rights in
238 Stand der Vorbereitungen auf das KSZE-Folgentreffen in Belgrad, 27.09.1977, in PA AA,
Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.395.
239 Auszug aus der Aufzeichnung der Abt. 2 des AA , 07.03.1977, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv,
Bd. 178.688.
240 Deutsch-amerikanisch Planungsstabsgespräche am 26./27. September in New York,
1.10.1977, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.395.
94
Eastern Europe, the second firmly opposed the scenario of turning
Belgrade into a mere “conference in human rights”. Translated into
practice, it meant to support Washington’s call for an in-depth review
debate, without otherwise closing the possibility of multilateral
cooperation with the Eastern countries.241
The preparatory phase of the first CSCE follow-up meeting started
on 15 June 1977 in Belgrade and ended eight weeks later, on 5 August
1977. The thirty-five delegations reached an overall agreement over the
conference’s dates, duration, agenda and main procedural questions, in
order to permit works in Belgrade to flow without impediments. The
relatively long duration of the preparatory meeting was due to the
emergence of the first disagreements between the Western and the
Eastern fronts. The West German delegation managed to push through
its demand for a dual structure of the plenary debate, with a first
temporally limited phase oriented “towards the past” – i.e. focused on
the review of the process of implementation of the Helsinki Act – and a
second phase directed “towards the future” – i.e. negotiations on
substantial improvements and developments. 242 The Auswärtiges Amt
welcomed warmly the proactive mediation role carried out by the
group of neutral and non-aligned countries – particularly by the
Austrian, Swiss and Spanish delegations – which anticipated the
dynamics that would mark the unfolding of the main conference some
months later.243
As regards the most divisive question of the conference’s duration
and of the schedule of its end date, the Western interests prevailed over
241 Botschafter Paul, Brüssel (NATO), an das Auswärtige Amt, 29.-30.09.1977, in AAPD,
1977, vol. II, doc. 267, pp. 1297-1300.
242 Verlauf und Ergebnis des KSZE-Vorbereitungstreffen, 6.09.1977, in PA AA,
Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.688.
243 Aufzeichnung des Ministerialdirigenten Meyer-Landrut, 4. August 1977, in AAPD, 1977,
vol. II, doc. 208, pp. 1046-1051. For an insightful analysis of the NNAs’ role at the followup meeting in Belgrade, see: T. Fischer, “Getting to Know Their Limits: The N+N and the
Follow-up Meeting in Belgrade 1977/78”, in From Helsinki to Belgrade. The First Follow-up
Meeting and the Crisis of Détente, eds. V. Bilandžić, D. Dahlmann and M. Kosanović
(Göttingen: V&R unipress, 2012), pp. 163-184; and T. Fischer, “Bridging the Gap between
East and West: The N+N as Catalysts of the CSCE Process , 1972-1983”, pp. 143-178.
95
Eastern demands for a short conference limited to a duration of threefour weeks and with a fixed end date. The Western delegations, which
aimed instead – with Bonn’s vivid support – at a sufficiently long
conference with an open end, managed to get a practicable duration of
indicatively sixteen weeks. The end of the first CSCE follow-up
meeting was hence scheduled for the spring of 1978; the conclusion was
however left open and tied to the adoption of a final document. The
organisational agenda of the conference was roughly structured: after
two weeks of plenary conference focused on review debates, the
following weeks would be dedicated to negotiations within five
working organs – respectively on Basket I, II and III, on Mediterranean
questions, and on the final document and the terms of the convening of
the second follow-up meeting.244
Between the conclusion of the preparatory meeting in August and
the beginning of the main conference in October 1977 no consultations
with the Warsaw Pact countries took place. Bonn’s impression was that
the Soviet Union and its allies – with the single exception of Romania245
– would pursue a low-profile approach in Belgrade and focus their
efforts on avoiding in-depth review debates – with particular regard to
human rights issues – which would damage their international prestige
and fuel dissidents’ demands. 246 Still during bilateral CSCE
consultations with the USSR in the early months of 1977, Bonn had
registered Moscow’s will to avoid any spectacular conference which
would compel the Soviet bloc to deal with the large shortcomings of its
implementation of Helsinki’s provisions.247 According to West German
244 Verlauf und Ergebnis des KSZE-Vorbereitungstreffen, 6.09.1977, in PA AA,
Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.688.
245 Romania undertook an independent course from the Soviet bloc, both before and
during the follow-up meeting. For an assessment of Romania’s autonomous strategy at
the CSCE, see: M. E. Ionescu, “Romania’s Special Position within the Eastern Bloc during
the CSCE Follow-Up Conferences of Belgrade and Madrid”, in Die KSZE im Ost-WestKonflikt. Internationale Politik und gesellschaftliche Transformation 1975-1990, eds. M. Peter
and H. Wentker, pp. 137-153.
246 Bericht an die Minister über den Stand der Vorbereitung des KSZE-Folgetreffens in Belgrad,
7.04.1977, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.688.
247 Aufzeichnung des Referats 212, 3.02.1977, in AAPD, 1977, vol. I, doc. 21, pp. 123-126.
96
analyses, signals coming from Moscow suggested that the Soviet Union
aimed at a short meeting with consultative character. Review debates
should consist in a mere exchange of national reports on the state of the
implementation process. The West German Foreign Office predicted,
furthermore, that Eastern delegations would try to shift soon the focus
of negotiations in Belgrade from implementation issues to general
discussions over security and to Brezhnev’s proposal for a panEuropean conference on cooperation in the fields of energy and
environment. 248 Therefore, it was to expect that the Soviet bloc would
abstain from taking any proactive initiatives, by rather investing its
efforts into a rapid conclusion of the conference.249
The upcoming follow-up meeting in Belgrade looked like being an
intermediate step in the CSCE process, split between the reconfirmation
of Helsinki’s realisation and the possibility of paving new
developments for the future follow-up meeting. According to Bonn’s
predictions, the Belgrade CSCE would exercise a “preventive function
of control” of the future behaviour of Eastern countries, wedging them
further into the process of détente. An extraordinary final document
was not, however, to be expected in Belgrade: therefore, it was
convenient to approach the appointment of the first follow-up
conference with pragmatism and not to pitch public expectations too
high.250
The Belgrade CSCE at its start: reviewing existing divergences
On the eve of the opening of the plenary session at the Belgrade
CSCE, positive signals coming from the superpowers alimented West
German hopes that the conference would display a fruitful cooperation.
Whereas it seemed difficult to replay the success of Helsinki, there was
248 Bericht an die Minister über den Stand der Vorbereitung des KSZE-Folgetreffens in Belgrad,
7.04.1977, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.688.
249 Stand der Vorbereitungen auf das KSZE-Folgentreffen in Belgrad, 27.09.1977, in PA AA,
Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.395.
250 Ibid.
97
enough room for confiding in the possible achievement of concrete
détente improvements. Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko’s visit in
Washington in September 1977 had given the hint for the resurgence of
the talks on strategic arms limitation (SALT II) and for a consequent
overall improvement of the superpowers dialogue in all fields, after
coolness had marked bipolar relations during the first months of the
Carter administration.251 As the American magazine Newsweek
reported, an officer of the State Department close to Cyrus Vance had
commented that “If SALT is on, Belgrade will be a lot shorter and
sweeter”.252 Even the authoritative Washington Post welcomed
positively the apparent return of “new warmth marking the U.S.-Soviet
ties”: “The stage is also set”, so the American newspaper, “for the
opening in Belgrade on Tuesday of the review conference on European
Security and Cooperation with the expectation that the U.S.-Soviet
confrontation over human rights will be either avoided, or much more
muted than originally anticipated”.253 The beneficial interaction
between the unfolding of SALT II and CSCE negotiations – as the
dependence of Belgrade’s fortunes on the superpowers’ willingness to
cooperate – was not unknown to the West German federal government.
The works of the first CSCE follow-up meeting started in the
Yugoslav capital on 4 October 1977. According to the schedule agreed
at the preparatory meeting, general plenary debates lasted two
weeks.254 On 9 October was the turn of the West German delegation to
issue its opening address. The Auswärtiges Amt had sent to Belgrade a
high-profile delegation which was headed by Ambassador Per Fischer
and included eight high-ranking servants of the Foreign Office, a staff
of six collaborators, a press speaker, and some experts for specific items
251 Aufzeichnung des Botschafters Ruth, 14 November 1977, in AAPD, 1977, vol. II, doc.
323, pp. 1549-1553.
252 KSZE-Folgetreffen in Belgrad, 03.10.1977, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.689.
253 Ibid.
254 Aufzeichnung des Ministerialdirigenten Meyer-Landrut, 4.08.1977, in AAPD, 1977, vol. II,
doc. 208, p. 1047.
98
of negotiation.255 After the long and careful diplomatic work carried out
during 1976-1977 to promote the implementation of the Helsinki
Accords and to prepare the first review conference, the moment had
come for Bonn to present on a broad stage its plans for the continuation
of the CSCE process. Hence, the head of the West German delegation
restated in his opening address Bonn’s main views about the aims, the
meaning and tasks of the CSCE, offering a small summa of the West
German idea of the process of multilateral détente. 256
As Fischer stressed, détente had to be necessarily continued because
there were no other available and pursuable alternatives. As Helsinki
Final Act represented the cornerstone of détente in Europe, its correct
interpretation and full implementation needed to be safeguarded. The
Helsinki CSCE had initiated a long but continuous process whose main
aim was making Europe safer and Europeans more human. 257 A
particular stress was put by Fischer on the human dimension of the
CSCE, by giving once again clear indications about what West German
priorities consisted in. The importance of human rights was evoked
with reference to their historical and multilateral significance; their
implementation and their respect were put into the hands of the shared
responsibility of all member states. 258
When moving to the analysis of the state of implementation of
Helsinki’s commitments, Fischer adopted the rhetorical strategy of
balancing achievements and shortcomings: he started mentioning what
had already been realised to proceed then by enlisting what was still to
do. Severe and direct criticisms were not spared to the Eastern
countries: concrete examples of setbacks and shortcomings of the
process of implementation in the Soviet bloc were listed by the head of
255 Stand der Vorbereitungen auf das KSZE-Folgentreffen in Belgrad, 27.09.1977, in PA AA,
Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.395.
256 KSZE-Folgetreffen. Hier: Deutsche Erklärung für Generaldebatte, 09.10.1977, in PA AA,
Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.689.
257 Ibid.
258 Ibid.
99
the West German delegation.259 As the Auswärtiges Amt had decided
when preparing its strategy for Belgrade firmness had to be displayed
in the first phase of the conference. On this point there was agreement
with the Western partners and the U.S. delegation. 260 Bonn drew,
however, a marked line between the “moment for firmness” and the
“moment for pragmatism”, i.e. the “moment of (moderate)
confrontation” and the “moment of negotiation”: once questions of
principles would have been discussed and exhausted in the first phase
of the conference dedicated to review debates, delegations had to put
aside ideological contrapositions and make room for substantial
negotiations in the ensuing phase of the conference. 261 This clear
separation proved soon to be difficult to implement: the confrontation
over the implementation of Helsinki’s provisions affected in an harmful
way the possibilities to build cooperation in the ensuing negotiation
phase.
After all delegations had issued their opening statements during the
first week of plenary debate, the conference works moved to the tasks
of reviewing implementation and presenting new proposals for
cooperation at the level of subsidiary working committees. The
divergent approaches to the interpretation and implementation of the
Helsinki Accords, which had emerged in the aftermath of the first
CSCE, continued to mark the East-West’s respective positions and
strategies in Belgrade. It was not that surprising, hence, that review
debates proceeded – as Fischer reported to Bonn – as a “dialogue of the
deaf”.262 The spectrum of the respective interests took soon shape
according the respective renown positions: on the one side, Western
delegations focused the attention of review debates on CBMs, human
259 KSZE-Folgekonferenz. Hier: Entwurf Ansprache Amerikanischen Chefdelegierten Goldberg,
04.10.1977, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.689.
260 Sitzung des Auswärtigen Ausschusses des Bundestages am 28.01.1977, 28.01.1977, in PA
AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.381.
261 Allgemeine Unterrichtung und zur Regelung der Sprache, 5.10.1977, in PA AA,
Zwischenarchiv, 178.689.
262 KSZE-Folgetreffen. Hier: Plenardebatte am 11.10.1977 Vormittags, 11.10.1977, in PA AA,
Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.689.
100
rights violations, existing obstacles to trade exchange, human contacts
and issues in the field of information; on the other hand, Eastern
delegations avoided any confrontation on human rights issues by
appealing to the principles of non-interference (Principle VI) and social
and political self-determination (Principle I) and put the stress on
general disarmament issues, obstacles to imports in the West and
positive realisations in the fields of culture.263
The moderate tones which had marked the debates until that
moment went through a dramatic change as Arthur Goldberg, head of
the U.S. delegation, took the floor on 18 October 1977 at the session of
the working committee on Basket III to direct a violent attack against
the Czech government which had prohibited reporters to cover the
ongoing trials against four members of the dissident group Charter
77.264 Goldberg’s speech was a surprise to the Western allies. The works
of the working committee had just started: the U.S. attacks appeared
fully inappropriate as they harmed the construction of that favourable
climate for substantial negotiations that the West German delegation
longed for. Goldberg’s charges seemed to move in the direction of
transforming Belgrade into a tribunal on human rights, a spectre often
evoked by the Soviet Union and a scenario ruled out by the Western
Alliance.265 A further reason of Western discontent – and of profound
Czech irritation – was Goldberg’s decision to break off the diplomatic
taboo of “not naming names” of specific guilty parties for human rights
violations. The U.S. solo initiative clearly contradicted the Western
263 Aufzeichnung des Ministerialdirektors Blech, 11.11.1977, in AAPD, 1977, vol. II, doc. 320,
p. 1538.
264 D. Selvage, “The Superpowers and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe, 1977-1983. Human Rights, Nuclear Weapons, and Western Europe”, in Die KSZE
im Ost-West-Konflikt. Internationale Politik und gesellschaftliche Transformationen 1975-1990,
eds. M. Peter and H. Wentker, p. 16.
265 On 30 June 1977 the NATO countries had declared indeed their common interest for
avoiding trials against the Eastern countries and for pursuing instead a sober and
objective “businesslike atmosphere” in Belgrade. See Botschafter Pauls, Brüssel (NATO), an
das Auswärtige Amt, 1.07.1977, in AAPD, 1977, vol. II, doc. 170, p. 877. As regards Soviet
expectations with regard to character of review debates in Belgrade, see Aufzeichnung des
Referats 212, 3.02.1977, in AAPD, 1977, vol. I, doc. 21, pp. 23-26.
101
overall agreement over the strategic course to pursue in Belgrade. At
the NATO meeting on 28 September 1977 the Western partners had
expressed their common intention to avoid mentioning single cases of
human rights violations in Belgrade, by prefer referring to larger
categories of impediments.266 Few days before the inauguration of the
conference Goldberg himself had personally reassured West German
Foreign Minister Genscher about his intention to refer to human rights
violations in the Soviet bloc through allusions and general examples,
when addressing the issue in his opening speech.267 As the U.S. chief
delegator had changed his mind within a couple of days and had
communicated to the Western partners his intention to mention, during
the general debate on Basket III the day after, a series of fresh violations
of human rights perpetrated in the Soviet Union, a spontaneous
“emergency meeting” of the NATO delegations had taken place under
the West German direction. The majority of Western delegations had
reconfirmed the common position expressed at the NATO meeting few
weeks before. They had reaffirmed their shared belief that single cases
were to be discussed in bilateral talks in the margins of the conference
works; they had committed themselves to avoiding counterproductive
confrontations on the human rights issue which would risk
endangering the cooperative atmosphere of negotiations. U.S. chief
delegator Goldberg had given his assent to the allies’ common
position.268 Goldberg’s solo initiative on 18 October was perceived as a
reiterated violation of the gentlemen’s agreement concerted with the
Western allies.
The West German delegation was in the difficult situation of being
the first amongst Western delegations to intervene in the debate of the
working committee after Goldberg’s attacks. Preserving the unity of the
266 KSZE-Belgrad. Hier: NATO-Rat mit Delegationsleitern am 28.09.1977, 28.09.1977, in PA
AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.688.
267 Amerikanische Vorbereitung auf KSZE-Folgetreffen in Belgrad, 29.09.1977, in PA AA,
Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.688; and Ministerialdirektor Blech, z.Z. New York, an das Auswärtige
Amt, 27.09.1977, in AAPD, 1977, vol. II, doc. 259, pp. 1259-1263.
268 Botschafter Fischer, Belgrad (KSZE-Delegation), an das Auswärtige Amt, 13.10.1977, in
AAPD, 1977, vol. II, doc. 283, p. 1376.
102
Western front was Bonn’s first inevitable priority. The head of the West
German delegation carried out its task and took Goldberg’s side. No
rule of procedure had been infringed, he explained, as any participant
have the legitimate right to address critical matters – as in the case of
the ongoing human rights violations in Prague – in the debate of the
working group. To the contrary, Belgrade provided the adequate forum
to deal with the shortcomings of the implementation of Helsinki’s
principles, included Principle VII.269
The West German intervention served as an illustration for the
middle-course approach Bonn’s Foreign Office had decided to pursue
in Belgrade. Taking the U.S. delegation’s side did not rule out the
possibility to keep the door open for negotiating with the East in a
cooperative atmosphere. As Fischer reassured Eastern delegators,
“frankness and constructiveness” did not contradict each other. 270 The
West German strategy seemed initially to reap some benefits: as Per
Fischer reported to Bonn, albeit his delegation had openly stood up
against the Prague’s trial and the Eastern deficits in the implementation
of the Helsinki Accords, Eastern criticisms had not been directed
against West Germans, but rather against the U.S., Canadian and
British delegations.271 The developments of the first weeks of works in
Belgrade unveiled what the preceding diplomatic preparation of the
conference had already suggested: i.e. that the game at the Belgrade
CSCE would be played not only between the East and the West, but
within the Western Alliance as well. The considerations of diplomatic
opportunity marking the Nine’s approach to review debates and
negotiations appeared, indeed, not to form part of Washington’s
strategy for Belgrade.
269 Intervention des deutschen Delegationsleiters zu Prinzipien 6 und 7 der Sitzung des
Arbeitsorgans am 21.10.1977, and Beispielhafte Zusammenstellung von Erklärungen der
deutschen Delegation zu humanitären Fragen. Drahtbericht Nr. 686 vom 19.10. –
Delegationsbericht Nr. 42, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.689.
270 Intervention des deutschen Delegationsleiters zu Prinzipien 6 und 7 der Sitzung des
Arbeitsorgans am 21.10.1977, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.689.
271 KSZE-Folgetreffen. Hier: Korb III (Sitzung am 19.10.1977), 19.10.1977, in PA AA,
Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.689.
103
Dealing with the German political implications of the Belgrade
CSCE
Whilst the West German delegation attempted to circumscribe the
detrimental consequences of the U.S. assertiveness on human rights at
the Belgrade CSCE, Bonn’s federal government had to deal with the
strong engagement for human rights of its parliamentary opposition at
home. The CDU/CSU had opposed the signing of the Eastern Treaties
in the Brandt era as well as the signing of the Helsinki Final Act. The
overall validity of Bonn’s détente policy towards East had been harshly
questioned by the opposition parties during the national election
campaign in 1976.272 The pursuit of a realistic dialogue with the East,
neither at the bilateral or multilateral level, was an item of the
minority’s political agenda. Not being interested in concrete
improvements of the process of European détente, West German
Christian-democrats aimed at putting the Eastern bloc on the defensive
at Belgrade. They were, hence, on the same wavelength of hardliners in
Washington: they appreciated the moral stances informing Carter’s
international struggle for human rights and shared the idea of that part
of the U.S. administration which aimed at turning Belgrade into an
international trial on human rights. 273
CDU/CSU’s activism for human rights – which had intensified as
the appointment of the first CSCE follow-up meeting was approaching
– pivoted in November 1977, as MPs of the minority group announced
their intention to hand a white book “on the state of human rights for
Germans living in Germany and Eastern Europe” amongst delegations
and journalists at the Belgrade CSCE. The initiative undertaken in the
Yugoslav capital was flanked by the presentation of a parliamentary
enquiry on the same themes, with the goal of opening a broad public
debate in the Bundestag and in the country over the violations of human
272 Gespräch des Bundesministers Genscher mit dem sowjetischen Außenminister Gromyko in
New York, 27.09.1977, in AAPD, 1976, vol. II, doc. 293, p. 1342.
273 W. Link, “Außen- und Deutschlandpolitik in der Ära Schmidt, 1974-1982”, p. 311.
104
rights and basic freedoms perpetrated by the Soviet bloc.274 The 175page document contained, first, a detailed list of charges directed
against the GDR, the Soviet Union, the CSSR and Romania concerning
violations of individual and collective human rights committed against
German citizens; and second, a series of demands for the federal
government and the other CSCE participants. The German political
implications of the white book were clear, as an important part of the
accusations were directed against the GDR – not accidentally,
mentioned in the title by referring to the whole Germany. The initiative
was, hence, twice as insidious for Bonn’s federal government: not only
were negotiations in Belgrade in the deadlock, but the inner-German
dialogue was undergoing difficult times as well.
The affair of the white paper was handled carefully by the
Auswärtiges Amt. According the assessment of the Foreign Office, the
document offered a quite accurate analysis, but did not bring new
evidence or information to the matter. The federal government was
indeed familiar with the numbers and facts presented by the
CDU/CSU, most of which had already been taken into account by the
Foreign Office when formulating its contributions for the debate on
human rights in Belgrade – by presenting them, though, in a less
detailed and smoother manner. That part of the white paper’s
reproaches which had not been included in the list of arguments for
review debates and negotiations had been packed into the so-called
“big baggage” for Belgrade, i.e. a chapter of the Western agenda
containing a list of reserve arguments to use only in the case the
exchange of blows with the East would become such violent to impede
any positive conclusion of the conference.275 The West German Foreign
Office firmly rejected the attempts of the domestic opposition to exert
influence on the position of its delegation in Belgrade and tried to limit
as much as possible the public resonance of its initiative. For this
purpose, the federal government’s answer to the parliamentary enquiry
274 Weißbuch der CDU/CSU-Fraktion „Über die menschenrechtliche Lage in Deutschland und
der Deutschen in Osteuropa“, 09.11.1977, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.689.
275 Weißbuch der CDU/CSU-Fraktion „Über die menschenrechtliche Lage in Deutschland und
der Deutschen in Osteuropa“, 09.11.1977, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.689.
105
of the minority was postponed to 9 March 1978, after the scheduled
conclusion of the CSCE follow-up meeting.276
The initiative of the CDU/CSU touched a sore point of Bonn’s
diplomatic strategy at the Belgrade CSCE – and more generally of its
overall Ostpolitik. Prudence and pragmatism marking the West German
approach to negotiations required a certain degree of secrecy and
discretion. Any resounding initiative likely to incur big public attention
had to be cautiously avoided as long as the federal government was
dealing with delicate negotiations. Looking constantly after the
relations with the press was one priority task of the West German
delegation throughout the whole conference. It was important that
detailed information about negotiations with the Eastern countries did
not leak. Consequently, the public opinion was kept informed about
the general unfolding of the conference and was informed in due time
about the outcomes of negotiations, once an achievement had been
secured.
This general need for secrecy assumed further importance when
dealing with inner-German questions: no details about the conduction
of parallel talks with the East German delegation in the margins of the
official conference works were provided by the West German
delegation to the national press. With its evident German political
implications, the white book of the CDU/CSU threatened to rouse at the
multilateral level a dangerous confrontation over specific innerGerman matters – an eventuality that Bonn’s federal government, in
accordance with the East German leadership, had tried to escape since
the beginning of the conference. As preparing its strategy for Belgrade,
the Auswärtiges Amt had dealt with the question of how to address
inner-German issues at the CSCE follow-up meeting.277 In conformity
with the approach adopted at the Helsinki CSCE, Bonn’s efforts
continued to be directed in Belgrade to preventing the follow-up
276 Große Anfrage der CDU/CSU: Vorschläge zum Verfahren, sowie Grundzüge der
Beantwortung, 17.12.1977, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.689.
277 Stand der Vorbereitungen auf das KSZE-Folgentreffen in Belgrad, 27.09.1977, in PA AA,
Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.395.
106
meeting from turning into a multilateral conference over Germany. The
main aspects of the CSCE regarding Bonn’s Deutschland- and
Berlinpolitik were confined to some mentions within the general
overview presented by the West German delegation in its opening
address. General problems related to inner-German human contacts
were roused by the Western delegation within the broader framework
of review debates and negotiations on Basket III. A particular stress
was put on those issues that were clearly important to Bonn for
German political reasons – e.g. the questions of Western journalists’
working conditions in the Eastern countries, which had become a very
sensitive matter after the reiterated expulsions of West German
correspondents from the GDR.278 Specific bilateral matters, as for
instance the issue of German citizenship, were put forward only
allusively.279 Moreover, the practice – which had already been tested at
the Helsinki CSCE – of handing confidentially lists of hardship cases
concerning German citizens living in the GDR over the East German
delegation, within the framework of informal contacts in the margins of
the official conference, was continued in Belgrade.280
Drafting the conference final document: a West German
miscalculation
At the beginning of November 1977 diplomatic works in Belgrade
headed slowly towards the next phase of substantial negotiations for
the conference final document. Review debates had brought poor
results during the weeks of October; especially within the working
committee on Basket III, discussions had remained stuck on sterile
matters of principles. On the one hand, the EC-Nine had been
278 Drahtbericht Nr. 732 vom 25.10.1977; Drahtbericht Nr. 756 vom 27.10.1977; Drahtbericht
Nr. 774 vom 31.10.1977; Drahtbericht Nr. 779 vom 1.11.1977, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd.
178.689.
279 Bericht der Bundesregierung über das KSZE-Folgetreffen in Belgrad, 22.11.1977, in PA AA,
Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.689.
280 KSZE-Folgetreffen in Belgrad. Hier: Behandlung von individuellen Härtefälle aus der DDR,
die an die Bundesregierung durch Petitionen herangetragen werden, 18.11.1977, in PA AA,
Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.689.
107
compelled to accept the embitterment of the confrontation on human
rights issues after Goldberg’s hard intervention against the Czech
government; on the other hand, Eastern delegations had refused to give
any answers to specific questions posed by the Western counterparts.281
In November 1977 review debates were progressively absorbed into
the negotiations on possible concrete improvements of the Helsinki’s
commitments. Eastern delegations complaint about the West’s lacking
willingness to conclude discussions on implementation issues for good
and move to the drafting of the final document. Notwithstanding the
U.S. insistence on human rights violations, Eastern delegations had
remained at the negotiation table: it was surprising, so Fischer reported
to Bonn, how much the Soviet Union and its allies had been willing to
tolerate.282 According to the analysis of the West German Foreign
Office, negotiations had entered a phase in which any spectacular
confrontation was to expect. However, Bonn still hoped to achieve in
Belgrade satisfactory results, likely to be presented to the national
public opinion as concrete improvements of the process of détente. 283
The greatest challenge for the West German delegation consisted in
pursuing balanced improvements in all fields in order to hinder that
selective improvements would dilute the political significance of the
CSCE process. Each group of delegations had presented its own
package of proposals for the final document. With the exception of
Soviet requests in the field of disarmament and Romania’s proposals in
the military field, the Eastern package focused on Basket II. The issue of
CBMs, one of Bonn’s main priorities, was deliberately avoided by the
Soviet Union: the Warsaw Pact, as reported by West German
Ministerial Director Blech, had shown scarce interest in improving
281 KSZE-Folgetreffen. Hier: Korb III (Sitzung am 19.10.1977), 19.10.1977, in PA AA,
Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.689. Botschafter Fischer, Belgrad (KSZE-Delegation), an das
Auswärtige Amt, 21.12.1977, in AAPD, 1977, vol. II, doc. 373, p. 1793.
282 KSZE-Folgetreffen. Hier: Stand des KSZE-Folgetreffens. Überblick über die bisher
eingereichten Vorschläge für das Schlussdokument, 11.11.1977, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv,
Bd. 178.689.
283 Bericht der Bundesregierung über das KSZE-Folgetreffen in Belgrad, 22.11.1977, in PA AA,
Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.689.
108
CBMs from the beginning of the conference, by rather turning its
attention to more propagandistic matters of disarmament and
armament control which overlapped with the scope of the MBFR
negotiations in Geneva.284 NNAs’ proposals addressed all three
Helsinki Baskets with preponderance for military and economic issues.
Western proposals aimed at improving the shortcomings of the process
of implementation highlighted during review debates, with a
pronounced stress on the human field. According to the division of
work within the Western caucus, the NATO group presented proposals
for the improvement of CBMs and the EC-Nine suggested a series of
measures to increase cooperation in the fields of Basket II. Western
delegations backed Bonn’s requests in the fields of Basket III, namely
on issues of family reunification, facilitation of bureaucratic procedures
for the release of visa and permits to leave the country, improvement of
exchange of information and working conditions for journalists. The
West German delegation extended its invitation to a meeting of experts
in charge of organising the international scientific forum to be hold in
Bonn in the summer of 1978. Furthermore, it gave notice of its wish to
include in the Belgrade final document a passage on the common
commitment to the international fight against hostage-taking.285 Matters
of terrorism and its international connections concerned closely the
Bundesrepublik which had gone through the fiercest season of terroristic
attacks in the summer and autumn of 1977. The extreme-left militant
group of the Red Army Fraction (RAF) had launched a violent attack
against the state which threatened to endanger the stability of the West
German political and social system, by opening scenarios of possible
reactionary deviations. During the so-called German Autumn –
Deutscher Herbst – tension in the country dramatically escalated, with
the kidnapping and assassination of industrialist Martin Schleyer by
the RAF and the hijacking of the Lufthansa airplane “Landshut” by the
284 Militärische Aspekte der Sicherheit auf dem KSE-Folgetreffen in Belgrad. Hier:
Zwischenbilanz, 12.01.1978, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.770.
285 KSZE-Folgetreffen. Hier: Stand des KSZE-Folgetreffens. Überblick über die bisher
eingereichten Vorschläge für das Schlussdokument, 11.11.1977, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv,
Bd. 178.689.
109
Popular Front for Liberation of Palestine. 286 Dealing with the terroristic
challenge had become one of the main tasks of Schmidt’s government
after the electoral turn in 1976, whose initiatives on the domestic front
were flanked by the pursuit of a diplomatic broad consensus over the
international fight against terrorism. The West German proposal for an
international convention against the taking of hostages, put forward at
the UN, received the large approval of the General Assembly. 287 The
West German parallel initiative at the Belgrade CSCE was directed to
its support.
Coming back to negotiations in Belgrade, the proposals for a final
document presented by all delegations amounted on the whole to
eighty at the end of November – a number which would grow further,
exceeding the threshold of one hundred by 22 December 1977. They
constituted a cumbersome stream, which hindered the pursuit of
effective negotiations.288 It was clear to all delegations that the working
mechanism of approval by consensus would prevent the largest part of
them from being included in the final document. As Fischer reported to
Bonn in December 1977, Western delegations would be compelled to
discard some of their proposals, by fixing their priorities in due time in
order to facilitate the advancement of negotiations.289 The Eastern bloc’s
reticence to discuss any Western factual proposal served as renewed
confirmation of its interest in a rapid and unsubstantial conclusion of
negotiations. As the conference was heading to the Christmas break
286 For an overview of the German Autumn and the season of terrorism in the FRG, see:
H.A. Winkler, Der lange Weg nach Westen. Zweiter Band (München: C.H. Beck, 2000), pp.
345-348.
287 KSZE-Folgetreffen. Hier: Stand des KSZE-Folgetreffens. Überblick über die bisher
eingereichten Vorschläge für das Schlussdokument, 11.11.1977, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv,
Bd. 178.689. In the resolution of 15 December 1976 (A/31/103), the UN General Assembly
had agreed the West German proposal for an International Convention Against the
Taking of Hostages, whose drafting the ad-hoc committee on International Terrorism was
in charge of: see Aufzeichnung des Ministerialdirigenten Fleischhauer, 25.08.1977, in AAPD,
1977, vol. II, doc. 228, pp. 1128-1132.
288 Bericht der Bundesregierung über das KSZE-Folgetreffen in Belgrad, 22.11.1977, in PA AA,
Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.689.
289 Botschafter Fischer, Belgrad (KSZE-Delegation), an das Auswärtige Amt, 21.12.1977, in
AAPD, 1977, vol. II, doc. 373, pp. 1793.
110
without any significant improvement, the question of what results
delegations aimed at achieving appeared to be strictly intertwined with
the question of the conference duration. A new configuration of
interests took shape over this question in December 1977. The West
German delegation was the main advocate – on indication of the
Foreign Office in Bonn – of the idea of remaining in Belgrade until
substantial improvements of the détente process would be attained, i.e.
at the inevitable cost of prolonging the conference by some weeks or
months over the scheduled end. The West German position gathered a
composite support: it received the full support of the Danish and
Belgian delegations, whilst it was backed by the U.K., France and
Canada only to a certain extent; on the same West German wavelength
were also, for different reasons, Austria, Yugoslavia, Switzerland and
Sweden; within the Eastern bloc it were Romania and, more timidly,
Poland and Hungary to show some interest in substantial decisions.290
As negotiations were temporary suspended on 22 December 1977 and
adjourned on 17 January 1978 with the task of drafting a final
document, the head of the West German delegation admitted that it
was impossible to predict which directions negotiations would take. 291
The unfolding of the last phase of the conference revealed to be very
difficult once delegations returned to Belgrade after the Christmas
break. West German hopes to prolong the duration of negotiations
until the achievement of concrete results clashed against the definitive
demonstration of the Soviet will to close the affairs of the CSCE followup meeting as soon as possible. The Soviet delegation tabled on 18
January 1978 a verbose draft for an unsubstantial final document which
swept away all proposals presented until that moment and limited
itself to accepting the Western suggestion of the city of Madrid as place
for the next follow-up meeting.292 The meaning of the Soviet initiative
was clear: there was no time for longer negotiations, no interest in
290 Ibid.
291 Ibid.
292 Stand des Belgrader Folgetreffens, 22.02.1978, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.770;
and Botschafter Fischer, Belgrad (KSZE-Delegation) an das Auswärtige Amt, 20.01.1978, in
AAPD, 1978, vol. I, doc. 16, pp. 110-113.
111
substantial achievements and no room for concessions on Western
proposals. Moscow’s aimed at concluding the conference with a
minimal document which would merely ensure the continuation of the
CSCE process, without otherwise introducing new commitments for
the thirty-five participants. As Fischer reported to Bonn, a shift had
occurred in the Soviet approach during the three and a half weeks of
break.293 The Soviet intentions were not surprising: since the
preparation of the follow-up meeting it had been clear that the Western
and Eastern ideas of the conference were largely divergent. But the
Soviet bloc’s decision to remain in Belgrade after the embitterment of
debates on human rights issues and to commit itself to presenting a
number of proposals for a substantial final document until 22
December 1977 had nourished West German hopes that, besides the
respective pursuit of strategic purposes, a East-West compromise on
concrete improvements was still possible.294 The experience at the
Helsinki CSCE had taught to West German diplomacy that important
results can be attained after troubled negotiations and notwithstanding
profound divergences of visions. There was a main difference,
however, between the first CSCE and its follow-up meeting: i.e. Eastern
delegations had not brought strong interests to Belgrade. Overlooking
this factor represented the core of Bonn’s miscalculation.
The “Western struggle” for a final document
In January 1978 it became evident that Eastern delegations would
rather forego achievements in their areas of interests – Basket II, nonfirst use of nuclear weapons, moratorium on joining alliances – than to
make any concessions in the area of human rights and human
293 Botschafter Fischer, Belgrad (KSZE-Delegation) an das Auswärtige Amt, 20.01.1978, in
AAPD, 1978, vol. I, doc. 16, pp. 110-113.
294 KSZE-Folgetreffen. Hier: Stand des KSZE-Folgetreffens. Überblick über die bisher
eingereichten Vorschläge für das Schlussdokument, 11.11.1977, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv,
Bd. 178.689; and Botschafter Fischer, Belgrad (KSZE-Delegation) an das Auswärtige Amt,
20.01.1978, in AAPD, 1978, vol. I, doc. 16, p. 111.
112
contacts.295 Things had taken too far: even though the whole
responsibility of the crisis was not ascribable to the behaviour of the
U.S. delegation, it was otherwise undoubted that Goldberg’s persisting
insistence on keeping discussions on human rights open had
significantly poisoned the constructive atmosphere that pragmatic
negations would require.296 Although the presentation of the Soviet
draft, Western and NNA delegations continued to pursue “business as
usual” within the drafting committee, with the conviction that
Brezhnev had not had the last word on the Belgrade CSCE yet. 297
Negotiations continued throughout February without bringing any
significant contribution to the reconciliation of the respective
irremovable positions. The list of negotiable proposals became shorter
and shorter and possibilities for a substantial final document scarcer as
weeks went by. The Soviets, backed by the East Germans and the
Czech, limited their goals to the inclusion of references to “military
détente” and “irreversibility of détente”.298 The EC-Nine continued to
seek the support and intermediation of the NNA delegations in order
to achieve at least some minimal concrete results.
The Western struggle for a final document turned into a struggle
within the West. The exacerbation of contrasts within the Western front
complicated further the difficult advancement of the works of the
drafting committee. As long as negotiations went on, the West German
delegation continued to pursue its strategy of intermediation, not so
much between Eastern and Western delegations but rather between the
divergent interests of its partners. To Goldberg’s accusation that
Europeans were too compliant to Soviet demands, Fischer replied that
it was not about being “hard” or “weak”, but rather about pursuing the
295 Botschafter Fischer, Belgrad (KSZE-Delegation) an das Auswärtige Amt, 20.01.1978, in
AAPD, 1978, vol. I, doc. 16, p. 111.
296 KSZE-Folgetreffe. Hier: Zusammenfassung Sitzungswoche vom 6.-11. Febr. 1978,
14.02.1978, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.770; and KSZE-Folgetreffen. Hier:
Sowjetische Demarche in Washington, 10.02.1977, ibid.
297 Botschafter Fischer, Belgrad (KSZE-Delegation) an das Auswärtige Amt, 20.01.1978, in
AAPD, 1978, vol. I, doc. 16, p. 111.
298 KSZE-Folgetreffe. Hier: Zusammenfassung Sitzungswoche vom 6.-11. Febr. 1978,
14.02.1978, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.770.
113
right tactic to compel the Soviet Union to make concessions – a position
the U.S. public opinion stigmatised as “indulgent”. 299 The French
delegation, inclined to sacrifice some Western requests and open to
some Eastern proposals, surprised its partners with an unexpected solo
initiative.300 On 15 February 1978 Fischer was informed by his French
colleague Richer that a French draft for a final document would be
tabled the day after. The French single-handed initiative, which
according to Bonn’s assessment hailed from direct instructions of
Giscard d’Estaing, violated the most important premise of Western
coordinated behaviour at the CSCE that the foreign ministers of the ECNine had agreed at the EPC meeting in Copenhagen. 301 Dealing with
the French initiative required West German diplomacy a good degree
of spirit of compromise: notwithstanding initial irritation, the West
German delegation opted for considering the French draft on a par
with the other drafts tabled that far and continued to be committed to a
Western joint draft. From the past experience at the Helsinki CSCE
Bonn’s diplomacy had learnt that the French, after their solo initiatives,
ended up falling into line with the Western partners. 302
Western attempts to pursuit a coordinated strategy continued to be
beset by the French-American contrast. After a number of votes within
the Nine’s and NATO’s groups and repeated consultations with the
NNAs, the heads of NATO’s delegations managed to approve a short
draft on 22 February 1978, which reproduced the contents of the
document agreed by the foreign ministers of the EC-Nine on 14
February in Copenhagen.303 Tension escalated after Goldberg’s
299 Botschafter Fischer, Belgrad (KSZE-Delegation) an das Auswärtige Amt, 01.02.1978, in
AAPD, 1978, vol. I, doc. 28, pp. 171-172.
300 KSZE-Folgetreffe. Hier: Zusammenfassung Sitzungswoche vom 6.-11. Febr. 1978,
14.02.1978, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.770.
301 Belgrader Treffen. Hier: Einbringen des Entwurfs eines Abschlussdokuments durch die
französische Delegation, 15.02.1978, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.770; Runderlass des
Vortragenden Legationsrats I. Klasse Engels, 15.02.1978, in AAPD, 1978, vol. I, doc. 50, pp.
266-269.
302 Ibid.
303 In Copenhagen the Nine agreed to keep the short draft aside for the case negotiations
on a substantial document would definitively fail.
114
advanced a last minute request to include a reference to human rights
in the short draft and Richer threatened to leave both NATO’s and the
Nine’s groups.304 The state of negotiations – and of Western
coordination – was such harmed to convince Western delegations to
take advantage of the Soviet wish for a rapid conclusion of the
conference.305 According to Fischer, NATO’s short document had good
chances to meet the favour of the NNAs and influence the contents of
the draft they were working on. Several NNA delegations had
expressed indeed their support for the so-called “second option”, i.e. in
the adoption of a short document in the form of a communiqué limited
to securing the continuation of the CSCE process. 306 The “second
option” offered an exit-strategy from a probable conference failure.
Things had gone too far: an intermediation of the NNA group
represented the last possibility to break the stalemate and bring the
conference to an acceptable conclusion.307 An initiative of the NNA
delegations was necessary both for strategic and public political
reasons: it was indeed important to Bonn that the responsibility for the
proposal of a short, unsubstantial document would not be publically
ascribable to the West.308
The West German Foreign Office did not want to leave any stone
unturned and attempted a last diplomatic initiative with Moscow
before yielding to the inevitability of the “second option”.309 State
Secretary van Well and West German Ambassador in Moscow Wieck
undertook a parallel diplomatic mission with the goal of convincing
their Soviet partners, Ambassador Falin and Vice-Foreign Minister
304 KSZE-Folgetreffen (semi). Hier: Haltung westlicher Staaten zu Option 2 und deutschem
Zusatz, 28.02.1978, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.770.
305 KSZE-Folgetreffen. Hier: Weiteres Verfahren, 22.02.1978, in PA AA, EA, Bd. 223.
306 Ibid.; and Stand des Belgrader Folgetreffens, 22.02.1978, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd.
178.770.
307 Stand des Belgrader Folgetreffens, 22.02.1978, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.770.
308 KSZE-Folgetreffen. Hier: Weiteres Verfahren, 25.02.1978, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd.
178.770.
309 Ministerialdirektor Blech an die KSZE-Delegation in Belgrad, 23.02.1978, in AAPD, 1978,
vol. I, doc. 60, p. 315; Stand des Belgrader Folgetreffens, 22.02.1978, in PA AA,
Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.770.
115
Firjubin, that the enhancement of the political value of negotiations in
Belgrade through the involvement of the participant states’ deputy
foreign ministers would possibly to break the stalemate. Van Well
made clear to Falin that he was ready to fly to Belgrade at any moment,
together with other Western vice-ministers. The same proposal had
been directed by Foreign Minister Genscher to his Czech colleague. 310
Firijubin’s answer came few days later, on 26 February 1978: the Soviet
vice-foreign minister confirmed that time for discussions was over. All
positions were well-known and negotiations had shown that there was
no adequate basis for a common agreement on substantial matters. A
high-rank gathering of the thirty-five deputy ministers, as proposed by
Bonn, had no sense at that point of negotiations.311 The failure of the
late diplomatic initiative of the Auswärtiges Amt swept away any West
German illusions of changing the course of the conference. At the end
of February 1978 the West German delegation had to accept the
evidence that a rapid conclusion of the conference with the adoption of
a short final document was the only option left over. 312
During the first week of March there was only room left for the last
attempts of some delegations – namely of Romania, Yugoslavia, Malta
and Switzerland – to include their proposals in the final document. The
West German delegation was the last in the Western caucus to give its
approval, by leaving the responsibility to the Soviet Union to take
position on the NNA and Romanian requests. 313 As the first CSCE
follow-up meeting was approaching to its end, the West German
Foreign Office was looking to the aftermath of Belgrade by dealing
with the problem of how to present the disappointing outcome of the
conference in front of the national public opinion.
310 KSZE-Folgetreffen Belgrad. Hier: Sondierung zur Verhandlung des Abschlussdokuments auf
der Ebene der stellv. Außenminister, 23.02.1978, in PA AA, EA, Bd. 223.
311 Ibid.; and KSZE-Folgetreffen Belgrad. Hier: Sondierung zur Verhandlung des
Abschlussdokuments auf der Ebene der stellv. Außenminister in PA AA, EA, Bd. 223,
23.02.1978.
312 Fernschreiben aus Bonn, 28.02.1978, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.770.
313 Vermerk zum Stand Belgrad nach dem Plenum vom 3.3, Ende 19 Uhr gemäß Anruf
Botschafter Fischer bei RL 212, 03.03.1978, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.770.
116
Dealing with a big disappointment: the West German assessment
of the first CSCE follow-up meeting in Belgrade
The first CSCE follow-up meeting ended with a unanimous
agreement sanctioning the irreconcilability of interests that had marked
the unfolding of the conference (“Consensus was not reached on a
number of proposals submitted to the meeting”). The thirty-five
delegations approved on 9 March 1978 a final document which, as
Selvage has well summarised, “basically confirmed that the
participating states had met to review implementation, had expressed
different views and would meet anew in Madrid” on 9 September 1980
for preparing the second follow-up meeting, whose beginning was
scheduled on 11 November of the same year.314 Substantial provisions
were limited to convening three meetings of experts which would hold
in the aftermath of the conference – i.e. the meeting for arbitration of
disputes in Montreux, the scientific forum in Bonn and the meeting of
experts on Mediterranean questions in Valletta. The choice of the
Spanish capital to host the ensuing follow-up meeting represented the
only poor victory of the Western European delegations. 315
In the direct aftermath of the conference it was time for assessments
in Bonn. What emerges from the West German evaluation of the whole
Belgrade endeavour is a sort of operation of “diminishing expectations
ex-post”. As already mentioned in the course of the chapter, the
Auswärtiges Amt had been aware that existing conjectural and structural
problems suggested limiting optimistic expectations on the eve of the
conference inauguration. During negotiations, however, the West
German delegation had hoped to replicate the successful experience of
the Helsinki CSCE by pursuing a strategy of patient intermediation
between conflicting interests. After the outcome of the conference had
belied West German hopes, West German chief delegator Per Fischer
314 D. Selvage, “The Superpowers and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe, 1977-1983”, p. 25.
315 For the full text of the concluding document of the Belgrade meeting see at the link:
http://www.osce.org/mc/40865?.
117
tied his final assessment to the consideration of what the conference
could and should not have been: “Neither a new ‘Geneva’ or a new
‘Helsinki’” – i.e. a renewed constitutional moment for the CSCE – “nor
a new ‘European New York’” – i.e. a sort of general assembly on
human rights.316 But considering the specific mandate of the follow-up
meeting – exchanging views on the implementation of the Helsinki
Final Act and deepening mutual relations amongst the participant
states – Bonn had sufficient good reasons to be disappointed. To allow
negotiations to succeed “the antagonists of the first phase should turn
into cooperative partners in the second phase of the conference, and the
identification of existing flaws should turn into mutually agreed
decisions on how to solve such flaws”. Both circumstances failed,
however, to happen. A real, constructive review debate, observed
Fischer, had never taken place; and the transition to the second phase
of the conference in charge of defining the conditions for the future
development of the CSCE process had proved to be even more
difficult.317
According to Fischer, his delegation had brought to the negotiating
table of the working committees a series of reasonable, pragmatic and
not destabilising proposals for improvements in all three Baskets.
Eastern delegations had refused cooperation on human rights and
human contacts, by equating the two fields and rejecting both in toto.
West Germans had repeatedly underlined the different nature of
debates on Principle VII – which addressed questions of principle – and
Basket III – which addressed concrete measures and different
categories of people. Bonn’s diplomacy had never hidden, since the
preparation of the follow-up meeting, its main interest in the
improvement of human contacts and exchange of information with the
East. The Soviet refusal to collaborate on Basket III was inacceptable for
Bonn for several different reasons which involved matters of principle,
foreign political interests and national needs. First, the Eastern selective
316 Das Ergebnis von Belgrad. Das KSZE-Folgetreffen in seiner Bedeutung für den
Entspannungsprozess. Von Per Fischer, 28.03.1978, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.770.
317 Ibid.
118
approach to the improvement of Helsinki’s provisions contrasted with
the idea of integrity and balance underlying the CSCE process. Second,
the rejection of any form of cooperation on Basket III jeopardised
Bonn’s idea of pursuing rapprochement through the multiplication of
occasions of contact, travel and exchange amongst European citizens.
Third, at stake was the international prestige of the Bundesrepublik,
which had invested many diplomatic efforts in the promotion of
human contacts since the origins of the CSCE process, by revealing
both to its allies and to the Eastern leaders that they represented a West
German vital foreign policy interest.318 Fourth, public expectations of
improvements in the human fields were very high in the FRG. Bringing
home no significant achievements with respect either to human rights
or human contacts would – and did – put the federal government in the
difficult position of justifying its debacle at the Belgrade CSCE in front
of the domestic opposition and public opinion.
Even though a great deal of responsibility for the poor outcome of
the conference was assigned to the intransigency of Soviet bloc, the
West German assessment reveals the will to understand objectively, or
at least take into account, the reasons of the Soviet behaviour in
Belgrade. In Bonn’s view, the hardening of Moscow’s line was due,
first, to the difficult state of American-Soviet relations. Second, the
East’s resistance to negotiations needed to be analysed against the
background of the inherent difficulties of the CSCE process, which had
been put to its first test in Belgrade after the signing of the Final Act. It
would be a mistake to interpret the poor performance at the Belgrade
CSCE as a proof of the Soviet will to bury definitely European détente:
the decision to schedule the second follow-up conference for 1980
318 Bonn’s diplomatic work to promote improvements in the fields of Basket III had
continued during the conference. For instance, on occasion of a bilateral meeting with
Soviet chief delegator Yuri Vorontsov, Fischer had let the Soviets know again that
“concrete decisions on all three Baskets, and especially on human contacts, were
indispensible to conclude the conference”. Drahtbericht von Fischer, 24.11.1977, in PA AA,
Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 115.085.
119
proved evidence against such hypothesis.319 Furthermore, the Foreign
Office shared the French analysis which identified the reasons of the
Soviet change of strategy in the course of conference in the rigidity
marking the “end of the Brezhnev era” (sic), and foremost in
Goldberg’s behaviour – who spent the months between October and
March attacking steadily the Eastern countries. 320
In the internal analysis of the West German Foreign Office
responsibilities for the conference’s failure were equally distributed
between the two superpowers. Per Fischer, who had personally dealt
with Goldberg’s assertiveness in Belgrade, admitted that the
disappointing outcome of negotiations was ascribable, besides to Soviet
rigidity, to the U.S. chief delegator’s harsh tones and obsession for
human rights.321 The first CSCE follow-up meeting had developed from
an occasion for improving détente into an attempt to savage both the
East-West multilateral dialogue and the unity of the Western Alliance.
As it had done when preparing the conference, Bonn committed itself
to keeping up appearances in front of the public opinion in the
aftermath of Belgrade: it was important not to stress the significant role
that increasing divergence with Washington had played in the negative
unfolding of negotiations and to avoid that Goldberg released public
critical remarks against the Western European behaviour in Belgrade. 322
There were technical elements, too, which had contributed to
compromise the good unfolding of negotiations in Belgrade: review
debates had been too long, too many proposals had been tabled, crossbargaining between the Helsinki Baskets had been scarce, coordination
between the groups of the Nine and NATO had been problematic,
319 Das Ergebnis von Belgrad. Das KSZE-Folgetreffen in seiner Bedeutung für den
Entspannungsprozess. Von Per Fischer, 28.03.1978, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.770.
320 KSZE-Bilanz und Sowjetische Außenpolitik, 04.04.1978, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd.
178.770.
321 Aufzeichnung von Fischer, 22.03.1978, in AAPD, 1978, vol. I, doc. 88.
322 KSZE-Folgetreffen. Hier: Einladung Botschafter Goldbergs zu Deutschlandbesuch,
23.02.1978, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.770.
120
some cracks had started to show in the coordination amongst the Nine
– particularly due to the French deviations from the common line.323
Even though the FRG had experienced a major disappointment in
Belgrade, the Auswärtiges Amt tended to smooth excessively negative
assessments, both in internal analyses and public statements. The
partial failure of the first follow-up meeting was justified in the name of
its exceptional character. Belgrade was depicted as “the first checkpoint
down a long road”.324 As follow-up conferences would become a
regular constituent of the CSCE process, both its participants and
public opinions would gradually get used to them and the spirit of
cooperation would gradually increase. 325 West German arguments did
not forget to highlight the positive outcome attained in Belgrade: i.e.
the Eastern commitment to meeting again two years later for a second
follow-up meeting which bound them more tightly to the
strengthening of East-West rapprochement. 326 Finally, the traditional
claim according to which détente was a slow process which required a
long breath and a far-sighted gaze turned into a central argument for
condoning the Belgrade fiasco in front of the public opinion.
Conclusions: Some important lessons for the FRG’s realistic policy of
détente
Defending the conference outcome in the aftermath of Belgrade
meant for the West German foreign government safeguarding the
grounds of its whole foreign political complex and its own
international prestige. The recognition of the importance of pursuing
dialogue itself in spite of concrete achievements included in the
Belgrade final document (“states stressed the importance they attach to
détente, which has continued since the adoption of the Final Act in
323 Ibid.
324 Main themes and catalogue of main points for Belgrade, 14.09.1977, in PA AA,
Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.395.
325 Das Ergebnis von Belgrad. Das KSZE-Folgetreffen in seiner Bedeutung für den
Entspannungsprozess. Von Per Fischer, 28.03.1978, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.770.
326 Runderlass 30 von Engels vom 11.04.1978, in AAPD, 1978, vol. I, doc. 113.
121
spite of difficulties and obstacles encountered” 327) was undoubtedly
relevant for the prosecution of the European détente process. A large
part of the positive historical account of the first CSCE follow-up
meeting has rested upon this recognition.328 The circumstance that all
delegations remained in Belgrade until the end of the conference and
committed themselves to continuing the CSCE process by agreeing
upon the date and place of the second follow-up meeting has not to be
overlooked. If analysed against the background of the international
developments which would occur in the ensuing years, the minimal
outcome attained in Belgrade seems retrospectively to have provided
an important anti-cyclical antidote against the renewed Cold War
confrontation. Moreover, the Belgrade follow-up meeting contributed
to shape the CSCE process as a dialectic process, by offering multiple
occasions of debate – at the level of plenary session, within the single
working committees and the meetings amongst experts, through the
complex of bilateral talks in the margins of the main conference and
diplomatic initiatives outside the conference – of undeniable diplomatic
significance.
However, positive re-examinations had not to prevent from
reflecting on some mistakes and miscalculations that the West German
approach entailed and the first CSCE follow-up meeting disclosed.
Bonn’s federal government – and the Auswärtiges Amt in particular,
which had the direct responsibility for the preparation of the
diplomatic strategy at the CSCE – learnt some hard lessons in the
Yugoslav capital. They would stimulate a partial rethinking of the
CSCE strategy in the aftermath of Belgrade.
First, the “realistic détente policy” had proved to be not that realistic
once put in place. The West German approach to negotiations remained
quite bound to principles, especially with regard to the proportioned
327 For the full text of the concluding document of the Belgrade meeting see at the link:
http://www.osce.org/mc/40865?.
328 See, for instance, the introduction to the collective volume edited by V. Bilandžić, D.
Dahlmann and M. Kosanović, From Helsinki to Belgrade. The First CSCE Follow-up Meeting
and the Crisis of Détente.
122
character of the Helsinki Final Act. The call for balance turned into a
demand for simultaneous improvements in all Baskets. Indirect
consequence of this attitude was the huge stream of Western proposals
which Western delegations, according to the reproach of the NNAs,
limited themselves to informing the other delegations about.329 Putting
aside for the moment the problems of coordination with the U.S., the
EC-Nine had been incapable to narrow their priorities and agree upon
the necessary sacrifices – a problem which the West German delegation
was aware of, as analyses drafted during and after the conference
reveal. The cohesion of the Nine showed its hidden flaws in Belgrade
and was harmed repeatedly by the French single-handed initiatives. It
was a serious blow to Bonn: the FRG was the country which most
needed the EC to speak with one voice (preferably with its own voice)
when dealing with the East.
It was especially with regard to the Soviet Union and its Eastern
allies that the FRG’s CSCE strategy displayed lacking realism. The
Western biggest mistake – and the second important lesson Bonn was
taught – was the incapability of involving any Soviet important
interests at any phase of the conference. This represented the
fundamental reason of the poor conference outcome. At the Helsinki
CSCE Soviets had been compelled to significant concessions, as they
had important interests at stake. At the Belgrade CSCE, to the contrary,
Soviet goals were limited to protecting the Eastern bloc from Western
pressures concerning the implementation of Helsinki’s provisions,
defending its international prestige from Western attacks and securing
the irreversibility of détente, i.e. the continuation of the superpower
dialogue on arms control and economic cooperation with Western
Europeans. These were the main explanations for the Soviet decision
not to leave the conference notwithstanding Goldberg’s unceasing
attacks. By focusing on unrealistic proposals which fell outside the
scope of the conference – as the “non-first-use” of nuclear weapons or
329 See A. Romano, “The European Community and the Belgrade CSCE”, in From
Helsinki to Belgrade. The First Follow-up Meeting and the Crisis of Détente, eds. V. Bilandžić,
D. Dahlmann and M. Kosanović, p. 22.
123
the moratorium on the further enlargement of military alliances –
Moscow confirmed its favour for an “empty” conference outcome. 330
Hence, the Eastern countries had good reasons to claim their victory at
the first CSCE follow-up meeting in the aftermath of Belgrade, apart
from traditional propagandistic purposes.331
Third, West Germans learnt in Belgrade how detrimental the U.S.
engagement in European détente could be. One of the reasons of the
success in Helsinki had been the convergent momentum between the
U.S. détente and European détente, which had been otherwise
paralleled by a certain Washington’s disinterest for the European
endeavour. Instead, the new U.S. administration had gone to Belgrade
with the intention to play an active role. Carter’s strong interest in the
first CSCE follow-up meeting was motivated by interwoven domestic,
foreign political and public political reasons. As Goldberg explained to
Fischer on occasion of an after-dinner talk in Belgrade at the beginning
of February 1978, the U.S. administration had decided to take on an
hard stance on human rights at the Belgrade CSCE in order to obtain
the endorsement to the SALT II agreement of those reluctant
congressmen who considered negotiations with Moscow as a proof of
weakness.332 Whereas the CSCE was a secondary diplomatic stage for
Washington – being important security issues discussed elsewhere – it
provided an ideal international showcase for Carter’s public foreign
policy. Turning the CSCE into the main framework for the pursuit of
his struggle for human rights allowed Carter to take a more pragmatic
330 Das Ergebnis von Belgrad. Das KSZE-Folgetreffen in seiner Bedeutung für den
Entspannungsprozess. Von Per Fischer, 28.03.1978, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.770.
331 Romania constituted the exception within the Eastern bloc: it had tried to play at
Belgrade its independent game from the Soviet bloc and returned home empty-handed.
See: KSZE-Folgetreffen in Belgrad. Hier: Offizielle Wertung der Teilnehmerländer zum Ergebnis
von Belgrad, 7.04.1978, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.770.
332 The SALT II agreement played a central role in the problematic relationship between
the U.S. administration and the Congress: as U.S. Ambassador in Bonn Stoessel explained
to Genscher on 22 March 1978, there were good chances for SALT negotiations to come to
a successful conclusion in the course of that year; but the ratification of the agreement
would be hardly attainable. See Gespräch zwischen Genscher und Stoessel, 22.03.1978, in
AAPD, 1978, vol. I, doc. 84.
124
approach to SALT-negotiations. The U.S. priorities were clearly set: a
gradual relaxation of East-West relations through growing human
contacts should be deferred until the SALT II agreement would be
achieved by the superpowers.333 The talk with Goldberg, in which the
U.S. chief delegator unveiled openly for the first time Washington’s real
goals, disclosed an inconvenient truth: U.S. détente and European
détente had never been so divergent, with regard both to their aims
and strategies. Bonn’s idea of a beneficial interaction between the CSCE
and SALT negotiations was deeply challenged by the disclosing of
Washington’s intentions.
Finally, there was a fourth general lesson West German diplomacy
had to draw from the Belgrade experience: i.e. it had to learn to deal
with the cooling-off of superpower détente. As Chancellor Schmidt had
declared in an interview in the summer of 1977, if Moscow and
Washington would develop a deep conflict of interests instead of
reaching an agreement on curbing their nuclear strategic armaments,
this would inevitably limit the room of manoeuvre for Germany’s
détente policy”.334 As international conditions had changed since the
times when Bonn’s Entspannungspolitik had been conceived and
achieved its first realisations, the prosecution of a realistic policy of
détente required to rethink its strategy and adjust it to the new
circumstances.
333 Botschafter Fischer, Belgrad (KSZE-Delegation) an das Auswärtige Amt, 1.02.1978, in
AAPD, 1978, vol. I, doc. 28, pp. 171-173.
334 Bonner Kritik an Präsident Carters Menschenrechtspolitik, 7.07.1977, in PA AA,
Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.688.
125
“Die Kräfte der Geschichte werden sich als stärker erweisen als ideologische Barrieren
und gewaltsame Schranken”335
Hans-Dietrich Genscher, inaugural address at the Second CSCE Follow-up
Meeting in Madrid, October 13, 1981
Chapter 3
The “Return of Military Security” and the
“Return of the Cold War”: Adjusting the FRG’s
Realistic Policy of Détente to International
Changing Conditions (1978-1980)
Introduction: Dealing with the legacy of Belgrade on the way to
Madrid
In the last phase of the troubled negotiations at the Belgrade CSCE,
the delegations of the thirty-five participant states could reach an
agreement upon the date and place of the CSCE of the second followup meeting. They had decided they would meet again in November
1980 in the city of Madrid. The appointment of the Spanish capital was
a small victory for the West, which managed to impose its preference
over the candidatures of Vienna and Malta. The choice of Madrid had a
significant symbolical meaning for the EC-Nine: it sealed Spain’s full
integration into the multilateral conference diplomacy after years of
diplomatic isolation and was a recognition of the successful democracy
transition efforts made by the country after Franco’s death in 1975.336
335 “The forces of history will prove to be stronger than ideological barriers and forcible
separations” [transl.]
336 On Spain’s transition to democracy and the Nine’s role in supporting the process of
democratisation, see: M.E. Cavallaro, Los origenes de la integraciόn de España en Europa.
Desde el franquismo a los años de la transiciόn (Madrid: Silex, 2009).
126
As pointed out by Judt, only in 1970 a visitor crossing the border from
France into Franco’s Spain could not but be struck through the abyssal
chasm separating the two sides of the Pyrenees.337 Ten years later, the
young Spanish parliamentary democracy prepared itself to host the
greatest European diplomatic forum. Détente had not been the only
major event in the European affairs during the Seventies. The unfolding
of the CSCE process was flanked in Southern Europe by the peaceful
transition to democracy in Greece, Portugal and Spain.338 Greece was
the first of the three Mediterranean countries to apply for membership
in the EEC in 1975, only one year after the fall of the dictatorship of the
colonels, and the first to join on 1 January 1981. As the second phase of
the Madrid CSCE started, the group of the Nine had enlarged to Ten.
The West German Foreign Office directed its attention towards the
preparation of the second follow-up meeting in Madrid in the direct
aftermath of Belgrade. During his speech in front of the European
Council in Copenhagen on 8 April 1978, West German Foreign Minister
Genscher addressed the steps the Nine should undertake to prepare
themselves accurately for Madrid.339 Turning the attention to the
following appointment of Madrid was a part of the federal
government’s strategy of sweeping away the disappointment for the
outcome of Belgrade.340 But it revealed also that Bonn’s interest in
337 T. Judt, Postwar. A History of Europe since 1945, p. 506.
338 For a historical analysis of transitions in Southern Europe and the role of the
European Communities, see: M. Del Pero, V. Gavìn, F. Guirao and A.Varsori, eds.,
Democrazie. L’Europa meridionale e la fine delle dittature ; A. Varsori, “Crisis and stabilisation
in Southern Europe during the 1970s: Western strategy, European instruments”, in
Journal of European Integration History, 2009, Vol. 15, No. 1, 5-14.
339 Runderlass des Vortragenden Legationsrats I. Klasse Engels, 11.04.1978, in AAPD, 1978,
vol. I, doc. 113, p. 539.
340 Disappointment was, however, always neglected in public statements. Genscher was
the one amongst the Nine’s foreign ministers – together with his Danish and British
colleagues – who expressed the less critical position towards the outcome of Belgrade at
the meeting of the European Council in Copenhagen: West Germans were not
disappointed, according to the foreign minister, as they had undoubtedly desired more
but had been realistically aware that greater achievements were not possible under the
present circumstances. See: Runderlass des Vortragenden Legationsrats I. Klasse Engels,
11.04.1978, in AAPD, 1978, vol. I, doc. 113, p. 539.
127
pursuing multilateral détente had remained unvaried notwithstanding
the failure of its diplomatic strategy in Belgrade.
The Auswärtiges Amt started an internal reflection aimed at
rethinking the West German CSCE policy for the following years. As
analysed in the last paragraphs of Chapter 2, the first follow-up
meeting had taught some important lessons to Bonn. It had shown that
there were several problems which were inherent in the CSCE process
and needed to be dealt with. The legacy of Belgrade provided useful
indications about how the West German – and Western – strategy for
Madrid could be shaped better. As Genscher highlighted at the meeting
of the European Council in Copenhagen, the second CSCE follow-up
meeting had to be prepared more carefully and in due time within the
Western Alliance. The coordination between the groups of the Nine
and NATO, which had functioned problematically in Belgrade, had to
be enhanced. Likewise, cooperation with the Eastern and the NNA
countries should be improved. The last had lamented the scarce
willingness of Western delegations to pursue real consultation on their
proposals, by limiting themselves to informing other delegations about
them. Therefore, the Nine had to discuss their positions with the other
CSCE participants before the beginning of the conference on occasion
of the rounds of bilateral talks which would be pursued in preparation
of Madrid.341 Moreover, the Nine had to define more precisely their
common goals in order to recover their ability to speak with one voice.
The European partners’ different views and interests needed to be
merged into one accepted strategy by avoiding to including them
simply into an endless list of proposals – as it had happened in
Belgrade, where Western delegations had given a significant
contribution to the enormous stream of proposals which had paralysed
negotiations. A better definition of Western priorities meant, according
to the West German Foreign Office, diminishing the horizon of
expectations as well. A clear dividing line needed to be drawn between
attainable and unattainable achievements. Bonn committed itself to
using the months between the first and the second CSCE follow-up
341 Proposals of the Nine for Madrid, 23.01.1980, in PAAA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 132.506.
128
meetings to pursuit consultations with the Western partners, the
Eastern counterparts and the NNA countries, in order to understand
what respective interests were at stake; to examine the available room
for bargaining; and to start discussing concrete proposals in advance.
The aim was to arrive in Madrid with a sufficiently clear overview of
the whole spectrum of interests and possibilities, which prevent the
Belgrade stalemate from happening again at the second CSCE followup meeting.342
The experience of the Belgrade conference had convinced the West
German Foreign Office that the relaunch of the CSCE process would
pass through the enhancement of the political rank of the follow-up
meetings, by envisaging the direct involvement of the foreign ministers
of the thirty-five participant states at some point of the negotiations. 343
A similar initiative had been attempted by Bonn’s diplomacy – without
success – in the last days of the Belgrade CSCE with the purpose to
rescue negotiations from a certain empty outcome. The idea behind the
West German proposal levered up considerations of international
prestige, by implying that the higher the political involvement of the
participant states, the greater their commitment to the success of the
conference would be. Moreover, the enhanced political profile of the
follow-up meetings would provide an antidote against the East’s
traditional attempts to bureaucratise the CSCE process. The main
question which Bonn’s diplomacy was faced with was how to convince
the Soviets and their allies to get more involved in the development of
multilateral détente. The struggle for elevating the political rank of the
Madrid CSCE represented a central item of the West German
diplomatic preparation of the second follow-up meeting.344 As works in
342 Das Ergebnis von Belgrad. Das KSZE-Folgetreffen in seiner Bedeutung für den
Entspannungsprozess. Von Per Fischer, 28.03.1978, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.770;
Runderlass des Vortragenden Legationsrats I. Klasse Engels, 11.04.1978, in AAPD, 1978, vol. I,
doc. 113, p. 539; and Botschafter Pauls, Brüssel (NATO), an das Auswärtige Amt, 28.04.1978,
ibid., doc. 133, pp. 632-634.
343 Das Ergebnis von Belgrad. Das KSZE-Folgetreffen in seiner Bedeutung für den
Entspannungsprozess. Von Per Fischer, 28.03.1978, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.770.
344 Außenministerebene für das Madrider Folgetreffen, 13.11.1979, in PA AA,
Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.804.
129
Madrid would begin in November 1980, Bonn would succeed to get the
support if not of all but of many participant states. Foreign Minister
Genscher would hold the inaugural address in the name of the West
German delegation, followed by a few colleagues of the Western and
NNA countries. The Eastern bloc – with the exception of Romania –
would make the eventual participation of their foreign ministers in a
second phase of the conference dependent on the outcome of
negotiations.345 As the conference would come to an end in the fall of
1983, after long months of difficult negotiations and repeated
adjournments, also the foreign ministers of the Eastern countries would
be present in Madrid to celebrate the adoption of the conference final
document.
Whilst fostering the reduction of the technocratic character of
negotiations at the CSCE, the Auswärtiges Amt recognised otherwise the
significance of the “minor” gatherings of experts, whose works flanked
the diplomatic preparation of the Madrid CSCE. According to the
dispositions of the Belgrade concluding document, three meetings of
experts were convened in the months between the first and the second
follow-up conferences. As regards the first, delegations of experts of all
thirty-five CSCE participant states met in the Swiss city of Montreux
between 31 October and 11 December 1978 to discuss matters of
peaceful settlement of disputes. 346 The second meeting, which had been
strongly fostered by the Maltese delegation and had been accepted
with little enthusiasm by the Western countries, dealt with
Mediterranean questions and was hold in Valletta between 13 February
and 26 March 1979.347 The third, “the scientific forum”, originated from
a West German proposal and was held in Hamburg between 18
345 Mögliches Szenario für den Besuch der Herrn Bundesministers in Madrid zur Abgabe der
Eingangserklärung auf dem KSZE-Folgetreffen – angesichts der gegenwärtigen Unklarheit über
den Ablauf dieses Treffens, 31.10.1980, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.804.
346 Botschafter Blomeyer-Bartenstein, z.Z. Genf, an das Auswärtige Amt, 12.12.1978, in AAPD,
1978, vol. II, doc. 383, pp. 1848-1852.
347 Runderlaß des Vortragenden Legationsrat I. Klasse Stabreit, 1.03.1979, in AAPD, 1979, vol.
I, doc. 60, pp. 267-269.
130
February and 3 March 1980.348 According to the West German
assessment, the three meetings of experts were more significant for
their bridging role than for their actual results. They represented an
additional occasion of multilateral encounter which provided some
interesting information about the development of the respective
participants’ approaches to CSCE process. In the aftermath of the
scientific forum in Hamburg, the West German Foreign Office stressed
that the meeting had unfolded already in the view of the upcoming
follow-up conference in Madrid. In particular, a shift in the overall
CSCE strategy of the USSR had been observed; the Soviet behaviour at
the scientific forum had reinforced Bonn’s impression that Moscow
would take a more open and flexible attitude to negotiations in Madrid
in respect to its performance at Belgrade.349
As the West German Foreign Office was reflecting on how to
relaunch the CSCE process, East-West dialogue was increasingly faced
with security matters. As this chapter investigates, issues of military
security played a pivotal role in diplomatic and public debates in the
time interval between Belgrade and Madrid; they interacted with the
preparation of the second follow-up conference by influencing
importantly the formation of the conference agenda and a partial
rethinking of the West German détente strategy. Moreover, as the
analysis of Chapters 3 and 4 illustrates, both the preparation and the
unfolding of the Madrid CSCE were deeply marked by two major
international crises: the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan in
December 1979 and the open challenge launched by oppositional
groups to the governing elite in Poland, which unfolded in the course
of 1980-1981 and pivoted in December 1981 as martial law was
imposed by General Jaruzelski. Both crises boosted a further revision
by the Auswärtiges Amt of its concept of realistic détente policy, in order
to adjust it to the strained international context. Chapter 4 shows that
those episodes of crisis seriously threatened the continuation of
348 Runderlaß des Vortragenden Legationsrat I. Klasse Ellerkmann, 07.03.1980, in AAPD, 1980,
vol. I, doc. 75, pp. 429-433.
349 Ibid., p. 431.
131
détente; but, paradoxically, they opened new possibilities of
cooperation by compelling CSCE participants to greater efforts to
rescue the multilateral dialogue. In order to allow the détente process
to continue, the FRG had to adjust its CSCE strategy to changing
international conditions and domestic pressures. Flexibility, realism,
and separation between principles and realisations characterised the
revised détente policy of the Bundesrepublik which in these years went
through a major political shift, marked by the gradual end of the
governmental experience of the social-liberal coalition and the return to
power of the Christian Democrats.
New challenges for East-West relations in the field of military
security
Security had traditionally been a central matter of concern for the
West German federal government. Lying on the Cold War border
between antagonist blocs, the FRG had lived since its foundation with
the awareness of being the most probable target of an eventual Warsaw
Pact’s military attack against the West. Because of the limits imposed to
its sovereignty, it was largely dependent on its allies for the provision
of its own security. As a result, Bonn was very sensitive to any change
of the military balance on the European continent. Hence, the
proceeding of the USSR’s program of renovation of its nuclear arsenal
in Eastern Europe through the deployment of long range theatre
missiles of the newest generation (SS-20s) roused increasing worries in
the Bundesrepublik. The holding of the nuclear balance in Europe was at
risk due to the growing advantage of the Soviet Union in the so-called
“grey area” between the strategic arms covered by SALT II and the
effective strategic systems at Moscow’s disposal.350 Helmut Schmidt,
who as federal defence minister in the years 1969-1972 had followed
personally the unfolding of SALT I negotiations, was preoccupied with
350 K. Stoddart, Facing Down the Soviet Union. Britain, the USA, NATO and Nuclear
Weapons, 1976-1983 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), p. 92.
132
the changing strategic conditions on the continent. 351 Indeed, the
exclusion of the SS-20s from the coverage of both SALT I and II
provided the Soviets with a new alarming free room of manoeuvre. As
Schmidt highlighted in his renowned London speech at the
International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) on 28 October 1977, a
gap was coming into being between the Eastern capability to attack
through nuclear tactical and conventional weapons and the Western
capability to answer.352
After the inglorious affair of the neutron bomb had embittered U.S.West German relations between the summer of 1977 and the spring of
1978 353 – as Carter convinced a reluctant Schmidt to accept the
inclusion of the newest enhanced radiation weapon into the NATO
arsenal; Schmidt hardly managed to convince his much more reluctant
party to deploy the U.S. “inhuman bomb” on the West German
territory; and Carter finally changed his mind and took back the
proposal – 354 Bonn pressed for a greater U.S. commitment to their
security. Traditional fears of an American decoupling and Soviet
military supremacy were still present in Bonn notwithstanding the
achievements of European détente. A “dual-track” policy was
necessary to counteract the military disparity between the East and the
West: NATO would modernise its nuclear arsenals in Europe, by
meanwhile continuing to pursue negotiations on arms control.355 The
concept was first discussed by U.S. President Carter, British Prime
Minister Callaghan, French President Giscard and Chancellor Schmidt
351 P.G. Kielmannsegg, Das geteilte Land. Deutsche Geschichte, 1945-1990, p. 226.
352 See: J. Carr, Helmut Schmidt: Helmsman of Germany (London: Weidenfeld and
Nicolson, 1985).
353 In his memoirs, National Security Advisor Brzezinski has defined the neutron bomb
as “a major setback in the West German-American relations”. See: Z. Brzezinski, Power
and Principle: Memoirs of a National Security Adviser, 1977-1981, p. 301.
354 For an insightful analysis of the unfolding of the “neutron bomb affair”, see: K.
Wiegrefe, Das Zerwürfnis: Helmut Schmidt, Jimmy Carter und die Krise der deutschamerikanischen Beziehungen, pp. 180-204.
355 J. Renouard and D.N. Vigil, «The Quest for Leadership in a Time of Peace. Jimmy
Carter and Western Europe, 1977-1981», in The Strained Alliance. U.S.-European relations
from Nixon to Carter, ed. M. Schultz and T.A. Schwartz, pp. 312-313.
133
at the informal meeting on the island of Guadeloupe in January 1979
and made inroads into the Western Alliance in the course of the year.
The adoption of a dual-track strategy was officially sealed through
NATO’s famous decision of 12 December 1979: Western foreign and
defence ministers agreed on proceeding with the stationing of
additional long-range theatre nuclear forces (LRTNFs) in Western
Europe – the “armament track” – if East-West negotiations would not
lead to a substantial reduction of the Soviet SS-20 missiles in Europe by
1983 – “the disarmament track”.356
Alongside the development of NATO’s new strategy and the
achievement of the superpower agreement on SALT II, the West
German federal government intensified its diplomatic efforts to
reanimate negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions
(MBFR) in Vienna, which were proceeding at a slow pace. Whereas the
superpowers held the monopoly on the discussion of strategic arms’
limitations, the MBFR talks represented am adequate multilateral
framework where Bonn could address directly its vital interests in the
field of security. West German proposals for the relaunch of
negotiations in Vienna – which had been advanced by Chancellor
Schmidt to President Carter in July 1977 and then approved by the
NATO partners – became a cornerstone of the whole Alliance’s
initiative.357 As West German détente interests had been fully
multilateralised at the CSCE, Bonn similarly longed for securing and
multilateralising its security interests at the MBFR talks. As security
issues imposed themselves gradually as the central item of
international debates in the years 1977-1978, Bonn committed itself to
reinforcing the integration between the CSCE and MBFR frameworks.
To this purpose, it proposed starting negotiations on the so-called
356 For an analysis of the development of NATO’s concept of the dual-track decision, see
for instance: L. Nuti, «The origins of the 1979 dual track decision – a survey», in The crisis
of Détente from Helsinki to Gorbachev, 1975-1985, ed. L. Nuti, pp. 57-71; Olav Njølstad, “The
Carter Legacy: Entering the Second Era of the Cold War,” in The Last Decade of the Cold
War: From Conflict Escalation to Conflict Transformation, ed. O. Njølstad, pp. 198–199.
357 Runderlaß des Vortragenden Legationsrats I. Klasse Rückriegel, 17.01.1978, in AAPD, 1978,
vol. I, doc. 12, p. 91.
134
“associated-measures” which were an integral part of MBFR talks but
had not been discussed in Vienna that far.358 Associated measures
reinforced, indeed, Helsinki’s provisions on CBMs. The West German
initiative was directed to adjust the scheme of the MBFR to the one of
the CSCE, by extending the area of jurisdiction of associated measures
to the European part of the Soviet territory. The operation was directed
to create a beneficial interaction between negotiations in Vienna and
Madrid and to enlarge the complex of instruments at disposal of
European détente to deal with crisis management and conflict
reduction.359
As Peter has highlighted, in 1979 Bonn aimed at including at
integrating the manifold dimensions of its international engagement in
the field of security – namely, the modernisation of LRTNFs, the
prosecution of MBFR talks, the support to the superpower arms talks
and the implementation of CBMs – into a single improved strategy,
capable to meet at best the new requirements of the security question
un Europe.360 Security was far from being a discovery of the late
Seventies: its protection had been strictly intertwined with the pursuit
of East-West dialogue since the origins of the détente project. The
interweaving of security and détente needs remained valid at the end
of the decade: the new predominance of security questions changed the
terms of the relationship, requiring the West German federal
government to rethink partially its détente strategy.
The decisions made by the West German federal government in the
field of security had important political and public repercussions of the
domestic front. The affair of the neutron bomb first and the prospect of
358 “Associated measures” had been conceived, as the name suggests, to flank and
reinforce the main decisions on force reductions; the category encompassed a variety of
tasks and actions: “constraints”, “stabilising measures”, “verification”, “noncircumvention”, “protection of the security of confining states. See: Aufzeichnung des
Botschafters Ruth, 21.07.1978, in AAPD, 1978, vol. II, doc. 226, p. 1139.
359 Ibid., p. 1137.
360 M. Peter, “Sicherheit und Entspannung. Die KSZE-Politik der Bundesregierung in
den Krisenjahren 1978–1981”, p. 68.
135
an upcoming deployment of new U.S. missiles in the FRG then,
reinforced the impression of a large part of the West German public
opinion that Schmidt’s government was not speaking the language of
détente anymore. A public opinion poll conducted in 1981 by the
Federal Press Office (Bundespresseamt) revealed that most of people
interviewed interpreted NATO’s dual-track resolution as a decision on
rearmament.361 West Germans had got used to the achievements of the
dialogue with the East. Even its traditional opponents had begun to
yield to the changed paradigm of Bonn’s foreign policy. The apparent
political reverse of the West German federal government and its NATO
partners aroused the formation of a broad oppositional front. At the
turn of the decade a wave of protests raged in the FRG, whose
immediate target was the deployment of U.S. missiles on the West
German territory – similarly to ongoing protests in other Western
democracies. The West German protest movement of the early Eighties
encompassed, however, a more composite spectrum of identities and
requests: peaceful and anti-nuclear stances, anti-American sentiments,
requests of rethink the bipolar division of the world, needs to redefine
the West German national identity.362
As protests against the “return of hard security” intensified
dramatically in the whole country, the relaunch of the CSCE process at
the Madrid meeting became increasingly urgent for the West German
federal government. It was necessary to counterbalance the decisions in
361 Bericht des Presse- und Informationsamts der Bundesregierung an den Bundeskanzler,
03.07.1981, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.489.
362 For an insightful analysis of West German peace movements of the early 1980s, see
for instance: P. Gassert, T. Geiger and H. Wentker, eds. Zweiter Kalter Krieg und
Friedensbewegung: Der NATO-Doppelbeschluss in deutsch-deutscher und internationaler
Perspektive (München: Oldenbourg, 2011); J. Hansen, “Der Protest und die Mächtigen: Zu
den Auswirkungen von Friedensbewegung, Nuclear Wapons Freeze Campaign und
Solidarność auf das Bonner »Establishment«”, in “All We Ever Wanted...”. Eine
Kulturgeschichte europäischer Protestbewegungen der 1980er Jahre, eds. H. Balz and J.H.
Friedrichs (Berlin: Dietz, 2013), pp. 231-246; J. Hansen, “La Spd e il movimento per la
pace in Germania: alleati o avversari?”, in Dal Sessantotto al crollo del Muro. I movimenti di
protesta in Europa a cavallo tra i due blocchi, eds. V. Lomellini and A. Varsori (Milano:
Franco Angeli, 2014).
136
the security field with important results on the détente front. The
implicit interweaving of security and détente should be pursued more
explicitly, both in the relations with the Eastern countries and in front
of the national public opinion. Whereas political and military aspects of
détente were, according to the West German theoretical conception,
inseparable, in the practice Bonn’s CSCE policy took on increasingly
the instrumental function of counterweighing the decisions made on
the front of military security.363
New opportunities for East-West relations in the field of military
security
One of the most important lessons the FRG had learnt at the
Belgrade CSCE was that the process of European détente could
improve only if Western countries would manage to get the Eastern
bloc more involved. Hence, the West German Foreign Office was faced
with a crucial question as it was preparing its strategy for the second
follow-up meeting of Madrid: where should the relaunch of the CSCE
process start from, in times of renewed East-West confrontation over
military security? An indication on the path to follow came from a
Soviet proposal; it suggested that the solution to the stalemate of the
CSCE should be sought within the field of security itself.
As the Western Alliance was discussing the details of the dual-track
strategy, the foreign ministers of the Warsaw Pact gathered in the
Polish capital on 14-15 May 1979 replied by advancing the idea of a
“Pan-European Conference on Questions of Military Détente.364 The
Eastern initiative recalled the French similar proposal for a Conference
on Disarmament in Europe (CDE) put forward by Giscard d’Estaing in
363 Erwägungen zur Entspannungspolitik nach Afghanistan, 09.01.1980, in PA AA,
Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.431.
364 Tagung des Politischen Beratenden Ausschusses des Warschauer Paktes am 14. / 15. Mai
1980 in Warschau. Hier: Endgültige Analyse, 06.06.1980, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd.
132.506.
137
January 1978.365 According to the Eastern project, the pan-European
conference would constitute a third additional forum of East-West
cooperation, whose negotiations should be carried out separately from
the MBFR and the CSCE frameworks. Questions of disarmament
should be discussed at a different pace from and in parallel with the
CSCE.366 From a strategic point of view, the new Warsaw Pact’s
proposal was in line with the Eastern idea of the development of
détente after the signing of the Helsinki Final Act. Indeed, it aimed first
at breaking up the unity of the contents of the CSCE by focusing
cooperation on selected issues; and second, at lowering gradually the
profile of the follow-up meetings, by extracting “important”
negotiations from the frame of the Helsinki Final Act. A similar attempt
had been already made at the Belgrade CSCE, where Eastern
delegations had tabled 1975 Brezhnev’s proposal for a conference on
cooperation in the fields of traffic, environment and energy which
aimed at deepening cooperation on specific issues of Basket II outside
the existing frameworks in charge – i.e. the CSCE and the UN
Economic Commission for Europe (ECE). 367 Whereas the new Eastern
invitation to cooperation on disarmament shared similar strategic and
propagandistic intents with elder initiatives, it contained some aspects
of novelty the West German Foreign Office considered worth to be
taken into account.368 During inner-German talks on 24 July 1979, East
German Deputy Foreign Minister Moldt introduced the project of the
pan-European conference to West German State Secretary van Well as
365 For an analysis of the origins of the French proposal for a CDE, see: V. Heyde, “Nicht
nur Entspannung und Menschenrechte. Die Entdeckung von Abrüstung und
Rüstungskontrolle durch die französische KSZE-Politik“, in Die KSZE im Ost-WestKonflikt: internationale Politik und gesellschaftliche Transformation 1975-1990, eds. M. Peter
and H. Wentker.
366 Tagung des Politischen Beratenden Ausschusses des Warschauer Paktes am 14. / 15. Mai
1980 in Warschau. Hier: Endgültige Analyse, 06.06.1980, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd.
132.506.
367 Aufzeichnung des Ministerialdirektors Pfeffer und des Botschafters Rut, 12.07.1982, in
AAPD, 1982, vol. II, doc. 206, p. 1083.
368 Tagung des Politischen Beratenden Ausschusses des Warschauer Paktes am 14. / 15. Mai
1980 in Warschau. Hier: Endgültige Analyse, 06.06.1980, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd.
132.506.
138
“the cornerstone of the Warsaw Pact’s package of proposals”. The
socialist countries were open, as Moldt declared, to discuss similar
initiatives coming from the Western side. 369 East Berlin was giving clear
indications about the direction to follow: the Eastern and French
proposals for a CDE offered a possible common ground for
negotiations at the Madrid CSCE.
As the armament track of NATO’s new dual strategy was taking
shape in the course of 1979, Eastern invitations to cooperation on
disarmament intensified. The interweaving between missiles,
disarmament and CSCE became stricter and stricter as the appointment
of the second follow-up meeting in Madrid was approaching. The
adoption of the NATO’s December 1979 decision did not only affect the
formulation of the West German détente strategy, but brought
important changes in the approach to the CSCE of the Soviet Union and
its protégées. Disarmament had been always been a focal item of Soviet
propaganda. A large part of the Soviet proposals tabled at the Belgrade
CSCE addressed matters of disarmament. 370 However, Eastern
initiatives in this field took on a new concrete dimension at the turn of
the decade: they became a major foreign political tool intended to
hinder the deployment of new U.S. ballistic missiles in Western Europe.
The CSCE became again, as in Helsinki, an important framework for
the Eastern bloc to pursue its own vital interests.
The proposal for a conference on disarmament – revised and
updated by the Warsaw Pact in May 1980 – was promoted by the
Soviet diplomacy through a round of talks in several Western capitals
in the summer of 1980.371 During bilateral CSCE consultations in Bonn,
369 Gespräch des Staatssekretärs van Well mit dem Ständigen Vertreter der DDR, Moldt,
24.07.1979, in AAPD, 1979, vol. II, doc. 212, p. 1033.
370 Militärische Aspekte der Sicherheit auf dem KSE-Folgetreffen in Belgrad. Hier:
Zwischenbilanz, 12.01.1978, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.770.
371 The denomination of “Pan-European conference” was abandoned by the Warsaw
Pact, in favour of more vague “Conference on Military Détente and Disarmament in
Europe”, after the NATO countries had declared their intention to extend the application
of CBMs and MBFR measures to the whole European territory, included the European
part of the Soviet Union, in the Communiqué of 14 December 1979. See: Vorschlag der WP-
139
Moscow reconfirmed its strong interest in negotiating a CDE with the
West. To this purpose, Eastern countries would consider to make
concessions in the fields of Basket II and III, against the Western
reassurance to avoid sterile polemics over confrontational issues. 372 The
way was paved for the strategic course Eastern delegations would
pursue during the whole duration of negotiations at the Madrid CSCE.
Besides the CDE project, a series of proposals for enhanced cooperation
on security issues were brought forward by the Warsaw Pact in the
months of preparation of the second CSCE follow-up meeting. They
focused on developing CBMs, reinforcing the security aspects of
détente in the Mediterranean region, 373 reducing troops and
armaments, renouncing to the first-use of both nuclear and
conventional force.374
The Eastern bloc had not played such a proactive role since the
times of negotiations for the first CSCE. The West German Foreign
Office observed with interest the ongoing shift beyond the Iron
Curtain. The complex of Eastern proposals indicated clearly what the
focal theme of the review conference in Madrid would be.375 More
importantly, it unveiled that the Soviet bloc had regained strong
interest, out of necessity, in getting involved in the CSCE process. As
the West German Foreign Office observed in the spring of 1980, the
East’s renewed interest for cooperation on the security dimension of
détente could be turned to the West’s advantage: if handled carefully
and kept within the framework provided by the Helsinki Final Act, it
could be utilised to revitalise the CSCE process and force the East to
Staaten für eine Konferenz über die militärische Aspekte der Sicherheit. Hier: Bezeichnung,
29.09.1980, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 132.506.
372 Deutsch-sowjetische KSZE-Konsultationen am 7./8.08.1980 in Bonn, in PA AA,
Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 132.506.
373 This initiative was directed, according to the assessment of the Auswärtiges Amt, to
block the deployment of U.S. missiles in Italy: see Tagung des Politischen Beratenden
Ausschusses des Warschauer Paktes am 14. / 15. Mai 1980 in Warschau. Hier: Endgültige
Analyse, 06.06.1980, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 132.506.
374 Ibid.
375 WP-Treffen in Warschau am 14. und 15. Mai 1980. Hier: Stellungnahme der DDR,
21.05.1980, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, 132.506.
140
those substantial concessions the Belgrade conference had failed to
achieve.376
Adjusting the FRG’s CSCE policy to new conditions: the
preparation of a balanced agenda for Madrid
The relaunch of the détente process at the Madrid CSCE required
the West German Foreign Office to deal with two main tasks, in
coordination with its Western partners: first, shaping debates on
disarmament according to the Western view; second, safeguarding the
balanced nature of the CSCE from the predictable predominance of
security questions. To these purposes, the diplomatic efforts of the
Auswärtiges Amt were directed, in the months of preparation of the
second follow-up meeting, to bring together the Soviet and French
drafts for a CDE and to agree a list of attainable proposals for the
improvements of détente in its fields of interest.
At the end of 1979 it had become clear that the Soviet bloc would
take a proactive approach to negotiations on security in Madrid. 377 The
Western Alliance was compelled to define a detailed, coordinated plan
in order “not to leave a clear field for Soviet initiatives”.378 In December
1979 NATO’s foreign and defence ministers had declared themselves in
favour of using the 1978 French draft as the basis for negotiations at the
Madrid CSCE. Overcoming the initial U.S. opposition and the
scepticism of a number of European partners, the CDE had become
part of the “negotiation track” of NATO’s twofold strategy.379 The
definition of the Western proposal for a CDE was object of analysis
within the Auswärtiges Amt and of debates within the Alliance in the
course of 1980. Bonn aimed at not limiting discussions to technical
376 Ibid.
377 KSZE-Folgetreffen in Madrid. Hier: Verhältnis einer möglichen KAE zum KSZE-Prozess,
24.03.1980, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 132.506.
378 Proposals of the Nine for Madrid, 23.01.1980, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 132.506.
379 Botschafter Pauls, Brüssel (NATO), an das Auswärtige Amt, 01.08.1980, in AAPD, 1980,
vol. II, doc. 224, p. 1185.
141
details, but rather at conceiving the Conference on Disarmament as a
project of vast “political dimensions and significance”.380 The West
German ambitions to enhance the political value of the CSCE process
were invested in the project of the CDE as well. The achievement of a
big initiative on disarmament within the framework of the détente
process would represent that important counterbalance to NATO’s
rearmament decisions the West German federal government longed for
in order to appease domestic oppositions.
The Auswärtiges Amt identified the most important aspect of the
CDE in its geographic mandate. Indeed, the 1978 French proposal
covered the whole European continent “from the Atlantic to the Urals”.
Keeping the initiative within the framework of the CSCE would
provide, amongst other reasons, the legal basis for the inclusion of the
European part of the Soviet territory.381 The geographic area of the CDE
represented the main difference between the French and the Eastern
proposal. The West German diplomacy tried to bring the two projects
together throughout the spring and the summer of 1980, in order to
achieve an agreement in principle before the start of negotiations in
Madrid. Bonn’s efforts did not succeed: both a Western initiative for a
Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE) and an Eastern initiative
for a Conference on Military Détente in Europe (CMDE) were brought
forward at the negotiation table of the second CSCE follow-up
meeting.382 The question of the geographic mandate of the conference
would represent a major bone of East-West contention in the Spanish
capital and the conditio sine qua non for the Western final approval.
The preparation of the Western agenda for the Madrid CSCE did
not limit itself to the sole CDE. To the contrary, the aim of the CDE
should be strategically used, according to Bonn, to obtain those
concrete improvements of the Helsinki process the West German
380Ibid.
381Ibid.; and Aufzeichnung des Ministerialdirektors Blech, 2.04.1980, in AAPD, 1980, vol. I,
doc. 100, p. 552.
382 In the course of the chapter it will be always referred to the “CDE” for reasons of
simplicity.
142
delegation had longed for in Belgrade. The West German traditional
interest for human contacts remained unvaried. The reinforcement of
the human dimension of détente appeared even more urgent in times
of renewed East-West tension, both from a substantial and a symbolic
viewpoint. Between the first and the second CSCE follow-up meetings
an interesting shift gradually occurred in the West German attitude
towards the idea of balance which should necessarily characterise the
development of the CSCE process. Safeguarding the harmonic
relationship amongst the Helsinki’s baskets had always been a
cornerstone of the Western German policy of multilateral détente. In
principle nothing changed: indeed, aiming at the balance between
security, economic and human matters continued to represent one of
the guiding postulates of the Western strategy at the Madrid CSCE.383
Its importance was reiterated in a number of declarations of the EPC,
NATO and European Council during the preparation and the
unfolding of the follow-up meeting. In practice the goal of balanced
improvements should be pursued less mechanically: the experience in
Belgrade had shown that it was quite unrealistic to attain achievements
in all fields of the Helsinki Final Act in every contingency. Particularly
in the human field, pragmatic distinctions should be made between
attainable and unattainable aims against the background of the existing
circumstances.384 The acceptance by the Eastern bloc of three or four of
the Western demands concerning the easing of family reunification,
exchange of contacts and visits of relatives would represent according
to the Auswärtiges Amt a sufficient counterweight to a positive decision
on the CDE.385
383 Proposals of the Nine for Madrid, 23.01.1980, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 132.506.
384 The shift to a more pragmatic interpretation of the “principle of balance” was a
gradual process: it was triggered, first, by the lessons learnt at the Belgrade CSCE; and
reinforced by the adverse international developments which occurred during the
unfolding of the Madrid CSCE. A retrospective assessment of the meaning of “balanced
character” with regard to the development of the CSCE was provided by Ministerial
Director Pfeffer and Ambassador Ruth in 1982: see Aufzeichnung des Ministerialdirektors
Pfeffer und des Botschafters Ruth, 12.07.1982, in AAPD, 1982, vol. II, doc. 206, pp. 1084-1085.
385 KSZE-Folgetreffen in Madrid. Hier: Verhältnis einer möglichen KAE zum KSZE-Prozess,
24.03.1980, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 132.506.
143
The preparation of Western proposals in the fields of Basket II and
III was carried out within the EPC frameworks between 1979 and 1980.
The legacy of Belgrade affected significantly the formulation of the
Nine’s strategy. In a strategic paper of December 1979 the West
German Foreign Office addressed the question of how to deal with the
numerous Western demands which had remained unanswered at the
first follow-up meeting. On the whole, they still remained valid and
relevant for the continuation of the process of détente: as West German
chief delegator Fischer had stressed in its concluding address in
Belgrade, they addressed concrete problems which could be solved
only through the common commitment of all CSCE participants. 386
However, they needed to be revised and updated. The West German
Foreign Office indentified the following tasks the Nine had to deal
with. First, the number of proposals should be reduced: an important
step in this direction was made by the Nine by collecting and
summarising their demands in some synthesis papers – as for instance
the so-called “Miller-Paper” on human contacts and the “HoffmanPaper” on information.387 Second, possible initiatives should be
classified according to criteria of priority and negotiability, by
excluding those which had scarce chances of success. For instance, the
U.S. proposal for the convening of a meeting of experts on the
participation of single individuals in the CSCE presented within the
NATO caucus in February 1980 was firmly rejected by the Nine. 388
Third, Western delegations should take the initiative with more
conviction than they had done in Belgrade, where fears of diverting the
attention from implementation issues had restraint more proactive
attitudes. In January 1981 the Nine openly declared their intention to
pursue a different course in Madrid. The reiteration of old demands
(addressing the implementation flaws of the Helsinki Final Act), would
be flanked by initiatives on those issues of the Helsinki Accords which
386 Vorbereitung des Madrider KSZE-Folgetreffen. Hier: Vorschläge der Neun auf dem Gebiet des
III. Korbes, 4.12.1979, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 132.506.
387 Ibid.
388 Die Rolle einzelner Bürger bei Implementierung der Schlusskarte, 30.07.1980, in PA AA,
Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 132.506.
144
leave room for further improvements (namely the CBMs) and by more
innovative proposals (resting upon the “letter and spirit” of the
Helsinki’s provisions but enlarging its contents). 389
To sum-up, the preparation of the second CSCE follow-up meeting
was pursued by Bonn with increasing pragmatism. The development of
a détente policy which did not limit itself to being realistic in words
was a gradual process, triggered by the lessons learnt in Belgrade, the
changing international environment and the enduring pressures
coming from the domestic public opinion. The West German CSCE
strategy underwent two important changes between Belgrade and
Madrid. First, after the adoption of NATO’s December 1979 decision,
the inherent interweaving of security and détente interests had to
become more evident: the CSCE policy was pursued instrumentally to
counterbalance the decisions of the federal government in the field of security
in front of the eyes of public opinion. Second, the necessity to relaunch the
CSCE process required greater flexibility: the Auswärtiges Amt developed
a more pragmatic interpretation of the “balanced character” of the
development of the CSCE process.
As those adjustments were gradually taking shapes, East-West
relations were faced with two major crises, which would profoundly
affect the unfolding of the second CSCE follow-up conference.
Adjusting the FRG’s CSCE policy to times of crises: the influence
of Afghanistan and Poland
In the twelve months before the beginning of the Madrid CSCE the
East-West relationship went through a significant deterioration, which
has led historians to speak of the “return to a second Cold War”. Two
major Cold War crises unfolded at the turn of the decade: they
triggered a redefinition of the balance of power between the two blocs
and challenged directly the continuation of the CSCE process. The first,
389 Proposals of the Nine for Madrid, 23.01.1980, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 132.506.
145
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on Christmas Eve of 1979, occurred
outside the European continent but contradicted the commitment made
by the CSCE participants to attune their general international conduct
to the principles of détente. The second, the Polish crisis, developed in
the heart of Europe and escalated between the summer of 1980 and the
end of 1981: notwithstanding its domestic nature, it had important
international repercussions and addressed open violations of the
provisions of the Helsinki Final Act. Both Afghanistan and Poland were
comparable, for their public impact and the imaginary they recalled, to
the 1968 Soviet military intervention in Czechoslovakia. 390 However,
they did affect much more seriously the prosecution of the policy of
détente, than the solution to the Prague crisis by armed intervention
had done a decade before.
Afghanistan
As Zubok has highlighted, Moscow’s decision to invade
Afghanistan was a surprise not only to politicians and foreign policy
experts in the West, but also to most of the Soviet foreign policy elite.391
Although it matured from the endemic weakness of the Soviet bloc, it
was largely interpreted as a clear proof of Moscow’s return to
expansionist drive in foreign policy. The Afghan crisis deepened the
strains between the superpowers and the rifts in the transatlantic
partnership. The U.S. administration undertook unilaterally a series of
punitive sanctions intended to affect economic, security and political
vital interests of the Soviet Union.392 Against Carter’s expectations,
Western Europeans were little inclined to follow the American
390 D. Wild, “Mourir pour Danzig?”, in Der Spiegel, Nr. 52/1980.
391 V.M. Zubok, A failed empire. The Soviet Union and the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev,
p. 227.
392 The complex of U.S. sanctions encompassed the suspension of the already troubled
Congressional ratification of SALT II treaty, an embargo on American grain shipments to
the USSR, the limitation of economic exchanges with Moscow with special regard to the
field of high-technology, the postponement of the opening of new consulates in New
York and Kiev, and a boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympics. See D. Selvage, “The
Superpowers and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1977-1983.
Human rights, Nuclear Weapons, and Western Europe”, p. 27.
146
example. Whereas the British declared themselves ready to met
Washington’s demands, the French tried to convince the European
allies to undertake an autonomous course from Washington. 393 West
Germans opted for a moderate course towards Moscow as well:
notwithstanding a firm condemnation of the military intervention in
Afghanistan, it was essential “not to break off communication with the
Soviet Union during such times of crisis”, as Schmidt explained to the
American President in a long call phone on 11 January 1980.394 The U.S.
sanctions against the Soviet Union had not been discussed with the
Western partners, although they affected some of their important
interests. Economic and trade measures would inflict important
damages to Western European economics in times of deepening
recession.395 The conditions for the continuation of the policy of EastWest dialogue were at stake, as concerned Schmidt and Giscard
observed few weeks after the invasion of Afghanistan. 396
The West German federal government had its hands tied. The
sanctions affair took on increasingly the meaning of a loyalty test
towards the U.S. administration. Possibilities of resisting to the
pressure coming from Washington were limited by the awareness that
the particular conditions of West German sovereignty made the FRG
more heavily dependent on the American public opinion and military
protection with respect to its Western allies. The pursuit of Bonn’s
Ostpolitik remained still critically dependent on the good health of its
Westpolitik. Since the beginning of its bilateral policy of dialogue with
the East, the West German federal government had to strike a balance
between supporting the foreign political choices of the U.S.
393 For an appraisal of the French attitude towards the USSR after the invasion of
Afghanistan, see the analysis of the West German ambassador in Paris: Botschafter Herbst,
Paris, an das Auswärtige Amt, 12.01.1980, in AAPD, 1980, vol. I, doc. 11, pp. 68-71.
394 H. Schmidt, Men and Powers. A political retrospective, (New York: Random House,
1990) p. 202.
395 M. Howard, “The Conduct of American Foreign Policy: Return to the Cold War?”, in
Foreign Affairs, Volume 59, Number 3, 1980.
396 R. Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet relations from Nixon to Reagan
(Washington D.C.: Brookings, 1985), p. 1089.
147
administration and pursuing good relations with the Eastern countries.
In times of superpower rivalry, this task required greater efforts and
sacrifices. A very reluctant Schmidt decided to make at least some
concessions to Washington’s demands. Whilst the FRG managed to
forego economic sanctions, it was amongst the few NATO countries –
together with Norway and Turkey, similarly exposed to the presence of
Soviet fighting forces on their immediate borders – to join the U.S.
boycott of the Moscow Olympics. Even though the boycott represented
“a victory of impotence over politics”, as former Chancellor Willy
Brandt commented in an interview on French television,397 it was the
necessary price to pay not to revise the policy of dialogue with the
Soviets. Hence, at the beginning of July 1980 Helmut Schmidt travelled
to Moscow to meet Brezhnev, following the example of Giscard’s visit
to the Soviet leader in Warsaw in May. 398
As the Western partners were drifting apart over the sanctions
issue, their efforts to coordinate their strategies for the Madrid CSCE
continued. The U.S. ambassador in Brussels presented a list of
proposals for Madrid at the NATO meeting in February 1980. 399
Washington seemed to wish to give its imprinting to the formulation of
the Western conference strategy.400 Its initiative featured a mixture of
good willingness and persisting scepticism about the possibilities of
European détente. On the one hand, the U.S. administration committed
itself to complying with the needs of the European allies: the
declaration that a “balance between a thorough and frank review of
397 “Die Krise infiziert Europa“, in Der Spiegel, Nr. 6/1980.
398 For a West German assessment of Giscard’s visit to Moscow, see: Aufzeichnung
Ministerialdirektors von Staden, Bundeskanzleramt, 21,05.1980, in AAPD, 1980, vol. I, doc.
154, pp. 814-818; and Botschafter Pauls, Brüssel (NATO) an das Auswärtige Amt, 27.05.1980,
ibid., doc. 159, pp. 840-844 . For the analysis of Schmidt’s meeting with Brezhnev see
Gespräch des Bundeskanzlers Schmidt mit dem Generalsekretär des ZK der KPdSU, Breschnew,
in Moskau, 01.07.1980, in AAPD, 1980, vol. II, doc. 195, pp. 1063-1064. An insightful
appraisal of his talks with the Soviet leader has been offered by Schmidt in his memoirs:
H. Schmidt, Men and Powers: A Political Retrospective, pp. 79-92.
399 Vorschläge für das Madrider KSZE-Folgekonferenz. Hier: USA, 26.02.1980, in PA AA,
Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 132.506.
400 Ibid.
148
implementation and willingness to discuss new proposals in all areas of
the Final Act” was the best course to follow in Madrid represented an
absolute novelty.401 On the other hand, the limits of possible
cooperation with the Soviet Union in the wake of Afghanistan were
clearly set: the U.S. ambassador warned Europeans that they “should
be aware that events of the next several months with regard
particularly to Afghanistan will determine whether the United States
can agree to participate in any post-Madrid meeting aimed at
expanding contacts or cooperation with the Soviets”. 402 Bonn remained
sceptical about the possibility of a significant shift in Washington’s
CSCE policy. As West German Ambassador at the NATO quarters
Pauls reported in August 1980, it was not to exclude that the U.S.
administration – considering the increasing political weight of hardline positions emerged in the aftermath of Afghanistan and in
concomitance with the ongoing presidential election campaign – would
reiterate the strategy pursued at the first CSCE follow-up meeting, by
putting great emphasis on review debates and human rights issues in
Madrid. The West German conference aims, namely improvements of
human contacts and the convening of a CDE, were at risk to be pushed,
again, to the background.403
Whilst no significant change was to expect on the front of the U.S.
approach towards the CSCE, an important shift was ongoing beyond
the Iron Curtain. As Zubok has highlighted, the collapse of superpower
détente in the wake of Afghanistan changed the Soviet calculus of the
CSCE between Belgrade and Madrid. 404 The international consequences
of Afghan crisis accelerated the trends triggered by the adoption of
NATO’s dual-track decision. Faced with the pending prospect of a U.S.
reinforced military presence in Western Europe, the economic
401 Speaking Notes: New Proposals for Madrid, 8.02.1980, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd.
132.506.
402 Ibid.
403 Botschafter Pauls, Brüssel (NATO), an das Auswärtige Amt, 01.08.1980, in AAPD, 1980,
vol. II, doc. 224, p. 1185.
404 V.M. Zubok, A failed empire. The Soviet Union and the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev,
p. 268.
149
repercussions of punitive sanctions placed by Washington and the
widespread international condemnation of its Afghan endeavour, the
Soviet leadership needed cooperation with Western Europe more than
before.405 The upcoming CSCE follow-up meeting in Madrid opened
possibilities for achieving the aim of the CDE, improving the trade with
the West and breaking away from diplomatic isolation. Taking on a
more cooperative attitude towards the process of European détente
imposed itself as a Soviet foreign political necessity in the course of
1980.
Poland
In August 1980, as the beginning of the preparatory works for the
second CSCE follow-up meeting of Madrid was getting close, a wave of
protests erupted in Poland. Labour strikes in Gdansk guided by the
anti-Soviet movement Solidarność (Solidarity) soon escalated into an
overall systemic crisis of the Communist rule in Poland. 406 In the second
half of 1980 and throughout 1981 workers’ requests took on a broader
political meaning, by discrediting the communist thesis of unity of
action between the ruling party and the working class and questioning
the legitimacy of Warsaw’s regime itself. Three main elements
characterised the Polish domestic developments of 1980-1981 as a major
international crisis.
First, Poland’s turmoil represented a serious threat for the duration
of the Soviet leadership and the existing geopolitical order in the
Eastern bloc. The possibility of a Soviet external military intervention
casted a long shadow over the development of the Polish crisis,
reinforced by the inability of the government in Warsaw to deal with
protesters’ demands. The solution by armed intervention to the 1968
405 The Soviet armed intervention in Afghanistan roused a widespread weave of
disapproval which went far beyond the borders of the Western bloc. At the emergency
special session on Afghanistan of the UN General Assembly, an overwhelming majority
of 111 countries expressed their firm condemnation of the Soviet military initiative.
406 M. Zubok, A failed empire. The Soviet Union and the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev, p.
265.
150
Prague Spring had not prevented the embryonic process of détente
from progressing at the end of the Sixties. But the overall international
background against which the Polish crisis unfolded had profoundly
changed since then. Indeed, it was clear to all parties involved in EastWest cooperation that détente – already harmed by the deterioration of
the superpower relationship, by the strains over securities between the
two blocs and by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan – would not
tolerate a military intervention in the heart of Europe. Moreover,
whereas détente had still been a clear field at the time of the Prague
crisis, a corpus of rules and commitments had been defined by its
participants and had consolidated throughout the Seventies: their open
violation could hardly be ignored.
Second, as Zubok has observed with force, the Polish revolution
spilled over, politically and psychologically, into the borders of the
Soviet Union.407 Fears of contagion were present in Moscow and in the
Eastern capitals. The Polish example risked to encourage further
dissident groups, whose public demands intensified as the
appointment of the Madrid CSCE was getting close. Hence, events in
Poland triggered defensive reactions in most of the Eastern countries,
which affected also their contacts with the West. Bonn’s federal
government observed with particular worry the ongoing developments
in the GDR at the beginning of the new decade. Hence, bilateral innerGerman relations were going through difficult times due to the
renewed restrictive political course pursued by East German
authorities.408 Already since the spring of 1979 the GDR had
strengthened its policy of ideological demarcation from the other
German counterpart: working conditions for West German journalists
407 Ibid., p. 266.
408 The GDR pursued a two-faced policy at the turn of the decade. A policy of sharp
demarcation and propagandistic confrontation with West Germans on the ideological
front was paralleled, indeed, by unvaried efforts to continue economic cooperation with
the FRG. Massively harmed by the world energy crises and faced with the serious
problems of its productive sector, the GDR became growingly dependent on West
German aid and trade in the second half of the Seventies. See H.A. Winkler, Der lange
Weg nach Westen. Zweiter Band, pp. 363-365.
151
had become harder, the criminal law had been reformed by introducing
more repressive elements, and the overall control over the lives of East
Germans reinforced by the adoption of new legal disciplining tools.409
But even more surprising and disappointing for Bonn was East Berlin’s
decision – taken on 9 October 1980, few days after the federal elections
in the FRG and before the opening of the CSCE works in Madrid – to
enhance drastically the so-called Mindestumtausch, i.e. the mandatory
minimum currency exchange of a specified amount of Deutsche Mark
for Western citizens visiting the GDR. 410 This measure, which came into
force immediately without any exception and notice, represented, first,
a unilateral modification of the agreed inner-German regulation in
force since November 1974, considered an integral part of the acquis of
détente. Second, it contradicted the multilateral commitments made at
the Helsinki CSCE with regard to the facilitations of travels and
contacts between signatory countries. Hence, Bonn denounced East
Berlin’s initiative as an open infringement of the legal and political
grounds which inner-German relations and East-West détente rested
upon.411 A second slap in the Bonn’s face came a week later, on 13
November, as during his speech in the city of Gera SED General
Secretary Honecker demanded a list of unacceptable conditions for the
normalisation of inner-German relations and directed a series of sharp
criticisms against the FRG which recalled the tones of the past, harshest
Cold War times.412 The Auswärtiges Amt’s interpretation of the East
German repressive turn, which in Bonn’s view had been largely
affected by the eruption of the Polish crisis, seemed to be confirmed
few months later as East Berlin agreed with Warsaw on a series of
restrictions to the flows of visits and contacts between the two
countries which aimed at closing de facto the Polish border to East
409 M. Peter, “Sicherheit und Entspannung. Die KSZE-Politik der Bundesregierung in
den Krisenjahren 1978–1981”, p. 72.
410 Aufzeichnung des Vortragenden Legationsrat I. Klasse Freiherr von Richthofen, 27.10.1980,
in AAPD, 1980, vol. II, doc. 305, p. 1575.
411 Erhöhung des Mindestumtausches für Besuche in der DDR und Berlin (Ost), 10.10.1980, in
PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 132.506.
412 H. Potthoff, Im Schatten der Mauer. Deutschlandpolitik 1961 bis 1990, p. 174.
152
German citizens.413 Whereas economic motivations could be put
forward by the East German leadership to explain the rationale of the
October 1980 enhancement of the mandatory currency exchange, they
could hardly be used to justify the limitations of human contacts with
Poland. East Berlin’s restrictive measures were rather to be understood,
according to Bonn, as similar attempts to discipline the population and
discourage contacts both with the West and with Polish dissidents.414
The meaning of such trends went far beyond the specificity of the
inner-German relationship. They contributed to complicate the
negotiation landscape at the Madrid CSCE, especially with regard to
the matters of Basket III.415
Third, the management of the Polish crisis by the government in
Warsaw received high international exposure as the confrontation
between protesters and authorities developed in concomitance with the
unfolding of the second CSCE follow-up conference in Madrid. Indeed,
the Polish crisis, already serious on the eve of Madrid, deteriorated
dramatically during the first conference year. The Madrid CSCE
became inevitably an international sounding board for the crisis: what
was happening in the Eastern country was under the eyes of the
delegations gathered in Madrid and of the international public opinion.
As a signatory state of the Helsinki Final Act, Poland had committed
itself to the respect of all its principles. Eventual massive violations of
Polish dissidents’ human rights and basic freedoms by the government
in Warsaw would compel delegations in Madrid to take positions. Even
though the Polish crisis did not become an official item of debate at the
Madrid CSCE during the first conference year, at least until Jaruzelski’s
decision to impose martial law in December 1981, it was constantly
under the careful scrutiny of the CSCE participants since the start of
multilateral negotiations in the Spanish capital. As Chapter 4 analyses,
diplomatic works in Madrid could not but be affected by the
413 KSZE-Implementierung. Hier: NATO-Halbjahrsbericht, 04.05.1981, in PA AA,
Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 132.507.
414 Ibid.; and Erhöhung des Mindestumtausches für Besuche in der DDR und Berlin (Ost),
10.10.1980, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 132.506.
415 Ibid.
153
deterioration of the relations between protesters and authorities in
Poland. If, on the one hand, it became more and more difficult to
silence massive violations of human rights and punitive measures
adopted by Warsaw’s authorities, on the other hand the crisis
drastically sank the Eastern countries’ tolerance thresholds and room
for manoeuvre.416 Hence, dealing with the Polish question became in
the course of the conference an inevitable task for all delegations
gathered in Madrid.
Rethinking a realistic policy of détente in the times of the Afghan
and Polish crises
The international developments in Afghanistan and Poland urged
the West German Foreign Office to revise further its multilateral
détente policy in view of the appointment of Madrid. The Soviet
military intervention in Afghanistan represented a massive violation of
the shared principle of geographic indivisibility of détente, according to
which each CSCE participant state committed itself to conforming its
conduct outside of Europe to the requirements of European détente.417
Such infringement posed the West German federal government in front
of the question of how to conciliate firmness on the respect of the basic
principles of the Helsinki Act with its foreign policy interests and
needs. Even though Schmidt and Genscher continued to foster the
continuation of détente even after the Afghan crisis – and in spite of it –
there was awareness in Bonn that indulgence towards the Soviet
endeavour would endanger seriously the credibility of the whole
détente construction.
A solution to the dilemma was found by distinguishing with
pragmatism, once more, between the theoretical and the operational
side of the process of multilateral détente. This meant that, even though
416 Schrifterlass des Vortragenden Legationsrat I. Klasse Joetze, 17.12.1980, in AAPD, 1980,
vol. II, doc. 369, p. 1915.
417 Erster Entwurf der Einführungserklärung des BMs auf dem Madrider Folgetreffen,
28.10.1980, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 132.506.
154
the principle of geographic indivisibility of détente remained valid as a
theoretical postulate of the CSCE and an imperative for its participants,
the West German Foreign Office decided to deal with it with flexibility
on the operational level.418 Developments in Poland of the years 19801981 came to Bonn’s aid to motivate this partial rethinking of its
realistic policy of détente. The FRG tied the continuation of the process
of East-West dialogue to the possibility of fostering stability in Poland
both in the internal analyses of the Auswärtiges Amt and in the
argumentations of the West German diplomacy. The improvement of
multilateral détente – and more specifically the successful outcome of
the second CSCE follow-up meeting in Madrid – would exert,
according to Bonn’s view, a positive effect on the ongoing attempts for
liberalisation in Poland.419 In the course of the Madrid CSCE the West
German Foreign Office promoted the link between improvement of
East-West dialogue and solution to the Polish crisis, shaping
increasingly its multilateral détente policy as a policy of stabilisation
and, after Jaruzelski’s imposition of martial law in December 1981, as a
policy of crisis management towards Poland.420 According to the
indications provided by the Auswärtiges Amt, whilst the West German
delegation at the Madrid CSCE should not withdraw from denouncing
open violations of the Helsinki Act – as the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan – in its opening address and during review debates,
negotiations on concrete improvements in the field of human contacts,
trade and disarmament should be pursued also for Poland’s sake. 421
Moreover, the CSCE’s protective function towards Poland was one of
the main arguments adducted by the West German delegation
418 Basispapier zur Prinzipienerklärung, 29.10.1980, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 132.506.
419 KSZE-Aspekte der Ereignisse in Polen, 05.09.1980, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd.
132.954.
420 See also M. Peter, “Sicherheit und Entspannung. Die KSZE-Politik der
Bundesregierung in den Krisenjahren 1978–1981”, p. 75.
421 KSZE-Aspekte der Ereignisse in Polen, 05.09.1980, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd.
132.954.
155
throughout 1981 to contrast the possibility of a premature conclusion of
the follow-up conference.422
Tying Poland’s destiny to the advancement of multilateral détente
was part of a broader strategy of stabilisation encompassing a series of
diplomatic actions pursued at different levels. Bonn’s strategy aimed at
improving East-West dialogue through CSCE negotiations in Madrid
and INF negotiations in Geneva; at sending positive signals from
Brussels to the Eastern bloc through the proposal of negotiations and
economic cooperation with the European Community; at offering to
Warsaw targeted economic help.423 As on the bilateral level, Schmidt
and Genscher used their network of good relations with the Eastern
countries to avert the risk of an armed intervention of the Warsaw Pact
in Poland, the West German diplomacy at Madrid aimed at continuing
the CSCE, with the idea that the Eastern neighbour would more easily
find a solution to its domestic crisis within an improved international
environment.
The strategy of de-escalation was directed also towards the USSR.
Given the renewed Soviet interest for achieving concrete results within
the process of European détente, CSCE negotiations were considered
by the West German Foreign Office an important diplomatic tool to
convince Moscow to abstain from an armed intervention in Poland. The
West German shifting attitude towards the principle of indivisibility of
détente served foremost to the purpose of constraining the Soviet
conduct in Poland. If the process of European détente had continued in
spite of Afghanistan, an armed invasion on the European territory
would not be tolerated, as Genscher made clear in his inaugural
address.424
422 Madrider KSZE-Folgetreffen. Hier: Vorschläge eines Zieldatums zur Beendigung des Treffens
Mitte Juli, 26.06.1981, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 132.954.
423 Vorgänge in Polen. Hier: KSZE-Aspekte, 29.12.1981, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd.
132.928.
424 Zum Entwurf Genschers Madrid-Erklärung, 06.11.1980, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd.
178.804.
156
More than a radical shift in the West German CSCE policy, the
formulation of an operative approach to the geographic dimension of
the indivisibility of détente represented a realistic adaptation of the
theoretical grounds of multilateral détente to the constraints imposed
by the tense international context. Bonn’s efforts revealed that the
federal government, besides continuing to consider the CSCE a priority
foreign policy field, preserved a certain amount of confidence in the
possibility of prosecution of East-West dialogue while approaching the
appointment in Madrid, against widespread scepticism of large part of
the national public opinion towards a process which seemed to be
seriously worn out through the difficulties of that year. 425
In the last phases of the preparation of the second CSCE follow-up
meeting the West German Foreign Office was faced with another, more
practical question: i.e. how to address publicly the Afghan and Polish
issues at debates in Madrid. According to the political guidelines for
the West German delegation at the CSCE, collected in the strategic
paper drafted by State Secretary van Well on 5 November 1980, all
major setbacks of détente – included Afghanistan – should be discussed
in the first review phase of the conference.426 A different treatment was
reserved instead for Poland. Although the Polish developments were a
central matter of concern for Bonn, it was decided not to mention them
in Genscher’s address at the inaugural session of the CSCE follow-up
meeting – except for the general but implicit reference, mentioned
above, to the circumstance that the process of détente would not
tolerate, after Afghanistan, any military enterprise within the European
borders.427 The West German Foreign Office decided to abstain as much
as possible from public statements on the Polish crisis which risked
425 See for instance the article published by Der Spiegel in November 1980, claiming the
death of the spirit of Helsinki: „KSZE: Der Geist von Helsinki ist tot“, Der Spiegel, Nr. 47,
1980. In an interview for Die Welt Genscher reiterated instead his belief that possibilities
of East-West dialogue were still available. See: “Genscher: Die Eiszeit darf man nicht
herbeireden”, Die Welt, 24.10.1980.
426 Schrifterlass des Vortragenden Legationsrats I. Klasse Joetze, 17.12.1980, in AAPD, 1980,
vol. II, doc. 369, pp. 1909-1915.
427 Zum Entwurf Genschers Madrid-Erklärung, 06.11.1980, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd.
178.804.
157
aggravating further the precarious international situation. Bonn’s
choice was dictated by reasons of diplomatic prudence and
convenience: there was awareness that any Western and West German
declaration would be easily stigmatized by the Eastern countries as an
attempt to interfere into the Polish domestic affairs, burdening in vain
the development of works at Madrid. The West German delegation,
along with its allies, reserved however the right to take a position,
depending on the future development of the situation. 428 Hence, both
for Poland’s and the CSCE’s sake, the Polish crisis managed to remain
an unspoken presence in Madrid at least until events escalated in
December 1981.
428 Basispapier zur Prinzipienerklärung, 29.10.1980, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 132.506.
158
“In this dynamic world, stability cannot be obtained by trying to turn back the wheel of
history”
Hans-Dietrich Genscher, speech at the Second CSCE Follow-up Meeting’s
plenary session in Madrid, February 9, 1982
Chapter 4
For the Sake of Poland, For the Sake of Détente:
the Implementation of a Realistic Policy of
Détente at the Second CSCE Follow-up Meeting
in Madrid (1980-1983)
Introduction: Changing political landscapes in the West at the
beginning of the new decade
One month before the start of the second CSCE follow-up meeting
in Madrid in November 1980, federal elections took place in the
Bundesrepublik. On 5 October West German voters reconfirmed the
social-liberal coalition: both the SPD and the FDP performed better
than in 1976, increasing their number of seats in the Bundestag, whereas
the CDU/CSU – though remaining the country’s strongest party –
suffered a consistent loss of 4,1 percent of votes. The October’s federal
elections had turned into a referendum over the hard-liner Christian
Democratic candidate Strauß, spokesman of those in the CDU who
continued to be opposed to the policy of dialogue with the East. 429 The
young political party of The Greens (Die Grünen) – founded at the
beginning of that year – obtained 1.5 percent of votes. It was the start of
a parabolic rise at the national level which would bring the ecologist
429 H.A. Winkler, Der lange Weg nach Westen. Band II: Deutsche Geschichte vom «Dritten
Reich» bis zur Wiedervereinigung, p. 360.
159
and pacifist party to enter the federal parliament in March 1983: for the
first time in the postwar time a new political entity added to the three
traditional parties at the federal level.430 This novelty marking the
political landscape was the symbol of a broader process of
transformation that the West German society – as well as other Western
European societies – was going through in the early Eighties.431 The
internal fragmentation of the Social Democratic party, the outburst of
the peace movement, the emergence of The Greens, the drift of public
opinion over security issues represented different aspects of an overall
process of polarisation.432
The reconfirmation of Helmut Schmidt as Chancellor – with HansDietrich Genscher continuing to lead the Auswärtiges Amt – represented
a countertrend to the developments occurring in the most important
Western countries at the turn of the decade. A first major political turn
took place on the other side of the Atlantic only one month after the
federal elections in the FRG. In the electoral turn-out on 4 November in
the U.S., Republican candidate Ronald Reagan reported an uncontested
victory over President Carter. Hence, unlike West Germans, Americans
showed their favour for a clear political change by turning their back
on the weak Carter administration, supporting Reagan’s economic
program of deregulation and opting for a harder line in foreign policy.
In Reagan’s foreign political program there was no room for any form
of dialogue with the East: as Romero has highlighted, the idea itself of
détente was undermined at its grounds by rejecting the Soviet Union as
430 For an investigation of the political rise of the West German Green Party and the
political turning point marked by the 1983 federal election in the Bundesrepublik, see in
particular: S. Mende, “Von der »Anti-Parteien-Partei« zur »ökologischen Reformpartei«.
Die Grünen und der Wandel des Politischen”, in Wandel des Politischen: Die Bundesrepublik
Deutschland während der 1980er Jahre, ed. M. Woyke (Bonn: Dietz, 2013), pp. 277-319; A.
Wirsching, Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Abschied vom Provisorium 1982-1990.
431 On the profound transformations Western European societies and political systems
underwent in the early Eighties, see: T. Judt, Postwar. A History of Europe since 1945, pp.
535-558.
432 D. Verheyen, The German question. A Cultural, Historical, and Geopolitical Exploration, p.
162.
160
a partner on the same level with the American power.433 As it will be
analysed in the course of this chapter, Reagan’s election worried
seriously the supporters of détente in the FRG and Western Europe,
who started to interrogate themselves on what possible developments
would occur in international politics after the inauguration of the new
U.S. administration on 20 January 1981. 434
Other two pillars of the Western Alliance underwent major political
changes at the turn of the decade. 1979 Margaret Thatcher’s seizure of
power in the UK caused an epochal twist whose political consequences
marked the beginning of the new decade. Moreover, in the course of
1980, French politics too was preparing for change: presidential
elections in the spring of 1981 marked the victory of Giscard’s
opponent, Socialist candidate François Mitterrand. A reconfiguration of
political balances and personal relations was ongoing within the
Western caucus in the early Eighties. It contributed to complicate
further the landscape wherein the Madrid CSCE took place.
The second CSCE follow-up meeting in Madrid started in
November 1980 and lasted, after repeated breaks and adjournments,
until the fall of 1983. It represented the main multilateral stage where
changing intra-bloc and inter-bloc dynamics were put to test and took
shape. Whereas interdependence between the two blocs had increased
during the Seventies, conflicts and contentions at the turn of the decade
imposed – or tried to impose – new dividing lines. As the wheel of
history seemed to turn back under the impulse of the affirmation of the
“second Cold War”, the Madrid CSCE offered the stage where
supporters of détente attempted to pursue a countercyclical
international policy. Amongst those, the FRG aimed at playing a primal
role. As the chapter illustrates, West German diplomacy tried to
implement in Madrid a realistic détente policy which, with respect to
433 F. Romero, Storia della Guerra Fredda. L’ultimo conflitto per l’Europa, p. 284.
434 See, for instance: „An den Nerv. Die Bonner fürchten einen Wahlsieg des USPräsidentschaftskandidaten Ronald Reagan“, in Der Spiegel, 33/1980, 11.08.1980;„Reagan
weiß, was er will“, in Der Spiegel, 48/80, 24.11.1980; T. Sommer, „Wut staut sich auf in
Washington“, in Die Zeit, 52/80, 19.12.1980; USA: Wie können die Europäer froh sein?“, in
Der Spiegel, 3/1981, 12.01.1981.
161
the past, had gained increased flexibility and pragmatism. Bonn
supported firmly the opportunity to continue negotiations even in
adverse conditions. But the Madrid CSCE became soon a terrain of
indirect confrontation over the major episodes of crises marking the
turn of the decade: Afghanistan, Poland, the deployment of new
missiles in Europe. Whereas the Polish crisis was not initially an item of
multilateral debate, it casted a lengthening shadow over the unfolding
of negotiations until the precipitation of events in Poland in December
1982 changed the track of the conference. The chapter shows how the
major issues of East-West confrontation entailed some potential for
bringing the conference to a good conclusion. Throughout the three
years of negotiations in Madrid, West German diplomacy tried to draw
from the major episodes of international crisis arguments of persuasion
and tactical tools of negotiation that they could used both with the
Western partners and the Eastern counterparts in order to attain its
own détente goals.
“Looking behind to go ahead”: reviewing the state of multilateral
détente in Madrid
The second CSCE follow-up meeting in Madrid was marked by a
difficult start. Delegations had not managed to agree on a common
conference agenda during the preparatory meeting which, started on 9
September 1980, was still ongoing at the beginning of November 1980
when the main conference should officially begin.435 West German
Foreign Minister Genscher instructed the head of his delegation,
Ambassador Kastl, not to cede to easy compromises in this first
determinant phase of the conference where the contents and the
structure of negotiations were defined: what would be given away at
the beginning could no more be improved afterwards.436 The lingering
fear of a premature interruption of the Madrid CSCE should not urge
Western delegations to excessive compliance. Indeed, the months of
435 Telefongespräch des Bundesministers Genscher mit Botschafter Kastl, Madrid (KSZEDelegation), 11.11.1980, in AAPD, 1980, vol. II, 319, pp. 1654-1656.
436 Ibid.
162
diplomatic preparation of the Madrid CSCE had revealed that the
Soviet Union and its Eastern allies had substantial interests in bringing
the conference to a successful conclusion.437 This awareness nourished
the West German confidence in the possibility of achieving concrete
détente improvements even though East-West dialogue was going
through one of its hardest phases. After a few days of uncertainties and
tensions, a last minute agreement on the main organisational
conference aspects was reached on Friday 14 November 1980, paving
the way to the official start of the second CSCE follow-up meeting the
week after.
The beginning of the conference was surrounded by troublesome
international developments. The hanging consequences of the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan, the escalating crisis in Poland, the growing
strains between the superpowers, the East-West confrontation over
armaments, the embitterment of inner-German relations, and the
overall worsening of Western journalists’ working conditions in the
Warsaw Pact’s countries were heavy problems weighing on the
diplomatic work in Madrid. Their existence and influence could not be
ignored by delegations at the CSCE. The question of how those
challenging issues were to deal with at multilateral negotiations had
been addresses by the West German Foreign Office – as it had been
partly analysed at the end of Chapter 3 – on the eve of the start of the
conference. According to the main political guidelines for the West
German delegation at the Madrid CSCE, collected in the strategic paper
drafted by State Secretary van Well on 5 November 1980, all major
setbacks of détente should be discussed in the first review phase of the
conference.438 Bonn asked its delegations to take a stand against open
violations of the Helsinki agreements perpetrated in the Eastern
European countries by using, however, objective, moderate and
political argumentations. It was not the case to turn Madrid into a
tribunal and to repeat the frustrating experience of Belgrade, where the
437 Ibid.
438 Schrifterlass des Vortragenden Legationsrats I. Klasse Joetze, 17.12.1980, in AAPD, 1980,
vol. II, doc. 369, pp. 1909-1915.
163
Warsaw Pact had used Western attacks to justify their refusal to
negotiate.439
In continuity with the strategy pursued in Helsinki and Belgrade,
instead, the Auswärtiges Amt decided to leave off the multilateral
negotiation table specific bilateral issues regarding the querelles
allemandes.440 In accordance with the GDR, questions related to the
status of the inner-German relationship and of Berlin should not – and
would not – become conference themes.441 Both Bonn and East Berlin
had good additional reasons for rescuing inner-German relations from
international debates: at the turn of the decade Schmidt and Honecker
tried to shelter the continuation of bilateral cooperation – as much as
their room of manoeuvre and upper reasons of dependence on their
respective alliances consented it – from the escalation of East-West
tensions that threatened to disrupt the achievement of the last years. 442
Hence, the late restrictive measures imposed by East German
authorities were mentioned in the inaugural address of the West
German delegation within the framework, however, of a broader
analysis of setbacks of the détente process in view of the ensuing
review debate. West German demands regarding the improvement of
everyday life of German citizens living in the divided country and
beyond the Iron Curtain were included in the proposals package on
Basket III of the EC-group.443 A list of other problematic inner-German
issues – concerning the Berlin Wall, the firing at the inner-German
border, the situation in East German prisons, the repression of the
freedom of expression in the GDR – were packed into the so-called “big
luggage” collecting those argumentations to keep in reserve and use as
439 Basispapier zur Prinzipienerklärung, 29.10.1980, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 132.506.
440 Ibid.
441 Schrifterlass des Vortragenden Legationsrats I. Klasse Joetze, 17.12.1980, in AAPD, 1980,
vol. II, doc. 369, pp. 1909-1915.
442 O. Bange, “‘Keeping détente alive‘: Inner German relations under Helmut Schmidt
and Erich Honecker 1974-1982”, pp. 230-243.
443Aufzeichnung des Ministerialdirektors Blech, 14.01.1981, in AAPD, 1981, vol. I, doc. 7, p.
31.
164
reply to direct Eastern attacks only in the case of a serious and
irreparable deterioration of cooperation in Madrid.444
In line with the strategy sketched out by the Auswärtiges Amt on the
conference eve, all major setbacks of détente of the years 1979-1978
were addressed directly by Foreign Minister Genscher in his inaugural
speech in Madrid. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was mentioned
as a massive violation of that principle of indivisibility of détente,
according to which each participant’s conduct outside Europe had to be
compliant with the requirements of détente in Europe. 445 After having
reminded the core points of West German Deutschland- and
Berlinpolitik, criticisms were directed against the violations of the
Helsinki commitments in the fields of human rights, freedom of
religion, freedom of movement, and free information perpetrated in the
GDR.446 A similar stress was put on other violations perpetrated by the
Eastern countries. Genscher was aware of the great visibility of his
inaugural speech, whose first addressees were the West German and
Western public opinions: Bonn’s concept of détente needed to be
explained with clarity and no hesitation in denouncing violations
needed to be showed to the domestic and international audiences. 447
According to a consolidated rhetorical strategy, critical stances were
concentrated in the first part of the speech, to leave room for positive
assessments of what had been reached so far in the second part.
Optimism towards possible future achievements of multilateral détente
had the meaning of holding out the hand to the Soviet Union and its
allies.448
Showing firmness when reviewing the state of détente did not
contradict the intention of pursuing pragmatism when negotiating
afterwards. A dividing issue as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was
444 Basispapier zur Prinzipienerklärung, 29.10.1980, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 132.506.
445 Erster Entwurf der Einführungserklärung des BMs auf dem Madrider Folgetreffen,
28.10.1980, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 132.506.
446 Basispapier zur Prinzipienerklärung, 29.10.1980, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 132.506.
447 Zum Entwurf Genschers Madrid-Erklärung, 06.11.1980, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd.
178.804.
448 Ibid.
165
considered exhausted by the Auswärtiges Amt with its mentioning in
the plenary session and it should not dominate ensuing review
discussions.449 This was in line with the West German concept of a
realistic policy of détente as it had been revised after the Afghan crisis:
pursuing realism at the Madrid CSCE required the West German
delegation to display acrobatic abilities to walk on the fine line between
the levels of principles and concrete behaviours. Moreover, review
debates should remain circumscribed – unlike in Belgrade – to the first
conference weeks in order to proceed soon to substantial
negotiations.450 A sense of precariousness – due to the worrisome
developments in Poland – loomed over the meeting. It was important
to Bonn not to miss time and opportunities: already the first phase of
review debates should be used by Western delegations to present their
proposals for the continuation of the Helsinki process. As stated in the
strategic paper of the West German Foreign Office, it was opportune
“to look behind, only when it is necessary to go ahead”.451
According to the conference schedule, the first phase of works in
Madrid dedicated to review debates lasted six weeks and came to an
end on 19 December. The West German delegation drew a quite
positive balance: whereas firm criticisms had been directed towards the
Eastern countries and East-West respective positions over the main
political questions – Afghanistan and human rights – had remained
irreconcilable, discussions had been overall marked by a more objective
atmosphere than in Belgrade.452 In compliance with the compromise on
the conference rules agreed by all delegations on the last day of the
preparatory meeting in November, the Eastern countries had not
obstructed the regular unfolding of review debates.453
449 Ibid.
450 Basispapier zur Prinzipienerklärung, 29.10.1980, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 132.506.
451 Politische Grundorientierung für die Delegation der Bundesrepublik Deutschland auf dem
KSZE-Folgetreffen in Madrid, 17.12.1980, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, 178.820.
452 KSZE-Madrid. Hier: Probleme der zweite Phase, 04.02.1981, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv,
Bd. 132.507.
453 Runderlass des Vortragenden Legationsrats Boll, 23.12.1980, in AAPD, 1980, vol. II, doc.
375, p. 1942.
166
Continuing European détente in the advent of the Reagan Era
There was awareness within the Western caucus that the second
phase of the conference, whose start was scheduled for 27 January 1981
after the Christmas break, would be more difficult, as its unfolding
would depend on the ongoing international developments and the
health condition of East-West relations.454 To be put to the test was not
only the possibility to negotiate material détente improvements with
the East, but the solidity of the Western unity front in Madrid as well.
The transition to the ensuing phase of substantial negotiations was
indeed welcomed by several Western delegations – and by some
delegations of the NNA group – with spread scepticism.455 The Dutch
and the British were those showing scarcest interest in multilateral
negotiations (they lacked, according to the West German assessment, of
the necessary “animus negotiandi”), as considered the mandate of the
follow-up meeting fulfilled with the review debate. The uncertainties of
the ongoing presidential election campaign in France further weighed
on the pursuit of a Western effective conference strategy. The biggest
interrogative regarded the future development of superpowers
relations after Ronald Reagan’s inauguration day on 20 January 1981.
Indeed, besides the persistent Soviet military presence in Afghanistan
and the precarious situation in Poland, the international policy of
strength launched by the new U.S. administration threatened to puzzle
definitively multilateral détente. An urgent question concerned the
West German Foreign Office: what were the intentions of the new
administration in Washington for the Madrid CSCE?
The years of the Carter administration had not certainly represented
a blossoming time for Washington’s diplomatic relations with Moscow
– and either for the relations with the Western European partners.
Ideological confrontation, human rights, sanctions, security issues and
454 Ibid.
455 KSZE-Madrid. Hier: Probleme der zweite Phase, 04.02.1981, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv,
Bd. 132.507.
167
a good dose of personal animosity and incomprehension – marking
both Carter’s relationship with his “special partner” Helmut Schmidt
and with his rival Leonid Brezhnev – had represented heavy
burdens.456 But the change of power in Washington did not appear
promising either. During the months of the presidential election
campaign, the West German federal government and the Auswärtiges
Amt had carefully analysed the contents of the Republican Party’s
foreign political program and the possible consequences of Reagan’s
victory for East-West dialogue. To emerge from the West German
assessment was a bipolar Weltanschauung, highly ideological and
characterised by strong anti-Communist stances, marking Reagan’s
attitude towards international politics.457 Many in Bonn feared that the
new administration in Washington would put under radical
examination the whole U.S. foreign policy, included MBFR negotiations
in Geneva and CSCE negotiations in Madrid, i.e. the only forums of
East-West dialogue which had remained in place after the interruption
of the superpowers talks on strategic arms.
With regard to the Madrid CSCE, the West German Foreign Office
aimed at profiting from the pending uncertainty to persuade Reagan
and his collaborators, as far as it was possible, of the convenience of the
West German strategy.458 During a confidential talk with U.S. Secretary
of State Haig in the wake of Reagan’s inauguration, Foreign Minister
Genscher reminded the vital importance the CSCE process had for the
456 For an historical account of the multiple strains marking the relationship between
Schmidt and Carter, see: K. Wiegrefe, Das Zerwürfnis: Helmut Schmidt, Jimmy Carter und
die Krise der deutsch-amerikanischen Beziehungen. On the personal incomprehension which
contributed to deteriorate relations between Carter and Brezhnev, see: V.M. Zubok, A
Failed Empire. The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev, pp. 257-264.
457 Alarming analyses of the possible international consequences of Reagan’s victory
were provided to Chancellor Helmut Schmidt by his collaborators and party colleagues.
See, for instance, the letter of Deputy President of the SPD Jan Wischnewski of 9 August
1980, (Aufzeichung des Stellvertretenden SPD-Vorsitzenden Wischnewski, 09.08.1980, in
AAPD, 1980, vol. II, doc. 229, pp. 1209-1215); and the letter of federal minister Hans Apel
of 14 May 1980, in Bundesminister Apel an Bundeskanzler Schmidt, 14.05.1980, in AAPD,
1980, vol. I, doc. 146, pp. 765-767.
458 KSZE-Madrid. Hier: Probleme der zweite Phase, 04.02.1981, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv,
Bd. 132.507.
168
FRG and highlighted the West’s position of strength in negotiating with
the East on CSCE matters.459 Even though no spectacular outcome was
to expect at Madrid, Bonn stood firmly on its conference aims on the
eve of the restart of the follow-up meeting’s works: pursuing with
conviction the continuation of the CSCE process in spite of adverse
international situations; not releasing the Soviet bloc’s countries from
their obligations to the Helsinki Act; and urging them, through an
achievement-orientated approach, to make concessions on the main
requests of the EC-Ten – i.e. CDE and improvements in the fields of
human contacts and information.460 On 16 February 1981 positive
signals came from the Reagan administration. The head of the U.S.
delegation at Madrid, Max Kampelmann, finally broke the silence over
the goal of the CDE and announced the U.S. backing of the French
project.461 In return, he demanded the European allies’ greater support
for the U.S. proposals on human rights.462 As highlighted by Selvage,
Western Europeans were highly relieved that the U.S. decided to
remain at Madrid and endorse the Western conference aims, against
Reagan’s electoral statements which had let them fear worse
scenarios.463
Negotiations at the Nullpunkt: the West German dilemma
between hypotheses of adjournment and risks of isolation
Whereas the American proof of goodwill reassured provisionally
European worries, it did not help appease contrasting views within the
Alliance. Existing differences amongst the Western partners emerged
indeed in the spring 1981 with regard to the issue of the duration and
conclusion of the follow-up meeting. Before the start of the second
459 Gespräch des Bundesministers Genscher mit dem amerikanischen Aussenminister Haig in
Washington, 09.03.1981, in AAPD, 1981, vol. I, doc. 62, pp. 340-341.
460 Ibid.
461 "Am Nullpunkt”, Der Spiegel, Nr. 32, 1981
462 D. Selvage, "The Superpowers and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe, 1977-1983. Human rights, Nuclear Weapons, and Western Europe“, p. 33.
463 Ibid.
169
conference phase in January ministerial director Blech observed that
the high number of proposals presented by all delegations – totally 85,
much more than expected – spoke itself against a rapid conclusion of
negotiations.464 As West German chief delegator Kastl confirmed,
negotiations in Madrid went on at a snail pace and entered soon a
stalemate.465 It became clear that the foreseen goal of ending the
conference at the beginning of March 1981 was quite unrealistic. Hence,
shortly before the Easter pause, after the date initially scheduled for
concluding negotiations had expired since weeks, delegators’ efforts to
agree on a final document had produced scarce results in all Baskets.
Moscow’s new interest in achieving concrete results at the Madrid
CSCE turned out to be a factor which slowed down significantly the
advancement of negotiations. Unlike in Belgrade, time pressure did not
seem to play any decisive role for Moscow in this phase of the
conference. In his speech at the CPSU congress on 23 February 1981,
Brezhnev had declared to be available to extend the area of CBMs and
the CDE to the Soviet territory up to the Urals against the inclusion of
the U.S. and Canadian territory and of air and sea manoeuvres.466 In the
following weeks Soviet diplomatic efforts in Madrid were focused on
obtaining compensations for Brezhnev’s opening. 467 The Soviet
delegation made its decision on a third follow-up conference and on
concessions in Basket III dependent on a positive decision on the
CDE.468 No progress was made with regard to the Western core
demands: the Eastern delegations opened to concessions limited to
those issues which were covered by their own proposals or did not
force them to big sacrifices.469
464 Aufzeichnung des Ministerialdirektors Blech, 14.01.1981, in AAPD, 1981, vol. I, doc. 7, p.
38.
465 Stand des KSZE-Folgetreffens und seine Aussichten nach der Osterpause 1981, 14.04.1981,
in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 132.507.
466 Madrider KSZE-Treffen, 19.03.1981, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 132.507.
467 Botschafter Kastl, Madrid (KSZE-Delegation), an das Auswärtige Amt, 19.03.1981, in
AAPD, 1981, vol. I, doc. 79, p. 426.
468 Stand des KSZE-Folgetreffens und seine Aussichten nach der Osterpause 1981, 14.04.1981,
in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 132.507.
469 Ibid.
170
As in April 1981 it became evident that multilateral negotiations
would go inevitably on for very long, a few NNA and Western
delegations – namely France, Italy, Denmark, Belgium and the U.S. –
got more and more inclined to withdraw experts from Madrid, to agree
in short time on a brief concluding document and, in case of failure, to
postpone the meeting for one year.470 France and the U.S. in primis were
not ready, for different reasons, to pay dearly for the continuation of
détente. The Reagan administration persisted on its anti-communist
stances and was not willing to cede on human rights. The French
government, fully absorbed by the last moves of the presidential
election campaign, 471 opposed instead any attempt to water down the
mandate of the CDE.472 The majority of Western delegations supported
the idea of raising renewed review criticisms after the Easter break in
order to spoil Soviet delaying tactics. Such views were contrasted by
the West German delegation, which considered all review discussions
definitively exhausted with the conclusion of the first phase of the
conference and continued to support the persistent pursuit of openended negotiations.473 Indeed, West German diplomacy was not
impatient to come to a rapid conclusion of the follow-up meeting: as
now in Madrid as before in Belgrade, Bonn had always spoken for
longer negotiation times in order to achieve positive outcomes.474 A
worrisome Kastl observed the growing risk that his delegation would
remain isolated within the Western caucus: an inconvenient position
that Germans could not easily afford.475
However, any proposal for a premature conclusion of the
conference was opposed by the West German delegation throughout
the spring of stalemate at the Madrid CSCE. During the informal
470 Aufzeichnung des Botschafters Ruth, 30.04.1981, in AAPD, 1981, vol. I, doc. 122, p. 680.
471 Presidential elections in France took place on 26 April and 10 May 1981.
472 Aufzeichnung des Botschafters Ruth, 30.04.1981, in AAPD, 1981, vol. I, doc. 122, p. 680.
473 Stand des KSZE-Folgetreffens und seine Aussichten nach der Osterpause 1981, 14.04.1981,
in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 132.507.
474 KSZE-Madrid. Hier: Probleme der zweite Phase, 04.02.1981, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv,
Bd. 132.507.
475 Ibid.
171
meeting in Venlo on 9 May 1981 the foreign ministers of the EC-Ten
decided to continue with negotiations until July of that year, after
having assessed that the state of things in Madrid was favourable to
Western interests.476 During his diplomatic visit to Washington at the
end of May, Schmidt explained to Reagan the fundamentals of the West
German policy of stabilisation pursued in Madrid: the prosecution of
the CSCE process made it more difficult for the Soviet Union to opt for
a military solution to the Polish crisis.477 West German stubbornness
seemed to be rewarded: Western pressures for a rapid (and
inconclusive) end of the conference were left out for the moment.
The West German victory turned out to be precarious. Negotiations
continued to be, indeed, at the Nullpunkt.478 In June 1981 the idea of
suspending negotiations around the mid of July for a long summer
break and adjourning the conference works to October, was growingly
catching on within the Western Alliance. Bonn could not oppose to this
eventuality: the West German delegation found itself gripped between
the impossibility to afford solo positions and the evidence that, given
the existing conditions, possibilities to unblock the stalemate were at
the moment scarce. West German diplomacy was forced to readjust
partially its official line – not without a certain political opportunism –
to the circumstances: the adjournment option would savage the most
important aim of continuing the conference. As Genscher confirmed to
deputy chief delegate Graf zu Rantzau, slow-moving was better than
breaking off.479 On 24 July 1981 the West German diplomat reported to
Bonn that the plenary session in Madrid had voted the adjournment of
the conference until 27 October 1981.480
476 Aufzeichnung der Vortragenden Legationsrätin Siebourg, 13.05.1981, in AAPD, 1981, vol.
II, doc. 138, p. 773.
477 Ministerialdirektor von Staden, Bundeskanzleramt, z.Z. Washington, an Bundesminister
Genscher, 22.05.1981, in AAPD, 1981, vol. II, doc. 151, p. 835.
478 “Am Nullpunkt”, Der Spiegel, Nr. 32, 1981.
479 Besprechung des Ministers mit dem amtierenden Leiter der deutschen Delegation bei der
KSZE-Folgekonferenz Graf Rantzau über den Stand in Madrid am 11. Juni 1981 in Madrid,
15.06.1981, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.846.
480 Drahtbericht Nr. 1080, 24.07.1981, in PA AA, Referat 212, Bd. 133.421.
172
Notwithstanding setbacks and difficulties, negotiations in Madrid
had worked that far, according to the West German assessment, better
than in Belgrade: Graf zu Rantzau observed with satisfaction that,
before the starting of the summer break, already seventy percent of the
conference materials had been already discussed. 481 West German
Ambassador in Moscow Meyer-Landrut stressed that the policy of
stabilisation pursued by the federal government seemed to work: the
international situation remained tense; this would enhance, on the
other hand, the importance for the Soviets to commit themselves to the
CSCE.482 Bonn expected with confidence signals of goodwill coming
from the Soviet Union, once delegations would be back to Madrid in
October.
The West German Foreign Office continued to work on the CSCE
during the summer break. An attempt to improve coordination within
the Western Alliance was undertaken with regard to the most dividing
matters, i.e. the issues of human rights and dissidents. In view of the
restart of negotiations in Madrid, all Western requests in the fields of
human rights and basic freedoms, human contacts and information
were grouped together under the formulation of the concept of “human
dimension”.483 From the theoretical point of view, dispositions of
Basket III remained a derivation, in the substance, of Principle VII of
the Helsinki Final Act. From the operative point of view, the collective
concept of “human dimension” served to avoid that improvements in
the fields of human contacts and information – i.e. the primal
conference interest of the Bundesrepublik – would be eclipsed by some
other partners’ preference for human rights and dissidents issues.484
Hence, the formulation of the “human dimension” was conceived as
tool of Western coordination to limit the drifts between the allies’
different interests. In Bonn’s view it had foremost the meaning of an
481 Ibid.
482 Botschafter Meyer-Landrut, Moskau, an das Auswärtige Amt, 30.07.1981, in AAPD, 1981,
vol. II, doc. 223, p. 1195.
483 Die „menschliche Dimension“ der Schlusskarte – Terminologie und Argumentation,
22.10.1981, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 132.507.
484 Ibid.
173
opening towards Washington’s demands, with whom the divergence
on principle still persisted after the power change. Similar reasons of
solidarity within the Alliance had dictated the FRG’s and Western
Europe’s decision to adhere to the U.S. proposal – initially welcomed
with some scepticism – of convening a meeting of experts on human
rights.485 As highlighted in the analysis of the Auswärtiges Amt, the
“human dimension” package should be instead used externally – i.e.
towards the Eastern countries – with caution and flexibility.486
Although differences in the Soviet bloc’s commitment to Principle VII
and Basket III existed, both issues of human rights and human contacts
became increasingly a sensitive matter for Eastern Europe’s communist
regimes throughout 1981, as developments in Poland continued to
deteriorate.
Because of Poland, for Poland’s sake: the impact of the Polish
crisis on the further unfolding of the Madrid CSCE
Because of Poland...
In the weeks between the restart of conference works in Madrid
after the summer break and the new Christmas break, as delegations
were mainly busy with discussions on the geographic jurisdiction of
the CDE, the gravity of the Polish crisis escalated.
1981 had been overall a quite positive year for West German foreign
policy. Particularly in the fall of the year East-West relations seemed to
have significantly improved. Negotiations at the Madrid CSCE had
continued in spite of repeated threats of interruption; West German
diplomacy had succeeded in convincing the allies of the opportunity to
use the Soviet Union’s moment of weakness and defensive stance to
persist in handling with the East and attain concessions to the West’s
advantage. The superpowers détente seemed to have slowly restarted:
485 Aufzeichnung des Ministerialdirigenten Bräutigam, 11.09.1981, in AAPD, 1981, vol. II,
doc. 251, p. 1320.
486 Die „menschliche Dimension“ der Schlusskarte – Terminologie und Argumentation,
22.10.1981, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 132.507.
174
U.S. Foreign Minister Haig had met with the Soviet colleague Gromyko
in New York on 23 and 28 November 1981; a couple of days later, on 30
November, bilateral INF talks between the superpowers had been
resumed. On the front of Bonn’s Ostpolitik, Brezhnev visited the
Bundesrepublik between 22 and 25 November 1981, and Schmidt’s long
planned and repeatedly postponed visit to the GDR took finally placed
between 11 and 13 December of that year.487 The summit visit, initially
scheduled for the end of August 1980, had been cancelled at the last
minute by the West German Chancellor because of the recent
developments in Poland: the renewed raging of strikes raised fears in
Bonn that tensions in the neighbouring country would exacerbate and
cause an international escalation.488 Whereas in the summer of 1980 a
Soviet armed intervention in Poland appeared indeed as an incumbent
threat, the virulence of the crisis appeared diminished in the mid-1981.
As observed in an internal analysis of the Auswärtiges Amt, after the
compromise achieved between Polish authorities and protesters on 1
April 1981 domestic tensions had been eased.489
Quite ironically, the Polish crisis degenerated again dramatically at
the end of the year, during the last day of Schmidt’s long-planned visit.
In the morning of 13 December 1981 the West German delegation at
Lake Werbellin was taken by surprise by the news that martial law had
been imposed in Poland during the night by General Wojciech
Jaruzelski, the head of the Polish armed forces who had taken over the
Party leadership in October. After some weeks of resistance to Soviet
pressures, Jaruzelski’s radical decision provided a fragile and
487 The visit was first postponed on Honecker’s decision at the beginning of 1980, as
East-West strains drastically reduced the room of manoeuvre of the inner-German
dialogue; the second postponement was announced by the West German side in August
of the same year under the influence of the Polish crisis and the ongoing federal election
campaign in the FRG. See H. Potthoff, Im Schatten der Mauer. Deutschlandpolitik 1961 bis
1990, pp. 162-172.
488 H.A. Winkler, Der lange Weg nach Westen. Band II: Deutsche Geschichte vom «Dritten
Reich» bis zur Wiedervereinigung, p. 360.
489 Besuch Außenminister Haig in Bonn am 11.04.1981. Sachstand: Lage in und um Polen (Nr.
38), in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 132.931.
175
provisional solution to the crisis in Poland – and in the Eastern bloc.490
From a pragmatic point of view, the “internal” solution to the crisis
adverted indeed the risk of a Soviet military intervention which would
have serious international repercussions – and to which détente would
hardly survive. Although Genscher would refer on 9 January 1982 in
front of the plenary session of the Madrid CSCE that the imposition of
martial law in Poland had been received in Bonn with “bewilderment,
bitterness and indignation”491, there was some realistic awareness, as in
the Bundesrepublik as in the other Western countries, that Jaruzelski’s
decision offered an exit strategy from worse scenarios and savaged the
possibility for East-West dialogue to continue. Similar considerations
had driven Schmidt’s decision to show some caution in expressing
condemnation of what was happening in Poland during the press
conference hold in the GDR on 13 December 1981.492
Besides considerations dictated by pragmatism and political
opportunism, the news of the declaration of martial law against
dissidents in Poland was a shock to the international public opinion. As
information about the recrudescence of the repression against the
Polish opposition begun to circle, all Western governments were
compelled to take on harder stances. The West German Bundestag
professed on 18 December 1981 its unanimous solidarity with the
Polish people and appealed to the military government in Warsaw to
release all detainees, restore the freedoms and the conquests reached by
490 As Zubok correctly argues, the Polish crisis was far to be at an end: it had been a
symptom of an ongoing and persisting structural crisis not only of the country, but of the
entire Eastern bloc; the imposition of the martial law did not solve in the long run
endemic problems either in Poland or in the other Eastern countries. See Zubok, A failed
empire. The Soviet Union and the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev, p. 270.
491 Rede des Bundesministers des Auswärtigen, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, vor dem Plenum der
KSZE-Folge-Konferenz in Madrid am Dienstag, den 9. Februar 1982, 09.02.1982, in PA AA,
Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 132.928.
492 H. Potthoff, Im Schatten der Mauer. Deutschlandpolitik 1961 bis 1990, p. 194. Schmidt’s
prudent attitude was motivated by the Chancellor’s wish, as well, not to break off his
visit and to preserve the conditions for the continuation of inner-German dialogue in face
of the Polish crisis; see: W. Loth, Overcoming the Cold War. A History of Détente, 1950-1991,
p. 177.
176
the opposition in the course of the process of liberalisation since the
summer of 1980, and resume the dialogue with the opposition.493
The harsh repression ongoing in Poland risked undermining the
conditions for the continuation of the CSCE. In the days in which
Jaruzelski was going to take his decision to impose martial law, some
significant steps had been made in Madrid. On 10-11 December
NATO’s foreign ministers had decided to go on with multilateral
negotiations after the conference Christmas break.494 As highlighted by
Peter, it was a lucky temporal coincidence, that NATO’s decision to
resume the conference works in February 1982 had been made few
days before the escalation of events in Poland.495 During the meeting of
the Four Political Directors in Brussels, Genscher tried to convince his
Western allies, sceptical about the possibility to continue the CSCE
follow-up meeting under such circumstances, to remain in Madrid and
focus discussions on the compromise draft for a final document handed
out informally by the NNA delegations: in the West German view, it
was a good draft which included a large part of the Western aims.496
And it was a fortunate case as well that the NNA draft for the final
document, the so-called “RM-39”, was ready to be tabled on 16
December.497 Both the NATO decision and the NNA initiative
undoubtedly contributed to lay the foundations for the continuation of
the follow-up conference after the imposition of martial law in Poland.
Since the beginning of the second CSCE follow-up meeting there
had been a widespread feeling that its destiny was strictly intertwined
with the development of the Polish crisis. As stressed by Mastny,
493 Rede des Bundesministers des Auswärtigen, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, vor dem Plenum der
KSZE-Folge-Konferenz in Madrid am Dienstag, den 9. Februar 1982, 09.02.1982, in PA AA,
Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 132.928.
494 Botschafter Wieck, Brüssel (NATO) an das Auswärtige Amt, 10.12.-11.12.1981, in AAPD,
1981 vol. III, doc. 357-358, pp. 1915-1921.
495 Aufzeichnung des Ministerialdirektors Pfeffer, 13.12.1981, in AAPD, 1981, vol. III, doc.
366, pp. 1968-1972.
496 Ibid., p. 1971.
497 M. Peter, “Sicherheit und Entspannung. Die KSZE-Politik der Bundesregierung in
den Krisenjahren 1977-1978“, p. 78.
177
Jaruzelski’s December 1981 initiative “plunged the CSCE into the worst
crisis of its existence”.498 The continuation of the conference after the
Christmas break became very uncertain: the Western delegations were
faced with the main questions of whether and how to remain in
Madrid.
In the direct aftermath of the imposition of martial law in Poland
Western Europeans opted for prudence, considering that radical
initiatives would primarily damage the Polish and the Eastern
societies.499 Harder stances were taken instead by the administration in
Washington: a series of punitive sanctions against Poland and the
Soviet Union were imposed by Reagan on 29 December 1981.500 With
regard to the CSCE, during the special NATO session on Poland on 14
December 1981 U.S. assistant secretary of State Eagleburger reassured
the European allies about the will of his administration to come back to
the negotiation table in Madrid after the Christmas break.501
Washington’s reassurance did not clarify, however, the fundamental
matter of what attitude Western delegations would take towards the
Polish question and multilateral negotiations once back in Madrid.
How to deal with Warsaw, Moscow and East-West relations after the
escalation of the Polish crisis were the main items of debate within the
Western caucus at the turn of the year. A question was raised in
NATO’s strategic paper on the state of the Alliance: could the West
negotiate further with the East, being aware that massive violations of
the Helsinki Final Act were being committed in Poland?502
498 See D. Selvage, "The Superpowers and the Conference on Security and Cooperation
in Europe, 1977-1983. Human rights, Nuclear Weapons, and Western Europe“, p. 36.
499 The foreign ministers EC-Ten issued on 15 December 1981 a common declaration,
where they agreed on the necessity to take a cautious attitude towards the Polish
question. See: Kontinuität unserer Polen-Politik seit der Verhängung des Kriegsrechts am
13.12.1981, 12.01.1982, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 132.932.
500 Lage in und um Polen (Nr. 76), 01.01.1982, and Lage in und um Polen (Nr. 77), 08.01.1982,
in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 132.932.
501 Botschafter Wieck, Brüssel (NATO), an das Auswärtige Amt, 14.12.1981, in AAPD, 1981,
vol. III, doc. 370, p. 1985.
502 Botschafter Wieck, Brüssel (NATO), 22.12.1981, in AAPD, 1981, vol. III, doc. 383, p.
2041.
178
Similar interrogatives confronted the West German federal
government as well, which was urged by the Polish late developments
to reflect on its overall complex of Ostpolitik and Entspannungspolitik. A
strategic paper of the Auswärtiges Amt drafted at the beginning of 1982
took into consideration the possibility to introduce some corrections to
Bonn’s détente policy in case of an aggravation of the situation in
Poland.503 Signals coming from Warsaw suggested that the lift of the
state of emergency and the return to normality in the country were not
to expect in the short run.504 However, Bonn remained convinced of the
opportunity to continue pursuing a policy of dialogue directed to the
stabilisation of its Eastern neighbour. According to the internal
analyses of the Auswärtiges Amt, Poland was compelled to remain
heavily dependent on Western economic aid if it wished to solve its
serious economic difficulties.505 The main task of the West was to play
skilfully the “economic card” in order to force Polish authorities to
concessions to its own advantage – and to the own sake of Polish
citizens.
The loyalty of the Bundesrepublik to its policy of dialogue with
Warsaw and Moscow risked opening a new front of transatlantic
strains. West German-American divergences on how to deal with EastWest relations in times of “emergency” were addressed with harsh
tones in the public debate. At the end of December 1981 the U.S. press
attacked repeatedly the West German “reticence” on the Polish
question.506 The Auswärtiges Amt denounced that U.S. media were
superficially informed about European stances on Poland; West
German positions in particular had been object of rough
misinterpretations.507 Schmidt’s visit to Washington at the beginning of
503 „Feste Sprache“, Der Spiegel, Nr. 4/1982.
504 Lage in und um Polen (Nr. 76), 01.01.1982, and Lage in und um Polen (Nr. 77), 08.01.1982,
in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 132.932.
505 Lage in und um Polen (Nr. 76), 01.01.1982, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 132.932.
506 Botschafter Wieck, Brüssel (NATO), an Staatssekretär von Staden, 29.12.1981, in AAPD,
1981, vol. III, doc. 393, p. 2073.
507 Besuch des Bundeskanzlers und des Bundesministers in Washington, 04.-06.01.1982. Hier:
Polen, 12.01.1981, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 132.932.
179
January 1982 was surrounded by a new series of public, harsh
criticisms against the West German federal chancellor and his
December meeting with East German leader Honecker: Schmidt was
blamed for being blinded by his attraction to the East and for putting
the Western Alliance at risk of finlandisation.508 Since the time when
Bonn’s Ostpolitik had moved its first steps at the end of the Sixties,
suspicions about the FRG’s ultimate aims had continued to surround
West German initiatives towards the Eastern countries. Still in the fall
of 1980, an article published on the outstanding French newspapers Le
Monde defined the FRG as the weakest point in the solidity of the
Western Alliance due to its indispensable tie with détente and its
benefits.509
The conduct of the FRG’s dialogue with the East remained still
strictly interwoven with questions of Deutschlandbild. If divergences
with the U.S. administration – with their load of public repercussions –
would deepen, it would be hard for Bonn to simply ignore them.
Bonn’s federal government still needed the support of the whole
Western Alliance to implement its Eastern policies. Détente and
Ostpolitik could be pursued in full autonomy, indeed, as long as their
ties with the interests of the Western Alliance were secured. Defending
the Western anchoring of its foreign political complex remained for
Bonn as important as defending the achievements of the dialogue with
the East. As long as a common strategy towards Poland would not be
agreed, it was important to abstain from any public statements which
could reveal disharmony with the allies. As the influential West
German magazine Der Spiegel reminded: “As we make public
statements on our Eastern policy, we must be aware of the distrust
which has always surrounded this policy and has further grown after
Afghanistan”.510
508 H.A. Winkler, Der lange Weg nach Westen. Band II: Deutsche Geschichte vom «Dritten
Reich» bis zur Wiedervereinigung, p. 391.
509 „Keine Deutschlandpolitik zum Nulltarif“, in Der Spiegel, 52/1980, 22.12.1980.
510 „Feste Sprache“, Der Spiegel, Nr. 4/1982
180
... for Poland’s sake
The Polish crisis was a matter of central concern for Bonn not only
with regard to the conduction of its Ostpolitik and Westpolitik. It raised
the question, as well, of how the West German delegation should
behave in Madrid, were CSCE negotiations were still officially open
and would be resumed on 9 February 1982 after the Christmas break.
Albeit developments in Poland had not caused the interruption of the
conference, it was undoubted that they would importantly change its
track. At the beginning of January some light was shed over the
strategy the NATO-Sixteen would implement once back to Madrid.
After few weeks of uncertainties and mutual suspects within the
Alliance, the Western partners agreed on a common strategy in which
punitive stances were relegated to the background and which Bonn
positively assessed as balanced and flexible.511
NATO foreign ministers, gathered on 11 January 1982 in Brussels
for a special meeting of the NATO Council on Poland, gave their
consent to the EC-Ten’s idea of returning to Madrid to deal with the
Polish crisis.512 They advanced the idea to dedicate the first weeks of
the new conference phase to assess and discuss developments in
Poland at the level of foreign ministers at a special plenary session.513
Hence, the Western proposal consisted in reopening review debates
with an exclusive focus on the ongoing violations of Helsinki
provisions perpetrated in Poland. In the Western view, it was a
necessity dictated by the circumstances: even though the “RM-39” draft
remained a valid basis for a final document, concrete negotiations on
human aspects of détente could not be normally pursued as long as
511 Die Allianz und die Krise in Polen. Hier: Bewertung der NATO-Sondersitzung der
Außenminister am 11. Januar 1982, 12.01.1982, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 132.928.
512 The idea had been proposed by Genscher to his American colleague on occasion of
the visit of the West German foreign minister, together with the Chancellor, to
Washington between 4-6 January. See: Besuch des Bundeskanzlers und des Bundesministers in
Washington, 04.-06.01.1982. Hier: Polen, 12.01.1981, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd.
132.932.
513 Sondertagung des Nordatlantikrats auf Ministerebene am 11.02.1982. Hier: Gemeinsame
Erklärung zu Polen, 11.02.1982, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 132.928.
181
major violations of human rights and basic freedoms were being
perpetrated by a participant state. 514 The Western allies approved three
demands directed to the Polish authorities: to end the state of martial
law, to release those arrested and to restore a general dialogue with the
church and Solidarność.515 Advocate of these three demands had been
the Bundesrepublik: they had already been issued by the West German
Bundestag on 18 December;516 and they had been sponsored by Foreign
Minister Genscher who at the end of December 1981 had told Polish
Deputy Prime Minister Mieczyslaw Rakowski that, in return for a
partial accomplishment of those requests, Bonn would plead for the
Polish government with the Western allies, convincing them eventually
to withdraw sanctions and creating some room for manoeuvre to
continue the cooperation with Warsaw.517 The three demands to Poland
had been then agreed by the EC-ten on 4 January 1982 and restated on
the following day by Schmidt and Reagan, before being agreed as a
cornerstone of NATO’s approach to Warsaw. On their fulfilment
depended the possibility that Poland could “enjoy fully the benefits of
stability in Europe and of constructive political and economic relations
with the West”.518
The broad consensus on the three demands to Poland represented
an episode of rare unity of the Western Alliance. On occasion of
previous major crises within the Eastern bloc – i.e. in the cases of 1953
East Berlin, 1956 Hungary, 1968 Prague and lastly, 1979 Afghanistan –
the Western partners had hardly reached common declarations of
intents.519 Though, substantial strategic and theoretical differences still
514 Ibid
515 Ibid.
516 Rede des Bundesministers des Auswärtigen, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, vor dem Plenum der
KSZE-Folge-Konferenz in Madrid am Dienstag, den 9. Februar 1982, 09.02.1982, in PA AA,
Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 132.928.
517 D. Selvage, “The Superpowers and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe, 1977-1983. Human rights, Nuclear Weapons, and Western Europe“, p. 40.
518 Sondertagung des Nordatlantikrats auf Ministerebene am 11.02.1982. Hier: Gemeinsame
Erklärung zu Polen, 11.02.1982, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 132.928.
519 Die Allianz und die Krise in Polen. Hier: Bewertung der NATO-Sondersitzung der
Außenminister am 11. Januar 1982, 12.01.1982, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 132.928.
182
divided the allies’ respective approaches. They regarded, first, the
definition of Moscow’s responsibilities and the consequent issue of
punitive sanctions; second, the destiny of the CSCE after the special
session on Poland; and third, the concrete meaning of the shared
consideration that “no business as usual” was possible in Madrid.
The issue of sanctions became one of the central bones of contention
between Reagan and the European allies. The U.S. administration
advocated a greater Western commitment to the unanimous
condemnation of the late developments in Poland. It made of it a
matter of principle and morality and put great pressure on Western
European governments to adopt hard punitive economic measures
against the Soviet Union.520 In accordance with his policy of strength,
Reagan urged the allies to use a “carrot and stick” approach towards
the East, which raised little enthusiasm amongst Western Europeans. 521
Similarly to what had occurred in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion
of Afghanistan, the Western Alliance split again over the issue of
sanctions between December 1982 and January 1983: the U.S.
administration imposed unilaterally economic sanctions against the
Soviet Union; in spite of Washington’s insistence, Western Europeans
deferred their decision on the issue by replacing punitive measures
with general statements of condemnation and warning.522 NATO’s
foreign ministers – gathered for a special session of the North Atlantic
Council dedicated to Poland on 11 February 1982 – limited themselves
to recognising the importance of the economic measures announced by
President Reagan to persuade Polish and Soviet authorities of the
seriousness of Western concerns, without otherwise joining them. The
revision of the overall course of their economic relations with the Soviet
Union was postponed to an undefined future.523
520 Botschafter Wieck, Brüssel (NATO), an Staatssekretär von Staden, 29.12.1981, in AAPD,
1981, vol. III, doc. 393, p. 2073.
521 H. Smith, “U.S. Stick and Carrot”, in The New York Times, 18.12.1981.
522 F. Romero, Storia della guerra fredda. L’ultimo conflitto per l‘Europa, p. 292.
523 Sondertagung des Nordatlantikrats auf Ministerebene am 11.02.1982. Hier: Gemeinsame
Erklärung zu Polen, 11.02.1982, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 132.928.
183
Transatlantic divergences regarded not only the operational
consequences of the Polish crisis – i.e. how to deal with it – but its
interpretation as well. Considering that the worst scenario of a Soviet
military initiative in Europe’s heart had been swept away, Western
European leaders tended to abstain from making the Soviets directly
responsible for the imposition of the martial law in Poland.524 It was
undoubted that some Soviet responsibilities were involved in the
escalation of the crisis, as West German Chancellor Schmidt had
stressed in the Christmas letters sent to Brezhnev and Jaruzelski on 25
December 1981.525 However, the FRG avoided, in accordance with its
European partners, attributing the origins of Jaruzelski’s initiative to
orders coming directly from Moscow.526 Whereas Western Europeans
had generally tended, since the declaration of the state of emergency in
Poland, to focus their criticisms on the repressive measures adopted by
Polish authorities in open violations of human rights, free movement
and trade union freedoms, Americans had not ceased to direct
vehement attacks against the Soviet Union. As West German
Ambassador in Moscow Meyer-Landrut had reported to Bonn at the
end of December 1981, justified sentiments of indignation over the
ongoing repression in Poland had caused misleading assessments in
the public opinion: American public statements addressed the Polish
crisis as a de facto Soviet aggression.527
Interpreting accurately the Polish crisis – i.e. identifying the
responsibilities involved, the main problems at stake and the possible
solutions in place – was not an issue of secondary importance for Bonn.
Since the declaration of the state of emergency developments in Poland
had been observed and assessed daily through in-depth analyses
524 D. Selvage, “The Superpowers and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe, 1977-1983. Human rights, Nuclear Weapons, and Western Europe“, p. 40.
525 Kontinuität unserer Polen-Politik seit der Verhängung des Kriegsrechtes am 13.12.1981,
12.01.1982, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 132.932.
526 Lage in und um Polen (Nr. 76), 01.01.1982, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 132.932.
527 Botschafter Meyer-Landrut, an das Auswärtige Amt, 23.12.1981, in AAPD, 1981, Bd. III,
doc. 384, p. 2044.
184
drafted by the Auswärtiges Amt.528 Poland was a West German
neighbour, connected to the Bundesrepublik through a complex of
multiple economic, human and historical ties. It was one of the main
addressees of West German Ostpolitik. It was, furthermore, an
important participant of the process of multilateral détente. The West
German idea of linking the solution to the Polish crisis to the
prosecution of East-West dialogue was driven by strategic
considerations, national interests and sincere motivations. Hence, in the
second part of the Madrid CSCE West German diplomatic efforts were
directed to the sake of Poland for the sake of détente.
“No business as usual”: dealing with the consequences of the
Polish crisis at the Madrid CSCE
Continuing the process of multilateral détente represented the
unchanged priority of West German foreign policy in the wake of the
Polish crisis. With regard to the prosecution of the Madrid CSCE,
Genscher held tight to the aim of resuming negotiations on the final act
in the direct aftermath of the special opening session dedicated to
Poland. Bonn’s Foreign Office instructed its delegation in Madrid to
convince the Western partners – especially the U.S. delegation – to
remain at the negotiation table and maintain an achievement-oriented
attitude with the declared aim of helping Poland’s stabilisation and the
general improvement of East-West relations.529 The West German
interests collided, however, with the goals the U.S. administration
pursued in Madrid. U.S. chief delegator Kampelmann had consented to
return to the Spanish capital on the scheduled date of 9 February 1982
with a very restricted mandate: after a short plenary session on Poland,
he was intentioned to adjourn the conference without further
negotiations.530 As U.S. Foreign Minister Haig pointed out in his speech
528 See the papers collected in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 132.932.
529 M. Peter, “Sicherheit und Entspannung. Die KSZE-Politik der Bundesregierung in
den Krisenjahren 1977-1978“, p. 78.
530 KSZE-Folgekonferenz in Madrid. Hier: Vortrag Kampelmann zum 4.02.1982, 05.02.1982, in
PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 132.928.
185
in the plenary debate at the Madrid CSCE, as long as situation in
Poland would not return to normalisation, “business as usual here at
Madrid would simply condone the massive violations of the Final Act
now occurring in Poland”.531
Bonn shared partly Washington’s point that it had to be made clear
to Moscow and Warsaw that the repressive course in Poland impeded
the normal conduction of “business as usual” in Madrid.
Notwithstanding a general agreement in principle, the Auswärtiges Amt
deduced, however, different operative implications from Haig’s
statement. “No business as usual” did not mean, according to the West
German viewpoint, interrupting or adjourning the conference: Western
delegations should rather use the Polish crisis – especially its economic
implications – to urge Moscow and Warsaw to make concessions on
Western demands.532 The gravity of the repressive measures
undertaken by Polish authorities, as well as their harmful impact on the
prosecution of East-West relations, should not be ignored.
Condemnation should be openly expressed by Western delegations
during the plenary debate and be then channelled during negotiations
into efforts of bearing pressure on the Eastern delegations to the
Western advantage.533 This was, according to Bonn, the meaning of the
three demands Western countries had been directing to Poland since
December 1982: besides their public dimension, they should be used
tactically to force the East to concessions. Not differently from the
management of the Afghan crisis, dealing with the Polish question
required the alternation of firmness on principles and flexibility in
negotiations. The restart of East-West negotiations should not be made
dependent on the reestablishment of normalisation in Poland; to the
contrary, solutions for the Polish crisis could develop within the
framework of the CSCE. This was the core difference between the
meaning the U.S. and the West German delegations attributed to the
531 KSZE-Folgetreffen Madrid. Hier: Eröffnungssitzung der 5. Phase am 09.02.1982,
09.02.1982, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 132.928.
532 KSZE-Konferenz in Madrid. Hier: Weiteres Vorgehen in Lichte der Polen-Frage, 01.02.1982,
in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 132.928.
533 Ibid.
186
formula of “no business as usual”: whilst for the first it meant exclusion
of negotiations in conditions of abnormality, for the second it meant
“harder negotiations” in order to restore normality.
The special session on Poland, which opened in Madrid on 9
February 1982, offered to the Auswärtiges Amt the ideal stage to expose
the main lines of its strategy of de-escalation and stabilisation. In his
address to the plenary assembly, Genscher listed first the violations of
the Helsinki commitments perpetrated in Poland to direct then to
Warsaw’s military government the main Western demands: “Lift
martial law. Release the detainees. Resume the dialogue with the
Church and with Solidarność. Let the scientists return to their work”.534
If Polish authorities would return to the path of reforms and
renovation, Bonn was ready – together with the Western partners – to
concede that generous financial support the country needed to
overcome its economic difficulties.535 There was still a margin, Genscher
reminded, to “keep the door open for the expansion of political and
economic relations”.536
However, expectations to close quickly debates on Poland and move
on revealed to be illusionary. The works of the plenary assembly were
cramped by procedural obstacles and ideological confrontation. The
opening session was interrupted before all delegations could have a
word. The Polish chief delegator, who chaired the session, impeded to
12 foreign ministers and diplomats amongst the 21 inscribed on the list
of speakers to held their speeches by raising procedural motivations.537
The “Kafkaesque play”, as it was defined by Spanish Foreign Minister
Perez-Llorca,538 aggravated the exacerbation of tensions between
delegations. Debates took on confrontational tones whose harshness
534 Rede des BM auf der KZSE-Sitzung in Madrid am 09.02.1982, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv,
Bd. 132.928.
535 Ibid.
536 Ibid.
537 KSZE-Folgetreffen Madrid. Hier: Stand nach der Eröffnungssitzung der 5. Phase,
11.02.1982, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 132.928.
538 Sendung der Nachrichtenabteilung der Bundespresseamtes zur Unterrichtung der deutschen
Delegation bei dem KSZE-Folgetreffen, 11.02.1982, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 132.928.
187
reminded of the tensest days of confrontation at the Belgrade CSCE. As
the Western delegations claimed their legitimate right to denounce
open violations of the Helsinki Accords committed by one participant
state, the Eastern countries stigmatised any Western remark as an
external interference in the country’s domestic affairs and as an attempt
to internationalise the Polish crisis. Against Bonn’s hope, the new phase
of the CSCE deadlocked hopelessly, again, over the Polish crisis.539
Confronted with the growing East-West animosity dominating in
Madrid, the group of the NNAs got more and more inclined to a
renewed adjournment-option.540 The proposal of Swiss Foreign
Minister Aubert to defer the conference works to the fall of 1982 was
opposed, as a few months before, by the West German delegation. A
speaker of the Auswärtiges Amt confirmed Bonn’s unchanged intention
to conduct negotiations on the basis of the “RM-39” draft with the goal
of achieving an acceptable final document. The possibility of
adjourning the conference to autumn would be taken into account if
and only if strictly useful for that purpose.541 In this case, the restart of
negotiations should be scheduled on a precise date and not tied to the
fulfilment of any precondition – especially with regard to the situation
in Poland.542 In spite of its outspoken position, the West German
delegation had soon become aware of the fact that circumstances had
made the conduction of substantial negotiations very hard during the
first 1982 conference weeks.543 Multilateral debates continued to be
strongly beset by the cumbersome Polish issue. Some positive signals
seemed to arrive from the Polish side in the course of February, as
during a press conference Deputy Foreign Minister Wiejacz announced
Warsaw’s intention to lift martial law and other restrictions until the
539 Ibid.
540 KSZE-Folgetreffen Madrid. Hier: Plenum vom 19.02.1982, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv,
Bd. 132.928.
541 KSZE-Folgetreffen Madrid. Hier: Stand des Madrider Folgetreffens, 18.02.1982, in PA AA,
Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 132.928.
542 KSZE-Folgetreffen Madrid. Hier: Sondierungen der N+N-Delegationen , 22.02.1982, in PA
AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 132.928.
543 Ibid.
188
end of the month and to start consultations on a possible new course of
reforms with trade unions and the church. Moreover, it was promised
that Solidarność’s leader Lech Walesa would be set free in the near
future together with other protesters kept in custody.544
However, as at the beginning of March it became clear that no
concrete steps would follow to Warsaw’s promises, most Western
delegations expressed themselves in favour of the adjournment-option.
For the West German delegation there was no other choice as to join the
majority. Kastl pointed out to the allies, however, that the recess of the
conference should be presented neither as an exceptional circumstance,
nor as a Western victory over the Eastern bloc. Most of all, the decision
had not to be motivated by referring to Poland. Any explicit linkage
between the suspension of the conference and the Polish crisis would
otherwise tie dangerously the possibilities to resume multilateral
negotiations with future developments in the Eastern country. 545 Bonn
wanted to avoid this circumstance at all cost. Even though positive
signals coming from Warsaw would undoubtedly enhance the
possibility of restarting East-West dialogue on the CSCE matters, they
had not to be turned into compulsory preconditions for the possibility
itself to negotiate. Of another opinion was, as renowned, the U.S.
administration. At the end of March, Undersecretary Eagleburger
pointed out in front of the U.S. Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe that there would be no room for negotiating
with the East in Madrid if no significant initiatives for the restoration of
normality – i.e. “the release of political prisoners, the lifting of martial
law, the initiation of a process of national reconciliation” – would be
realised by the Polish government.546 The fact that Eagleburger referred
generally to the release of “some” prisoners and to the initiation of a
process of reconciliation without demanding its completion were
assessed by Bonn as signal of a possible, more flexible attitude of the
544 Ibid.
545 KSZE-Folgetreffen Madrid. Hier: 1. 16-er Abstimmung am Vormittag des 09.03.82; 2.
Redaktionsgruppensitzung am 09.03.82, 09.03.1982, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 132.928.
546 Sondersitzung des Politischen Komitees am 26.03. in Brüssels. Hier: Zusatzinformation zum
Thema KSZE (Amerikanische Haltung), 25.03.1982, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 132.928.
189
U.S. administration.547 Onto those signals grabbed West German hopes
to make the process of multilateral détente continue in spite of its
evident crisis.
On 12 March 1982, after a month of unfruitful debates on Poland
had undermined the possibility of restoring the conditions for running
“business as usual”, the plenum at Madrid decided to adjourn the
restart of negotiations for the final document on the basis of the “RM39” draft to 9 November 1982.548 The West German delegation could
achieve at least the fulfilment of its requests: the adjournment was
decided with the consensus of all participant states; the resuming of
negotiations was scheduled on a precise date without being subjected
to any preconditions.549
During the months after the conference recess, the destiny of the
process of European détente remained very uncertain. Divergences of
views on matters of East-West relations continued to split the Western
Alliance. Bonn’s main task with regard to the CSCE process focused on
convincing the sceptic partners to return to Madrid on the scheduled
date.550 Flexibility and pragmatism continued to represent the
trademark of the West German foreign political approach to East-West
relations throughout 1982. In a strategic paper of July 1982 the
Auswärtiges Amt highlighted that every international conjuncture was
marked by specific problems Western countries had to take into
account to rethink pragmatically their diplomatic strategies towards the
process of détente. The adverse state of international relations required
to adapt the CSCE policy to the situation. Translated into the practice of
the negotiations for the final document of the Madrid CSCE, it meant to
understand what could be achieved and what not under the given
547 Eagleburger’s statement on CSCE in front of the CSCE Commission Hearing on March 23,
25.03.1982, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 132.928.
548 Zum Madrider-Folgetreffen, 29.03.1982, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 132.928.
549 Ibid.
550 Aufzeichnung des Ministerialdirektors Pfeffer und des Botschafters Ruth, 12.07.1982, in
AAPD, 1982, vol. II, doc. 206, p. 1083.
190
circumstances.551 Bonn’s Foreign Office suggested interpreting and
pursuing the principle of equilibrium amongst the components of the
final act with flexibility. It was not always possible to attain
improvements in all fields of the Helsinki Act. This approach
contrasted with the U.S. and British rigid insistence on including in the
final document of Madrid reinforced commitments in the field of
human rights. But, as the credibility of such commitments would be
compromised by persisting violations in Poland, the request was
tantamount to aim at an empty final document, on the model of
Belgrade.552
Change and continuity: the new West German federal government
dealing with the last moves of the Madrid CSCE
During 1982 the West German federal government was faced with
serious social, political and economic problems on the domestic front.
The recess of the Madrid CSCE seemed to give right to those West
Germans who denounced the Reagan administration’s lack of
willingness to negotiate with the East. There was a shared feeling that
East-West relations had returned to the hard confrontational tones of
the first Cold War years. Protests against the return to a course of
military and nuclear confrontation with the Eastern bloc intensified as
the imminent appointment for the deployment of new U.S. missiles on
the West German territory came closer. As negotiations in Madrid had
been failing to bring improvements on the front of détente, the question
of the implementation of NATO strategy’s “armed track” remained at
the centre of the public debate without an adequate counterbalance.
Besides public anxieties and social unrests, the federal government was
growingly confronted with political problems inside the social-liberal
coalition. The unfolding of 1982 was marked by the progressive
deterioration of the relations between the SPD and the FDP. Political
balances within the Bundestag were shifting. Chancellor Schmidt, in a
551 Aufzeichnung des Ministerialdirektors Pfeffer und des Botschafters Ruth, 12.07.1982, in
AAPD, 1982, vol. II, doc. 206, p. 1085.
552 Ibid.
191
position of minority inside its own party with regard both to the
missiles issue and economic matters, was increasingly in trouble with
the allied party. The overall affirmation of the neoliberal turn affected
the configuration of the West German political landscape as well. The
common social-liberal project came to an end in the course of 1982, as
divergences on economic policies become irreconcilable and the entente
on foreign policy was no more sufficient to keep the coalition
together.553 Helmut Schmidt, the “good manager of economic affairs”,
was defeated foremost on the front of unsolved economic problems.
The FDP left the coalition government in September and joined a new
alliance with the opposition of the CDU/CSU. The Christian
Democratic leader Helmut Kohl was elected Bundeskanzler by the
Bundestag on 1 October 1982 after Schmidt had been deposed through a
constructive vote of no confidence – used for the first time in the
parliamentary history of the FRG.554
This major political change marked the return to power of the CDU
for the first time after the Bundesrepublik had entered the new era of
good relations with the GDR and the East. The new Chancellor led the
party which had vehemently opposed the new Ostpolitik in the years of
its formation and consolidation. Christian Democrats had reconciled
with the policy of dialogue with the East only in the late Seventies, after
bilateral Ostpolitik and multilateral Enstpannungspolitik had brought to
important realisations and had affirmed themselves as solid foreign
political paradigms.555 This reconciliation paved the way for securing a
certain degree of continuity in foreign policy, once the CDU came back
to power. Hence, the program of radical spiritual-moral renovation of
West German politics announced by Helmut Kohl left nearly
553 On the gradual cooling-off of relations between the SPD and the FDP and on the
growing problems within the SPD which paved the way to the political change in the fall
of the year, see: H.A. Winkler, Der lange Weg nach Westen. Band II: Deutsche Geschichte vom
«Dritten Reich» bis zur Wiedervereinigung, pp. 392-402.
554 Ibid.
555 As well explained by Kielmannsegg, the Christian Democrats’ reconciliation with
Ostpolitik was comparable, for its development and significance, to the SPD’s
reconciliation with the FRG’s Western integration at the end of the Fifties. See: P.G.
Kielmannsegg, Das geteilte Land. Deutsche Geschichte, 1945-1990, p. 233.
192
untouched the cornerstones of the FRG’s foreign political system.
Continuity in foreign policy was granted, moreover, by Genscher’s
confirmation at the lead of the Auswärtiges Amt. Some corrections were
introduced to adjust the balance of Westpolitik-Ostpolitik: diplomatic
relations with the GDR and the Eastern countries continued to be
pursued, but with less ideal conviction; greater attention was directed
to foster the special relationship with Washington and reinvigorate the
process of European integration.556 Even though Bonn’s dialogue with
the East continued, the West German propulsive role diminished under
the years of government of Helmut Kohl who, unlike Brandt and
Schmidt, did not share similar ambitions to play the role of interpreter
between the East and the West. With regard to the process of
multilateral détente, Bonn’s commitment to the CSCE process remained
nearly unchanged. Quite meaningfully, the Helsinki Final Act, which
had been strongly opposed by Kohl at the time of its signing, was
mentioned in the new Chancellor’s inaugural address in front of the
Bundestag as “an element of change, a Charta for the coexistence in
Europe”.557
Kohl’s seizure of power was not the only significant political
turnover of the fall of 1982. Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev died in
November 1982; KGB chief Yuri Andropov was chosen by the Politburo
as the new General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union (CPSU). Brezhnev’s replacement brought no dramatic change to
the Soviet international strategy: Andropov had been, together with
Foreign Minister Gromyko and Minister of Defence Ustinov, one of the
three aged members of the troika which had directed Moscow’s foreign
policy in the years of Brezhnev’s physical decline.558 The stagnation
marking the last years of Brezhnev’s leadership continued under the
short offices of Andropov and of his successor Konstantin Chernenko.
556 Ibid., p. 234.
557 Winkler, Der lange Weg nach Westen. Band II: Deutsche Geschichte vom «Dritten Reich»
bis zur Wiedervereinigung, p. 405.
558 V.M. Zubok, “Soviet foreign policy from détente to Gorbachev, 1975-1985”, p. 91.
193
As the West German political landscape was undergoing a major
change, the appointment for the resuming of the CSCE in Madrid was
approaching. Reconfirmed as foreign minister of the new Christianliberal government, Genscher continued to support the idea of
restarting multilateral negotiations with the aim of bringing the
conference to a quick and acceptable conclusion. Even though all
delegations had agreed to return to Madrid without requiring the
fulfilment of any preconditions in return, the U.S. delegation aimed de
facto – backed by the British and the Dutch – at tying the destiny of the
conference to the liberalisation of the repressive course in Poland.
During the 1982 summer break the West German Foreign Office
observed with preoccupation that the restart of multilateral
negotiations in Madrid in the fall of that year seemed to be possible,
given the circumstances, only if either Poland would fulfil the three
Western demands or the U.S. administration would change its mind. 559
An answer to the dilemma of whether the U.S. delegation would accept
to return to Madrid came few weeks before the scheduled date for the
beginning of the last conference phase. On occasion of an informal
meeting in Lisbon, all Western chief delegators agreed to resume
negotiations in Madrid on 9 November. Washington’s assent was
merely tactical and aimed at pleasing the European requests. The U.S.
delegation remained of the view that the possibility of a successful
conclusion of the conference was to exclude. 560 As Kampelmann
pointed out to his NATO partners, the Alliance’s solidity was the U.S.
priority: “Negotiations are not the aim of the U.S.; if we negotiate, we
do it as a favour to our friends”.561 However, Washington asked for
compensation for its return to Madrid. In the margins of Lisbon’s
informal meeting Kastl was informed by Kampelmann that his
delegation would continue to negotiate at a higher price: i.e. in change
of the Western partners’ assent to include additional demands on
559 Aufzeichnung des Ministerialdirektors Pfeffer und des Botschafters Ruth, 12.07.1982, in
AAPD, 1982, vol. II, doc. 206, p. 1088.
560 Botschafter Kastl, Madrid (KSZE-Delegation), an das Auswärtige Amt, 11.11.1982, in
AAPD, 1982, vol. II, doc. 300, p. 1562.
561 Aufzeichnung des Ministerialdirektors Pfeffer, 13.10.1982, in AAPD, 1982, vol. II, doc.
270, p. 1407 (footnote).
194
human rights, evidently tailored on the Polish situation, in the list of
Western proposals for the final document.562
On those additional demands the U.S. delegation made dependent
the good outcome of the conference once back to the negotiation table.
Addressees of the American ultimatum were both the Eastern
delegations and the Western partners, whose deviations would not be
tolerated by Washington. Between the last weeks of 1982 and the first
weeks of 1983 a renewed stalemate dominated at Madrid. As Selvage
has correctly highlighted, all delegations were compelled, for different
reasons, to remain in the Spanish capital, but were unable to pursue
real negotiations.563 It was clear that the CSCE had turned into a forced
occasion of gathering in times in which the exacerbation of the
superpower relationship reached its zenith.
A way out of the deadlock was offered by a new draft of the final
document presented by the NNA delegations on 15 March 1983, whose
providential efforts were praised, once more, by the West German
delegation.564 The so-called “RM-39 revised” took extensively into
account the Western aims and incorporated a large number of Western
proposals. Most importantly, the mandate of the CDE was defined
according to Western criteria. The area of MBFR was extended to the
whole European territory, with consideration for the functional
limitation for maritime activities. The convening of a meeting of experts
on human rights – one of the main U.S. request from the beginning of
the conference – was now assured. Even though improvements in the
“human dimension” remained insufficient, the new NNA draft
proposed some small facilitations of human contacts and incorporated
a passage on the freedom of religion and contacts between churches
which, though not being a West German demand, responded largely to
562 Ibid., p. 1406.
563 D. Selvage, “The Superpowers and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe, 1977-1983. Human rights, Nuclear Weapons, and Western Europe“, p. 48.
564 Namensartikel des Herrn Bundesministers über den N+N-Vorschlag eines Schlussdokuments
des Madrider KSZE-Folgetreffens, 30.03.1983, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.879.
195
West German views.565 Main reason of disappointment for Bonn was
the exclusion, amongst several other aspects left out, of the West’s
proposals in the field of information, traditionally a West German
priority domain. But according to the assessment of the Auswärtiges
Amt, the overall progress made in the “human dimension” with respect
to the Helsinki Accords represented a not minor achievement.566 As the
West German delegation had unceasingly repeated since the beginning
of the conference – and particularly after the exacerbation of the Polish
crisis – the actual state of East-West relations required pragmatism and
flexibility, which suggested focusing only on those issues where a
compromise with the Eastern countries was possible. Bonn remained
loyal to its realistic approach: small, attainable improvements in the
field of human contacts should not be sacrificed in the name of greater
unreachable aims. The “RM-39 revised” had all the characteristics, in
Bonn’s view, to be considered as a good document for a satisfactory,
substantial conclusion of the conference.
Not of the same idea was the U.S. delegation: backed by the British
and the Dutch, it continued to refuse to negotiate any documents which
did not include all November 1982’s Western requests in toto.567 As
Kastl reported to Bonn after a round of top-level talks in Washington,
the CSCE continued to represent, as before in Belgrade as now in
Madrid, a quite secondary stage for the U.S. foreign policy. The Reagan
administration considered the CSCE mainly a forum on human rights
and a multilateral showcase to carry out its ideological struggle with
the Soviet Union.568 In the meantime, the vehemence of the U.S. anti-
565 Namensartikel des Herrn Bundesministers über den N+N-Vorschlag eines Schlussdokuments
des Madrider KSZE-Folgetreffens, 30.03.1983, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.879; and
Aufzeichnung des Ministerialdirigenten Schauer, 30.03.1983, in AAPD, 1983, vol. I, doc. 85, p.
443.
566 Vortragender Legationsrat I. Klasse Joetze an die Botschaft in Paris, 18.04.1983, in AAPD,
1983, vol. I, doc. 105, pp. 541-543.
567 Deutsch-amerikanische Spitzengespräche am 14./15.04.1983 in Washington. Hier: KSZE:
Argumentation, 11.04.1983, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.879.
568 Deutsch-amerikanische Spitzengespräche am 14./15.04.1983 in Washington. Hier: KSZE:
Argumentation, 11.04.1983, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.879; Botschafter Hermes,
196
communist rhetoric gained new impulse, as Reagan addressed the
Soviet Union as “an evil empire” in a renowned public speech on 8
March 1983.569 The statement was ensued, a couple of weeks later, by
Reagan’s announcement of the launch of a new big project in the field
of military security under the label of Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI).
Within the overall security strategy of the U.S. administration the CDE
played a very little role, as the decision to tie its destiny to the
acceptance of unattainable demands in the field of human rights
demonstrates.
West German diplomacy tried, first, to convince the U.S.
administration of the opportunity to foster the “RM-39 revised”. In a
letter to U.S. Secretary of State George Schultz,570 Genscher stressed that
“on the whole the draft does greater justice to Western interests than
Eastern ones”. He then added that “the draft by the neutral and nonaligned countries affords a framework for keeping the CSCE process
alive and for making the Soviet Union answer every three years for its
behaviour in honouring the pledges entered into and for wringing
further concessions from it in the fields of importance to us”.571 When it
became clear that the attempts of persuasion pursued that far would
not affect Washington’s decisions, Bonn tried to correct its strategy. As
West German chief delegator Kastl observed, any attempts to convince
the U.S. delegation in Madrid and the administration in Washington of
the value of the NNA draft or of the reasonable idea of Western
“victory” at Madrid were vain.572 Bonn’s efforts were redirected, hence,
to convince the Americans of the detrimental consequences of an
eventual failure of the Madrid CSCE.
The new strategy of “reinforced persuasion” attempted by
Chancellor Kohl during his visit in Washington in mid-April 1983
Washington, an das Auswärtiges Amt, 1.12.1982, in AAPD, 1982, vol. II, doc. 328, pp. 17041707.
569 W. Loth, Overcoming the Cold War. A History of Détente, 1951-1990, p. 165.
570 George Schultz had replaced Haig after his resignation on July 1982.
571 Vortragender Legationsrat I. Klasse Joetze an die Botschaft in Paris, 18.04.1983, in AAPD,
1983, vol. I, 105, pp. 541-543.
572 Ibid.
197
levered the spread anti-American sentiments present in the West
German society.573 Anti-Americanism had grown in the Bundesrepublik,
indeed, after the adoption of NATO’s 1979 dual-track decision and the
inauguration of the first Reagan administration, returning to similar
levels of those of the Vietnam War’s years. Reagan’s foreign policy had
raised widespread public concerns almost everywhere in Western
Europe. According to an opinion poll published in Newsweek in 1983,
pluralities of around 40 percent of the people interviewed in France,
Britain and Germany disapproved American policies.574 The
transatlantic relationship in the first half of the Eighties was marked by
problems regarding the entente within the Western Alliance and the
U.S. image in Western Europe.575 Both aspects were taken into account
by the arguments devised by the West German Foreign Office to
convince Washington.
Hence, Kohl and Genscher warned the U.S. administration that in
case it would not modify its intransigent stances towards negotiations
at the Madrid CSCE, the European allies would have no other choice
than to follow, to the detriment of the outcome of the conference.
Whilst this would savage the surface of the Alliance’s unity, the West
would become the easy target of Soviet propaganda and blamed for the
failure of the CSCE. Predictably, a large part of the Western public
opinion, too, would single out the U.S. responsibility. Many Western
Europeans had doubts about Washington’s commitment to East-West
dialogue and were protesting against the deployment of U.S. middlerange rockets in Europe. A renewed faux pas on the front of the CSCE
process would reinforce such suspicions further, to the detriment both
of the U.S. reputation and missiles. The West German federal
573 Reise des Bundeskanzlers nach Washington am 14./15.04.1983, 22.04.1983, in PA AA,
Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.879.
574 J.S. Nye, Soft Power. The means to success in world politics (New York: Public Affairs,
2004), p. 37.
575 On the redefinition of Western European representations of the U.S. in the early
Eighties, see: J. Hansen, C. Helm and F. Reichherzer, eds., Making Sense of the Americas:
How Protest Related to America in the 1980s and Beyond (Frankfurt am Main and New York:
Campus, 2015).
198
government – as the administration in Washington was admonished –
would hardly manage to make the deployment publically acceptable if
not able to offer some concrete improvements in the field of détente in
return.576 The list of West German arguments continued by depicting
other consequent negative scenarios: the hardening of Spain’s path
towards NATO membership; the strengthening of neutralist
movements in Scandinavia; the disappointment of the lefts in power in
France; the risk of compromising cooperation with the NNA
countries.577
Bonn tabled an ultimatum trade option, by demanding
Washington’s commitment to a successful conclusion of the conference
in Madrid in return for Bonn’s endorsement of the decision of
stationing U.S. Pershing II on its territory. The intertwining between
the diplomatic pursuit of the process of détente and its domestic
reception had always been an important costituent of Bonn’s CSCE
policy. It was not the first time that the West German federal
government, when negotiating with its Western allies and the Eastern
countries, reminded its counterparts of its domestic need for concrete
achievements on the front of détente and made a tactical use of it in
order to attain its foreign policy goals. Quite interestingly, this assertive
diplomatic initiative towards Washington was taken by a liberal-right
coalition government which had declared that strengthening the
special relationship with the U.S. was its main foreign policy goal. This
episode shows that the landscape of relations between Americans and
Western Europeans was more complicated than mere ideological and
political vicinity would suggest and was rather dependent on specific
circumstances, especially when vital national interests were involved.
The upcoming implementation of the armed track of NATO’s 1979
decision had tactical implications with regard to negotiations with the
Soviet delegation at the Madrid CSCE, too. Moscow hoped that a
positive decision on the CDE would undermine the psychological
576 Deutsch-amerikanische Spitzengespräche am 14./15.04.1983 in Washington. Hier: KSZE:
Argumentation, 11.04.1983, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.879.
577 Ibid.
199
grounds of the decision to station U.S. LRTNF in Western Europe. Even
though Bonn disagreed with such calculation, it was determined to use
it strategically to win the Soviet approval of the Western parameters for
the CDE.578 Time became a decisive factor in the spring of 1983: in order
to attain their respective goals, both Bonn and Moscow aimed at
reaching as soon as possible an agreement on the Madrid final act – and
a positive decision on the CDE – before the first missiles would be
stationed on the West German soil in the fall of the year. On 6 May 1983
the Soviet delegation appealed to all participating states to negotiate on
the basis of “RM-39 revised”. The initiative meant that the Soviets
accepted the last NNA draft in its entirety, including its provisions
regarding the CDE. Time for further negotiations had run out: no
additional Western proposals or revisions would be taken into account
by the Soviet delegation.579
By accepting the NNA draft in all its parts, the Soviet Union had
decided to make large concessions to Western requests. Besides the
matter of the mandate of the CDE, “RM-39” included indeed a series of
proposals which had already been tabled at the Belgrade CSCE and
had been rejected by the Eastern countries for years. The new opening
revealed the East’s urgency to obtain a final document which ensured
the convening of the CDE and the continuation of cooperation with the
West. In April 1983 Erich Honecker expressed its favour to a successful
conclusion of the conference.580 The East German leader was aware that
the interruption of the CSCE process would burden the continuation of
inner-German relations. As the GDR’s economic dependency on
cooperation with the FRG had dramatically grown, the protection of
inner-German relations had become increasingly vital for East Berlin.
Negotiations on important financial projects and on the facilitation of
human contacts had continued in the early Eighties via the existing
578 Aufzeichnung des Ministerialdirigenten Schauer, 30.03.1983, in AAPD, 1983, vol. I, doc.
85, p. 447.
579 Aufzeichnung des Vortragenden Legationsrats I. Klasse Edler von Braunmühl, 07.05.1983, in
AAPD, 1983, vol. I, doc. 129, p. 679.
580 Gespräch des Bundeskanzlers Kohl mit Ministerpräsident Schlüter, 19.04.1983, in AAPD,
1983, vol. I, doc. 106, p. 551.
200
confidential channels.581 However, adverse international conditions –
i.e. the renewed bipolar confrontational course, the Polish crisis and its
repercussions within the Eastern bloc, the East-West competition over
missiles – had drastically limited Honecker’s room of manoeuvre and
prevented the East German leader to make significant concessions to
the FRG. There was awareness both in Bonn and East Berlin that the
achievement of a multilateral agreement at the Madrid CSCE would
facilitate the expansion of bilateral relations between the two German
states. The multilateral embeddedness of the inner-German dialogue
continued to be in place in 1983 and still affected German political
decisions.
The Madrid CSCE at its conclusion: matters of détente, matters of
security
In the concluding phase of the Madrid CSCE, the game of the
agreement on the final document was played mainly within the
Western field. Washington did not seem to be particularly impressed
by the West German strategy of reinforced persuasion. The aim of
securing the planned deployment of U.S. rockets in Western Europe
contributed to convince the Reagan administration to remain involved
in the affairs of European détente, but did not urge the American
delegation in Madrid to revise its strategy and goals. For the West
German frustration, additional provisions on human rights continued
to be demanded with unchanged insistence. On occasion of the London
meeting of the Four Political Directors on 22 April 1983, Kampelmann
notified that the corrections to the NNA draft suggested by the Western
delegations were insufficient; the “Soviet performance” – i.e. the
implementation by Soviet authorities of concrete steps in the field of
human rights – was added as fundamental precondition for the
conclusion of the conference. As the U.S. chief delegator had pointed
out to the British, French and West German colleagues: “For us
581 W. Loth, Overcoming the Cold War. A History of Détente, 1950-1991, p. 178.
201
performance is of the same importance as CDE”.582 The Western allies’
respective positions remained irreconcilable: whilst Washington
advocated the possibility of a failure of the conference – for which the
Soviet Union could be blamed – Bonn aimed at the favourable
conclusion of the meeting and not at the apportioning of blame. 583 Also
after the Soviets had opened to the acceptance of “RM-39 revised”, the
U.S. delegation did not change its mind. The NNA draft’s provisions
remained inadequate: as Secretary of State Schultz explained to his
British, French and West German colleagues, at the Madrid CSCE it
was about improving both the text of the conference final document
and the Soviet behaviour.584
The way to the conclusion of the Madrid CSCE was paved by a last
intermediation attempted by the Spanish delegation. As guest of the
conference, Madrid had promised to take all necessary initiatives to
favour a successful outcome of the second follow-up conference.
Spain’s new Socialist Prime Minister Felipe Gonzales took the initiative
on 17 June 1983 by proposing to incorporate into “RM-39 revised” two
provisions convening a meeting of experts on human rights in Ottawa –
a major concession to one of the U.S. fundamental demands – and a
meeting of experts on human contacts in Bern – an addition pleasing
particularly Bonn. Moreover, the calendar of the CDE was set: the
works of the preparatory meeting were scheduled for the end of
October in Helsinki and the beginning of the main conference for 17
January 1984 in Stockholm.585 A week later, all Western and NNA
delegations declared their willingness to accept the Spanish draft. 586
After few days of uncertainty, on occasion of the meeting of the Soviet
582 Vortragender Legationsrat I. Klasse Joetze, z.Z. London, an das Auswärtige Amt, 23.04.1983,
in AAPD, 1983, vol. I, doc. 116, pp. 609-610.
583 Ibid., p. 607.
584 Ministerialdirigent Schauer, z.Z. Paris, an das Auswärtige Amt, 09.05.1983, in AAPD,
1983, vol. I, doc. 131, p. 685.
585 Erklärung des Bundesministers am 26. Juni 1983 zum Madrider KSZE-Folgetreffen,
24.06.1983, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.879; and Aufzeichnung des
Ministerialdirektors Pfeffer, 16.06.1983, in AAPD, 1983, vol. I, doc. 181, p. 948.
586 Erklärung des Bundesministers am 26. Juni 1983 zum Madrider KSZE-Folgetreffen,
24.06.1983, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 178.879.
202
bloc’s leaders of 28 June in Moscow, Andropov suggested to accept the
Spanish offer.587 On 1 July Soviet chief delegator Kovalev declared
officially to be willing to work within the framework of the Spanish
initiative. As unique, small concession to Moscow’s requests, the clause
convening the meeting of experts on human contacts was incorporated
into the chairman’s statement, instead of being included amongst the
matters of Basket III.588
On 15 July 1983 the final document of the Madrid conference was
approved by thirty-four delegations – with the only exception of Malta,
the “enfant terrible” of the CSCE,589 which, as it had already done in
Belgrade, tied its approval to three additional requests.590 The shooting
down of a South Korean passenger plane flying over Soviet territory by
the Soviet air force in September 1983 represented the last hindrance
and episode of East-West tension marking the concluding moves of the
Madrid CSCE.591 Works were still protracted until the fall of 1983 – the
year initially thought for beginning possibly the third review
conference. After “two years and eight months of continual frustration”
– as it was commented by the West German delegation592 – the second
CSCE follow–up meeting came to a conclusion which was far more
satisfactory than initial expectations and following developments had
let hope. The achievements in the human field were reason of
particular satisfaction for the West German diplomacy. Besides the
convening of the two meetings of experts on human rights and on
587 D. Selvage, “The Superpowers and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe, 1977-1983. Human rights, Nuclear Weapons, and Western Europe“, p. 55.
588 Ibid., p. 56.
589 Runderlass des Vortragenden Legationsrat I. Klasse Steinkuehler, 25.07.1983, in AAPD,
1983, vol. II, doc. 223, pp. 1144-1148.
590 Malta’s three requests consisted (1) in a declaration of intents to reduce armaments in
the Mediterranean region; (2) in the inclusion of the Mediterranean sea in the area of the
CBMs; and (3) in the convening of a meeting of experts on security in the Mediterranean
basin.
591 Ministerialdirektor Pfeffer, z.Z. New York, an das Auswärtige Amt, 27.09.2983, in AAPD,
1983, vol. II, doc. 281, pp. 1413-1418. On the US-Soviet tensions caused by the incident,
see: H.D. Genscher, Erinnerungen (Berlin: Siedler Verlag, 1995), p. 314.
592 Deutsch-sowjetische KSZE-Konsultationen am 7./8.08.1980 in Bonn, in PA AA,
Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 132.506.
203
human contacts, the West could attain a series of important
improvements which were largely tailored on the situation in Poland.
The Eastern countries committed themselves to recognising the
freedom of religion and tolerating free contacts between churches; to
facilitating the fulfilment of the applications for family reunification
and marriage between Eastern and Western citizens, by introducing
faster processing times, clearer rules, more information and lower
taxes; to guaranteeing free access to the respective embassies and
consulates for foreign visitors; to selling Western newspapers and
magazines at reasonable prices and to improving working conditions of
Western journalists; to liberalising trade unions, by recognising the
right of citizens to choose freely their trade union.593
On 8 September 1983, the foreign ministers of all thirty-five
participant states gathered in Madrid to approve the final document.
The conference ended, as it had begun, under a high political profile.
This responded, as the West German Foreign Office pointed out, to the
significance of the circumstance: in Madrid was celebrated the first
important political agreement between the East and the West after a
long time.594
Few weeks after the adoption of the final document of Madrid the
preparatory works of the Conference on Confidence and Security
Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe started in Helsinki.
The Conference on Disarmament in Europe, which had originated from
two parallel proposals by the Soviets and the French, represented a
traditional long-sought goal of the Warsaw Pact and had turned into
the priority aim of the Western delegations at the Madrid CSCE. The
mandate of the conference had been progressively shaped according to
the Western criteria. The Warsaw Pact had ceded, indeed, on the
inclusion of the Soviet territory up to the Urals; on the primal
negotiation of binding and verifiable CBMs; and on the notification of
big manoeuvres. As unique concession to the Eastern requests, the
593 “KSZE: Der Präsident ist sehr zufrieden”, Der Spiegel, Nr. 29/1983.
594 Runderlass des Vortragenden Legationsrat I. Klasse Steinkuehler, 25.07.1983, in AAPD,
1983, vol. II, doc. 223, pp. 1144-1148.
204
obligation of notifying air and naval forces operating on the Atlantics in
connection with ground forces had been accepted by the West.595
The West German Foreign Office was confident that the positive
outcome of Madrid would nourish renewed East-West cooperation and
exert a positive effect on the prosecution of armament negotiations. 596
The fact that the CSCE process could have continued and expanded
notwithstanding major adversities reinforced Bonn’s firm belief that
European détente was the right way to follow. Within the West
German overall complex of détente and security, the upcoming CDE
represented an important stage wherein the grounds for the
construction of a safer Europe could be negotiated. As the following
chapter of this work illustrates, matters of security returned to
dominate East-West relations in the wake of Madrid as they done
before its start; but important decisions on central security issues took
place elsewhere, outside the CSCE framework.
During the very last days of the follow-up meeting in Madrid, INF
negotiations597 and the deployment of U.S. new cruise and Pershing
missiles in Europe were main items of debate between Genscher and
his Soviet and East German colleagues, Gromyko and Fischer, in the
margins of the conference.598 Negotiations in Geneva had reached a
stalemate because of the Soviet demand to include the British and
French strategic systems in the U.S count and the consequent U.S.
refusal to take the request into account.599 As Andropov explained in an
interview with the Prawda, the Soviet security strategy aimed at
preventing a West’s military hegemony on the European continent by
595 “KSZE: Der Präsident ist sehr zufrieden”, Der Spiegel, Nr. 29/1983.
596 Runderlass des Vortragenden Legationsrat I. Klasse Steinkuehler, 25.07.1983, in AAPD,
1983, vol. II, doc. 223, p. 1144.
597 Formal negotiations on INF between the superpowers had opened in Geneva on 30
November 1981
598 Ministerialdirektor Pfeffer, z.Z. Madrid, an das Auswärtige Amt, 08.09.1983, in AAPD,
1983, vol. II, doc. 262, pp. 1314-1317; and Gespräch des Bundesministers Genscher mit dem
Außenminister der DDR, Fischer, in Madrid, 09.09.1983, in AAPD, 1983, vol. II, doc. 263, pp.
1318-1322.
599 Ministerialdirektor Pfeffer, z.Z. Madrid, an das Auswärtige Amt, 08.09.1983, in AAPD,
1983, vol. II, doc. 262, pp. 1314-1317.
205
pursuing two concrete goals: the inclusion of third countries’ nuclear
systems in the calculation of the INFs and the exclusion of the
stationing of new U.S. LRTNF in Western Europe.600 In return,
Andropov was open to concessions, by reducing the number of Soviet
warheads targeted at Western Europe.601 Around the issue of the
nuclear arms in Europe everyone was playing its own diplomatic
game. At stake for Bonn were its traditional security needs and reasons
of transatlantic alliance: it was not just about diminishing the Soviet
threat but remaining on board with the deployment decision as well.
As he had already done before on occasion of negotiations on the CDE,
Genscher reminded Fischer that all fractions of the Bundestag had
agreed in 1979 to start the stationing of Pershing II in the fall of 1983, if
negotiations on armaments control would not lead to concrete results
capable of appeasing West German security needs.602
Eastern hopes that the agreement on a CDE would be sufficient to
derail the armament track of NATO’s dual-track decision vanished in
the course of few weeks after the conclusion of the CSCE in Madrid.
The preparatory works for the CDE concluded successfully on 11
November 1983.603 The Conference on Disarmament in Europe would
start on 17 January 1984 in Stockholm. On 22 November 1983, the
majority of the West German Bundestag – namely the MPs of the
CDU/CSU and FDP fractions – approved the stationing of the U.S.
Pershing II. The day after the Soviets announced to walk out of INF
negotiations and on 8 December they decided to break off START
negotiations as well. On 10 December, the stationing of the U.S. new
cruise and Pershing II missiles began in Germany and Italy.604
600 Botschafter Kastl, Moskau, an das Auswärtige Amt, 09.11.1983, in AAPD, 1983, vol. II,
doc. 340, p. 1697.
601 W. Loth, Overcoming the Cold War. A History of Détente, 1950-1991, p. 179-180.
602 Gespräch des Bundesministers Genscher mit dem Außenminister der DDR, Fischer, in
Madrid, in AAPD, 1983, vol. II, 263, p. 1321.
603 Vortragender Legationsrat I. Klasse Citron, z.Z. Helsinki, an das Auswärtige Amt,
11.11.1983, in AAPD, 1983, vol. II, doc. 346, p. 1716.
604 D. Selvage, “The Superpowers and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe, 1977-1983. Human rights, Nuclear Weapons, and Western Europe“, p. 57.
206
The deployment of Pershing II in the FRG was followed by
Genscher’s reassurances about the West German enduring commitment
to détente. The fulfilment of its alliance duties did not mark a shift in
Bonn’s foreign policy. As Genscher claimed in front of the Bundestag on
6 December 1983: “missiles neither are an instrument for a ‘new policy
of strength’, nor are conceived as an instrument for a new
confrontational strategy towards the Soviet Union on the European
territory; to the contrary, we hold onto détente and cooperation”. 605
Assessing the second CSCE follow-up meeting in Madrid:
security needs, good intentions and foreign political ambitions
The deployment of U.S. cruise and Pershing II missiles in Western
Europe marked the symbolic conclusion of the long diplomatic affairs
of the second CSCE follow-up meeting of Madrid. Matters of security
in Europe dominated its overall unfolding. They strongly affected the
preparation of the conference. Multilateral negotiations in Madrid
focused mainly on the issue of the Conference on Disarmament in
Europe and were flanked by the fluctuating unfolding of talks on
armaments and disarmaments in Geneva. The CSCE participants’
security needs were taken into account to shape the respective
diplomatic strategies towards the allies and their counterparts. And,
last but not least, the common interest in the security aspects of détente
provided the grounds for achieving an agreement on a substantial final
document. This does not mean that the Madrid CSCE was just about
security. As stressed in the previous paragraph, multilateral
cooperation was intensified in other areas of the Helsinki Accords, too.
With regard to the “human dimension”, in particular, achievements
were possible which had been unattainable at the Belgrade CSCE and
had seemed unconceivable during the tensest phases of negotiations in
Madrid. The way to those improvements had been largely paved by the
CSCE participants’ respective security needs and security fears.
605 “Erklärung vom 6. Dezember 1983“, in Deutsche Außenpolitik: ausgewählte Reden und
Aufsätze, 1974-1985, ed. H.D. Genscher, p. XVII.
207
Paradoxically, when major crises unsettled East-West relations, détente
managed to achieve more concrete realisations. The importance of such
results had not to be diminished: a positive outcome of the conference
was not expected. Episodes of tension endangering the continuation of
negotiations in Madrid were serious and fears that the developments in
Afghanistan and Poland would interrupt the process of détente for
good were real.
The Federal Republic of Germany was the country which suffered
the most from the uncertainties caused by the deterioration of EastWest relations. Therefore, it had good reasons to celebrate the outcome
of the Madrid CSCE as a diplomatic success. The CSCE continued to be
for the Bundesrepublik the multilateral framework which allowed and
completed the bilateral pursuit of its Deutschlandpolitik and Ostpolitik.
Bonn’s federal government was aware of their vital interdependence.
As East-West confrontation escalated between the late Seventies and
the early Eighties, the West German Foreign Office repeatedly observed
in its internal strategic papers that, if East-West dialogue would come
to an end, it would be impossible for Bonn to continue to expand innerGerman relations single-handed. This awareness did not represent an
element of novelty: but concrete evidence for it was provided by the
renewed escalation of East-West confrontation at the turn of the
decade.
The CSCE process asserted itself gradually as a West German
established foreign policy priority in the aftermath of Helsinki. Its wellgrounded stability within the FRG’s foreign political system was
proven by the fact that it continued to be pursued nearly unchanged
after the major political turn marked by Kohl’s seizure of power in the
fall of 1982. Not only did the CSCE process keep the door open for a
future solution to the German question, but it turned into an important
channel to keep open East-West dialogue itself. European détente had
had since its origins alternative aims in respect to superpower détente.
As American-Soviet relations returned to confrontation under the
Carter and the first Reagan administrations, European détente
prevailed by default as the only available form of East-West dialogue to
208
remain in place. Taking into account the changing international
circumstances and the lessons learnt at the follow-up meeting in
Belgrade, the FRG’s CSCE policy was subject to a partial rethinking: it
readdressed its goals by diminishing expectations; it gained in
flexibility and pragmatism; it acquired a more explicit separation
between levels of principles and practice; and it was shaped as a tool of
anti-cyclical stabilisation in times of crisis. Moreover, the interaction
between détente and security policies – which had traditionally shaped
the West German concept of détente – took on new tactical tasks. If
matters of security risked endangering détente, security needs were
levered strategically in order to safeguard the achievements of détente.
Even though elements of real threats for the continuation of the CSCE
process were more serious in Madrid than they had been in Belgrade,
higher were the risks for the participants of the CSCE to compromise
their own respective interests.
The Warsaw Pact’s unveiled interest in the security dimension of
the CSCE was used strategically by West German diplomacy in order
to obtain concessions in the human field. Bonn’s enduring confidence
in the possibility of achieving concrete results in those areas where the
Eastern countries had refused cooperation before was motivated by the
awareness that, unlike at the Belgrade CSCE, the Soviet Union had now
a greater interest in not leaving Madrid empty handed. As analysed in
Chapter 2, the Eastern bloc had presented itself to the first review test
of European détente without any specific goals. Its efforts had been
directed mainly to the attainment of a rash conclusion of the conference
which would simply allow cooperation with the West to continue.
During the diplomatic preparation of the second CSCE follow-up
meeting, Moscow had revealed to Bonn its interest in negotiating the
convening of a Conference on Disarmament in Europe, with the
unspoken aim of mining the political and psychological premises for
the implementation of the armed track of NATO’s 1979 decision, as it
has been analysed in Chapter 3.
The shift in the Warsaw Pact’s attitude towards CSCE negotiations
had been urged by the changing balance of power between the blocs.
209
The East’s economic weakness and security worries, as well as the
cooling off of the superpower relationship, compelled the Soviet Union
to turn to Europe. Notwithstanding the Soviet frustration with the U.S.
initiatives, the nature of the superpower relationship under the Carter
administration was still based on the recognition of parity. But
Reagan’s new policy of strength wiped out any illusion of negotiating
with the Soviet Union on an equal footing. Matters of perception were
involved in the political shift as well: Reagan’s assertive security
policies put an end to the idea of the “weakness of the West” promoted
by the Soviet bloc throughout the Seventies. To the contrary, the
Warsaw Pact was confronted with a renewed military competition it
was not able to afford. As Washington had needed superpower détente
to deal with the consequences of the disastrous Vietnam War, Moscow
needed now European détente to face its international and intra-bloc
difficulties. It had to be remembered that also the 1969 Budapest
Appeal – the first Eastern proposal for a pan-European security
conference without preconditions – had come in a time when the Soviet
Union was dealing with the negative diplomatic repercussions of the
crackdown on Czechoslovakia.606 The Soviet weakness at the beginning
of the Eighties was aggravated by the growing international isolation
that the invasion of Afghanistan and the protracting of the Polish crisis
brought about. Besides drawing Soviet financial resources and rousing
fears of contamination in the other Eastern countries, the Polish crisis
unveiled to the world the fragility of the realisations of socialism in the
Eastern societies. All these elements of East’s urgency and weakness
were carefully examined by the Auswärtiges Amt: they nourished the
West German confidence in the possibility of obtaining favourable
achievements at the Madrid CSCE.
Similar considerations were taken into account by the arguments
Bonn used to convince its most sceptical allies of the opportunity to
606 A firs proposal had been made by the Soviet Union in 1954 but had turned down by
NATO because of the exclusion of the United States and Canada. The Appeal Budapest
represented hence the first serious proposal, dictating no preconditions with regard to
the participants. On this point, see: J.M. Hanhimäki, “Détente in Europe, 1962-1975”, p.
213.
210
continue multilateral negotiations in spite of adverse circumstances.
The CSCE was subject to criticism within several participating states;
they interpreted it as a diplomatic tool in Soviet hands used cleverly by
Moscow to compensate for its incapability of coping with international
security challenges and intra-bloc political changes.607 West German
diplomats repeated unceasingly that the Soviet bloc negotiated from a
position of weakness and the outcome of the conference could be
smartly directed, as a consequence, to the West’s advantage.
A second block of arguments the West German diplomacy
frequently appealed to, especially in the wake of Poland’s military
takeover, rested upon the stabilising effects that the prosecution of
multilateral détente negotiations could exert on the Polish crisis. As
developments in Poland casted a lengthening shadow over the
unfolding of the CSCE, West German efforts were directed to linking a
possible solution to the emergency in Poland to the good outcome of
the conference – and not vice versa. Whether the CSCE did contribute to
the de-escalation of the Polish crisis and prevented a Soviet armed
intervention in the country is object of historical debate. Zubok has
firmly rejected this hypothesis: as Soviet papers show, the decision to
avoid the repetition of “another Prague” was taken by Moscow
independently from considerations linked to the CSCE.608 However, it
is undoubted that the Polish crisis showed that Eastern countries
needed cooperation with the West more and more. Hence, West
German diplomacy turned a perhaps overestimated aspiration – i.e.
normalising the Polish crisis through détente negotiations – into a
diplomatic tool of persuasion: the potential beneficial effects of the
CSCE on Poland were frequently used by West German diplomats to
convince the Western allies of the opportunity to remain in Madrid and
continue with “business as usual”.
607 J. Freeman, Security and the CSCE Process. The Stockholm Conference and Beyond
(Basingstoke and London: Macmillan, 1991), p. 79.
608 V.M. Zubok, A Failed Empire. The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev,
pp. 267-268.
211
Bonn’s wish to remain at Madrid at (almost) any costs risked to cut
the West German delegation from the majority of the Western partners
in a number of delicate phases of the conference. Isolation was a risk
that the FRG could not afford. Preserving the unity of the Western
Alliance – or at least its surface – and bringing negotiations to a
favourable conclusion appeared to be – throughout most of the
duration of the conference – incompatible aims. Notwithstanding the
Western Alliance performed very poorly at the Madrid CSCE, the fact
that both aims could be attained in the end was reason of satisfaction
for Bonn’s federal government. The achievement of the final document
of Madrid represented probably the last significant success of West
German diplomacy when dealing with the convergence of Westpolitik
and Ostpolitik, until the end of the Cold War.
212
“Die Prozedur und das Ziel für die Entspannungspolitik in Europa sind abgesteckt.
Der Schlingerkiel ist in Position. Er hat in den vergangenen Jahren, als die Wogen des
Misstrauens zwischen Ost und West hochgingen, das Schiff vorm Kentern bewahrt.”609
Christoph Bertram, Die Zeit, July 26, 1985
Chapter 5
The “Return of the Superpowers” and the
“Return of the Past”: A Reappraisal of the Process
of Multilateral Détente Ten Years after Helsinki
(1984-1985)
Introduction
The years of the first Reagan administration represented a
troublesome and ambivalent period in the trajectory of the Cold War
transatlantic partnership.610 Whereas moments of profound crises
alternated with moments of rapprochement in several policy areas, as
Nuti has highlighted, in the field of East-West cooperation transatlantic
divergences were profound. One of the most evident elements
emerging from the long experience of the second CSCE review meeting
in Madrid was that the chasm between American and Western German
conceptions of East-West dialogue had never been more profound. As
it has been analysed in the previous chapters of this work, the U.S. had
been a quite sceptical participant of the CSCE since the origins of the
609 “The mechanism and the aim of détente policy in Europe are outlined. The rolling
keel is in position. It protected the ship from capsizes in the last years, as the weaves of
distrust between the East and the West reached their peak.”[transl.]
610 L. Nuti, “Gli anni Ottanta: Le relazioni transatlantiche durante la presidenza
Reagan”, p. 65.
213
European endeavour. The transatlantic partners had managed,
however, to reach in Helsinki a strategic convergence between the
respective interests of superpower détente and European détente. This
temporary entente could not have been replicated at the CSCE in
Belgrade and Madrid. Although single leading actors and specific
elements of disputes changed from Belgrade to Madrid, the lacking
convergence between West German and American interests
represented an element of continuity. Whereas Carter’s human rights
battle needed the CSCE as international showcase, Reagan’s overall
foreign political vision did not envisage any room for European
détente. Quite significantly, before the resuming of negotiations in
Madrid in the fall of 1982, American chief delegator Kampelmann
explained to the European colleagues that a positive conclusion of the
follow-up conference and the convening of the CDE risked alimenting
détente illusions and mistaken feelings of improved security in the
continent of the public opinion.611
The problematic entente with Washington concerned the other face
of détente, too, i.e. cooperation in the field of security. The alternation
of fears of American decoupling and fears of excessive American
assertiveness marked the West German – and more generally Western
European – attitude towards Washington’s initiatives in the field of
military security. European worries were alimented by several episodes
of lacking information coming from the side of the U.S. administration.
The frustration experienced by Bonn’s federal government on occasion
of Carter’s fluctuating conduction of the neutron bomb affair continued
during the Reagan administration. Both in the case of Reagan’s launch
of the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) in March 1983 and of the
renown “walk in the woods” between the U.S. and Soviet chief
delegators at the INF-talks in Geneva, respectively Paul Nitze and Julii
Kwizinski – on whose occasion they agreed on a reduction of arm
systems which pleased Western Europeans – the allies were informed
by the U.S. administration only after initiatives had already been
611 Aufzeichnung des Ministerialdirektors Pfeffer, 13.10.1982, in AAPD, 1982, vol. II, doc.
270, p. 1404.
214
taken.612 Divergences of views and interests on security were particular
problematic for the Bundesrepublik, the country which most depended
on the U.S. military protection and most suffered from uncertainties
and changes in the field of security. Whereas Bonn’s concerns about the
vulnerability of NATO’s deterrence strategy towards the Soviet bloc
and fears of a possible American decoupling were reassured by the
implementation of NATO’s dual-track decision and the stationing of
new American LRTNF, Reagan’s aim of asserting the West’s military
superiority over the East endangered, to the contrary, the maintenance
of that strategic balance of power between the East and the West which
represented, in the West German view, the cornerstone of détente and
peace in Europe.
The Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and
Disarmament in Stockholm, whose works were inaugurated on 17
January 1984, provided the FRG with an additional framework where it
could aspire to play a relatively influential role in shaping the
discussion of security issues. The conference was a derivation of the
CSCE; as it will be shown in this chapter by analysing the West German
approach to the conference during its first year, Bonn borrowed a
number of elements from the CSCE and brought along to Stockholm
similar strategies, aims and ambitions. Bonn greatest aspiration,
namely relaunching East-West dialogue through a successful pursuit of
the CDE, remained largely unfulfilled. Indeed, the unfolding of the
Stockholm conference coincided in time with the restart of SovietAmerican negotiations that marked the renewed assertion of the
superpower dialogue in the field of security as the main stage of EastWest relations in the second half of the decade. 1985 was not only the
year of the epochal change marked by Gorbachev’s seizure of power in
the Soviet Union. It was a year of important anniversaries as well. As
the second part of the chapter analyses, West German efforts with
regard to the upcoming celebrations of the year 1985 were directed to
intertwine commemorations of Europe’s past – namely of the fortieth
612 H.A. Winkler, Der lange Weg nach Westen. Band II: Deutsche Geschichte vom «Dritten
Reich» bis zur Wiedervereinigung, p. 392.
215
anniversary of the conclusion of WWII – with celebrations of Europe’s
possible changing future – namely of the tenth anniversary of the
signing of the Helsinki Final Act. This linkage provides an additional
explanation for the significance attributed by the West German Foreign
Office to the ceremony in Helsinki. Besides material achievements, in
the mid-1980s the CSCE continued to serve important purposes of West
German international image as well.
The FRG’s aspirations at the Conference on Confidence and
Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Stockholm
After having stood two tests in Belgrade and Madrid and having
survived major international crisis, the CSCE process had acquired a
certain amount of solidity. A sort of semi-institutionalisation had come
into being in the course of the decade after the signing of the Helsinki
Final Act. A genuine institutionalisation of the CSCE process in the
sense of its bureaucratisation would be realised only after the end of
the Cold War. New CSCE institutions would be established by the 1990
Charter of Paris for a new Europe which would open a new era for the
process of European détente. Its transformation into an international
organisation able to cope with the new tasks and challenges of the postCold War time would bring to the 1994 decision by the Budapest
Summit of changing the name from the CSCE to the Organisation on
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).613 Bureaucratising the
process of multilateral dialogue in Europe remained, instead, out of the
scope of the CSCE as long as the Cold War was in place. All Eastern
offers in this direction had been declined by the Western countries
since the origins of the CSCE.614 The West German Foreign Office had
repeated many times in its strategic papers the reasons underlying this
decline: the nature of the forum for multilateral East-West cooperation
613 See: www.osce.org; and N. Ronzitti, “OSCE peace-keeping”, in The OSCE in the
Maintanance of Peace and Security. Conflict Prevention, Crisis Management and Peaceful
Settlement of Disputes, eds. M. Boethe, N. Ronzitti and A. Rosas (The Hague: Kluwer Law
International, 1997), pp. 237-256, p. 237.
614 J.W. Young, “Western Europe and the end of the Cold War, 1979-1989”, p. 291.
216
should remained flexible and open, as well as its political relevance
high. The requests for bureaucratising the CSCE process advanced by
the Eastern countries entailed the risk of lowering its political value, by
turning it into an empty framework for the freezing of the status quo in
Europe. Hence, as it has been shown in the previous chapters, both
elements – flexibility and involvement of political commitment – had
contributed to rescue the process of European détente from its ultimate
interruption during the tensest phases of bipolar confrontation.
However, a combination of practices, dynamics and rules had
progressively
cemented
over
the
years
beyond
formal
institutionalisation. The CSCE had been taking the shape of a process of
steady learning by doing, wherein diplomats and experts of all
delegations, as well as the planning offices of all participants’ foreign
ministries, had got skilled to know each other’s interests, approaches,
and ways of negotiating. This load of experience had contributed to
bestow a certain degree of continuity on the CSCE process,
notwithstanding changing leaderships and changing international
conditions.
As it had been analysed in this work, the West German diplomacy
was taught some important lessons in the course of the unfolding of the
multilateral détente process, which had been used by Bonn to adjust
the orientation of its policies and its concrete strategies. The experience
collected over a decade of CSCE was put to work by the West German
Foreign Office to prepare and shape the Conference on Confidence and
Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Stockholm – simply
known by its acronym CDE. After a rapid preparatory meeting, which
took place in Helsinki between 25 October and 11 November 1983, the
main works of the CDE opened in the Swedish capital on 17 January
1984.615 The CDE was a rib of the CSCE: its convening and its mandate
had been included in the final document of Madrid after long
615 Vortragender Legationsrat I. Klasse Citron, z.Z. Helsinki, an das Auswärtige Amt,
11.11.1983, in AAPD, 1983, vol. II, doc. 346, p. 1716.
217
negotiations.616 Its participants were the same thirty-five member states
of the CSCE. The CDE was an integral part of the multilateral complex
on which rested European détente. It provided a parallel forum for
political cooperation on security which flanked both the CSCE and the
other multilateral and bilateral forums of negotiations on disarmament
and armament control in place. Hence, its general aim was directed to
enhancing security in Europe and favouring the overall improvement
of East-West relations. According to the West German viewpoint, the
conference in Stockholm served the purpose to show that East-West
dialogue in the mid-Eighties was not exclusively dominated by issues
of missiles deployment.617 This was a way to affirm that,
notwithstanding the stationing of U.S. Pershing II on the West German
territory, cooperation with the East in the field of security could and
should continue.
In times in which MBFR negotiations were permanently deadlocked
and INF negotiations and superpower arms reduction talks had been
broken off for an undefined period of time,618 Bonn identified in the
CDE an adequate occasions to relaunch East-West dialogue on security.
The recent success of the Madrid CSCE against the background of
adverse international circumstances had reinforced the West German
confidence in the means and potential of European détente. As long as
relations of superpowers remained strained, the West German Foreign
Office could continue to nourish its ambition of playing a propulsive
role in East-West affairs. The FRG’s self-representation as a mediator
between the East and the West still had in 1984 a two-fold meaning: it
coincided with Genscher’s genuine ambition to pursue a more
influential foreign policy; and it continued to serve the purpose of
affecting public perceptions of Bonn’s foreign political decisions
616 Erklärung des Bundesministers am 26. Juni 1983 zum Madrider KSZE-Folgetreffen,
24.06.1983, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, vol. 178.879; and Aufzeichnung des
Ministerialdirektors Pfeffer, 16.06.1983, in AAPD, 1983, vol. I, doc. 181, p. 948.
617 Aufzeichnung des Vortragenden Legationsrat I. Klasse von Ploetz, 06.01.1984, in AAPD,
1984, vol. I, doc. 3, p. 17.
618 M. Sæter, “The CSCE Process: Problems and Prospects”, in Current Research on Peace
and Violence, vol. 8, No. 3/4 (1985), pp. 133-136, p. 133.
218
positively. Particularly in the wake of the unpopular decision made by
the federal government of proceeding with the stationing of new
American weapons on the West German territory, matters of selfrepresentation were carefully handled by the Auswäertiges Amt in the
public sphere. As an example, State Secretary Meyer-Landrut was
meticulously instructed to highlight, on occasion of his participation in
the popular television show Kontraste on Germany’s first broadcaster
ARD, the central role played by the Bundesrepublik in bringing together
the two superpowers during the last years of bipolar tension.619
From the West German viewpoint, the general aims and foreign
political usefulness of the CDE were consistent with the broader
framework of multilateral détente. In order to repeat in Stockholm the
successful outcome of the Madrid conference, there were a number of
elements that the CDE should borrow from the experience of the CSCE.
First, the West German Foreign Office aimed at reproducing at the
CDE, mutatis mutandis, the structure laid down by the Helsinki Final
Act.620 The partition of negotiations in thematic Baskets had provided a
successful procedural solution at the CSCE: it had consented to pursue
parallel negotiations in different areas with a certain autonomy, by
keeping constantly an eye on improvements made in other fields.
Drawing inspiration from the CSCE scheme, Bonn had in mind to
divide the work at the CDE amongst different commissions working in
parallel.621 This would allow interconnecting strategically separate
negotiation tracks, i.e. to use Eastern interests in some areas to force
concessions in other areas. This aim would be attained only in
December 1984, as all delegations would decide to restructure the CDE
in working groups, after one year of sterile negotiations. 622 Second, the
contents of the CSCE Basket I provided the basis for negotiations on
disarmament. Indeed, the proposal package tabled by the Western
delegations on 24 January 1984 built significantly upon the Helsinki
619 Aufzeichnung des Vortragenden Legationsrat I. Klasse von Ploetz, 06.01.1984, in AAPD,
1984, vol. I, doc. 3, p. 19.
620 Ibid., p. 18.
621 Ibid.
622 J. Freeman, Security and the CSCE process. The Stockholm Conference and Beyond, p. 99.
219
CBMs, by putting forward provisions for sizeable improvements and
expansion of existing measures.623 Third, according to what West
German diplomacy had always advocated at the CSCE, pragmatism
should inform the conduction of negotiations: any “take it or leave it”
approach should be put aside and Soviet conference interests – in the
case of the CDE mainly ideological – should be strategically used to
force Eastern delegations to make concessions on Western demands.624
Moreover, there were other elements that the CDE shared with the
CSCE: the high political rank of the conference, marked by the presence
of the participants’ foreign ministers at the inaugural session; the
grouping of delegations into a number of main groups (namely, the
NATO, the Warsaw Pact and the NNA groups) and sub-groups
(namely the EC-group – with a limited role – and the Nordic group – a
loose gathering of NATO’s and NNA delegations coming from the
same area) and the configuration of alliances (with NATO’s and NNA
delegations sharing a common view notwithstanding different nuances
with regard to single proposals and goals).625
On its whole, Bonn’s idea of the CDE in Stockholm was consistent
with the West German general conception of realistic détente and with
the assessment of the West German possibilities of diplomatic success.
This second element explained Bonn’s insistence that an important part
of negotiations in Stockholm should be devoted – besides debates on
concrete measures – to the discussion of the principle of renouncing the
use of force.626 According to the West German position, debates on the
formulation of the principle should start from the beginning of the
conference. This idea contrasted with the approach to the conference of
other Western partners, especially with the French one. France held a
strong interest in the conference on disarmament, which originated
from the initial idea formulated by Giscard d’Estaing in 1978 and which
French diplomacy had been the first advocate of before and during the
623 For a more insightful analysis of the Western proposal package, see: ibid., p. 93.
624 Aufzeichnung Botschafter Ruth, in AAPD, 1984, vol. I, doc. 11, 18.01.1984, p. 56.
625 J. Freeman, Security and the CSCE process. The Stockholm Conference and Beyond, p. 96.
626 Ibid.
220
Madrid CSCE. As French Ambassador Andréani explained to West
German State Secretary Meyer-Landrut in January 1984, Western
delegations had to proceed in Stockholm according to the principle of
“first things first”: i.e. negotiations should focus first on concrete
measures; issues of principle could be eventually discussed in a
ensuing phase, as conclusive crowning of the conference.627 Bonn
opposed to the French position motivations which entailed, once again,
general tactical considerations, its own foreign political interests, as
well as its own vision of détente. The multilateral recognition of the
principle of renouncing the use of force was a Soviet request which had
consequently to be handled with some caution. It had been proposed
by the Warsaw Pact in January 1983 and relaunched by Gromyko
before the start of negotiations in Stockholm:628 the definition of a treaty
on the non-use of force was one of the broad “political proposals”
demanded by the Soviet foreign minister in order to remediate to the
dangerous climate created by the NATO deployment. 629 The
recognition of the principle would provide further reassurance to the
Eastern enduring security worries. It offered, moreover, an adequate
handhold for Soviet ideological aims: after the armed track of NATO’s
security strategy had been implemented, the Soviet bloc was compelled
to rethink what the long-sought conference could be immediately used
for.630 Bonn aimed at repeating the successful two-fold strategy Western
delegations had devised at the Madrid CSCE when negotiating the
CDE: first, the Warsaw Pact’s interest in attaining the principle of
renouncing the use of force should be used as a lever to obtain Eastern
concessions in other fields; second, Western delegations should commit
themselves to the formulation of the principle, by shaping it as much as
possible according to their own view and interest. 631 Focusing on
negotiations on the principle of non-use of force provided West
627 Aufzeichnung des Vortragenden Legationsrat I. Klasse von Ploetz, 06.01.1984, in AAPD,
1984, vol. I, doc. 3, p. 17 (footnote 19).
628 The proposal was contained in the declaration of the Political Council of the Warsaw
Pact which gathered in Prague on 4-5 January 1983: see AAPD, 1983, vol. I, p. 40.
629 J. Freeman, Security and the CSCE process. The Stockholm Conference and Beyond, p. 98.
630 Ibid., p. 91.
631 Aufzeichnung des Botschafters Ruth, 19.03.1984, in AAPD, 1984, vol. I, doc. 85, p. 428.
221
German diplomacy, moreover, with other tactical advantages: namely,
the West German delegation could aspire to play a more prominent
role in discussions on non-use of force than in other negotiations areas
wherein, given the more technical matters at stake, the positions of
other NATO’s bigger partners would undoubtedly have greater
weight. With regard to the contents of the principle of non-use of force,
the FRG intended to reach in Stockholm the assertion of a common
reinforced formulation entailing some potential for change: namely, the
principle should be directed to overcoming the 1968 Brezhnev’s
Doctrine and to avoiding the repetition of unilateral international
intervention as the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.632 A shared
recognition of the principle of non-use of force, together with further
improvements of the CBMs and an agreement in the field of
conventional forces in Europe – which represented another primal
conference interest of the FRG – would contribute, according to the
West German viewpoint, to make East-West relations in the field of
military security more stable and calculable in the immediate future. 633
The duality of stabilisation and change, underpinning the idea that
pursuing stabilisation in the present would pave the way to change in
the future and marking the theoretical approach of the Bundesrepublik to
the CSCE process, was reconfirmed by the West German conception of
what the Stockholm conference would and should be.
The West German delegation, guided by Ambassador Klaus-Jürgen
Citrus, committed itself to playing a propulsive role within the Western
European caucus.634 As at the CSCE negotiations, the West German
Foreign Office’s first task consisted in collecting the necessary
consensus of the Western allies around its own conference aims.
During the first months of 1984 West German diplomacy worked on
convincing the sceptical Western partners – particularly the French and
the Americans, who considered discussions on principles of secondary
632 Ibid.
633 Aufzeichnung Botschafter Ruth, 18.01.1984, in AAPD, 1984, vol. I, doc. 11, p. 53.
634 Botschafter Citron, Stockholm (KVAE-Delegation), 19.12.1984, in AAPD, 1984, vol. II, doc.
348, p. 1596.
222
importance and likely to be eventually postponed to the last phase of
the conference 635 – of the opportunity to develop a common operative
concept of non-use of force, in conformity with the Western conference
goals and with the West German conception.636 A first signal of opening
came from the U.S. administration in the late spring of 1984. In his
Dublin’s speech on 4 June 1984, Reagan proposed to discuss at the
Stockholm CDE the formulation of the principle of non-use of force in
return for the Soviet commitment to negotiations on technical aspects
of CBMs. The U.S. shift opened the way to the inclusion of the principle
into the list of Western conference aims.637 Bonn’s Foreign Office
welcomed this turn with satisfaction. But the meaning of Reagan’s
move went far beyond the internal dynamics within the Western
caucus, as well as beyond the strict development of the conference on
disarmament in Stockholm. The American foreign political strategy
towards the Soviet Union was preparing a major shift during the
months of Reagan’s second election campaign which would bring to
the President re-election on 6 November 1984. Reagan’s speech in
Dublin contained, indeed, a much more relevant message: it
represented an invitation directed to the other superpower to return to
the main negotiation table and resume bilateral talks on nuclear arms
reduction.638
635 The French and the Americans were the most sceptical. Andréani had repeated to
Meyer Landrut in January 1984, what he had already explained to West German
ministerial director Pfeffer in December 1983: Paris was not against the idea itself of using
negotiations on the principle of non-use of force as a lever to obtain concession from
Moscow; but in the French strategy the formulation of the principle was postponed to an
undefined future, as conclusive crowning of the Stockholm conference. See: AAPD, 1983,
vol. II, doc. 394. With regard to the U.S. position, President Reagan had pointed out in
January 1984 that the issue was not amongst his priorities: “First, we need to find ways to
reduce – and eventually to eliminate – the threat and use of force in solving international
disputes”. See: Aufzeichnung der Abteilung 2, 09.03.1984, in AAPD, 1984, vol. I, doc. 76, p.
383.
636 Aufzeichnung der Abteilung 2, 9.03.1984, in AAPD, 1984, vol. I, doc. 76, p. 380-389.
637 Aufzeichnung des Vortragenden Legationsrats I. Klasse Hartmann, 27.07.1984, in AAPD,
1984, vol. II, doc. 209, p. 959.
638 Aufzeichnung des Vortragenden Legationsrat I. Klasse Holik, in AAPD, 1984, vol. I, doc.
167, 08.06.1984, p. 807.
223
New ways for cooperation on security: the restart of the
superpower dialogue in the mid-Eighties
The first year of the Conference on Confidence and Security
Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe came to conclusion on
14 December 1984 without any significant result.639 Negotiations had
proceeded in a sterile manner through the largest part of the first
conference year, under the influence of the lengthening impact of the
NATO deployment of the fall of 1983.640 Between September and
December 1984 debates had taken on a more business-like character –
even though they had focused mainly on procedural issues – as a
consequence of the beginning of a progressive shift in the Soviet
attitude. By assessing what possible future developments would mark
the CDE in the following year, West German chief delegator Citron
observed that, in respect with the CSCE, the destiny of the conference
in Stockholm would more strongly depend on the willingness to
negotiate of the superpowers.641 The unfolding of the Stockholm CDE
during 1984 coincided with a moment of transition in East-West
relations. The balance of power between the two Cold War blocs was
under redefinition after the implementation of the armed track of
NATO’s dual-track decision. In its wake, the Soviet bloc started a
process of redefinition of its security strategy and international
interests. The U.S. administration was preparing to shift its political
course towards the Soviet Union. The balance of power between
European detente and superpower détente was undergoing a major
change as well.
The works of the CDE would continue until September 1986, when
an agreement would be reached in Stockholm. It would be the first
639 The fourth negotiation round took place between 6 November and 14 December 1984;
the previous three rounds took place, respectively, between 17 January and 16 March
1984, between 8 May and 6 July 1984, and between 11 September and 12 October 1984.
640 J. Freeman, Security and the CSCE process. The Stockholm Conference and Beyond, p. 98.
641 Botschafter Citron, Stockholm (KVAE-Delegation), an das Auswärtige Amt, 19.12.1984, in
AAPD, 1984, vol. II, doc. 348, p. 1597.
224
important agreement in the field of security since the formulation of the
1975 Helsinki’s CBM-provisions and the 1979 signing of SALT II. 642 It
would be also the first agreement signed in the new era of superpower
dialogue which slowly began in the mid-Eighties. Being the CDE an
emanation of the CSCE process, its concluding document represented
an important improvement in the field of the CSCE security chapter. 643
Hence, its successful conclusion could be interpreted more as an
outcome of the restart of American-Soviet negotiations rather than an
achievement of European détente. It marked the omen of a changing
trend: bilateral superpower talks on arms reduction would provide the
decisive forum where important decisions in the field of security would
be taken in the second half of the Eighties. Against West German
aspirations, multilateral negotiation frameworks – as the CDE in
Stockholm, MBFR negotiations in Vienna and the UN Conference on
Disarmament in Geneva – would represent quite secondary stages.
The declared aim of the conference in Stockholm was to relaunch
East-West dialogue and mark the beginning of a new phase of
cooperation in Europe.644 In January 1984, directly before the conference
start, West German Ambassador at the NATO headquarters Ruth had
predicted that the conference in Stockholm could “give a hint to a
profound process of rethinking in Moscow”.645 The prediction of a
CDE’s influence on political changes in the Soviet Union turned out to
be overrated. A major political shift did occur in the Soviet Union in the
mid-Eighties. Its preparation and realisation was mainly interwoven
with the return of the superpower dialogue on the international stage.
On 7-8 January 1985 the American and Soviet foreign ministers met
in Geneva to resume talks on disarmament. Schultz und Gromyko
decided to restart negotiations on disarmament with the common goal
of taking effective actions to reduce nuclear intercontinental and
middle-range weapons, to hinder the space arms race and to reinforce
642 J. Freeman, Security and the CSCE process. The Stockholm Conference and Beyond, p. 141.
643 Ibid., 142.
644 Aufzeichnung Botschafter Ruth, 18.01.1984, in AAPD, 1984, vol. I, doc. 11, p. 53.
645 Ibid., p. 58.
225
strategic stability.646 This bilateral meeting marked the gradual return
of the superpower dialogue which would dominate East-West relations
in the second half of the 1980s. The restart of Soviet-American talks on
arms control and disarmament was a slow-moving process on which
the numerous conflicts and episodes of mistrust of the previous years
weighed importantly. Its path was shaped by important domestic
developments occurring both in the Soviet Union and in the U.S.
between 1984 and 1985.
With regard to the USSR, old Soviet leader Andropov died in
February 1984 after a long illness and was replaced by another old
apparatchiki, Konstantin Chernenko, who would die as well only a
year after, in March 1985.647 The youngest member of the Politburo was
elected as Chernenko’s successor thanks to the decisive vote of Andrei
Gromyko: on 11 March 1985 the time of Mikhail Gorbachev as new
leader of the USSR was inaugurated, marking an epochal change in the
Soviet domestic and foreign political course. With regard the other
superpower, a major foreign political shift occurred in the U.S. within a
framework of power continuity. During the unfolding of his second
presidential election campaign in 1984, Ronald Regan decided to
change the direction of his foreign political program: the assertive antiSoviet tones which had dominated Reagan’s first mandate were
replaced by repeated invitations to Moscow to focus on the shared
interests of the superpowers and work together on the reduction of
nuclear armaments.648
Reagan’s invitations to renewed superpower cooperation did not go
unheard. After Soviet initial hesitation, a first step towards the restart
of superpower talks on arms reduction took place in the fall of 1984, as
Reagan and Schultz met Gromyko on 26 and 28-29 September in New
646“’Auf keinen Fall Öl ins Feuer.‘ Hans-Dietrich Genscher im Gespräch mit Dieter
Buhl“, in Die Zeit, 40/1985, 27.09.1985.
647 V.M. Zubok. A Failed Empire. The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev,
p. 276.
648 F. Romero, Storia della Guerra Fredda. L’ultimo conflitto perl’Europa, p. 304.
226
York in the margins of the UN General Assembly. 649 In their respective
addresses in front of the General Assembly, both Reagan and Gromyko
reaffirmed the superpowers’ responsibility for the management of the
world affairs. Reagan proposed to Gromyko regular talks on regional
questions and greater commitment to achieving concrete results at the
MBFR negotiations in Vienna, at the Conference on Confidence and
Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Stockholm, and in the
field of nuclear armaments.650 These initiatives for renewed bipolar
cooperation were observed and assessed with some caution in Bonn.
Reagan’s willingness to resume negotiations with Moscow
undoubtedly pleased West German needs for a relaxation of East-West
relations. However, Bonn’s Foreign Office looked with some
preoccupation at the hidden risks of resurgent bilateralism: the fact that
Europe had been addressed as a “regional problem” in Reagan’s and
Gromyko’s speeches in front of the UN General Assembly roused
concerns about a possible limitation of that relative room of manoeuvre
that European initiatives had hardly gained in the course of the last
decade.651 Quite significantly, when assessing the resuming of talks
between the superpowers, the West German Foreign Office pointed out
that: “our statement ‘we cannot replace the dialogue between the
superpowers’ should now be paralleled by an U.S. similar statement
affirming its will not to replace the European and CSCE partners’
efforts for dialogue, cooperation and stability in Europe. Both forms of
dialogue have to complete each other”.652 The other face of the desire of
protecting multilateral détente from the turbulences of the superpower
relationship was the wish to protect the prosecution of multilateral
détente from the superpower monopoly over the management of East649 Botschafter Ruth, z.Z. Washington, an das Auswärtige Amt, 29.09.1984, in AAPD, 1984,
vol. II, doc. 259, pp. 1190-1191.
650 Ministerialdirektor Edler von Braunmühl, z.Z. New York, an das Auswärtige Amt,
26.09.1984, in AAPD, 1984, vol. II, doc. 244, p. 1121 (footnote 7).
651 For the assessment of the West German Foreign Office of the meaning of the resumed
dialogue between the superpowers, see: Aufzeichnung des Ministerialdirigenten Edler von
Braunmühl, 2.10.1984, in AAPD, 1984, vol. II, doc. 262, p. 1199.
652 Aufzeichnung des Ministerialdirigenten Edler von Braunmühl, 2.10.1984, in AAPD, 1984,
vol. II, doc. 262, p. 1203.
227
West dialogue. Even though the resuming of American-Soviet
negotiations was still in embryo in the second half of 1984, it is
interesting to see how rapidly the West German Foreign Office
identified the intrinsic perils that this return could involved for its
ambitions of playing an influential international role between the East
and the West.
Times had changed since the early Seventies, when the parallel
projects of European détente and superpower détente had been
conceived and first put into practice. The conditions underlying
Washington’s decision to move towards a more cooperative course
with Moscow were profoundly different in the mid-Eighties: the U.S.
administration proposed now to negotiate on arms control from an
established position of undisputed force. Similarly, the reasons of the
Soviet consent were different: in the course of the Eighties the USSR
growingly needed to relieve itself of its most burdensome military
encumbrances.653 As Romero has rightly observed, Washington’s return
to dialogue in the mid-Eighties did not represent a return to Kissinger’s
project of superpower détente.654 The framing conditions of European
détente had changed as well. As the momentum of convergence with
the interests of the superpower dialogue had disappeared, European
détente had learnt to survive on its own legs. European détente –
namely the CSCE process – had undoubtedly had the great merit of
allowing East-West dialogue not to be interrupted during the tensest
years of the bipolar relationship. However, its triumph by default over
superpower détente had led some of its participants – the FRG on the
frontline – to somewhat overestimate its international role within the
broader framework of Cold War relations. As it has been analysed in
the previous chapters, the FRG, as one of the key player of European
détente, had developed a good deal of self-confidence in the potential
for change of European détente in the course of the troubled unfolding
of the CSCE. West German Foreign Minister Genscher stressed in front
of his NATO partners, once again in December 1984, that the CSCE
653 T. Judt, Postwar. A History of Europe since 1945, p. 600.
654 F. Romero, Storia della Guerra Fredda. L’ultimo conflitto perl’Europa, p. 304.
228
process provided the adequate political framework for the pursuit of
the superpower dialogue, by completing it thanks to the manifold
nature of its contents.655 Bonn’s insistence on including the re-emergent
superpower dialogue into a single, comprehensive landscape was
largely motivated by the desire to continue to have its say in matters
directly affecting West German vital national and international
interests; and by the aspiration not to renounce to the international
room of manoeuvre Bonn’s diplomacy had conquered with great effort
during the last decade.
A symbolic year: commemorating the common past, looking to the
common future
1985 was an important year from a symbolic viewpoint. Two
important anniversaries fell within the space of few months: they both
were of particular significance for the FRG. The first was the fortieth
anniversary of the end of WWII and of the Potsdam conference. The
recurrence reminded West Germans of the painful origins of their
democratic rebirth and of the territorial, political and psychological
restrictions which still affected their national and international identity.
The second was the tenth anniversary of the signing of the Helsinki
Accords, i.e. of the founding act of the multilateral process of détente
which had provided the FRG with vaster foreign political possibilities
and had contributed to reinforce its international emancipation.
The two anniversaries were tied by a fil rouge which intertwined
Germany’s past, present and future. They touched some West German
very sensitive nerves: whilst the first recalled the roots of Germany’s
and Europe’s division, the second addressed the possibilities for its
future overcoming. Hence, it is not surprising that the respective
organisations of both celebrations interacted with each other as well.
The West German Foreign Office tried deliberately to establish a
655 Botschafter Wieck, Brüssel (NATO), an das Auswärtige Amt, 14.12.1984, in AAPD, 1984,
vol. II, doc. 339, p. 1557; and Runderlass des Vortragenden Legationsrat I. Klasse Schneppen,
19.12.1984, ibid., doc. 349, p. 1599.
229
linkage between the organisation of the celebrations for the anniversary
of WWII’s conclusion and the organisation of the ceremony for the first
ten years of European détente. Being important matters of West
German international image involved in the celebration of both
anniversaries, the ceremonies in their memories were carefully
prepared within the Auswärtiges Amt and by West German diplomacy
already starting from 1984.
West German diplomatic efforts were devoted to shape the political
meaning of the upcoming celebrations of the year 1985, as much as
possible, according to the FRG’s view. The anniversary of the
conclusion of WWII was particular worrisome for Bonn. The federal
government’s aim was avoiding that the focus of celebrations would
excessively lay on the issue of Germany’s defeat. 656 A demonstration of
what Bonn feared that the ceremony on 8 May 1985 would turn into
was provided by the celebrations of the D-Day on 6 June 1944, i.e. of
the landings operation which had marked the beginning of the
liberation of German-occupied Western Europe. The dilemma whether
a West German delegation would be present at the commemorative
ceremony in Pointe du Hoc represented for Bonn a crucial issue of
great diplomatic significance. The list of invites was limited to all those
who could be counted amongst the winners of the Normandy landings:
the heads of state and government of the six countries which had
participated in the military operation, namely the U.S. President, the
British Queen, the Prime Minister of Canada, the Kings of Norway and
Belgium, the Queen of Netherlands; the Grand Duke of Luxembourg,
who had participated in the landing at Normandy as an officer of the
British army; and the ministers of defence of those countries whose big
contingents of soldiers had taken part in the operation, namely Poland,
Denmark, Greece and Czechoslovakia. 657 The configuration of the
ceremony for the D-Day seemed to be marked by a symbolically
divisive character which greatly displeased Bonn. The Auswärtiges Amt
656 Botschafter Ruth, z.Z. Washington, an das Auswärtige Amt, 30.11.1984, in AAPD, 1984,
vol. II, doc. 325, pp. 1498-1503.
657 Botschafter Scholler, Paris, an das Auswärtige Amt, 07.06.1984, in AAPD, 1984, vol. I, doc.
164, p. 795.
230
had informed its three big Western allies – France, the U.S. and the U.K.
– of its preference for shaping celebrations, as far as it was possible, as a
forward-looking event whose meaning should not be limited to a mere
memory of the past. Celebrations in Normandy should be respectful,
according to the words of West German Ambassador in Paris Scholler,
of “the present position of the Bundesrepublik as a democratic
constitutional state and a loyal member of the Western Alliance and of
the European Community”.658 Bonn was aware of the fact that the
German past imposed unavoidable duties and responsibilities, with
whom the FRG had to cope with. Bonn’s attempt was directed,
however, to transform the commemoration of the past into an occasion
of reaffirmed reconciliation. Initially, West German requests did not
find positive reception in Paris. Indeed, as Ambassador Schoeller
reported to Bonn, French President Mitterrand attached special
importance to the commemoration of the landing at Normandy. The
stress on reconciliation wished by West Germans would be more
suitable as symbolic cornerstones of the celebrations of 8 May the year
after.659 The awkwardness of the West German relations with its
European allies with regard to their common but different past
prevented Bonn from taking any assertive initiatives to convince Paris.
The decision to rule out the presence of a West German delegation at
the celebrations in Normandy was, however, reason of disappointment
for Bonn. As it was assessed in the Auswärtiges Amt, the fact that the
exclusion of the FRG at the commemorative ceremony on 6 June 1984
fell in a month marked by numerous important meetings of the
Western Alliance did highlight even more the enduring existence of
demarcation lines amongst the Western partners. 660 Ultimately, even
though the FRG was not represented in Normandy, it received a moral
reward through its mentioning in Mitterrand’s address in Pointe du
Hoc. In the passage concerning the past confrontation with Germany,
after remembering German war victims and partisans, the French
658 Ibid.
659 Ibid. (footnote 3).
660 Ibid. (footnote 3).
231
president reminded that: “L’ennemi de l’époque n’était pas l’Allemagne
mais le pouvoir, le système, l’idéologie qui s’étaient emparés d’elle”.661
Few months after the celebrations for the Normandy landings,
another important anniversary was commemorated in France, this time
in the presence of the West German Chancellor. On 22 September 1984
Mitterrand and Kohl were together on the battlefield of Verdun to
honour the victims of the longest battle of WWI, quintessence of the
bloodbath marking Europe’s history at the beginning of the century.
The symbolic value of the ceremony staged in Verdun was welcomed
with coolness by a large part of the European press: most reports did
not forget to highlight that it had the meaning of a palliative
consolation for the exclusion of the West German chancellor at the
fortieth anniversary of the D-Day.662 To the contrary, the celebration in
Verdun was praised by Bonn’s federal government as an additional
crucial reaffirmation of the solidity of the French-German entente.
From a pragmatic viewpoint, the spirit of reconciliation dominating in
Verdun gave clear indications, according to Bonn, on the right way to
follow for remembering the past in view of the upcoming anniversaries
of 1985.663
The commemoration of the fortieth anniversary of the conclusion of
WWII on 8 May 1945 represented, for several reasons, a delicate
appointment for the FRG. It was the day of remembrance of Germany’s
defeat. It recalled the responsibilities of the Nazis for the rage of the
war and for the crimes committed against humanity. It reminded the
Germans and the world of the clear-cut division between Europe’s
liberators and war winners on the one side and Europe’s occupants and
war defeated on the other side. The issue of war’s defeat still remained
in the Eighties a sensitive issues for the FRG: for a country which had
661 Not without satisfaction, West German Ambassador in Paris Scholler reported to
Bonn that the German passage of Mitterrand’s speech was the one receiving greatest
attention on French television. See: Botschafter Scholler, Paris, an das Auswärtige Amt,
07.06.1984, in AAPD, 1984, vol. I, doc. 164, p. 796.
662 Aufzeichnung des Ministerialdirigenten Schauer, 26.09.1984, in AAPD, 1984, vol. II, doc.
242, p. 1116.
663 Ibid.
232
built its postwar identity on the pursuit of a full integration into the
family of Western democracies, every element or circumstance echoing
back to the existence of a German special path was carefully handled
by the West German federal government. Quite significantly, in an
internal paper drafted by ministerial director Pfeffer on the issue of the
commemoration of 8 May, the formulation according to which “the
defeat of Germany had paved the way to the rebirth of democracy in
the Western part of the country” was replaced by the recognition that
“Hitler’s fall had led to the liberation of Western Europe and to the rebirth of
democracy in the Western part of the country”.664 It was not only
opportune to single out Hitler’s responsibilities for Germany’s defeat; it
was of the utmost importance, as well, to tie Germany’s destiny to the
common European destiny.
Even though the FRG had managed to consolidate over the postwar
decades its position as an integral part of the Western Alliance, the
burden of the past continued to affect the country’s relations with its
Western partners. The fortieth anniversary of the end of WWII
reminded Bonn of another bitter truth, i.e. that its national settlement
remained dependent on the decisions of its allies.665 The former capital
of the German Reich was the quintessential symbol of this lasting
dependency: decisions about the arrangement for postwar Germany
had been taken in Berlin; questions concerning the status of the divided
city continued to be item of regular debate between Bonn, its allies and
the Soviet Union throughout the whole duration of the Cold War. 666
664 Aufzeichnung des Ministerialdirektors Pfeffer, 8.11.1984, in AAPD, 1984, vol. II, doc. 298,
p. 1390
665 In the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin signed on 3 September 1971, the Four
Powers had reaffirmed the validity of their joint rights and responsibilities over Berlin
and Germany as a whole.
666 The main questions with regard the status of Berlin, discussed after the signing of the
1971 Quadripartite Agreement, concerned: first, the extension of the validity of
international treaties signed by the FRG to West Berlin (see: AAPD, 1977, vol. I, doc. 382);
second, the inclusion of West Berlin into the 1979 direct election of the European
Parliament (see: AAPD, 1976, vol. II, doc. 231); third, the establishment of a Federal
Environment Agency in West Berlin. One important regular forum of discussion on
inner-German and Berlin questions was provided by the routine of the meetings of the
233
Hence, the U.S. proposal to organise a commemorative ceremony on 8
May 1985 in the city of Berlin did not enjoy the West German favour.
As pointed out by the Auswärtiges Amt in an internal paper, the FRG
did not want to appear, on occasion of the anniversary of the end of
WWII, as an object of international affairs.667 As Kohl confirmed to
Reagan in the course of his visit to Washington at end of November
1984, the West German federal government intended to take care of the
anniversary and to take part in the celebrations together with the
Western allies.668 Bonn’s idea was to shape the commemoration of the
anniversary as a celebration of reconciliation between former enemies,
by lessening distinctions between winners and losers: whilst an “EastWest Verdun” did not seem to be feasible because of the tense state of
international relations, a sort of “Verdun within the Western Alliance”
could be instead realised.669 Insisting on the aspect of reconciliation
implied, according to the West German viewpoint, not restricting
celebrations to the mere commemoration of the past, but focusing
instead of the ensuing positive developments that had sprung from the
conclusion of the war.
It was during his talks with American Secretary of State Schultz at
the end of 1984 that Genscher advanced the proposal of tying the
commemoration on 8 May 1985 with the celebrations of the tenth
anniversary of the signing of the Helsinki Final Act.670 This operation
would offer the possibility to commemorate Europe’s common past,
foreign ministers of the FRG, the U.S., the U.K. and France, which traditionally took place
in conjunction with the gatherings of NATO’s Council of Ministers. The coordination
between the Bundesrepublik and the three Western partners was two-way: on the one
hand, Bonn was offered the possibility to be involved and have voice in the decisions
regarding Berlin – for whose status the three powers shared the responsibility with the
Soviet Union; on the other hand, Bonn was asked to keep constantly informed the
Western partners about the pursuit of its bilateral relations with the GDR.
667 Aufzeichnung des Ministerialdirektors Pfeffer, 8.11.1984, in AAPD, 1984, vol. II, doc. 298,
p. 1390.
668 Botschafter Ruth, z.Z. Washington, an das Auswärtige Amt, 30.11.1984, in AAPD, 1984,
vol. II, doc. 325, pp. 1498-1503.
669 Ibid.
670 Ministerialdirektor Pfeffer, z.Z. Brüssel, an das Auswärtige Amt, 13.12.1984, in AAPD,
1984, vol. II, doc. 388, p. 1552.
234
looking at the same time towards Europe’s common future. Bonn had
put a peculiar stress on the future-oriented character of the CSCE since
its origins, by advocating the idea that the steady improvement of the
process of détente would create the favourable conditions for the
overcoming of the continent’s division and for the solution to the
German question. In 1985 the future-oriented character of the CSCE
process served to another purpose as well: i.e. to cope with the most
problematic aspects of the remembrance of the German past and with
its enduring legacies still weighing on the FRG’s international image.
The linkage with the commemoration of the fortieth anniversary of the
end of WWII helps explain Bonn’s insistence, in the course of 1984, on
the necessity of preparing carefully the celebrations of the tenth
anniversary of the CSCE and deciding in due time at what political
level the ceremony in Helsinki would take place.671 Genscher sponsored
the idea of gathering at the level of foreign ministers, as he had done
beforehand when preparing the Madrid CSCE. The process of
European détente continued to require the highest political
commitment of its participants. As commented by West German
foreign policy analyst Christoph Bertram: “foreign ministers would go
to Helsinki not just for a class reunion of memories; they could instead
continue to work on shaping the future.”672
Celebrating ten years of European détente: a final reappraisal
As Genscher has recalled in his memoirs, the celebration of the tenth
anniversary of the CSCE, which took place in Helsinki between 31 July
and 1 August 1985, was mainly a West German initiative. 673 According
to the West German wish, the foreign ministers of the thirty-five
participant states of the CSCE participate in the ceremony in the
671 Botschafter Wieck, Brüssel (NATO), an das Auswärtige Amt, 14.12.1984, in AAPD, 1984,
vol. II, doc. 339, p. 1557.
672 C. Bertram, “Ein Schlingerkiel für die Entspannung. Bilanz und Ausblicke zehn Jahre
nach Helsinki”, in Die Zeit, 31/1985, 26.07.1985.
673 H.D. Genscher, Erinnerungen, p. 317.
235
Finnish capital. The significance of the gathering limited itself to its
symbolic value: neither the thirty-five foreign ministers agreed on a
common declaration – apart from proclaiming their vague willingness
to continue the CSCE process and deepen cooperation in the field of
economy and environment – nor any tangible impulse was given to the
future development of the CSCE.674 The real element of novelty of the
ceremony in Helsinki was represented by the international debut of
new Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze.675 After Soviet foreign
policy had been under Gromyko’s steady direction for 27 years,
Shevardnadze’s appointment was surrounded by diffuse curiosity and
many expectations in Western Europe.
Hence, at the celebrations of European détente everyone’s eyes were
focused on the superpowers. As contemporary policy analyst
Christoph Bertram commented, relations between the superpowers in
Helsinki were very affable.676 If on the one hand Soviet Foreign
Minister Shevardnadze recalled in his speech at the plenary session the
urgent necessity of peaceful coexistence,677 on the other hand U.S.
Secretary of State Georg Schultz spoke in Helsinki of the possibility of
opening a “new era” of international politics.678 Similarly to the CDE in
Stockholm, the meeting in Helsinki on 31 July-1 August 1985 did
represent more a test for the willingness to cooperate of the
superpowers rather than a test for the willingness to improve the
process of European détente. The significance of the Soviet-American
encounter in the Finnish capital was mainly assessed by commentators
and foreign policy analysts of the time through the lenses of the
upcoming bilateral appointment of November 1985, when Reagan and
Gorbachev would meet for the first time. It would be the first time that
a U.S. president and a Soviet leader would come face to face with each
674 Ibid.
675 C. Schmidt-Häuer, „Schnellere Züge auf dem Schachbrett“, in Die Zeit, 32/1985,
02.08.1985.
676 C. Bertram, „Zum Gipfel recht gerüstet?“, in Die Zeit, 33/1985, 09.08.1985.
677 H.D. Genscher, Erinnerungen, p. 317.
678 “Genscher warnt vor Wechselbädern”, in Der Spiegel, 32/1985, 05.08.1985.
236
other since the last meeting between Carter and Brezhnev in 1979.679
Quite significantly, Gorbachev gave evidence of some new flexibility in
foreign policy before the CSCE foreign ministers gathered in Helsinki
to celebrate European détente. The new Soviet leader advanced the
proposal, first, of a unilateral moratorium for all nuclear tests starting
from 6 August 1985 – date of the fortieth anniversary of the bombing of
Hiroshima – and lasting until the end of the year. Second, the Kremlin
smoothed its position on the American SDI project during the arms
reduction talks in Geneva. The Soviet delegation opened, just before the
conclusion of the second negotiation round, to the possibility of
implementing research programmes in the field of anti-ballistic missile
defence systems under certain conditions; moreover, it declared its
availability to discuss the possible dismantling of about 30 percent of
its missile delivering systems and nuclear warheads. 680
Whether and to what extent the improvement of European détente
would benefit from the return of superpower initiative in the field of
East-West dialogue was unclear in the summer of 1985. According to
Christoph Bertram, looking back at the developments of the previous
decade helped answer to the question what the CSCE process could
and could not be in the future.681 In the past ten years of CSCE, setbacks
had been paralleled by important achievements. First, the Helsinki
framework had provided protection for the slow but steady process of
change in the Soviet bloc. After Helsinki, transformations in the field of
East-West contacts had been pursued by the West with the forced
connivance of the Soviet bloc’s communist regimes. Second, the CSCE
process had affirmed itself as an important form of diplomacy by
instalment wherein the ball of dialogue remained steadily in game.
This had allowed, third, Europeanising and stabilising East-West
relations in times of major bipolar tensions. 682 However, the question
679 C. Bertram, „Zum Gipfel recht gerüstet?“, in Die Zeit, 33/1985, 09.08.1985.
680 C. Schmidt-Häuer, „Schnellere Züge auf dem Schachbrett“, in Die Zeit, 32/1985,
02.08.1985.
681 C. Bertram, “Ein Schlingerkiel für die Entspannung. Bilanz und Ausblicke zehn Jahre
nach Helsinki”, in Die Zeit, 31/1985, 26.07.1985.
682 Ibid.
237
the participants of the CSCE were compelled to answer to in the
summer of 1985 was whether the framework of the process of
European détente would still be valid in the future under changing
international conditions.683 In an interview released in August 1985,
Genscher declared that East-West relations were at the beginning of a
new era in which the West German Foreign Office would continue its
realistic policy of détente with unchanged efforts.684
The CSCE process had always represented an important indicator of
the state of health of bipolar relations. Once more, the 1985 gathering of
the CSCE foreign ministers in Helsinki served the purpose to test the
direction of the changing dynamics East-West relations were going
through. The return of the superpower dialogue changed the
conditions that had underlain the unfolding of multilateral détente.
Whereas Genscher declared he was intended to give new impulse to
his realistic détente policy towards the East, it was evident that Bonn’s
foreign political possibilities would be compelled to cope with the
ongoing redefinition of Cold War dynamics. As argued by Bertram, in
this new phase of East-West relations the FRG seemed not to play a
central role for the first time since the late Seventies. 685 After his
appointment, Gorbachev had decided to travel first to Paris and Rome;
similarly, his Foreign Minister Shevardnadze met Genscher only at the
end of his tour of visits in the Western European capitals.686 Times had
changed since the era of Schmidt’s Eastern diplomacy of state visits.
The lower profile of West German diplomatic initiatives towards the
East was certainly affected, first, by Kohl’s international vision, which
privileged a pronounced preference for the special relationship with
the U.S.; and second, by the enduring opposition to proactive Eastern
initiatives shared by some large sectors of the CDU. However,
Genscher’s aspirations to play a propulsive role in the process of East-
683 Ibid.
684 “Genscher warnt vor Wechselbädern”, in Der Spiegel, 32/1985, 05.08.1985.
685 C. Bertram, “Ein Schlingerkiel für die Entspannung. Bilanz und Ausblicke zehn Jahre
nach Helsinki”, in Die Zeit, 31/1985, 26.07.1985.
686 “Genscher warnt vor Wechselbädern”, in Der Spiegel, 32/1985, 05.08.1985.
238
West rapprochement were challenged most importantly by the
resumption of the superpower monopoly on East-West dialogue.
To sum up, 1985 represented an important year of transition and
redefinition for the FRG’s international identity. West German foreign
policy was compelled to cope with some major challenges imposed
both by the public confrontation with its own past and by the gradual,
renewed shift in Cold War balances. Analysing how the West German
international role was redefined and redefined itself against the
background of the changing international conditions of the last Cold
War years will be the important task of future historical research.
239
Conclusions
Assessing the meaning of the FRG’s CSCE policy in the years
1975-1985
This thesis has shown that the West German Foreign Office
undertook major efforts to allow the process of multilateral détente in
Europe to continue and improve between 1975 and 1985, on the basis of
the founding grounds laid down in the 1975 Helsinki Final Act. These
efforts aimed primarily at protecting the achievements of East-West
dialogue from the renewed exacerbation of bipolar tensions which
marked international relations between the late Seventies and early
Eighties. This work does not discard traditional interpretations
according to which the CSCE represented for the FRG the necessary
multilateral framework to embed its dynamic policies towards the GDR
(Deutschlandpolitik) and the Soviet bloc (Ostpolitik) and make them
acceptable to the Western partners. However, it challenges the idea that
the meaning of the FRG’s CSCE policy can be reduced to this single
aspect. The multilateral guarantee of Bonn’s bilateral Eastern policies
was only one side of a more complex foreign political project which
involved manifold motivations and aims.
After the formative years of negotiations in Geneva and Helsinki,
the CSCE policy affirmed itself after 1975 as a solid foreign policy
paradigm and a major foreign political priority of the FRG. Improving
the process of multilateral détente was a genuine West German
political interest. As it had been highlighted in this thesis, the
Auswärtiges Amt dedicated a great deal of time and attention to the
preparation of the CSCE meetings: the diplomatic work of coordination
with the Western partners and negotiation with the Eastern and NNA
240
countries was sided by a careful planning within the Foreign Office. A
load of papers addressing strategic considerations and political
orientations, assessments of contingent conditions, course corrections,
evaluations of reached outcomes and previsions of future
developments were drafted by diplomats, officers and policy analysts
working for the Auswärtiges Amt. Bonn’s engagement in the CSCE
process implied a combination of ideal stances, vital national interests and
foreign political ambitions. The analysis of their interweaving explains
why the CSCE process represented a main German question in the years
1975-1985: it involved, directly and indirectly, the manifold dimensions
of the German question (question of intra-European borders and their
change; definition of new shared rules of co-existence; question of trust
building and mutual perceptions; duality of Westpolitik-Ostpolitik;
issues of Germany’s image); it allowed the FRG to pursue its vital
foreign political needs and interests; it provided the FRG with the
framework wherein the federal government could merge the
peculiarities of the country’s geopolitical position with its ambition of
playing a more influential international role.
Ideal inspiration
The 1975 Helsinki Final Act added to the complex of Treaties
negotiated and signed with the Eastern countries during the first
successful phase of Bonn’s new Ostpolitik. On their whole they form the
“constitutional”
corpus
of
West
German
détente.
With
Deutschlandpolitik and Ostpolitik Bonn’s CSCE policy shared the ideal
horizon, too. The aim of building a new European order of peace,
which had been the cornerstone of Bahr’s conception of Ostpolitik and
had been mentioned by Willy Brandt in his acceptance speech on
occasion of the award of the Nobel Peace Prize in Oslo in 1971, 687 was
inherited and pursued by Genscher in the field of the CSCE. As the
West German foreign minister unceasingly repeated in speeches and
interviews, Bonn efforts should be directed to the reinforcement of the
687 For the text of Brandt’s speech of acceptance of the Nobel Peace Prize on 10 December
1971, see at: http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1971/brandtacceptance.html.
241
climate of détente in Europe which would create in the long-term the
favourable conditions for German people to decide in selfdetermination about their unification. The traditional view according to
which Bonn’s Eastern policies suffered from a loss of visionary
inspiration after the important achievements of the years 1969-1973
does not stand scrutiny: the analysis of speeches and public
interventions on issues of East-West dialogue during the second half of
the 1970s and the first half of the 1980s shows that the idealistic thrust
marking West German détente during its formative years remained
nearly unchanged. As Konrad Seitz has put it in his introduction to the
volume collecting a selection of Genscher’s speeches, for the West
German foreign minister multilateral détente was Deutschlandpolitik and
Deutschlandpolitik was multilateral détente.688 Contrary to the argument
according to which the issue of “unification” disappeared from Bonn’s
political agenda since the mid-Seventies, the process of multilateral
détente provided the federal government with an adequate framework
within which the discourse on the German reunification could be
continued.689 Even though strict inner-German issues were always kept
out of the multilateral negotiation agenda at the CSCE meetings both
for Bonn’s and East Berlin’s own will, the proclaimed West German
aim underpinning the process of multilateral détente remained always
to keep the door open to the German reunification in the long-run.
Bonn’s insistence on the importance of multiplying and expanding
human contacts between the blocs – the primal goal pursued by West
German diplomats at the CSCE negotiations – was certainly due to the
wish of improving the present living-conditions of Germans living
688 K. Seitz, “Einleitung” in Deutsche Außenpolitik: ausgewählte Reden und Aufsätze, 19741985, ed. H.D. Genscher, p. XVIII.
689 Beside the CSCE, the UN was the other main stage were the discourse on German
reunification was publicly addressed; references to the division-unification issue were
mentioned by Genscher in his annual speech in front of the General Assembly in New
York. See, for instance: Rede Genschers vor der 30. UNO-Generalversammlung, 24.09.1975, in
PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 179.024; Rede Genschers vor der 34. UNO-Generalversammlung,
27.09.1979, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd. 179.034; Interview Genschers anlässlich seiner
Rede vor der 37. UNO-Generalversammlung, 07.10.1982, in PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, Bd.
179.047.
242
beyond the Iron Curtain. However, it rested upon the awareness, as
well, that improved every-day contacts would pave the way to a
growing interdependence between the two German states and the two
blocs.690
Vital national needs
The prosecution of the CSCE process was of primal importance for
Bonn because it contributed to satisfy the country’s vital interests not
only in the field of human contacts, but in the field of security as well.
The peculiarity of West German security needs has been discussed in
the introduction of the thesis. The FRG’s influence on decisions in the
field of the military security was limited by the existing structural
limitations to the country’s self-reliance in this area. Differently, Bonn’s
diplomacy could aim at having a greater weight when discussing about
security issues within the CSCE framework. This was mainly due to the
existence of multiple interactions amongst the Helsinki Baskets:
through crossed negotiations West German delegators could pursue
the goal – not always successfully – to achieve results in some areas by
making concessions in other areas. Confidence-building measures and
the Conference on Disarmament in Europe were Bonn’s primal
conference interests. They were an integral part of a broader security
complex whose reinforcement was felt as more urgent as greater
became the federal government’s perennial worries and uncertainties
about the fragile East-West military balances in Europe. Security and
détente had been intertwined constitutive dimensions of the common
project of European détente since the times of the 1967 Harmel Report.
This dissertation discards the view according to which issues of
security dominated West German international initiatives and East690 The achievements of the inner-German dialogue in the years of the Schmidt
administration must be evaluated through the same lenses. Frequently defined “minor” if
compared with the 1972 signing of the Basic Treaty, they laid instead fundamental and
concrete grounds for the rapprochement between the two German states: one need only
consider the permanent legacy of the project of construction of the highway connecting
Hamburg with Berlin, which was successfully negotiated in the years 1978-1980. See: M.
Roth, Zwei Staaten in Deutschland. Die sozialliberale Deutschlandpolitik und ihre
Auswirkungen 1969-1978 (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1981).
243
West relations between the late Seventies and the early Eighties, by
making the prosecution of a policy of détente nearly impossible. It
suggests instead to look more carefully at the interaction of security
and détente and to interpret it differently. Even though an accurate
investigation of debates and negotiations in the field of security is out
of the scope of the thesis, it has been attempted to take into
considerations their interactions with the developments of the CSCE
process. Their study prompts the following conclusion: not only did
détente and security continue to belong to the same political project
even in the years of renewed Cold War tension, but they were also
correlated to each other in a complex way. Far from representing a
mere hindrance to the prosecution of East-West dialogue, security
issues offered the opportunity to give a new impulse to the CSCE
process and rediscover a field of shared East-West convergent interest
which would allow negotiations to achieve concrete improvements, as
the analysis in chapters 3 and 4 has shown.
Foreign political ambitions
West German efforts in the pursuit of multilateral détente were
dictated, moreover, by Bonn’s ambitions to develop a more self-reliant
and assertive international identity. The country’s overwhelming
economic strength and assumption of new international tasks – for
instance, the ones deriving from the FRG’s first appointment as rotary
member in the UN Security Council – nourished the West German
federal government’s awareness of the necessity to have its voice more
clearly heard in the realm of world affairs. The CSCE policy was
mentioned in Genscher’s memoirs as one of the three pillars – beside
the UN policy and the engagement for the project of European Union –
which built Bonn’s new foreign policy of growing international
responsibility.691 There was awareness in Bonn that the solution to the
German question – at least to its psychological aspects linked to
widespread fears of a perennial German threat – passed through the
demonstration that Germany could play a different, responsible role in
Europe. Hence, the pursuit of multilateralism – and in the specific of
691 H.D. Genscher, Erinnerungen, pp. 299-402.
244
multilateral détente – by Bonn aimed at the assertion of the FRG as a
more influential European power. It wasn’t a coincidence that Bonn’s
efforts were directed to the reinforcement not only of the process of
détente but of the political and foreign political identity of the EC as
well.692 In this sense, Bonn’s CSCE policy in the years 1975-1985 has to
be collocated within a game played mostly within the Western caucus.
As it has been analysed in the course of this study, an important part of
the West German diplomatic efforts were directed, both during the
preparation and the unfolding of the CSCE meetings, to coordinating
and negotiating with the Western partners. The Western coordination
within both the smaller EC-caucus and the larger NATO-caucus proved
to be problematic in many occasions over the decade under study. The
numerous changes of leadership in the Western countries contributed
to the reconfiguration of the landscape of relations and balances within
the Alliance. The evolution of the FRG’s role within the Western
Alliance coincided in time and interacted with this broader process of
redefinition transatlantic relations underwent in these years.
The reasons of the West German special interest in the CSCE were
twofold. Fist, the multilateral dimension of the process of European
détente offered the adequate conditions for Bonn to take more dynamic
initiatives. The necessary coordination with the Western partners set
the limits of the FRG’s ultimate decisions: as it has been analysed in the
course of the work, Bonn could not allow itself to bear the risk of
diplomatic isolation. This provided the antidote against the allies’
enduring fears of a FRG’s solo turn to East, of its possible decision to
opt for neutrality and of its return to great power politics. However, the
large composition of the diplomatic forum allowed West German
diplomacy to use multiple negotiation channels and take a wide range
of diplomatic initiatives at multiple levels within the Western caucus,
692 Genscher was a convinced promoter, together with his Italian colleague Emilio
Colombo, of the initiative for relaunching the process of European integration by
developing its political dimension and proposing the expansion of the EC’s powers and
coordination into new policy areas. For an historical analysis of the origins and adoption
of the 1981 Genscher-Colombo Initiative, see: U. Rosengarten: Die Genscher-ColomboInitiative. Baustein für die Europäische Union, (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2008).
245
with the NNA countries and the Eastern counterparts. It was on this
diplomatic work behind the scenes that Bonn focused its attention and
efforts in order to pursue its foreign political goals in autonomy.
Second, the CSCE process was the most suitable framework wherein
Bonn could cultivate its ambitions of playing a political lead role within
the Western caucus in the field of East-West dialogue which would
parallel the country’s undisputable leadership in the field of economy.
Given the geographic structure of the CSCE, the FRG could use the
peculiarities of its geopolitical position – collocated in the centre of the
continent (Mittellage) and on the outskirts of the Western bloc
(Randlage) – to perform the role of natural mediator between the East
and the West. The CSCE encouraged Germany’s traditional Central
European vocation: not coincidentally, frequent references to the
inheritance left by the East-West policies of Weimar Republic’s Foreign
Minister Gustav Stresemann emerged from Genscher’s explanations of
his multilateral détente policy.693 Hence, the trajectory of the CSCE
policy in the years 1975-1985 could be read through the lenses of a
vaster process of growing West German self-confidence and
emancipation in foreign policy. Assessing this process requires to take
into due account both its achievements and shortcomings.
Achievements were manifold: the dialogue with the East continued in
spite of bipolar major tensions; channels of dialogue remained open
even when the conditions for material agreements lacked; the U.S.
administration remained involved in the process of European détente,
even though it did not share either its aims and methods; East-West ties
increasingly grew and improvements in the different areas covered by
the Helsinki Final Act were realised. Those results were valuable for
Bonn for their tangible impact as well as for reasons of diplomatic
693 Gustav Stresemann devoted his efforts as foreign minister of the Weimar Republic in
the years 1923-1929 to a comprehensive international policy of reconciliation both with
the West and the East. For an historical account of the figure of Gustav Stresemann, see:
J.R.C. Wright, Gustav Stresemann: Weimar’s greatest statesman (Oxford et al.: Oxford
University Press, 2002). With regard in particular to his foreign political project, see: P.
Krüger, “Zur europäischen Dimension der Außenpolitik Gustav Stresemanns“, in
Politiker und Bürger. Gustav Stresemann und seine Zeit, ed. K.H. Pohl (Göttingen:
Vadenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2002).
246
prestige: being the country which invested most efforts into the project
of multilateral détente, the FRG perceived any advancement attained
on the front of the CSCE as its own diplomatic victory. As described in
the preceding chapters of this work, in several occasions the FRG
overestimated the effectiveness of its diplomatic means. Neither was
Bonn able to persuade the U.S. administration to undertake a more
pragmatic course in Belgrade and Madrid; nor was it able to bear the
risks of diplomatic isolation within the Western Alliance. Suspicions
about the ultimate aims of Bonn’s special interest in continuing EastWest dialogue in spite of major bipolar tensions re-emerged regularly
in the debate within the Western Alliance. It was especially in the years
1981-1982 – the most difficult years in the trajectory of the CSCE
process, when many within the Western caucus took into serious
account the opportunity of changing foreign political course towards
the East – that the FRG returned to be placed under special
surveillance. A problem of trust and perceptions continued to be an
integral part of the German question. West German attempts to change
its international image brought only to partial results. The long-lasting
limitations to Bonn’s foreign policy did not only draw the borders
within which West German diplomacy could chase to reinforce its
general international action; but they did limit the political and
psychological West German room of manoeuvre within the framework
of the CSCE as well.
Assessing the trajectory of the FRG’s CSCE policy in the years
1975-1985
Another conclusion which emerges from this study is that the FRG’s
CSCE policy underwent a major process of qualitative change in the
years after 1975. Contrary to the scholars’ general trend to focus on the
genesis of the CSCE and on the formative years of Bonn’s involvement
in multilateral détente negotiations, the significance of this consecutive
evolution deserves greater attention. The trajectory of Bonn’s
multilateral policy of détente in the years 1975-1985 represented a stepby-step learning process, where setbacks and crises turned into
247
occasions of revision and correction. Episodes of crisis played a
formative role in the evolving process of Bonn’s multilateral détente
strategy. Crisis is an ancient word, which originally indicated the act of
separating the wheat from the chaff; as the etymology of the word
suggests, crises represent occasions of rethinking, where decisions are
to made about what one had to preserve and what one had to get rid
of. This was the case of the process of partial revision the West German
détente strategy went through in the late 1970s: the stall of the CSCE
process and the climate of growing crisis coming into being in the
landscape of East-West relations urged Bonn to make some decisions
about what its détente policy had to focus on and renounce to.
The theoretical grounds underpinning the West German
participation in the CSCE remained nearly unchanged since Helsinki
onwards: a pronounced continuity regarded its general aims and
principles. To change were the strategies devised by Bonn in order to
deal with the concrete challenges the CSCE process was faced with
from time to time. The West German Foreign Office gradually
developed a realistic policy of détente, whose realism did not limit
itself to good intentions but was growingly translated into practice. As
chapters 2 and 3 have shown, even though the concept of “realistic
détente policy” was formulated by the Auswärtiges Amt and advocated
by Genscher amongst the Western allies in the aftermath of the first
CSCE in Helsinki, it was only during the years spanning between the
follow-up meetings of Belgrade and Madrid that the concept found
new ways of coming into being. As major international challenges –
primarily the Afghan and the Polish crises – affected directly the
validity and continuation of the CSCE process, realism became
synonym of increasing flexibility and adaptability. Flexibility implied
to accept the separation between the levels of principles from the level
of actions. During the preparation and the unfolding of the review
conference of Madrid – under the boost of the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan, of the general deterioration of East-West relations, and of
the imposition of martial law in Poland – Bonn learnt to look with more
flexibility at the respect of the principles of geographic and functional
integrity of multilateral détente. This meant, in the practice, that CSCE
248
negotiations could continue in spite of Afghanistan and Poland; and
that détente improvements were to pursue at different speeds in
different areas.
The analysis of how West German diplomacy dealt with the EastWest dispute over missiles and the Polish crisis with regard to the
CSCE process has revealed one Bonn’s important intuition: i.e. that
serious episodes of crises could be used to the Western advantage, if
managed with carefulness and discretion. The West German Foreign
Office identified in the missiles and the Polish crises some potential for
relaunching the CSCE process. In the case of the first, the Soviet wish to
derail the implementation of the armed track of 1979 NATO’s decision
was used to force the Soviet bloc to negotiations. In the case of the
second, the CSCE’s potential beneficial effect on Poland’s stabilisation
and liberalisation was used to convince the sceptical Western partners
to continue negotiations in Madrid. Notwithstanding the partial
success of the second strategy – especially with regard to the capability
of persuading the U.S. administration to pursue a more moderate
negotiation course – Bonn’s intuition remains important. It suggests an
alternative interpretation of the role of the crises marking the years of
the so-called second Cold War which does not limit itself to considering
the harmful impact of these episodes of crisis on East-West relations
but which takes into account their multi-faceted meaning.
Pursuing a realistic détente policy meant, as well, being able to take
into account with pragmatism the reasons and motivations of all parts
involved into the CSCE process. As Genscher wrote in 1984: “The
Helsinki Final Act could be signed because none of the participants
aimed at attaining everything by expecting the others to cede
everything. This had to remain valid for the future continuation of the
CSCE process as well”.694 The lesson learnt from the Helsinki CSCE
could be replicated at the follow-up meeting in Madrid after the
misstep of Belgrade and after long, strenuous efforts to convince the
U.S. administration to abandon its zero-sum approach to negotiations.
As Bonn unceasingly repeated to Washington during the unfolding of
694 H.D. Genscher, Erinnerungen, p. 312.
249
the Madrid CSCE, the Eastern vital interest for a CDE and enhanced
economic cooperation with the West could be turned to the West’s
advantage and to the CSCE’s sake. Tying the Soviet bloc’s growing
needs for cooperation in the security and economic fields to the
advancement of the process of multilateral détente was the most
important achievement the CSCE process could attain after Helsinki: it
paved the way to the ensuing major developments of the last Cold War
years.
250
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Zaccaria Benedetto, For the Sake of Yugoslavia. The EEC’s Yugoslav Policy
in Cold War Europe, 1968-1980, PhD thesis (IMT Lucca), 2014.
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