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Anxiety and defective decision
making: an elaboration of the
groupthink model
Judith Chapman
School of Management, University of Western Sydney, Sydney, Australia
Anxiety and
decision making
1391
Received April 2006
Revised August 2006
Accepted September 2006
Abstract
Purpose – This article sets out to revisit Janis’ groupthink theory that holds that, when anxiety is
present for a decision-making group, premature concurrence seeking emerges unless other mitigating
factors are present. Research from selected segments of the decision making literature are introduced
to explain the underlying causes of concurrence seeking. The result is an elaboration of the theory
based on a synthesis of older and newer ideas, supporting Janis’ core thesis that anxiety triggers this
phenomenon.
Design/methodology/approach – The paper is conceptual and draws on literature addressing the
impact of emotions on decision-making behaviour; human responses to anxiety, including
psychological defence modes and mechanisms; and groupthink research and writing.
Findings – The theoretical elaboration of the groupthink model centres on the idea that anxiety
associated with a decision task triggers implicit motivations of anxiety reduction in groups, which are
enacted through the activation of common defence mechanisms, thus resulting in the symptoms of
defective decision making. A table that recasts the symptoms of groupthink as common defence
mechanisms is provided.
Research limitations/implications – Suggestions are made for broadening the conceptual base of
the groupthink model, including consideration of the research on negative and positive emotions.
Practical implications – The article distinguishes between poor decision making due to
groupthink and other causes. Remedies for the emergence of groupthink include better approaches
to recognising and surfacing anxiety and other negative emotions, so they can be managed
constructively. Such remedies complement more conventional methods of improving group decision
making.
Originality/value – The article focuses on the underlying causes of premature concurrence seeking,
an aspect of the groupthink model that is not well understood. It builds on Janis’ explanation of anxiety
as the main cause, by elaborating the linkages between the presence of anxiety, the symptoms of
groupthink and the signs of defective decision making. In this, the article draws on research into the
effects of negative emotions on decision-making behaviour and related theories. It synthesises several
research streams to provide a more comprehensive explanation of concurrence seeking.
Keywords Group thinking, Decision making, Psychology
Paper type Conceptual paper
Concurrence seeking behaviour
The groupthink model was proposed by Janis (1972, 1982) as an explanation for poor
decision making processes and outcomes in groups. Using a small number of
well-known policy making disasters, including the decision to invade Cuba during the
Cold War, Janis associated certain contextual conditions with a concurrence seeking
tendency. The term “groupthink” is appropriate only when the concurrence seeking
emerges prematurely, thus curtailing thinking and discussion, and increasing the
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DOI 10.1108/00251740610715713
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likelihood of poor decision outcomes (Longley and Pruitt, 1980). This phenomenon is
not inevitable in decision making groups. Indeed, Janis (1972) and Neck and Moorhead
(1992) described several cases where policy makers worked closely together to solve a
complex dilemma while displaying few, if any, symptoms. The puzzle then, was this:
why does a groupthink tendency happen in some problem solving situations and not in
others?
For Janis (1972) the answer was to be found in the characteristics of the context
within which the decision was made. He theorised that groupthink only emerged when
group members were faced with a decision task in a “provocative situational context”
involving a moral dilemma or risks of material losses. Such contexts were stressful –
they made the decision makers anxious and fearful of not coping adequately. The
stress was exacerbated in situations where the group had experienced previous failures
(Janis, 1982). From Janis’s perspective concurrence seeking was a form of striving for
mutual support to help group members cope with the emotion, and this was only really
possible for groups that were highly cohesive. In fact, he thought that cohesiveness
was the most important factor in the emergence of a groupthink tendency. However,
cohesiveness was not in itself sufficient to explain why groupthink occurred since not
all groups succumbed to it. Apart from the provocative situational context, he
proposed an additional set of structural antecedent conditions: a leader actively
promoting his or her own solutions; homogeneity of group members; lack of
methodical decision-making procedures; and insulation of the group from the opinions
of other qualified associates. Janis did not think that all of these needed to be present.
Over a period of several decades a considerable amount of research and writing has
been generated with regard to the groupthink model. However, the results provide only
partial validation of it (McCauley, 1998; Aldag and Fuller, 1993; McCauley, 1989), and
little support for the central notion that groups need to be cohesive for premature
concurrence-seeking to take hold (Aldag and Fuller, 1993; Park, 1990). Theorists and
researchers have responded in two ways to these results. On the one hand, various
modifications to the chain of causality in the model have been proposed, and some new
variables have been factored in (e.g. Neck and Moorhead, 1995). A different, but
complementary response is to probe more deeply into, or re-evaluate the underlying
theory about concurrence seeking, its causes and impact on decision making behaviour
in groups. This aspect of the groupthink model is not well understood (Neck and
Moorhead, 1995).
This current paper is primarily of the latter kind: it revisits Janis’ (1972, 1982) theory
of concurrence seeking, and reviews it in the light of selected segments of the decision
making literature, including knowledge about the influence of emotion on decision
making that was not available until relatively recently. The result is an elaboration of
Janis’s theory based on a synthesis of older and newer ideas. This elaboration supports
the core thesis that anxiety triggers premature concurrence seeking, while also
explaining why cohesiveness is not a necessary condition for the concurrence seeking
to occur. In brief, the explanation of concurrence seeking presented in this paper builds
on the work of Janis (1972, 1982) while providing a different explanation for research
results that on first appearance, weaken the efficacy of the groupthink effect.
The literature used for this elaboration of the groupthink model is from a wider
range of theoretical streams than is usual. This is done deliberately, and in the view of
the author is necessary to progress groupthink research and related management
practice. Fuller and Aldag (1998) and Paulus (1998) argued that the conceptual base of
the model needed to be generally broadened in the light of the research results, while
McCauley (1998) argued for a broader and more consistent use of research in group
dynamics. In addition, Fuller and Aldag (1998) was concerned that groupthink studies
had lionised the research on group decision making, and that artificial boundaries were
being drawn between premature concurrence seeking and other causes of poor decision
making. This may have, he suggested, hampered progress on decision making in
groups generally, as well as on the groupthink phenomenon itself, through the
exclusion of potentially useful ideas from related research domains. Since a special
1998 issue of Organization Behavior and Human Decision Processes, relatively few
papers have been published on groupthink, and fresh ideas are needed. This review
and elaboration of the groupthink model therefore seems timely. The article proceeds
with an overview of the existing model and the research results. It then turns to
alternative explanations of concurrence seeking, followed by the proposed
amendments to the original. The paper concludes with some implications for
research and suggestions for management practice.
The groupthink model
Concurrence-seeking is a tendency towards convergence and mutual agreement in
problem solving groups. “Groupthink” is the term used to describe a situation where
concurrence seeking emerges before a problem or proposed solution has been
sufficiently analysed or evaluated. The full groupthink model proposes a causal link
connecting the structural antecedent conditions, a concurrence-seeking tendency,
symptoms of groupthink, indications of defective decision making, and a decision
outcome marked by low probability of success. The model is depicted in Figure 1. The
symptoms of groupthink were derived from case study observation undertaken by
Janis himself and include collective rationalisation of information, self-censoring
information that does not fit current positions and placing pressure on group members
with dissenting points of view. When these symptoms are present, the group is more
likely to exhibit specific defects in the way it searches for and processes information
about the problem at hand. The likelihood of poor decision outcomes increases in
relation to the prevalence of these defects, summarised by Neck (1996, p. 6) as:
incomplete survey of alternatives; incomplete survey of objectives; failure to examine risks or
the preferred choice; failure to reappraise initially rejected alternatives; poor information
search, selective bias in processing the information at hand, and failure to work out
contingency plans.
The research and writing on groupthink is summarised in the two sections below. The
first looks at research on the variables and the chain of causality in the model, while the
second turns to theories explaining premature concurrence seeking.
Research on model variables and causality
In testing the model, case study researchers typically look for the presence of
antecedent conditions and symptoms of groupthink in real scenarios where defective
decision making was evident. For example, Kramer (1998) used new evidence to revisit
the Bay of Pigs fiasco; Moorhead et al. (1991) analysed the Challenger disaster; and
Eaton (2001) looked at two cases from British corporate management, British Airways
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Figure 1.
Janis’s groupthink model
and Marks & Spencer. In general, researchers have found certain of the antecedent
conditions in the presence of groupthink symptoms, but in various combinations.
These results provide general support for the model: we can conclude that groupthink
does occur from time to time, but the factors that trigger it are unclear or vary in their
effects in different situations.
Laboratory studies have generally tested for the presence and strength of linear
relationships between selected antecedent conditions and symptoms of groupthink.
Overall, the evidence provides only partial support for the model. Neck and Moorhead
(1995) noted that most of the studies to that point had focused on the interactive effects
of cohesiveness and the structural faults. Their review, and those of others (Aldag and
Fuller, 1993; McCauley, 1989) indicated that the best predictors of groupthink were
closed leadership style (the presence of a strong leader showing early support for a
particular solution to the problem) and lack of methodical processes for making
decisions. For example, Longley and Pruitt (1980) found that the presence of structural
faults increased the tendency for early development of a norm towards a particular
choice in cohesive groups, possibly explaining the symptoms of defective decision
making. Consistent with this, research showed that the existence of norms regarding
methodical procedures reduced the groupthink tendency (Callaway and Esser, 1984).
Flowers (1977) and Leana (1985) each found that closed or directive leaders who
discouraged diverse opinions and promoted their favoured solutions received fewer
suggestions from their teams. Most damaging for the original formulation from the
accumulated evidence is the lack of support for the link between cohesiveness and
symptoms of groupthink (Aldag and Fuller, 1993; Park, 1990).
The provocative situational context (producing stress and anxiety) has received
little attention from researchers, which is surprising, given its importance in the
original model. Callaway et al. (1985) found support for the hypothesis that
concurrence-seeking is a stress-reduction process that was not mitigated by the
presence of decision making procedures while Turner (1992 cited in Esser, 1998)
manipulated stress and found more rationalisation behaviour in information
processing when levels of stress were higher. In other studies, the importance of
stress and anxiety was asserted (e.g. Moorhead et al., 1991), but supporting studies
were not reported. Neck and Moorhead (1992, 1995) were also interested in the idea of
the provocative situational context, but suggested the inclusion of two additional
variables: highly consequential decision and pressure due to time constraints. It seems
therefore that stress and anxiety have been overlooked in the research. Hence, a central
tenet of the groupthink model remains largely untested.
Explanations of the causes of premature concurrence seeking
An intriguing aspect of the groupthink debate is the possibility that concurrence
seeking might have more than one cause, arising from different circumstances. Hart
(1991) fielded this possibility when he suggested that groupthink can be driven by two
very different forces. Type 1 groupthink is associated with a pessimistic view about
the capacity of the group to solve the presenting problem successfully or creatively.
Symptoms of groupthink represent “collective avoidance”, a stress-induced defensive
reaction to a potential failure. This is quite similar to the position taken by Janis
himself, who pointed to stress and lack of self-esteem due to previous failures. Type 2
groupthink (Hart, 1991), on the other hand, is driven by an optimistic view of the
potential of the group to solve the presenting problem. Symptoms of groupthink reflect
an overly optimistic attitude on the part of a group that is highly confident in its
capacity to succeed. This view is closer to the position taken by Whyte (1998) and
applied in an organisational setting by Koerber and Neck (2003).
Whyte (1998), who noticed that decisions in the presence of groupthink often
seemed foolhardy or overly risky, questioned Janis’s view of concurrence seeking as a
response to stress. He proposed that symptoms of groupthink are due to
overconfidence, or an excessive level of collective self-efficacy. This view draws on
prospect theory (Kahnman and Tversky, 1979) and decision framing (Tversky and
Kahnman, 1981). Under experimental conditions, people respond differently to
problems that are framed in terms of perceived losses to those that are framed in terms
of perceived gains: they tend to be risk averse in situations involving gains, but risk
seeking when the same situation is described as leading to potential losses. Whyte
(1998) thought that framing effects led to risk seeking in groups where perceptions of
collective efficacy exceeded actual capacity, or in other words, when a strong “can do”
attitude caused people to take excessive risks to avoid the possible loss of attractive
outcomes. In Whyte’s (1998) proposed change to the groupthink model, “high perceived
collective efficacy” replaces “cohesiveness”. Since his view was that overconfidence
and high self efficacy reduce or cancel out stress, he saw no need for “provocative
situational context” to remain in the model.
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A different explanation, based on group dynamics, was provided by McCauley
(1998) drawing on Festinger’s (1950) theory of informal social influence. In accordance
with this theory, group consensus is important for the emergence of meaning and
value, and the main purpose of persuasion and other forms of social pressure is to
prevent disagreements that might undermine confidence in the group’s reason for
being. Applying this idea, McCauley (1998) hypothesised that premature
concurrence-seeking is triggered by norms privileging the preservation of friendly
relations over frank appraisal of ideas and alternatives, and was not due to cohesive
groups seeking an “escape from uncertainty” (McCauley, 1998, p. 159) as suggested by
Janis.
Where does the research leave us in terms of the underlying causes of concurrence
seeking? The explanation for groupthink is undoubtedly complex and several
alternatives have been proposed but none of these has been presented in any depth of
detail. In relation to Janis’ theory we have the key insight that while stress and anxiety
are experienced within individuals, they can be managed collectively by groups, thus
producing a tendency towards premature concurrence seeking. However, Janis did not
fully explain the processes through which the negative emotional states of stress and
anxiety actually produce the symptoms of groupthink and the symptoms of defective
decision making. Since 1972 some important discoveries have been made about the role
of emotion in the decision making process. Some of this research is introduced below to
show that negative emotional states such as stress and anxiety can impair decision
making in ways that may shed light on the processes that occur during groupthink.
Decision-making behaviour
Anxiety is a stress-induced emotion that figures large in the groupthink model. It
entails an unpleasant emotional state in anticipation of exposure to danger or threat.
Although there is no agreed definition (Carlson and Hatfield, 1992) anxiety is often
depicted as a continuous feeling of low intensity, having much in common with fear,
but with an orientation to future ills rather than immediate threat of harm (English and
English, 1958). Anxiety can affect processes of decision making in several ways that
are discussed below. First, it appears to have a detrimental effect on decision makers
by affecting the ways in which they process information: information processing is
generally poorer under negative affect. Second, anxiety may cause a tendency towards
excessive risk taking in some situations. Third, it can deflect attention away from the
problem at hand: anxiety reduction operates as an implicit motivator where decision
makers become more concerned with reducing the feelings of anxiety, than with
finding the best solution to the presenting problem.
Anxiety and information processing
The interplay of reason and emotion has been noted by many researchers (e.g.
Ashforth and Humphrey, 1995; Fineman, 1996; Damasio, 2000; Loewenstein et al., 2001;
Sinclair and Ashkanasy, 2005). The research on negative emotion indicates that being
in this state typically has a detrimental effect on the capacity of decision makers. Mittal
and Ross (1998) concluded that people in a negative emotional state process
information more systematically, while those in a positive state do it more
strategically. Overall, the quality of decision making when in a positive mood state was
better. Environmental uncertainty is one factor that stimulates stress and anxiety
(Garling et al., 1998). Apparently heightened levels of stress interfere with optimal
human functioning, but how this happens is not entirely clear. It may be that stress
creates an imbalance between environmental demands and an individual’s resources to
cope. Generally, people seek to reduce or minimise uncertainty and prefer
environments that are more predictable and controllable (Evans and Cohen, 1987).
Presumably, efforts to reduce uncertainty interfere in some way with, or limit the
capacity for full cognitive functioning, for example, by increasing errors on cognitive
tasks (Leon and Revelle, 1985). Janis and Mann (1977) proposed a “decision conflict
theory” concerning the effects of stress on information processing. This theory
contends that decision makers under stress resort to hypervigilant strategies for
information processing, manifested as a frantic search for solutions, a failure to
consider all alternatives, disorganization and rapid shifting among possible solutions.
Baradell and Klein (1993) found support for decision conflict theory when they
investigated the effects of anxiety on the quality of decision making performance.
Exposure to naturally occurring life stressors, such as undesirable life events or daily
hassles, produced autonomic reactions that individuals perceived as anxiety. These
reactions demand the individual’s attention, leaving him or her with less capacity to
cope with the task at hand, ultimately resulting in impaired decision making.
Emotion and risk taking behaviour
Turning now to the research on risk taking, Mittal and Ross (1998) concluded that most
studies show that people in a positive mood state tend to be risk averse and vice versa.
Moreover, they tend to be relatively more risk averse when the decision is framed as a
potential gain (e.g. buying a lottery ticket) and the choice situation is personally
relevant. On the other hand, Mano (1992, 1994) found that people under negative affect
are more likely to take risks than those in a neutral state. A theoretical explanation for
the effects of emotion on risk taking in decision making is known as the “mood
maintenance hypothesis”. This suggests that decision makers are motivated to manage
their mood state (Isen and Patrick, 1983). Those in a positive mood state want to stay
that way and are risk-averse, since failure might induce a mood change, while people
under negative affect are motivated to feel better and are therefore prepared to take
more risks (Kuvass and Kaufmann, 2004; Mittal and Ross, 1998).
The results for risk taking are not conclusive however: different negative emotions
may have different consequences and individual variations could be quite significant.
Mano elicited physiological arousal in his experiments, but people vary in the degree to
which they are aware of their internal reactions to stress (called “private body
consciousness” or PBC by Miller et al., 1981). Baradell and Klein (1993) found that this
factor moderated the relationship between naturally occurring stressors and decision
outcomes – the decision making behaviour of people with higher levels of PBC were
more susceptible to the effects of stress. Perrewe and Zellars (1999) also pointed to the
degree of variety in the way that individuals interpret the environment as stressful.
People do not necessarily read a situation in the same way, and their emotional
responses are different.
Implicit motivation and anxiety reduction
When engaging in group decision making behaviour, those involved may be motivated
by a range of factors. Making a good decision is just one possibility among several
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(McCauley, 1998). Other motivators in group situations include improving member
satisfaction, gaining commitment to the decision, and diffusing responsibility for poor
decisions (Aldag and Fuller, 1993). Some of these could complement sound decision
making outcomes, but others might not. The literature on the effects of implicit
emotion on decision making has a long history, although it is not always presented as
such. Bion (1968), for example, theorised that the need to reaffirm basic beliefs and
assumptions could lead groups away from constructive solutions to their problems,
while Asch (1956) demonstrated the influence of a desire to conform. Indeed, decision
making situations are full of drama arising from the interplay of overt and covert
motivations, the baggage from past decisions and experiences, and micropolitical
behaviour (Fuller and Aldag, 1998). The “mood maintenance hypothesis” (Isen and
Patrick, 1983, discussed above) also suggests another way in which negative emotions
can become an implicit source of motivation for risk taking behaviour.
It is also known from the psychoanalytic literature that anxiety elicits a defensive
response, although this is often at the cost of considerable self-deception and loss of
contact with reality (Carlson and Hatfield, 1992, p. 33). According to Rycroft (1968), the
defensive response has three modes: controlling one’s feelings or those of others,
denying the reality of the threat, and seeking an escape from the situation. Specific
defence mechanisms that work in with one or more of these modes include
rationalisation, denial and repression. In relation to decision making situations where
anxiety and stress are present, it could be suggested that decision makers deal
simultaneously with the anxiety and the choice dilemma. It might be deduced that the
anxiety reduction process, engaging the protective modes and defence mechanisms, is
a distraction that lowers the chances of a sound choice being made. While it might
seem counter intuitive that decision makers tend to be less vigilant when anxious, there
is considerable research evidence to support it.
Concurrence seeking: an elaboration
From the above discussion, the decision making behaviour of individuals and groups is
clearly affected by emotion. When under negative effect, people are less strategic in the
way they gather and evaluate information and they are inclined towards riskier
decisions. These tendencies are characterised in the groupthink model as the
symptoms of defective decision making, including incomplete survey of alternatives,
selective bias and failure to examine risks. Under negative effect also, decision makers
divide their efforts between making the choice and managing their mood state,
increasing the possibility of a poorer outcome. In the groupthink model concurrence
seeking is elicited by stress and anxiety. It is consistent with the research evidence that
the presence of these emotional states triggers implicit motivation for anxiety and
stress reduction. While the emotion is not directly observable, the implicit motivation
surfaces as the symptoms of groupthink, which are. The groupthink symptoms,
including rationalisation, censorship, pressure on dissenters and mindguarding,
provide indirect evidence that the anxiety reduction mechanism is in play. We can
summarise the argument so far by suggesting that premature concurrence seeking
occurs when decision makers respond more strongly to the implicit motivation of
anxiety reduction than to motivations regarding full evaluation of information or
search for alternatives.
But what is the connection between the concurrence seeking and the symptoms of
groupthink? In the writer’s view, if the underlying purpose of concurrence seeking is to
defend the group against anxiety, then the symptoms of groupthink are manifestations
of defensive modes and mechanisms that are instrumental in doing this. In other
words, the defence modes and mechanisms are the missing link between the implicit
motivation of anxiety reduction and observable decision making behaviour. The
connections are illustrated in Table I.
In this table Janis’s eight symptoms of groupthink are recast in relation to the three
defensive modes (Rycroft, 1968) of control, denial and escape. The column on the left
categorises the eight symptoms of groupthink according to each mode. The central
column suggests one or more corresponding defence mechanisms, while the last
column provides a brief explanation of the purpose of each as a defence against
anxiety. A sense of control is obtained through creating an illusion that the group is in
command of the situation, that the facts are known and events are unfolding as they
should. Denial is evident in self-censorship, pressure on dissenters and mindguarding.
Escape is through a belief in the superior morality of the decision making group and in
the stereotyping of outgroups. This spares the group from confronting the morally
Anxiety defence mode and
groupthink symptoms
Defence mechanisms
Purpose as response to anxiety
Control
Illusion of invulnerability
Control compensation
Collective rationalisation
Rationalisation
Illusion of unanimity
Fantasy
Keeping a tight rein on people/events.
Covering weaknesses in one area by
attending to areas of greater strength
Convenient selection, manipulation and
explanation of the facts to allay fears. Not
seeing what one does not wish to see
Mutual reassurance of support and
agreement
Denial
Self-censorship
Self-appointed mindguards
Repression
Denial control
Pressure on dissenters
Suppression control
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Doubts pushed out of conscious thought
Feelings of concern or dread not
acknowledged by self; others discouraged
from expressing them as a means of
protecting the group
Others dissuaded from expressing doubts
that might upset the status quo
Escape
Belief in morality of the group Regression
Stereotyping of outgroups
Inability or refusal to question the moral
position of the group or to acknowledge
other values or positions as a means of
avoiding value conflict
Projection displacement Rather than acknowledging own fears or
responsibilities, attributing those to others,
often in a derogatory manner that hints of
outgroup inferiority or weakness
Table I.
Anxiety defence modes
and symptoms of
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difficult dilemmas inherent in the situation, and helps to shift primary responsibility
for them onto a more blameworthy group.
When the defence mechanisms are drawn upon, decision makers begin to lose vital
information and the capacity to evaluate their situation effectively. Critical details are
rationalised away or pushed out of consciousness. Those with different points of view
are turned upon or simply decide to keep quiet. The competition is underestimated and
an unreal picture of the difficulties ahead emerges. Consistent with Janis (1972, 1982) a
greater prevalence of groupthink symptoms is associated with an increase in decision
making defects, and a decreased likelihood of quality decision outcomes.
But do groups succumbing to premature concurrence seeking need to be cohesive?
According to the empirical research, the answer is “no”. Apparently, the presence of
anxiety is sufficient in itself to trigger groupthink among people engaged on a common
task, but this issue certainly merits more research. The position taken here is that
concurrence seeking occurs in decision making contexts that provoke anxiety in
decision makers, and are not mitigated by structural factors, in particular, impartial
leadership and methodical decision making procedures.
Conclusions
Janis hypothesised that groupthink was caused by anxiety and stress arising from the
decision making issue faced by a management group, but did not elaborate the
processes through which these states had their effect. This paper has attempted to
address this by drawing on the research into the impact of emotion and decision
making and by drawing on psychoanalytic theory.
Implications for research
A considerable amount of research on the impact of negative emotions on decision
making has accumulated over the past thirty years, and in general is consistent with
Janis’s view that anxiety is a possible cause of premature concurrence seeking.
However, research on the effects of anxiety has involved individual research
participants only, and there is a need for research into group patterns. For example,
comparisons of groups working on consequential and non-consequential decision tasks
would reveal any differences in the emergence of premature concurrence seeking and
the presence of defensive modes or mechanisms. Case study researchers might
consider investigating for the presence of negative emotions and exploring the links
between symptoms of defective decision making and common defence mechanisms.
This could be done by revisiting old cases or by exploring new ones.
More generally, future research on decision making in groups should focus on
broadening the conceptual base of both the groupthink model and other theories to
include the latest findings on the role of both negative and positive emotions. There is
an expanding body of research findings from the social and biological sciences, which
is revolutionising our understanding of human behaviour and decision processes. As
yet, little of this has filtered into the field of management studies.
Management applications
Groupthink is a term that is not well understood, and is sometimes confused with other
causes of poor decision making. However, as suggested below, it may be more
commonplace than most people think, and have more devastating consequences than
are normally acknowledged. Managers need to understand the causes and
consequences of concurrence seeking as a key step in reducing the human and
economic costs of their mistakes.
The causes of poor decision making. There are many reasons why managers
sometimes make poor decisions, and premature concurrence seeking is but one of them.
Understanding the underlying causes can be a confusing task, but for managers to
learn from their mistakes, they need to do so. The term “groupthink” is almost
universally recognised by managers, and in the view of this writer, is sometimes used
inappropriately or is not well understood. Groupthink, as Janis intended the term,
refers to premature concurrence seeking behaviour due to the presence of stress and
anxiety. This is a problem because it results in defective information search and
evaluation processes. It is also clear from the research that groups do not have to be
cohesive for groupthink to emerge. More critical are a closed leadership style and lack
of methodical decision making procedures.
Confusion occurs because decisions made in “bounded rationality” (Simon, 1956)
can also be marked by symptoms of defective decision making. It is commonplace that
managers face the daily incumberances of time pressure, lack of pertinent information,
poor knowledge of cause and effect relationships, and so on. The complexities of
organisational life inevitably introduce uncertainty and risk. We could add a host of
other factors including organisational politics and culture. To a large extent these
factors are different from those contributing to groupthink, but it is likely that a
tendency towards groupthink would be exacerbated in the presence of some of them. In
reducing the incidence of groupthink it is therefore important, for example, to ensure
that the culture supports employees who wish to express their concerns about safety,
or that managers are not punished for sometimes making cautious decisions or “crying
wolf”.
Improving decision making in groups. Janis (1982) described groupthink as a
temporary derangement that diminishes the capacity of groups to make sound
decisions, and recommended several measures to prevent it from emerging. These
measures included instituting impartial leadership and more systematic ways of
evaluating choice alternatives. Aware managers are now equipped with a range of
decision making tools and techniques, such as nominal group technique and
brainstorming, to overcome structural barriers to full and open discussion. While these
measures may be part of the solution, they do not address the underlying cause of the
premature concurrence seeking, which is the stress and anxiety elicited by the decision
task. As has been argued in this article, implicit motivation for anxiety reduction
triggers defence mechanisms that potentially blind decision makers to the reality of
their situation. Unless checked, the tendency to explain away, deny or repress critical
information can descend upon all in the group, with devastating effect in some
circumstances. The remedies include the ability to recognise negative emotions in
ourselves and others, and a preparedness to discuss and deal with these states. In other
words, managers need a special range of techniques for bringing potentially damaging
emotions to the surface where they can be dealt with constructively. This is an
interesting challenge, since management culture and writing tends to emphasise a
rational approach to decision making (Harrison, 2000), where emotions have little part
to play. Nonetheless, unless managers better understand how their emotions influence
their choice behaviour, potentially avoidable mistakes will continue to be made.
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Janis (1972, 1982) referred to important and visible decisions in high level policy
situations. He did not consider lower level operational contexts where the decision
making process is less formal, where problems arise unexpectedly, or where key choice
points are embedded in the everyday flow of workplace activity. Yet these situations
too, are sometimes accompanied by pressures and stresses that can easily heighten
levels of anxiety, and they happen frequently. For example, should the crew continue to
fly through bad weather, or should it turn around and return to base? Should the plant
be shut down to investigate an unexplained oil leakage, or should production continue
under pressure of meeting targets? Do contractors leave the building site until
protective equipment is provided, or do they keep working? Although these dilemmas
suggest actual choice points that the players recognise, in real situations they often
pass without much discussion of the problem, or any definitive decision. In real life,
potential choice points can slide into long moments of non-decision making where the
opportunity to avert a serious risk is lost.
The elaboration of groupthink theory discussed in this article provides an
explanation for various failures in decision making: not recognising that an actual
decision needs to be made; procrastination and delay; and actual decisions that are
overly risky. The explanation is this: some of the defence mechanisms, e.g. repression
and denial, can blind managers to the existence of a developing problem, while other
defence mechanisms, e.g. rationalisation and projection, can cause them to
underestimate the dangers or deflect attention elsewhere. Whether by omission or
commission, the result is the same: a crisis that was potentially avoidable. Better group
leadership and methodical decision making procedures are part of the solution. Also
important is developing a capacity for self-knowledge, reflexive management practice
and a rich array of communication skills.
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Corresponding author
Judith Chapman can be contacted at: [email protected]
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