Rachel Haydecker
Public policy in Scotland after devolution: convergence or divergence.
Rachel Haydecker
Abstract:
Public policy in Scotland after devolution has significantly diverged from policy at
Westminster due to the political nature of devolution, and the wide legislative remit of
the Scottish Executive and Parliament. Devolution has provided Scotland with the
policy-making autonomy to continue historic policy differences in health, higher
education and local government. Before devolution, these policy variations tended to
be expressed through differences in implementation of Westminster legislation in
Scotland. However, policy divergence is not guaranteed by the devolution settlement,
as the fiscal and political requirements for divergence are influenced by the actions of
the UK Government at Westminster. Policy convergence in the future is likely if the
current financial and intergovernmental frameworks persist.
Introduction
Bogdanor states that devolution was „the most radical constitutional change‟ (1999: 1)
the United Kingdom had seen since the Great Reform Act of 1832. The Scotland Act
1998 established a set of clearly separate Scottish institutions: the Scottish Parliament,
the Scottish Executive1 and a First Minister, and diminished the role of the Secretary
of State for Scotland and the Scottish Office (McGarvey and Cairney, 2008: 37). The
powers of legislative competence reserved by Westminster are enshrined in the
Scotland Act, with the effect that any area not specifically stated as reserved falls
under the remit of the Scottish Parliament (Bogdanor, 1999). Devolution has provided
Scotland with substantial areas of legislative competence, such as health, education
and training, local government, law and home affairs, agriculture and sports and arts.
The Scottish Parliament also has limited tax-varying powers, enabling it to vary the
rate of income tax by up to three pence in the pound. However, the majority of the
funding for the legislative agenda of the devolved institutions is determined by
Westminster through the Barnett Formula (Cowley, 2000). Devolution has enabled
1
After the 2007 Holyrood election, the SNP rebranded the Scottish Executive as the Scottish
Government, which has been colloquially accepted in Scotland. However, the official title under the
Scotland Act remains the „Scottish Executive.‟ This dissertation will refer to the Scottish Executive as
the „Scottish Government‟ when discussing policies introduced or events taking place after the 2007
election.
1
POLIS Journal Vol.3, Winter 2010
Rachel Haydecker
Scotland to follow a distinct policy-making agenda, allowing clear policy divergences
from the rest of the United Kingdom to occur during the first ten years of devolution.
However, the ability for Scottish public policy to vary significantly is restrained by
factors such as the common security area and the single market area across the whole
of the UK. Scotland has, in fact, chosen to reproduce policies introduced at
Westminster in some instances, despite having the opportunity to follow a different
policy path.
Policy divergence in Scotland is not a new phenomenon; Mitchell states that the Act
of Union in 1707 „did not entail uniformity and assimilation‟ (2003: 162) between
Scotland and the rest of the United Kingdom. Political devolution built upon a history
of administrative devolution and policy differences in areas such as law, education,
the Church and local government. Before devolution, policy in these areas could
differ to maintain Scottish traditions, meaning policy in Scotland sometimes diverged
from policy in England. This scope for distinctiveness was facilitated by the creation
of the Scottish Office in 1885, and a Secretary of State for Scotland to represent
Scottish demands at Westminster. Divergence tended to occur only where there was a
clear Scottish precedent for a different policy, or in areas of no real political
significance (Kellas, 1989). The Scottish Office mainly influenced and implemented
the policies of other departments, and rarely initiated policies (Midwinter et al, 1991).
Kellas (1989) argues that there was a Scottish „political system‟ before devolution due
to strong Scottish traditions. This is countered by authors such as Midwinter et al
(1991), who state that the main political institutions in Scotland before devolution
were British institutions, and as power was retained by Westminster, the existence of
a separate Scottish political system was not possible. Policy divergence before
devolution was more a difference of implementation or emphasis, rather than
concrete, substantial divergence (Midwinter and McGarvey, 2001; Mitchell, 2003).
This dissertation will focus on the policies introduced by the devolved institutions in
the areas of health, higher education and local government, with a specific focus on
the high profile, „flagship policies‟ (McGarvey and Cairney, 2008: 204) of free
personal care for the elderly, the abolition of tuition fees, and the use of Single
Transferable Vote (STV) in local elections. Health, higher education and local
2
POLIS Journal Vol.3, Winter 2010
Rachel Haydecker
government have been selected because policy divergence in these areas occurred
before devolution, and so they have been identified as areas where further divergence
would be highly likely. It is acknowledged that Wales and Northern Ireland have
followed distinct policy paths from Westminster in some of the policy areas examined
in this dissertation, however the exploration of differences in policy across all four
nations forming the United Kingdom is not within the remit of this work.
It can be argued that the „aim‟ of devolution is „less about pursuing distinctive policy
agendas in different places,‟ and is instead about „a sense of ownership of the policy
process in more “proximate” devolved settings‟ (Jeffery, 2006b: 153; Jeffery, 2009;
Mitchell, 2006). The Scottish Executive and Parliament can choose to prioritise
legislation affecting important Scottish industries, such as whisky or fisheries, or
emphasise areas such as council housing or public health, where Scotland has
historically differed from the rest of the United Kingdom. Devolution can therefore be
seen as reinstating Scottish ownership of politics, as decision-making now occurs as
close as possible to the people who will be directly affected. This dissertation argues
that the point of devolution is to enable the devolved institutions in Scotland to make
their own choices and decisions, allowing a different approach to issues and resulting
in divergent policies.
Although there has been clear divergence in public policy in the areas considered in
this dissertation, the capacity for continued divergence is not guaranteed. The
devolved institutions are constrained by the single market and the common security
area throughout the whole of the United Kingdom, as well as the welfare state
settlement and membership of the European Union (Keating et al, 2003; Keating,
2005b). These factors encourage policy convergence with the rest of the United
Kingdom. The capacity to fund generous policies in Scotland, such as free personal
care for the elderly and the abolition of tuition fees, relies heavily on favourable
financial decisions made at Westminster, due to the workings of the Barnett formula.
If cuts are made at Westminster level, the Scottish budget would be decreased as a
result, and convergence could occur, as the devolved institutions would no longer be
able to continue to fund such policies. Convergence in health and welfare policies
may occur in the future, due to the continued presence of Scotland in the United
3
POLIS Journal Vol.3, Winter 2010
Rachel Haydecker
Kingdom, as citizens expect a similar standard of service and provisions, regardless of
where they live. If health policy continues to diverge in Scotland, there could be
discontent voiced by residents in other parts of the UK, putting pressure on
Westminster to encourage a convergence of policy.
Divergent public policies in the areas examined in this dissertation have been
introduced since devolution. Upon closer examination there have also been changes in
the policy-making process in Scotland since devolution; consensus and compromise is
often required due to the likelihood of a coalition or minority Scottish Government.
However, the informal nature of the current intergovernmental framework and the
significant financial impact of spending decisions made at Westminster on the policymaking capacity of the devolved institutions means that policy convergence should be
expected in the future.
Literature Review
It is argued that a new „Scottish policy style‟ has been created after devolution. A
policy style is described as the „repeated choice of policy tools, and the adoption of
the same tools in different policy fields‟ (Greer and Jarman, 2007: 167). This new
„Scottish policy style‟ is based on consensus and a more open, inclusive consultation
process (Cairney, 2007, 2008; Keating et al, 2003). The use of proportional
representation in Scottish Parliamentary elections gives a greater likelihood of a
coalition or minority government, necessitating consensus on policy decisions. The
smaller political arena in Scotland leads to closer personal contacts, and ministers
who personally manage policy communities, encouraging meaningful consultation
(Cairney, 2008). The Scottish Executive frequently consulted a wide range of interest
groups in Scotland in the early years of devolution due to its limited legacy of policymaking, as the Scottish Office had previously implemented rather than formulated
policy. Keating et al describe the Scottish Office‟s policy-making role prior to
devolution as simply „putting a Scottish face on British policy‟ (2003: 454).
Nonetheless, the importance of interest groups in policy-making after devolution
should not be over-exaggerated. Despite expectations, devolution did not lead to the
creation of new Scottish interest groups; Cairney et al (2009) state that only a small
proportion of Scottish interest groups were created after devolution. Existing interest
4
POLIS Journal Vol.3, Winter 2010
Rachel Haydecker
groups instead shifted their focus from Westminster to the Scottish Parliament by
increasing their policy capacity and resource levels in Scotland.
The existence of a new „Scottish policy style‟ should not be accepted without
question. Parry (2002) suggests that if devolution had not occurred, the Labour
government at Westminster would have continued to give the Scottish Office the
relative autonomy it enjoyed between 1997 and 1999, which would have had almost
the same effect on policy as the Scottish Parliament. This implies that the Scottish
Parliament simply followed the policy path of the Scottish Office, and that devolution
did not symbolise a true change in direction for Scottish policy. The concept of a new
„Scottish policy style‟ can be negated by the suggestion that the most publicised
policy divergences in Scotland, such as the abolition of up-front tuition fees, were
simply due to the Liberal Democrats pursuing their UK-wide policy agenda as junior
coalition partners (Devolution and Constitutional Change Programme, 2006). Yet
Scotland‟s historical distinctiveness in education, health and local government should
not be dismissed. Devolution has allowed this distinctiveness to continue, and the
autonomy of the devolved institutions has allowed significant policy divergence from
Westminster, as well as providing some protection against the imposition of
unpopular policies in Scotland.
Devolution has significantly changed the political arena in Scotland. The devolved
institutions have the ability to create and follow their own legislative agenda; dealing
with distinctly Scottish problems and following the precedent set by the Scottish
Office in the years before devolution in areas such as education and health. Policy
divergence is facilitated by the lack of formal, systematic co-ordination across the
United Kingdom. The UK Government is not able to legally constrain the policymaking of the Scottish Government and Parliament, as there are no UK-wide
framework laws covering matters devolved to Scotland. Instead, the UK can only
„inconvenience or obstruct‟ (Trench, 2009: 129) the devolved government at
Holyrood by failing to create the space for devolved policies in UK legislation or
programmes, or by following policy directions with knock-on effects for Scotland
without consulting the devolved government. Asymmetrical devolution has
encouraged bilateral, rather than multilateral discussions between governments at
5
POLIS Journal Vol.3, Winter 2010
Rachel Haydecker
Westminster and Holyrood over policy ideas and objectives (Schmueker and Adams,
2005), especially before 2007, as some intergovernmental problems could be handled
within the internal machinery of the Labour Party. The election of a different political
party at Holyrood from the party of government at Westminster has exposed the
limitations of the informal intergovernmental understandings that underpinned
devolution for the first eight years. Giving evidence to the House of Commons Justice
Committee, Jeffery states that the arrangements for dealing with differences in
territorial interests „appear unfit for purpose now that they connect governments led
by different political parties‟ (2008: 34).
The creation of new political focal points in Scotland, the devolved institutions, also
encourages policy divergence. The pattern of party politics has changed and policy
divergence is more likely as different political parties compete in Scottish Parliament
elections, leading to a wider variety of policy suggestions than at Westminster.
Devolution also presents a specific challenge to the Labour party, which can be seen
as being „pulled in different ways‟ (Greer, 2004: 10) by the need to compete for
voters with different priorities in Westminster elections, and then in Scottish
Parliament elections. In the Scottish electoral arena, Labour MSPs face competition
from parties on the left of the political spectrum, such as the SNP, the Scottish
Socialist Party and the Scottish Green Party, whereas at Westminster, Labour‟s main
competition is from the Conservatives, on the right of the political spectrum. Party
politics in Scotland have also changed due to the increased likelihood of coalition
government. After the formation of the first two Scottish Executives, Scottish Labour
was forced to move away from the party line preferred by Westminster due to the
coalition with the Liberal Democrats. As junior partners in the first two coalition
Executives, the Liberal Democrats were able to insist on the introduction of headline
policy divergences, such as the abolition of up front tuition fees and the introduction
of STV in local elections. The political dynamic of devolution also means that the
new Scottish institutions may wish to demonstrate that devolution does make a
difference by introducing divergent policies (Hazell and Jervis, 1998). There were
high public expectations that devolution would bring improvements in the NHS,
education, welfare services and the economy, which can partly explain why major
policy divergences occurred in some of these areas (McEwan and Parry, 2005: 48).
6
POLIS Journal Vol.3, Winter 2010
Rachel Haydecker
Although devolution has led to the introduction of significantly different policies in
Scotland from those in England, there are several contextual and political factors
encouraging policy convergence in Scotland. In the early years of devolution, the
devolved government in Scotland appeared to take its policy cues from Westminster,
and then modify the proposals to reflect the consultative and more collaborative
Scottish policy style (Laffin, 2007). Nelson (2001) refers to this as the Scottish
Executive „regurgitating work done in London and passing it off as its own,‟ and
argues that devolution has „barely changed the output of Scottish government.‟
Contextual factors encouraging convergence are the UK single market area, the
welfare state settlement and the common security area throughout the whole of the
UK (Keating, 2005b). It is necessary for security policy to be consistent across the
UK to ensure uniformity in law enforcement and regulation, and the reservation of the
bulk of social security policy at Westminster means that the devolved institutions
have a very limited ability to create new legislation in this area. Membership of the
EU also constrains Scottish policy-making, as the Scottish Executive can sometimes
find itself caught between European and UK requirements. Although agriculture is a
devolved issue, Scottish policy has to comply with European requirements, and as
European issues are reserved, Westminster plays a role in Scottish policy-making by
ensuring that all legislation is compatible with European legislation.
A major constraint on policy-making is the financial settlement used to fund the
devolved government in Scotland (Keating, 2005b; Jeffery, 2006b). Scotland has no
borrowing power and no significant revenue raising power, apart from the power to
vary the basic rate of income tax in Scotland by up to 3 per cent of the rate in the rest
of the United Kingdom, which has not occurred to date (Bogdanor, 1999). The
Scottish Executive and Parliament receive funding through the Barnett Formula,
which allocates money to Scotland at the same rate per capita levels as funding
decisions for political programmes in England, so any spending increases or cuts
directly affect the amount of money received by Scotland. The Barnett Formula
encourages policy convergence as it gives Westminster a significant amount of
influence over the Scottish Government‟s budget; public expectations encourage the
Scottish Government to match spending increases pledged by the UK Government,
7
POLIS Journal Vol.3, Winter 2010
Rachel Haydecker
and English spending increases can be exempted from Barnett calculations, such as
extra spending on the Olympics in 2009 (House of Commons Justice Committee,
2009). The Barnett formula may lead to greater convergence in public policy within
the United Kingdom in the future; the amount in the block grants given to each area
of the UK was intended to converge over time, as the amount received by Scotland
was originally set at levels higher than per capita spending in England (House of
Commons Justice Committee, 2009: 73). This convergence has not occurred to date,
but it could eventually mean Scotland could not fund policies such as free personal
care for the elderly and the abolition of top up fees, leading to policy convergence
with England (Hazell and Jervis, 1998). Despite this, the devolved institutions are not
obliged to follow any spending promises made by Westminster, giving them a large
amount of freedom to decide how the money allocated from the Barnett formula is
spent (Keating, 2005b).
Although there is no formal requirement for Scotland to follow the lead from
Westminster regarding spending increases, the „concept of equity‟ (Hazell and Jervis,
1998: 69) can dictate any decisions made over spending increases in Scotland. British
citizens expect the same basic levels of public services wherever they live, and
significant differences in health, education or welfare policies could lead to calls of
inequality, and a perceived better standard in one country over another (Woods,
2002). However, it can be argued that territorial variability has always been a feature
of British social policy, and that devolution cannot undermine the British welfare
state, which never had a classic unitary structure (Wincott, 2006; Mitchell, 2006).
Before devolution, differences between Scottish and English education and health
policies were seen as „benign‟ (Wincott, 2006: 185), however divergence since
devolution is considered to be a problem by some. Devolution could create a tension
between the „logic of social citizenship and the logic of federalism,‟ (Banting, 2006:
44) although the UK is not a federal system. The logic of social citizenship suggests
that there should be policy uniformity and national standards, whereas the logic of
federalism allows for regional diversity, so a federal government can reflect the needs
and priorities of their electorate through differing policies. The permissive nature of
the UK‟s devolution settlement, and the unconditional nature of the block grant used
to fund the devolved administration‟s policies, gives Scotland considerable scope to
8
POLIS Journal Vol.3, Winter 2010
Rachel Haydecker
vary social citizenship on a territorial basis (McLean et al, 2009). However, the
Scottish Executive may feel obliged to ensure parity in services with the rest of the
UK, leading to policy convergence. Public opinion could also encourage convergence,
as the public favour common standards in services across the UK (Schmueker and
Adams, 2005). There is no discernable difference between public opinion in Scotland
and England in polls conducted about free long-term care for the elderly, the public in
both countries are in favour of the Government paying for the care needs of the
elderly (Curtice, 2005). Yet Scottish policy has diverged significantly in this policy
areas, raising questions about the fairness of only providing free personal care for the
elderly in Scotland, when this is also supported in England. The presence of
seemingly more generous Scottish policies does not correlate with the principle of
having a set of „common citizenship rights and values‟ across the UK (Greer, 2007:
158). However, Jeffery (2005) believes that divergence is necessary to express the
distinct Scottish identity and sense of national community.
Policy convergence during the first eight years of devolution was encouraged by the
„pan-British hegemony of the Labour Party‟ (Jeffery, 2005b: 114; Keating, 2005b).
Labour politicians at Westminster and Holyrood would be expected to share broadly
the same ideas and party loyalties, and Scottish Labour MSPs would not want to offer
a radically different platform of policies for fear of embarrassing their English
counterparts, or forcing them to introduce similar policies. Parry argues that the full
potential of devolution in Scotland has been constrained by a „perceived need for
compatibility‟ (2002: 322) with UK policy, partly due to Holyrood‟s political
alignment with Westminster before 2007. The Labour Government at Westminster
could influence the Scottish Executive, and try to discourage any embarrassing
divergences from UK policy before 2007; no real safeguard against political
interference from the UK Government exists (Simeon, 2003). However, Scottish
Labour has moved away from the party line followed in Westminster, for example by
introducing the ban on smoking in public places in 2005 in direct defiance of John
Reid, the Labour Secretary of State for Health at the time (McGarvey and Cairney,
2008: 207). The civil service can also be seen as a „unifying force,‟ encouraging the
convergence of policy across the UK (Keating et al, 2003).
9
POLIS Journal Vol.3, Winter 2010
Rachel Haydecker
The ability of the devolved institutions to produce divergent policy is limited by the
retention of certain powers by Westminster in the devolution settlement, and the
overlap between some areas of devolved and reserved policy. This is apparent in areas
such as the relationship between the social security system, which is reserved, and
forms of social intervention such as housing, training and social work, which are
devolved. Social security in the UK is an aspect of central economic sovereignty, and
therefore cannot be used as an instrument of devolved social policy (Keating et al,
2003). This can, and will, cause problems for a Scottish Executive that wants to
radically change social policy in Scotland, as there are a lack of fundamental
economic powers to create more meaningful policies. It is also important to remember
that although legislative competence in many areas is devolved to the Scottish
Parliament, Westminster retains the ability to produce legislation that will affect
Scotland, even if the matter is devolved, through the use of Legislative Consent
Motions (LCMs)2.
The claim that public policy in Scotland after devolution has diverged implies that
there is a norm from which Scottish policy-makers are departing, namely the policymaking approach of the UK Government (Trench, 2007). However, if the policymaking and direction of the Scottish Office before devolution is instead taken to be
the norm in Scotland, it can be argued that policy is not diverging as dramatically as it
appears. Policies such as free long-term care for the elderly and the abolition of upfront tuition fees can be seen as continuing tradition of Scotland as a socially
democratic country with support for egalitarian issues, social justice and redistribution
(Hassan and Warhurst, 2000). The headline divergence of free personal care for the
elderly was introduced in Scotland following the Sutherland Royal Commission, a
pre-devolution report for the whole of the UK (Parry, 2003). Some policy changes
which can be perceived as being „divergent‟ are simply a difference of style and
implementation of a policy introduced across the UK, such as less target-setting in the
health services (Adams and Robinson, 2002: 14). This tactic was normal when there
was administrative autonomy under the Scottish Office, and does not necessarily
2
LCMs are colloquially called Sewel motions. An LCM is used when UK bills make provision for a
matter on which the Scottish Parliament has the power to legislate, when they vary the legislative
competence of the Scottish Parliament, or when they vary the executive competence of Scottish
Ministers. An LCM means that this will only happen if the Scottish Parliament has given its consent
(House of Commons Library, 2005).
10
POLIS Journal Vol.3, Winter 2010
Rachel Haydecker
represent a change in policy-making post devolution. It can be argued that devolution
has allowed Scottish politicians to reinforce their „welfarist spirit‟ (McEwen and
Parry, 2005: 43), and that Scotland‟s tradition of placing priorities on social
democracy increased the likelihood that some aspects of health and education policy
in Scotland would diverge from England after devolution.
There appears to be the potential for the emergence of a different „Scottish policy
style‟ as the devolved institutions mature. However, the devolution settlement must be
able to prove that it can withstand the political pressure it may be placed under after
the General Election in May. The devolved administrations rely heavily on informal
arrangements and the „goodwill‟ (Trench, 2008: 222) fostered during Labour‟s
dominance at Westminster and Holyrood in the first years of devolution. In the future,
it will be necessary to use more formal mechanisms to manage intergovernmental
relations and the complex relationships between the administration in Scotland and at
Westminster, with their overlapping interests and roles (Trench, 2008).
11
POLIS Journal Vol.3, Winter 2010
Rachel Haydecker
Health
Health is one of the most important, complex, and politically visible policy areas for
the devolved government in Scotland, and Scottish policy can be seen to be taking a
different path to the rest of the UK (Greer, 2004). Due to the prominence of health
and NHS policy in the devolved administrations‟ responsibilities, it is important that
the public view the actions of the devolved institutions in this area as successful
(Woods, 2002). Devolution was seen as a prime opportunity to address the poor
health status of Scots, and the health inequalities between Scotland and many parts of
England, as policy could be tailored to meet specific Scottish needs. Despite the
relatively short time period since devolution in 1999, and strong links between the
health systems throughout the United Kingdom, divergent health policy has been
introduced in Scotland by the devolved institutions.
Scottish health policy differed from the rest of the UK prior to devolution. The
informal autonomy of the Scottish Office enabled some policies to be implemented
differently, although this autonomy was limited. The Scottish Office developed close
links with the health policy communities built around Scotland‟s medical schools and
Royal Colleges, and most of the distinctiveness in Scottish health policy before
devolution is due to the reliance of the Scottish Office on these medical elites (Greer,
2004). Scotland consists of „policy villages with tight policy and professional
networks‟ (Hazell and Jervis, 1998: 9), enabling policy makers to come to agreement
over policy more quickly and easily than in other parts of the UK. After Labour‟s
victory in 1997, and before the formal handover of powers to the new Scottish
institutions, Scotland was given the opportunity to further depart from UK-wide
health policy to „prepare for devolution‟ (Greer, 2004: 79). The NHS reforms
introduced in Scotland in 1998 differed from English proposals, as they aimed to
preserve the ability of „trusts‟ (i.e. hospitals) to organise themselves, leaving broader
strategy issues to boards. By the time the Scottish Parliament was introduced,
Scotland had formally made trusts responsible for self-administration, giving boards
control over policy. This showed that Scotland wished to return to the concept that
doctors should play a major role in the allocation of resources, rejecting the policy
pursued in England that management was better able to fulfil this job (Greer, 2004).
12
POLIS Journal Vol.3, Winter 2010
Rachel Haydecker
After devolution, organisational structures within the NHS in Scotland have been
based on the idea of partnership, leading to a system largely dominated by
professionals and staff. This reflects the more communitarian leanings of Scottish
politics as a whole (Greer, 2003; Woods, 2002). The National Health Service Reform
(Scotland) Act 2003 legally enshrined the existing differences between Scotland and
the rest of the UK by abolishing the „internal market‟ (Keating and Cairney, 2009: 39)
within the NHS in Scotland, at the same time that it was being extended in England
through the introduction of foundation hospitals. Scottish policy regarding public
services since devolution has been able to „drift…away from the English model of
consumerism and competition‟ (Keating and Cairney, 2009: 40), and retain more of
the traditional public service model than England (Keating et al, 2003). Historically,
there has been a higher amount spent on health in Scotland in comparison to England.
This has led to more beds in Scottish hospitals, more GPs per capita and a higher level
of prescribing, which can be seen as necessary due to Scotland‟s poorer standard of
public health. Scotland also has a smaller private healthcare sector in comparison to
England (Woods, 2002). The Scottish Executive purchased Scotland‟s most
prominent private hospital, the HCI Hospital in Clydebank, in the summer of 2002,
expressing a clear policy choice in favour of the NHS over privately provided
healthcare (Greer, 2003). Scotland concentrated on rebuilding a unitary NHS after
Labour‟s election victory in 1997, in comparison with England, where reforms were
more market-based (Greer, 2003).
The headline health policy divergence in post-devolution Scotland has been the
introduction of free personal care for the elderly in 2002. The Scottish Executive
pledged up to £145 per week for individuals to provide personal care, and an
additional £65 for nursing care, as well as £50 million to be used to improve home
care services (Simeon, 2003). This was a clear divergence from Westminster on a
high profile policy issue, and means a substantial amount of money has to be provided
from within the Barnett provisions to fund this policy. Greer states that the Scottish
Executive‟s decision to fund long-term personal care for the elderly was „the most
important divergence in policy in the UK in four years of devolution‟ (2004: 77).
However, the origins of this policy were in a pre-devolution report by the Royal
Commission on Long-Term Care, meaning that the policy was not completely
13
POLIS Journal Vol.3, Winter 2010
Rachel Haydecker
formulated by the devolved institutions and the Scottish health policy community
(Parry, 2003). The UK Government established the Royal Commission in 1997 to
examine the options for the provision of long-term care for elderly people. The
Commission‟s report, published in 1997, recommended that personal care, including
nursing care and some social care tasks, should be funded from general taxation. The
UK Government chose not to follow this recommendation, stating that the proposals
carried a „very substantial cost, both now and in the future‟ (Department of Health,
2000:
11).
The
Scottish
Executive
chose
to
adopt
the
Commission‟s
recommendations, a move which can be attributed to Henry McLeish, Scotland‟s
second First Minister. McLeish became First Minister in the shadow of Donald
Dewar, and was keen to make his own mark on the office and make Scottish health
policy, and policy more generally, distinctive from the rest of the UK (Greer, 2004).
The Commission‟s report provided an opportunity for McLeish to distinguish his
leadership of the Scottish Executive, and simultaneously introduce a policy which
was popular with the Scottish electorate. The introduction of this policy can therefore
be seen as being due to a political imperative, rather than an impartial judgement. The
health policy community was very influential in the first few years after devolution,
due to the relative lack of experience in policy-making of the Scottish Executive and
Parliament. The fact that the health policy community was in favour of the
introduction of free personal care for the elderly can be seen to have encouraged the
Scottish
Executive‟s
actions
in
deciding
to
follow
the
Commission‟s
recommendations. Simeon argues that ministers did not have the „firmness of
purpose‟ (2003: 228) to stand up to pressure from the public and the media, who were
all in support of the policy.
There has been additional health policy divergence in Scotland since devolution. The
Mental Health (Care and Treatment) (Scotland) Act 2003 was a significant piece of
legislation passed by the Scottish Parliament with no Westminster counterpart, until
the Mental Health Act 1983 was amended by a short bill at Westminster in 2007.
Devolution has allowed Scotland to take a distinctive policy direction on mental
health, which is described as a „national public health priority for Scotland‟ by NHS
Health Scotland (2009). Mental health policy developed differently in Scotland before
devolution, and the establishment of the Scottish Parliament and Executive provided
14
POLIS Journal Vol.3, Winter 2010
Rachel Haydecker
the opportunity, in terms of time and legislative capacity, for divergent legislation.
Unlike the previous Mental Health Act, the new Scottish Mental Health Act is based
on a set of guiding principles, to „set the tone of the Act and guide its interpretation‟
(Scottish Association for Mental Health: 2004). These principles include ensuring
non-discrimination against people with mental health disorders, and encouraging the
use of informal care rather than compulsory powers. The new Scottish Mental Health
Act did not follow controversial plans put forward at Westminster to detain people
with personality disorders preventatively. The legislation introduced at Westminster
contained a provision allowing for the detention of people suffering from severe
personality disorders who are viewed to be dangerous, even if they have not
committed a crime (Keating and Cairney, 2009: 38, House of Commons Library:
2007). The progressive attitude in Scotland towards mental health can be seen by the
introduction of a comprehensive new Act dealing with mental health in Scotland
years before a limited version of the same Act was introduced in Westminster.
The current Scottish Government can be seen to be working towards a health care
system that is truly free at the point of delivery, with the announcement in 2007 that
prescription charges would be gradually phased out, and completely abolished in
2011. This marks a clear divergence from policy in England, and the policy of the
previous Scottish Executive, who favoured the retention of prescription charges (BBC
News, 2007). Currently, prescription charges in Scotland are £3 per item, in
comparison to £7.20 in England (Sturgeon, 2010). The Scottish Government is
following in the footsteps of the Welsh Assembly and the Northern Ireland Assembly,
who have already introduced free prescriptions. However, the UK Government
eliminated prescription charges for cancer patients in England in 2009, and state that
charges for sufferers of other long-term conditions will be abolished in the future
(BBC News, 2009), suggesting that convergence on this issue could eventually occur.
Divergence in health policy is also evident when policies developed in England are
not adopted in Scotland (Woods, 2002).
The ability of the Scottish Executive to formulate a distinctively „Scottish‟ health
policy is limited by a lack of control over the amount of money granted to Scotland
through the Barnett Formula. Funding presents a dilemma for health policy-makers in
15
POLIS Journal Vol.3, Winter 2010
Rachel Haydecker
Scotland, as although they can propose policies within the competences of the
devolved institutions, the funds available through the Barnett Formula are decided by
policy decisions taken in Whitehall (Wood, 2002). The Scottish Executive was able to
fund the generous policy of free personal care for the elderly due to spending
increases on health made at Westminster, which resulted in an increase in Barnett
funding. The expectation was that this extra funding would be also used for the health
services in Scotland (McEwan and Parry, 2005). However, the ability of the Scottish
Government to continue to finance such an expensive policy is dependent on the
fiscal decisions made by the Government at Westminster.
Divergence in health policy is also limited by the „concept of equity‟ (Hazell and
Jervis, 1998: 69). Residents in the United Kingdom expect the same basic levels of
public service wherever they live, meaning that any significant difference in health
policy could lead to calls of inequality, and create a perceived better standard of care
in one country over another. There is a lack of general guiding principles for the UKwide NHS, despite the assumption that there should be equity in health service
provision across the UK (Simeon, 2003). If health policy divergence leads to a
situation where access to certain services, or the standard of services, depends on
where a citizen lives, this challenges the assumption of the right to a common set of
welfare state programmes and services that UK residents are currently entitled to.
McEwan and Parry argue that devolution has challenged the principle at the heart of
the UK welfare state, which is that „broadly equivalent services are available, as a
right of citizenship, to all citizens according to their needs‟ (2005: 59). Greer claims
that an „underlying sense of common citizenship rights and values‟ (2007: 158) exists
across the UK, and that if policies diverge significantly in Scotland, this could
eventually cause problems due to public expectations of equity in the health service
provision across the UK.
The dominance of the English health service and its policy choices, and the desire for
continuity in policy by the health policy communities across the UK can lead to
convergence. Hazell and Jervis note that professional bodies in Scotland are likely to
prefer conformity in areas such as clinical practice, education and training, which acts
as a „brake‟ (1998: 14) on divergent policy. Wincott (2006) also suggests that the
16
POLIS Journal Vol.3, Winter 2010
Rachel Haydecker
medical elites in Scotland are keen to protect the health policy legacies that they
inherited from the pre-devolution era, so health policy suggestions may be less radical
than those proposed in other policy areas. The Commission on Scottish Devolution 3
recommended that the regulation of health professionals in Scotland was brought
under the control of Westminster, leading to convergence. The Commission stated
that the regulation of all health professionals, not just those professionals specified in
the Scotland Act 1998, should be reserved at Westminster. A curious situation
affecting the regulation of healthcare professional had arisen; new professions which
had emerged since devolution, such as dental nurses and dental technicians, were
regulated by the Scottish Parliament as anything not listed in the Scotland Act as
reserved is devolved. The Calman Commission did not consider this potential for
different standards to be in the best interest of patients across the UK. The UK
Government supported the recommendation, and the regulation of all healthcare
professionals is now reserved at Westminster (Scotland Office, 2009: 16). This also
demonstrates the unintended consequences that can arise from the devolution
settlement.
Devolution has allowed Scotland to tackle a history of health problems, and
emphasise specific areas of health, such as mental health. There has been a clear
divergence in health policy due to the introduction of free personal care for the
elderly, which was explicitly rejected by the UK Government. However, the
introduction of this policy can be seen as an opportunistic move by Henry McLeish to
distinguish his leadership of the Scottish Executive, and to capitalise on the public
support for the policy. Further divergence in health policy remains constrained by the
financial framework of devolution and the dominance of the English health service. It
is important to remember that the English health service represents eighty-five per
cent of the total of the UK health service, meaning that the direction that it takes, and
policies it introduces, are less likely to be influenced by the actions of the NHS in
Scotland (Hazell and Jervis. 1998: 15). During the first years of devolution, the
Scottish Executive was in a favourable financial situation due to the priority placed on
healthcare by Westminster, and the resulting spending increases. If spending on health
is cut in the future, this will have a negative effect on the ability of the Scottish
3
The Commission is colloquially referred to as the Calman Commission.
17
POLIS Journal Vol.3, Winter 2010
Rachel Haydecker
Government to continue the provision of free personal care for the elderly, and meet
their pledge to abolish prescription charges by 2011. Convergence in health policy
may be likely in the future, due to common standards of citizenship in the UK. A
situation where citizens in one part of the UK receive significantly different standards
of healthcare, or provision of healthcare, is not desirable while a UK-wide welfare
state remains in existence.
Higher Education
Education has traditionally been identified as one of the institutions marking the
cultural and social life of Scotland as distinctive (Humes and Bryce, 2003).
Historically, Scotland has had a different relationship with the principle of education
as a whole in comparison to England, with an education system based on a
„widespread respect for learning,‟ and „an egalitarian social outlook‟ (Chitty, 2004:
100). There has been a separate provision for Scottish education in the machinery of
government since 1872, when the Scotch Education Department was created, and
administrative responsibility for education was then gradually devolved to the
Scottish Office. Although higher education policy in the latter half of the twentieth
century was determined by Westminster, Scottish universities were able to retain
distinct features and develop their own traditions, as they developed separately from
other parts of the UK. When devolution was proposed in the 1970s, Scottish
universities were „deeply suspicious‟ (Paterson, 1998: 467) of plans for a Scottish
Parliament, as they felt that detaching themselves from the UK would lead to the
decline of the high standards of universities in Scotland. However, the imposition of
university funding cuts after 1979, and a Conservative government which did not
accept the precedent for Scottish universities to develop separately, changed the view
of the majority of the academic elite (Paterson, 1998). They felt that a Scottish
Parliament would be able to protect Scotland‟s distinct history in the higher education
sector, and came out in support of devolution.
There are structural and cultural differences between the general education systems in
Scotland and England. At the secondary level, Scottish students take Standard Grade
examinations rather than GCSEs, after which the majority of students remain at
school for a fifth year and complete Higher Grade examinations. Entrance to
18
POLIS Journal Vol.3, Winter 2010
Rachel Haydecker
university in Scotland is typically based on Higher Grade results, and students
entering university with their Highers grades are on average one year younger than
students in England (Arbuthnott, 1997). These structural differences continue into the
higher education sector. Scottish university courses are based on the philosophy of
breadth of education; most students study a range of subjects in their first and second
year, then specialise in the third and fourth year. University courses in England are
more specialised from the outset. A particular structural difference between Scottish
higher education and higher education in the rest of the UK is the existence of a fouryear Honours degree in Scotland. After three years, a student may be awarded a
General or Ordinary degree, or go on to a final year of study, culminating in an
Honours degree. In England, Honours degrees are usually three years, and an
Ordinary degree is awarded if a student has not achieved sufficient marks for an
Honours degree, rather than as a degree in its own right (Arbuthnott, 1997).
Attitudes towards education in Scotland differ from those in England. There is a
higher degree of confidence in the state system of education in Scotland, and few
Scottish children attend private schools. There has been little enthusiasm for the
creation of Trust Schools and Academies in Scotland, and league tables were
scrapped in 2003 (Chitty, 2009). These differences also extend to the higher education
sector. Keating states that the English approach to higher education emphasises
„management, regulation, differentiation and competition,‟ in comparison to the
Scottish approach, which stresses „professional autonomy, consensus, egalitarianism
and policy learning‟ (2005: 430). There is a higher participation rate in Scotland than
in England, and by 2003, Scotland had half of the relevant age cohort in higher
education. This achievement was partly due to the presence of a higher education
sector within further education colleges, where students can study for Higher National
Certificates and Diplomas, as well as studying in traditional universities. Nonetheless,
the number of students undertaking some form of higher education in Scotland
remains higher than in England (Keating, 2005: 432). Universities in Scotland are
also seen as part of the local community, and an essential part of Scottish civic
tradition. However, the use of the Barnett Formula means that if cuts in higher
education funding are made at Westminster, Scotland will face the prospect of having
19
POLIS Journal Vol.3, Winter 2010
Rachel Haydecker
to make equivalent cuts in higher education, bringing the ability of the devolved
institutions to protect the Scottish higher education sector into doubt.
The headline divergence in Scottish higher education policy has been the abolition of
tuition fees. The Scottish Executive abolished up-front tuition fees in Scotland for
Scottish domiciled and EU students studying at a Scottish institution in 2000
(Keating, 2005; Rees, 2002). Every Scottish political party apart from Labour
supported this policy during the first Holyrood elections. The abolition of tuition fees
became a non-negotiable condition of the coalition deal for the Liberal Democrats
when it came to the formation of the first Labour/Liberal Democrat Executive. As the
parties‟ opinions differed, an independent body, the Cubie Committee Inquiry, was
created to consider the abolition of tuition fees. The Cubie Committee recommended
the abolition of fees for all Scottish students, and the introduction of a Graduate
Endowment. The Scottish Executive accepted these recommendations, and even
proposed the abolition of tuition fees for Scottish students at Scottish universities a
year earlier than recommended, and a reduction in the amount that graduates would
contribute to an endowment from £3,075 to £2,000 (Scottish Parliament Information
Centre, 2000: 3). The Graduate Endowment fee was used to fund bursaries for poorer
students. Students were required to pay the Graduate Endowment after they finished
their degree, either by making a lump sum payment, or taking out a loan from the
Student Loans Company to cover the payment. This loan was subject to the same
conditions as the loans made to students in England, meaning Scottish students repaid
the loan for the Graduate Endowment when they were earning over £15,000. Rees
(2002) suggests the Scottish initiative to abolish up-front tuition fees continues the
well-established tradition of relatively equitable access to university education in
Scotland.
The abolition of tuition fees marked a clear divergence in Scottish higher education
policy concerning student support, with two important features of UK Government
policy: the introduction of means-tested tuition fees and the ending of means-tested
student grants, being overturned in Scotland (Caldwell, 2003). However, the ability to
introduce a different repayment scheme for loans used to pay the Graduate
Endowment was constrained by the overarching control of Westminster over student
20
POLIS Journal Vol.3, Winter 2010
Rachel Haydecker
finance. The Scottish Executive could not establish a separate repayment system for
Scottish students who took out a loan to pay the Graduate Endowment, as it was not
feasible for the Inland Revenue to set up a recollection scheme solely for Scotland.
Instead, the collection of the Graduate Endowment loan in Scotland was combined
with the existing system for the collection of student loans provided to other UK
students by the Inland Revenue. Therefore, the amount that Scottish students had to
earn before they began to repay their Graduate Endowment loan was decided by
Westminster; the Scottish Executive and Parliament had no influence over this
decision. Any increase in the income threshold for repayments of tuition fee and
maintenance loans introduced by Westminster had a knock-on effect for Scottish
students, despite the fact that higher education is a devolved issue (Scottish
Parliament Information Centre, 2000b: 12). The interconnected nature of the system
for repaying loans for student support meant that some convergence with the rest of
the UK was forced upon Scotland.
The election of an SNP minority Government in 2007 led to further changes in the
system of support for higher education students in Scotland. The Scottish Government
introduced the Graduate Endowment Abolition (Scotland) Bill in October 2007,
abolishing the Graduate Endowment fee for students finishing their studies on 1 April
2007 and after. It was felt that the Graduate Endowment fee had failed to deliver its
original aims: to remove the barriers to widening access to, and participation in,
higher education, and to use the revenue raised from the fee to fund higher education
for future students from low-income backgrounds. The fee was seen as an extra
burden on graduates and their families, and discouraged some from entering higher
education. The abolition of the Graduate Endowment will cost the Scottish
Government around £17 million in net income, however the Scottish Government has
assured students that this would not affect funding for student support or for
universities (Mullen, 2007). This legislation demonstrates the dedication of the
Scottish Government and Scottish Parliament to the principle of having a „free higher
education system for all‟ (Mullen, 2007: 11). However, this aim may prove unrealistic
in the immediate future, if cuts are made at Westminster.
21
POLIS Journal Vol.3, Winter 2010
Rachel Haydecker
The ability of the Scottish Executive and Parliament to introduce divergent policies
from the rest of the UK is constrained by their financial capabilities. Funding for
higher education policy is provided through the Barnett block grant, and problems
will occur if England decides to fund higher education through fee increases rather
than government spending, while Scotland wishes to retain the current system, as the
block grant will be cut accordingly (Keating, 2005). Although the Scottish
Government has the ability to make higher education policy, Scottish universities also
depend on UK-wide systems of resource allocations for research funding. The
Research Assessment Exercise, which allocates base research funding to universities,
is conducted across the whole of the UK (Rees, 2002; Keating, 2005). The higher
education policy community in Scotland operates within a broader UK and
international framework, meaning that there is not as much emphasis on Scottish
distinctiveness in this sector as in others (Humes, 2003). These factors can encourage
convergence in higher education policy across the UK. It is also important that
education and training policies „join up‟ (Raffe and Byrne, 2005: 2) with reserved
policy areas such as social security and unemployment, meaning that the scope to
radically diverge in some areas of higher education policy is limited. Scotland must
continue to award qualifications that are recognised as being equivalent to those
awarded in England while it remains part of the United Kingdom. The movement of
students and staff between institutions across the UK also leads to pressure for
common, or at least compatible, qualifications (Adams and Schmueker, 2005).
Scottish students could be put at a disadvantage if qualifications gained at a Scottish
educational institution are not easily comparable with qualifications awarded across
the rest of the UK, and employers throughout the UK must be able to equate Scottish
qualifications with English qualifications. Although Higher qualifications currently
awarded in Scotland are recognised by universities in other parts of the UK, further
divergence in qualifications could cause problems.
Caldwell states that there is a danger of overstating the changes that have occurred
within Scottish higher education since devolution, claiming that „the similarities
(between Scotland and England) still outweigh the differences‟ (2003: 69). These
similarities in policy can be seen as Scotland making autonomous choices to follow
England‟s lead, rather than having policy choices forced upon them by Westminster.
22
POLIS Journal Vol.3, Winter 2010
Rachel Haydecker
Scottish universities also wish to remain part of the UK wide higher education system
while preserving important elements of Scottish distinctiveness, limiting the amount
of divergence that is likely to occur (Keating, 2005). Devolution has been criticised
for its impact on higher education in Scotland, with some claiming devolution will
force Scottish higher education institutions into an „enforced allegiance to the Scottish
nation‟ (Paterson, 1998: 459). It is implied that higher education policy makers could
feel pressure to create increasingly divergent policies to justify devolution, at the
expense of the status of Scottish universities as „outposts of the British polity‟
(Paterson, 1998: 459). However, Anderson suggests that the idea of a distinct Scottish
academic elite may be a „sentimental or romantic fantasy,‟ and that to outside
observers, the differences between Scottish and English higher education are „less
significant than the features which distinguish the British system as a whole‟ (1992:
74).
Despite the general desire for convergence between the higher education systems
across the UK, devolution has allowed a distinct Scottish approach to higher
education to continue. Devolution has affected the approach of policy-makers in
Scotland to higher education, rather than encouraging the introduction of an excess of
divergent legislation. The Scottish education department has been split into two
departments, one covering school education and the other concentrating on further
and higher education. The department covering further and higher education, the
Scottish Executive Enterprise and Lifelong Learning Department, links higher
education with economic and regional development, a move which was supported by
the business community in Scotland (Caldwell, 2003; Keating, 2005). The creation of
a separate department for further and higher education policy may not necessarily
lead to divergence, but demonstrates a different approach to policy in Scotland.
Devolution has led to divergence in higher education policy concerning student
support. This is only one area of higher education policy, and the likelihood of further
divergence in other areas is constrained by the need for compatible qualifications
across the UK, and the financial implications of devolution. The Scottish Government
has ruled out the use of tuition fees to fund higher education for the foreseeable
future, meaning the higher education sector is now reliant on funding through the
23
POLIS Journal Vol.3, Winter 2010
Rachel Haydecker
Barnett formula.
However, the Scottish Government has also made additional
financial commitments in the years since devolution, and it may have to make
difficult decisions over the funding of higher education in the future. In the current
economic situation, and with the expectation that cuts will be made to the Scottish
Government‟s budget, such a generous higher education policy may not continue to
be feasible. If the UK Government increases the use of fees to fund higher education,
Scotland‟s lack of significant revenue raising powers could mean that fees are
introduced in Scotland, or that a cutback in other services occurs to provide funding
for higher education. Devolution has provided a safeguard for the traditional aspects
of Scottish higher education, such as the four-year Honours degree. However the
nationwide context remains important for higher education policy-making in
Scotland, and the higher education policy community is keen not to distance itself
from the rest of the UK. Although higher education policy in Scotland has diverged
since devolution, there may be a need for convergence over the issue of tuition fees in
the future, if Scottish universities are to avoid a funding crisis and retain their highly
regarded status.
Local Government
The system of local government in Scotland has always differed from the relative
system in England. Before devolution there was separate legislation concerning the
structure, organisation, functions and financing of local authorities in Scotland
(Himsworth, 1998). The differences in local government are partly due to distinct
conditions in Scotland; it is a smaller country than England, with a huge difference in
population size and lifestyle between the central belt and the rural, Highland and
Islands areas. These factors create different pressures and demands on local
government in Scotland in comparison to the rest of the United Kingdom (Himsworth,
1998; Midwinter et al, 1991). As a result of the relative size of Scotland, there are
fewer politicians and officials in Scottish local government, which led to a closer,
more personal relationship between local government in Scotland and the Scottish
Office before devolution than between local government and Whitehall in England
(Kellas, 1989). It is argued that central-local relations have always been better in
Scotland than in England (McGarvey and Cairney, 2008; Jeffery, 2006), however this
„intimacy‟ should not be overstated. During the period from 1979 to 1997, there was a
24
POLIS Journal Vol.3, Winter 2010
Rachel Haydecker
„sharp divide‟ (Himsworth, 1998: 21) in Scotland between the majority of local
authorities, which were dominated by Labour, and the Conservative Government at
Westminster. The system of local government in Scotland has consisted of 32 unitary
local councils since 1995 (McGarvey and Cairney, 2008: 135). Previously, the
recommendations of the Wheatley Commission led to the Local Government
(Scotland) Act 1973, which created two, independent tiers of local government: a
regional tier and a district tier. This system was attacked by critics due to the
interdependency of the two tiers, despite the insistence that they operated separately
from each other (Midwinter et al, 1991: 124).
Devolution has significantly altered the way that local government works in Scotland.
There has been an opportunity for central and local government to work in greater
proximity, and local authorities provided policy-making expertise to the Scottish
Executive in the early years of devolution through the work of the Convention of
Scottish Local Authorities (COSLA). Devolution has also changed the political
landscape at a local level in Scotland, due to the introduction of a proportional voting
system. This can be seen as encouraging the more consensual, inclusive style of
politics that was promised in the run-up to devolution. Devolution has impacted on
the relationship between the various tiers of government within Scotland, and also
with Westminster. Carmichael stated that before devolution, Scottish local
government differed from England more „in the way things were done, rather than in
actions that were actually taken‟ (1992: 30). To a certain extent, this difference in
policy implementation has continued since devolution, rather than clear policy
divergence occurring.
The creation of the Scottish Parliament has changed Scottish central-local relations.
Bulpitt argued that the United Kingdom worked as a „dual polity‟ (1983: 160) before
devolution, a structure of territorial politics where the „centre‟ and periphery
interacted relatively infrequently, giving Scottish local authorities the ability to
concentrate on „local‟ issues concerning Scotland. He stated that the government at
Westminster accepted that distinct policy patterns should be allowed in Scotland,
however in practice this gave more autonomy to the Scottish Office, rather than local
authorities. Before devolution, central-local relations were between the Convention of
25
POLIS Journal Vol.3, Winter 2010
Rachel Haydecker
Scottish Local Authorities (COSLA) and the Scottish Office, creating a bi-partite
structure. Since devolution, these relations have been replaced by a structure
involving local government interests, the Scottish Government and the Scottish
Parliament, leading to a tri-partite structure (McGarvey, 2009). Since 2007,
McGarvey (2009) states that the SNP minority Government has chosen to work more
closely with local government than with the Scottish Parliament, due to the lack of an
SNP majority in Parliament. This has marginalised Parliament‟s role in the tri-partite
structure. McGarvey and Cairney (2008) go as far as stating that there is an
interdependent relationship between the Scottish Government and local authorities. In
fact, the constitutional position of local authorities in post devolution Scotland
remains the same as it was previously, and is similar to that of local government in
England (McGarvey, 2009). Local government continues to be subordinate to the
„centre,‟ which has shifted from Westminster to the Scottish Parliament. The Scottish
Parliament has the power to re-draw council boundaries, remove functions or even
abolish local authorities. McConnell (2004) argues that the pattern of central-local
relations in Scotland has not changed significantly since devolution, as although the
„centre‟ has moved from Whitehall to Holyrood, it is still responsible for the financial,
legal and policy frameworks within which local authorities operate. Devolution has
also changed relations between Scottish local government and the UK Government.
Westminster has become less relevant to the workings of Scottish local government
on a day to day basis, as most of the responsibilities of local councils are devolved to
the Scottish Parliament and Executive (Bennett et al, 2002). However, Westminster is
still influential in financial terms, as the resources to finance developments and
actions at a local level are allocated through the Barnett Formula.
There were initial concerns that the Scottish Parliament could encroach on the work
of local government, as the Parliament‟s main areas of responsibility, such as health,
education and training and housing, all have important implications for the work of
local government (Bennett et al, 2002). However, it was emphasised in the devolution
settlement that an important feature of devolution in Scotland would be subsidiarity,
and the Scottish Parliament and Executive were not expected „to accumulate a range
of new functions at the centre which would be more appropriately and efficiently
delivered by other bodies within Scotland‟ (Scottish Office, 1997). It is explicitly
26
POLIS Journal Vol.3, Winter 2010
Rachel Haydecker
stated in the Scotland Act that the devolved administrations will respect the role of
local government in practice. Devolution has changed the context within which local
government in Scotland operates. Since devolution, close relations have been fostered
between Scottish local government and the Scottish Parliament and Executive. Local
authorities through COSLA have been actively engaged in policy formation,
particularly in the first few years of devolution, as the Executive was relatively
inexperienced in the policy-making field. The proximity of the Scottish Parliament
and Government to Scottish local government is seen as an improvement on the
previous relationship between the Scottish Office and local government. The work of
local government was central to the delivery of many of the first Executive‟s
priorities, such as education and roads, making a good working relationship between
the Executive and local authorities imperative (McGarvey, 2002). As many MSPs are
former councillors, useful links have been created between politicians at a local and
central level, which has fostered a sense of „shared ownership of Scottish policy‟
(Jeffery, 2006: 61). Jeffery states that devolution „offered the opportunity (for local
government) to reconnect with new central governments after the alienation of the
Conservative era‟ (2006: 63). However, this „opportunity to reconnect‟ may only have
been temporary, due to Labour dominance at both levels of government in Scotland.
Since devolution, the Scottish Executive has focussed on central-local relations in
Scotland as a topic in its own right, instead of seeing it as a by-product of policy
changes in other areas. The proximity of the governing institutions to Scottish local
authorities has increased the capacity for the Executive to adopt a „more co-ordinated,
integrated approach‟ (McGarvey, 2002: 43). The Scottish Executive has adopted
oversight mechanisms which are less regulatory to deal with local authorities in
Scotland, in comparison with the mechanisms used by Whitehall in relations with
English local authorities. Scottish local authorities appear to be directed with more of
a „light touch‟ (McGarvey, 2002: 43) than local authorities in England, and are even
described as „docile‟ (McGarvey, 2002: 44). In certain areas, this docility can be
attributed to Labour domination at a local level, and the resulting close relationship
with the Labour dominated Scottish Executive. There is also less need for local
government to be controlled at a central level, due to the existing good relations
27
POLIS Journal Vol.3, Winter 2010
Rachel Haydecker
between the two levels of government, and the interlinked responsibilities over many
areas of policy.
The headline divergence in local government policy in Scotland was the Local
Governance (Scotland) Act 2004, which introduced a proportional voting system in
local elections: Single Transferable Vote (STV). Local government elections in
England continue to use the first past the post system, which is used across the UK in
Westminster elections. The use of STV has dramatically changed the political
landscape at a local level in Scotland. The introduction of STV in local elections can
be seen as a result of Liberal Democrat pressure on the first two Scottish Executives,
as the use of proportional representation in elections is a long-standing demand of the
party. However, its introduction should not solely be attributed to the Liberal
Democrats, as it was also recommended by the Commission on Local Government
and the Scottish Parliament (McIntosh Commission) and the Renewing Local
Democracy Working Group, appointed by Scottish Ministers to build on the
recommendations made by the McIntosh Commission.
The first local elections in Scotland held using STV took place in 2007. The
introduction of a proportional system of voting in local elections was extremely
significant because it ended Labour‟s dominance of Scottish local government, and
considerably altered the party-political make up of Scottish councils. The impact of a
proportional system of voting can be seen by comparing the 2003 local election
results, the last elections held using the first past the post system, and the 2007 local
election results, the first held using STV. In 2003, 509 Scottish Labour councillors
were elected, making Labour the largest party in Scottish local government, and
giving Labour control of thirteen out of the thirty-two Scottish councils. However,
only 348 Labour councillors were elected in the 2007 election, leaving Labour in
complete control of only three councils, and in minority control of two (Herbert,
2007: 8; COSLA, 2010), demonstrating that Labour has been negatively affected by
proportional representation at a local level. The introduction of STV has benefitted
the SNP at a local level. In 2003, only 181 SNP councillors were elected, but the SNP
emerged as the largest party in Scottish local government after the 2007 elections,
with 363 councillors (Herbert, 2007: 8). Despite having the largest number of
28
POLIS Journal Vol.3, Winter 2010
Rachel Haydecker
councillors, the SNP do not have overall control of any council in Scotland; they are
in minority control of three councils, and control one council with Independent
support (COSLA, 2010). The introduction of proportional representation has altered
the way that local government operates on a council-by-council basis, as there are
now 19 councils where multi-party coalitions form a governing administration
(Herbert, 2007: 9). The greater likelihood of coalitions at a local level means there
will have to be greater consensus between parties in order for council business to
continue effectively, and concessions may have to be made by all of the parties. The
introduction of STV and the resulting likelihood of coalitions have also changed the
dynamic between central and local government, as the likelihood of a single party
dominating both levels of government in Scotland, as Labour did before 2007, is
reduced.
Legislation regarding the timing of local elections has also diverged in Scotland. The
Scottish Local Government (Elections) Act 2002 states that local elections will be
held at the same time as those for the Scottish Parliament, however the Westminster
Act gives the Secretary of State the power to alter the frequency of local elections,
and the years in which they are held (Keating et al, 2003: 122). Scottish local
elections now also have fixed terms, which eliminates the opportunity for the timing
of local elections to be manipulated by the party of government in Scotland. However,
this move has been criticised as it has led to voter confusion due to two elections with
different electoral systems being held on the same day, leading to thousands of spoilt
ballot papers being discarded in 2007 (Tempest, 2007).
The ability of the current Scottish Government to introduce divergent policies
concerning local government has been restricted by its minority status. The SNP‟s
2007 manifesto pledged to abolish Council Tax and replace it with a Local Income
Tax, which was described as a „fairer system based on the ability to pay‟ (SNP, 2007).
However, due to the lack of an SNP majority in the Scottish Parliament, this proposal
faced almost certain parliamentary defeat, and the policy had to be dropped for the
immediate future. The SNP minority Government has to rely on other parties in the
Scottish Parliament to pass its legislation, and is therefore constrained by the need to
gain other parties‟ support. The opposition of Labour ministers at Westminster and in
29
POLIS Journal Vol.3, Winter 2010
Rachel Haydecker
the Treasury to a Local Income Tax may well have encouraged the Scottish Labour
Party‟s opposition to the policy (Carrell, 2009).
In the future, there is the possibility of convergence on the use of proportional
electoral systems. The Labour Party‟s manifesto for the 2010 election promises a
referendum on the use of Alternative Vote in Westminster elections (The Labour
Party, 2010), and the Liberal Democrats have stated they would introduce STV in
Westminster elections without a referendum (BBC News, 2010). If either of these
parties forms, or has significant influence in, the next UK Government, the
introduction of a proportional electoral system would mean a convergence of policy,
with Westminster elections coming into line with Scottish local and Parliamentary
elections. Certain legislation introduced at Westminster covering local government in
England has been adopted and adapted by the devolved institutions in Scotland,
leading to convergence. Scotland chose to follow England‟s lead and replace
Compulsory Competitive Tendering (CCT) with a system of Best Value. However,
Scotland has adopted a „more collaborative and less controlling approach‟ to Best
Value (Laffin, 2007: 82), and the consequences for local authorities for failing to meet
targets are less punitive than in England (McGarvey and Cairney, 2008: 141),
demonstrating the different approach taken in Scotland to a policy in effect across
England and Scotland.
After devolution, Scottish local government has „unprecedented access‟ (Bennett et
al, 2002: 43) to central government, as there is greater proximity between the local
authorities and the Scottish Parliament and Government. This allows local
government to have an increased input into policy-making, particularly due to the
Scottish Government‟s extensive use of advice given by COSLA. Links between
central and local government were important in the early years of devolution, and
these links have become more significant since the election of the SNP minority
Government, as an emphasis has been placed on working in partnership with the local
tier of government in the absence of a parliamentary majority (McGarvey, 2009).
Devolution has allowed for important policy developments and divergences in policy
affecting local government, and the use of proportional representation in local
elections is of particular consequence as it ended Labour‟s dominance of Scottish
30
POLIS Journal Vol.3, Winter 2010
Rachel Haydecker
local government. However, the devolved institutions have been inclined to continue
the practice of adapting Westminster policy on local government to suit Scottish
circumstances, rather than introducing clearly divergent policy.
Conclusion
Public policy after devolution has diverged significantly in the three policy areas
examined in this dissertation. Devolution has provided the political impetus for
divergent policy, as there is a desire to demonstrate that devolution makes a
difference, and the political autonomy for divergent policy, as Scottish politicians can
make the decision to follow the policy lead of Westminster or forge a separate,
Scottish policy style. Devolution has fostered a more consensual policy-making style,
encouraging the introduction of divergent policies. The election of an SNP minority
Government in 2007 has signalled a change in the dynamics of devolution, as a party
with different policy ideas and a clear interest in emphasising and developing Scottish
distinctiveness formed a minority government, increasing the likelihood of a
divergent policy trajectory. The tradition of Scottish differences in health, higher
education and local government, and the willingness of the first two Scottish
Executives to diverge from Westminster‟s policy position despite the dominance of
the Labour party in both executives, demonstrates a commitment by the devolved
institutions to introduce policies that are the most suited to Scottish needs, regardless
of policy decisions made elsewhere in the UK.
The scope for divergence during the early years of devolution was significantly
augmented by the sustained increases in the level of expenditure available to the
devolved administrations through the Barnett block grant, avoiding „tough policy
trade-offs‟ (Schmueker and Adams, 2005: 32) between priorities and areas where
expenditure was necessary. Generous increases in Scotland‟s share of the Barnett
Formula meant that no intergovernmental disputes over financial resources occurred,
which are a common source of strain in other multi-level governmental systems
(Trench, 2007). A crucial factor enabling policy divergence during the period from
2000 to 2008 was the fact that public spending at Westminster was rising sharply in
real, inflated adjusted terms. This allowed the Scottish Executive to introduce flagship
policies, and still have the ability to fund other programmes (Schmueker and Adams,
31
POLIS Journal Vol.3, Winter 2010
Rachel Haydecker
2005). The first two devolved Scottish administrations could also afford to fund
policies such as free personal care for the elderly and the abolition of tuition fees
because the Labour Government‟s spending priorities during this time corresponded
with the Scottish Executive‟s priorities: health and education (McEwen and Parry,
2005). English spending increases in these areas led to corresponding increases in
Scottish spending. However, the current economic downturn may create tensions
between Westminster and the devolved administrations, and lead to disputes between
the governments (House of Commons Justice Committee, 2008). The Chancellor,
Alastair Darling, confirmed that his 2010 Budget would have significant
consequences for the Scottish Government‟s spending plans, due to the consequences
of cuts made at Westminster. The exact amount by which the Scottish Government‟s
budget will decrease has not been specified; it has been suggested that the Scottish
block grant of £35 billion will face a £3 billion real terms cut by 2013-14 (Maddox,
2010). The repercussions of the financial downturn could potentially impact on
Scotland‟s allocations through the Barnett Formula, and have a negative effect on the
Scottish Executive‟s ability to provide divergent policies as a result.
The continued use of the Barnett formula has been questioned in recent years. The
Commission on Scottish Devolution suggested that the Scottish Parliament should be
able to determine a „Scottish rate‟ of income tax, and the tax revenue would then be
substituted for some of the block grant given to Scotland from Westminster. In
practice, this means the Scottish Parliament would levy its own „Scottish rate‟ of
income tax to recoup the money from the decrease in the block grant. This would
make the Scottish Parliament accountable to the Scottish electorate for the raising of a
portion of its revenue, in the same way that it is accountable for how money is spent
(Commission on Scottish Devolution, 2009). The UK Government agreed with the
proposals for a new Scottish rate of income tax, but state that a move to the full tax
model proposed by the Calman Commission will only happen „as soon as the
economic and fiscal circumstances permit‟ (The Scotland Office, 2009: 11). This
could lead to the implementation of the proposals being postponed in a similar
manner to Britain‟s membership of the Euro. The Commission‟s proposals require
new legislation to be passed at Westminster; the UK Government envisages
introducing the necessary legislation „as soon as possible during the next Parliament‟
32
POLIS Journal Vol.3, Winter 2010
Rachel Haydecker
(The Scotland Office, 2009: 12). The introduction of these changes partly relies on the
Labour party wielding some element of power after the General Election, although the
Liberal Democrats also support the implementation of the Calman Commission‟s
recommendations (Liberal Democrats, 2010: 92). This demonstrates how the
devolved administrations in Scotland are still restrained by the wishes and actions of
the Government at Westminster.
Although a lack of formal intergovernmental relations between Holyrood and
Westminster has enabled divergence, it is becoming apparent that after ten years of
devolution in Scotland, the existing intergovernmental mechanisms may be too
informal. There is a heavy reliance on goodwill between governments, which has only
been tested after the election of a minority SNP Government in 2007. Jeffery and
Wincott believe that not enough emphasis was placed on creating coping mechanisms
for intergovernmental disputes and encouraging formal discussions over policy during
„the relatively easy early years of devolution‟ (2006: 13), and there has been minimal
preparation for any future difficulties. The overlap between important devolved and
reserved policy areas, such as welfare, and the impact of spending decisions made at
Westminster on the Scottish budget, requires a good working relationship between the
UK and devolved Governments. Some of these concerns were overlooked or
underdeveloped when devolution was introduced, and Trench (2007) raises the issue
of the ability of the devolved institutions to continue to operate successfully when
they are faced with a serious political challenge. Political pressure resulting from the
election of a party without a strong interest in making devolution work at Westminster
could negatively affect the successful operation of the devolved institutions, and make
them more vulnerable to the actions of the UK Government.
It is argued that focussing solely on flagship policies could exaggerate the levels of
divergence in post-devolution Scotland (McGarvey and Cairney, 2008). The success
of devolution is judged in part by policy outcomes, which encouraged divergence in
the early years of devolution, as an obvious contrast could be made between Scotland
and England. Academics have questioned whether the point of devolution is to enable
the devolved institutions to do things differently, or simply to enable them to make
their own choices (Trench and Jarman, 2007). This dissertation has argued that
33
POLIS Journal Vol.3, Winter 2010
Rachel Haydecker
devolution has given Scotland the ability to choose whether or not to implement
policy from Westminster, which has led to divergence on occasion, but has also
continued the practice of adapting Westminster legislation to Scottish circumstances
in some areas. This element of choice means that Scotland can follow the lead of
Westminster on policy, as frequently happened under Jack McConnell as First
Minister, or choose a different policy path, such as abolishing up-front tuition fees.
However, the policy direction followed during the second session of the Scottish
Parliament appeared to follow the direction set by Westminster, rather than
continuing to diverge further. This suggests that the first major pieces of legislation
introduced at Holyrood were used to justify devolution, as it provided proof to
Scottish voters that the devolved administrations could make a difference to their
lives. Once this had been demonstrated, the Scottish Executive may have felt that it
was less necessary to introduce radically divergent policy, as the worth of devolution
had been proven.
Despite the presence of factors encouraging divergence, and the introduction of
clearly different policy in Scotland, there is a strong likelihood that health and other
welfare-related policy in Scotland will converge with policy from Westminster in the
long term. This is due to the „concept of equity‟ (Hazell and Jervis, 1998: 69), and the
expectation of common welfare standards and policies across the whole of the UK. If
health policy continues to diverge in Scotland, there could be discontent voiced by
residents in other parts of the UK, putting pressure on Westminster to encourage a
convergence of policy. The ability for divergence to continue in other policy areas is
constrained by the „fragile‟ (Greer, 2006: 98) nature of the devolution settlement. The
current ability of the devolved institutions to provide divergent policies relies heavily
on financial assistance from Westminster. If the Scottish budget was significantly
reduced due to cuts made at a UK level, the capacity for the devolved institutions to
offer free personal care for the elderly, prescriptions at a significantly reduced price
and higher education without tuition fees would be severely impaired, and
convergence could occur. England remains the dominant part of the United Kingdom,
with the majority of the population, and the largest GDP of the nations in the Union,
meaning that policies for England will always have an impact on Scotland. Holyrood
34
POLIS Journal Vol.3, Winter 2010
Rachel Haydecker
is guided by policy and actions taken at Westminster much more than Westminster is
guided by Holyrood.
The powers and autonomy granted to Scotland in the devolution settlement have been
seized and used to full advantage, with the exception of tax raising abilities, as
demonstrated by the introduction of clearly divergent policies. Yet the ability of
Scotland to introduce divergent legislation is not guaranteed. The ad hoc nature of the
devolution settlement, and the lack of protection for Holyrood from the financial and
policy decisions made at Westminster, means that divergence may only be possible
under a tolerant Westminster Government. The combination of a reduction in the
Scottish budget due to cuts made at Westminster, and serious intergovernmental
disputes, would have the potential to cause convergence in public policy in Scotland
after devolution.
35
POLIS Journal Vol.3, Winter 2010
Rachel Haydecker
Bibliography
ADAMS, J. and ROBINSON, P. (eds). 2002. Devolution in Practice: Public Policy
Differences within the UK. London: IPPR.
ADAMS, J. and SCHMUEKER, K. 2005. Introduction and Overview. In ADAMS, J.
and SCHMUEKER, K. (eds) 2005. Devolution in Practice 2006: Public policy
differences within the UK. Newcastle: IPPR.
ANDERSON, R. 1992. The Scottish University Tradition: Past and Future. In
CARTER, J. and WITHRINGTON, D. (eds). Scottish Universities. Edinburgh: John
Donald Publishers.
ARBUTHNOTT, J. 1997. The distinctiveness of Scottish higher education. In
CRAWFORD, R. (ed). 1997. A Future for Scottish Higher Education. Glasgow:
Committee of Scottish Higher Education Principals in association with BP.
AUGHEY, A. 2001. Nationalism, devolution and the challenge to the United
Kingdom state. London : Pluto Press
BANTING, K. 2006. Social citizenship and federalism: Is a federal welfare state a
contradiction in terms. In GREER, S. (ed). 2006. Territory, democracy and justice:
regionalism and federalism in western democracies. Houndmills: Palgrave
Macmillan.
BBC NEWS. 2007. Staged end to prescription charge [online]. [Accessed 6 April
2010]. Available from: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/scotland/7127997.stm
BBC NEWS. 2009. Scottish prescription charges cut [online]. [Accessed 22 March
2010]. Available from: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/scotland/7974787.stm
BBC NEWS. 2010. At-a-glance: Lib Dem general election 2010 manifesto [online].
[Accessed 14 April 2010]. Available from:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/election_2010/8619630.stm
36
POLIS Journal Vol.3, Winter 2010
Rachel Haydecker
BENNETT, M., FAIRLEY, J., and MCATEER, M. 2002. Devolution in Scotland:
The impact on local government. York: Joseph Rowntree Foundation [online].
[Accessed 3 January 2010]. Available from:
http://www.jrf.org.uk/publications/impact-devolution-local-government-scotland
BOGDANOR, V. 1999. Devolution in the United Kingdom. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
BRADBURY, J. and MITCHELL, J. 2002. Devolution and territorial politics:
stability, uncertainty and crisis. Parliamentary Affairs. 55(2), pp. 299-316.
BROWN, A. 1997. Scotland: Paving the way for Devolution? Parliamentary Affairs.
50(4), pp. 658-671.
BROWN, A. MCCRONE, D. and PATERSON, L. 1998. Politics and Society in
Scotland. Houndmills: Macmillan.
BULPITT, J. 1983. Territory and Power in the United Kingdom. Manchester:
Manchester University Press.
BURNSIDE, R. 2003. Funding Higher Education in Scotland and England. Scottish
Parliament Information Centre briefing 03/67 [online]. [Accessed 21 March 2010].
Available from: http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/business/research/briefings03/sb03-67.pdf
CALDWELL, D. 2003. Scottish Higher Education: Character and Provision. In
BRYCE, T. and HUMES, W (eds). 2003. Scottish Education. Second Edition: PostDevolution. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
CAIRNEY, P. 2007. A „Multiple Lenses‟ Approach to Policy Change: The Case of
Tobacco Policy in the UK. British Politics. 2(1), pp. 45-68.
37
POLIS Journal Vol.3, Winter 2010
Rachel Haydecker
CAIRNEY, P. 2007b. Using Devolution to Set the Agenda? Venue Shift and the
Smoking Ban in Scotland. British Journal of Politics and International Relations.
9(1), pp. 73-89.
CAIRNEY, P. 2008. Has Devolution Changed the „British Policy Style? British
Politics. 3(3), pp. 350-372.
CAIRNEY, P., CURTICE, J., SCOTT, D., TRENCH, A. (eds). 2009. Scotland
Devolution Monitoring Report. September 2009 [online]. [Accessed 11 November
2009]. Available from: http://www.ucl.ac.uk/constitutionunit/files/research/devolution/dmr/Scotland_Sept_2009.pdf
CARMICHAEL, P. 1992. Is Scotland Different? Local Government Policy under Mrs
Thatcher. Local Government Policy Making. 18(5), pp. 25-37.
CARRELL, S. 2009. Alex Salmond drops flat-rate local income tax plan. The
Guardian [online]. 11 February [Accessed 5 April 2010]. Available from:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2009/feb/11/alex-salmond-snp-local-income-tax
CHITTY, C. 2004. Education Policy in Britain. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan.
CHITTY, C. 2009. Education Policy in Britain. Second Edition. Houndmills:
Palgrave Macmillan.
CLARK, A. and BENNIE, L. 2008. Electoral Reform and Party Adaptation: The
introduction of STV in Scotland. The Political Quarterly. 79(2), pp. 241-251.
COURT, S. 2005. Government getting closer: higher education and devolution in the
United Kingdom. Higher Education Quarterly. 58(2/3), pp. 151-175.
COMMISSION ON SCOTTISH DEVOLUTION. 2009. Serving Scotland Better:
Scotland and the United Kingdom in the 21st Century. An Executive Summary of the
Final Report – June 2009 [online]. [Accessed 22 March 2010]. Available from:
38
POLIS Journal Vol.3, Winter 2010
Rachel Haydecker
http://www.commissiononscottishdevolution.org.uk/uploads/2009-06-12-csda5_final-summary_ibook.pdf
THE CONSTITUTION UNIT. 2000. Nations and Regions: the Dynamics of
Devolution. Quarterly Monitoring Programme. Scotland. November 2000 [online].
[Accessed 23 March 2010]. Available from: http://www.ucl.ac.uk/constitutionunit/files/research/devolution/dmr/scotnov00.pdf
THE CONSTITUTION UNIT. 2001. Nations and Regions: The Dynamics of
Devolution. Quarterly Monitoring Programme. Scotland. November 2001 [online].
[Accessed 23 November 2009]. Available from: http://www.ucl.ac.uk/constitutionunit/files/research/devolution/dmr/scotnov01.pdf
COSLA. 2010. Council Political Control [online]. [Accessed 24 April 2010].
Available from:
http://www.cosla.gov.uk/political_control.asp?leftId=10001C39110766746&rightId=10001C391-11002366&hybrid=false
COWLEY, P. 2000. Legislatures and Assemblies. In DUNLEAVY, P., GAMBLE,
A., HOLLIDAY, I. and PEELE, G. 2000. (eds). Developments in British Politics 6.
Houndmills: Macmillan.
CURTICE, J. 2005. Brought together or driven apart? In MILLER, W. 2005. (ed).
Anglo-Scottish Relations from 1900 to Devolution and Beyond. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
CURTICE, J. and SEYD, B. 2009. Has devolution worked? Manchester: Manchester
University Press.
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH. 2000. The NHS Plan. The Government’s response to
the Royal Commission on Long Term Care [online]. [Accessed 8 April 2010].
Available from:
39
POLIS Journal Vol.3, Winter 2010
Rachel Haydecker
http://www.dh.gov.uk/prod_consum_dh/groups/dh_digitalassets/@dh/@en/document
s/digitalasset/dh_4082154.pdf
DINWOODIE, R. 2009. SNP ditches plans for local income tax in Scotland. The
Herald [online]. 11 February [Accessed 5 April 2010]. Available from:
http://www.heraldscotland.com/snp-ditches-plans-for-local-income-tax-in-scotland1.902448
DEVOLUTION AND CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE PROGRAMME. 2006.
Final report of the Devolution and Constitutional Change Programme [online].
[Accessed 26 February 2010]. Available from:
www.devolution.ac.uk/final_report.htm
GREER, S. 2003. Policy Divergence. Will it change something in Greenock? In
HAZELL, R. 2003. (ed). The State of the Nations 2003. The Third Year of Devolution
in the UK. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
GREER, S. 2004. Territorial Politics and Health Policy. UK health policy in
comparative perspective. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
GREER, S. 2007. The fragile divergence machine: citizenship, policy divergence and
devolution in health policy. In TRENCH, A. (ed). 2007. Devolution and Power in the
UK. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
GREER, S. and JARMAN, H. 2007. Policy Styles and Devolution. In Trench, A.
2008. The State of The Nations. Exeter: Imprint Academic.
GREER, S. 2009. Conclusion. In GREER, S. (ed). 2009. Devolution and Social
Citizenship in the UK. Bristol: Policy.
GREER, S. and ROWLAND, D. 2007. Devolving Policy, Diverging Values? The
Values of the United Kingdom’s National Health Services [online]. [Accessed 26
February 2010]. Available from:
40
POLIS Journal Vol.3, Winter 2010
Rachel Haydecker
http://www.nuffieldtrust.org.uk/members/download.aspx?f=/ecomm/files/Devolving_
Policy_Diverging_Values.pdf
HASSAN, G and WARHURST, C. 2000. The New Scottish Politics – The first year
of the Scottish Parliament and beyond. Norwich: Stationary Office.
HAZELL, R. (ed). 2003. The State of the Nations 2003. The Third Year of Devolution
in the UK. London: The Constitution Unit.
HAZELL, R. and JERVIS, P. (eds). 1998. Devolution and Health. London: The
Nuffield Trust; The Constitution Unit.
HEALD, D. and MCLEOD, A. 2005. Scotland‟s Fiscal Relationships with England
and the United Kingdom. In MILLER, W. 2005. (ed). Anglo-Scottish Relations from
1900 to Devolution and Beyond. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
HERBERT, S, 2002. Proportional Representation (Local Government Elections)
(Scotland) Bill. Scottish Parliament Information Centre briefing 02/124 [online].
[Accessed 20 March 2010]. Available from:
http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/business/research/pdf_res_brief/sb02-124.pdf
HERBERT, S. 2007. Local Government – Subject Profile. Scottish Parliament
Information Centre briefing 07/31 [online]. [Accessed 20 March 2010]. Available
from: http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/business/research/briefings-07/SB07-31.pdf
HIMSWORTH, C. 1998. New devolution: New dangers for local government?
Scottish Affairs. 24, pp. 19-30.
HOLLIDAY, I. 2000. Executives and Administrations. In DUNLEAVY, P.,
GAMBLE, A., HOLLIDAY, I. and PEELE, G. 2000. (eds). Developments in British
Politics 6. Houndmills: Macmillan.
41
POLIS Journal Vol.3, Winter 2010
Rachel Haydecker
HOUSE OF COMMONS JUSTICE COMMITTEE. 2008. Devolution: A decade on.
Fifth Report of Session 2008-09 [online]. [Accessed 29 March 2010]. Available from:
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmjust/529/52902.htm
HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBRARY. 2005. The Sewel Convention. Standard Note:
SN/PC/2084 [online]. [Accessed 3 May 2010]. Available from:
http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/briefings/snpc-02084.pdf
HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBRARY. 2007. The Mental Health Bill (HL). Research
Paper 07/33 [online]. [Accessed 8 April 2010]. Available from:
http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/rp2007/RP07-033.pdf
HOUSE OF LORDS SELECT COMMITTEE ON RELATIONS BETWEEN
CENTRAL AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT. 1996. Rebuilding Trust. HL Paper 97.
London: The Stationary Office.
HOWIESON, C., RAFFE, D., SPOURS, K. and YOUNG, M. 1997. Unifying
Academic and Vocational Learning: the state of the debate in England and Scotland.
Journal of Education and Work. 10(1), pp. 55-35.
HUMES, W. 2003. Policy Making in Scottish Education. In BRYCE, T. and
HUMES, W. 2003. Scottish Education. Second Edition: Post-Devolution. Edinburgh:
Edinburgh University Press.
HUMES, W. and BRYCE, T. 2003. The distinctiveness of Scottish Education. In
BRYCE, T. and HUMES, W. 2003. Scottish Education. Second Edition: PostDevolution. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
HUTCHISON, I. 1992. The Scottish Office and the Scottish Universities, c. 1930 - c.
1960. In CARTER, J. and WITHRINGTON, D. (eds). Scottish Universities.
Edinburgh: John Donald Publishers.
42
POLIS Journal Vol.3, Winter 2010
Rachel Haydecker
JEFFERY, C. 2005. Devolution and divergence: Public attitudes and institutional
logics. In ADAMS, J. and SCHMUEKER, K. (eds) 2005. Devolution in Practice
2006: Public policy differences within the UK. Newcastle: IPPR.
JEFFERY, C. 2005b. Devolution, social citizenship and territorial culture: Equity and
diversity in the Anglo-Scottish Relationship. In MILLER, W. (ed). 2005. AngloScottish Relations from 1900 to Devolution and Beyond. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
JEFFERY, C. 2006. Devolution and Local Government. Publius. The Journal of
Federalism. 36(1), pp. 57-73.
JEFFERY, C. 2006b. Devolution and the Lop-sided State. In DUNLEAVY et al.
2006. Developments in British Politics 8. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan.
JEFFERY, C. and WINCOTT, D. 2006. Devolution in the United Kingdom:
Statehood and Citizenship in Transition. Publius. 36 (1), pp. 3-18.
JEFFERY, C. 2009. Devolution, public attitudes and social citizenship. In GREER, S.
(ed). 2009. Devolution and Social Citizenship in the UK. Bristol: Policy.
JOHNSTON, J. 2003. Current Priorities. In BYRCE, T. and HUMES, W. 2003. (eds).
Scottish Education. Second Edition: Post-Devolution. Edinburgh: Edinburgh
University Press.
KEATING, M., STEVENSON, L., CAIRNEY, P. and TAYLOR, K. 2003. Does
Devolution Make a Difference? Legislative Output and Policy Divergence in
Scotland. The Journal of Legislative Studies. 9(3), pp. 110-139.
KEATING, M. 2005. Higher Education in Scotland and England after Devolution.
Regional and Federal Studies. 15(4), pp. 423-435.
43
POLIS Journal Vol.3, Winter 2010
Rachel Haydecker
KEATING, M. 2005b. Policy convergence and divergence in Scotland under
devolution. Regional studies. 39(4), pp. 453-463.
KEATING, M., CAIRNEY, P. and HEPBURN, E. 2009. Territorial policy
communities and devolution in the UK. Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and
Society. 2(1), pp. 51-66.
KEATING, M. 2009. Social citizenship, devolution and policy divergence. In
GREER, S. (ed). 2009. Devolution and Social Citizenship in the UK. Bristol: Policy.
KEATING, M. and CAIRNEY, P. 2009. The New Scottish Statute Book: The
Scottish Parliament‟s Legislative Record since 1999. In JEFFERY, C. and
MITCHELL, J. (eds). 2009. The Scottish Parliament 1999-2009. Edinburgh: Luath
Press Ltd.
KELLAS, J. 1989. The Scottish political system. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
KELLAS, J. 2005. After the Declaration of Perth: All Change! In MILLER, W. (ed).
2005. Anglo-Scottish Relations from 1900 to Devolution and Beyond. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
LAFFIN, M. 2007. Comparative British Central-Local Relations: Regional
Centralism, Governance and Intergovernmental Relations. Public Policy and
Administration. 22(1), pp. 74-91.
THE LABOUR PARTY. 2010. The Labour Party Manifesto 2010: A future fair for
all [online]. [Accessed 14 April 2010]. Available from:
http://www.labour.org.uk/manifesto/
LIBERAL DEMOCRATS. 2010. Liberal Democrat Manifesto 2010 [online].
[Accessed 18 April 2010]. Available from:
http://network.libdems.org.uk/manifesto2010/libdem_2010_yoursay.pdf
44
POLIS Journal Vol.3, Winter 2010
Rachel Haydecker
MACLEOD, A. 2010. We will abolish Barnett formula, say Lib Dems. The Times
[online]. 15 April 2010 [accessed 15 April 2010]. Available from:
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/scotland/article7097844.ece
MADDOX, D. 2010. Scottish Government faces cuts of £3 billion. The Scotsman
[online]. 26 March 2010 [accessed 27 March 2010]. Available from:
http://news.scotsman.com/politics/Scottish-Government-faces-cuts-of.6182776.jp
MCATEER, M. and BENNETT, M. 2005. Devolution and Local Government:
Evidence from Scotland. Local Government Studies. 31(3), pp. 285-306.
MCCONNELL, A. 2004. Has devolution transformed Scottish local government?
[online]. [Accessed 10 January 2010]. Available from:
http://www.adelaide.edu.au/apsa/docs_papers/Others/McConnell_final.pdf.
MCEWAN, N. and PARRY, R. 2005. Devolution and the preservation of the UK
welfare state. In MCEWAN, N. and MORENO, L. (eds). 2005. The territorial politics
of welfare. London: Routledge.
MCGARVEY, N. 2002. Intergovernmental Relations in Scotland post-devolution.
Local Government Studies. 28(3), pp. 29-48.
MCGARVEY, N. 2009. Centre and Locality in Scottish Politics: From Bi- to Tripartite Relations. In JEFFERY, C. and MITCHELL, J. (eds). 2009. The Scottish
Parliament 1999-2009. Edinburgh: Luath Press Ltd.
MCGARVEY, N. and CAIRNEY, P. 2008. Scottish politics: an introduction.
Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
MCLEAN, I. 2005. Goschen, Barnett, and Beyond. In MILLER, W. (ed). 2005.
Anglo-Scottish Relations from 1900 to Devolution and Beyond. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
45
POLIS Journal Vol.3, Winter 2010
Rachel Haydecker
MCLEAN, I., LODGE, G. and SCHMUECKER, K. 2009. Social citizenship and
intergovernmental finance. In GREER, S. (ed). 2009. Devolution and Social
Citizenship in the UK. Bristol: Policy.
MCPHERSON, A. and RAAB, C. 1988. Governing Education. A Sociology of Policy
since 1945. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
MIDWINTER, A. 1992. The Review of Local Government in Scotland – A Critical
Perspective. Local Government Studies. 18(2), pp. 44-54.
MIDWINTER, A. 2002. The New Politics of Local Spending: Central-Local
Financial Relations Under Scottish Devolution. Public Money & Management. 22(2),
pp. 37-44
MIDWINTER, A., KEATING, M. and MITCHELL, J. 1991. Politics and public
policy in Scotland. London: Macmillan.
MIDWINTER, A. and MCGARVEY, N. 2001. In Search of the Regulatory
State: Evidence from Scotland. Public Administration. 79(4), pp. 825-849.
MITCHELL, J. 2001. The study of Scottish politics post-devolution: new evidence,
new analysis and new methods? West European Politics. 24(4), pp. 216-223.
MITCHELL, J. 2003. Politics in Scotland. In DUNLEAVY, P., GAMBLE, A.,
HEFFERNAN, R. and PEELE, G. 2003. (eds). Developments in British Politics 7.
Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan.
MITCHELL, J. 2003b. Governing Scotland. Houndmills: Basingstoke.
MITCHELL, J. 2006. Evolution and Devolution: Citizenship, Institutions, and public
policy. Publius. 36(1), pp. 153-168.
46
POLIS Journal Vol.3, Winter 2010
Rachel Haydecker
MITCHELL, J. 2006b. Devolution‟s unfinished business. Political Quarterly. 77(4),
pp. 465-474.
MITCHELL, J. and BRADBURY, J. 2004. Devolution: Comparative Development
and Policy Roles. Parliamentary Affairs. 57(2), pp. 329-346.
MOONEY, G, SCOTT, G and MULVEY, G. 2008. The „Celtic Lion‟ and social
policy: Some thoughts on the SNP and social welfare. Critical Social Policy. 28(3),
pp. 378-394.
MORENO, L. and MCEWAN, N. 2005. Exploring the territorial politics of welfare.
In MCEWAN, N. and MORENO, L. (eds). 2005. The territorial politics of welfare.
London: Routledge.
MULLEN, F. 2007. Graduate Endowment Abolition (Scotland) Bill. Scottish
Parliament Information Centre briefing 07/54 [online]. [Accessed 4 April 2010].
Available from: http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/business/research/briefings07/SB07-54.pdf
MULLEN, F. 2009. The Future for Scotland’s Universities. Scottish Parliament
Information Centre briefing 09/10 [online]. [Accessed 21 March 2010]. Available
from:
http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/business/research/briefings-09/SB09-10.pdf
NELSON, F. 2001. Is this devolution or just duplication? The Times, 26 July.
NHS HEALTH SCOTLAND. 2009. Mental Health Indicators [online]. [Accessed 6
April 2010]. Available from: http://www.healthscotland.com/scotlandshealth/population/mental-health-indicators.aspx
PARRY, R. 2002. Delivery structures and policy development in post-devolution
Scotland. Social Policy and Society. 1(4), pp. 315-324.
47
POLIS Journal Vol.3, Winter 2010
Rachel Haydecker
PARRY, R. 2003. The Scottish Executive and the challenges of complex policy
making. The Political Quarterly. 74(4), pp. 450-458.
PATERSON, L. 1998. Scottish higher education and the Scottish Parliament: the
consequences of mistaken national identity. European Review. 6(4), pp. 459-474.
PEELE, G. 2000. The Law and the Constitution. In DUNLEAVY, P., GAMBLE, A.,
HOLLIDAY, I. and PEELE, G. 2000. (eds). Developments in British Politics 6.
Houndmills: Macmillan.
RAFFE, D. 2000. Investigating the Education Systems of the UK. Oxford Studies in
Comparative Education. 9(2), pp. 27-44.
RAFFE, D. and BYRNE, D. 2005. Policy Learning from ‘Home International’
comparisons [online]. [Accessed 26 February 2010]. Available from:
http://www.ces.ed.ac.uk/PDF%20Files/Brief034.pdfA
RAFFE, D. and SPOURS, K. (eds). 2007. Policy-making and Policy Learning in 14
19 Education. London: Institute of Education, University of London.
REES, G. 2002. Devolution and the restructuring of post-16 education and training in
the UK. In ADAMS, J. and ROBINSON, P. (eds). 2002. Devolution in Practice:
Public Policy Differences within the UK. London: IPPR.
ROKKAN, S. and URWIN, D. 1982. The Politics of Territorial Identity. London:
Sage.
SCHMUECKER, K. and ADAMS, J. 2005. Divergence in priorities, perceived policy
failure and pressure for convergence. In ADAMS, J. and SCHMUEKER, K. (eds)
2005. Devolution in Practice 2006: Public policy differences within the UK.
Newcastle: IPPR.
48
POLIS Journal Vol.3, Winter 2010
Rachel Haydecker
THE SCOTLAND OFFICE. 2009. Scotland’s Future in the United Kingdom.
Building on ten years of Scottish devolution [online]. [Accessed 22 March 2010].
Available from:
http://www.scotlandoffice.gov.uk/scotlandoffice/files/Scotland's%20Future%20in%2
0the%20United%20Kingdom.pdf
SCOTTISH ASSOCIATION FOR MENTAL HEALTH. 2004. The New Mental
Health Act – What’s it all about? A Short Introduction [online]. [Accessed 24 March
2010]. Available from:
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2004/01/18753/31686
SCOTTISH EXECUTIVE. 2000. A report of the Renewing Local Democracy
Working Group [online]. [Accessed 15 January 2010]. Available from:
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/Doc/158178/0042807.pdf
THE SCOTTISH GOVERNMENT. 2007. Abolition of Prescription Charges [online].
[Accessed 30 January 2010]. Available from:
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/News/Releases/2007/12/05141211
SCOTTISH NATIONAL PARTY. 2007. It’s time to move forward. Holyrood
manifesto 2007 [online]. [Accessed 2 April 2010]. Available from:
http://www.snp.org/node/13534
THE SCOTTISH OFFICE. 1997. Scotland’s Parliament. [online]. [Accessed 30
January 2010]. Available from:
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/government/devolution/scpa-00.asp
THE SCOTTISH OFFICE. 1998. Shaping Scotland’s Parliament [online]. [Accessed
23 March 2010]. Available from:
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/library/documents-w5/rcsg-00.htm
49
POLIS Journal Vol.3, Winter 2010
Rachel Haydecker
SCOTTISH PARLIAMENT INFORMATION CENTRE. 1999. The Debate about
Tuition Fees. Scottish Parliament Information Centre Research Note 12/99 [online].
[Accessed 21 March 2010]. Available from:
http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/business/research/pdf_res_notes/rn99-12.pdf
SCOTTISH PARLIAMENT INFORMATION CENTRE. 1999. Tuition Fees.
Scottish Parliament Information Centre Research Note 2/99 [online]. [Accessed 21
March 2010]. Available from:
http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/business/research/pdf_res_notes/rn99-02.pdf
SCOTTISH PARLIAMENT INFORMATION CENTRE. 2000. The Cubie Report.
Scottish Parliament Information Centre Research Note 00/06 [online]. [Accessed 21
March 2010]. Available from:
http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/business/research/pdf_res_notes/rn00-06.pdf
SCOTTISH PARLIAMENT INFORMATION CENTRE. 2000b. Reform of Student
Funding. Scottish Parliament Information Centre Research Note 00/61 [online].
[Accessed 21 March 2010]. Available from:
http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/business/research/pdf_res_notes/rn00-61.pdf
SCOTTISH PARLIAMENT INFORMATION CENTRE. 2001. Education (Graduate
Endowment and Student Support) (Scotland) (No. 2) Bill. Scottish Parliament
Information Centre Research Note 01/11 [online]. [Accessed 21 March 2010].
Available from:
http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/business/research/pdf_res_notes/rn01-11.pdf
SCOTTISH PARLIAMENT INFORMATION CENTRE. 2002. Local Government in
Scotland Bill – Best Value. Scottish Parliament Information Centre briefing 02/66
[online]. [Accessed 21 March 2010]. Available from: http://www.scottishparliament.biz/business/research/pdf_res_brief/sb02-66.pdf
50
POLIS Journal Vol.3, Winter 2010
Rachel Haydecker
THE SCOTTISH QUALIFICATIONS AUTHORITY. 2009. Introducing Advanced
Highers. [online]. [Accessed 2 April 2010]. Available from:
http://www.sqa.org.uk/files_ccc/NQIntroducingAdvancedHigherLeaflet.pdf
SIMEON, R. 2003. Free Personal Care. Policy Divergence and Social Citizenship. In
HAZELL, R. (ed). 2003. The State of the Nations 2003. The Third Year of
Devolution in the UK. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
SULLIVAN, M. 2002. Health Policy: Differentiation and Devolution. In ADAMS, J.
and ROBINSON, P. (eds). 2002. Devolution in Practice: Public Policy Differences
within the UK. London: IPPR.
STURGEON, N. 2010. Keynote address by Nicola Sturgeon [online]. [Accessed 22
March 2010]. Available from: http://www.snp.org/node/16812
TEMPEST, M. 2007. Ballot chaos mars Scottish elections. The Guardian [online]. 4
May [Accessed 24 April 2010]. Available from:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2007/may/04/scotland.devolution4
TRENCH, A. 2007. Conclusion: Devolution and the territorial distribution of power
in the UK. In TRENCH, A. (ed). 2007. Devolution and Power in the UK.
Manchester: Manchester University Press.
TRENCH, A. and JARMAN, H. 2007. The practical outcomes of devolution: policymaking across the UK. In TRENCH, A. (ed). 2007. Devolution and Power in the UK.
Manchester: Manchester University Press.
TRENCH, A. 2008. The Practice of Multi-level Government: How Intergovernmental
relations work in federal systems. In TRENCH, A. (ed). 2008. The State of the
Nations 2008. London: The Constitution Unit.
51
POLIS Journal Vol.3, Winter 2010
Rachel Haydecker
TRENCH, A. 2009. Un-joined-up government: Intergovernmental relations and
citizenship rights. In GREER, S. 2009. (ed). Devolution and Social Citizenship in the
UK. Bristol: Policy.
WINCOTT, D. 2006. Social Policy and Social Citizenship: Britain‟s Welfare States.
Publius. 36 (1), pp. 169-188
WOODS, K. J. 2002. Health Policy and the NHS in the UK 1997-2002. In ADAMS,
J. and ROBINSON, P. (eds). 2002. Devolution in Practice: Public Policy Differences
within the UK. London: IPPR.
WRIGHT, A. (ed). 2000. Scotland: the Challenge of Devolution. Ashgate: Aldershot.
52
POLIS Journal Vol.3, Winter 2010