Undergraduate Review
Volume 5 | Issue 1
Article 6
1992
Meddling in the Middle East: The Beginning of the
End of U.S.-Iran Foreign Relations
Jonathan Moore
Illinois Wesleyan University
Recommended Citation
Moore, Jonathan (1992) "Meddling in the Middle East: The Beginning of the End of U.S.-Iran Foreign Relations,"
Undergraduate Review: Vol. 5: Iss. 1, Article 6.
Available at: http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/rev/vol5/iss1/6
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Moore: Meddling in the Middle East: The Beginning of the End of U.S.-Ir
Meddling in the Middle East:
The Beginning of the End of U.S.-Iran Foreign Relations
by
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17
1
Undergraduate Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [1992], Art. 6
Iranians shocked the world in 1979 when they stormed the American
embassy in Tehran, taking U.S. citizens hostage. These revolutionaries rattled
the American public's sensibilities: just who were these people, many asked, and
why do they have a grudge against us? This paper shows that the 1978-79 Iranian
revolution, so fanatically anti-American in character, sprouted from seeds
planted in the Iranian consciousness some 25 years earlier. What transpired in
1978-79 Iran is, according to Barry Rubin, wholly "unintelligible to those who
know nothing of what occurred in 1953" (12, x). Motivated by self-serving political
and economic concerns, the 1953 American covert intervention in Iran's internal
affairs achieved a short-lived Cold War victory while breeding long-term Iranian
animosity toward the United States.
American foreign policy became increasingly active in Iran during the
Anglo-Iranian oil dispute of the early 1950s. Led by Charismatic National Front
leader and Prime Minister Muhammed Musaddiq, Iranian partisans threatened
to expropriate all holdings in the British-controlled Anglo-Iranian Oil Company
(AlOC) if a more equitable profit sharing system was not hammered out.
Truman Administration policy concentrated on placating the British while
convincing Musaddiq to compromise (1, 72-4). However, American ambivalence
soon confused any attempt at impartial mediation. Though hoping to evict the
British from Iran, the U.S. began to lean toward the British following Musaddiq's
nationalization of AlOC interests, an action approved by the Iranian parliament,
the Majlis, in March 1951 (11, 83). U.S. policymakers staunchly refused to cave in
to Musaddiq's intransigent nationalist demands, ever wary of providing a
dangerous precedent for other oil-rich nations to follow. It was this overriding
concern for American oil interests in such places as Saudi Arabia and Venezuela
that shifted U.S. policy toward a more British hard line (13,117). Nevertheless,
active American intervention was not feasible at the time. While Secretary of
State Dean Acheson noted that the maintenance of American influence in the
Middle East was "far more important ... than it had ever been before," the
Truman Administration balked at using any U.S. force that was not publicly
requested by Iran (4, 137; 11, 88).
However, the American stance in the Anglo-Iranian oil dispute steadily
and more stridently solidified into an anti-Musaddiq posture. Indeed, the United
States soon drifted from protector and mediator to exploiter. Because Musaddiq
nationalized the AIOC, Great Britain and most other Western nations imposed an
informal boycott on Iranian oil, with quiet and indirect U.S. government support
(10,22). Following the 1952 presidential election, the new administration of
Dwight D. Eisenhower began "tightening the noose even further" by rescinding
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Moore: Meddling in the Middle East: The Beginning of the End of U.S.-Ir
American aid to Iran, an act that Jonathan Kwitny claims "effectively
underwrote the position of the oil companies" (5, 164). Despite continued U.S.
pressure, Musaddiq refused to budge. In mid-1952, the cagy Prime Minister
sought and received dictatorial power from the Majlis (1, 67). His hold on
domestic power solidified, Musaddiq directly warned President Eisenhower that
Iran might turn to the Soviet Union for development and military aid if U.S.
assistance was not forthcoming. While hoping to spark an immediate American
response, Musaddiq's extortionist strategy actually backfired. Already strongly
identified with the Iranian communist party, the Tudeh, Musaddiq further
frightened U.S. policymakers by raising the specter of Soviet influence (10, 38).
Wary of squandering money on an intransigent nationalist with communist ties,
American officials were increasingly in search of other options for resolving the
crisis.
The United States eventually chose covert intervention to depose Musaddiq
and shore up the weakened but pro-Western shah for various reasons, all
intertwined in the minds of American decisionmakers. The most immediate
reason stemmed from Great Britain's successful campaign for a U.S.-assisted
interventionist solution to the crisis. While the United States was "still largely
illiterate in matters Iranian," Britain was a relative expert concerning Iranian
affairs (1, 84). Most American diplomats had sown their foreign policy oats in the
Cold War theater of eastern Europe and had concentrated little upon the Middle
East; even Central Intelligence Agency operative Kermit Roosevelt--one of the
U.S.'s supposed experts--possessed only a "limited understanding" of Persian
society (1,88). American policymakers' inexperience thus made the U.S.
somewhat more susceptible to advice and pressure from their more
knowledgeable British counterparts, who began pressing strongly for a covert
solution to the situation after Eisenhower ascended to office (1, 89).
The U.S. also proceeded with a covert operation because of Prime Minister
Musaddiq's perceived personality deficiencies and irritating diplomatic
bullheadedness. Clearly, few Americans like the Iranian nationalist. ~
magazine's "Man of the Year" cover story on Musaddiq notes his "grotesque
antics," calling him "an appalling caricature of a statesman" (7, 18-20). Kermit
Roosevelt described him as an "ill-tempered, erratic old peasant" (11, 77). Such
attitudes misperceived the wily, charismatic leader, belying an American
ignorance of Iranian national politics. One author calls the aged Persian "one of
the least understood political figures of this century," further noting that the
United States "distorted and seriously hindered an understanding" of the Iranian
leader. (1, 54-5).
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3
Aside from personality clashe
increasingly intolerable because he
President Eisenhower lambasted tb
rebuffing American attempts to solv
political methodology ultimately pro
the communist threat to gain U.S. l:
his memoirs that he had no intentil
country in turmoil in order to bail 0
to work out an agreement with the]
to compromise became his fatal flaVli
United States so desperately desired
The U.S. ardently sought this
interests might be preserved. Arnel
substantial marketing agreements ~
huge profits if an unstable Iranian !
over western access to Iran's profita
State Department diplomats, who II
interests throughout the Iranian cri
pursued an antitrust suit against tl
proved especially intimate since bod
brother Allen, the CIA director, pre'
the major oil companies at New YOI
this concern over western access to 1
intervention go unrewarded. Not 0:
preserved, but the British also allow
its oil interests following the coup. 1
oil interests in Iran where they had
perhaps suggesting the possibility oj
Throughout the crisis, President Ei!
oil of the Middle East must in no cil
daring to threaten much hallowed 1
intervention easy for American polil
Additionally, as Eisenhower's
mentality hung like a cloud over aU
Melbourne, head of the American e:
time, remembers clearly the Cold Vt
foreign policy in the 1950s: the perc:
quagmire, domestic McCarthy-indul
an Kwitny claims "effectively
ies" (5, 164). Despite continued U.S.
mid-1952, the cagy Prime Minister
n the Majlis (1, 67). His hold on
ctly warned President Eisenhower that
evelopment and military aid if U.S.
loping to spark an immediate American
y actually backfired. Already strongly
lrty, the Tudeh, Musaddiq further
ne specter of Soviet influence (l0, 38).
lsigent nationalist with communist ties,
earch of other options for resolving the
covert intervention to depose Musaddiq
;ern shah for various reasons, all
lcisionmakers. The most immediate
,ccessful campaign for a U.S.-assisted
ile the United States was "still largely
LS a relative expert concerning Iranian
had sown their foreign policy oats in the
:tad concentrated little upon the Middle
~erative Kermit Roosevelt--one of the
a "limited understanding" of Persian
nexperience thus made the U.S.
f pressure from their more
I began pressing strongly for a covert
. ascended to office (1, 89).
'ert operation because of Prime Minister
ncies and irritating diplomatic
, like the Iranian nationalist. Tim.e
yon Musaddiq notes his "grotesque
;ure of a statesman" (7, 18-20). Kermit
~ed, erratic old peasant" (11, 77). Such
Latic leader, belying an American
ne author calls the aged Persian "one of
nis century," further noting that the
lndered an understanding" of the Iranian
Undergraduate Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [1992], Art. 6
Aside from personality clashes, the United States found Musaddiq
increasingly intolerable because he refused to compromise with the British.
President Eisenhower lambasted the septuagenarian for "contemptuously"
rebuffing American attempts to solve the AlOC crisis (3, 161). Musaddiq's own
political methodology ultimately proved self-defeating, as his strategy of raising
the communist threat to gain U.S. assistance backfired. Eisenhower recalled in
his memoirs that he had no intention of pouring "more American money into a
country in turmoil in order to bail [Musaddiq] out of troubles rooted in his refusal
to work out an agreement with the British" (3, 162). The Iranian leader's inability
to compromise became his fatal flaw, preventing governmental stability that the
United States so desperately desired.
The U.S. ardently sought this stability in Iran so that crucial western oil
interests might be preserved. American'giants like Exxon and Mobil already had
substantial marketing agreements with AlOX partners, and they stood to lose
huge profits if an unstable Iranian situation effectively shut them out. Concern
over western access to Iran's profitable oil industry permeated the mindset of
State Department diplomats, who maintained constant contact with U.S. oil
interests throughout the Iranian crisis, even while the Department of Justice
pursued an antitrust suit against them. This government-big oil connection
proved especially intimate since both Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and his
brother Allen, the CIA director, previously had worked as well-paid lawyers for
the major oil companies at New York's Sullivan and Cromwell (5, 163). Sharing
this concern over western access to Persian oil, Great Britain did not let U.S.
intervention go unrewarded. Not only was America's share in Iranian oil
preserved, but the British also allowed the United States to substantially expand
its oil interests following the coup. In fact, the U.S. soon controlled 40% offoreign
oil interests in Iran where they had previously held no direct interest at all,
perhaps suggesting the possibility of a secret deal in the works (1, 80).
Throughout the crisis, President Eisenhower held firmly to the position that "the
oil of the Middle East must in no circumstances fall to Communism" (3, 130). By
daring to threaten much hallowed U.S. property rights, Musaddiq made
intervention easy for American policymakers to justify.
Additionally, as Eisenhower's comment suggests, the whole anti-Soviet
mentality hung like a cloud over all American dealings with Iran. Ray
Melbourne, head of the American embassy's political section in Iran during this
time, remembers clearly the Cold War concerns governing the mindset of U.S.
foreign policy in the 1950s: the perceived 10ss' of China, the unresolved Korean
quagmire, domestic McCarthy-induced paranoia, the arms race, and the widely­
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Moore: Meddling in the Middle East: The Beginning of the End of U.S.-Ir
held fear of monolithic Communism (8, 346). Indeed, Secretary of State Dulles
and Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson Sounded the alarm in early 1953, fearful
that "political and economic conditions will continue to deteriorate and that
important areas, such as Iran, might be lost Communism" (4, 220). President
Eisenhower agreed that "Iran seemed to be almost ready to fall into Communist
hands" (3, 1). These concerns led the U.S. to direct more energy toward both
"overt and covert measures to discredit Soviet prestige ... and to reduce the
strength of communist parties and other pro-Soviet elements" (4,513). With this
Cold War mentality alive and well in the minds of U.S. decisionmakers, it is little
wonder that people like Kermit Roosevelt were preoccupied with the "obvious
threat of Russian takeover" (11, 11). The United States foreign policy
establishment grew to despise Musaddiq, and Eisenhower perceived the Prime
Minister as "8 leader whom the Communists, having gained power, would
eventually destroy" (3, 163). The arrival of Anotol Laurentiev, the director of the
1948 coup in Czechoslovakia, as the new Soviet ambassador to Iran, further
magnified the fears of communist takeover already pervasive in the American
Cold War psyche (12,79). The U.S. increasingly felt challenged by the Soviet
Union's assistance to the Tudeh party, feeling as though the Soviets "were
flaunting their power ... to intimidate us" (11, 119).
Although this fear of monolithic communism was quite real, the existence
of Soviet paranoia allowed the United States to ignore more complex Iranian
domestic realities. By mislabelling Musaddiq as a communist dupe, Secretary of
State Dulles and other Cold Warriors were able to ensure the silence of those who
had questions about big oil's role in shaping U.S. intervention. When the Iranian
situation was inappropriately painted as a choice between the shah or a
communist Iran, any dissenters felt forced to hold their tongues for fear of being
perceived as a communist sympathizer. In describing the meeting where CIA
intervention was finally authorized, Kermit Roosevelt relates: "I was morally
certain that almost half of those present, if they had felt free or had the courage to
speak, would have opposed the undertaking" (11, 19). In fact, some experts
suggest that the oil companies and Secretary of State Dulles consciously presented
the crisis as one of communism and containment (l3, 117-8). However, as Rubin
notes, most of the Eisenhower team typically looked upon nationalist reform
movements-osuch as Musaddiq's--as "disruptive and as likely to be capture by
local Communists," a confusion of nationalism and communism quite common
in U.S. foreign relations during the 1950s (12, 57). Whether intentional or not, the
explicit association of Prime Minister Musaddiq and his National Front party
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'wn
22
5
with communism effectively silencel
have posed moral questions about tb
For these complex reasons, tl
instability finally prompted the Uniu
Administration decided upon cover i
Approved by ranking American offic
Ajax" set out to clean up the Iranian
Musaddiq (12, 81). U.S.-orchestrate
similar attempt at removing the Pril
disastrously temporary. Brigadier (
quite visible visit to Iran in March oj
securing indigenous, high-ranking I
(11, 147·9; 1, 90). CIA operative Kel'l
Ajax field commander during a FebI
made further clandestine contacts w
(11, 134 & 164). Armed with $100,00
affiliation with "the lower-middle-eli
that would later prove useful in beef
After the shah fled the city a£
Roosevelt and other CIA 'employees'
confused Iranian public. As word oj
streets of Tehran flooded with Tudeb
These mass pro-Musaddiq demonstI
thugs emerged from Tehran's south
the army in installing the shah's de
The shah soon reigned unchallengec
sentenced to three years in prison. .
memoirs, he cryptically understated
the situation" (3, 164). On August 2,
supposedly thanking Kermit Roosevi
my people, my army--and to you" (11
ludicrous reply, telling the grateful !
owed by him to the United States (ll
the U.S. government viewed the ope
President Eisenhower exulted: "For
and still free" (3, 166).
Both Washington and Tehran
the shah as self-congratulatory just
Undergraduate Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [1992], Art. 6
i6). Indeed, Secretary of State Dulles
Sounded the alarm in early 1953, fearful
ill continue to deteriorate and that
lost Communism" (4, 220). President
be almost ready to fall into Communist
l. to direct more energy toward both
:met prestige ... and to reduce the
pro-Soviet elements" (4, 513). With this
minds of U.S. decisionmakers, it is little
; were preoccupied with the "obvious
United States foreign policy
, and Eisenhower perceived the Prime
milts, having gained power, would
Df Anotol Laurentiev, the director of the
Soviet ambassador to Iran, further
'er already pervasive in the American
asingly felt challenged by the Soviet
ieling as though the Soviets "were
~" (11, 119).
Dmmunism was quite real, the existence
ates to ignore more complex Iranian
ilddiq as a communist dupe, Secretary of
re able to ensure the silence of those who
ling U.S. intervention. When the Iranian
a choice between the shah or a
~d to hold their tongues for fear of being
In describing the meeting where CIA
mit Roosevelt relates: "I was morally
if they had felt free or had the courage to
ing" (11, 19). In fact, some experts
itary of State Dulles consciously presented
ainment (13, 117-8). However, as Rubin
cally looked upon nationalist reform
roptive and as likely to be capture by
lnalism and communism quite common
~ (12, 57). Whether intentional or not, the
usaddiq and his National Front party
2
with communism effectively silenced those Americans in government who might
have posed moral questions about the impending covert operation.
For these complex reasons, then, continuing Iranian intransigence and
instability finally prompted the United States to act in 1953, when the Eisenhower
Administration decided upon cover intervention to depose the Prime Minister.
Approved by ranking American officials during a June 22 meeting, "Operation
Ajax" set out to clean up the Iranian situation by calling for the shah to dismiss
Musaddiq (12, 81). U.S.-orchestrated support was crucial, since the shah's
similar attempt at removing the Prime Minister a year earlier had proven
disastrously temporary. Brigadier General Norman Schwarzkopf, arrived for a
quite visible visit to Iran in March of 1953, bolstering the shah's cOnfidence and
securing indigenous, high-ranking military support for the impending dismissal
(11, 147-9; 1, 90). CIA operative Kermit Roosevelt--already named as Operation
Ajax field commander during a February 3 consultation with British officials-­
made further clandestine contacts with the shah to reassure him of U.S. backing
(11, 134 & 164). Armed with $100,000 in CIA money, Roosevelt developed an
affiliation with "the lower-middle-class rent-a-crowd leaders of south Tehran"
that would later prove useful in beefing up prO-Shah demonstrations (1, 90).
After the shah fled the city after signing Musaddiq's dismissal into law,
Roosevelt and other CIA 'employees' helped distribute copies of the decree to a
confused Iranian public. As word of the Prime Minister's mister spread, the
streets of Tehran flooded with Tudeh party supporters on August 16 (11, 178-9).
These mass pro-Musaddiq demonstrations waned three days later, as CIA-hired
thugs emerged from Tehran's south slums to take control of the streets and assist
the army in installing the shah's designated replacement for the Prime Minister.
The shah soon reigned unchallenged, and Musaddiq was arrested and later
sentenced to three years in prison. When Eisenhower recalled the situation in his
memoirs, he cryptically understated that the U.S. "did not stop trying to retrieve
the situation" (3, 164). On August 22, the shah triumphantly returned to Tehran,
supposedly thanking Kermit Roosevelt with the tribute: "lowe my throne to God,
my people, my army--and to you" (11, 199). In return, Roosevelt uttered a most
ludicrous reply, telling the grateful shah that "there is no debt, no obligation"
owed by him to the United States (11, 201). Roosevelt's dubious assertions aside,
the U.S. government viewed the operation as a huge containment success.
President Eisenhower exulted: "For the first time in three years Iran was quiet-­
and still free" (3, 166).
Both Washington and Tehran emphasized the overwhelming support for
the shah as self-congratulatory justification for the CIA-induced coup. The shah
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Moore: Meddling in the Middle East: The Beginning of the End of U.S.-Ir
seemed to have tapped into a wellspring of domestic sentiment, returning
stronger and more popular than ever before. The New York Times agreed,
trumpeting the shah's return with the self-explanatory August 23 headline:
"Shah, Back in Iran, Wildly Acclaimed; Prestige at Peak" (6, 5). This supports
Roosevelt's assertion that the more noise the anti-shah demonstrators made, "the
more the army and the people recognized them as the enemy" (11, 180). The CIA
operative was not surprised, since his Iranian contacts had continually
reassured him that the people would choose the shah over Musaddiq (11,93). So
overwhelming was the shah's indigenous support that one scholar likens the
overthrow of the Prime Minister to "pushing on an already-opened door" (12, 89).
Perhaps all the Iranian people needed was a little push to make the 'right'
decision.
Just how forceful this 'little push' needed to be is perhaps the most difficult
aspect of the intervention to discern, even with the benefit of over 30 years of
hindsight analysis. Certainly, the coup could not have succeeded without
substantial, willing assistance from the Iranian people. However, the Iranian
populace "would not or could not have acted without AmericanlBritish direction
and the psychological support that this involvement carried with it" (1, 93). And
while support for the shah was indeed widespread, post-Musaddiq Iranian society
still experienced spasms of dissent. In mid-November, the shah and his
rejuvenated army "smashed a well-planned major effort" by Tudeh remnants to
protest his ouster ofMusaddiq (2,2). Tehran later trotted out the security police in
full force to prevent any demonstrations during Vice President Richard Nixon's
visit to Iran in early December (9, 3). Despite beginning an immediate purge of
former Tudeh supporters, the shah still had to contend with substantial Iranian
ambivalence toward his U.S.-assisted grip on power.
No such ambivalence characterized the reaction from Washington. Not
only did covert U.S. intervention extract the troublesome Musaddiq thorn from the
western world' side, but the CIA operation's success also heralded a welcome
victory against the forces of communism. Ray Melbourne took great satisfaction
from his belief that Musaddiq's overthrow was "viewed by the Soviets as a great
defeat" (8, 358). By establishing a Cold War alliance with Iran, some experts
think the U.S. realized important gains in both regional politics and the global
advancement of an anti-Soviet agenda (10, 46). Certainly the U.S. was "almost
completely able to control the course ofintemal events" in post-coup Iran (14,81).
As well, the message that the United States stood opposed to nationalism
apparently took told within the Third World; aside from the Suez Canal, no
country expropriated any foreign holdings for more than 20 years. The 1953 covert
Published by Digital Commons @ IWU, 1992
24
success also provided the U.S. gover
means of implementing American 1
Agency. By elevating the CIA's stat
Iranian coup provided the impetus i
necessarily successful) covert opera1
93).
These gains aside, the United
foreign relations by forcing the Iran
would not have made on their own.
people "like the institution of the ml
important a figure as Musaddiq. In
linked" (8, 349). Iranians probably ~
constitutional monarchy. Instead, s
Persian people were "forced to live
that were closely identified in the Ii
States (5, 175). by forcing Iranians'
States embittered many Iranians at
East for years to come.
If one accepts the noble premi
the best interests of the American Jl4
considered a failure. Though initis
was beholden to the U.S., this inter
whose interests were not at all sync
5). The coup actually resulted in h
contributed to the climate that even
Mghanistan (5, 5). More importan1
incentive grew because of the carro
shah's government (12, 73). In 195~
discontent that would subsequently
American hatred (1, 31). Thus, in
politics proved to be a long-term die
While this may have been a !
that the CIA meddling in Iran "left
years ..." (1, 86). The 1980 retun
after a full 444 days in captivity, er
themselves upon a humiliated and
effects produces by the 1953 Amen.
boomeranged to cause the United E
7
- _
~'~'''''''''~''lW
,
Undergraduate Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [1992], Art. 6
of domestic sentiment, returning
()re. The New York Times agreed,
llf-explanatory August 23 headline:
'restige at Peak" (6, 5). This supports
.the anti-shah demonstrators made, "the
them as the enemy" (11, 180). The CIA
anian contacts had continually
Ise the shah over Musaddiq (11, 93). So
i support that one scholar likens the
ing on an already-opened door" (12, 89).
is a little push to make the 'right'
leeded to be is perhaps the most difficult
with the benefit of over 30 years of
:ould not have succeeded without
[ranian people. However, the Iranian
:ted without AmericanlBritish direction
lvolvement carried with it" (1, 93). And
idespread, post-Musaddiq Iranian society
rid-November, the shah and his
led major effort" by Tudeh remnants to
iI'8lllater trotted out the security police in
during Vice President Richard Nixon's
spite beginning an immediate purge of
lad to contend with substantial Iranian
.p on power.
i the reaction from Washington. Not
lhe troublesome Musaddiq thorn from the
on's success also heralded a welcome
Ray Melbourne took great satisfaction
7 was "viewed by the Soviets as a great
Var alliance with Iran, some experts
n both regional politics and the global
),46). Certainly the U.S. was "almost
lternal events" in post-coup Iran (14, 81).
tes stood opposed to nationalism
dd; aside from the Suez Canal, no
~ for more than 20 years. The 1953 covert
success also provided the U.S. government with what it thought was yet another
means of implementing American foreign policy, the Central Intelligence
Agency. By elevating the CIA's status as a foreign policy instrument, the 1953
Iranian coup provided the impetus for a number of successive (though not
necessarily successful) covert operations, beginning with Guatemala in 1954 (1,
93).
These gains aside, the United States intervention seriously damaged
foreign relations by forcing the Iranian people to make a decision that they likely
would not have made on their own. Diplomat Ray Melbourne recalls that the
people "like the institution of the monarchy, and to them [the shah] was as
important a figure as Musaddiq. In the public mind of 1953, they were still
linked" (8, 349). Iranians probably would have like to have kept both leaders of the
constitutional monarchy. Instead, since the 1953 coup, Kwitny states that the
Persian people were "forced to live under brutal dictatorships," harsh regimes
that were closely identified in the Iranian conscience with the meddling United
States (5, 175). by forcing Iranians to choose the shah over Musaddiq, the United
States embittered many Iranians and undermined its credibility in the Middle
East for years to come.
If one accepts the noble premise that U.S. foreign policy attempts to serve
the best interests of the American people, then the 1953 covert operation must be
considered a failure. Though initially creating a pro-American government that
was beholden to the U.S., this intervention actually served to "protect an oil cartel
whose interests were not at all synonymous with those of the American people" (5,
5). The coup actually resulted in higher American gas prices, it directly
contributed to the climate that eventually allowed the Soviet Union to invade
Mghanistan (5, 5). More importantly, even as early as 1952, anti-American
incentive grew because of the carrot-and-stick nature of American aid to the
shah's government (12, 73). In 1953, the United States firmly planted the seeds of
discontent that would subsequently mature into a violent eruption of anti­
American hatred (1, 31). Thus, in the final assessment, interference in Iranian
politics proved to be a long-term disaster.
While this may have been a short-term victory, one political scientist notes
that the CIA meddling in Iran "left a running would that bled for twenty-five
years ..." (1, 86). The 1980 return of exhausted American hostages, repatriated
after a full 444 days in captivity, engendered painful images that branded
themselves upon a humiliated and bewildered American conscience. Indeed, the
effects produces by the 1953 American intervention in Iran eventually
boomeranged to cause the United States a painful would of its own.
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Moore: Meddling in the Middle East: The Beginning of the End of U.S.-Ir
WQRKSCITED
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2. Doty, Robert C. "Iran Crushes Dissent Bid to Challenge New Regime." The.
New York Times 13 November 1953: 1.2.
13. Samil, Kuross A. Involyemen
Containment in Iran. Un
State University Press, 19~
14. Sheehan, Michael K. Iran; T
Policies 1941-1954. New'
3. Eisenhower, Dwight D. Mandate for Change. Garden City, New York:
Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1963.
4. Foreign Relations of the United States: 1952-1954. Vol. 2. Washington: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1978. 136-9.
5. Kwitny, Jonathan. Endless Enemies: The Making or an Unfriendly World.
New York: Penguin Books, 1986.
6. Love, Kennett. "Shah, Back in Iran, Wildly Acclaimed; Prestige at Peak."
The New York Times 23 August 1953: 1.5.
7. "Man of the Year,"
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• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •- _
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