Undergraduate Review
Volume 5 | Issue 1
Article 8
1992
On Mackie's Paradox of Omnipotence: A Solution
and Subsequent Problems
Ryan Nichols '95
Illinois Wesleyan University
Recommended Citation
Nichols '95, Ryan (1992) "On Mackie's Paradox of Omnipotence: A Solution and Subsequent Problems," Undergraduate
Review: Vol. 5: Iss. 1, Article 8.
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Nichols '95: On Mackie's Paradox of Omnipotence: A Solution and Subsequent Pr
Corrections and Other Solutions to
.can Correctional Association, 1988.
son Crowding: The Politics of Change." In
Prison Populations and Public Policy. ed.
n McConville. New York: Greenwood
On Mackie's Paradox of Omnipotence:
A Solution and Subsequent Problems
Psychological Perspectiye. New York:
by
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Undergraduate Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [1992], Art. 8
J. L. Mackie, opposing Christian theism, argues in support of the famed
problem of evil. He concludes his argument with a version of the paradox of om­
nipotence. A refutation of this paradox does in no way alleviate the entire problem
of evil, but it does assist in making Christianity more reasonable. Prior to this
task I will first state this paradox in full, and next enumerate the consequence for
the theist; then a reconciliation and problem solving can begin.
I would endeavor to give a possible answer, a defense, to Mackie's charge
and conclude. contrary to Mackie, that it is most probable God has a good reason
for not intervening to halt the wrong willing people do. I charge that ifit were the
case. God did intervene each time someone willed to do moral evil (which is the
type of evil this paper is confined to), we would no longer have free will (hereafter
FW). FW could be called a more important or greater good than the lack of both
evil and FW, Le. it seems plausible that the evil allowed in the world by FW could
be outweighed by the immense good of having FW.
First. what is claimed in the paradox of omnipotence? Mackie states that
there is a fundamental difficulty in the notion of an omnipotent
God creating men with free will, for if men's wills are really
free this must mean that even God cannot control them, that
is, that God is no longer omnipotent. (Mackie 230)
This says that if we humans have FW then God is not omnipotent. Later in the
article Mackie reformulates the paradox explicitly by posing the questions "can an
omnipotent being make things which he cannot subsequently control? Or...make
rules which then bind himself? (Mackie 231). It is imperative that the carefully
reading theist understand how Mackie uses "cannot."
Does Mackie give thoughtful and correct support for bringing in the strong
term "cannot"? I think that he does not and I argue also that Mackie does not ade­
quately treat the rebuttal that Christian theists typically set forth, namely that
God has the ability to control human wills but refrains from doing so.
Unfortunately, Mackie's support comes in the form of the above two rhetorical
questions, which is a poor way to support a position. The question he poses with
which we must grapple is "why should he [God] not leave men free to will rightly,
but intervene when he sees them beginning to will wrongly?" (Mackie 230). I
assume Mackie is implying that there is no reasonable answer to this question.
Mackie wants to use "cannot" in reference to God's inability to control beings with
FW, so if we find a plausible answer to this question, God would be found to have a
possible reason why he would choose not to control human wills when they will
wrongly. Our first task, before giving such a response, is to determine more pre­
40
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Nichols '95: On Mackie's Paradox of Omnipotence: A Solution and Subsequent Pr
cisely what Mackie intends to claim with this rhetorical question, reforming it to
render the query more understandable.
What does Mackie mean by using the term "will"? Understanding
Mackie's use of this term is essential. It is possible that "will" could merely mean
a choice, staying in the mind, e.g. I am able to will, or choose, to have Fruit Loops
rather than Raisin Bran tomorrow for breakfast. I would reject this as Mackie's
understanding, however, for I do not think he intends to ask why God would not
intervene when he knows humans are willinfi or haye willed evil choices, but
rather when he sees them ready to act upon those choices. Mackie is not defining
"will" as choice in thought only, but in action as well. The term "free will" is
most often understoQd by society in this form; governmental laws are meant to
punish for the acted out choices of the will. Mackie refers to "man's choices and
consequent actions" but without specific reference to defining "will" (Mackie 230).
Given this allusion and the above information we must take this as Mackie's defi­
nition of "will."
The question he raises now becomes, "why should God not leave men free to
will, to determine both choices and carry out actions based on those choices,
rightly, but intervene when he sees them beginning to will, determine choices and
carry out actions, wrongly?" By "intervene" I understand Mackie to mean
"control and put a halt to" this evil or wrong act of willing. Mackie is not
thoroughly clear here either and he may intend to convey merely "influence,"
perhaps in the form of a divine voice. I will however make his claim stronger,
based on his parallel use of the term "controlling" in the previous sentence
(Mackie 230). Now it is seen that Mackie asks, "why should God not allow men to
will and act rightly and put a ·halt to their would-be subsequent action when they
will wrongly?" By "wrongly", I take Mackie to mean "evilly," because he uses
these terms interchangeably, as will 1.
The consequence for the theist is fairly clear. If Mackie's question is
without a reasonable response then it would seem Christian theism is incoherent.
Traditional Christians include an omnipotent and wholly good God in their set of
beliefs. Mackie seems to claim that the point of conflict is that this God would
need to halt all the evil willing in order to be consistent with his supposed
metaphysical attributes.
Thankfully, the answ:er is not as complex as forming the understandable
question we have before us from Mackie's original. Is there a possible reason why
God should not do this? Let us, by analogy, suppose that God did in fact put a halt
to someone's acting out of a wrong will and that eating Fruit Loops is decidedly
wrong. I am infatuated with Fruit Loops but ~instancein which I attempt to
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eat a bite, my lips seal shut. This b
-everything. I have tried eating the:
different positions, but fortunately,:
Do I have a FW in regard to tI
that Mackie and I defined FW as m.
quent action the choice may bring al
to eat Fruit Loops because some foro
I am halted every time I try to parta
them, because to have FW means to
choice if I so desire. If God intervel
do then humans would no longer hs
possibly have for not intervening is
Mackie's conclusion hinges 0:
wholly good, omnipotent God shou1c
when he sees them beginning to wi]
have a good reason for not interveni
time humans began to "will wrongl
FW, since will is both thinking a chi
that God chooses not to control hUlI
greater good than the evil which re
on evil decisions. Mackie then state
he is wholly good, the only explanat
is not really evil, that its freedom il
(Mackie 230-31).
Mackie ends this passage by ,
"can be maintained only in the fom
cannot control their wills" (Mackie
advocating the paradox of omnipote
the paradox raises the question, "c;
cannot subsequently control" (Mack
refraining from control and lacking­
circumstances. Dissenting with M
to claim that God has the ability to
plausible reason.
It may be argued, in defense
omnipotent. However, it seems ver:
FW. This is not to say that he is lit
controllable by God, but rather that
Undergraduate Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [1992], Art. 8
ith this rhetorical question, reforming it to
~.
the term "will"? Understanding
It is possible that "will" could merely mean
l able to will, or choose, to have Fruit Loops
breakfast. I would reject this as Mackie's
:link he intends to ask why God would not
willing or have willed evil choices, but
.upon those choices. Mackie is not defining
action as well. The term "free will" is
IS form; govemmentallaws are meant to
will. Mackie refers to "man's choices and
ic reference to defining "will" (Mackie 230).
:mation we must take this as Mackie's defi­
Ig
mes, "why should God not leave men free to
ry out actions based on those choices,
em beginning to will, determine choices and
rvene" I understand Mackie to mean
1YT0ng act of willing. Mackie is not
ay intend to convey merely "influence,"
I will however make his claim stronger,
controlling" in the previous sentence
lrie asks, "why should God not allow men to
leir would-be subsequent action when they
~c1rle to mean "evilly," because he uses
~
fairly clear. If Mackie's question is
would seem Christian theism is incoherent.
ipotent and wholly good God in their set of
! point of conflict is that this God would
•to be consistent with his supposed
complex as forming the understandable
ie's original. Is there a possible reason why
)gy, suppose that God did in fact put a halt
and that eating Fruit Loops is decidedly
ps but ~instance in which I attempt to
I
42
eat a bite, my lips seal shut. This happens when using a spoon, a fork, my hands·
-everything. I have tried eating them in many different locations and even in
different positions, but fortunately, I have never been successful in my attempt.
Do I have a FW in regard to the eating of Fruit Loops? No, I do not. Recall
that Mackie and I defined FW as more than a mental choice, to include the conse·
quent action the choice may bring about. I am no longer .ab!e...to freely will myself
to eat Fruit Loops because some force has prevented me from doing so; Le., since
I am halted every time I try to partake of them, I am left without the FW to eat
them, because to have FW means to possess a mental choice and to act on that
choice if I so desire. If God intervened, or halted, the evil willings that humans
do then humans would no longer have a FW. Thus, the good reason God may
possibly have for not intervening is the maintenance of human FW.
Mackie's conclusion hinges on what he think's he's shown, namely that a
wholly good, omnipotent God should "leave men free to will rightly, but intervene
when he sees them beginning to will wrongly" (Mackie 230). However, God may
have a good reason for not intervening. Namely that if he were to intervene every
time humans began to "will wrongly", then those humans would no longer have a
FW, since will is both thinking a choice and acting it out. So, it is quite plausible
that God chooses not to control human wills because the freedom of will is a
greater good than the evil which results from willing wrongly, making and acting
on evil decisions. Mackie then states that "if God could do this, but does not, and if
he is wholly good, the only explanation could be that even a wrong free act of will
is not really evil, that its freedom is a value which outweighs its wrongness..."
<Mackie 230-31).
Mackie ends this passage by saying that the FW solution of the problem
"can be maintained only in the form that God has made men so free that he
cannot control their wills" (Mackie 231). This leaves Mackie's next argument of
advocating the paradox of omnipotence on unsure ground because he states that
the paradox raises the question, "can an omnipotent being make things which he
cannot subsequently control" (Mackie 231). Certainly having a good reason for
refraining from control and lacking the ability to control are two wholly different
circumstances. Dissenting with Mackie's argument, I maintain it is consistent
to claim that God has the ability to control human FW but chooses not to for a
plausible reason.
It may be argued, in defense of Mackie, that we cannot have FW if God is
omnipotent. However, it seems very reasonable that God is able to lmm beings
FW. This is not to say that he is limited because the FWs are free, and thus un­
controllable by God, but rather that they are free and can be controlled by God, but
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Nichols '95: On Mackie's Paradox of Omnipotence: A Solution and Subsequent Pr
are not currently under His control. Mackie uses an analogy, speaking of the
paradox of omnipotence in terms of a paradox of sovereignty. He asks, "could the
British parliament make a law forbidding any future parliament to socialize
banking, and also forbidding the future repeal of this law itself?" (Mackie 231).
This does not parallel the situation that God faces. It would be more useful to con­
ceive of this situation as FW being a special loan to humans from God, which is
potentially subject to change from moment to moment. He is able to take it away
and is not le~ally bound to continue refraining from controlling our wills. Judeo­
Christian scripture records no pact or law in which God says he will grant us FW
forever. An omnipotent and omnibenevolent God has the ability to determine the
wills of humans, but presumably does not do this most of the time.
However, there seems to be a problem in holding the troublesome and
tenuous conclusion that God refrains from controlling the wills of humans (given
our definition of FW that includes the mental choice and...consequent action) and
yet miracles do happen; for any single miracle in which God violates someone's
FW, means that at some point in time that person was without FW. A few
illustrations would be useful, even though finding the perfect one is difficult.
Suppose that I have a vendetta against Daniel and therefore I make the premed­
itated mental choice to kill him. I then actualize this choice by dismembering him
so that he is undoubtedly dead. Next I realize that his six parts are suddenly re­
forming before my eyes; he is back together and whole instantly. Dan tells me
that it was a miracle. The question to decide is whether or not he is consistent in
holding that God has loaned humans FW, and maintaining that such a miracle
occurred and was willed by his God.
If a miracle took place and God intervened to heal Dan, and if FW is defined
to include both choice and action, then it follows that I, the murderer of Dan, was
relieved, however briefly, from possessing FW. This is because the consequent
action I had performed was changed, reversed in this case. The Christian could
reply to this argument in one of three ways. First, one may say that this analogy
is nonsensical because no miracles in similar fashion are purported to happen in
the New Testament. On this point Mackie and I may agree, but this does in no
way seriously damages the argument. All that needs to be shown is that some­
one's FW has been ignored or taken away, even though there is not such an
obvious example in scripture as the previous one.
Take the crucifixion of Jesus as an example. It is quite clear that many
people wanted him dead and it suffices for my purposes to suppose that only one of
them reallY wanted him dead. This person actualized this desire and assisted in
crucifying Jesus. If Jesus rises from the dead then the murderer's FW, namely
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5
the consequent action, is taken from t.
that that person only "assisted" in the
Christian must then say that the Ron
the cross did not desire, or make the I
me quite improbable, but reasonable I
difficulty.
The same could be said of the r
makes the mental choice of cutting oft
capture Jesus at the Garden of Geths
violated Peter's FW by healing the so:
by that time the mental choice of PetE
therefore he desired Jesus to restore
did not violate Peter's will. Even thOl
non-scriptural, it may yet have some
It seems that the miracles in tt
of the sort that FW may be left intact
lepers and other people with illnesses
choice to be healed. In most instanCE
wanted it to happen to them. In the
tal choice nor the consequent action I
others did not choose and act on somE
Testament claims aside, however, if
Dan was healed by God, then my FW
that humans have FW and also mail"
wounds inflicted by my chainsaw unl
from me.
Another objection a second Clu
of FW is improper and not in accord
understanding. One would then pro!:
choice and not the consequent action,
presents a grave problem because if c
one must say that God does control tI
leaves one open to a fatal blow from a
control our actions and nl2t. our ment
responsible for all the moral evil in tI
defense for it would be totally unden:
Thirdly, and most formidably,
miraculous healing of Dan is not an
lck:ie uses an analogy, speaking of the
radox of sovereignty. He asks, "could the
19 any future parliament to socialize
repeal of this law itself?" (Mackie 231).
God faces. It would be more useful to con­
~alloan to humans from God, which is
nt to moment. He is able to take it away
~aining from controlling our wills. J udeo­
lW in which God says he will grant us FW
,lent God has the ability to determine the
:>t do this most of the time.
:>lem in holding the troublesome and
om controlling the wills of humans (given
nental choice and...consequent action) and
miracle in which God violates someone's
lat person was without FW. A few
gh finding the perfect one is difficult.
Daniel and therefore I make the premed­
actualize this choice by dismembering him
~ealize that his six parts are suddenly re­
her and whole instantly. Dan tells me
ecide is whether or not he is consistent in
W, and maintaining that such a miracle
Ltervened to heal Dan, and if FW is defined
t follows that I, the murderer of Dan, was
19 FW. This is because the consequent
lversed in this case. The Christian could
rays. First, one may say that this analogy
imilar fashion are purported to happen in
rie and I may agree, but this does in no
lli that needs to be shown is that some­
ly, even though there is not such an
vious one.
n example. It is quite clear that many
br my purposes to suppose that only one of
son actualized this desire and assisted in
,e dead then the murderer's FW, namely
Undergraduate Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [1992], Art. 8
the consequent action, is taken from him. Here the Christian may object to say
that that person only "assisted" in the death and did not actualize it himself. The
Christian must then say that the Roman soldier responsible for nailing Jesus to
the cross did not desire, or make the mental choice to kill Jesus. This seems to
me quite improbable, but reasonable enough to cause this example some
difficulty.
The same could be said of the recorded instance in which Peter apparently
makes the mental choice of cutting off an ear of one of the people who came to
capture Jesus at the Garden of Gethsemane and then actualized it. Jesus clearly
violated Peter's FW by healing the soldier's ear, but the Christian may claim that
by that time the mental choice of Peter had changed, Peter had repented, and
therefore he desired Jesus to restore the injured soldier's ear. Jesus' action then
did not violate Peter's will. Even though this seems rather counterintuitive and is
non-scriptural, it may yet have some intuitive plausibility.
It seems that the miracles in the New Testament are mostly, if not entirely
of the sort that FW may be left intact, Le. miracles are performed on paralytics,
lepers and other people with illnesses: people who probably made the mental
choice to be healed. In most instances, the people receiving the miraculous action
wanted it to happen to them. In the performance of the miracle, neither the men­
tal choice nor the consequent action of another human was infringed upon, Le.
others did not choose and act on someone to make them paralyzed. New
Testament claims aside, however, if in this instance a Christian does claim that
Dan was healed by God, then my FW was infringed upon. It is impossible to think
that humans have FW and also maintain that Dan was miraculously healed from
wounds inflicted by my chainsaw unless they recognize that my FW was taken
from me.
Another objection a second Christian theist would pose is that my definition
of FW is improper and not in accord with his or her own Christian
understanding. One would then probably choose to define FW as only a mental
choice and not the consequent action, limiting the scope of the term. This
presents a grave problem because if one wants to maintain this definition then
one must say that God does control the consequent actions that people will. This
leaves one open to a fatal blow from an advocate of the problem of evil. If God ~
control our actions and n21 our mental choices then he must be directly
responsible for all the moral evil in the world. This theist must give up the FW
defense for it would be totally undermined.
Thirdly, and most formidably, the Christian may say that God's
miraculous healing of Dan is not an infringement on my FW because God was not
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Nichols '95: On Mackie's Paradox of Omnipotence: A Solution and Subsequent Pr
intervening with my consequent action. In other words, she would care to sepa­
rate the results of my action (Dan's death) from the actual act of sawing his limbs
off. Whereas the second objector wished to include only statement one in the
definition, this third objector would draw the line between two and three.
This latter has some force for it would seem that once the consequent action is fin­
ished then my exercise of FW in this situation is also.
However, I would disagree, finding that separating the results from the ac­
tion is quite difficult in many circumstances without having the original mental
choice violated. Imagine again that I desire to kill Dan and actualize this mental
choice by killing him. It is possible to want to kill Dan for a few different reasons,
at least two of which seem relevant. First, I should be doing it for the thrill the act
itself, severing limbs with a chainsaw, gives me, Le. it may be done for
excitement. IT this is the case then I believe this third objection would hold true
because having Dan dead is not necessarily a part of my mental choice. Second,
what if having Dan dead were part of my mental choice? IT the reason behind my
desire to kill Dan is that I really want him to be dead, then it would seem that if
God resurrected him then my FW would be taken from me. This would be the
case because God would have violated my mental choice for Dan to be dead,
because the result of my subsequent action is undone by this miraculous action.
This third objection is a sound one, but it does not totally destroy my argument,
even though it does weaken it. The rebuttal would work for situations of FW
where the mental choice was acted upon due to a feeling of stimulation, etc.,
received from the acting itself. I would think, though, that this holds true for very
few incidents of FW where God would perform a miracle. For example, some of
the people shouting "Crucify him!" were surely thrill-seekers wanting to see a
body on a cross at Golgotha, but many, if not most, actually wanted Jesus dead,
permanently.
Miracles however, are not the only Christian anomaly in jeopardy of con­
flicting with FW. I would argue that many forms of intercessory prayer intend to
violate the FW of the one who is being prayed for. In fact, I would argue that this
is quite common because much of the time intercessory prayer is implemented
(excluding healings) it is used so that God will "correct" someone's life and
change it to be in accord with the Christian ethic. For example, my mom prays
that God would "help" me stop smoking; "help" could mean a number of different
things. Probably, she would ~ that I myself wanted to quit and I act on that
supposed mental choice. However, since it is not my desire to discontinue
smoking, she could pray for one of two series of events, both of which, if God actu­
alized, would infringe upon my FW .
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7
First, she could pray for God tc
this "give" would contradict the menl
"help" might mean that my mom wie
thereby inhibiting either my mental e
forced the notion into my mind that c
quit (this is quite similar to the first:
always make cigarettes unavailable 1
to sell them to me. In any case, if thl
no longer have FW in regard to smol
In effect, my mom was prayin~
miracle would violate my FW unless
The action of my mom praying for thi
intervene would it, and if he did my 1
admitting that I was without FW for
that surface when using the FW defe
IT my mother would want to sa
it is what makes the greater good ane
must say that she wants God to take
or squelch on his "loan" of FW to hur
"greater good" of human FW is now i
she objects to Mackie by saying that (
wrongly because this would take aWE
wanting God to occasionally interven.
certain humans to be negated on oceIt is rational for a theist to sUp
istence of God, the means to this bem
accepts this and simultaneously wan
which do violate FW, it follows that r
Earlier I claimed that FW is a loan t­
Christians must say that some of the
broke the loan.
So what does it matter, retorts
forming some miracles or in grantinl
actually, because it would seem that
situations. Therefore according to tb
cases in which to do this. IT he has t
smoking, then for what reason does
another?
Undergraduate Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [1992], Art. 8
:n other words, she would care to sepa­
l) from the actual act of sawing his limbs
oinclude only statement one in the
the line between two and three.
m that once the consequent action is fin­
ltion is also.
that separating the results from the ac­
ces without having the original mental
ire to kill Dan and actualize this mental
it to kill Dan for a few different reasons,
, I should be doing it for the thrill the act
'es me, i.e. it may be done for
ive this third objection would hold true
ly a part of my mental choice. Second,
mental choice? If the reason behind my
I to be dead, then it would seem that if
>e taken from me. This would be the
mental choice for Dan to be dead,
In is undone by this miraculous action.
does not totally destroy my argument,
l;a1 would work for situations ofFW
due to a feeling of stimulation, etc.,
rink, though, that this holds true for very
rform a miracle. For example, some of
surely thrill-seekers wanting to see a
not most, actually wanted Jesus dead,
Christian anomaly in jeopardy of con­
ly forms of intercessory prayer intend to
Iyed for. In fact, I would argue that this
e intercessory prayer is implemented
rl will "correct" someone's life and
LD ethic. For example, my mom prays
'help" could mean a number of different
nyself wanted to quit and I act on that
t is not my desire to discontinue
ies of events, both of which, if God actu-
First, she could pray for God to ~ me the desire to quit smoking, but here
this "give" would contradict the mental choice of my wanting to smoke. Secondly,
"help" might mean that my mom wishes God would force me to quit in some way,
thereby inhibiting either my mental choice about the matter or the action. If God
forced the notion into my mind that cigarettes are in actuality dog feces I would
quit (this is quite similar to the first instance). God could, on the other hand,
always make cigarettes unavailable to me, perhaps by never permitting a cashier
to sell them to me. In any case, if these prayers were actualized by God I would
no longer have FW in regard to smoking.
In effect, my mom was praying for a miracle to happen, and this type of
miracle would violate my FW unless I did in fact want to quito-which I do not.
The action of my mom praying for this does not affect my FW. Only if God did
intervene would it, and if he did my mom would logically be committed to
admitting that I was without FW for a time. There are implications from this
that surface when using the FW defense for the problem of evil.
If my mother would want to say that God has given humanity FW because
it is what makes the greater good and if she prays for me in this way then she
must say that she wants God to take FW away; i. e., she wishes God "Indian give"
or squelch on his "loan" ofFW to humans. When this occurs it seems that the
"greater good" of human FW is now in jeopardy if it is even still in existence. If
she objects to Mackie by saying that God does not intervene every time people will
wrongly because this would take away FW from humans, then by wanting
wanting God to occasionally intervene, it follows that she would want the FW of
certain humans to be negated on occasion.
It is rational for a theist to suppose that moral evil is consistent with the ex­
istence of God, the means to this being the FW defense. However, once the theist
accepts this and simultaneously wants to hold that some miracles have happened
which do violate FW, it follows that rationally held belief in God is in jeopardy.
Earlier I claimed that FW is a loan to humans from God. I have shown that most
Christians must say that some of the miracles they posit have violated FW; God
broke the loan.
So what does it matter, retorts the theist, that God has violated FW in per­
forming some miracles or in granting intercessory prayers? It is quite relevant
actually, because it would seem that God should violate FW in all the applicable
situations. Therefore according to the theist, God presently selects some very few
cases in which to do this. If he has taken away FW once, e.g., stopping me from
smoking, then for what reason does he not stop someone from murdering
another?
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Nichols '95: On Mackie's Paradox of Omnipotence: A Solution and Subsequent Pr
First, what has become of this greater good that FW produced? Surely, ac­
cording to the FW defense, it is highly valued, so much so that God permits it to
cause unfathomable degrees of human and animal pain. Proportionate to this
surety, so must this greater good go down in flames. Second, without FW man
cannot justly be said to be made in the image of God. Somehow humans are
degraded into being mere puppets rudely attached to the strings God pulls--or
doesn't pull--randomly.
Last, it is philosophically much more safe to say that God has never done a
miracle which violated FW than to say he has done some and not others in cases,
as above, which would obviously merit a violation of FW, unless of course the
Christian would care to step back with the word "faith." It would be consistent for
God either not to violate FW at all or violate it each time evil is willed, rendering
humans with no FW. The latter is obviously not the case and, according to the
theist, neither is the former. The alternative, to have a situation where God picks
and chooses with seemingly little discretion whose FW to violate is extremely
untenable. Unfortunately, it seems that complete certainty cannot be reached;
this point is not logically inconsistent, but certainly, at the least, is non-reason­
able.
In this paper I have set forth a plausible alternative to Mackie's suggestion
that the only good reason God would have for not intervening when humans begin
to will wrongly would be that acts of evil are not really evil. This alternative
solution is that if God did intervene every time humans willed wrongly then
humans would no longer have FW and possessing the good of FW would outweigh
the evil which results from it. In this manner,I side with the Christian.
However, in regard to the compatibility of some miracles and intercessory prayers
I would stand at odds with the Christian. If one takes this FW defense combined
with the "greater good" option, when FW is taken away from humans by God
doing some miracles Christians claim he has, then the greater good caused by the
FW also disappears. As of yet, there has been no reasonable argument presented
to contest my argument that some happenings which Christians call miracles, if
they are such, merit the violation of someone's FW. This presents problems for
the Christian who wishes to bridge the two. The theist's position here is that of on
a fence. In any event, the nuances of such intriguing argumentation should
encourage further debate. '
Published by Digital Commons @ IWU, 1992
48
9
Ed. note: All citations of Mackie arE
William J. Wainwright (eds.),
(Chicago: Harcourt, Brace & ~
Undergraduate Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [1992], Art. 8
rreater good that FW produced? Surely, ac­
'valued, so much so that God permits it to
1 and animal pain. Proportionate to this
own in flames. Second, without FW man
e image of God. Somehow humans are
.ely attached to the strings God pulls--or
Ed. note: All citations of Mackie are taken from his essay in William L. Rowe and
William J. Wainwright (eds.), Philosophy of Reliejon. Selected Readings
(Chicago: Harcourt, Brace & Jovanovich, 1989),230-1.
more safe to say that God has never done a
y he has done some and not others in cases,
; a violation of FW, unless of course the
1 the word "faith." It would be consistent for
iolate it each time evil is willed, rendering
ri.ously not the case and, according to the
mative, to have a situation where God picks
~etion whose FW to violate is extremely
tat complete certainty cannot be reached;
but certainly, at the least, is non-reason­
plausible alternative to Mackie's suggestion
lave for not intervening when humans begin
nI are not really evil. This alternative
,ery time humans willed wrongly then
i possessing the good of FW would outweigh
i manner,I side with the Christian.
ty of some miracles and intercessory prayers
an. If one takes this FW defense combined
?W is taken away from humans by God
he has, then the greater good caused by the
las been no reasonable argument presented
.ppenings which Christians call miracles, if
I>meone's FW. This presents problems for
! two. The theist's position here is that of on
.such intriguing argumentation should
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