CSF Associates Inc.
The Articles of Confederation as the Background to the Federal Republic
Author(s): Donald S. Lutz
Source: Publius, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Winter, 1990), pp. 55-70
Published by: Oxford University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3330362 .
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The Articlesof Confederationas the
Backgroundto theFederalRepublic
Donald S. Lutz
University
of Houston
TheArticles
theAmerican
usuallyneglected
bythosestudying
founding,
ofConfederation,
tothe1787Constitution.
an important
TheArticles
functioned
formed
partofthebackground
American
as thefirstnational
constitution
Statesand,as such,reflected
oftheUnited
political
as itemerged
a textual
revealsthe
duringtheRevolution.
theory
Equallyimportant,
analysis
to whichthe1787Constitution
wasa logicalextension
extent
oftheArticles
ofConfederation.
intheU.S. Constitution,
MostoftheArticles
wereincorporated
andseveral
keychanges
found
in thelaterdocument
werepresentin embryo
in theArticles
of Confederation.
is notkindto thosewholose,or areperceived
to have
Americanhistory
lost.Thereis no morestriking
thanthefate
exampleof thisphenomenon
of thosenowtermed"Antifederalists"
and thenationalconstitution
they
of Confederation.
wrote,theArticles
bya labelto theranksof
Consigned
thosewhomerely
havebeenlargely
opposed,theso-calledAntifederalists
dismissed
of
academics
as
"men
little
faith"
and
by
bytherest
forgotten
ofAmerica.
Recent
a
of
the
emphasis
upon comprehensive
recovery American
has
our
view
of
the
Antifederalists.
founding onlymarginally
improved
Symptomaticof thecontinuing
is
the
recentpublication
situation,
perhaps,
by
J.Storing
of TheComplete
Herbert
Thefirst
oftheseseven
Antifederalist.'
volumesis entitled"WhattheAntifederalists
WereFor," as if anything
in
ifnotan outright
someexplaining,
positive theirstancerequires
apology.
andcertainly
inthereviews,
unremarked
thecollection
Perhapsunnoticed,
enhancesthenegative
byStoring
imageof theAntifederalists
bycollecting
in one place anything
together
negativetheyhad to say.
YettheseAntifederalists
wereworking
froma coherent,
positiveviewof
rule,deliberative
politicsthatstressed
popularsovereignty,
liberty,
majority
centralto
localism,and a wholehostof ideasandcommitments
processes,
whatwe wouldrecognize
as American
Furthermore,
politicaltheory.
they
wrotetwodozenstateconstitutions;
a warofliberasuccessfully
prosecuted
tionagainst
a worldpower;generated
ofpolitical
thousands
tracts,
pamphlets,
andnewspaper
mostofwhateventually
wouldgo into
essays;andprovided
theUnitedStatesConstitution.
If we wereto identify
thoseAmericans
describedby theircontemporaries
as "Antifederalists,"
and collectall the
'HerbertJ. Storing,ed., withMurrayDry, The CompleteAntifederalist,
7 vols. (Chicago:
Universityof Chicago Press, 1981).
of Federalism
Publius:The Journal
20 (Winter
1990)
55
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All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
56
1990
Publius/Winter
theessaysagainsttheConstitupoliticalwritings
bythoseso categorized,
tionwoulddisappear
oftheir
totalpolitical
as a marginal
percentage
writing;
are inappropriately
yet this small portionis how the Antifederalists
remembered.
Thecollected
ofthesemendatedbacktothe1760s,andconstituted
writings
imofAmerican
themainstream
politicalthought
duringthosehistorically
in
decades
before
Americans
the
mainstream
1787.2
political
portant
writing
havepreferred
thosethreedecadeswouldprobably
callingthemselves
during
didnotworkoutan adequateform
ofWhigtheory
"Whigs."Theexponents
themainstream
of
ofgovernment
fornationalunion,buttheystilldefined
American
had,inpart,tobuild
thought
uponwhichtheFederalists
political
and, in part,renovate.
to illustrate
whathas happenedto the
Letus engagein a mentalexercise
arereallydefined
as
Antifederalists.
ImaginethatwedecidetheFederalists
of Confederation,
and thusmightbe termed
thoseopposedto theArticles
Thenwecollecteverything
"Anticonfederationists."
theyhadtosayagainst
andignore
elsetheywrote.Wethereby
exclude
theConfederation
everything
andall writings
mostof TheFederalist
Madison,Jay,andthe
byHamilton,
ThenwetaketheseexwhowerenotAnticonfederationist.
otherFederalists
wouldbetoremember
them.Thenetresult
andstopreprinting
cludedwritings
menof littlefaith.
as crabby,negative,
theFederalists
unimaginative
succeededin havingtheBillof Rightsaddedto the
The Antifederalists
forced
Convention
andthoseoftheirilkat theConstitutional
Constitution,
in favorof
to abandontheplanfora unitary
theFederalists
government
a "federalrepublic."Theythusmustbe contermed
whatis nowproperly
Thismuchis
oftheoriginsof federalism.
sideredcentralto anydiscussion
who has studiedthefounding
era.
readilyconcededby almosteveryone
ofConfederaoftheAntifederalist
theimportance
However,
(Whig)Articles
in general,and American
tion bothforthe UnitedStatesConstitution
in particular,
has notbeenwidelyrecognized.
federalism
on the
a "boomlet"of publications
Therehas beennothing
resembling
celebration.
Asidefrom
of Confederation
Articles
duringthebicentennial
in 1940,andthree
workbyMerrill
Jensen
theexcellent,
published
yetsolitary
iningeneral
booksthatdealwiththeContinental
and,therefore,
Congress
withtheArticles,
thereis onlya specialissueofPubliusdevotedto
directly
of Confederation.3
Asidefromthisslenderatof theArticles
a discussion
2For an introductionto AmericanWhig politicalthought,see Charles S. Hynemanand
Donald S. Lutz,AmericanPolitical Writing
DuringtheFoundingEra, 1760-1805,2 vols. (Indianapolis: LibertyPress, 1983). The end of volume2 containsan annotatedbibliographyof
over fivehundreditemsfromthe mainstreamof Americanpoliticalthoughtduringthe era.
An Interpretation
3MerrillJensen,TheArticlesof Confederation:
of theSocial-Constitutional
of WisconsinPress,1940).
Historyof theAmericanRevolution,1774-1781(Madison: University
See also AndrewC. McLaughlin,The Confederationand the Constitution,1783-1789 (New
York: New York University
Press,1962); JackN. Rakove, TheBeginningsofNationalPolitics:
An Interpretive
Historyof theContinentalCongress(New York: Knopf,1979); PeterS. Onuf,
in theUnitedStates,1775-1787
Controversies
TheOriginsof theFederalRepublic:Jurisdictional
of PennsylvaniaPress,1983); and Publius: TheJournalofFederalism
(Philadelphia:University
12 (Fall 1982).
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Articlesof Confederation
57
theArticles
havebeenwritten
offas unimportant
anduninteresting.
tention,
Ourdiscussion
hereis notaimedat raisingtheArticles
ofConfederation
to
somelevelofpreeminence,
butrather
to placethedocument
moresecurely
in itsplaceas thefirst
nationalconstitution
oftheUnitedStates,as partof
our firstnationalcompact,and as theinstrument
uponwhichthepresent
UnitedStatesConstitution
wasdirectly
built.As such,theArticles
areboth
and important.
interesting
EARLY PLANS FOR UNION
in colonialAmericapotentially
Politicalrelationships
had threelevelsand
It
that
intracolonial,
intercolonial, colony-mother
country. isinteresting
inthefirst
andthird
the
solution
tended
to
be
instances,
federalism-although
a federalism
thatwas unconscious,
was notderivedfromtheory,
and had
no nametodescribe
it.Thecolonieswereeacha collection
oftownsorcounthana single,
tiesrather
undifferentiated
Forexample,
Colentity.
Plymouth
was
of
seven
eachwithitsowntownmeeting.
ony eventually
towns,
composed
a colony,thesevarious
Still,sincecharters
recognized
onlya singleentity,
federal
partshad to coordinate
policyand control.Theydidso bywriting
suchas theFundamental
OrdersofConnecticut
documents,
(1639)andActs
and Ordersof RhodeIsland(1647),whichcreateda common,colony-wide
withlimitedpowerswhilepreserving
towngovernments
to
government
Bothtownand colonygovernoperatein theirownsphereofcompetence.
mentswereoftenderivedin formand substance
fromcovenants,
whichin
turnwerebaseduponwhatwe nowknowas "federaltheology,"buteven
whentheywerenotderived
fromcovenants,
colonialgovernments
functioned
as federalpolities,havingbeenbuiltup frombelow.4
effectively
Relations
between
thecoloniesandEnglandrevolved
aroundtwokeyprovisionsfoundinmostcharters.
Thefirst
the
toformand
colonists
permitted
ownlocalgovernments.
Thesecondprovision
thatlaws
operatetheir
required
these
local
not
be
to
the
laws
passedby
governments
contrary
passedbythe
Parliament.
These
were
based
obvious
needsof
English
arrangements
upon
With
a
minimum
two-month
round
between
the
colonies
practicality.
trip
andEngland,thecoloniescouldnotbe runfromthemother
Also,
country.
thecrowncouldnotuse themilitary
to runthecoloniesifit wishedto attractthesettlers,
neededtosecureBritish
claimsinNorth
families,
primarily
America.Also,thosemigrating
oftenowneda partialstakein thecolony
andthushadvoting
Thesefactors,
with
rights.
plusEngland'spreoccupation
theCivilWarandFrenchexpansionism,
ledtothetwostandard
charter
provisionsjust describeddefining
a relationship
betweencolonyand mother
thatwas federalin operation,
country
althoughnotfederalby design.
One mightexpectthataftera century
anda halfoflivingwithessentially
federalsolutions
tobothintracolonial
andcolony-mother
relationcountry
4The processis describedin greaterdetailin Donald S. Lutz, "From Covenantto Constitutionin AmericanPoliticalThought,"Publius: TheJournalof Federalism10 (Fall 1980): 101-133.
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58
Publius/Winter
1990
Americans
wouldturneasilyto a federal
solution
ships,post-independence
forintercolonial
relations.
Thattheydid notcan be explained
(interstate)
in partbythegenerallackof interest
duringthecolonialerain combining
thecoloniesundera commongovernment.
Thislackof interest
leftthecolonistswithalmostno practical
atcontinent-wide
instituexperience
political
tionsbefore1754.As wewillsee,however,
workedout
BenjaminFranklin
oneofthefirst
seriousdesigns
foran intercolonial
anditcame
government,
muchcloserto a federalsystem
thandidtheArticles
of Confederation.
In
ordertounderstand
howtheAmericans
cameup withtheArticles,
then,we
mustfirstlook at whatoccurredearlier.
onthepartofEnglishcolonists
lackofinterest
to unite
Despitea distinct
theircoloniesundera continent-wide
therewerea considerable
government,
number
ofsuchplans.TheNewEnglandConfederation
(1643),createdby
thecolonists,was thefirst.Typicalforplanswritten
in America,it was
andessentially
theinbytheneedforcommonsecurity
generated
preserved
oflocalgovernments.
The 1660Commission
oftheCouncilfor
dependence
wastypical
forplansofuniondevisedinBritain.It was
ForeignPlantations
ofeconomic
forthecolpredicated
uponmercantilist
principles
development
forBritain.Atthesametime,itwassomewhat
oniesandenhanced
revenue
to theexisting
indifferent
politicalinstitutions
developedbythecolonists.
Laterplansincluded
theRoyalCommission
toGovernor
EdmundAndros
to uniteall of New England,New York,and theJerseys
(1688);William
Penn'sPlan of Union(1696);theReportof theBoardof Tradeon union
ofNewYorkwithothercolonies
Plan(1698);A Virgin(1696);theD'Avenant
oftheEnglishPlantations
ian's Plan,in "An Essayon theGovernment
on
ofAmerica"(1701);TheLivingston
Plan (1701);theEarl of
theContinent
Stair'sProposals(1721);thePlanoftheLordsofTrade(1721);DanielCox's
of theEnglishprovince
of Carolina"(1722);the
Plan, in "A Description
Planof1751;Richard
Peter'sPlan(1754);
Plan(1751);theFranklin
Kennedy
Plan(1754);theAlbanyPlanofUnion(1754);PlanoftheLords
Hutchinson's
Plan(1760);theGalloway
Plan(1774);
ofTrade(1754);Dr. SamuelJohnson's
of Confederation
Articles
and Franklin's
(1775).
As notedearlier,
thecolonies,andlaterthestates,tendedtobe builtfrom
oflocalgovernments.
at region-wide
thebottom
Attempts
up as a federation
seema naturalexsuchas theNewEnglandConfederation,
confederations,
all of thecolonies.However,the
tension,as does a confederation
uniting
resistant
American
Whigdevotionto localcontrolmadetheWhigshighly
to confederations
largerthana singlestate.At thesametime,theseideas
andplansfora unitedAmericawerenotsimply"pie-in-the-sky"
creations
withvarying
of no consequence.
Each addressed,
success,theissuesthat
would continueto exercisenationalpoliticsthroughthe 1787Constitutional
Convention.
Americaand colTo illustratetheconnectionbetweenpost-revolutionary
theAlbanyPlan of Union. In June
letus examinebriefly
onial developments,
1754,theEnglishBoard of Trade called fora congressof Americancolonies
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Articlesof Confederation
59
to discussproblems
of mutualdefense.Britainwas clearlyon thevergeof
a majorwarwithFrance,andthewarwasexpected
to spilloverintoNorth
America(laterto be calledtheFrenchand IndianWars).It was feltthat
a collective
without
thecolonists
wouldbe no matchfortheFrench,
effort,
sincetheFrenchwereexpected
to mobilizetheirIndianallies.In
especially
additionto working
out plansforjointdefense,thedelegatesto theconwiththeIroquoisConfederacy
and thus
gressweresupposedto negotiate
undercut
theFrenchadvantage.
Sevencoloniessentdelegates
toAlbany-NewHampshire,
Massachusetts,
Rhode Island, Connecticut,
New York, Pennsylvania,
and Maryland.
withtheIroquoiswerenotsuccessful,
as theylatersidedwith
Negotiations
theFrench,buta littleappreciated
of themeeting
effect
was to bringthe
in directcontactwiththesuccessful
colonists
The
Iroquoisconfederation.5
lessonwas notlostas at leastthreeplansforuniting
theEnglishcolonies
in a similarconfederation
werepresented
at theAlbanycongress.
One of
theseplanswas written
discusbyBenjaminFranklin.Afterconsiderable
as itsmajorrecommendation
for
sion,theplanwasadoptedbythecongress
mutualdefense,
and it was termed
theAlbanyPlan of Union.6Thus,this
notonlyseta precedent
forunitedcolonialcongresses
congress
dealingwith
commonproblems,
it also providedthefirstversionof a unitedcolonial
arrivedat bya trans-colonial
government
politicalprocesssimilarto that
usedduring
theStampActcrisisand thentheContinental
durCongresses
ingthe1770s.
UnliketheIroquoismodel,Franklin's
plandidnotprovidea vetoforeach
oftheAmerican
colonialpattern
colony.Instead,itwasa logicalextension
of politicalorganization.
Therewas an executive
appointedbythecrown
andtermed
the"president
calledtheGrandCoungeneral."Thelegislature,
thepursestrings,
all legislation
hadtobe signedby
cil,controlled
although
thepresident
of a royalgovergeneralas well.The typicalcolonialpattern
nor lockedin combatwitha legislature
electedbythecolonistswas thus
on the"national"plane.Since,bythistime,thelegislatures
had
reproduced
the
in
hand
the
was
no
there
reason
to
that
gained upper
colonies,
suspect
butthesamewouldoccureventually
on thetrans-colonial
anything
plane.
Theunitedlegislature
was to writeand regulate
treaties
withtheIndians
themakingof peace and declaring
of war);regulatetradewith
(including
theIndians;providefortroops,forts,
and
elserequired
for
ships, anything
thedefense
ofanycolony(although
theconsent
ofa colony'slegislature
was
to raisetroopswithin
newsettlements
until
required
it);createandregulate
theirowngovernment
wasgranted
fromtheking;and,mostimbycharter
raise
dutiesandtaxes"collectedwiththeleastinportant,
moneythrough
convenienceto thepeople; ratherdiscouragingluxurythanloadingindustry
5For further
discussionon the possibleimpactof the Iroquois Confederationon American
see Bruce E. Johansen,ForgottenFounders: Benjamin Franklin,the Iroconstitutionalism,
quois and theRationalefor theAmericanRevolution(Ipswich,Mass.: GambitPublishers,1982).
6Thetextis in AlbertH. Smyth,ed., The Writings
of BenjaminFranklin,10 vols. (New York,
1907), vol. 3, pp. 8-29.
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60
1990
Publius/Winter
withunnecessary
burdens."Clearlythisgovernment
wouldhavehad more
powerthanthatproducedby theArticlesof Confederation.
Itssuperiority
totheforthcoming
Articles
ofitslegislature.
layinthedesign
threeyears,therepresentatives
weretobe apportioned
Electedevery
accordof eachcolony.Thiswouldhaveputthe
contributions
ingto thefinancial
intheirrespective
ofarguing
fora decrease
coloniesintheposition
representationeverytimetheyaskedfora lowertaxlevy.Linkingtaxesto thecomof overrepresentmerceandwealthgenerated
bythecolonieshadtheeffect
ing the smallerstatescomparedto theirpopulation,becausetheyhad
inlowincome-producing
frontier
situations.
fewer
citizens
disproportionately
intoaccountthecomItalsooverrepresented
thesouthern
coloniesbytaking
of slavery,
without
mercialeffects
havingto facethequestionthatwould
as thebase-shouldslavesbe includedinthe
be raisedbyusingpopulation
headcount?
threeyearsuntiltaxcontribuThe apportionment
proposedforthefirst
thatFranklin
theshrewd
calculations
tionscouldbe workedoutillustrated
in
united
TheCouncil
a
hadmadeaboutprobablefuture
legislature.
politics
follows:
to
be
as
was
initially
apportioned
New Hampshire
....................2
Massachusetts
.......................7
RhodeIsland........................2
Connecticut
..........................5
New York............................4
NewJersey
.......................... 3
Pennsylvania
........................6
Maryland
.............................4
Virginia
...............................7
North
Carolina
.....................4
SouthCarolina
.....................4
Total= 48
NewEnglandtotal=16 (33%)
Middle statetotal= 17 (350%)
Southern
stateTotal= 15 (32%)
a majority,
colonies
tocreate
forfouroutoftheeleven
It waspossible
colbecause
thethree
thatthiswouldhappen
butitwasalsounlikely
largest
Themost
ofa different
onieswereeachthecenterpiece
subculture.7
political
rather
of
but
on
size
the
not
based
on
the
were
coalitions
colonies,
likely
a southern
coaliaroundMassachusetts,
a NewEnglandcoalitioncentered
and a centercoalitionbuiltaroundPennaroundVirginia,
tioncentered
it shouldnotsurprise
a Pennsylvanian,
was
Given
that
Franklin
sylvania.
was likelyto lead theswingcoalition,and thusbe
us thatPennsylvania
influential.
disproportionately
and theirimportanceforAmericanpoliticsis discussed
7Thebasis forthesethreesubcultures,
in Daniel J. Elazar, AmericanFederalism:A ViewfromtheStates(3rded.; New York: Harper
& Row, 1984).
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Articlesof Confederation
61
wouldlater
The divisionbetween
thethreeregionssuggested
byFranklin
of
be reproduced
almostexactlyin theContinental
Congressand Articles
theaddition
ofDelawareandGeorgiatothedelegaConfederation,
although
of exactlysixteenseatsout of forty-eight
to
tionspermitted
theallotment
intheselaterbodieseachstatehad onevote,
eachoftheregions.Although
and thustheroughparitybetweenregionswas actually4-5-4 insteadof
astuteforthelongrun.When
16-16-16,Franklin's
proposalwaspolitically
theUnitedStatesConstitution
established
thenumberof seatsinitially
to
be allocatedeachstateintheHouseofRepresentatives,
thedivision
between
wasveryclosetoFranklin's
regions
proposalmadein1754.It isalsoofpassinterest
the
seats
to thesouthern
colonies
that
apportioned
ing
byFranklin
inhis1754proposalmatched
whatthey
wouldhavebeengivenusinga populathree-fifths
of a person.
tionbase withslavesbeingcountedas roughly
TheAlbanyPlan ofUnionwas rejected
the
crown
as
its
by
undercutting
of
The
failed
to
the
also
colonial
authority. plan
gain acceptance
legislatures
to sacrifice
becausetheywereunwilling
anyof theirpower.The weakness
of Whigpoliticaltheory
withrespect
to "national"unionis hererehearsed
morethantwodecadesbeforetheArticles
ofConfederation.
Preference
was
at a distance.The same
alwaysgivento localcontroloverpoliticalentities
whenperceived
thatlaterfueleda breakwithBritain,
as tyranperspective
wouldbe a
nical,also fueleda suspicionthatanycontinental
government
usedstandard
sourceofdangeras well,evenifthecontinental
government
Whiginstitutions.
It is an ironyofhistory
thatintheArticles
ofConfederation,
theAmerican
muchclosertotheIroquoisConfederation
than
Whigsoptedforsomething
to theirownstatesystems
as represented
byFranklin's
plan.The ironyis
furthered
durbyFranklin's
planbeingexplicitly
proposedas an alternative
it
been
Had
Franklin's
ingthedebateintheContinental
Congress.
adopted,
inthenationalgovernhaveovercome
theweaknesses
planwouldprobably
mentto theextentof stallingfora considerable
time,ifnotpermanently,
theneedfortheevenmorepowerful
represented
replacement
bytheFederalist
Constitution
of 1787.In thelongrun,theformofgovernment
proposedby
Franklin
wouldprobably
haveevolvedintoa parliamentary
similar
system
to whatBritainhas today.
THE PLACE OF THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION
On 7 October1777,theContinental
thestates
Congressvotedon whether
undertheArticles
of Confederation
shouldhaveone voteforevery50,000
whiteinhabitants.
and Virginiavotedin favor.8The
OnlyPennsylvania
ratioof one vote forevery30,000inhabitants
was thenproposed.Only
Virginiavoted forit, althoughthe two NorthCarolina delegatessplittheir
8Discussionof eventsin theContinentalCongressis based upon the recordcollectedby W.
C. Ford et al., eds., Journalsof theContinentalCongress,1774-1789,34 vols. (Washington,
D.C.: 1907).
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All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
62
1990
Publius/Winter
threevotesinfavor.Then
vote,andJohnAdamscastoneofMassachusetts'
toa state'scontribution
itwasproposedthatrepresentation
beproportional
ThistimeVirginia
votedin favor,
in taxrevenueto thenationaltreasury.
votedin favor,and JohnAdams
oneofthethreeSouthCarolinadelegates
oftheproposal.Finally,on the
voteinsupport
onceagaincasthisminority
votedno.
delegation
proposalto giveeachstateonevote,onlytheVirginia
voteswerecastbyoneofthreedelegates
NorthCarolinasplit,andnegative
fromSouthCarolinaand by JohnAdams.9
It is easyto writeofftheVirginiavoteas thedesireof a largestateto
butthisfailsto accountforthecondoubleitsproportional
representation,
vote"
"one
one
sistent
of
state,
by theotherlargestates.During
support
thecomofNewJersey
laidoutmostclearly
thedebate,JohnWitherspoon
He
to
which
view
representation.10
underlay
pact
opposition proportional
andthusthenationalgovernto an individual,
saweachstateas equivalent
as a selfmentas a compactbetweenindividualstates,each considered
the
Continenno
matter
ever
before
He
saw
sufficient
coming
community.
withina stateas opto individuals
tal Congressthatwouldrelatedirectly
shouldthusbe the
of
a
state
as
whole.
entire
state
a
The
entity
posedto the
one
no
basis
for
there
was
and
unitofrepresentation,
judging stateas deservin
his
votethananother.Implicit
positionwas thenotion
ingof a greater
oftheir
sizes.
between
ofmoralequivalence
communities,
respective
regardless
rearedand educatedin Scotland.The biblical
was a minister
Witherspoon
covenantidea was at thecoreof hisworldview.At anotherpoint,in the
into
debateon howto levytaxes,Witherspoon
said,"we arenowentering
standon original
a newcompactandtherefore
ground."JohnLockewould
froma biblicalperspective.
was working
butWitherspoon
haveapproved,
ThekeypointinWitherspoon's
designwasnot
positionforconstitutional
should
thatstatesshouldeachhaveonevote,butthatthenational
government
within
a state.Since
thandirectly
actuponthestatesrather
uponindividuals
itmadelittlesensetoactupon
individuals
wereseenas partofa community,
individuals
was to imply
To
act
the
other
than
community.
upon
anything
ThiswastheverycoreofwhatMadison
thedestruction
ofthecommunity.
As wewillsee,muchofwhathepraised
withtheArticles.
sawas theproblem
was alreadyto
of 1787,suchas theextended
in theConstitution
republic,
Theonethingthatwasnotfoundwasthenational
be foundintheArticles.
The communitarian
stanceof
actingdirectly
uponindividuals.
government
with
its
local
American
especially comemphasis
uponcommunity,
Whigs,
them
at
national
levelthantheir
the
more
was
deemed
munities,
by
important
indetailandwas
thecommunity
thatreflected
to a legislature
commitment
betweenwhathe
in itssphere.Witherspoon
clearlydistinguished
supreme
itremained
stilllargely
calleda "federalunion,"inwhichthosecomposing
independent,and whathe called an "incorporating"union,whichcreated
a new communitycomposed of all the individualsin the nation.
9As recordedin Ford, Journalsof the ContinentalCongress,vol. 9, pp. 779-782.
1oFord,Journalsof the ContinentalCongress,vol. 6, pp. 1079, 1082, 1101, and 1103.
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ofConfederation
Articles
63
sawtheneedforan oppositemodel.Thequestion
JohnAdams,however,
forhimwasnot"whatwearenowbutwhatweoughttobe whenourbargain
shallbe made."llHe sawtheconfederacy
as creating
a newcommunity,
a
newentity.
He usedthemetaphor
of melting
separatepiecesof metalinto
a common
masssuchthat"we shallno longer
retain
ourseparate
individualias to all questionssubmitted
to theconty,butbecomea singleindividual
thenationalgovernment
wouldact
federacy."In sucha newcommunity,
thanuponstates.
directly
uponeachindividual
personinthenationrather
Adamswas usingtheWhigperspective
hereto emphasize
a nationalcomwithin
as
he
"the
interests
doors
should be
where,
it,
munity
put
the
of
interests
without
doors."
The
"Essex
mathematically
representatives
Result" was beingechoed here,the same way Witherspoonechoed it.12 An
within
inherent
contradiction
waslaidbareforthefirst
Whigpolitical
theory
and
came
down
on
different
sidesof thesplit.
time,
prominent
Whigs
Adamsusedwordssimilar
to thoseMadisonwouldusein TheFederalist.
Interests
shouldbe represented,
as such.Makingrepresennotcommunities
tationinlegislatures
to
ofpeoplewasviewedas a surproportional numbers
thecommonwealth
ofa comand,thus,theinterests
rogateforrepresenting
"it is thenumberof labourers
because,as Adamssaid elsewhere,
munity
whichproduce
thesurplus
fortaxation,
andnumbers
therefore
indiscriminatelyarethefairindexof wealth."Adamssaidin anotherpartof thedebate
that"the numbers
of peopleweretakenbythisarticle(ArticleXI of the
as an indexofthewealthofthestateandnotas subjects
proposedArticles)
oftaxation."Adamshadnotyetfacedthefullimplications
ofhis"melted
metal"theory
wouldindeedbe subbecause,undersucha view,individuals
TheUnitedStatesConstitution
laterreflected
thisinjecttodirecttaxation.
actdirectly
consistency
byhavingthenationalgovernment
uponindividual
butprohibiting
direct"headtaxes."It tooktheSixteenth
Amendcitizens,
mentto maketheConstitution
in thisregard.
consistent
AdamsthusbackedFranklin's
onrepresentation
andtaxation
beposition
He
also
backed
Franklin's
that
ingdistributed
proportionally.
position an
of
even
the
state
as
the
unit
of
didnotproanalysis interests, using
analysis,
ducea large-state/small-state
Both
saw
and
split.
Virginia,
Pennsylvania,
Massachusetts
as naturalleadersofcoalitions
baseduponregional
political
subcultures
rather
thanuponsize.JamesWilsonalsosupported
proportional
on thegroundsthat"we arenotso manystates;we areone
representation
state."
He
concludedfinally
large
that,"I defythewitof manto invent
" Ibid.,
and 1104.
pp. 1099-1100
12The"EssexResult"(1778),written
on the
influential
Parsons,washighly
byTheophilus
whichin turnbecametheprimary
modelfor
Constitution,
designof the1780Massachusetts
laterstateconstitutions.
TheMassachusetts
stillineffect
Constitution,
today,istheoldestwritten
intheworld.The"EssexResult"efficiently
constitution
ofAmerican
laysoutthemainstream
atthetime,anddoesso ina theoretically
coherent
fashion.
Itshouldberanked
political
thought
in importance
withtheessaysfoundin TheFederalist.
Thetextof theessaycanbe foundin
severalplaces,butwasfirst
inmodern
timesbyOscarHandlinandMaryHandlin
reproduced
in theirPopular Sources of Authority:Documentson theMassachusettsConstitutionof 1780
Mass.: HarvardUniversity
(Cambridge,
Press,1966),pp. 324-365.
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64
1990
Publius/Winter
a possiblecase,or to suggest
anyonethingon earth,whichshallbe forthe
andwhichwillnot
of
and Massachusetts,
interests Virginia,
Pennsylvania,
also be fortheinterest
of theotherstates.""3
BenjaminRushpressedthe
thatofpursuing
thecommon
samepositionusinganother
Whigargument,
good. He said, "I wouldnothave
good as opposedto anyparticularistic
thatI ampleadingthecauseofPennsylvania;
whenI entered
itunderstood
a citizenofAmerica."14
Hereagainthenothatdoor,I considered
myself
to theindividual
tionof thenationalgovernment
directly
beingconnected
havinga dual
implied,as was theidea of Americans
personwas strongly
of thecrucialconceptsunderlying
theU.S. Constitution.
citizenship-one
ofnotewereworkFederalists
Adams,Wilson,and otherfuture
Franklin,
to a theory
moresuitablefor
ingouttheshiftfromtraditional
Whigtheory
ofConfederation
national
union,buton theArticles
theywerenotyetstrong
oftheArforexperience
withtheoperation
enoughto prevail.It remained
the
minds
to
for
the
critical
ticlesto convert
change-having
enough
push
individuals.
nationalgovernment
operatedirectly
upon
of
undertheArticles
of thedebateoverrepresentation
Anotherfeature
Sherman
forbicameralism.
wasthejustification
Confederation
began
Roger
"We arerepresenthestates-as-communities
bysaying:
position
bysupporting
tativesof States,notindividuals.""Aftera fewsentences
why
outlining
veeredto
he suddenly
shouldnotbe baseduponnumbers,
representation
voteshouldbe takentwoways;calltheColtheideaofbicameralism--"The
of both." In Thomas
and havea majority
onies,and call theindividuals,
a slightnotesonthedebate,SamuelChaseofMaryland
Jefferson's
proposed
He was recordedas saying"thatthe
basisforbicameralism.
ly different
lifeor liberty,
smallerstatesshouldbe securedin all questionsconcerning
tomoney,
onesinallrespecting
andthegreater
... invotesrelating
property.
to thenumberof itsinthevoiceof eachcolonyshouldbe proportioned
The "Essex Result" summarizedthe position to the
habitants."'16
whilethelower
property
upperhousewassupposedtoprotect
contrary-the
in
housewas supposedto protectlivesand rights.The lack of coherence
Chase'spositionwasunderscored
byhisvotingagainsteveryproposalfor
forbicameralism
ornot,no argument
Coherent
representation.
proportional
defenwerethinking
totheContinental
washeeded.Mostdelegates
Congress
withpreserving
statepolitical
powertotake
sively.Theyweretooconcerned
andtherefore
tomakethenational
effective,
government
seriously
arguments
powerful.
on 11June1776to createa comhadresolved
TheContinental
Congress
Thedebateontheproposalconofconfederation.
towriteup articles
mittee
in Congressas thecommittee
tinuedintermittently
piecesof arpresented
ticlesfromtimeto time. The overallproposal was adopted 15 November
13Ford,Journalsof the ContinentalCongress,vol. 6, p. 1106.
14Ibid.,p. 1081.
"Ibid.
161bid.,p. 1102.
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ofConfederation
Articles
65
1777,and on 26 June1778a formforratification
bythestateswas finally
butotherratifications
Eightstatessigneditalmostimmediately,
presented.
inuntil,on 1 March1781,Maryland
becamethelastto ratify.
dribbled
The
of ConnextdayCongressassembledforthefirsttimeundertheArticles
America'sfirstnationalconstitution.
federation,
andbackward.17
Thetextofthedocument
lookedbothforward
Thevery
thetraditional
first
linesaid"we theundersigned,"
for
style openingfounsincetheMayflower
dationdocuments
Compact(1620).At theend,there
intheformcommonly
usedduringthecolonialera.
was a listofsignatures
Thesesignatures
weregroupedby state.At thebeginning
of theArticles,
of statesrather
thefactthattheagreement
wasmadebydelegates
thaninin
the
states
dividualswas underscored
order
from
bylisting
geographical
northtosouth,notoncebuttwice.InArticle
for
the
time
in
first
American
I,
we runacrossthe phrase"The UnitedStatesof
history,
documentary
thisphraseresonated
withtheFederalist
America."Although
Constitution
to be written
in 1787,thephrasewas also anotherstatement,
in thisdocuthis
ment,of theagreement
beingmadeamongstates.ArticleII reinforced
once againby notingthateach stateretainsitssovereignty
as wellas any
totheUnitedStates.Theexisting
stategovernpowersnotexpressly
granted
mentswereaffirmed,
buttheTenthAmendment
was also prefigured.
TheArticles
of Confederation
so heavilyitsstatusas a comemphasized
thestatesthattheframers
felta needto providelanguagerepactbetween
readers
thattheywereindeedengagedina commoncause.Articles
minding
III andIV referred
to thestatesentering
into"a firmleagueoffriendship"
to "perpetuate
mutualfriendship
andintercourse."
Thepreamble
calledthe
ofConfederation
document
"articles
andperpetual
union
Union,"perpetual
againin ArticleXIII.
beingmentioned
Therewerecuriousechoesof colonialdocuments.
For example,Article
IV saidinpartthat"No Stateshallbe represented
inCongressbylessthan
whichwastherangesuggested
two,norbymorethansevenmembers,"
by
in theAlbanyPlan of Unionin 1754,and moreor lessfollowed
Franklin
in nationalcongresses
until1790.Franklin's
idea forthree-year
termswas
also echoedinArticleIV insofar
as no delegatecouldservemorethanthree
terms
overanysix-year
one-year
period,whichinpractice
usuallymeantthat
theaveragedelegateservedforthreeyearsandthenwasoffforthreeyears.
on multiple
werecommonproviThis,and theprohibition
office-holding,
sionsin stateconstitutions.
Ofevengreater
interest
wastheextent
towhichtheArticles
ofConfederationcontained
whatwas laterfoundin the1787Constitution.
The general
is
that
the
Articles
were
impressionusuallygiven
wholly
replaced
bythe1787
Constitution.
It wouldbe moreaccurateto saythatthe1787document
was
generallywrappedaroundan amendedArticlesof Confederation.Depend-
17We willbe relying
hereon thetextof theArticlesof Confederation
as reproducedin Francis
N. Thorpe,comp. and ed., TheFederaland StateConstitutions
..., 7 vols. (Washington,D.C.,
1907), vol. 1, pp. 9-17.
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66
Publius/Winter
1990
fromone-half
totwo-thirds
inguponhowonecountswordsandprovisions,
ofwhatis in theArticles
showedup intheFederalist
Constitution
of 1787.
Forexample,andjustforexample,sections1 and2 of ArticleIV in the
UnitedStatesConstitution
weretakenalmostentirely
fromArticle
present
IV of theArticles
of Confederation,
thewording
for"fullfaith
including
and credit,""privileges
and immunities,"
and the returnof interstate
ofnewstatesfoundin section3 ofArticleIV had
Theadmission
fugitives.
inArticle
X oftheArticles.
Therepublican
ofsecitscounterpart
guarantee
IV haditscounterpart
inArticleIII oftheArticles.
Article
tion4 ofArticle
andwhileitwas
IX oftheArticles
is a specific
grantofpowerto Congress,
itwasstrucnotnearly
as broada grantas foundinthepresent
Constitution,
there
list
of prohibithe
end
of
Article
was
a
similar.
Toward
IX,
turally
Section
9 ofthe
to thatfoundinArticle
tionson nationalpowerssimilar
I,
VI
that
list
of
on
state
Article
was
a
Constitution.
prohibitions
governments
paralleledArticleI, Section10 of theConstitution.
imIV oftheArticles
ofconsiderable
wasan innovation
BuriedinArticle
whose
but
for
the
later
United
States
Constitution,
implications
portance
werenotfullyutilizedin theArticles.Section2 of ArticleIV in theConto all Privileges
stitution
says:"The CitizensofeachStateshallbe entitled
exofCitizensintheseveralStates."Thisis a fundamental
andImmunities
is
a
citizen
American
of
federalism
because
simultaneously
every
pression
he or sheresides.One of the
of theUnitedStatesand of thestatewherein
aredirectly
ofSection2 isthatAmericans
subjectto laws
manyimplications
madeby eithertheCongressor theirstatelegislature.
of
ofConfederation
said: "thefreeinhabitants
ArticleIV intheArticles
each of theseStates... shallbe entitledto all theprivilegesand immunities
were
andimmunities
intheseveralStates."Theseprivileges
of freecitizens
tomovebetween
as theabilities
thenenumerated
states,engageintradeand
in thestateto which
withtheothercitizens
on an equalfooting
commerce
as other
onemayhavemoved,be subjectto thesametaxesandrestrictions
out
citizensofthestateto whichonehas moved,and moveone'sproperty
of a state(and thusintoanotherstate).
The implication
was thatas a resultof therebeinga UnitedStatesof
nothavewithout
thatonemight
andimmunities
onehadprivileges
America,
conand immunities
The extentof suchprivileges
a nationalgovernment.
ina given
as opposedtocitizenship
thebasisfora national
stituted
citizenship
acrossstateborders.
andimmunities
theseprivileges
state,becauseonecarried
in Article
The Articlessetup whatamountsto a nationalcourtsystem
between
to
functioned
this
court
but
adjudicate
disputes
only
IX,
system
could
Thishadtobe becausetheConfederal
Congress
states,notindividuals.
and thuscouldnothold individuals
individuals,
affecting
pass no lawsdirectly
to account foranything.When Congresswas giventhe powerby the Constitutionto affectindividualsdirectly,the notion of dual citizenshipwas
Nationalcitizenshipfilledout,to theextentthatthenational
revolutionized.
governmentcould directlyaffectindividuals.By the same token,and this
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Articlesof Confederation
67
is veryimportant,
theinvention
of dual citizenship
in theArticles
of Conthewayin whichnationalcitizenship
federation
structured
operatedlater
in theUnitedStatesConstitution.
The invention
of dual citizenship
in the
and thenthetransfer
of thisconceptto thenationalConstitution
Articles,
in 1787,wasthelegalbasisfortheoperation
offederalism
inall ofitsmany
a dual courtsystem.
manifestations,
including
Without
theArticles
ofConfederation,
andthuswithout
dualcitizenship,
therewas no certainty
thattheU.S. Constitution
wouldhavetakenitspresentform.Indeed,itwaspossiblethatsomething
otherthantheextremes-a
without
ora looseleagueofindependent,
unitary
government
states,
sovereign
states-wouldhavebeenverydifficult
to visualizeineithertheory
or practice.Putanother
ofConfederation
waslikea vesselwaiting
way,theArticles
to be filledup. Notonlydiditscontents,
whenexperienced
inpractice,
sugof theUnited
gestwhatneededto be added,butwhenthenewsubstance
StatesConstitution
wasadded,theoldervesselto a significant
degreedeterminedthefinalshapeof thenewsubstance.
Asidefromthenarrower
and
grantof powerto thenationalCongress,
a unicameral
where
eachstatehadonevote,theArticles
differed
legislature
fromtheUnitedStatesConstitution
of the
mainlyin havinga Committee
Statesinsteadofa singleexecutive-the
Committee
ofone
beingcomprised
fromeachstate-anda courtthatwasdirectly
a creature
oftheCondelegate
werecharacterized
often
gress.The stateconstitutions
bya weakexecutive,
undertheswayof a committee
or electedbythelegislature,
and
appointed
a courtsystem
underthelegislature.
TheArticles
ofConfederation
directly
in theseimportant
wasmorereflective
ofWhiginstitutions
in state
respects
thananyindependent
aboutthebestinstitutions
for
governments
theorizing
a nationalgovernment.
Bothwithrespect
to thelimited
grantofpowerand
thestyleofinstitutions
theArticles
a straightforward
described,
represented
extension
of Whigpoliticalthought
to nationalgovernment.
The loosenessof the confederation
and its inherent
weaknesswas
closeto theIroquoisConfederation,
reasonably
exceptin one important
TheIroquoisConfederation
tribalunanimity
forconcerted
respect.
required
ofConfederation
action;theArticles
required
unanimity
onlywhenamendforlegislaingthedocument.
Otherwise,
byninestateswasrequired
approval
of theStateswas
tion,andapprovalbynineof thestatesintheCommittee
requiredto executeanyof thepowersgivenitbythesitting
Congress.Admissionof newstatesalso requiredtheapprovalof ninestates.
Thisbringsus to an interesting
incomparison
with
aspectoftheArticles
theConstitution.
JamesMadisonmademuchinFederalist
10ofsomething
nowknownas theextended
Modernanalysts
creditthenotionof
republic.
theextended
as
at
the
heartof theMadisonianmodeland
republic being
thusan integral
theUnitedStatesConstitupartof thetheory
underlying
tion.Theextended
wastheresult
oftwoconstitutional
republic
provisionstherequirement
thatninestatesapprovebeforetheConstitution
is ratified,
andtheprovision
foradmitting
newstateson an equalfooting.
Witheither
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68
Publius/Winter
1990
ofthesetwoprovisions
therewouldhavebeenno extended
missing,
republic.
and sufficient
conditions.
Theywereitsnecessary
As to thefirstcondition,
pickthenumbernineinwhydidtheframers
of seven?Whynotconcludethatanytwoormore
steadof,say,a majority
theUnitedStates?The answerto thelast
wouldconstitute
statesratifying
A
oftwo,three,
orfourstateswouldhave
is
nation
rather
obvious.
question
leftat leastnineor tenindependent
nations,onlya marginal
improvement
A majority
of sevenwouldhavebeenbetterstill,butwhat
overthirteen.
ifthesesevenwerecomposedof onlysmallstatesor statesfromonlytwo
knewthatthenew
Convention
to theConstitutional
Thedelegates
regions?
the
four
three
of
nationhadto haveat least
largeststates-Massachusetts,
Withanything
andVirginia.
NewYork,Pennsylvania,
less,thenationwould
to workas designed.The
forthesystem
be too smalland too fragmented
number
nineseemedto offera goodchancethatat leastthreeof thelarge
whentheydidnotexpectRhodeIsland
stateswouldbe included,
especially
togo alongeasilywithanyplan.A randomlistofnineoutoftwelveseemed
in sizeand
of statesthatwouldbe extensive
to providefora combination
population.
to expectratification
withstatepoliticsledtheFederalists
by
Familiarity
and especially
in
the
situation
but
Massachusetts,
Virginia,
Pennsylvania,
It was also hopedthatas morestates
NewYorkwas farfromreassuring.
effect.
wouldbe caughtup ina bandwagon
holdouts
theremaining
ratified,
would
nine
states
toldthemthatat least
Thus,simplepoliticalcalculations
andsucha nationwouldinevitably
be neededforthenewnationto survive,
be extensive.
thattherewasconsiderable
Atthesametime,itshouldnotbe overlooked
As inin
the
Continental
nine-state
with
a
Congress.
requirement
experience
an
had been,it had structured
of Confederation
as theArticles
efficacious
stanas
the
nine-state
to
a
the
founders
that
led
approval
expect
experience
It wasat
a two-thirds
Ninestatesconstituted
dardforagreement.
majority.
that
buta provision
sucha majority,
to construct
timesextremely
difficult
morethannine.Thiswasa litmustestthe
satisfied
nineinvariably
satisfied
and thetwo-thirds
framers
requiredby theArticles
understood,
majority
theConstitufor
similar
them
to
a
requirement ratifying
adopt
helpedlead
If
extended
If
have
an
it
would
tion.
republic. theycouldnot
worked,they
national
withthedefective
off
were
better
nine
toapprove,they
sticking
get
in
already place.
government
wouldhave
theextended
ofConfederation,
theArticles
Without
republic
of Europeansas a rankexperiment
outof thewritings
had to be invented
withlittlechanceofacceptance
public,and thedecisionrule
bya skeptical
would have been based on somethingotherthanreasonable
forratification
expectationsderivedfrompast political experience.On the other hand,
on a
Americanshad learnedfroma decade of experiencethatgovernment
basis was possible,in certainrespectsdesirable,and thata stable,
continental
effectivenationalgovernment
requiredmore than an extendedrepublic,it
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Articlesof Confederation
69
also neededsomepowerthatcouldbe applieddirectly.
also conExperience
vincedthemthatthenationalgovernment
shouldhavelimited
powers,and
couldnotbe destroyed.
thatstategovernments
Therewasa logictoexperience
thatno amountof readingin politicaltheorycouldshake.
Providingforan amendment
processwas one of the mostinnovative
Evenmoredaringwastheprovision
aspectsofbothnationalconstitutions.
foradmitting
newstates.History
whena nationaddshowedfewinstances
ed newterritory
without
itas a conquered
land.Evenwhennewunits
treating
wereadded on an equal footing,
thesewerealreadyexisting
states.The
founders
wereproposing
theadditioninfuture
of
new
states
fromteryears
thensparsely
ifsettledat all. In theArticles,
ritories
was
settled,
provision
also madeforaddingCanada.Todaywetakethepossibility
of addingnew
statesforgranted,
buttheArticles
ofConfederation
wasofmajorhistorical
for
first
this
liberal
andfor
importance
containing extraordinarily provision,
it
on
to
the
U.S.
Constitution.
It
the
of
passing
guaranteed building an extensiverepublic.
intheFederalist
Constitution
thatservedto create
Thus,bothprovisions
Madison'sextended
were
also
found
in
the
Articles
of Confederarepublic
tion.If theArticles
ofConfederation
an extended
alreadydefined
republic,
thenwhatwasthemajoradvantage
of theConstitution?
WhydidMadison
makeso muchofsomething
hedidnotrespect?
alreadyfoundina document
He didso notbecausetheproposed
Constitution
created
anextensive
republic,
butbecausethenational
wouldaffect
thecitizens
ofthisextended
government
It was thecombination
of extensive
republicdirectly.
republicand direct
citizensthatproducedtheeffectMadisonwanted.
poweroverindividual
Madisonmayhaveborrowed
thelanguageof David Humeto describethe
ofan extended
butthefactofan extended
was
advantages
republic,
republic
handedtohimthrough
theArticles
ofConfederation,
andhisownexperience
as a citizeninan extended
hadto be decisive.Furthermore,
theexrepublic
ofliving
undertheArticles
himwiththebestpossible
school
perience
provided
forunderstanding
thecrucialelement
thatneededto be addedif we were
tohavea stable,effective
foran extended
congovernment
republic-adirect
nectionbetweenthenationalgovernment
and its citizens.This,in turn,
thebasisforwhichalreadyexistedin
necessarily
implieddual citizenship,
theArticlesof Confederation.
CONCLUSION
The Declarationof Independence
and Articlesof Confederation
together
formed
America'sfirst
nationalcompact.TheDeclaration
ofIndependence
and UnitedStatesConstitution
formedthesecondnationalcomtogether
thefirstcompact
pact, underwhichAmericansstilllivetoday.'8Underlying
18That the Articlesof Confederationwas partof a nationalcompactis discussedin Donald
S. Lutz, "The Declarationof Independenceas Part of a National Compact," Publius: The
Journalof Federalism19 (Winter1989).
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70
Publius/Winter
1990
The
whichwecancallAmerican
wasa coherent
political
theory,
Whiggism.
secondcompactalso had a coherent
it,one thatwe can
theory
underlying
likethesecondcompact,did
Thesecondtheory,
Federalism.
callAmerican
notso muchreplacethefirstas evolveit. The secondcompactbuiltupon
thathad beenfoundto
in an earlierexperiment
thefirstone as a revision
be flawed.TheUnitedStatesof Americawas notsimplyfoundedin 1787,
but refounded
upon a base thathad beenlaid earlierin theArticlesof
Confederation.
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All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions