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Announcing the Use of the Atomic Bomb on
Hiroshima
Harry S Truman
USS Augusta, Atlantic Ocean in route from the Potsdam Conference, August
7,1945 (*Transcribed from the video, GREAT SPEECHES, VOLUME XII)
*Content taken from a longer statement released to the press. Speech captured by the Signal Corps aboard ship.
A short time ago an American airplane dropped one bomb on Hiroshima and destroyed
its usefulness to the enemy. That bomb had more power that 20,000 tons of TNT.
The Japanese began the war from the air at Pearl Harbor. They have been repaid
many fold and the end is not yet. With this bomb we have now added a new and revolutionary increase in destruction to supplement the growing power of our armed forces.
In their present form these bombs are no\v in production and even more pmvcrCu! forms
are in development.
It is an atomic bomb. It is a harnessing of the basic power of the universe. The
force from which the sun draws its power has been loosed against those who brought
war to the Far East.
We have spent two billion dollars on the greatest scientific gamble in history and
we have won. But the greatest marvel is not the size of the enterprise, its secrecy, nor its
cost, but the achievement of scientific brains in making it work. And hardly less marvelous has been the capacity of industry to design and of labor to operate, the machines
and methods to do things never done before. Both science and industry worked together under the direction of the United States Army, which achieved a unique success
in an amazingly short time. It is doubtful if such another combination could be got [sic]
together in the world. What has been done is the greatest achievement of organized
science in history.
We are now prepared to destroy more rapidly and completely every productive
enterprise the Japanese have in any city. We shall destroy their docks, their factories,
and their communications. Let there be no mistake; we shall completely destroy Japan's
power to make war.
It was to spare the Japanese people from utter destruction that the ultimatum of
July 26 was issued at Potsdam. Their leaders promptly rejected that ultimatum. If they
do not now accept our terms they may expect a rain of ruin from the air, the like of
which has never been seen on this earth. Behind this air attack will follow sea and land
forces in such numbers and power as they have not yet seen and with the fighting skill
of which they are already aware.
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109
HARRY TRUMAN ANNOUNCES THE
ATOMIC BOMB ATTACK ON JAPAN
CRITIC: John C. Hammerback
Speeches, like works of art and other artifacts of history and culture, have much to tell
us if we listen carefully to them. Most speeches are busy intersections where orator and
audience join to create meaning, where rhetorical elements reflect and affect an interrelated past, present, and future, where the speaker negotiates between her or his own
needs and abilities, and the varied and sometimes contradictory rhetorical requirements
of occasion, purpose, and audience. A striking example of such a complex rhetorical
event occurred on August 6, 1945, when President Truman announced the dropping of
an atomic bomb on Hiroshima, Japan. From this speech we can learn much about the
president and public in that summer, and about how history and rhetoric are intertwined. 1
The wrenching years of World Waf n had obviously altered the speech's intended
audiences as well as Truman himself. He had become president in April upon Franklin
D. Roosevelt's death, assuming chief responsibility for foreign policy and the war.
Following the German surrender in May, he joined United Kingdom Prime Minister
Winston Churchill and Russian leader Generalissimo Josef Stalin at the Potsdam Conference in July. There, on July 16, he learned that the U. S. 's latest atomic bomb tests,
a secret well kept from Americans and the rest of the world, had been successful; shortly
afterwards the allied leaders issued an ultimatum to the Japanese to surrender an
order to which the Japanese government did not respond and therefore presumably
rejected. Meanwhile, Truman cut back on his efforts to bring Russia into the war against
Japan, for he was beginning to believe that Soviet communism would be a treacherous
adversary rather than a willing partner in the post-war era.
Older and deeper historical forces were also at work. To most Americans, victory
in World War II was but one manifestation of a venerable "exceptionalism" that was
once again revealed in a blessed history for a chosen people in a nation destined by
God or Providence to succeed and even to serve as a model for other nations. This
exceptionalism usually was demonstrated in material-rather than aesthetic or spiritual ways, for example, through a long history of progress in science and industry
that contributed to a high standard of living. Although American exceptionalism has
waned significantly in the last half-century, and seems quaintly misguided or even
dangerously arrogant to many Americans today, it was largely beyond criticism in 1945.
Each of the historical forces above influenced the composition and effects of
Truman's address. He strove to convince the Japanese government to surrender by
underscoring the power and threat of the bomb, thus shortening the war and saving
American lives, and to offer good reasons for its use on Hiroshima. His military advisors estimated that 30,000 (and in one judgment 60,000) Americans would be killed
during the first thirty days of a land invasion of Japan. 2 The Japanese had demonstrated
extraordinary bravery in combat and were expected to ferociously defend their homeland. The American public, his immediate audience, shared his view of the deadly
costs of invading Japan, his desire to end the war quickly, and his perception of the
Japanese military as unusually cruel, even barbaric, a perception fueled by the Ameri-
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can mass media and government throughout the war years. To prevent Russia from
claiming that its role in victory over Japan earned it huge political gains and economic
reparations and to block Russian military expansion and subsequent political control in
Asia, Truman and his advisors also wanted to showcase America's nuclear superiority
before the Soviets declared war on Japan. According to a growing number of scholars,
a major reason for employing the terrible new weapon was "to make Russia more
manageable." 3
History is personal as well as collective, and Truman's own past left imprints on
the speech. After an early career in Missouri and the U. S. Senate unmarked by noteworthy accomplishments, he had been chosen by Roosevelt to run as vice president. In
sharp contrast to his revered running mate, who possessed a Harvard education, respected lineage, upper-class social status, patrician bearing and manner, and immense
wealth, Truman had modest roots, no college degree, and a folksy and feisty personality. Small in literal and figurative stature, he seemed to be an accidental president at a
momentous moment in history.
Perhaps in partial compensation for his lack of education, wealth, height, accomplishments, and place on any socia/lists, Truman projected a persona-the view of him
by his audience-as being cocky, combative, and willing to take responsibility and
make difficult decisions. A sign on his desk read, "The Buck Stops Here." Straightforward and down-to-earth, he seemed to be a simple, honest man of modest talents and
upbringing, an uncomplicated man of the people who stood up for what was right and
what he believed.
In any speech, the orator's persona will merge with other rhetorical elements to
persuade audiences. Rhetorical theorist, Kenneth Burke offers one explanation of this
rhetorical process. Persuasion results when audiences identify with elements of a message or with a speaker or with both. As I have written elsewhere, when a speaker embodies his or her substantive arguments, explanations, and themes, a multi-layered identification occurs that can account for the most startling transformations of audiencesa multiplying of rhetorical potency. 4 Through his speeches Truman created and refmed
elements of his personal image, although as president in August, 1945, he had made few
major addresses and none on foreign policy.
A rhetor brings to her or his public address a set of rhetorical qualities and skills.
Truman's rhetorical profile includes his view of public speeches. Uncomfortable speaking in public, he began his presidency by viewing speeches as something to get through
"as painlessly and quickly as possible" and often did not spend the time in speech
preparation that his advisors desired. 5 A team of writers ordinarily wrote his first drafts,
and he made later changes. Here again he differed from Roosevelt, an eloquent rhetorical stylist who devoted considerable time to writing and practicing his public address.
Truman, not a notable orator in the Senate from 1934-44 and never skillful in speaking
from a manuscript, did improve while serving as president and became a successful
campaigner in 1948, especially in extemporaneous "off-the-cuff' addresses. His advisors' most pressing challenges were to slow his overly fast delivery, a rapid manner
that enabled the new president to complete a speech quickly and "get it over with," and
to convince him to practice.
On August 6, history, audience, speaker, and speech converged on the occasion to
announce the 8:45 a.m. atomic-bomb explosion. Since the efforts of British and Arneri-
Rally Speeches: National Crisis
III
can scientists to produce the bomb had been kept highly secret, Truman's announcement unveiled nothing less than the atomic age. On July 24 he had prepared an order to
drop the bomb on or around August 3, and before leaving Europe he authorized the
broadcast of his statement. The explosion at Hiroshima killed some 80,000 people
almost immediately and badly injured an equal number; a second bomb would be
dropped on Nagasaki just three days later. It was clear that this new weapon, each equal
to millions of tons of ordinary bombs dropped by many aircraft, had unleashed immediate devastation and later radiation that dwarfed the destruction caused by any weapon
in history. At noon while sailing home from Potsdam on the cruiser U. S. S. Augusta,
Truman learned of the successful bombing as he ate lunch with a group of enlisted
men. He exuberantly informed them and then told the ship's officers. Within minutes
his address was broadcast, following its release in written fonn four minutes earlier at
the White House.
The speech, barely three minutes in length, was broadcast on the radio and printed
in newspapers and elsewhere. As Truman introduced a turning point in world history,
you will notice rhetorical choices that are puzzling. Little is said about the war with
Japan or the atomic atlack and the destruction it wrought, and nothing about the use of
radiation as a weapon for the first time, the dangers of the impending atomic age, or
any ethical issues associated with authorizing an atomic-bomb attack. Instead, the President enthusiastically emphasized technological and industrial triumphs of U. S. and
other nations' scientists who worked cooperatively to build the bomb and develop atomic
energy. He boasted of the "marvel" of the "size of the enterprise, its secrecy, ... its
cost," and especialJy of the "achievement of scientific brains in putting together infinitely complex pieces of knowledge held by many men in different fields of science
into a workable plan." He cited the specific number of workers in the plants that made
the bomb, 125,000; proclaimed the "greatest achievement of organized science in history.... It was done under pressure and without failure"; lauded all elements of the
team of labor, the army, and industry as well as the scientists; and promised a "new era
in man's understanding of nature's forces" that, after "intensive research" and careful
development, would supplement conventional power in valuable ways commercially
and could "become a powerful and forceful influence toward the maintenance of world
peace." The United States and Great Britain, he concluded, had succeeded in "harnessing the basic power of the universe." He had decided to keep the production process
"secret," implying that America would have new and unmatched military power valuable in maintaining peace and reaching its foreign policy objectives.
Truman's optimism appealed to the American exceptionalism that ruled the day,
reflecting the values of scientific productivity and material progress that showcased
America's dazzling talent and secured its bright future. Rejecting rhetorical conventions, he devoted little time to justifying the horrifyingly lethal attack. In the first two
short paragraphs he briefly reported the bomb being dropped sixteen hours earlier and
succinctly depicted the Japanese as paying a heavy price for beginning the war; later in
a three-sentence paragraph he warned that "we are now prepared to obliterate more
rapidly and completely every productive enterprise the Japanese have above ground in
any city." "Let there be no inlstake," he declared, "we shall completely destroy Japan's
power to make war." If the Japanese government did not accept the ultimatum from
Potsdam, an ultimatum issued to "spare the Japanese people from utter destruction," its
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GREAT SPEECHES FOR CRlTICISM & ANALYSIS
people could "expect a rain of ruin from the air, the like of which has never been seen
on this earth."
In clear and straightforward language, with few rhetorical flourishes and in his
customary rapid and high-pitched voice and serious albeit matter-of-fact manner, Truman
adapted to the sober occasion but added little drama to his message. His persona maintained its usual confident, combative, and enthusiastic qualities despite the gravity of
his news. Nowhere did he reveal any doubts over choosing to bomb a civilian target,
over unleashing atomic warfare and an atomic age, or over the unchallenged value of
•
SCIence.
Yet Truman had encountered troubling difficulties and doubts during this period,
as is now clear from evidence in memoirs, archives, and his own diary entries and
personal letters to his wife and daughter. He expressed "awe, fear, caution, bluster, or
bravado, depending on his mood, his audiences, and the circumstances of the moment."6
For example, in his diary after the successful atomic bomb tests in Alamogordo, New
Mexico, on July 16, 1945, he lamented that "machines are ahead of morals by some
centuries and when morals catch up perhaps there'll be no reasons for any of it. I hope
not. But we are only termites OIl a planet and maybe when we bore too deeply into the
planet there'll [be] a reckoning-who knows?" He added that the bomb was "the most
terrible thing ever discovered" and might be "the fIre of destruction" prophesied in the
Holy Bible,'
Although Truman had compelling evidence that Japan soon would surrender without an invasion by US troops, neither in this speech nor in his later memoirs did he
betray any ambiguity about his decision to bomb. Instead, he pugnaciously challenged
Japanese leaders, emphasizing the might of the United States in science and industry.
As he said, "we have won the battle of the laboratories as we have won the other
battles" or, later in the speech, the United States "spent two billion dollars on the
greatest scientific gamble in history-and we won."
Most Americans, including senior govenunent officials, first received the news of
the bombing in newspapers. The immediate response to Truman's address, and more
broadly to a coordinated rhetorical campaign featuring press releases, interviews, and
other speeches, was undeniably positive. The American public, by autumn, supported
the decision to bomb by 80-85%; newsmedia editorials and articles reflected public
opinion; and public and press accepted the President's claim that a long and costly land
war was the only alternative to the atomic bomb. That Americans felt great hostility
toward Japan, resulting from its sneak attack on Pearl Harbor and reported cruel treatment of prisoners as well as from normal antipathy toward a wartime foe, helps to
explain why no lengthy justifications were needed. Here Truman and his audience
merged, uncritically supporting the seemingly undebatable decision to bomb.
Americans' belief in exceptionalism and heady confidence in 1945 make understandable the rhetorical potency of Truman's portrayal of science, industry, and particularly atomic energy as magic wands for a triumphant future, a portrayal he sketched
on August 6 and he and his senior officials developed more fully in later days and
weeks. Yet undercurrents of anxiety were visible. The New York Daily Herald reported
that "one senses the foundation of one's own universe trembling"; and Hansen W.
Baldwin wrote uneasily in the New York Times: " ... with such God-like power under
man's imperfect control we face a frightening responsibility." The future could indeed
Rally Speeches: National Crisis
113
be a "bright new world," he sunnised, or "a world of troglodytes." 8 As Professor Paul
Boyer pointed out, the President's and public's dominant attitudes and hidden doubts
mirrored one another to an extraordinary degree. 9
Truman also reached his goals for other audiences. Within four days of the attack,
and after reading Truman's words and reasons carefully and in some cases believing
that he told the true story, Japan's leaders accepted the Potsdam tenns to end the war. 10
The Russians declared war against Japan on August 8; and other countries and peoples
throughout the world had no choice but to accept Truman's claim that the United States
had leaped far ahead in the anns race and his implied, soon-to-be explicit, threat that
the bomb would become the centerpiece of American foreign policy.
Words and reasons, explanations and stories, induce attitudes and actions potentially far marc influential than any immediate reactions by audiences. Truman's appeal
to American exceptionalism and its sub-themes of America's impressive superiority in
and categorical prizing of science, industry, and material achievement, may sound outof-place to young people today after the scaling down of national confidcnce that followed the unpopular and unvictorious military engagement in Viet Nam, the expanded
awareness of the dangers of unregulated scientific application, and the increased
multicultural mix of a population that would fifty years later no longer see itself as
superior in all ways to people of other color, nationality, culture, and national origin. In
1945, however, Truman found a responsive public and rhetorically set the course for
questionable policies and at times disastrous practices based on a national sense of
superiority and an uncritical faith in science. L L
Truman's rhetorical choices would help to detennine foreign policy toward our
perceived enemies for many decades. In the view of some scholars, his link of atomic
weapons to foreign policy as a way to "maintain the peace" established an adversarial
relationship with communist nations that contributed to an intractable conflict. L2 The
price has been high: enonnous expenditures of resources to confront and contain rather
than to work cooperatively with communist countries, a Cold War that cost lives and in
Korea and Vietnam turned hot, and an arms race that prodded Russia and other nations
to develop their own arsenals of potential death.
The long-lasting effects of Truman's speech did not spare the orator himself. Criticism of his decision to unleash atomic weapons followed him until the end of his life
and dominated unfavorable evaluations of his perfonnance as president. His August 6
address might have reduced this criticism or converted it to a constructive discussion
by raising moral and ethical issues and by acknowledging his fears, doubts, and apprehensions. Though he never publicly admitted that he made a mistake, and even declared that he had never doubted his decision, Truman was increasingly forced to defend himself as newly released information indicated that even before they knew of the
bomb the Japanese had decided to surrender in a matter of days or weeks. Once the
rhetorical course was set on August 6 of 1945, the life of the President and the contour
of his later discourse seemed at least partially imprisoned and predestined by his wordsas has the world in which we now live.
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NOTES
l.For an up-to-date and Pulitzer-prize winning biography of Truman, see David McCullough,
Truman (New York: Simon and Shuster, 1992). Among the many other useful studies of
Truman and his presidency are the fact-filled two volumes by Robert J. Donovan, Conflict and
Crisis: The Presidency of Harty S. Truman, 1945-1948 (New York: Norton, 1977) and
Tumultuous Years: The Presidency ofHarry S. Truman, 1949-1953 (New York: Norton, 1982).
For Truman's recollections, see Memoirs of Hany S. Truman, Vol. 1, Year of Decisions
(Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1955). Robert Underhill, The Truman Persuasions
(Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1981), combines history, biography, and some rhetorical
analysis in insightful ways.
2. Robert James Maddox, From War to Cold War: The Education of Han)" S. Truman (Boulder
and London: Westview, 1988) 129.
3. Gar Alperovitz, Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam, expanded and updated edition
(New York: Penguin, 1985) L For a discussion of Truman's thinking and policies toward
Russia and Japan, see also Paul Boyer, '''Some Sort of Peace': President Truman, the American
People, and the atomic bomb," The Truman Presidency, ed. Michael J. Lacey, Woodrow
Wi lwn Center Series (Cam bridge: Cambridge U. Press. 1989) 174-202. In 1965. in the initial
edition of Atomic Diplomacy, Alperovitz was the first scholar to present an extensiv(; argument
that Truman dropped the atomic bomb on Japan in part to make Russia a more "manageable"
adversary in the post-war era.
4. See my "Jose Antonio's Rhetoric of Fascism," Southern Communication Journal, 59 (1994):
181-195; John C. Hamlllerback, "Barry Goldwater's Rhetorical Legacy," Southern
CommunicalionJournal.64 (1999), 323-332; and, co-authored with Richard J. Jensen, '''Your
Tools Are Really the People': The Rhetoric of Robert Parris Moses," Communication
Monographs, 65 (1998): 126-140, and, for the fullest development of this critical approach,
Chapter 3, " The Rhetorical Criticism of Reconstitutive Discourse: A Model for Analyzing
Chavez's Public Address," The Rhetorical Career ofCesar Chavez (College Station: Texas A
and M University Press, 1998) 44-61.
5. Underhill 207 . For the most thorough chronicling and analysis of Truman' s speechrnaking, see
Halford R. Ryan, Harry S. Truman: Presidential Rhetor, Great American Orator Series, no. 17
(Westport, CN: Greenwood, 1993).
6. Boyer 200.
7. Truman diary entries, 16 and 25 July, 1945, quoted in Boyer 192-93.
8. Aug. 7, 1945, cited in AIperovitz 237, note *; Aug. 7, 1945, "The Atomic Weapon" 10.
9. Boyer.
10. Peter Wyden, Day One: Before Hiroshima and After (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984)
297-98.
1 L These policies and practices have ranged from lethally iITadiating workers to engaging in
widely regretted military ventures such as the Vietnam War.
12. AIperovitz presents one of the most extensive cases in support of this conclusion.