MEDITERRANEAN PAPER SERIES 2013
THE FUTURE OF MEDITERRANEAN
EUROPE: BETWEEN THE EURO CRISIS
AND ARAB REVOLUTION
A REFLECTION ON THE SEVENTH MEETING OF THE
MEDITERRANEAN STRATEGY GROUP
Emiliano Alessandri
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Cover photo: Protesting against social cuts in Valencia, Spain on February 25, 2012. © Eduardo Luzzatti Buyé
The Future of Mediterranean Europe:
Between the Euro Crisis and Arab Revolution
A Reflection on the Seventh Meeting of the Mediterranean
Strategy Group1
Mediterranean Paper Series
April 2013
Emiliano Alessandri2 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
The European Crisis and Mediterranean Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
The Revolutions Next Door . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Who Will Drive Future Mediterranean Partnerships? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
The Transatlantic Dimension: Southern Europe and U.S. Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Thinking Beyond the Crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Annexes
1 This paper is based on discussions held at the seventh Mediterranean Strategy Group meeting, “The Future of Mediterranean Europe: Between the Euro Crisis and Arab Revolution.” The conference was organized on February 25-27, 2013 in
Lisbon by the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) in cooperation with the Italian Institute for International
Affairs (IAI), and in partnership with the Compagnia di San Paolo, the OCP Foundation, Noble Energy, the Luso-American
Foundation, and the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation. See the Annex for the agenda of the meeting and list of participants.
2 Emiliano Alessandri is a Senior Transatlantic Fellow with The German Marshall Fund. He wishes to thank the conference’s
participants for their contribution of information, ideas, and perspectives. He also wishes to thank the Luso-American
Foundation for their very generous and kind hospitality in Lisbon and Johanna Urrutia, Charlotte Brandsma, and Sarah
Sousa e Sa’ for helping with the minutes. The paper draws on ideas and opinions floated during the meeting but the author
remains solely responsible for its content.
1
Introduction
A
s the Arab world goes through revolution
and unrest, a Southern Europe that many
thought had fully stabilized through
European integration has come under severe
pressure in the context of the euro crisis. Years
of belt-tightening to contain burgeoning public
debts have left many scars and opened new
wounds. Austerity may have succeeded in reining
in spending and tackling the accounting side of
the problem, but it has inflicted deep pain to large
swaths of the Southern European populations,
exacerbating the social side of the crisis and
triggering unpredictable political developments.
Increasingly disillusioned with and more openly
critical of both their national governments and
Brussels institutions, Southern European societies
— especially vast segments of a largely unemployed
youth — have lost trust in their political
representatives and confidence that the future will
continue to be synonymous with progress. They are
now nervously swinging between apathy and raging
impatience over the need for radical change.
Protracted economic malaise even as short-term
financial challenges are addressed; the prospect of
social unrest erupting in those contexts in which
economic adjustment may have irremediably
weakened the fabric of society; and the demise of
traditional political elites under the pressure of
movements that no longer believe that the system
can be reformed from within — all these trends cast
shadows on the domestic evolution of Southern
European countries. On the other hand, the reemergence of old divides across Europe, between
more and less developed regions or, as it is often
put, between the “core” and “peripheries” that
are perceived to be drifting, threatens European
cohesion along its north-south axis, raising
questions about the international trajectory of
Mediterranean Europe.
As a matter of fact, the combined effect of the twin
crises in the Arab world and Southern Europe
could be the re-emergence of the Mediterranean as
an area of widespread instability, north and south,
with the common sea marking a fault line between
peoples and civilizations rather than providing the
engine for regional growth and development as has
been the case during the brightest periods of this
region’s history. Rightly seen as one of the main
theaters of globalization, the more interdependent
but also more multipolar Mediterranean of the
21st century could return to being a conduit of
international tension. This would be especially
true if Southern Europe were not to successfully
overcome the present challenges, gradually
abdicating its role of bridge between the European
Union (EU) and the regions to Europe’s south.
Reasons for a cautious optimism are not lacking
even in this bleak context. One element that
stands out is the democratic resilience shown
by Southern European societies even as they go
through profound internal disruptions. Many
tend to forget that most Southern European
countries are relatively young democracies whose
structures could still prove fragile under adverse
circumstances. Another element is Southern
Europe’s continuing engagement at the EU level
toward creating those new governance structures
and international balances that may both save
European unity and break a pattern of European
decline. But even positive readings of unfolding
dynamics hinge on the expectation — indeed the
imperative — that Southern Europe deeply reforms
itself in ways that make it a more structurally
competitive, inclusive, functioning region,
and therefore a reconfirmed solid partner in a
Mediterranean region in which Western influence
is said to be receding.
The elements of this Southern European transition
— which some call a renewal while others go
so far as to call a “re-invention” — are apparent,
The Mediterranean Region in a Multipolar World
1
The combined effect
of the twin crises in
the Arab world and
Southern Europe could
be the re-emergence
of the Mediterranean
as an area of
widespread instability,
north and south, with
the common sea
marking a fault line
between peoples and
civilizations rather than
providing the engine
for regional growth and
development.
largely revolving around the cardinal concept of
“openness”: what is needed is more open political
systems, more open economies and job markets,
more open attitudes toward other societies within
and outside of Europe so as to bridge existing
divides and addressing issues such as declining
demographics. The conditions for these elements
2
to be put in place, and the concrete steps to take
in that direction, however, remain the subject
of intense debate. What follows is an attempt to
identify some of the key challenges and decision
points that may appear along this path.
The German Marshall Fund of the United States
2
The European Crisis and
Mediterranean Europe
A
s views remain mixed as to whether
Southern European countries are out of the
woods financially — the Cyprus bailout
providing just the latest instance of persisting
challenges — there is a wide consensus that
accounting is only the more quantifiable side of
a crisis that has clearly become social as well as
political. While economic policies dictated by
Brussels under strong German pressure are still
being implemented, the risk is not only that fiscal
consolidation will be confused with the much more
complex and difficult task of structural reform, but
that the bitter medicine that has been administered
— austerity — will kill the patient rather than the
illness.
Signs that austerity has been working toward
solving short-term financial challenges of troubled
European economies, especially in the South, are
tangible. Deficits are being reduced, leading, in
some contexts, to a primary surplus. Indicators
such as yield spreads over German bonds have
significantly reduced from the height of the euro
crisis in 2011. It is noticeable that talk about a
break-up of the eurozone is no longer common.
In fact, Greece has achieved the largest fiscal
consolidation among OECD countries in decades
and attracted back some of the foreign investment
that had fled the country over persistent rumors
of a likely exit from the common currency just a
couple of years ago. The small Portuguese economy,
for its part, was able to reaccess financial markets
this year, to the relief of its credit institutions and
the government.
But other indicators, from real GDP growth to
unemployment rates, from unit labor costs to
industrial production, tell a less rosy story. Signs
of some regaining of competitiveness are not
absent, including in the Greek case, but remain
feeble overall. Unemployment has risen sharply in
recent months across an already weakly employed
Southern Europe. Lack of job opportunities has
disproportionately affected the already more
unemployed youth, with the majority of those
under 25 out of a job in Greece (over 60 percent)
and Spain (55 percent) and over a third in Italy (38
percent). Some have already declared the European
youth a “lost generation.”
While Greece was going through a 25 percent
GDP loss in the past six years, larger economies
such as Italy, too, headed toward recession since
2012. Wages and benefits sharply declined in
several countries (between 20 and 50 percent for
many categories of workers), creating challenges
for households. For now, however, this has not
dramatically boosted competitiveness, as indirect
costs for employers have remained comparatively
high. Deprived of an autonomous monetary policy
and faced with a currency that has remained strong
throughout the euro crisis, Southern European
economies have gone through adjustment
by internal devaluation, but with mixed or
inconclusive real economy outcomes.
The social impact of macroeconomic adjustment,
predictably accumulating with a time lag, is
becoming fully manifest only now. Although
protest movements have started from the very
beginning, it is in the current context that they may
be leading to more permanent effects in the form
of sustained populist, anti-establishment forces
with a large following. If Greece were able to have
a new European-minded government after the
last elections saw the rise of extreme nationalist
movements such as the “Golden Dawn” (7 percent
of votes in 2012), Italy could be the country where
the lid of a Pandora’s box of a crumbling party
system has been lifted. After the Italian elections
of February 2013, which granted many seats in the
new Parliament to representatives of movements
with a strong anti-Brussels, anti-system agenda,
there are reasons to ask whether the Italian case will
be an exception or a precedent.
The Mediterranean Region in a Multipolar World
3
If the youth is the
society of tomorrow,
Mediterranean Europe
can be already seen as
a failed society.
In this fluid and tense context, the outbreak of
widespread social unrest cannot be any longer ruled
out. Even traditionally resilient and quiet societies
such as the Portuguese one are being described
as standing on the brink. Some of the largest
demonstrations so far in the country have been
characteristically spontaneous, instead of being
fully led or owned by major opposition parties.
The risk that rising unemployment increasingly
affecting mid-career workers could reach the
tipping point of breaking the backbone of society
is not negligible. In fact, if the youth is the society
of tomorrow, Mediterranean Europe can be already
seen as a failed society.
Problems seem to have been made worse not only
by growing disillusionment and detachment, but
by weakening solidarities both at the national,
regional, and European levels. Autonomist and
secessionist impulses have strengthened in some
contexts, coming back strongly to the fore in places
like Catalonia in Spain. Regionally, undeniable
differences among Southern European countries,
which span from a country like Italy, the EU’s
second largest manufacturing economy and a net
contributor to the EU budget, to Greece, a largely
unindustrialized country accounting for a mere 3
percent of EU GDP, are often taken as reasons for
intra-Southern European finger pointing. Indeed,
as the crisis moves around the European space and
is not leaving untouched even traditionally stronger
economies such as France’s — whose GDP growth
is expected to be close to zero this year —the notion
of “Southern” seems to have acquired a cultural
rather than geographical connotation. Sometimes it
is now applied to places as far north as Belgium or
the Netherlands.
At the European level, weakening solidarity
has taken different forms, leading to opposing
accusations. In richer countries, nationalist
movements are on the rise. The telling acronym
of the “PIGS” has gained currency to identify a
4
composite region extending from Atlantic Portugal
to Eastern Mediterranean Greece. Issues of culture,
even of religion, are rediscovered as alleged factors
behind long-standing differences in economic
development that many see to be “inherent” to
some of the European societies.
On the other hand, the front of those who depict
austerity as a German-made strategy to prostrate
already embattled societies is widening. Even
milder views of Germany’s aims indict Berlin’s
and Frankfurt’s apparent reluctance to combine
necessary fiscal consolidation with a growth agenda
as requested not only by Southern European
governments but also by “core Europe” leaders such
as French President François Hollande.
Uneasiness concerns both the substance and
the context of adjustment. It is pointed out
that Germany’s adjustment after the Cold War,
especially under Chancellor Gerald Schroeder’s
reforms, took years to accomplish, with GDP
growth taking time to pick up even against an
international backdrop that was much more
favorable. Germany’s problems, moreover, had
mainly to do with regional imbalances, which
reunification forced it to address, rather than with
unsound incentive structures.
While the substance of the adjustment is
sometimes questioned, concerns are growing
about the asymmetric nature of the transition.
Germany and other “core economies” that have
been largely spared the economic turmoil in
recent years are not going through what should
be a parallel and opposite process of adjustment,
at least deliberately and incisively so. Wages in
Germany are going up, female participation is at
its highest, immigrants flock to the country, but
nothing seems to fully match, and compensate
for, the transformations that Southern European
countries are experiencing. A feeling is spreading
that Germany, too, took advantage of an economic
The German Marshall Fund of the United States
incentive structure that produced imbalances,
but is now disproportionately benefiting from
its dominant role in the management of the euro
crisis, from control over a tight monetary policy
that strangles growth to the tying of governance
reform to the swallowing of a drastic reduction in
social benefits in the South. As the finger is still
pointed against Southern Europe, slowing growth
in Germany is finally spurring a debate on whether
its comparatively higher competitiveness standards
are indeed enough, whole of Europe needing in fact
to undertake reforms.
In this context, it can be rightly seen as alarming
that the relieved market pressure on the Eurozone
seems to have already lessened the sense of urgency.
In Germany more than in other contexts, there
seems to be declining support for those projects,
from a future banking union to fiscal integration,
that could prevent future crises from threatening
the European construction. Meanwhile, the EU
budget for 2014-20 hardly bodes well for the future
of European solidarity, as between requests to
streamline spending and Southern Europe’s defense
of traditional areas such as regional policy and
agriculture, the final result was the reduction of
the EU budget altogether — the first such outcome
in the bloc’s history and one seeing a disturbing
alliance between Germany and the increasingly
EU-skeptic U.K. This decision was taken at a time
when, formally, all major leaders of continental
Europe still admit that “more Europe” is the way
forward if protracted instability is to be prevented.
The Mediterranean Region in a Multipolar World
5
3
The Revolutions Next Door
T
That the wave of
protests rising across
the Arab world
in 2011-12 took
place at a time of
crisis in Southern
Mediterranean
societies may not be
a matter of complete
coincidence.
hat the wave of protests rising across the Arab
world in 2011-12 took place at a time of crisis
in Southern Mediterranean societies may not
be a matter of complete coincidence. Indeed, albeit
homegrown and home driven, developments in the
Southern and Northern Mediterranean are bound
together by an intriguing web of commonalities and
interdependencies. These include similar political
problems, although not of the same scale and with
a basic difference between democratic and non
democratic political contexts: sclerotic political
systems, ossified and weak institutions, self-serving
leaders, clientelistic cultures prone to cronyism and
corruption. To these can be added similar social
trends, from high youth unemployment to the vast
social and economic inequalities.
domestic consumption — have not materialized.
Notwithstanding the images coming from
Lampedusa and other European entry points,
most of the displaced and refugees have fled to
neighboring countries, either because they were
incapable of getting to Europe or because they were
discouraged to do so by unappealing job markets in
the EU.
That despite their different levels of development
and unique characters, societies around the
Mediterranean shared similar trends became
clear when the Arab Spring was emulated in
the European context. In Spain, the movement
of the “indignados” took to the streets to
protest unemployment and claim participation,
symbolically merging with movements advancing
similar demands in the Arab context. The
worsening issue of income inequality and declining
social mobility rose in importance in developed
economies in the same years, with the “Occupy
Wall Street” movement in the United States giving
transatlantic projection to demands heard around
Europe and the Mediterranean space.
In fact, fear of foreigners has increased with the
crisis in Europe. Already wary Southern European
societies have seen the further consolidation or
even strengthening of xenophobic movements,
with riots erupting in places like Greece where
nationals and immigrants have became parties
of a war amongst the unemployed or the poor.
While rightly identifying mobility as one of the
possible tools that the EU could offer to encourage
transitions, together with money and market access
(the so-called “3 Ms”), the EU has been overall
timid in extending new partnerships in this area,
often succumbing to the negative orientations of
reluctant member states. The spat between Italy and
France over the fate of some hundreds of Tunisian
immigrants who were trying to cross the FrenchItalian border in 2011 became sadly symbolic of
Europe’s closure as well as of the lack of intraEuropean solidarity. That this dispute took place at
a time when the French-led military intervention
in Libya was formally justified on the principle
of the protection of the Libyan people added the
accusation of hypocrisy.
But interdependencies have also taken more
tangible, forms. As Southern European young
people have increasingly migrated to Germany
or emerging markets on other continents (such
as the Portuguese moving to Brazil and Angola),
North Africans have tried (but often failed) to
reach the shores of Southern Europe. As a matter
of fact, specters of an “Arab invasion” of Europe
following the Arab Spring — a nightmare scenario
that local politicians often promulgated for
6
The overall limited north-south flow across the
Mediterranean, however, does not diminish the
reality of Mediterranean interdependency. The
South could provide the North with a rebalancing
that could reverse dire demographic trajectories.
The economic crisis, however, is acting as a
restraining force in the short term.
Economically, the impact of the Arab uprisings
on Europe has been mainly in the form of missed
The German Marshall Fund of the United States
opportunities rather than vast-scale disruptive
effects. Southern European countries still account
for the bulwark of trade and investment to the
region. Economic difficulties in the eurozone,
especially in the South, have therefore determined a
weakening of exchanges. Tourism has also suffered
from instability in the Southern Mediterranean,
depriving the region one of its key sources of
revenue, especially for energy-poor countries. The
fate of the energy sector has been understandably
more at the center of European preoccupations,
with disruption in Libyan oil during the 2011
military intervention raising fears in the oildependent Northern Mediterranean. While
Southern European countries fought for keeping
their positions in energy markets across the sea,
local governments quickly understood that they
could further extract economic as well as political
benefits from existing contracts.
These interdependencies have also highlighted a
changing geography of Mediterranean relations.
Turkey has been challenged by developments
in its southern neighbors, particularly by the
civil war in Syria, the aggravation of the Kurdish
question, and possible dangerous spillovers of
the hardening Sunni-Shia divide in Iraq. But the
fast growing Turkish economy has remained a
powerful attraction and an element of dynamism
in the region in a way the EU could not be
because of the crisis. The more uncertain role that
weakening Southern European economies have
in Mediterranean trade has not necessarily led to
lower engagement. Recent data show that Italy has
become more integrated with the Mediterranean
region, not less, in recent years. At the same time,
more powerful Northern economies, starting
with Germany, have consolidated their position
in the region, both from a trade and investment
perspective, but this has apparently not translated
into a higher political profile. Germany chose noninvolvement in the Libya operation, and kept a low
key position in Mediterranean politics altogether,
starting with the reluctance to rebalance the EU
“neighborhood policies” from the East to the South
to meet the new emergencies.
Meanwhile, the weakness of Southern European
countries, and of the EU as a whole, in terms of
external projection has clashed with the rising
influence of new or re-emerging actors. Wealthy
actors from the Gulf have transformed the
challenge of Arab revolts into an opportunity to
expand their influence by pouring cash into the
region and helping regimes that may serve their
strategic goals, such as barring Iranian influence in
the Middle East and North Africa (MENA).
New extra-regional actors such as South Africa,
Brazil, and China have gained more visibility and
influence in the region, with their actions or nonactions on key issues such as the Syrian crisis and
the Iranian nuclear program. Re-emerging actors,
such as Russia, have been a key impediment to the
development of Western policies in some contexts.
In other words, Southern Europe’s weakness,
Europe’s self-absorption, and the United
States’ more selective engagement have further
highlighted trends toward a more multipolar
Mediterranean space. While post-colonial legacies
still do matter when it comes to language and
economic interchange, developments in the
region increasingly emphasize national ways and
local ownership. Western power is still critical in
Mediterranean developments, but it is receding
and no longer acts as a magnet of attraction.
The EU’s approach to the Mediterranean as
a “neighborhood” may miss the reality of an
increasingly diverse Mediterranean basin
where growing interdependence and political
fragmentation seem to be going hand in hand.
Traditionally the most outspoken advocates of a
Mediterranean policy, Southern European countries
are increasingly dragged into the Mediterranean as
The Mediterranean Region in a Multipolar World
7
The EU’s approach
to the Mediterranean
as a “neighborhood”
may miss the reality
of an increasingly
diverse Mediterranean
basin where growing
interdependence and
political fragmentation
seem to be going hand
in hand.
their ties with the rest of Europe are put to a test.
This is happening, however, more in the name of
common weakness than anything else. The risk is
that rather than acting as a bridge between Europe
and neighboring continents across the sea, they will
be increasingly perceived as part of the “South.”
north and south really lies, if in the Mediterranean
or in Europe. More practically, the question of
who is going to lead Mediterranean engagement
currently stands without a clear answer, even in the
new more realistic, low-expectation context.
With notions of core and peripheries in Europe in
transition, it is unclear where the border between
8
The German Marshall Fund of the United States
4
Who Will Drive Future
Mediterranean Partnerships?
B
y putting emphasis on the previously
neglected goal of democracy support, the
EU has clearly signaled that it is ready to
change its policies in order to remain part of the
Mediterranean equation. But has the change being
meaningful and thorough? And will it make a
difference?
On one hand, there is recognition that the shift in
EU policies has been far from insignificant. Even at
a time of crisis in Europe, the EU has been able to
substantially increase its financial contribution to
development support and other schemes, increasing
the neighborhood policy budget as well as making
some new funds available for the short term.
Conceptually, the EU has recognized the failure
of what some had defined as the “authoritarian
stability model,” underlining that only democratic
transitions can ultimately provide the region
with the stability it needs for future growth and
development. The two notions combined have been
incorporated in the vision of a “partnership for
democracy and shared prosperity.”
The EU has also correctly identified the three key
needs of Arab Mediterranean countries: money,
market, and mobility (the already mentioned
“3 Ms”). Linking access to these to progress in
democratic reform, the EU has tried since the
beginning of the Arab Spring to add a dynamic
component to its traditional conditionality policy
through the so-called “more for more” approach.
More reforms will come with more financial
assistance and greater openness. Likewise, the EU
has tried to pursue negative conditionality through
the “less for less,” which is meant to “disincentivize”
or even sanction developments that run counter to
democratization.
The application of these adapted principles,
however, has encountered obstacles of various
nature and faced dilemmas not too different from
past ones. For instance, it has remained very
difficult to adopt negative conditionality, especially
when it comes to partners that are valuable to
the EU in economic or security terms. Economic
sanctions have been actually applied against the
regime of Bashar al Assad in Damascus in light
of the blatant violation of basic human rights
during the Syrian civil war. No cooling off of
relations, however, has taken place with countries
like Algeria, a major exporter of gas to Italy and
other Southern European countries, which has
undertaken only limited reforms and in many ways
continued to pursue policies that do not support
any meaningful democratic development.
In other words, by failing to establish a clear link
between democracy promotion and European
strategy — that is by not making explicit the
identification of democracy as a strategic interest —
the EU has risked perpetuating the tension between
interests and values, accepting the possibility of an
almost unavoidable clash. Democracy promotion
has been largely seen as a goal in itself, not as
linked to a European interest. Accepting the
latter would have allowed for further delving into
the issue of democratization and more clearly
acknowledging, for instance, that “free and fair”
elections are a necessary but far from sufficient
requisite of a democracy. In societies with multiple
ethnic, religious, and sectarian cleavages like those
in the Middle East, elections can actually lead to
hardening of divides and to the “dictatorship of
majorities.” What needs to be in place for an orderly
democratic transition are laws protecting minorities
and fundamental human rights as part of systems
increasingly based on the rule of law.
Other obstacles encountered by the new EU
approach go under the rubric of declining EU
influence. The EU remains a key market for Arab
goods and an important cultural and political
reference for Southern Mediterranean countries. At
the same time, however, revolutions have further
fragmented a region that seems to have no wish
The Mediterranean Region in a Multipolar World
9
By failing to establish
a clear link between
democracy promotion
and European
strategy, the EU has
risked perpetuating
the tension between
interests and values,
accepting the
possibility of an almost
unavoidable clash.
for imported models and is looking for its own
way out of the crisis. EU neighborhood policies
are still patterned after EU enlargement, which has
run into fatigue and in any event does not apply
to the Arab world, which is not included in any
notion of Europe. The combination of the lack of
a membership perspective, the declining weight
of Europe in a more multipolar Mediterranean,
and the new emphasis on national paths to
change mean that EU policies seem destined
to have an element of wishfulness if they will
still to be designed around EU-centric notions
of a “neighborhood.” In fact, the neighborhood
approach seems to be questionable at a time when
divides are appearing or reappearing not only
across the Mediterranean, but between North and
South of Europe, complicating the geography of
the continents and extending and confusing the
concepts of center and periphery.
On the positive side of things, there is recognition
that the EU can still do a lot for Southern
Mediterranean countries despite these limitations.
One direction is to keep exploring economic
integration. Especially in fields such as energy,
cooperation can largely proceed irrespective
of political convergence. Also trade deals
can be further explored if elements of builtin conditionality are kept limited. It is widely
conceded, for instance, that so-called Deep and
Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements discussed
between the EU and some of the North African
countries, an instrument taken from enlargement
policy, can be too “heavy” for partner countries to
digest as they come with many conditions but stop
short of giving full access to the economic union.
An area in which the EU, and southern European
countries, could still play an important role is
working to support South-South cooperation,
sharing experiences and building on instruments
that were used in the past in the European
context. The MENA region remains one of the
10
least integrated in the world, with regional trade
accounting for less than 5 percent of total trade.
The EU and institutions such as the Union for the
Mediterranean have worked on initiatives to create
new connections across the region, starting with
large infrastructure projects like roads, ports, and
sea lanes. These efforts could be further stepped
up as EU countries recognize the difficulties and
delays that will accompany any process of opening
up the European market to the MENA region.
Actually, some link could be drawn between the
ability of Southern Mediterranean countries to
overcome current obstacles to intra-regional trade
and the willingness to open the European market
further.
The EU could also do more to sustain education
and training in North Africa, where the workforce
is already significantly more educated than in
past decades but a problem of matching skills still
plagues the anemic local job market. As regimes
in transition face the challenge of education
reform, which is rightly seen as a critical test of
deep democratization and the development of a
new culture of openness, the EU could encourage
exchanges, as it is doing with Erasmus Mundus, as
well as acquire a more direct role in youth policies
in the region. This could help both create a larger
local market, and to prepare those segments of the
local workforce that could later join the European
workforce.
All these developments will require a set of
difficult conditions to be in place. Among these,
of fundamental importance is a clearer indication
of what the newly elected regimes intend to do,
politically and in terms of foreign policy. The
victory of parties rooted in political Islam in the
Arab Spring countries was as expectable as its
domestic and foreign policy implications remain
unpredictable. While these parties and the new
regimes have become the necessary interlocutors
The German Marshall Fund of the United States
of Europe in the region, the meaning of their
leadership is the subject of debate in the West.
Some hope that like Christian Democratic parties
in the European context, the new forces will fully
accept to work in a secular context, progressively
evolving into democratic parties. Signs for now,
however, have been mixed, if not outright negative.
Majoritarian tendencies and deep ambivalences
toward secularism are on display.
The presence within Arab societies of forces and
groups that do not share the views of Islamists, or
that have voted for Islamist parties because they
were better organized and the only ones who could
claim some distance from previous authoritarian
elites, leaves room for hope. But it is clear that for
the time being, those who led the uprisings are not
those who are guiding the transitions, and that the
principles and claims that were stated then — from
dignity to liberty — are not necessarily upheld
in the new contexts. Violations of rights and the
oppression of minorities remain unfortunately
widespread.
The uncertainty and the difficulties that will be
experienced in dealing with the new regimes
are an invitation to deep engagement with civil
society. As European institutions remain focused
on the European crisis and new Arab regimes
may prove to be as problematic to engage as
past ones, civil society actors from around the
Mediterranean Basin could be the leading and
most promising drivers of the new “partnerships.”
From development to democracy support, from
issues concerning gender equality and inclusion to
mobility and education, the expertise and role that
European civil society can play is significant. Civil
society engagement could at once help identify
appropriate counterparts in the Arab countries,
and deliver tangible assistance closer to where the
needs are felt, indirectly also contributing to a more
tailored approach to the conditions and preferences
of individual contexts — an orientation that the EU
has rightly increasingly advocated.
In this framework, with an endorsement from
the EU and national governments, European
civil societies could build that bridge across
the Mediterranean that the euro crisis, which
its epicenter in Southern Europe, have risked
undermining. The experience of civil society
in Southern Europe, especially in societies like
Portugal, Spain, and Greece, which democratized
only some decades ago, could be as valuable for
Arab countries as those of Central and Eastern
Europe.
The Mediterranean Region in a Multipolar World
11
The uncertainty and
the difficulties that
will be experienced
in dealing with the
new regimes are an
invitation to deep
engagement with civil
society.
5
The Transatlantic Dimension:
Southern Europe and U.S. Strategy
T
The Europeanization
and democratization
of Southern Europe
largely relieved the
United States of
the need for direct
concerns in Southern
Europe at a time when
the end of the Cold
War brought stability in
East-West relations.
he weakness of Southern Europe is potentially
detrimental not only to European unity, but
also to transatlantic security. Historically,
the United States has had a continued and at
times complicated engagement with the Southern
European countries. Often overlooked is the fact
that notwithstanding isolationism, the Monroe
Doctrine, and the frontier, the United States has
been a Mediterranean power for over 200 years,
sending its first ships in the area as early as 1793,
at a time when it lacked a navy worth the name.
Back then as in more recent eras, the reason for
this engagement was threats emanating from the
southern rim of the sea — in the late 18th century, it
was piracy off the coasts of Morocco and Algeria —
that Mediterranean European countries could not
fully handle alone.
Although never developing a “Mediterranean
policy” as such, the United States has pursued
strategic objectives in the Mediterranean,
most often security-oriented ones. One of the
overarching goals has consistently been keeping the
Mediterranean Basin clear of hegemonic powers to
preserve its connections to the Atlantic highways,
and preserving its role as connector to the Black
Sea region and a corridor toward the Gulf. During
the 20th century, even before the Cold War set in,
U.S. engagement in the Mediterranean was also
seen as key to European stability, as fascist regimes
in Italy and elsewhere threatened England and
liberalism and as the disintegration of the Ottoman
Empire risked bringing protracted instability on its
European extensions.
With the progressive stabilization of Southern
Europe, U.S. interest in the northern Mediterranean
increasingly rested in it being a platform from
which to project influence and power to more
unstable nearby regions. Early membership in
both the Atlantic Alliance and the European
communities made Italy a particularly important
asset for the United States in the area. With the
12
receding threat of strong communist parties in
all major Southern European countries and the
entry of Portugal, Spain, and Greece into the EU
in the 1980s, Southern Europe as a whole — with
the notable exception of the Western Balkans —
became a potential ally of the United States in a
strategy that increasingly looked at the north-south
dimension across the Mediterranean.
In fact, the Europeanization and democratization of
Southern Europe largely relieved the United States
of the need for direct concerns in Southern Europe
at a time when the end of the Cold War brought
stability in East-West relations. Countries like Spain
and Portugal — which had already offered bases for
U.S. forward presence — became parts of a strategy
increasingly looking at North Africa and also the
Sahel. Italy was seen as key to the stabilization of
places like Albania as well as engagement in North
Africa through its relationship with Libya and
other countries. Greece’s entry into the common
currency and Greek-Turkish rapprochement in
the late 1990s also seemed to allow for some new
geometries, particularly with the NATO member
and aspiring EU candidate Turkey becoming in U.S.
strategy a prospective “gate keeper” on the East of
an increasingly integrated and pacified European
space.
Against this backdrop, most recent risks of a
collapse of Southern Europe, and of a breakup
of the EU along the north-south axis, reopen a
“Southern European question” for the United States
that had been considered closed. That it is at least
partly why the U.S. administrations have been
very outspoken, sometimes more so than some
European countries, about the need to prevent the
exit of even small countries that only account for
a tiny share of the EU GDP. From Washington’s
perspective, the question in fact is not so much an
economic, but a geopolitical one. A Greek exit, or
just a new hegemony in that and other Southern
European countries of populist movements with
The German Marshall Fund of the United States
nationalist orientations, could reintroduce elements
of an international competition that would threaten
the European peace altogether. Despite the certainly
different context, the abandonment of the common
currency was a key step in the disintegration of
Yugoslavia and its eventual spiraling into war in the
1990s.
The question of the weakness of Southern Europe
could be further accentuated by two trends that,
on the contrary, originate with the United States:
a tighter fiscal environment that will reduce
U.S. resources in traditional areas of foreign
engagement, including in the Mediterranean, and
a strategy that is increasingly oriented toward the
Pacific. The bleak scenario of a Mediterranean
that plunges into instability north and south while
the United States turns attention away, however, is
not plausible for a number of important reasons.
First of all, the United States is not pivoting away
from Europe, nor is it withdrawing from the
Mediterranean region.
The so-called “Pacific pivot” announced by the
Obama administration in 2011 was overemphasized
and misread. It deals, for now, with a transition
from a 50-50 to a 60-40 ratio in U.S. military
projection in the Pacific and Atlantic regions,
respectively, which had already started after the
end of the Cold War. As the U.S. administration
has repeatedly stated and is proving in deeds, this
transition has to happen “with Europe” not against
Europe. In fact, a stable and possibly strong Europe
is in a sense a prerequisite of a U.S. strategy that can
focus more on the Pacific. When it comes to the
Mediterranean region, it is clearly recognized that
even as a “decade of war” comes to an end — to use
President Barack Obama and its administration’s
refrain — the MENA remains a conflict-ridden
area where the U.S. presence will be needed. From
Iran’s nuclear program and regional ambitions, to
the risk of a disintegration of Iraq along sectarian
lines, from the security of Israel in a changing
neighborhood to threats emanating from the Sahel,
the United States will continue to be drawn to the
region, albeit more selectively.
As a matter of fact, the question is precisely how a
more selective U.S. engagement can be reconciled
with European declining capabilities. U.S. presence
in the Mediterranean region is still significant
even if a standing fleet has not been in place for
several years. Bases are kept in many countries,
particularly in Southern Europe from Italy to
Turkey. In fact, it is the North Atlantic rather than
then Mediterranean that has become increasingly
less militarized in recent years, completing a
process started with the end of the Cold War. The
Europeanization of the continent, again, created
one of the permissive factors for removing some of
the forward-deployed resources in areas that were
no longer likely to be theaters of conflict or military
competition.
The United States is also investing new resources
in the region. The naval base of Rota in Spain
will see the installations of key elements of the
missile defense shield that the United States and
NATO have committed to establish to protect
the European space from ballistic threats mainly
emanating from the Middle East — the major hard
security project of transatlantic allies in the new
century after NATO enlargement. The so-called
“sequester” in the United States may mean fewer
U.S. resources for also this project as there will be
fewer ships deployed in the Mediterranean. As a
sign of U.S. engagement, however, the maritime
components of the shield are both a tangible
reaffirmation of the U.S. commitment to Europe
and a testament to the continuing relevance of the
Mediterranean in Western strategy.
The United States has also continued to provide
support to operations in the Mediterranean region,
although no longer necessarily “leading from the
front” as had been generally the case in the past.
The Mediterranean Region in a Multipolar World
13
From Iran’s nuclear
program and regional
ambitions, to the risk
of a disintegration of
Iraq along sectarian
lines, from the security
of Israel in a changing
neighborhood to
threats emanating
from the Sahel, the
United States will
continue to be drawn
to the region, albeit
more selectively.
When intervention was decided, such as in the
2011 NATO-led Libya operation and more recently
in Mali, U.S. military capabilities proved essential.
The air force capabilities of the United States took
down Libyan air defenses, making the Europeanled campaign possible. Later, the United States
pushed to ensure that the mission would transition
to a NATO operation.
The NATO operation in Libya in fact epitomized
many of the current trends and their sometimes
contradictory nature. Europeans took the
leadership even as Europe was engulfed in an
economic crisis. But it was not the EU that
launched the operation, but a coalition of the
willing led by France and the U.K., which needed
U.S. involvement to reach its objectives. Southern
European countries, which had been more
reluctant to intervene, joined the cause when the
assurance was given that NATO would be tasked
with the mission. An often neglected aspect of the
Libya operation is that endorsement from other
UN security members came only when some of
the local players, particularly key Gulf countries,
Morocco, and Jordan, gave their assent. That NATO
had developed an Italian original initiative for
a “Mediterranean dialogue” for years with these
“partner countries” is seen as an important factor in
their decision to endorse intervention.
support, ships (Portugal), or airpower (Italy,
Spain). This involvement testified to the continuing
solidarity and loyalty of Southern European
members even at a time of domestic distress. In
fact, a key issue going forward is finding the exact
definition, mainly on a case by case basis, of what
“reasonable challenge” (to use defense parlance)
may be, for countries that enjoy a guarantee of
collective defense through NATO, but that could
face increasing problems in delivering on the other
side of the bargain: their fair burden sharing in
dealing with non-European security contingencies.
Southern European countries’ declining budgets
were a most pressing reason why former U.S.
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates raised the
specter of a “demilitarizing alliance” doomed to
future irrelevance.
Much of the discussion in months and years to
come will revolve around streamlining and pooling
of resources, to make sure that reductions will
cut the fat not the meat of transatlantic security
solidarity. No such discussion, however, which will
involve technical as well as political considerations,
may be successful if Southern Europe as a region
collapses or fragments, reopening a front within
Europe. That is why, together with other concerns,
“thinking beyond the crisis” becomes all the more
necessary.
Southern Mediterranean countries were also
involved in the operation either through logistical
14
The German Marshall Fund of the United States
6
Thinking Beyond the Crisis
T
he fact that Southern Europe is confronted
with structural challenges that predate the
present financial and economic contingencies
should not deter serious forward-looking thinking.
On the contrary, it should prompt a discussion
of long-term plans and solutions that can project
Mediterranean Europe’s future beyond the current
crisis. A predicament of internal decay and
international decline is likely if the existing path is
followed. A renewal of Southern Europe is possible,
however, if the crisis is disentangled in its different
components and dealt with at each level, from
the economic to its ever more evident social and
political dimensions.
At the same time, an overall vision is needed if
different Southern European polities are to be
successfully brought into a common effort, that
will take years if not decades to accomplish. This
vision cannot but to revolve around the cardinal
concept of “openness,” which seems to be at the
center of many of the solutions, or paths toward a
solution, in the various domains in which the crisis
is manifesting itself.
The crisis can be characterized as one currently
trapping Southern Europe between two fronts —
the European and Mediterranean — a place in
which the new reality of interdependence is still to
find the adequate institutional and political means
to express itself. Much of the latter can be achieved
through a process of opening of the region, from
the attainment of standards of competitiveness that
are closer to the European core to accepting that for
these results to be attained, the Arab Mediterranean
can be seen as a partner in this effort. Maritime
connections, in fact, bring not only instability but
also some of the ingredients that Southern Europe
currently lacks, starting with a more promising
demographic base.
At the European level, Southern European
countries should avoid dividing each other based
on their undeniable differences and relationships
to the euro crisis. They should, on the contrary,
recognize their similarities and use their combined
influence to keep promoting bold reforms toward
deeper European integration engaging the EU as
a whole. Nothing would be more deleterious than
a Southern European bloc that by hardening its
position would contribute to deepening instead
of bridging the North-South divide in Europe,
inadvertently giving substance to the thesis that
Southern European countries are indeed different
and may not belong to a future EU.
Southern European countries should remind fellow
EU members that the concept of “southern” is not
strictly geographical. Problems of competitiveness,
weak growth, and weak institutions, that are
experienced in a more intense way by Southern
European societies, are shared or can be shared
by other European societies. Culture undoubtedly
plays a role in some of the areas in which Southern
Europe is “lagging behind” but much of the
problems facing Southern Europe — at least what
made these long-standing issues less sustainable
in the present context — result from the pressures
that the processes of globalization are putting on
all developed societies. Development in Europe
brought with it not only wealth but institutions —
such as the so-called “welfare state” — that may
be seen as a cost in today’s internationally more
competitive environment.
Experiences of countries such as Germany, which
presciently saw or were forced to go through
competitive adjustment earlier, could therefore
be shared. This approach would help shift the
emphasis currently on meeting accounting criteria
to adopting new systems for the production and
distribution of wealth.
Boosting the competitiveness of the whole of
Europe should be the key goal, sharing best
practices in critical areas such as education reform
The Mediterranean Region in a Multipolar World
15
Nothing would be
more deleterious
than a Southern
European bloc that by
hardening its position
would contribute to
deepening instead of
bridging the NorthSouth divide in Europe,
inadvertently giving
substance to the
thesis that Southern
European countries
are indeed different
and may not belong to
a future EU.
Shifting attention from
the divisions within
Europe to the common
challenges could
also help find a new
narrative for the EU.
(Germany’s successful vocational training program
is attracting growing interest in this context), as
well as welfare state reform. This European-wide
effort would help create a dynamic of European
change instead of finger-pointing or scapegoating.
In the process, it would also help highlighting littleknown facts, such as the significant progress that
a country like Italy has made in pension reform,
for instance, placing it among the most efficient in
this area. Greece, for its part, is slowly but steadily
becoming a case of successful public sector reform
— the area where much of its deficits originated.
Shifting attention from the divisions within Europe
to the common challenges could also help find a
new narrative for the EU. Everybody agrees that
the European project as a peace project is no longer
immediately appealing to generations that were
born after the end of the Cold War and have only
school book understanding of World War II. An
alternative that enjoys support is rebranding Europe
as a platform for global opportunity.
In order for this to happen, however, European
citizens, especially the largely unemployed youth,
will have to feel that Europe works also for them,
not just for the members of the “entitlement
society” who preceded them. Opening spaces for
youth by transferring at least part of the wealth
accumulated by older generations to the new, and
by creating the most permissive environment for
entrepreneurship in both the economy and politics
is therefore critical.
This transition, too, has to do with “openness.”
Much of it is about liberalizing areas of the
common market that are still protected. A lot of
it is about insiders understanding that the system
may break down if room is not made for outsiders
to share some of the benefits of society. As elections
in Italy and other places are showing, what the
outsiders — from the youth to other groups — ask
is not just a different direction but participation
in a society that has come to marginalize them.
16
Changing social compacts to make decisionmaking more inclusive and economic opportunity
more accessible is therefore the necessary path
forward.
For these goals to be achieved in Southern Europe,
solidarity should be present at the European level.
The question, again, is not only about recognizing
that the European space is differentiated and
some areas are more in need of development than
others, but that “cohesion” policies benefit both the
weaker and the stronger members through reduced
threats of instability. On one level, solidarity will
have to lead to temper a focus on austerity only,
putting growth in the agenda of core countries
as well. On the other hand, solidarity will have to
underpin efforts to reform European governance
in a way that the current monetary union reflects
a political union of countries. Nothing less than
the idea of a unity of destiny can now fully protect
the EU and the euro from the outbreak of a new
crisis threatening the whole European integration
process.
In this respect, Southern European countries are
already among the most determined supporters of a
deepening of integration through the establishment
of a banking union that is accompanied down
the road by greater fiscal coordination. Wealthier
countries such as Germany are on the record for
having called for political union. The problem
currently lies with the consequentiality of these
calls. Short-term political or electoral calculus may
in fact suggest postponing some of the necessary
steps when confronting stakeholders in German
society who fear the loss of autonomy that this may
entail.
A solution is sometimes found in presenting
political union as a way for stronger countries to
impose their criteria and views of unity on the
rest of the community of European nations. The
narrow path toward a solution to the present
The German Marshall Fund of the United States
crisis is, on the contrary, to reject calls for more
independent national trajectories that in a context
of interdependence would hardly serve anyone
while setting unity to the highest standards, not
the common minimum denominator. The EU will
not survive its centrifugal tensions if it will settle
for a minimalist approach. It may thrive again if
solidarity’s goal will be identified with not just a
“closer union,” but a “more perfect one,” to echo the
U.S. Constitution.
The Mediterranean component of this change is
no less important. What is unfolding in the Arab
world, in fact, is not taking place in isolation.
Challenges are indeed society-specific and drivers
behind the recent uprisings can only be understood
in their local context. Societal imbalances that
led to demands for change and unrest were not
completely different, however, in an authoritarian
setting, from the ones affecting, in lesser degrees,
societies in other parts of the Mediterranean.
In fact, the Arab world is going through turbulent
change because societies that have transformed
rapidly have faced structures adverse to
adaptation — a tension not too different from
the one experienced by European neighbors.
Closed systems of distribution of wealth have
clashed with demands coming from a growing
population of educated youth and from women
looking for opportunities in areas where men once
commanded unchallenged control. The outcome
of this transformation may not be “democracy,” at
least not in the short term. However, what is taking
place in Arab countries is at once different and
deeper than a quest for political representation.
It is the emergence of societies that processes of
globalization have transformed more deeply than
their institutions.
As the Southern Mediterranean is cut across by
these convulsive tensions, the risk that challenges
in Europe will prevent traditional stakeholders
from playing a role is concrete. In the more
interdependent but also fragmented Mediterranean
space of the 21st century, no single actor calls the
shots and no central source of reference exists.
But this is not to say that Europe has lost all of its
influence and should not play a role. The Southern
part of Europe is effectively cut across by a societal
change that spans the Mediterranean, north
and south. Instead of being a buffer as it would
have been if Europe were strong, and instead of
succumbing to negative tendencies in both areas,
Mediterranean Europe can be at the center of the
new bargain.
The key word is, again, openness. A less restricted
flow of people in the area could be complemented
by greater activism of civil society, which in both
contexts is questioning established institutions.
Economically, the free flow of people would provide
a much-needed counterpart to the movement
of capital, truly expanding the breadth of EuroMediterranean relations. For both the youth in the
Arab countries and in Southern Mediterranean
Europe, the keys are more skills-oriented education
to tap into the underexploited opportunities that
societies already offer and mobility to match
existing needs. This is already possible for the
highly skilled Southern European youth that are
moving to economically more attractive areas
of Europe. It cannot still take place across the
Mediterranean, despite the proved benefits that
migrants have given by filling in gaps in the
productive system of service societies while helping
counter trends such as an aging population.
Openness would also mean favoring civil-societyto-civil-society engagement. Southern European
countries could help with a transition toward a
growing role for EU institutions as active promoters
of people-to-people contacts that would avoid
problems experienced in direct EU-civil society
engagement in the MENA region, which many
The Mediterranean Region in a Multipolar World
17
Nothing less than
the idea of a unity of
destiny can now fully
protect the EU and the
euro from the outbreak
of a new crisis
threatening the whole
European integration
process.
agree has traditionally failed to reach out to the
most dynamic elements of society.
Southern Europe, moreover, could help develop
a Mediterranean market for energy. Energy
developments in the Western as well as Eastern
Mediterranean hold promise despite political
uncertainty. As a proof of their commitment
to Mediterranean cooperation, the natural
competition toward access to local energy resources
could be channeled in framework projects that are
more closely tied to the equation between European
energy security and Southern Mediterranean
prosperity. Greater coordination of energy policies
in the area would lead to more directly address the
needs of energy-dependent Arab countries, thus
18
putting energy, together with traditional areas such
as infrastructure and transportation more firmly at
the center of a revitalized South-South integration
agenda.
In other words, the role of Southern members
of the EU in a host of different areas would not
necessarily have to be diminished by Southern
European weakness. Current challenges, on
the contrary, could lead to a reappreciation
connections with the larger Mediterranean space,
which effectively place Southern Europe at the
center of the Mediterranean rather than on its
fringe, its prosperity depending on translating
existing interdependencies into opportunities for
development and growth.
The German Marshall Fund of the United States
Mediterranean Strategy Group
Lisbon
February 25 – 27, 2013
“The Future of Mediterranean Europe:
Between the Euro Crisis and Arab Revolution”
Organized in cooperation with the Italian Institute for International Affairs (IAI), and in partnership with the
Compagnia di San Paolo, OCP Foundation, Noble Energy, the Luso-American Foundation, and the Calouste
Gulbenkian Foundation
AGENDA
Monday, February 25
Participants arrive throughout the day at York House (Rua das Janelas Verdes 32, Lisbon) and As Janelas
Verdes (Rua Janelas Verdes 47, Lisbon)
1800
Participants gather in the lobbies of York House and As Janelas Verdes and depart for
City Hall (Praça do Município 1, Lisbon) via shuttle bus
1830 – 1930
Cocktail Reception
Location: Lisbon City Hall
1930 – 2100
Welcome Dinner
Location: Aura Restaurant (Praça do Comércio – Terreiro do Paço, Lisbon)
Tuesday, February 26
830 – 840
Participants gather in the lobbies of York House and As Janelas Verdes and depart for
Luso-American Foundation (Rua Sacramento à Lapa 21, Lisbon).
900 – 930
Opening Remarks
Location: Luso-American Foundation
Craig Kennedy
President, German Marshall Fund of the United States, Washington
Charles Buchanan
Administrator, Fundação Luso-Americana, Lisbon
Ettore Greco
Director, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome
930 – 1100
Session I – The European Crisis and Mediterranean Europe: Economic, Social and
Political Challenges
Location: Luso-American Foundation
Southern Europe is at the center of the economic turmoil affecting the Eurozone. From Portugal to
Greece, societies are facing enormous challenges of austerity, uncertainty and adjustment. The
countries of Europe’s Mediterranean south are among the leading stakeholders in the economic
and political future of Europe, but they are also exposed to, and dependent on, decisions taken in
Berlin and elsewhere. What are the sources of the crises in Europe’s south? What is the economic
outlook? What are the potential social and political consequences of a crisis that is taking different
forms across the region?
Moderator:
Emiliano Alessandri
Senior Transatlantic Fellow, German Marshall Fund of the United States, Washington
Discussants:
Megan Greene
Chief Economist, Maverick Intelligence, London
Dimitris Kourkoulas
Deputy Minister for EU Affairs, Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Athens
Andres Ortega
Editorial Writer, El Pais, Madrid
Francisco Seixas da Costa
Director, North-South Centre, Lisbon
1100 – 1130
Coffee Break
-2-
1130 – 1300
Session II – The Revolutions Next Door: Southern Europe and Change in the MENA
Location: Luso-American Foundation
Europe’s Southern neighbors across the Mediterranean have been swept by an unprecedented
wave of uprisings. In every case, the post-revolutionary transitions have not been smooth, and
further turmoil may be in store. Southern Europe will be directly affected by the economic,
political and security future of neighbors across the Mediterranean. What are the likely
developments, from migration to spillovers of political violence? What are the potential positive
developments flowing from change across the MENA? How might Southern European futures be
shaped by Mediterranean-wide trends?
Moderator:
Alexandra De Hoop-Scheffer
Office Director, German Marshall Fund of the United States, Paris
Discussants:
Tomás Duplá del Moral
Former Director for the Americas, European External Action Service, Brussels
Ghazi Ben Ahmed
Executive Director, GMF Tunis, Tunis
Michalis Attalides
Rector, University of Nicosia, Nicosia
Claire Spencer
Head, Middle East & North Africa Programme, Chatham House, London
1300 – 1400
Luncheon
Location: Luso-American Foundation
1400 – 1530
Session III – Southern Europe in the Mediterranean Equation – Who Will Drive Future
Mediterranean Partnerships?
Location: Luso-American Foundation
Southern European countries have been leading advocates of EU, NATO and bilateral dialogue
and cooperation across the Mediterranean. How have Europe’s crises and MENA revolutions
affected this longstanding vocation and its prospects? Can Southern Europe still lead, or does the
coincidence of crises mean that the shape and character of its leadership must change? What can
we expect from the EU and Euro-Atlantic partners? Is there a new place for Turkey? What will be
-3-
the role of civil society on both sides of the Mediterranean, and is there a special role for Southern
European institutions?
Moderator:
Sir Michael Leigh
Senior Advisor, German Marshall Fund of the United States, Brussels
Discussants:
Nathalie Tocci
Deputy Director, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome
Randa Achmawi
Political Commentator and Consultant on MENA Region Politics, London
Isabelle Montoya
Senior Advisor, European Parliament, Brussels
Marc Pierini
Visiting Scholar, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Brussels
1830
Participants gather in the lobbies of York House and As Janelas Verdes and depart for
Grémio Literário (Rua Ivens 37, Lisbon) via shuttle bus.
1900 – 2100
Cocktail Reception and Gala Dinner
Location: Grémio Literário, Biblioteca Room
Wednesday, February 27
830 – 840
Participants gather in the lobbies of York House and As Janelas Verdes and depart for
Luso-American Foundation (Rua Sacramento à Lapa 21, Lisbon).
900 – 1030
Session IV – Southern Europe and U.S. Strategy
Location: Luso-American Foundation
The U.S. has been among the leading beneficiaries of the progressive “Europeanization” of
Southern Europe. Once difficult bilateral relationships have, in general, become part of the overall
U.S.-EU relationship. The integration of Europe’s south has paid clear political and security
dividends for Washington, at a time when partnership and power projection beyond Europe has
taken center stage. How will this trajectory be affected by the current European crisis – and the
potential for a new north-south divide in Europe? What role can and should the U.S. play in
Europe’s crisis, and its southern dimension? Does American engagement still matter?
-4-
Moderator:
Ian Lesser
Executive Director, Transatlantic Center, German Marshall Fund of the United States,
Brussels
Discussants:
Alessandro Minuto-Rizzo
Senior Strategic Advisor, ENEL Holding, Rome
Robert Bell
Secretary of Defense Representative, Europe, and Defense Advisor to the U.S. Mission to
NATO, Brussels
Peter Swartz
Principal Research Scientist, Center for Naval Analyses, Washington
1030 – 1100
Coffee Break
1100 – 1230
Session V – Thinking Beyond the Crises: Reinventing Southern Europe
Location: Luso-American Foundation
Challenges north and south, against a backdrop of larger, global power shifts, raise fundamental
questions about the future of Southern Europe, both within Europe and on the international scene.
In a period of European enlargement, Europe’s southern members were models for development
and integration – economic and political. What now? To what extent do current crises offer an
opportunity for change at the level of societies, including youth participation, the structure of
economies, and governance? What are the consequences of inaction? What are the alternative
futures? How can they be shaped? Who can do the shaping?
Moderator:
Thomas Kleine-Brockhoff
Senior Transatlantic Fellow and Senior Director for Strategy, German Marshall Fund of
the United States, Washington
-5-
Discussants:
Luis Amado
Chairman, Banco Internacional do Funchal, Lisbon
Ahmet Evin
Executive Committee Member, Istanbul Policy Center, Istanbul
Elena Panaritis
Founder and Director, Panel Group/Thought For Action, Washington
1230 – 1300
Concluding Remarks and Next Steps
Location: Luso-American Foundation
Emiliano Alessandri
Senior Transatlantic Fellow, German Marshall Fund of the United States, Washington
1300 – 1400
Luncheon and Departure
Location: Luso-American Foundation
-6-
Mediterranean Strategy Group
Lisbon
November 12 – 14, 2012
“The Future of Mediterranean Europe:
Between the Euro Crisis and Arab Revolution”
PARTICIPANT LIST
Randa Achmawi
Journalist, Commentator and Consultant
Al-Ahram Hebdo
London
Emiliano Alessandri
Senior Transatlantic Fellow
German Marshall Fund of the United States
Washington
Luis Amado
Chairman
Banif - Banco Internacional do Funchal, SA
Lisbon
Ekavi Athanassopoulou
Senior Research Fellow
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign
Policy
Athens
Michalis Attalides
Rector
University of Nicosia
Nicosia
Elisabete Azevedo-Harman
Vice-Director of the Institute for Political
Studies and Coordinator of the Research
Center
Universidade Católica Portuguesa
Lisbon
Robert Bell
Secretary of Defense Representative, Europe,
and Defense Advisor
Mission of the United States to NATO
Brussels
Mohammed Belmahi
Chairman
OCP Foundation
Rabat
Ghazi Ben Ahmed
Director, MENA Trust
German Marshall Fund of the United States
Tunis
Jorge Braga de Macedo
President
IICT
Lisbon
Charles Buchanan
Administrator and Vice President
Fundação Luso-Americana
Lisbon
Graça Maria da Fonseca Caetano Gonçalves
City Councillor
City Council of Lisbon
Lisbon
Giancarlo Chevallard
President
Paralleli - Istituto Euromediterraneo del Nord
Ovest
Turin
Alexandra de Hoop Scheffer
Office Director
German Marshall Fund of the United States
Paris
Massimo Deandreis
Director General
Intesa Sanpaolo
Naples
Mónica Dias
Assistant Professor of the Institute of Political
Studies
Universidade Católica Portuguesa
Lisbon
Tomás Duplá del Moral
Former Director for the Americas
European External Action Service
Brussels
Ahmet Evin
Executive Committee Member
Istanbul Policy Center
Istanbul
Nora Fisher Onar
Assistant Professor
Bahçeşehir University
Istanbul
Ettore Greco
Director
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Rome
Megan Greene
Chief Economist
Maverick Intelligence
London
Craig Kennedy
President
German Marshall Fund of the United States
Washington
Thomas Kleine-Brockhoff
Senior Transatlantic Fellow and Senior Director
for Strategy
German Marshall Fund of the United States
Washington
Dimitris Kourkoulas
Deputy Minister
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Greece
Athens
2
Alberto Laplaine Guimaraes
Secretary-General
Municipality of Lisbon
Lisbon
Michael Leigh
Senior Advisor
German Marshall Fund of the United States
Brussels
Ian Lesser
Executive Director, Brussels Office and Senior
Director for Foreign and Security Policy
German Marshall Fund of the United States
Brussels
Alejandro Lorca Corróns
Professor Emeritus
Universidad Autónoma de Madrid
Madrid
Hamdi Loza
Egyptian Ambassador to Lisbon
Embassy of the Arab Republic of Egypt
Lisbon
Bruno Macaes
Senior Policy Advisor
Prime Minister's Office, Portugal
Lisbon
Gonçalo Matias
Assistant Professor
Universidade Católica Portuguesa
Lisbon
Catarina Mendes Leal
Policy Advisor
Ministry of National Defense, Portugal
Lisbon
Alessandro Minuto-Rizzo
President
Nato Defense College Foundation
Rome
Isabelle Montoya-Wilkinson
Principal Administrator, Committee on Foreign
Affairs
European Parliament
Brussels
Andres Ortega
Analyst and Editorial Writer
El País
Madrid
Elena Panaritis
Director and Founder
Panel Group/Thought for Action
Washington
Marc Pierini
Visiting Scholar
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Brussels
Nabila Ramdani
Journalist
Freelance
London
3
Nicolo Russo Perez
Program Manager, International Relations and
European Integration
Compagnia di San Paolo
Turin
Francisco Seixas da Costa
Director, North-South Centre
Council of Europe
Lisbon
Chrysostomos Sfatos
Director
Veritas Strategic Solutions
Athens
Claire Spencer
Head, Middle East & North Africa Programme
Chatham House
London
Peter Swartz
Principal Research Scientist
Center for Naval Analyses
Washington
Nathalie Tocci
Deputy Director
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Rome
Nuno Torres
National Defense Policy Director
Portuguese Ministry of National Defense
Lisbon
4
Offices
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