1
Pain and Commonsense: How Dissociation Syndromes Motivate the Appearance/Reality
Distinction
John Jenkinson
Pathologies can often illuminate our understanding of the mechanisms that underlie
human experience. In this respect, the study of pathological disorders is invaluable, for it often
results in a reconceptualization of these experiences.
Pain dissociation syndromes are
pathological cases that reveal that there are different components underlying our common
experience of pain and that these components are in fact distinct phenomena, which is
demonstrated by their independent instantiation. This, I argue, demands a revision of certain
philosophical assumptions in order to accommodate the implications suggested by the
occurrence of these syndromes.
I will examine two dissociation syndromes in particular - pain asymbolia and another,
which I will refer to as Sensory-Discriminative Impairment (SDI) – which I argue have two
important philosophical implications. The first raises difficulties with traditional (dualistic)
formulations of qualia, such as that of Saul Kripke, and subsequently favors Lewis’ rejection of
the Identification Thesis, which he argues informs the traditional view of qualia through the
rejection of an appearance/reality distinction. The rejection of this thesis is important to Lewis
because he argues that it makes folk-psychology – a common body of shared belief about mental
phenomena – more consistent with physicalism. The second implication, which comes out of the
first, challenges certain platitudes that are built in to folk-psychology.
I argue that this
strengthens rather than weakens folk-psychology by revealing false platitudes that can be weeded
out of the theory and make it more accurate as a result. It happens to be the case that Lewis’
2
theory of mind – commonsense functionalism – relies to a great extent on folk-psychology, and
as such, my discussion of folk-psychology will focus on his interpretation of it.
This paper is thus an implicit defense of the importance and usefulness of pathological
cases in developing and revising our conceptions of ‘normal’ phenomena.
Although it is
difficult to determine when the investigation of a particular phenomenon has matured enough to
accept its implications as more or less accurate, even in the early stages of such investigation
pathologies can nonetheless be extremely useful as thought experiments that challenge our
previous assumptions about non-pathological phenomena.
1. Pain Asymbolia and SDI
Nikola Grahek describes pain asymbolia as a pain dissociation syndrome in which its
sufferers experience “pain without painfulness”.1 According to recent evidence, there are (at
least) two components of a normal experience of pain: the sensory-discriminative component and
the affective-motivational component.2 The former component is responsible for informing the
individual in pain of the quality of pain (e.g. mechanical), the location of the pain and the
duration of the pain. Prima facie it appears to be the component of pain that allows one to
discriminate the experience as being that of pain and not some other sensation – it is the
distinctive recognitional component of pain.3 The latter component determines the amount of
suffering or unpleasantness associated with the pain, produces appropriate autonomic responses
– physical, behavioral, emotional or otherwise – and gives rise to the sense of injuriousness, or
1
Nikola Grahek, Feeling Pain and Being in Pain, 2nd Ed. (MIT Press: Cambridge, 2007),1.
Murat Aydede and Güven Güzeldere, “Some Foundational Problems in the Scientific Study of Pain”, Philosophy
of Science, Vol. 69, No. 3 (2002): 272-274.
3
Grahek, Pain, 98.
2
3
harm, that is present in an experience of pain. Pain asymbolia demonstrates that these two
components can come apart under certain circumstances.4,5
To test the individuals’ reactions to noxious stimuli, the individuals with pain asymbolia
were pricked with pins and exposed to varying degrees of pressure with the intent of causing
pain. Grahek summarizes the results of the tests, providing a brief description of the condition of
pain asymbolics:
These patients were quite capable of detecting noxious stimuli,
discriminating quality, and feeling pain. But…they were incapable of
appreciating the threatening nature of such stimuli or displaying any
avoidance or escape behavior…they systematically underestimated the
intensity of the injurious stimuli inflicted upon them.6
Thus, the individuals can recognize that they are in fact in pain but lack the ability to perceive or
represent it as problematic or dangerous. They appear to be incapable of recognizing their
experience of pain to be something harmful. Verbal reports given by the patients provide further
support for this claim: “’It hurts indeed, but I do not know what that really is’”7; “’I feel it
indeed; it hurts a bit, but it doesn’t bother me; that is nothing.’”8 The patients were also tested
for responses to verbal as well as visual threats, both of which failed to illicit appropriate
responses. The patients were thus able to discriminate the sensation they experienced as that of
pain, but the pain they experienced meant nothing to them; they were not motivated to try to
4
These are lesions in parts of the brain relevant to the affective-motivational component of pain, but the specific
details of the causes of pain asymbolia are not of consequence here, only that the condition produced is one in which
the patient feels, but does not suffer, pain.
5
There is, perhaps, a third component relevant to pain experience related to higher-level conscious mediation
relevant to the pain experience, such as memory recollection associated with the experience. Indeed, it is possible
there could be additional components as well. As such, one is only warranted in claiming that there are at least two
components so as not to preclude the possibility of additional components.
6
7
Grahek, Pain, 63.
Schilder, P., and Stengel, E. “Schmerzasymbolie.” In Zeitschrift für die gesamte Neurologie und (1928), 151.
Pötzl, O., and Stengel, E. “Über das Syndrom Leitungsaphasie-Schmerzasymbolie.” In Jahrbuch der Psychiatrie
53 (1937), 180.
8
4
cease it or avoid it in any way. What pain asymbolia shows about normal pain experience is that
these two components of a “normal” experience of pain are only contingently associated – the
sensory-discriminative component (the “feel”) can remain intact, while the affectivemotivational (associated with the suffering or unpleasantness) is compromised.9 It follows from
this discussion that it is possible that one can know that they are feeling pain without thereby
suffering anything painful.
For two reasons in particular it seems plausible to state that the experience of pain that
the pain asymbolics experiences is not in fact pain, but rather a sort of quasi-pain state. The first
reason takes into account certain subjective aspects of the experience and the second focuses on
the difference in the causal roles fulfilled by the state. With regard to the first reason, the state
that the pain asymbolics experience has a different phenomenal quality than a “normal”
experience of pain. 10 Phenomenal quality could be understood as the distinctive “felt” quality of
a state by which one knows what it’s like to be in that state, and for my purposes I will use it
roughly coextensively with ‘qualia’. Unpleasantness undoubtedly contributes to the overall
subjective experience of the state and certainly has its own distinct phenomenal quality. A
“normal” experience of pain is always accompanied by a sense of unpleasantness, and as such,
the phenomenal quality of “normal” pain is always contributed to by this sense of
unpleasantness.11
Since pain asymbolics do not experience a sense of displeasure in their
experience of pain, it follows that the state that they are in when they experience pain is
9
Grahek, Pain, 75.
Without getting too involved in the debate about whether phemonenal qualities are irreducibly mental, if one
wanted to be “more” physicalist one could says that instead of the phenomenal qualities of the experience being
different, the subject’s experience of that state differs from a “normal” experience of pain in such a way that their
introspective reports would also differ significantly.
11
Some might object that masochists experience pleasure rather than unpleasantness in the pain that they
experience, but I think this would be a mistake. Surely masochists still have a pain threshold, perhaps different than
normal, which implies unpleasantness. Perhaps the pleasure that masochists enjoy in the experience is exactly a
result of the presence of the unpleasantness in the experience.
10
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phenomenally distinct from a normal experience of pain. With regard to the second reason, the
“pain” that the asymbolics experience is essentially inert. Presumably the phylogenetic reason
for experiencing states of pain is an indirect means of protecting individuals by alerting the
individual to the presence of some harmful agent, and, if intense enough, producing autonomic
responses to avoid such dangers. It appears to be the case that the impairment of the affectivemotivational component of pain results in an inability to produce any appropriate responses. The
responses to the noxious stimuli by the asymbolics seem to be indirect and resulting from
knowledge of the presence of something they know to be harmful rather than any direct
experience of harm. The state itself appears to be inert – action that results from it appears to be
only as a result of some secondary thought process. These two reasons make it appear highly
implausible that pain asymbolics are in a state of pain that is similar to the experience of pain
that “normal” individuals have.
However, because there are very significant features of
experiences of pain present in their experience (i.e. they can introspectively recognize the state
they are in as pain), I will permit that they have experiences of quasi-pain.
It might be argued that the pain that the asymbolics experience is actually pure pain –
pain in its barest form, revealing only those properties of pain that are essential to it, since the
sensory-discriminative component appears to be the recognitional component. This move, I
think, would be appealing to an individual such as Kripke, for it attempts to isolate the core
phenomenal aspect of the sensation that makes it the sensation that it is. If this were the case,
then it would seem to follow that the asymbolics are indeed in a pain state. I disagree with the
Kripkean interpretation on this point, however, and opt for a more Lewisian one. If the sensorydiscriminative component alone is sufficient for pain and that what the asymbolics experience is
something much closer to pure pain rather than the “impure” version of pain that a “normal”
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individual experiences, then this pure pain would be causally isolated from the phylogenetic
purpose of the state, viz. to serve the protection of the individual.
For if the affective-
motivational component of pain is what allows the individual to learn aversive behavior, and
ultimately serve the protection and well-being of that individual, then the pain asymbolic’s
experience will consistently fail to achieve this end, and it is a wonder why such a state would
exist at all. To identify this state as pain would have the result of making pain a completely inert
state, able to cause nothing more than a sense discrimination, which amounts to quite little. It
seems more plausible to me that the component responsible for ensuring appropriate aversive
behavior (the affective-motivational component) is much more relevant than this isolated, inert,
phenomenal quality, for it is difficult to understand the role of this phenomenal quality in the
phylogenetic development of the state if it has no affective significance at all. If the presence of
the sensory-discriminative component is all that really matters, then the state simply amounts to
nothing. The causal role of the state must in some way be essential to the state, and the
affective-discriminative component is what permits there to be any reaction – learned or
instinctual.
The tests on SDI, the second dissociation syndromes, can further support the conclusion
that the two relevant components can be independently instantiated. In this syndrome, which I
have labeled sensory-discriminative impairment (SDI) for ease of reference, the patient was able
to distinguish an unpleasant feeling when presented with noxious stimuli, but unable to
determine the location, duration or quality of the unpleasantness, and unable to identify that the
unpleasantness as an experience of pain, or in anyway “painful”.12,13 The patient was tested for
12
Grahek, Pain, 108-9.
After all, there are reasonable grounds to distinguish between unpleasantness and pain, e.g. a mild hunger is
unpleasant but not painful.
13
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pain response using cutaneous laser stimulation to generate a “burning” pain. The response was
documented as follows:
[the patient] described a ‘clearly unpleasant’ intensity dependent feeling
emerging from an ill-localized and extended area ‘somewhere between
fingertips and shoulder’, that he wanted to avoid. The fully cooperative
and eloquent patient was completely unable to further describe quality,
localization
and
intensity
of
the
perceived
stimulus.14
The individual was thus strongly motivated to avoid this sensation of unpleasantness, but lacked
the relevant information to specify the sensation’s particular location, its cause (e.g. heat), its
intensity, or the duration of the sensation. In this case, the affective-motivational component of
pain is intact while the sensory-discriminative component is compromised, and thus the
individual is able to experience unpleasantness, but not feel the pain, that is normally followed
by exposure to noxious stimuli.
These individuals, while they certainly experience
unpleasantness, cannot be said to experience pain, for they do not recognize the state they are in
as pain and cannot locate the specific occurrence of the state.
These two dissociation syndromes, therefore, reveal both that the two components found
in “normal” experiences of pain exist and can be instantiated independently, and also that neither
on its own is to sufficient for a “normal” experience of pain.15 Our experience of pain is thus
complex, consisting of separable parts.
2. Lewis’ Commonsense Functionalism
Lewis’ theory of commonsense functionalism is built upon the a priori theory of folkpsychology. Folk-psychology is a theory consisting of a collection of all the platitudes that are
common knowledge among individuals with a shared psychology. Lewis argues that mental
states are the theoretical terms – the terms that a theory introduces into a language – of folk-
14
15
Ploner et al., “Pain affect without pain sensation in a patient with a postcentral lesion”, in Pain 81 (1999), 213.
Grahek, Pain,111.
8
psychology (or commonsense psychology). So terms such as ‘mind’, ‘belief’ or ‘thought’ are
terms introduced into our language by folk-psychology. Lewis argues that theoretical terms are
definable by the causal roles that they occupy, and that mental states are therefore be definable in
terms of their causal roles.16 Folk-psychological platitudes about pain, for example, are a
collection of shared knowledge about pain common to all pain experiencers about “the causal
relations of mental states, sensory stimuli, and motor responses” that are involved in explaining
such a psychological phenomenon.17
Lewis qualifies this to allow for variation by claiming that mental states typically occupy
their respective causal roles. So, an individual may be in the same state as a “normal” individual
would experience as pain – they experience the state subjectively in the same manner that a
“normal” individual would – but share few or none of the same causal relations.18 In this
respect, causal roles still exhaust the mental states, but which causal roles do so is contingent.
Mental states are thus a priori identified with their theoretical terms, since the causal roles that
define them are knowable by anyone who feels pain without needing to investigate beyond the
experience itself. That is, since the causal roles are built into, and exhaust, the definition of pain,
the entailment is a priori.
However, this theoretical identification says nothing about the
ontology of the mental states, since theoretical terms are topic neutral, and thus it does not
specify whether mental states are physical or non-physical substances – either one, or both, are
compatible with the theory up to this point.19
16
Ibid., 256.
David Lewis, “Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications”, in David Lewis: Papers in Metaphysics and
Epistemology (Cambridge University Press: New York, 1999), 257.
18
David Lewis, “Reduction of Mind”, in David Lewis: Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology (Cambridge
University Press: New York, 1999), 301.
19
Ibid., 302.
17
9
To make his theory physicalist,20 Lewis further argues that there is an a posteriori
identification of mental states with certain physical states.21 Once the specific physical state that
realizes the same causal role as a given mental state is determined, a psychophysical
identification can be made between the relevant physical state and mental state. But this requires
rigorous empirical investigation and is thus an a posteriori matter.22 Furthermore, Lewis argues
that this psychophysical identification is contingent, since the physical realizer could have failed
to be the type of thing that fulfills the same causal roles as the relevant mental state(s).
With regard to our discussion of dissociation syndromes at hand, there are a few points to
keep in mind. So far, nothing about pain asymbolia or SDI appears to come into conflict with
any of Lewis’s claims. For example, Lewis would likely claim that the pain asymbolic, when
exposed to noxious stimuli, does not experience pain. The physical and behavioral responses are
disparate from a “normal” experience of pain, and it could even be argued that no response
occurs as a direct response to the pain at all (since the affective-motivational component is
compromised). I agree with Lewis on this point and add, as above, that some might interpret the
phenomenal quality of the pain asymbolics’ experience of pain as well as the causal roles it
fulfills to be too significantly disparate from normal pain experience to be called a proper
experience of pain.
It is worth noting that in this respect the quasi-pain state that the pain asymbolics are in,
although it appears similar, is quite unlike Lewis’ “mad pain”. In mad pain, noxious stimuli (or
other stimuli) cause the “madman” to behave in a certain way, albeit the behavior it causes is
20
The philosophical position stating that physical substances exhaust all of the types of substances.
Lewis, “Reduction”., 293.
22
Ibid., 303.
21
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drastically different than typical behavior.23 However, the particular state that the madman is in
is the same state that we (as normal experiencers of pain) are in when we experience pain; he
feels pain just as we do. So the state is the same, but the causal role is disparate. Yet, for pain
asymbolics, without the affective-motivational component of pain the behavior that follows
cannot accurately be identified as being caused by the stimulus in the same way. For if the
individual does not perceive any danger or harm in the pain that they feel, and yet acts
appropriately, then their actions must be motivated by something other than that sensation (i.e.
they can see that their hand is on fire and know that this is something that should be avoided –
but this amounts to being motivated not by pain, but by some visual sensation, or knowledge that
this is something to be avoided). It is as if the state that the asymbolic is in does not cause any
behavior. This is reinforced by the observation that some asymbolics would laugh during the
pain test, pointing to a marked causal dissociation between their experience of pain and their
reactions.24
3. Reconceptualizing Qualia
The discussion in §1 suggests that we refine our traditional definition of qualia. Recall
that the quale of a state is the distinctive felt quality of a state by which one knows what it’s like
to be in that state. While Kripke argues that such phenomena exist but cannot be accounted for
in physical terms, which is the “traditional” interpretation of qualia, Lewis claims that there are
no phenomena that perfectly fit the description, while others claim that such phenomena simply
do not exist.
Given that the phenomenal quality of an experience of pain appears to be
comprised of two contingently associated components, the traditional conception of qualia as
23
David Lewis, “Mad Pain and Martian Pain”, in Philosophical Papers, Vol. I, (Oxford University Press: New
York, 1983), 130.
24
Grahek, Pain, 43.
11
simple, indivisible aspects of experience appears problematic.
As discussed in §1, the
phenomenal quality of an experience of pain is made up of at least two distinct components, the
absence of either changing the phenomenal character of the experience greatly. The phenomenal
quality of pain thus cannot be simple even though it may subjectively appear to be so. Kripke
may claim that the conjunction of these two components of pain is what was meant by ‘the feel’
or ‘phenomenological quality’ of pain all along. But this would be a mistake. For what is
revealed above is that an experience of pain is complex and layered. Qualia would thus be
complex, not simple, as is typically claimed. There does not seem to be any single feature of
pain the independent instantiation of which can be called an experience of pain. This bolsters
Lewis’ rejection of the traditional “phenomenally friendly” interpretation of qualia (e.g.
Kripke’s) via his rejection of the Identification Thesis.25
Lewis argues that the reason that Kripke, and other likeminded philosophers, hold the
traditional view and claim qualia to be inconsistent with physicalism is because of their
adherence (whether tacit or explicit) to the Identification Thesis, which he claims is built in to
folk-psychology. The Identification Thesis states that we identify our qualia in such a way that
we “know exactly what they are…in an uncommonly demanding and literal sense of ‘knowing
what’.”26 When we have an experience of a particular quale, we come to know it in a very
strong sense; the knowledge we gain through the experience reveals all and only the essential
properties of that quale.
The thesis relies on the idea that there is no appearance/reality
distinction when it comes to the phenomenal qualities of our experiences—if some feature of
experience appears to be essential to it then it is essential to it.
25
Lewis’ rejection of the
David Lewis, “Should a Materialist Believe in Qualia?”, in David Lewis: Papers in Metaphysics and
Epistemology (Cambridge University Press: New York, 1999), 325.
26
Ibid., 327.
12
identification thesis amounts to a denial of an appearance/reality distinction with respect to
experiences. This thesis is inconsistent with physicalism, which is why Lewis wants to reject it.
If it is true, then when we experience qualia, we know everything that is essential to them.
However, if physicalism is true, then qualia have a physical realization base (e.g. C-Fibres27) that
is essential to it. But since when we experience, e.g., a qualia of pain we do not know anything
about its physical realization base, then, if the Identification Thesis is true, being physical is not
essential to the qualia of pain.
This, of course, is inconsistent with the core tenants of
physicalism: all phenomena are physical.28
Lewis goes on to claim that “the simplicity of the qualia is a consequence of the
Identification Thesis (inter alia), and so a derivative part of the folk-psychological concept of
qualia.”29 This is because if we know the essence of the qualia of our experiences simply by
experiencing them, then if they appear simple in our experience they are simple. So, if Lewis is
right, the traditional conception of qualia, and thus the belief that qualia are simple, is informed
by our tacit commitment to the Identification Thesis. However, pain asymbolia clearly shows
that “pain, although seemingly simple and homogenous, is actually a complex experience.”30 To
reiterate a relevant point made in §1, the phenomenal quality of pain is composed of at least two
components: one provided by the sensory-discriminative component and the other through the
affective-motivational component.
Assuming that ‘qualia’ is roughly coextensive with
“phenomenal quality”, it would follow that the qualia of pains are not simple; the Identification
Thesis is false. This is because the phenomenal quality of pain, and thus its qualia, has two
27
The argument that pain states reduce to, or just are, C-Fibres firing is a toy example often used in the philosophy
of mind, which, though incorrect, is nonetheless useful for illustrating how mental phenomena can be “explained
away” by bodily phenomena.
28
Lewis, “Qualia”, 328-329.
29
Ibid., 329.
30
Grahek, Pain, 73.
13
separate phenomenal properties that contribute to the overall phenomenal quality of the
experience of pain.
The quale of pain is thus divisible, not simple like it appears to be;
appearance does not coincide with reality.
The Identification Thesis as well as the folk-
psychological concept of qualia, as far as they apply to pain, is simply inaccurate.
Further, since the Identification Thesis subsumes pain qualia as and other qualia without
any distinction, and contains no indication that qualia can be heterogeneous in this respect (i.e.
that some qualia are simple while others are complex), is must be false. If qualia exist, then they
are either heterogeneous in type, or different than the qualia postulated by the Identification
Thesis. Even if physicalism is false, the Identification Thesis is still in error.
At this point, the adherent of the traditional view of qualia may concede the above points
and agree that pain is indeed complex, but argue that the components of pain (e.g.
unpleasantness) are nonetheless indivisible, simple qualia. However, it is sufficient to point out
that our experience of pain is indeed homogenous and seemingly simple, and this is enough for
the Identification Thesis to fall. For the thesis claims that appearance is a reliable guide to
“essence”, but we have seen that such is not the case. As such, traditional qualia theorists need
to appeal to some other principle to ground their claim that subjective experience reveals all
intrinsic properties of experience.
4. Pain and Folk-Psychology
In this section I will argue that in spite of the above objection against the Identification
Thesis, it does not follow that one should reject folk-psychology in general. Because folk
theories are generally shared bodies of tacit belief, they are in principle capable of being revised,
and are not necessarily the final answer in theoretical matters. Instead, they present a starting
point to theoretical investigations. Because of this, folk-theories are much more resistant to
14
objections that target specific platitudes within the theory. With this in mind, there are at least
two points of concern with the folk-psychological definition of pain that have not already been
discussed.
Lewis claims that it is a plausible platitude of folk-psychology that “it is impossible to
believe that one is in pain and not be in pain.”31 Pain asymbolia renders this false. Asymbolics
believe that they are in pain because they feel it and can recognize the state they are in as pain,
but they are clearly not having an experience of pain. They are mistaken about the state that they
are in – which is actually quasi-pain. In fact, that these individuals can believe that they are in
pain but not be in pain is exactly contrary to commonsense, and yet is nonetheless the case. But
commonsense just is what informs folk-psychology! In this respect it is obvious how our folkpsychological conception of pain is ill suited to explaining pain asymbolia. It may be objected
that although folk-psychology is mistaken about it being impossible to believe that one is in pain
and not be in pain, it nonetheless grasps the deeper fact that one cannot be in pain without
believing that they are in pain. Even if this is the case, the presence of such an error reflects
incompleteness in our shared understanding of pain that is then articulated (however generally)
in the false platitudes of the theory.
Building on this last point, we can go farther than just saying that some of the platitudes
of folk-psychology are wrong or misguided. We can also argue that it fails to capture properties
of the experience of pain that that are highly significant. For example, it cannot account for the
role of the unpleasantness of pain (the affective-motivational component) in aversion behavior,
largely because folk-psychology cannot grasp the complexity of pain experience. Individuals
who lack the affective component of pain experience (i.e. pain asymbolics) cannot learn aversion
31
Lewis, “Identifications”, 261.
15
behavior to physical, visual, or auditory threats.
32
Any attempt to learn, or mimic, aversion
behavior ultimately fails. The unpleasantness of pain allows for the possibility of aversion
behavior, and the affective-motivational component is apparently also responsible for producing
aversion behavior across sense modalities. Absent unpleasantness, threatening and noxious
stimuli simply mean nothing to the individual. It does not seem plausible that one could know a
priori that if pain was not experienced as something unpleasant one could not learn appropriate
aversion behavior to any threatening stimuli. Folk-psychology cannot account for this.
As stated above, folk-psychology is not typically appealed to as a final answer to
philosophical questions.
Folk-psychological definitions, which are tacit rather than strict
theoretical definitions, are not usually thought to exhaust the “essence” of the phenomena that
they describe. As Lewis claims, folk-psychology usually turns out to be true, or at least close to
true, but that there aren’t usually perfect occupants of the causal roles described by folk theories
even though there are indeed imperfect ones that are close enough.33 This appears to be the case
with pain as well. While there are many valuable insights into experiences of pain that are built
into folk-psychology, there are platitudes that appear to be inconsistent with the implications
drawn from the discussed dissociation syndromes. Since folk-psychology is a collection of tacit
belief, rather than explicit theoretical formulations, it permissible that some platitudes are going
to be false, and that since there is no official folk-psychological doctrine, there are going to be
platitudes built into folk-psychology that are inconsistent with each other. Since there need not
be perfect occupiers of the causal roles outlined by folk-psychology, the presence of a few false
platitudes does not seem to devalue the theory enough to reject it entirely. Correcting the errors
32
Grahek, Pain, 47.
David Lewis, “Naming the Colours”, in David Lewis: Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology (Cambridge
University Press: New York, 1999), 332.
33
16
within the theory that I have outlined above would, however, greatly improve the accuracy and
viability of folk-psychology, which is surely a worthy endeavor (if it is at all possible).
5. Conclusion
Interpreting the philosophic implications of dissociation syndromes can provide many
challenges to certain theoretical assumptions that are taken for granted. Yet, at the same time,
these challenges can inform revisions to theories as well. We have seen that if the false
platitudes in folk-psychology, such as the Identification Thesis, are rejected, then the theory
becomes much more plausible and accurate.
Further, the support for the rejection of the
Identification Thesis that comes from these dissociation syndromes turns out to make folkpsychology much more consistent with physicalism.
The existence of these dissociation
syndromes provides empirical support for Lewis’ desire to rid folk-psychology of the
Identification Thesis as a means to make it more consistent with physicalism. It also turns out to
pose a difficulty for traditionally dualistic formulations of qualia. But as indicated in the
introduction, the value of pathological cases is sometimes contested exactly because of how
interpretive the implications can often be. However, it cannot be contested that, at the very least,
these pathologies are valuable thought experiments that can be used to challenge our
philosophical assumptions, if not displace them.
17
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