ETHICAL MILITARY LEADERSHIP
INTRODUCTION
1.
In the aftermath of the ‘Second Gulf War’ the content of the media1 illustrates that there is
public concern both over whether it was ‘right’ to go to war with Iraq, and over the conduct of
British and US soldiers during that war. These twin concerns: whether it is right to commence a war
(traditionally expressed as jus ad bellum) and the correct way of behaving during a war (jus in bello)
have a long history and are the two key elements of the tradition and theory of ‘Just War’.
However, whilst these matters are, and should be, the subject of national and international debate,
they would seem to be even more pertinent to soldiers engaged, or about to engage, on operations.
In a strictly hierarchical organisation, such as the armed forces, it is reasonable for soldiers2 to
expect their leaders to provide them with guidance on such matters. This paper will therefore
examine the need for ethical leadership and the roles and responsibilities of the leader; review how
this requirement applies in the military context; describe the Just War tradition and how this can be
applied to modern military operations; and then outline how an ethical code encapsulating these
ideals could be inculcated in the British Armed Forces.
THE NEED FOR ETHICAL LEADERSHIP
THE NEED FOR LEADERSHIP
2.
Before examining the specifics of the military, it is useful to consider whether ‘ethical
leadership’ is a valuable notion in any context. There have been whole libraries written about
leadership3 and it does not seem too wild an assertion to suggest that leadership is a necessary (and
usually welcomed) aspect of human interaction. Furthermore, that ‘almost all groups, even those
that are apparently most egalitarian, have some form of unequal distribution of power and influence
whereby some people lead and others follow. .. leadership can take a variety of forms; it is a
fundamental aspect of almost all social groups’4.
3.
Amongst the theories of leadership are those based on traits; behaviour; and situation
(contingency theory). However, in understanding the need for leadership, as opposed to how it is
manifest, ‘action-centred leadership’ is useful. John Adair, in numerous books on leadership5 has
suggested that there are 3 kinds of need discernable in any human enterprise. First, people need to
know where they are going in terms of the common task. Second, they need to be held together as a
team, and lastly each individual, by virtue of being human, will have separate individual needs. It is
1 There have been numerous articles on Iraq’s possession of Weapons of Mass Destruction together with others
concerning the alleged ill-treatment of Iraqi Prisoners of War by British soldiers or the use of excessive force. For
example, see: New York Times 20 April 2003: 'Good Kills' by Peter Maass; Sunday Times 25 May 2003: Cover story:
‘Overkill’ by Jon Swain. Press Association 30 May 2003: ‘Soldier arrested over Iraqi PoW 'torture' pictures’.
2 Throughout the paper, the term ‘soldiers’ will be used to identify non-commissioned ranks of all Services.
3 For the purposes of this paper the simple definition of leadership used is: ‘The process of getting other people to
achieve group goals’ (Hogg M & Vaughan, G (2002) Social Psychology, 3rd Edn). [It should be noted that British
Defence Doctrine (2nd Edition 2001) defines military leadership as: ‘the projection of personality and character to get
subordinates to do what is required of them and to engender within them the confidence that breeds initiative and the
acceptance of risk and responsibility’.]
4 Ibid (p 309)
5 Including Effective Leadership, Pan 1983, where he describes the concept of Action Centred Leadership.
1
in satisfying these overlapping requirements that leadership is required. This relationship is usually
shown diagrammatically thus:
TASK
TEAM
INDIVIDUAL
4.
If it is accepted then, that in most (if not all) walks of human life there is a need for
leadership of some kind (since leadership enables synergy and is therefore a requirement of
efficiency), then the question is whether there is any benefit in leaders behaving in an ethical way
and, thereby, proving role models of ethical leadership6.
THE DESIRABILITY OF ETHICAL BEHAVIOUR
5.
History (and the used-motor trade) is full of unethical leaders, and a lack of ethical
awareness or a specifically unethical approach is certainly no barrier to being an effective leader.
However, there is, within most societies, a desire for ethical behaviour7 and ethical leadership: ‘In
periods where there is no leadership, society stands still. Progress occurs when courageous, skilful
leaders seize the opportunity to change things for the better’8.
6.
This desire for ethical behaviour is most marked in the professions; we expect our doctors
and lawyers to act ethically, and both these groups have governing bodies that can censure or disbar
their members for unethical behaviour9. However, the world of commerce has been an area where
such high standards were not always readily apparent. In launching a report on ‘Does Business
Ethics Pay?’, the Institute of Business Ethics10 acknowledged that ‘the public perception of business
behaviour is consistently low, fuelled as it is by high profile examples of unethical and illegal
conduct’. In this respect, the names of ENRON and WorldCom are currently the most well known
6 It should be noted, however, that the notion of the leadership of ethical thinking and theory is deliberately excluded
from the meaning of the term ‘ethical leadership’ as considered here, which could be re-phrased as ‘leadership that is
ethical’.
7 For the purposes of this paper ‘ethical’ behaviour is defined as: ‘doing what is morally right’. Whilst it is appreciated
that this is a simplistic definition, since the nature of what is ‘morally right’ in any given situation is likely to be the
subject of debate, it would be unhelpful (and probably fruitless) to try to pursue a more refined definition within this
paper.
8 Harry S Truman (1884 - 1972).
9 The Medical Ethics Committee of the BMA produces reports, codes of practice and discussion documents on topical
and often controversial issues. (http://www.bma.org.uk/ap.nsf/Content/__Hub+ethics). Similarly, Solicitors may obtain
confidential advice on matters relating to professional ethics from the Law Society's Professional Ethics Division or
consult the Guide to the Professional Conduct of Solicitors (http://www.guide-on-line.lawsociety.org.uk/).
10 http://www.ibe.org.uk/ The Institute of Business Ethics was established in 1986. In Europe, business ethics first
emerged as a distinct field in the 1980s following a series of well-publicised business scandals such as the
Guinness/Distillers take-over battle and the part played by Ernest Saunders and the ‘Guinness Four’.
2
and dramatic examples. Concerns over the ethical standards of US corporations led President
George W Bush to call for corporate America to be ‘made more accountable to employees and
shareholders and held to the highest standards of conduct’, during his ‘Axis of Evil’ speech.11
However, before considering whether ethical behaviour is justified on the grounds of it making good
business sense, it would be appropriate to consider more fundamental arguments for ethical
behaviour, and hence a need for ethical leadership.
7.
The Philosophical Case. From an Aristolean philosophical perspective, we are guided to
ethical behaviour by our innate faculty of practical wisdom which enables us to achieve eudaimonia
(happiness / success / fulfilment) – to act in a lesser way would be to fall short of our potential and
duty as human beings. Alternatively, there is the utilitarian view, put forward by Jeremy Bentham
and J S Mill, that it is necessary to act ethically in order to increase the sum of human happiness.
8.
The Theological Case. Thomas Aquinas, whose theory of ethics had its roots in those of
Aristotle, stated that God gave humans a faculty (synderesis), which provides an insight into moral
obligation as well as a predisposition to will what is right.
9.
The Emotional and Rational Cases. The 18th century philosopher David Hume held the view
that emotion can motivate an individual to moral action and that rational considerations have no
influence:
‘What is honourable, what is fair, what is becoming, what is generous, takes possession of
the heart and animates us to embrace and maintain it12.
Conversely, Immanuel Kant took the view that only when emotion is excluded, can one take true
moral action. Whilst if one acts from desire or emotion one is blameless, (one is merely acting as a
part of one’s nature – it is inevitable) it is only if one acts out of good will – a determination to do
one’s duty – that the actions can be morally good.
10.
The Self-Interest Case. Thomas Hobbes suggested that ethical behaviour was merely the
pragmatic product of self-interest (psychological egoism). Hobbes believed that fear of our own
murderous appetites is what drove humans to form societies in the first place. In The Leviathan, he
claimed that humans co-operated with each other in order to escape from the miserable anarchic
State of Nature, where man’s existence consists of ‘continual fear and danger of violent death; and
the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.13 Hobbes proposed that even acts which
appear altruistic are motivated by self interest. However, Hobbes felt that it was still in the interest
of the individual to promote ethical conduct, for without some curb on behaviour, the individual’s
possessions and life would be constantly under threat from the exercise of other people’s
unrestrained selfish intents.
11.
The ‘Good Business’ Case. Turning lastly to the ‘Good Business Case’, as noted above, the
Institute for Business Ethics commissioned research14 into whether employing ethical business
practice resulted in greater financial performance. In the first instance the research sought to
establish that the presence of an ethical code was indicative of genuine ethical commitment. Once
this had been established, the report was able to conclude that: ‘there is strong evidence to indicate
11 State of the Union address 30 January 2002.
12 Hume, David, ‘An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals’, Book 1, Sect 1 para 136 (quoted in Warnock,
Mary, ‘An Intelligent Persons Guide to Ethics’).
13 Hobbes, Leviathan Ch XIII (see: http://oregonstate.edu/instruct/phl302/texts/hobbes/leviathan-contents.html).
14 ‘Does Business Ethics Pay? Institute of Business Ethics research report by Simon Webley and Elise More, (ISBN: 0
9539517 3 1).
3
that larger UK companies with codes of ethics, e.g. those who are explicit about business ethics, out
perform in financial and other indicators those companies who say they do not have a code. Having
a code of business ethics might, therefore, be said to be one hallmark of a well managed company’.
This finding supports the views of Richard Lambert, the former Editor of the Financial Times, who
said:
"once a financial bubble comes to an end, it becomes clear that ethical behaviour is just not
an optional extra. It’s the glue that holds businesses together …….lots of firms are going to
discover that this sense of trust – carefully nurtured and built on a set of shared values and
ethical practices – will turn out to be a real competitive advantage."15
ETHICAL LEADERS
12.
From the above it is clear that there are a number of diverse arguments, both conceptual and
practical, that point to the general desirability of ethical behaviour. A consequence of this is that in
order to promote ethical behaviour it will be necessary for there to be leaders who display and
espouse ethical beliefs. In a speech on ‘Ethics in Public Life’, Sir Nigel Wicks stated:
‘(I must) emphasise the importance of leadership. Ethics, Standards, call them what you will,
have to come from the top. Top people, Company Directors – and I am one – Ministers,
Members of the House of Commons, senior civil servants, senior people in the local
authorities and on public boards, have to lead. They have to set a good example’. 16
Indeed, the public demand for this is readily apparent in everyday life, where the behaviour of
leaders is regularly held up for inspection. The increasing democratisation of western society has
promoted a far greater level of scrutiny of those holding public office than ever before. This, in
turn, has resulted in the establishment of formal mechanisms, such as the Committee on Standards in
Public Life17.
THE ETHICAL ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE LEADER
13.
In trying to judge whether public figures were falling short of suitable standards of
behaviour, the Committee on Standards in Public Life outlined the ‘Seven Principles of Public Life’:
Selflessness,
Integrity, Objectivity, Accountability, Openness, Honesty and Leadership. Furthermore, they noted
that these principles should ‘apply to all aspects of public life’ and that in accordance with the last
principle, ‘holders of public office should promote and support these principles by leadership and
example’. It would therefore be useful to consider both the roles and the responsibility of leaders,
and the nature of public office.
THE ROLE OF LEADERS
14.
In the Action Centred Leadership model, the leader fulfils the role of satisfying the
conflicting needs of individuals within a team in order to achieve a given task. However, another
15 Lecture to the Securities Institute by Richard Lambert, February 2002.
16 ‘Ethics in Public Life’: speech by Sir Nigel Wicks, Chair, Committee on Standards in Public Life to the Institute of
Business Ethics, 19 September 2002.
17 Set up in 1994 by Prime Minister John Major at the height of the Westminster row over MPs and cash-for-questions,
the standards committee was first chaired by Lord Nolan but is currently chaired by Sir Nigel Wicks.
4
approach to describing leaders and leadership is to use the attributes that it is thought leaders should
possess. This ‘Trait Theory’18 approach suggests that the role of a leader is to possess, and more
importantly, to display certain qualities such as: Integrity, Vision, Communication, Decision
Taking, Innovation, Developmental Focus, Humility and Professional Knowledge19. As might be
expected, the number of differing lists of ‘leadership traits’ is huge and the contents vary from
organisation to organisation.
15.
Alternatively, the ‘Contingency Theory’20 of leadership views good leadership as situational;
not just particular to a given discipline, but to a specific time and environment. This implies that
certain leaders and leadership styles are appropriate and successful in one set of circumstances but
not in others. As Machiavelli put it: ‘as fortune is changeable whereas men are obstinate in their
ways, men prosper so long as fortune and policy are in accord, and when there is a clash they fail’.
This suggests that only certain leaders (or types of leadership) can fulfil specific leadership needs at
a particular time. A leader, who fulfils this function successfully when a project is being established
and set up, may not be the best person to fulfil the leadership needs of its long-term administration.
16.
However, regardless of whether leadership is viewed as being attribute based, action-centred,
or environment specific; it is axiomatic that the key role of the leader is to give guidance and
direction and thereby fulfil the needs of the led. In guiding their actions, however, the leader
inevitably takes on some responsibility both for the actions and for the moral well being of those he
leads.
THE RESPONSIBILITY OF LEADERS
Responsibility is a unique concept. It can only reside and inhere in a single individual. You
may share it with others, but your portion is not diminished. You may delegate it, but it is
still with you. You may disclaim it, but you cannot divest yourself of it21.
17.
The leader has a number of responsibilities: to the team as an entity and to each individual
that makes up the team. In addition, he has a responsibility for the achievement of the task. This
may be a responsibility that is again to the team (such as where an entire community builds a well
for its communal use) or to a third party (such as an employer). As the focus of the endeavour, the
leader is responsible for the ethical propriety of the task itself is and the manner in which it is
undertaken. His responsibilities entail ethical considerations since inherent in leadership is the
requirement to make decisions and every decision will have a moral element. Therefore, leaders are
required to weigh moral considerations as an intrinsic part of their role. They also take on some
responsibility for each individual’s moral health. In this respect, leaders have a responsibility for the
extent to which they ask their subordinates to act in unethical ways, or to put them in positions
where they are required to make ethical judgements without adequate direction or training.
PUBLIC OFFICE
18.
In addition to the roles and responsibilities fulfilled by all leaders, the notion of ‘public
office’ adds a further impetus to the requirement for ethical behaviour and leadership. Public
18 Stogdill, Ralph M, Handbook of Leadership: A Survey of Theory and Research, The Free Press, 1974.
19 Defence Leadership Centre Leadership Attributes as at June 2003.
20 Fiedler, Fred E, A Theory of Leadership Effectiveness, McGraw-Hill Book Coy, 1967. Fiedler’s work on Leadership
included a study of leadership in the Belgian Navy.
21 Attributed to Admiral Rickover, USN in Army Doctrine Publication: Command.
5
officials act in a ‘trustee’ role for the public. They have delegated powers (in the case of the Armed
Forces: to use deadly force on the public’s behalf) but these powers entail responsibility:
‘there is a moral threshold which is crossed by those who assume power to change the lives
of many men through public action… A new responsibility, and even a new kind of
responsibility, and new moral conflicts, present themselves.’22 .
Thus public office adds to the responsibilities of the leader since he acts on behalf of the public and
hence is representative of their will and ethical code. In this way a policeman who, for example, is
caught exceeding his duty-free allowance, is seen as morally guilty of a greater crime than a market
trader who does exactly the same. Both are fully aware that they are breaking the law, but in doing
so the policeman has proven unworthy of the trust and responsibility he assumed as the holder of a
Public Office and through his actions has brought that Office (temporarily) into disrepute.
CAN LEADERSHIP BE COMPLETELY ETHICAL?
19.
The search for an over-arching ethical code, independent of culture, religious or individual
beliefs, which can be applied in all circumstances, has occupied many great minds and has been
termed ‘The Enlightenment Project’23. A number of philosophical positions have been established.
20.
The Utilitarian View. John Stuart Mill believed that it was possible to establish an objective
universal principle for resolving ethical issues. In simple terms, this principle was to choose the
course of action that brought the greatest happiness to the greatest number of people.24 To an extent,
utilitarianism, as set out by Mill and Jeremy Bentham, seeks to render ethical judgements little more
than mathematical assessments. If a certain course of action adds up to a greater increase in good
then it must be better than an alternative action. In this way it would be possible to justify the
deliberate killing of the innocent if enough could be gained by it. The Benthamite view assumes
that it is possible to both predict the outcome of an act, and accurately to quantify its pros and cons,
before its commission. Human experience, however, suggests that accurately predicting the
outcome of simple events is extremely problematic (one only has to listen to the Weather Forecast!).
Therefore, a less extreme version of utilitarianism would concentrate not on certain consequences
but on foreseeable consequences. However, Bentham’s position still assumes that the moral
consequences of different acts can be judged using the same values in order to provide a
comparison; an assumption disputed by some commentators.
21.
The Absolutist / Deontological View. Whilst utilitarianism focuses on the results of actions,
absolutism forbids the commission of certain actions. Those who follow a code of absolutism, such
as Immanuel Kant, believe that certain actions are wrong regardless of the consequences of not
adopting them and despite the fact that taking the action might prevent a greater evil25. Kant
believed that actions were morally correct if they conformed to the moral law and if the person
22 S Hampshire (Ed): Public and Private Morality, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978.
23 MackInytre, Alasdair: After Virtue, Notre Dame, University of Notre Dame Press 1984 (pp51 – 78)
24 Mill has often been described as a ‘rule utilitarian’ since he believed that the principle of maximising happiness
justified intermediate rights, duties and other ethical rules. These rules, in turn, could be used for guidance on
particular actions. In contrast an ‘act utilitarian’, or ‘consequentialist’, ignores middle-level rules and judges each action
by its consequences for the sum total of happiness: means being justified by ends.
25 Utilitarians seek to maximize good and minimize evil and therefore if it is possible to prevent a greater evil (such as
a terrorist attack) by committing a lesser evil (torturing a terrorist to reveal details of the planned attack) then one should
commit the lesser evil. An absolutist would reject this proposal.
6
performing the actions intended to do his or her duty (telling the truth, keeping promises, respecting
the rights of others etc). This focus on duty is often referred to as deontology. However,
absolutism does not rule out utilitarianism completely; an absolutist could be expected to seek to
maximize good and minimize evil as long as doing so does not conflict with his absolutist code.
Conversely, it could be argued that it is right to adhere to absolutist restrictions unless the utilitarian
considerations favouring violation are overwhelmingly weighty and certain. However, absolutism
stands in danger of allowing others to suffer in order to preserve one’s own sense of moral purity.
Whilst most people would agree that, outside war, it is morally wrong deliberately to take another
human life, is it not possible that there are occasions when it is morally justified – for example to
end the suffering of a terminally ill patient; or to prevent someone from killing several other people?
22.
Achieving a Common View. In an experiment involving professional medical ethics
consultants who were asked to express their opinions on the correct ethical standpoint when
recommending life-prolonging treatment of patients in a permanent vegetative state, it was found
that there was general agreement for only one out of 7 vignettes26. This indicates that even amongst
those who are regularly dealing with ethical considerations within a given discipline, it is still
impossible to set out a definitive ethical code.
23.
Dirty Hands and Defining Moments. Furthermore, it has been suggested by some that there
can be no over-arching ethical code. They believe that the notion of completely ethical leadership is
a fallacy and that: ‘The world can present us with situations in which there is no honourable or
moral course for a man to take, no course free of guilt and responsibility for evil’ 27. This view was
set out by Sartre in the play ‘Les Mains Sables’ (The Dirty Hands), in which a young idealist
accuses the veteran leader of an underground Communist Party unit of having betrayed the party’s
ideals. The veteran replies:
"How you cling to your purity, young man! How afraid are you to soil your hands! All right
stay pure! What good will it do? … Well, I have dirty hands. Right up to the elbows. I’ve
plunged them in filth and blood. But what do you hope? Do you think you can govern
innocently?”
Of course Machiavelli held a similar view, although his abandonment of ethical behaviour appears
to be simply pragmatic and certainly not tinged with any great regret:
‘the gulf between how one should live and how one does live is so wide that a man who
neglects what is actually done for what should be done moves towards self-destruction
rather than self-preservation. The fact is that a man who wants to act virtuously in every
way necessarily comes to grief among so many who are not virtuous. Therefore, if a prince
wants to maintain his rule he must be prepared not to be virtuous, and to make use of this or
not according to need.’28
24.
Ruthless Leaders. Machiavelli is also not short of disciples; Amin Rajan29 has noted that
‘The Prince’ is widely read by modern business leaders. Furthermore, in his book ‘The Ruthless
26 Cox, Ellen and Stocking, Carol, Ethics Consultants’ Recommendation for Life-Prolonging Treatment of Patients in a
Permanent Vegetative State (Journal of American Medical Association, 1 December 1993. (as reported by Badaracco).
27 War and Massacre, Thomas Nagel, Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 1, No. 2. (Winter, 1972), p. 143.
28 Machiavelli, Niccolo, ‘The Prince’, Penguin Classics, (pp 49-50)
29 Presentation by Professor Amin Rajan of the Centre for Research in Employment and Technology in Europe
(CREATE)
to The Windsor Leadership Trust on 27 February 2003.
7
Leader’, Alastair McAlpine, a former Treasurer and Deputy Chairman of the Conservative Party for
15 years under Mrs Thatcher, reports with relish that: ‘As true today as when Machiavelli first
presented the notion, the evil in humankind can be recognised for what it is and used to the
advantage of one who is able to recognise it.’30 This was apparently intended to be read without
irony.
25.
Defining Moments. ‘Dirty hands’ problems have also been described as ‘Defining
Moments’ by Joseph Badaracco31. In illustrating the nature of the Right vs Right problem
Badaracco uses the ‘Mexican village32’ example to show how the utilitarian and absolutist
approaches differ. Badaracco sees these ‘Right vs Right’ choices as the key experiences in a leaders
development. In order to deal with such problems he proposes the adoption of ‘Sleep Test Ethics’.
This notion rests not so much on whether a leader can sleep soundly after taking a decision in a
‘defining moment’ but with a belief that we should rely on our personal insights, feelings and
instincts.
26.
Wrong vs Wrong. Although Badaracco talks of ‘Right vs Right’ decisions, as Amin Rajan
has pointed out, such decisions would be relatively easy, since if both of the outcomes are ‘right’ to
a greater or lesser extent, then even the incorrect decision will not be ethically wrong but simply not
as ethically good as the alternative. It would therefore be better to talk of ‘Wrong vs Wrong’
choices (such as in the Mexican village) where both options involve unethical outcomes.
27.
‘Me-ism’ and Narratives. In ‘Generation X’ Coupland describes ‘me-ism’; this is not
selfishness or egocentricity, but rather an attempt by an individual in the absence of formal training
in religious tenets, to formulate a personally tailored religion – a customised personal faith. This too
could be seen as a source of guidance when confronting ‘defining moments’ –‘to thine own self be
true’. Hemingway expressed the same idea rather more succinctly when he said: ‘I only know that
what is moral is what you feel good after and what is immoral is what you feel bad after’33. In a
similar vein, the Christian theologian Stanley Hauerwas has suggested that ethical objectivity cannot
be secured by retreating from the narrative, but only by being anchored in those narratives that best
direct us towards good. He argues that ‘if the individual agent’s intentions and motives – in short,
the narrative embodied in his or her character – are to have systematic significance for moral
judgement, then it seems that we will have to give preference to the agent’s interpretation of what he
does’34. Indeed, Badaracco notes that ‘Nietzsche and Aristotle both viewed critical personal
decisions, such as defining moments, not as single, separate events, but rather as the most recent
link in the long chain of a person’s past decisions, actions, and experiences. Nietzsche was
particularly interested in another aspect of important decisions; they were also opportunities to
forge the first link leading to a person’s future: ‘Become who you are35’.
30 McAlpine, A, Ed: The Ruthless Leader, John Wiley & Sons, 2002.
31 Badaracco, Joseph L, Jr, ‘Defining Moments: When Managers must choose between Right and Right, Harvard
Business School Press, Boston, Mass 1997.
32 In the scenario a visitor to a Mexican village is confronted by a bandit who has taken 20 innocent villages hostage.
The bandit threatens to kill all the villagers unless the visitor agrees to kill one villager himself, in which case the
remaining villagers will be allowed to go free. A utilitarian (Mill / Bentham) would judge that it would right for the
visitor to kill 1 villager to save the remaining 19. An absolutist (Kant) would judge that the visitor should not take an
innocent life, regardless of the consequences. (Badaracco p 36) This example could be extrapolated to the use of
nuclear weapons against cities.
33 Quoted in Badaracco. (p 46 – 47)
34 Stanley Hauerwas with Richard Bondi & David B Burrell, Further Investigations in Christian Ethics, (p 20)
University of Notre Dame Press 1977.
35 Badaracco (p 70)
8
28.
No Problem. Some commentators feel that trying to establish any system on which to base
moral judgements or decisions is futile, as fundamental moral concepts cannot be derived nor
defined. Rather, that it is merely necessary to see the ethical choice and it will be apparent as such.
Once identified, that choice is self-evidently to be pursued. G E Moore felt that: ‘Good is good and
that is the end of the matter’36
29.
No Easy Solution. When confronting ‘Wrong vs Wrong’ decisions, although it may be
possible for the individual to justify his actions to himself, there may still be instances when a moral
man cannot find an ethically acceptable solution. One theologian has asked: ‘could one accept the
rule – directly killing the innocent is wrong except in those cases where one is forced into a
situation in which there is certitude that this is the only way a far greater number of innocent
persons can be saved?’37 However, certitude is an elusive property, as is shown by the number of
pardons that have been given to those convicted on evidence that has later been ruled unsafe38. If
there were certitude then ethical dilemmas would be far simpler to tackle. However, ethical
judgements have to be made on the balance of probability and conjecture. It therefore seems that
there is no easy way to avoid getting ‘dirty hands’ and that when faced with ‘Wrong vs Wrong’
choices, leaders ‘can hardly help but choose the utilitarian side of the dilemma. That is what they
are there for’39. However, as Walzer points out, this does not absolve them of moral guilt but rather
that they should accept their responsibility: ‘to know with despair that the political act is inevitably
evil, and to act nonetheless, is moral courage’40 In other words, the visitor to the Mexican village
must shoot one of the hostages to save the others, but in doing so he cannot avoid becoming a
murderer.
THE MILITARY CONTEXT
30.
Whilst the desirability of ethical behaviour, and therefore a requirement for ethical
leadership, can be held to apply to most areas of human endeavour, the military context adds
considerable complexity and weightier responsibilities to the matter. The consequences of military
failure are profound and can mean the destruction of a state, the enslavement of a people or the
ending of a way of life. Therefore, whilst it might be readily agreed that in an ideal situation the
military should both win and do so ethically, it would be a noble people indeed who would choose
that their armed forces should lose a war of national survival rather than compromise their ethical
code. It is in this uncomfortable area that nuclear deterrence theory lies; most people would agree
that it is wrong to kill, or threaten to kill, large numbers of civilians, yet are prepared to countenance
this if there is no other way of protecting their state.
36 Moore, G E, Principia Ethica, Cambridge, 1903 (p 6) [Quoted in Warnock, p110-111]
37 Curran, Charles, Themes in Fundamental Moral Theology, University if Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, 1977.
38 Published in 1961, Ludovic Kennedy’s book ‘Ten Rillington Place’ identified Reginald Christie, and not the already
hanged Timothy Evans, as being the murderer residing at that address in London’s Notting Hill. Evans was eventually
granted a posthumous free pardon in 1966. Further details of miscarriages of justice are at www.innocent.org.uk
39 Walzer, M ‘Just and Unjust Wars’ Basic Books, 2000 (p 326)
40 Morgenthau, ‘Scientific Man vs Power Politics’ University of Chicago Press, 1946, (p203)
9
REALISM
31.
One of the earliest, and well known, views of the reality of war and international relations is
set out by Thucydides in The Melian Dialogue41. Here, whilst the representatives of Melos speak of
the justice of their desire to avoid invasion, the Athenians point out that if they do not defeat Melos,
they will be seen as weak. Their argument is not based on notions of justice but on pure political
necessity and the power derived from their military capability.
32.
Just as Clausewitz believed that ‘War is nothing but a continuation of politics with the
admixture of other means’,42 this approach to international relations, which relies more on notions of
pragmatism than principle, was greatly favoured by Henry Kissinger the former US Secretary of
State. In Kissinger’s view, the idealism espoused by President Woodrow Wilson43 was a noble
aspiration but does not recognise the world as it actually is. Kissinger believed in a policy that
simply sought to retain balance by preventing the hegemony of one power or group of powers and
promoting equilibrium. A foreign policy that has this as its prime objective ‘knows few permanent
enemies and few permanent friends44’. Applied to the Gulf ‘it would avoid branding Iraq as forever
beyond the pale. Rather it would seek to balance rivalries as old as history by striving for an
equilibrium between Iraq, Iran, Syria and the other regional powers’45. That is not to say that any
war fought in pursuance of this policy would necessarily be unlimited. The limiting of war under
these circumstances would be based on pragmatic grounds associated with diminishing political
returns, rather than on moral grounds. The political objectives would establish a relationship
between the force employed and the goal to be attained. However, as Coates notes: ‘What
represents for some a damning indictment of US foreign policy – its readiness to make war against a
state to which it has lent recent material as well as diplomatic support – is portrayed here as a mark
of genuine statesmanship’46. Furthermore, when there is only one superpower, the imposition of
what it deems the ‘proper balance’ may be highly unattractive.
33.
Indeed, there are those who believe that war should be seen as existing outside the normal
moral and legal arena: inter arma silent leges (Oratio pro Milone, IV 52 BC Cicero: in war the law
is silent). This is based on the view that a realistic appraisal of war recognises that it is, and should
be, beyond ethical regulation. This is either because by its very nature it is unethical, being
essentially a matter of power, self interest and necessity; or because only by ignoring ethical
considerations can it be conducted to minimise total suffering. This may not be mere savagery, and
for some is a reaction to the nightmare scenario of two opposing ‘civilised’ armies, both having
reached their culminating points, with neither able to make a significant or overwhelming move.
Constrained by rules of war that prevent the employment of decisive weapons or tactics, they
become locked in a potentially unending war of attrition which therefore eventually costs more in
terms of human lives and suffering than a short, bloody and unconstrained war.
41 Thucydides, The History of the Peloponnesian War, Book V, Ch XVII. (See:
http://www.ibiblio.org/gutenberg/etext04/plpwr10.txt)
42 Howard, Michael & Paret, Peter, Eds, Clausewitz, On War, Princetown University Press, 1989.
43 US President at the end of the First World War and author of the ‘Fourteen Points’ – a formulation of terms for a
German surrender.
44 Kissinger, H A, America Cannot Police the World Forever, The Times, 12 March 1991.
45 Ibid.
46 Coates, AJ: The Ethics of War, Manchester University Press, 1997, (p 20).
10
34.
The strategy of General Erich von Falkenhayn at Verdun, where he sought to ‘bleed the
French Army white’, gives a glimpse of the horror such a perpetual ‘civilised’ war would entail47.
To some it therefore seems that: ‘The greatest kindness in war is to bring it to a speedy conclusion.
It should be allowable, with that view, to employ all means save those that are absolutely
objectionable’48. This notion of prosecuting a total war was set out by Giulio Douhet, an Italian
strategist, who was one of the first to grasp the full potential of air power. Douhet felt that war
should not be confined to the armed combatants but that it involved the entire nation. He therefore
concluded that air power should be used to attack the heart of a nation: its cities and civilians:
"A complete breakdown of the social structure cannot but take place in a country subjected
to this kind of merciless pounding from the air. The time will soon come when, to put an end
to the horror and suffering, the people themselves, driven by the instinct of self-preservation,
would rise up and demand an end to the war.’49
35.
Not only did this view, subsequently adopted by Sir Arthur Harris50, not draw a distinction
between combatants and non-combatants, but it actively sought to focus military resources against
non-combatants. The indirect and unspecific nature of aerial bombardment (whether by bomb, shell
or missile) seemed to enjoy a curious position in military ethics. If it had been suggested that,
simply in order to create a collapse in civilian morale, an Army should consciously destroy a large
part of a city, flattening and burning buildings, whether they were occupied or not, this would
presumably have been rejected as unacceptable. Even Sherman, a man infamous for his ‘March to
the Sea’, and who held realist views51, ordered the evacuation of Atlanta before it was burned.
36.
However, the bombing of enemy cities, with the same intent, was seen somehow to be
acceptable. This is strange and the answer lies perhaps in the notion of chance: if one bombs a
building one may, as a result, kill the occupants, but some may survive. Alternatively, it may be due
to the extreme ‘killing distance’ - as the distance between the serviceman and his victim increases,
‘so the moral perception of the act of killing diminishes: an adversary who is never seen can be
killed with equanimity’.52 For the airman involved in such bombing, it seems important (and
possible) to separate the act from the victim: ‘You couldn’t afford to think too much about civilians ..
you can’t afford to let your mind dwell on casualties in war, whether they are the enemies or those
of your own unit’.53 For the soldier on the ground, it is often less easy to separate their actions from
the results.
47 The battle of Verdun, which lasted from 21 February – 18 December 1916, cost approximately 542,000 French and
434,000 German casualties, with the respective front lines ending virtually where they had started.
48 General Helmuth von Moltke, the Chief of the Prussian General Staff under Bismarck; [his nephew (also Helmuth
von Moltke) had been replaced by Falkenhayn in 1914].
49 Douhet, Giulio: The Command of the Air (translated by Dino Ferrari) London, Faber and Faber, Translated from the
2d ed., 1927. As a colonel, Douhet was court martialed and imprisoned for his criticism of the Italian Army in World
War 1. He was subsequently vindicated and was released from prison and made chief of the Italian Army’s Aviation
Arm. He was promoted to General shortly before his retirement, after which he wrote ‘The Command of the Air’. His
theories were first put into practice during the Spanish Civil War, when Madrid was heavily bombed.
50 Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur ‘Bomber’ Harris was the head of RAF Bomber Command from 1942 – 1945 and
directed a strategic air offensive against German cities, specifically aimed at built up areas in order to destroy civilian
morale.
51 ‘If the people raise a howl against my barbarity and cruelty, I will answer war is war … war is cruelty, and you
cannot refine it’ William T Sherman was a Union General in the American Civil War who, in 1864 cut a 50 mile wide
swathe of ‘scorched earth’ from Atlanta to the sea. He ordered the burning of Atlanta so that it could not be used as a
Confederate depot.
52 Coates (p 85) quoting Ryan, C C, Self-Defense, Pacifism, and the Possibility of Killing, Ethics, 93 (p508-524).
53 Leonard Cheshire VC, quoted in Coates. (p 38).
11
37.
Despite ample evidence of man’s ability to act with extreme brutality in war, ‘the truth is
that one of the things most of us want, even in war, is to act or to seem to act morally’54. This is
borne out by the work of Stanley Milgram,55 who suggested that people commit war crimes for a
number of different reasons. They may be subject to ‘Escalation, Entrapment and Routinization’; a
small crime may make avoiding a larger crime appear illogical, or a series of crimes may make
subsequent crimes merely part of the same routine. Alternatively, they may indulge in selfjustification by blaming the victim or through claiming that they are defending their honour or
reputation. They may also indulge in a devalution of the out-group who form their victims.
However, in all these cases, the perpetrators try to justify their actions so that they can believe that
they are acting morally to some degree.
THE LEGAL REQUIREMENTS
38.
Imperial Russia instigated one of the first attempts at regulating the conduct of warfare
between ‘civilized’ nations. The result of the deliberations by an international military commission
was the St Petersburg Declaration56, which ‘fixed the technical limits at which the necessities of war
ought to yield to the requirements of humanity’. This was eventually followed by the 1907 Hague
Conventions and the Geneva Conventions.
39.
It might be argued that, together with humanitarian rights legislation and the establishment in
July 2002 of an International Criminal Court, there are sufficient safeguards built into the legal
framework based around the Geneva and Hague conventions and their associated Protocols. This
could therefore mean that a legalistic approach alone would ensure that soldiers act ethically; that as
long as their actions remain legal they will be ethical. Unfortunately, there are a number of
fundamental flaws in any such assumption: First, no legal construct can hope to cater for every
specific case and so there will inevitably be gaps between the letter and the spirit of the law. Indeed,
some legal agreements or documents (eg United Nations Resolutions) are deliberately phrased so as
to be open to a range of interpretations. This is for the thoroughly pragmatic purpose of enabling
groups with differing views to agree to a common resolution, without compromising their beliefs57.
However, if legal requirements can be open to different interpretations then they cannot be relied
upon to ensure that a given standard of behaviour is maintained.
40.
Second, a reliance on a purely legal approach may promote a tendency to exploit up to the
limits of the law and to operate as close as possible to the boundary with illegality. Actions can be
strictly legal but of dubious ethical value. For example, until 1974, Members of Parliament were not
forced publicly to disclose any extra income or gifts they received. A compulsory Register of
Interests was then introduced to ensure that an MP’s behaviour in the House of Commons could not
be influenced by undisclosed personal considerations. Tighter regulations were adopted in 1994 on
the recommendation of Lord Nolan’s Committee on Standards in Public Life. This was set up
54 Walzer (p20).
55 As reported in Smith, Eliot R & Mackie, Diane M, Social Psychology, 2nd Edition, Taylor and Francis, 2000, ISBN
0-86377-587-X.
56 Of 29 November 1868. Note that the Geneva Convention of 1864 sought just to legislate for the treatment of
Prisoners of War.
57 An example of this is UN Resolution 1441, which warned Iraq of ‘serious consequences’ if its conditions were not
met. This was interpreted by the US and UK as sanctioning military action against Iraq, yet was not seen to go this far
by other nations, especially France, Germany and Russia. Furthermore, there was great disagreement over what would
constitute a ‘material breach’ of the resolution and hence justify the ‘serious consequences’.
12
following the ‘cash for questions’ affair, where a national newspaper accused Conservative MPs
(including Neil Hamilton) of accepting money in return for asking questions in the House of
Commons. Even after the introduction of the tightened regulations, a number of Conservative MPs
still refused to declare all their earnings, because MPs are only required to declare outside earnings
that arise from the provision of services as an MP. They are not legally required to disclose earnings
from work 'arising' out of their membership of the House, something that is far more difficult to
assess58.
41.
Alternatively, some actions may fall into an area of legal ambiguity, where they could be
covered by a number of different legal requirements – either by accident or design. The legal status
of the prisoners captured by US forces in Afghanistan and now held at Camp Delta in Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba has been kept deliberately vague. If they are legitimate combatants then they should be
treated as Prisoners of War in accordance with the Geneva Convention. Alternatively, if they are
criminals, then they are entitled to legal representation. However, the US Government’s position, as
set out by Secretary of State for Defense, Donald Rumsfeld is that: ‘The characteristics of the
individuals captured is that they are unlawful combatants, not lawful combatants. That is why
they're characterised as detainees and not prisoners of war.’ However, the Red Cross has said that
the ‘unlawful combatant’ category is an American concept unrecognised in the Geneva
Conventions. The Red Cross has repeatedly asked the US to determine properly each prisoner's
status.
42.
Even an ideal legal code, which somehow managed to cover every eventuality with complete
clarity, would not provide a total safeguard of standards. This is because a law that lacks moral
compulsion is often ignored. The laws on ‘drink-driving’ are unequivocal and all drivers know that
it is illegal to drive whilst over the legal limit for blood alcohol. However, the regular government
sponsored anti drink-driving campaigns focus not on the illegality of the act or the penal
consequences but rather try to establish drink-driving as an anti-social and unethical act, by
highlighting the potential human cost of drink-driving. In other words, the aim is not to tell people
that drink-driving is illegal (they already know it is) but rather to show people why it is wrong.
Therefore a legal code that lacks an accepted ethical basis is unlikely to be strictly observed.
43.
Finally, and perhaps most crucially, a legal code has to be enforced: there have to be those
willing to bring charges, witnesses willing to testify, admissible evidence and a workable court. In
the case of the most extreme breaches of ethical behaviour, such as war crimes, there may be
significant problems. No doubt many war crimes have gone unknown because no witnesses, other
than the perpetrators survived. Furthermore, witnesses may be unwilling to come forward in case
they are subsequently targeted. Even when crimes do become known about by those not involved in
their commission, there may be an attempt to cover up the details, as noted by the Peers Report
which was set up to investigate the massacre at My Lai59. Where it is possible to establish a means
58 Lord Nolan's Committee also recommended on 8 July 1997 that there should be a criminal offence of "misuse of
public office", applying to ministers, civil servants, police, magistrates, and judges who seek advantage from their public
position.
59 On March 16, 1968 Charlie Company, 11th Brigade, Americal Division, commanded by Lt William Calley, entered
the village of My Lai and massacred 504 civilians including women, children, and the elderly. Word of the massacre
did not reach the American public until November 1969, when journalist Seymour Hersh published a story detailing his
conversations with ex-GI and Vietnam veteran, Ron Ridenhour. Ridenhour learned of the events at My Lai from
members of Charlie Company who had been there; before speaking with Hersh, he had appealed to Congress, the White
House, and the Pentagon to investigate the matter. The Peers Report into the My Lai massacre identified failures of
13
of enforcing the requirements of the Geneva Convention, such as through The International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)60 there are often strict limits to jurisdiction. In
the case of ICTY, the Tribunal can only investigate offences committed after 1991. More recently,
the establishment of the International Criminal Court has faced opposition from the US, who have
sought an exemption from prosecution for US Peacekeepers until 1 July 2004. The Deputy US
Ambassador to the UN, James Cunningham expressed the view that that: ‘the ICC is not the law’
and that it was ‘a fatally flawed institution’. Laws that exist without the full means of enforcement
cannot be guaranteed to ensure the observance of ethical standards. Furthermore, it is often
impossible to avoid ‘victor’s justice’ where ‘Right is subjugated to Might’ and a vanquished foe is
deprived of the means of bringing cases of misconduct against the victor whilst being subject to
such action himself. For: ‘the guilty must be punished for their guilt, not for having been
defeated’.61
44.
Therefore if it is desired to prevent war crimes rather than punish those responsible for them;
to encourage ethical behaviour rather than censure those who can be proven to have fallen short of
their responsibilities; it is clear that something beyond a legal code is required. In fact, it appears
that what is required is for soldiers to act in accordance with their ethical beliefs rather than in
response to laws.
WHAT SOLDIERS WANT TO BE
45.
The military world is surrounded by images of machismo, ruthlessness and cavalier
references to death62. However, it would be wrong to misinterpret this bravado as a proper
expression of how most soldiers actually view themselves, or would wish to be thought of. Most
soldiers desire to be seen as more than merely efficient butchers for, as Aristotle observed:
..’nobody chooses to make war or provokes it for the sake of making war; a man would be
regarded as a bloodthirsty monster if he made his friends into enemies in order to bring
about battles and slaughter63.
46.
This is supported by more recent examinations of attitudes amongst those wishing to join the
military64. Indeed, the military tradition is one that includes concepts of standards of behaviour that
go far beyond those necessary merely for efficient killing. The code of chivalry, which developed
during the 12th and 13th centuries, required knights to display a range of virtues such as: ‘justice /
wysedom / charite / loyalte / verite / humylite / strength / hope swiftness & al other virtues’65.
Knights, by observing this code, demonstrated that they stood apart from common brigands and
served a higher purpose than merely their own good. This code persisted, in theory if not in strict
leadership throughout the command chain, from the rank of Major General downwards. The military investigation
resulted in Calley being charged with murder in September 1969.
60 Established by Security Council Resolution 827.
61 Thibon, G Love and Violence, Sheed and Ward, London 1954 (p 6)
62 The unofficial motto adopted by many US Army units, especially those of the Airborne and Air Cavalry, in Vietnam
was: ’Death from Above’; a ‘Death’s Head’ was not only adopted as the cap badge of the German Schutzstaffel (SS)
but, over a scroll bearing the inscription: ‘Or Glory’, is the cap badge of the Queen’s Royal Lancers.
63 Aristotle: The Nicomahean Ethics, Book 10, vii.
64 In ‘The Warrior’s Code’, a paper given by Prof Shannon E. French, Ph.D. U.S. Naval Academy Dept. of Leadership,
Ethics, and Law at JSCOPE 02 (http://www.usafa.af.mil/jscope/JSCOPE02/French02.html), she detailed an exercise in
which potential officers were asked to judge certain terms as suitable synonyms for ‘Warrior’. The results showed that
‘It is very important to them .. that while most warriors do kill people, they never murder anyone’.
65 Lull, Raymon: Libre del Orde de Cauayleria, (The Book of the Order of Chivalry) Caxton edition, c. 1494.
14
observance, for many centuries but in the end, chivalry, it was said, was the victim of democratic
revolution and of revolutionary war66. However, in his study of British leadership during the First
World War, Gary Sheffield argues that a form of chivalric code that had re-emerged in the 19th
century had, by 1914 metamorphosed into ‘gentlemanliness’67:
Chivalric influences, ingested via the public school, pulpit and sports field, left the young
men who served as subalterns in the trenches with little doubt as to the standards expected of
gentlemen placed in command of men who were fighting for their country… Christ’s dictum
that ‘greater love hath no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends’ (John
15:13) dovetailed neatly with chivalric ideals. The result was a view of life summarised by
the Latin tag: dulce et decorum est pro patria mori: it is sweet and right to die for one’s
country68.
47.
Whilst soldiers accept that they have a contract of unlimited liability that may require them
to lay down their lives, they (and their families) are eager that they should not die in vain. Paying
‘the ultimate price’ in order to protect the innocent; defend their state from a wicked aggressor; or
defeat some monstrous evil, would be seen as being both noble and worthwhile. There would be
some comfort amongst their comrades and relatives that their death was a bitter yet necessary
payment for some greater good. Even where soldiers die by accident in a war (for example as a
result of ‘friendly fire’) it can be a crumb of comfort to the bereaved if they were at that time engage
in a just, and by definition, necessary endeavour. As Walzer points out: ‘a soldier who dies in a just
war does not die in vain’.69 Conversely, the prospect of expending the lives of soldiers on a cause
that is not justifiable or necessary, is morally repugnant.
48.
This notion of soldiers serving a noble cause is in stark contrast to mere mercenaries, who
Machiavelli dismisses as:’ disunited, thirsty for power, undisciplined, disloyal; they are brave
among their friends and cowards before the enemy; they have no fear of God, they do not keep faith
with their fellow men’70. In the end, it would appear to be true, at least in the eyes of soldiers, that ‘a
man can be … in every way corrupt and be a brilliant mathematician, or a great painter, but there’s
one thing he can’t be and that is a good soldier”. 71
WHAT SOLDIERS NEED TO BE
49.
Aggressive. For all their noble aspirations, most professional servicemen recognise that
aggression is a powerful and necessary force in motivating soldiers to fight when they may be
scared or unsure of their own abilities. This is not peculiar to the military; the ‘pep talk’ given to
sports teams before an important match rarely focuses on the rights of the opposition or the need to
consider their feelings. Instead, especially in contact sports, teams are encouraged to feel aggression
towards their opponents. This serves to bond the team, focus their efforts on the defeat of the
opposition and raise their adrenalin in order to heighten performance and overcome nerves.
Experience on the sports field translates to the soldier’s understanding: a group that lacks aggression
66 Fuller, Maj Gen J F C, The Conduct of War 1789 – 1961: A Study of the impact of the French, Industrial and Russian
Revolutions on War and its Conduct, 1972, Eyre Methuen, London.
67 Sheffield, G D, Leadership in the Trenches: Officer-man relations, morale and discipline in the British Army in the
Era of the First World War, ISBN 0-333-71046-0.
68 This was taken as the ironic title of a poem by Wilfred Owen.
69 Walzer (p110).
70 Machiavelli, Niccolo: The Prince, Penguin Classics, (p 39).
71 Gen Sir John Hackett, from Gwen Dyer’s film A Profession of Arms.
15
may be easily disheartened or may lack the drive to put all their efforts into the battle. As warfare is
often described as a contest of wills, where ‘the aim is to kill enemy’s spirit’72, it is the group that is
most resolute that is likely to prevail. The deliberate engendering of aggression is publicly
displayed in the way boxers are warmed up by their coaches, including their highly stage-managed
entrances to the arena. It is seen in ritualised form at New Zealand rugby matches, in the Maori
Haka.
50.
Belligerent. Aggression, and the way it is promoted, also has the additional benefit of
making ‘the enemy’ seem less a group of individuals, each entitled to be treated with respect, but
more a hostile entity that must be defeated. The de-personalising of an enemy is important in
helping the soldier or sportsman deal with the prospect of inflicting his will forcibly on his
opponents.
‘The troops must be brought to a state of wild enthusiasm before the operation begins .. They
must enter the fight with the light of battle in their eyes and definitely wanting to kill the
enemy’73
However, aggression can be difficult to control, especially in the aftermath of a battle and when
fuelled by alcohol. When Wellington’s troops stormed the Spanish walled city of Badajoz and
captured it from the French on 19 April 1812, the found that their Spanish allies had made the city
‘illuminated to welcome them, but it counted for nothing and they began to engage in plunder,
waste, destruction of property, drunkenness, and debauchery, that usually follows a capture by
assault’74.
51.
Terrifying. As well as raising aggression, the Haka is also designed to terrorise opponents.
The aim of instilling terror in an opponent’s mind, so that he will be less resolute in battle (or better
yet, simply run away) has been apparent throughout the history of warfare and can be seen in such
diverse activities as the wearing of woad or bearskins to make warriors look frightening, to the use
of music (especially bagpipes!) and propaganda. In the modern context, the intended use of ‘shock
and awe’ at the start of the Second Gulf War, fits the pattern exactly. The use of terror is, however,
paradoxical, since by threatening dire consequences (such as a painful death) it seeks to make an
enemy surrender and hence make the threatened sanction unnecessary.
52.
Disciplined. The aim of much military endeavour is to create a single entity out of a group
of individuals. This is a military necessity, since an army acting in perfect concert is far more
effective than a disparate group of the same size: ‘A disorderly mob is no more of a fighting force
than a heap of building materials is a house’75 For this reason armies are obsessed with creating
uniformity both in dress and behaviour. Uniformity of behaviour is a pre-requisite if a group of
soldiers is to be able to act as one and, more importantly, respond quickly to changing situations.
53.
Obedient: ‘Orders is Orders’76. The origins of military drill are in the exercises carried out to
enable soldiers to manoeuvre around the battlefield in a cohesive group and to bring their firepower
72 Clausewitz, On War (p 259).
73 Montgomery, B L The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery, Collins London 1958 (quoted in Coates p 29)
74 As reported by Sergeant William Lawrence in Hathaway, Eileen, A Dorset Soldier: The Autobiography of Sergeant
William Lawrence 1790 – 1869, Spellmount, 1993 (pp87-93). Note: It was the practice of the day that if a walled city
refused to surrender once its defences had been breached, if it was then taken by assault, the occupants could expect no
quarter. This policy did not, however, cater for friendly cities occupied by the enemy, as was the case at Badajoz.
75 Socrates.
76 The title of a 1934 British Gaumont Film, which passed into popular usage by soldiers during World War 2.
16
to bear effectively77. Such drill movements are carried out instantly the word of command is given,
as this is how the soldiers are required to respond in the heat of the battle. Clearly, it would be
impossible to manoeuvre a large body of men effectively if each responded at a different time, or if
some wished to consider the requirement before acting. Were cohesion to break down in this way,
an enemy would find it easy to exploit the ensuing confusion. Therefore, in order to ensure
collective survival, instant obedience to orders is the foundation of military discipline. This
requirement to obey orders is enforced by law.
54.
Controlled by those in Authority. The authority to give orders is obviously of great
significance. The hierarchical system of the armed forces is rigidly upheld, with a clear
differentiation between ranks, so that it is always clear who in any group has the ultimate authority
to issue orders. Military rank structure is reinforced by dress, where rank is prominently displayed,
and in the domestic arrangements that constitute the various Messes. Whilst the need for orders to
be obeyed instantly is an essential military requirement, it does carry risks in terms of ethical
behaviour. If an individual or group is pre-disposed towards obeying someone in authority there is a
danger that they will do so, even when they think it is wrong. During his famous experiments at
Yale in 1963, Stanley Milgram asked volunteers to administer electric shocks to an assistant when
he failed to perform tasks correctly. Even when the assistant was apparently suffering extreme pain
as a result of the shocks, 68% of the volunteers proved willing to administer the maximum shock
level of 450 volts (ominously marked XXX on the control box). From this experiment, Milgram
developed his theory of the ‘Norm of Obedience to Authority’.78 Milgram found that as long as the
volunteers were under the supervision of someone they felt to be in a position of authority; were told
that someone else would take the responsibility for their actions; and that the experiment had to go
on, most continued to administer the shocks to the assistant despite his apparent suffering. Clearly,
the military parallels are potentially disturbing.
55.
Decisive. The importance of speedy and resolute decision making has long been recognised
as a key element of military operations79. This was dramatically demonstrated during the German
advance into France in 1940. Despite having superior numbers of tanks available80, the French
command system was unable to cope with the speed of the German blitzkrieg. Thus, the orders
issued by French headquarters were often hopelessly late.81. Given this necessity for rapid decision
making, it would be unreasonable, and militarily disastrous, to expect commanders to weigh
77 At the battle of Salamanca on 22 July 1812, the speed with which the British 3rd Division were able to move from
column into line (and thereby engage the French) was a significant factor in the French defeat.
78 Smith & Mackie, Social Psychology.
79 Colonel John R Boyd was a pilot during the Korean War. In 1953 he observed that whilst the Korean MiG-15s were
faster than the US F86s, they were less manoeuvrable. In simulated combat, Boyd used the difference in response time
between the aircraft to create an increasing decision making lead. This was because each time the F86 manoeuvred, the
MiG would respond slightly later by which time the F86 could be beginning a new manoeuvre. Boyd developed a
theory based on this phenomenon that was based around an Observation – Orientation – Decision – Action (OODA)
loop. Getting inside an enemy’s decision making cycle is a key aim of military commanders. Details in: Coram, Robert,
Boyd: The fighter pilot who changed the Art of War, Little, Brown and Company, (ISBN: 0-316-881465(hc).
80 ‘The Panzerwaffe was substantially outnumbered in every class save that of light tanks, which were of no value in
the tank battle. It was also at a qualitative disadvantage in that its thickest armour was only 30mm while that of the 800
modern (French) Char Bs and Soumas alone was 60mm and 55mm respectively…. And its standard armour defeating
weapon, the 37mm, could not compare with the 47mm gun carried by the Char B and Souma’. From: Perret, Bryan: A
History of Blitzkrieg, Hale 1983. (p 88).
81 Ibid. Perret outlines how a great French counter-stroke against the German crossings over the Meuse was launched
too late. The commander of one unit (1st Divisions Cuirassées) was required to travel 20 miles to a Headquarters
merely to be told to attack. The attack was then postponed by 24 hours and the unfortunate unit was subsequently
caught by Rommel’s 7th Panzer Division, whilst it was replenishing in preparation for the delayed attack. (p 94-95).
17
separately ethical considerations before or during the decision making process. A suspension of
operations whilst a particularly knotty ethical problem was deliberated would be unacceptable,
although there is an historical precedent82. Therefore, great emphasis is placed on developing
commanders at all levels who can rapidly assess a situation and come to a decision, even if it does
not provide the optimal solution since: ‘a good plan violently executed now is better than a perfect
plan next week’83. In seeking to understand how decisions can be taken quickly without a formal
objective assessment of all the known facts, considerable work has been conducted into the role of
intuition in military decision making. This has revealed that experience is a significant factor in
allowing rapid decisions to be made, since once circumstances fit a recognised and previously
experienced pattern, intuitive deductions concerning the likely outcome of events can be made. This
experience can, it appears, be artificially created through exercises that simulate real conditions. A
study of successful World War 2 divisional commanders has shown that most of these men spent
between 49 and 108 months on schools faculties and staffs and became experts on subject of warfare
and therefore developed a wealth of experience, albeit artificial, on which to base their decisions84.
56.
Just. In the ‘heat of battle’ many people get killed by accident, including friendly forces (socalled ‘blue on blue’ incidents). However, enemy soldiers clearly wishing to surrender should not
be deliberately killed. That this often happens, especially after an enemy has inflicted significant
casualties, is well known and is even recorded in official histories without explanation:
While some of the occupants (of Switch Trench) made a poor fight, others, stouter hearted,
threw bombs and fired rifles till our lines were atop of them, and then on a greater part of
the front, throwing down their weapons, they held up their hands, and with calculated
presumption called for mercy. Mercy, however, was shown only to the Red Cross men and
the wounded’85.
Such actions are normally put down to the hysteria or frenzy of battle, suggesting that soldiers, once
charged with aggression and adrenaline are temporarily unable to consider the impact of their
actions; they have a temporary bloodlust. Walzer asserts that ‘whilst it is true that enemy soldiers
are often killed trying to surrender, it is also true that a relatively small number of men do the
‘extra’ killing. The rest seem ready enough to stop as soon as they can, whatever the state of mind
they had worked themselves into during the battle itself’86. This suggests that some soldiers may
consider such killing justified in terms of ‘an eye for an eye’.
57.
Compassionate. Soldiers are also required to be compassionate, not just in order to comply
with the legal requirements of the Law of Armed Conflict, but because their role is increasingly
expanding beyond simply Warfighting. The emergence of doctrine for ‘Peace Support Operations’
has only just kept pace with Peace Keeping and Peace Enforcement operations. Indeed, looking at
82 King Charles V of Spain (who was also the Holy Roman Emperor) suspended the conquest of Latin America in 1550
– 1551, so that the justice of the war and its conduct could be debated. Vitoria and Las Casas considered a range of
questions including whether the native Indians could be killed in order to protect European settlers from the practice of
human sacrifice; was pre-emptive killing permissible; was ‘regime change’ justified, and whether the Indians were
‘natural slaves’. It should be noted, however, that this was a very unequal war of conquest where the suspension of
operations had no deleterious effect on subsequent capabilities or opportunities.
83 Patton, General George S, War as I Knew It’ Allen, 1948.
84 Wade, LTC G H, World War II Divisional Commanders, Combat Studies Institute Report No 7 (US Army
Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas).
85 From the Divisional History of the New Zealand Division, referring to the capture of Switch Trench (between
Delville and High Woods), Somme, 15 September 1916. Reported in Sheffield (p 120)
86 Walzer (p 307).
18
the British Armed Forces, over the period since the end of the Falklands Conflict in 1982, only a
small proportion of time has been spent engaged in offensive combat operations. The vast majority
of the period has seen British land forces employed on Peace Support Operations in Cyprus, Sierra
Leone, Bosnia, Kosovo and elsewhere, whilst the Royal Navy and RAF have also been conducting
similar operations.
58.
Risk Accepters. People are often motivated to join the armed forces because they wish to
test themselves or because they seek excitement and adventure. Inherent in this is a willingness
(sometimes a desire) to take risks that could endanger their bodies or lives. This is apt since the
holding of public office, and their role as defenders, means that servicemen are expected (and
generally accept the expectation) to put their own lives at risk in order to protect others. Indeed,
Walzer states that ‘The war convention requires soldiers to accept personal risks rather than kill
innocent people’.87 However, there have been circumstances recently where the implementation of
this principle has been questioned. The conduct of air operations over Kosovo has been seen by
some as demonstrating a willingness to accept civilian casualties in order to protect servicemen. In
this particular case it was argued that coalition aircraft flew at high altitude in order to be safe from
Surface to Air Missiles, but that ‘NATO's determined effort to avoid pilot casualties precluded lowflying operations that might have helped to identify targets more accurately.88 The willingness of
some nations to give over-riding emphasis to the protection of their own forces, regardless of the
impact on non-combatants, is an issue of great concern.89
59.
Professional. Just as soldiers hold public office, they are also seen by some as being
‘professionals’. The definitions of what constitutes a profession, as opposed to an occupation are
varied90 but all seem to embrace the possession of specialized knowledge; a commitment to service;
a common identity and ethos; and autonomy in decision making. In view of this it does appear that
the military can be deemed a profession. It has been argued that because of these attributes,
professions are perceived to exhibit that high quality of work in terms of requisite expertise,
experience, and dedication to service; that justifies public respect and trust. However, it has also
been argued that if servicemen are truly to be considered as professionals, they need to have
education and training in ethics. This is so that they can retain the autonomy91 they enjoy in
decision making by demonstrating to the public that they are aware of the proper role of their
profession and its function as a force for good. Also, professional judgement involves more than
simply identifying that which is most efficient, and should involve consider the ethical implications
since: 'Technical skills without moral insight are directionless, and therefore dangerous. The
87 Walzer (p 305)
88 Human Rights Watch report on Kosovo (see: http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/kosovo/undword2b.html)
89 See: New York Times 20 April 2003: 'Good Kills' by Peter Maass; Sunday Times 25 May 2003: Cover story:
‘Overkill’ by Jon Swain.
90 Pavalko, Ronald M, Sociology of Occupations and Professions, FE Peacock Publishers 1971. Pavalko describes
certain qualities that are attributed to professions: 1. Theory and intellectual technique - a unique knowledge base
justifying the claim to special expertise. 2. Relevance to Basic Social Values - the relevance of work to social values. 3.
Training Period - a long training period requiring specialised knowledge and indoctrination into the occupational
subculture. 4. Motivation - a service versus a profit motivation. 5. Autonomy - occupational autonomy; the profession is
self-regulating and self-controlling. Only members of the profession judge and certify who is competent to practice. 6.
Sense of Commitment - a strong sense of commitment and loyalty to the profession. 7. Sense of Community - a strong
sense of common identity resulting in a significant subculture. 8. Code of Ethics - a code of ethics and system of norms
that are parts of the subculture, reinforcing motivation, autonomy and commitment.
91 Servicemen enjoy autonomy in as much as they are generally given a mission but are expected to use their
professional judgement in how best to achieve it.
19
amoral professional (to say nothing of the immoral professional) is a tool for hire, and indeed, he is
no professional at all; he is a technician, valued for his skill but not for his judgement.’92
60.
The Dichotomy. Requiring soldiers to be ruthlessly aggressive, instantly obedient, and a
source of terror to the enemy; whilst at the same time being just, reasoning and compassionate, can
pose significant problems. There have been several instances of elite fighting formations failing to
keep their aggression in check, especially when confronted with an enemy that they cannot get to
grips with, such as terrorists or guerrillas. The conduct of French paratroopers in Algeria during the
conflict with the Front de Libération Nationale during the period 1954-62 was noted for the brutality
with which terrorist suspects were interrogated and, allegedly, murdered by the French. More
recently, the behaviour of soldiers engaged on Operation RESTORE HOPE in Somalia has
demonstrated how soldiers from nations that consider themselves not just civilised, but
sophisticated, can fail to behave humanely. The Daily Telegraph, in reporting numerous accusations
of the torture of civilians by UN peacekeepers noted that ‘A common thread through the accusations
against the Belgian, Italian and Canadian forces, is the racism of elite units, particularly airborne
units, and their inability to adapt to low-intensity peacekeeping operations.’93
61.
Multiple Personalities? It must then be asked whether we require our servicemen to be two
people: warrior and carer. Apart from the difficulty of trying to create such conflicting
characteristics within an individual’s personality, the requirement is for servicemen to display both
characteristics concurrently. Therefore what is needed is an ethical outlook that can comprehend the
need both for killing and compassion. Indeed, even von Moltke’s realistic views acknowledged
some limits to warfare94.
62.
Balanced. The need for soldiers to operate within an ethical framework, which balances
necessary aggression with compassion, is apparent. Observance of such a code was clearly lacking
in the conduct of some of the forces engaged in RESTORE HOPE. However, acting with
compassion is not just an ethical imperative; it also makes sound military sense. If an enemy
believes that he will be treated humanely if he surrenders, he is far more likely to do so, than if he
believes he will be given no quarter. In that case he will fight desperately, regardless of the overall
situation, and seek to make his opponent pay dearly for taking his life. Similarly, treating civilians
humanely makes military sense and the practice of trying to ‘win hearts and minds’ has shown to
pay enormous dividends in a range of conflicts since the Malayan Emergency of 1948.
92 Kennedy, Robert G, Why Military Officers Must Have Training in Ethics, 25 January 2000 (see:
http://www.usafa.af.mil/jscope/JSCOPE00/Kennedy00.html)
93 The Daily Telegraph of 24 June 1997 reported that 2 Belgian paratroopers, who were photographed "roasting" a
Somali boy over a flaming brazier, were expected to be jailed for only a month and fined $200 after admitting the
atrocity in a military court in Brussels. Two other members of the unit were awaiting trial (including for suspected
murder) and 15 members of the same regiment were investigated in 1995 for "acts of sadism and torture" against
Somalian civilians. In the same month a Milan magazine published pictures of Italian soldiers from the Folgore
(Lightning) Division, torturing a young Somali youth, and abusing and raping a young Somali girl. An Italian
paratrooper said: "What's the big deal? They are just niggers anyway." In 1995 a group of Canadian paratroopers were
investigated for torturing a Somali to death and killing three others, their regiment (the Vingt Doux) was disbanded in
1996 as a direct result.
94 Von Moltke: ‘all means save those that are absolutely objectionable’.
20
JUST WAR
‘The duty of bearing arms, of being prepared to fight, kill and if necessary die in carrying
out orders, carries with it the responsibility only to do so in a just cause. All soldiers have
direct and unique responsibility for life and death. Soldiering is subject to international and
national law, but all British soldiers must discharge their duties not just according to orders
and law, but consciously and clearly for the greater good. Commanders must ensure that all
soldier understand these responsibilities of their service, and that their cause is just. This
entails proper understanding of the Laws of War, Humanitarian Law and Rules of
Engagement; but it also means an underlying deep realisation of the moral and ethical
responsibility of bearing arms. British soldiers must obey their orders confident that the
ends, ways and means are right morally as well as militarily, not least because they will be
increasingly exposed to external moral debate.95
63.
Some guidance for the serviceman is needed since ‘As a consequence of a soldier being
ordered to fight, it becomes his virtuous duty to break one set of rules and simultaneously devote all
his energies, and maybe his life, to abide by another’. 96 How can an ethical code, which has utility
in the military context and which also is acceptable to the public on whose behalf they act, be
framed? What cultural norms can be applied or assumed as its basis? It would seem that it is
necessary to define the code such that it can have universal acceptance and applicability. It should
not, therefore, be reliant on religion or nationalism for its justification. Indeed, any code based on
strictly religious grounds might be open to the accusation of encouraging zealots, for the question is:
‘how democracies are to develop virtues in their citizens to fight wars with limited purposes, not
crusades’97. There will always be those who seek to characterise conflicts by reference to battles
between religions (eg Christians against Moslems).
64.
There are essentially four ways in which to approach a consideration of war98. The first,
which has already been discussed, is Realism. Since this views the conduct of war beyond
regulation it cannot form the basis of an ethical code. The second view is to consider Holy War; a
belief that God can authorize the killing of unbelievers or those who have broken some taboo. Holy
wars normally aim at the achievement of a religious goal and are authorised by religious leaders
with the promise of spiritual reward for those taking part. This view has a long tradition stretching
from the Roman Emperor Constantine, through the Crusades and to the present day99. However,
inevitably in any war, religious men will claim that God is on their side. During Lincoln’s second
inaugural address in 1865, he noted that both sides in the Civil War ‘read the same bible, and pray
to the same god; and each invokes His aid against the other .. the prayers of both could not be
95 From Army Doctrine Publication: Soldiering para 0303.
96 Mileham, Patrick in The British Army, Manpower and Society into the Twenty First Century, Strachan, Hew (Ed),
Frank Cass, London 2000.
97 Hauerwas, Stanley, Dispatches from the Front, University of Notre Dame Press, 1994 (p 147).
98 The term ‘war’ is used in its broadest sense to cover the range of forms of collective aggression that encompasses
things such as civil war and revolutionary war. It is not restricted to those conflicts where there is a formal declaration
of war between 2 states.
99 Although much is made of the notion of jihad in Islam, Christian views on the holy purpose of war are by no means
confined to the Old Testament. During the Spanish-American war the editor of the Methodist Review said: ‘we shall be
much disappointed if the final outcome of the war does not show that it was one of God’s most efficient agencies for the
advancement of true Christian Civilisation and the ushering in of brighter times for the human race’ Sheffield (p199)
21
answered; that of neither has been answered fully.’100 However, as noted earlier, any code that is
not secular could not be hoped to gain universal acceptance.
65.
Pacifism is another means of dealing with war. Pacifists argue that the evils associated with
war are so great that it can never be right. Clearly, this is an inappropriate basis for an ethical code
for soldiers whose profession involves the willingness to engage in war.
66.
The final way of viewing war has been called Just War. This view is based on a belief that
war is justified under certain circumstances and that ethical considerations have a part to play both
in deciding when it is right to go to war, and how the war should be conducted. Just War’s origins
are secular and although other faiths101 contain teaching on Just War, it was the development of
theories within the Christian church that has most significantly shaped its current expression. Just
War has helped shape both the UN Charter and international law. It seeks to reflect the sanctity of
human life and the principle of equal human dignity and that these concepts should apply to foe and
ally alike.
A POTTED HISTORY OF ‘JUST WAR’
67.
Cicero. The development of a concept of ‘Just War can be traced back to the Greeks and
Romans. The Roman orator, jurist and philosopher Cicero (c106-43BC) held that the use of force
was justifiable only when the war was declared by an appropriate governmental authority within
specific limits and ‘after an official demand for satisfaction has been submitted or warning has been
given and a formal declaration made’102. Cicero argued that the only acceptable reason for war
was just vengeance and self defence, in which he included the defence of honour. Cicero based his
arguments on the assumption that both nature and human reason biased a society against war. He
believed that there was a universal norm of human behaviour that transcended the laws of individual
nations and governed their relations with each other. He also believed that there was a humani
generic societas, a society of mankind rather than of states.
68.
St Augustine of Hippo. St Ambrose (c339-397) began outlining the circumstances under
which a war could be just but it was his pupil, Augustine (354-430) who fully developed these ideas.
Augustine, who lived in Algeria and Italy, believed in the primacy of peace and therefore that the
only just reason to go to war was the desire for peace.
100 Quoted in Sheffield (p 197).
101 Jainism is claimed to be the only faith that has always been completely peaceful. In Judaism, the Talmud defines 3
kinds of war: milhemet hova (obligatory war), milhemet reshut (optional war), and pre-emptive war. For Moslems, the
idea of a total unrestricted war is unislamic (‘Fight in the cause of God against those who fight you, but do not
transgress limits. God does not love transgressors.’ Qur'an 2:190). Furthermore, Muslims must only wage war
according to the principles of Allah's justice. (‘Those who believe fight in the way of Allah, and those who disbelieve
fight in the way of the Shaitan.’ Qur'an 4:76). Sikhism has a concept of the Just War (Dharam Yudh), which is war in the
defence of righteousness. Hinduism, a term that covers a variety of Indian faiths, also includes teachings on the just way
to conduct war. The great Sanskrit epic, The Mahabharata, is a poem that chronicles the human and divine war between
the Pandavas and the Kauravas, and contains example of the justice of war. Although Buddhism is essentially a
peaceful religion, in the 14th century Buddhist fighters led an uprising to evict the Mongols from China and in the 20th
century, Buddhist Japanese Zen masters wrote in support of Japan's wars of aggression.
102 Bederman, David J, Reception of the Classical Tradition in International Law: Grotius’ De Jure Belli Ac Pacis,
Emory International Review 1, 31 – 32 (1996).
http://www.law.emory.edu/students/eilr/volumes/spring96/bederman.html
22
‘We do not seek peace in order to be at war, but we go to war that we may have peace. Be
peaceful, therefore, in warring, so that you may vanquish those whom you war against, and
bring them to the prosperity of peace.’
Augustine tried to reconcile Christian pacifism with the world as it actually was; to bring together
the pacifist teachings of Jesus Christ with the obligations of Roman citizens, including Christians, to
‘render unto Caesar’ by fighting for their country when required to. Whilst Augustine accepted that
there would always be wars, he believed that war was always a sin. Therefore, if soldiers had to
fight, he believed that it was a moral imperative that they do so without hatred. He made it clear
that prisoners and conquered peoples should be treated with compassion and that the vanquished
should be shown mercy, particularly if they were no longer a threat to peace. He also believed that
the rulers of states had an obligation to maintain peace, and this obligation gave them the right to
wage war in order to maintain peace. It also gave them the right to wage war in order to ensure
justice and even impose punishment:
‘The natural order, which seeks the peace of mankind, ordains that the monarch should have
the power of undertaking war if he thinks it advisable’103
As well as competent authority (the ruler), Augustine believed that the intent behind a decision to go
to war must always be right: ‘(f) or it makes a great difference by which causes and under which
authorities men undertake the wars that must be waged’. Augustine believed that injustice was a
greater evil than war and that:
‘A just war is wont to be described as one that avenges wrongs, when a nation or state has to
be punished, for refusing to make amends for the wrongs inflicted by its subjects, or to
restore what it has seized unjustly’.
Augustine made it clear that individuals and states (or the rulers of states) have different obligations
when it came to war or violence. He stated that Christians did not have the right to defend
themselves from violence; however they could use violence if it was necessary to defend the
innocent against evil.
69.
St Thomas Aquinas. Thomas Aquinas (1225 – 1274) is regarded as one of the greatest
philosophers ever. He adopted Augustine’s teachings and elaborated them, and whilst he did not
take Augustine’s ideas a great deal further, he did make Just War theory clearer and more structured.
He too believed that war is always a sin although he held that soldiering itself was not.104 He also
addressed the question of ambushes and deception and whether these should be seen as lawful in
accordance with Christian theology, concluding that they were105. Aquinas, like Augustine,
concerned himself with the right of making war (jus ad bellum) rather than the conduct of war (jus
in bello). Aquinas stated:
‘For a war to be just, three things are necessary.
103 Augustine, Contra Faustum (XXll. 75)
104 Summa Theologica, pt. II/II Question 40 (http://www.newadvent.org/summa/): ‘If the Christian Religion forbade
war altogether, those who sought salutary advice in the Gospel would rather have been counselled to cast aside their
arms, and to give up soldiering altogether. On the contrary, they were told: ’do violence to no man.. and be content
with your pay’ [Luke 3:14] If he commanded them to be content with their pay, he did not forbid soldiering’
105 Aquinas believed that deliberate deception, through lying or breaking promises was unlawful but that deception that
arises from the concealing of a true purpose is lawful.
23
First the authority of the sovereign by whose command the war is to be waged ..
Secondly, a just cause is required, namely that those who are attacked should be
attacked because they deserve it on account of some fault ..
Thirdly, it is necessary that the belligerents should have a rightful intention, so that
they intend the advancement of good, or the avoidance of evil.’ 106
Together with St Augustine, Aquinas’ views on the justification of war form the basic core of Just
War theory and it was from their concepts that the theory of Just War was adapted and expanded by
later thinkers.
70.
Hugo Grotius. Hugo Grotius (1583-1645), a Dutch Protestant philosopher, who is
sometimes referred to as the ‘father of international law’, lived during the 30 Years War and was
appalled by the brutality with which Christians, as well as others, behaved during conflicts: ‘I saw
in the whole Christian world a license of fighting at which even barbarous nations might blush.’
Grotius developed the Just War doctrines to remove their religious foundation and in his book De
Jure Belli Ac Pacis (The Rights of War and Peace), published in 1625107, he set out the conditions
for a Just War that are accepted today. Although he was himself a believer, he wanted to show that
ethical guidelines for war could be based on rational, secular reasoning and would be valid without
involving God or religion, making such a theory more acceptable for the Age of the Enlightenment.
For Grotius, a war was just if the danger faced by the nation was immediate; the force used was
necessary adequately to defend the nation’s interests; and if the use of force was proportionate to the
threatened danger. He agreed with Cicero’s notion of the need for a declaration of war in the natural
law and also suggested methods for arranging truces and peace treaties. He set down rules of war
that would protect innocent non-combatants and improve the treatment of hostages and prisoners.
Crucially, Grotius proposed the independence of Jus in Bello from Jus ad Bellum. He believed that
as both sovereigns fighting a war could not both be correct in their claim of jus ad bellum, the
soldiers on the ‘unjust side’ could not be responsible for the recourse but were still required to act
justly. In other words: a war can be conducted, indeed must be conducted, justly even if it was not
predicated on a just cause.
71.
The Charter for the Nuremburg Trials and the United Nations Charter. Just War theory
changed little until the end of the Second World War when the Charter for the International Military
Tribunal at Nuremburg set out the contemporary notion of just war theory as represented by both
Aquinas and Grotius. The Nuremburg Charter also expressly stated that the fact that a defendant
acted under superior orders is not a lawful defence. Prior to Nuremburg, this had been uncertain,
with both British and US manuals of military law until 1944 stating that a serviceman did not
commit a war crime if he merely carried out orders. The United Nations’ Charter also contributed to
the Just War theory by recognising the right of self defence. Article 51 of the Charter set out ‘the
inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of
the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain
international peace and security.108 Although both Augustine and Aquinas believed that war could
be a just punishment, the idea that war could be conducted to punish outlaw nations or achieve
retribution gradually lost support such that by the 1960s the idea of war being conducted for reasons
other than self-defence had lost credibility.
106 Ibid.
107 See a translation of the text of De Jure Belli ac Pacis at: http://www.geocities.com/Athens/Thebes/8098/
108 http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/
24
THE PRINCIPLES OF JUST WAR
72.
It should be noted that ‘there is no such beast as the ‘just war theory’. Instead there is a
family of theories’109. However, in order to permit an examination of the problems surrounding
these theories, it is necessary to outline a generally accepted standard view of Just War110.
73.
The Recourse to War. In the case of recourse to war (jus ad bellum), it is thought that it is
just when there is:
a.
Just Cause. This is generally viewed as being restricted to self-defence, either to
right a wrong already committed or to pre-empt an anticipated attack.
b.
A Competent Authority to initiate and guide the use of force. Whilst competent
authority can be identified with a sovereign state, or with an organisation such as the United
Nations, this does not provide a complete solution.
c.
Right Intention. War should not be used to secure advantage or for reasons of
national self-interest; it must only be used to secure justice.
d.
Reasonable Chance of Success. In order to spare unnecessary suffering on both
sides, war should only be contemplated if there is a reasonable chance that it can be won.
e.
Proportionality of the ends to the means. This has been taken to refer both to the
level of destruction involved in the war and to consideration of the balance of power.
Other commentators111 include the notion that war should be an act of the Last Resort as a separate
requirement. Note that Grotius’ requirement for a formal declaration is no longer part of the Just
War formulation and that war can therefore be defined in its broadest sense to include conflicts and
other large scale employment of offensive military force.
74.
The Conduct of War. With regard to the conduct of war (jus in bello), it is generally held
that there are 2 key principles:
a.
Discrimination and Non-Combatant Immunity. As non-combatants are deemed to be
innocent and not part of the realm of war, it is held that it is necessary to discriminate
between them and combatants. Furthermore, it is necessary to assert that the innocence of
non-combatants is based on their being harmless: unable to contribute militarily to the
conduct of the war. Their innocence is not based on their not supporting the war; they can be
heartily in favour of a war but still not legitimate targets by virtue of their harmless nature.
However, it is acknowledged as inevitable that non-combatants will accidentally be killed in
war. To guide actions that could result in the death of non-combatants, the ‘Doctrine of
Double Effect’ was developed. This states that action that results in civilian deaths is
justified as long as that was not the object of the action. Therefore, targeting a military
facility in a city is legitimate, as although civilian casualties are foreseeable, that is not the
object of the attack, but an unwanted side-effect.
109 Boulton, Wayne G, Kennedy, Thomas d & Verhey, Allen: From Christ to the World: Introductory Readings in
Christian Ethics, William B Eerdmans Publishing Company, Grand Rapids, Michigan, 1994.
110 As set out by Alex Moseley in the Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy.
(http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/j/justwar.htm).
111 Such as Coates and Walzer.
25
b.
Proportionality. As in jus ad bellum, the requirement is that the means employed
must be proportional to the desired ends; the use of force and the consequent infliction of
suffering must be neither gratuitous nor excessive.
Clearly, these descriptions of the tenets of Just War Theory are mere outlines; a full discussion of
their meanings, implications and apparent contradictions is out with the scope of this paper.
However, some specific problems surrounding Just War criteria will be discussed later.
JUST WAR TRADITION OR THEORY?
75.
As noted above, there is, in fact, no single and definitive ‘Just War Theory’. Furthermore,
some commentators refer not to a theory, but to a ‘Just War Tradition’112. In judging which is the
most appropriate term, it is necessary to decide whether one wishes to view ‘Just War’ as a concept
that can be seen as distinct from actual practice; something that can be selectively employed, or not,
as necessary. If this is the case, then Just War is indeed a family of theories and nothing more.
However, if Just War is to be seen as an ingrained and inseparable element of behaviour, then it
should be deemed a ‘tradition’113.
‘The standards, the ethics, must become embedded into the organisation’s everyday
behaviours, whether that organisation may be a public institution at the heart of government
or one of our smaller companies. That is what has to happen with standards, even a Code
and a charismatic leader do not guarantee the desired end result in either the private or the
public sector – the business with high ethics, the public body with high standards. A Code is
useless unless the people it covers first, know it exists and what it says; second, understand
how it should affect the way they carry out their duties; and third, actively want to be part of
the culture it represents.’114
THE PRACTICAL APPLICABILITY OF JUST WAR TO MODERN CONFLICTS
76.
It is held by some that the Just War Tradition has been overtaken by reality and that ‘it is the
nuclear age in which we are now seen to live that has made just war thinking irrelevant’115.
Alternatively, that it is ‘modern war itself, quite irrespective of its particular mode, that has
destroyed the moral possibilities of war… Nuclear war simply takes to an extreme a trend that was
already established well before the advent of nuclear or atomic weapons’116. These commentators
argue that ‘It is time to file the Just War Theory away in the same drawer that hides flat-earth
theory’117. At first look it does indeed appear as though the concept of Just War belongs to a
simpler era. How then does Just War stand up in an age when war is not formally declared; when
conflict is often intra-state rather than inter-state; where violence is perpetrated by non-state actors
such as terrorists, guerrillas and freedom-fighters; and where ‘peace’ seems an inappropriate
description to apply to the majority of the world’s nations, even when they are not formally at war?
In order to review the applicability of Just War to modern conditions, it is instructive to look at a
number of problem areas.
112 For example, see ‘A statement by the United States Catholic Conference’, November 1993.
113 To use a military parallel, saluting is a tradition, not a theory; whilst blitzkrieg is a theory, not a tradition.
114 ‘Ethics in Public Life’ speech by Sir Nigel Wicks, Chair, Committee on Standards in Public Life to the Institute of
Business Ethics, 19 September 2002.
115 A J Coates: The Ethics of War, pp 5 & 169
116 Ibid, p 81.
117 Ibid p 94 [quoting Zahn 1983 (p 130)]
26
JUS AD BELLUM – RECOURSE TO WAR
77.
Competent Authority and Intervention. An obvious competent authority is the democratic
sovereign nation-state. Alternatively, it could be argued that the United Nations represents a
competent authority that could act as an impartial arbiter of what is just in international relations.
Unfortunately, in both these cases, the reality of the modern world frustrates a simple notion of
competent authority, as it does not appear to cater for intra-state conflict, intervention, terrorism or
guerrilla warfare.
a.
The Nation-State. For John Stuart Mill, the nation-state was clearly the most suitable
competent authority. He suggested that states should be treated as self-determining
communities, whether or not their internal political arrangements are free. The members of a
political community must seek their own freedom and, ‘as with individuals, so with
sovereign states: there are things that we cannot do to them, even for their own ostensible
good.’118 Self-determinism is the right of a people ‘to become free by their own efforts’;
they cannot be set free by an external force. Mill felt that ‘the only test of .. a people’s
having become fit for popular institutions is that they, or a sufficient portion of them to
prevail in the contest, are willing to brave labor and danger for their liberation’119. Mill felt
that it was therefore wrong for one state to intervene in another’s civil war.
b.
External Intervention in the Nation-State. There are, however, circumstances where
Mill’s non-intervention policy needs to be qualified. The first concerns two or more political
communities contained within a single national boundary (ie a war of secession or national
liberation). In this case, Mill’s respect for communal authority could be seen as justifying
external intervention in order to defend it. Also, if a third party had already joined one of the
sides of a civil war, it would be justified for another party to intervene in order to restore the
balance. Another cause for intervening in the affairs of a sovereign states, but one not
explicitly examined by Mill, is in order to prevent a wholesale violation of human rights
such as massacre or ‘ethnic cleansing’, as was the motivation behind the NATO intervention
in Kosovo in 1999. Therefore, Walzer, in reviewing Mills’ position, concludes that Just
War can apply to interventions; that states can be invaded and wars justly begun: to assist
secessionist movements120 (once they are viable), to counter third-party interventions and to
rescue peoples threatened with massacre. He does, however, emphasize that when an
attempt to intervene in the domestic arrangements of another country involves the use of
armed force, there is a significant burden to justify this action. This is not just because it will
inevitably result in casualties, suffering and restrictions of human rights but because: ’the
citizens of a sovereign state have a right, insofar as they are to be coerced and ravaged at
all, to suffer only at one another’s hands.’121
c.
Regime Change. In the aftermath of the Second Gulf War, the question of whether
‘regime change’ can be a legitimate cause for military intervention has been widely debated.
This is because the Bush administration defined ‘regime change’ as the direct object of the
118 Walzer (p89)
119 Ibid (p88). quoting Mill, J S, Dissertations and Discussions: A Few Words on Non-Intervention, New York, 1873
120 Ibid (p 108). Walzer uses the case of Hungary in 1849 and 1956 as examples of legitimate attempts at secession,
although in both cases, the secessionist movements were not assisted by external powers (such as Britain) due to
concerns over the likely response from Russia.
121 Ibid (p 86).
27
war, not merely as a potential benign outcome of an intervention justified on other grounds.
Henry Kissinger, a man whose name is synonymous with a highly pragmatic (some might
even say Machiavellian) approach to international relations wrote:
‘The new approach is revolutionary. Regime change as a goal of military intervention
challenges the international system established by the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia. Which,
after the carnage of the religious wars, established the principle of non-intervention in the
domestic affairs of other states.’122
Some commentators123 feel that the notion of ‘regime change’ is difficult to justify since it
requires the extremely complex judgement of whether a new regime would definitely
produce less evil and suffering than the evil to be eliminated. Whilst assessments of the
current suffering of a nation may be relatively easy to assess, the evaluation of the wrong
that may result from and after ‘regime change’, including the potential imposition of
unwanted structures or restrictions on the defeated nation, is hard to predict. ‘Regime
change’, like ‘unconditional surrender’ also carries a moral obligation not just to overthrow
the extant regime but also to rebuild the political, economic and social reconstruction of the
defeated nation. It is therefore a long term commitment, not a short term expedient.
c.
The United Nations. Whilst the United Nations (UN) might seem to hold out the
prospect of an international ‘competent authority’, able to judge impartially when a war is
just, experience suggests that it is ‘often at best no more than a coalition of interests serving
the particular purposes of certain dominant states’124. Indeed, Michael Walzer has stated
that:’ it doesn’t help to pretend that the UN is an effective agent of global law and order
when it isn’t’125. This has resulted in some nations using the UN’s Resolutions as a
justification for recourse to war, arguing that if the UN is unwilling to enforce its own
resolutions then someone else will have to do it for them. Aside from the varied differences
of interpretation that are sometimes applied to UN Resolutions, there are difficulties
associated with nations acting as international vigilantes. To use a comparison, if the police
fail to deal with an illegally parked car, this does not give an individual citizen the right to
tow it away, regardless of how much it may also serve his self-interest, alongside his
affronted sense of justice. At the same time, few nations would be willing to accept the
simple notion that unless the UN specified that a war was definitively just, that it was
therefore, by definition, unjust.
78.
Terrorism and Guerrilla Warfare. Just War seems to be inextricably linked to inter-state
conflict, the preserve of princes. How then can it have any relevance to terrorists and guerrillas?
First, it is necessary to draw a definition between these two groups126. Guerrillas seek to attack an
enemy by harassing him and avoiding pitched battles, although, as in Mao’s doctrine, a guerrilla
group may intend to move to a phase of conventional warfare once it is strong enough. However, it
122 Quoted during: Iraq and Just War: A Symposium organised by the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, 30
September 2002. See: http://pewforum.org/
123 Professor William Galston, speaking at the Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, expressed such views.
124 Coates (p155)
125 Speaking at the Pew Forum.
126 It is acknowledged that definitions of terrorism and guerrilla warfare are many and varied. The definitions used
here seek to enable a comparison between these forms of violence and Just War. Furthermore, it should be noted that
the terms ‘terrorist’ and ‘guerrilla’ as used here are not mutually exclusive; guerrillas may employ terrorism and
terrorists may adopt the habits of guerrillas. However, a guerrilla who commits a terrorist act is still, in that act, a
terrorist even though his other acts are all directed at ‘legitimate’ targets.
28
is apparent that when it does this it ceases to be a guerrilla force and becomes an army. The target
of a guerrilla group is the manifestation of their enemy. This may be interpreted as buildings,
institutions or individuals (eg public officials) who whilst not actively engaged in conflict with the
guerrillas, are part of the apparatus of the state that is. Terrorists, by contrast, do not discriminate
between their victims and use the very random nature of their attacks to induce terror amongst the
population. This is done with the aim of creating sufficient popular pressure on the state to force it to
meet the terrorists’ demands as the only means of ending the terror.
a.
Terrorists. Since terrorists attack the innocent, they commit criminal acts that cannot
be justified by any attempt to equate their actions to those of a legitimate army, even by
employing a corrupt version of double effect127. In any case, the deliberate murder of
innocents by a nation’s army is a crime and certainly not allowable within the concept of Just
War. Therefore, terrorists are violent, politically motivated criminals and although they may
often describe themselves as being engaged in a war, their selection of targets and means of
attack shows that they are out with the concept of Just War.
b.
Guerrillas. If guerrillas adopt ‘a fixed distinctive sign visible at a distance’ and
‘carry their arms openly’128 then they are entitled to be considered as soldiers and, when
captured should be treated as legitimate Prisoners of War. Similarly, they could be expected
to conduct their operations in accordance with the jus in bello criteria. However, the
guerrilla’s main defence is often his invisibility; his ability to move unnoticed amongst the
civilian population, only adopting signs and openly carrying arms when he wishes to engage
the enemy. Indeed, even then, many guerrillas do not wear signs so that they can disappear
after an attack. Under these circumstances, are guerrillas entitled to be treated as legitimate
soldiers? Walzer argues that if the guerrillas enjoy any ‘significant degree of popular
support’ they could be seen as being representative of the people and hence being entitled to
‘war rights’ – if captured to be treated as Prisoners of War and not criminals’.129 This
judgement is not easy to make and there may well be good political reasons for treating
guerrillas as criminals, thereby denying them the legitimacy that would be seen to accrue
from recognition of their rights as soldiers. Thus, guerrillas inhabit an area that is seen to
straddle the border between criminality and Just War. Whilst they remain unpopular they
cannot be seen as being legitimate representatives of the people, and therefore can be treated
as criminals. However, once they have gained significant popular support, some
commentators believe that they take on the rights that the people would have, were they to
rise en masse.
79.
Last Resort and Pre-Emptive Strikes. In examining the idea that recourse to war should be a
last resort, the policy of appeasement pursued by the Government of Neville Chamberlain in dealing
with the rise of Nazi Germany, is often cited to prove its folly. It is claimed that by seeking to keep
war as a last resort, and hence trying to appease Hitler, Chamberlain failed to act in a way that might
127 It could not be argued that the civilians killed in a terrorist attack were, (like those who might be killed in a
conventional war during the course of an attack on a military target) the victims of an attack whose greater intent was
aimed at coercing the state. This is because the terrorist specifically intends the killing of civilians as a means to his
desired ends; the civilians are not killed by accident.
128 Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. Geneva, 12 August 1949, Part I: General provisions,
Article 4.
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/5a780f680129b33841256739003e6367/2f681b08868538c2c12563cd0051aa8d?OpenDocum
ent
129 Walzer (p 185). Guerrillas would still be criminally responsible for any specific acts of murder (in their view:
assassination) etc for which a soldier could be prosecuted.
29
have actually averted war, and that ‘in March 1936 or September 1938, a German climb-down
would have been the likely result of Allied firmness’130.
a.
Last Reasonable Resort. However, this appears to be a too literal reading (and
application) of the notion of ‘last resort’, emphasising the temporal aspects of ‘last’, rather
than interpreting it as ‘least favoured’. That said, the notion of ‘last resort’ certainly does
have some temporal implications, as it is most certainly not time-neutral. A state cannot be
expected to continue to pursue all means except war beyond the point where, if it were
subsequently forced into a war, it would be at a significant disadvantage.
‘There is no merit in putting off a war for a year, if when it comes, it is a far worse
war or one much harder to win’131
Of course, detecting such a moment is exceptionally difficult, since amongst the smog of
intelligence assessments, diplomacy and political manoeuvring, a potential adversary will be
attempting to prevent such a judgement. It is therefore perhaps better to adopt the notion of
‘last reasonable resort’ to identify the point where, with the available information, a nation
judges that it must go to war or else be disadvantaged in a war which it has good reason to
believe is imminent. Under these terms a pre-emptive strike is wholly permissible. An
example of such a case is the pre-emptive destruction of 90% of the Egyptian Air Force on
the ground by the Israelis at the start of the Six Day War in June 1967. This was justifiable
on the grounds of the apparent and imminent threat to Israel’s borders posed by Syria, Jordan
and Egypt; and that if Israeli had waited to be attacked, she would have been overrun132.
b.
Unjustified Pre-emptive Strikes – Pearl Harbour. However, such a justification could
not be made for the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour in December 1941. In this case, Japan
had been pursuing a policy of regional expansion since the 1931 Mukden Incident had been
used as a pretext for the invasion of Manchuria. In July 1937 Japanese troops invaded
China, during which time Japanese aircraft sank the USS Panay (the Japanese subsequently
apologised to the US). Despite warnings of the unfavourable reaction in the US of any
moves against French Indochina, the occupation commenced in September 1942 and resulted
in President Roosevelt ordering an embargo on the shipment of scrap iron and steel from the
US to Japan. Japan declared this to be ‘an unfriendly act’. Against this background, it can
be seen that the attack on Pearl Harbour was not an act of pre-emptive self-defence. In fact it
was the first stage of a strategic plan that relied on the neutralization of the US Pacific Fleet,
as a precursor to securing Malaya, the Philippines and Dutch East Indies. The plan was
initiated once Tojo’s government realised that the US would require a withdrawal of
Japanese forces from French Indochina and China as a pre-requisite for a resumption of
normal trade.
c.
Preventive Strikes. A distinction is drawn between pre-emptive strikes and
preventive strikes. Pre-emptive strikes are conducted when the threat is imminent and highly
probable; and where delay would degrade a nation’s subsequent ability to respond militarily.
Preventive strikes, by contrast, are not based on the probability of imminent enemy actions;
rather they are based on a prediction of an enemy’s capabilities and intentions (this is in tune
130 Coates (p 191).
131 Churchill, W S, Gathering Storm, 1948.
132 See Walzer (p 83) and Coates (p 159).
30
with the currently emerging ‘Bush Doctrine’ for US foreign policy). Thus if a nation starts
to expand its armed forces, a preventive strike (or war) against it would take place before the
nation had posed a credible and imminent threat to another. Once the nation posed an
imminent and probable threat to another, any action by that other would be pre-emptive. The
justification for preventive strikes is not widely accepted by theorists or international
lawyers. This is because, whilst the costs of a preventive war are near certain and terrible,
the danger it seeks to avert are distant, speculative and unknown. Thus a war might be better
prevented through diplomacy rather than preventive strike.
80.
Reasonable Hope of Success. Of all the Just War requirements, this is, in many ways, the
most curious since it places pragmatism before principle. Its intention is obvious: to prevent
unnecessary suffering in conflicts that can have no decisive outcome. Yet it, too, raises practical
problems, not least: when does a state know that it does not have a reasonable hope of success?
Many nations, (Walzer gives the example of Finland’s struggle with Stalin’s USSR), might expect
to lose a war yet still choose to fight, since not to would be to render their independence worthless.
On 4 June 1940, a few months after the Finnish defeat, Churchill made his ‘Fight them on the
Beaches’ address133 in which he spoke in unequivocal terms of continuing to resist even if the island
of Britain were invaded. There are many other examples of nations or groups deciding to fight for
principles even against apparently daunting odds – were these endeavours unjust?
a.
Number Crunching. There are other examples, including the Six Day War cited
above, where a state who might be expected to lose has triumphed. From this it is clear that
reasonable hope of success cannot be calculated merely by counting the opposing tanks,
ships and aircraft and applying the 3:1 criteria134 before deciding whether there is a
‘reasonable hope of success’. Even were one able to develop a highly sophisticated measure
of a group or nation’s ‘strength’ which entailed a detailed examination of combat power135,
alliances, diplomatic links, national support for war, industrial capacity, natural resources
and national characteristics, it would still be impossible to predict the outcome of a conflict
with certainty.
b.
Asymmetry. The employment of asymmetric means, which deliberately seek to
avoid meeting an opponent on equal terms, further frustrate any attempt to judge a
comparison of forces and, thereby, a reasonable hope of success. This is particularly
relevant with regard to non-state actors who, by not having a state that can be subject to
attack or coercion, may be in a position of relative strength when compared to a
sophisticated state that could be vulnerable to a wide means of attack. In this respect, a small
group possessing no actual combat power could cripple a country if it were able to attack the
computer systems at the heart of a number of key financial institutions.
133 ‘We shall go on to the end, we shall fight in France, we shall fight on the seas and oceans, we shall fight with
growing confidence and growing strength in the air, we shall defend our Island, whatever the cost may be, we shall fight
on the beaches, we shall fight on the landing grounds, we shall fight in the fields and in the streets, we shall fight in the
hills; we shall never surrender, and even if, which I do not for a moment believe, this Island or a large part of it were
subjugated and starving, then our Empire beyond the seas, armed and guarded by the British Fleet, would carry on the
struggle, until, in God's good time, the New World, with all its power and might, steps forth to the rescue and the
liberation of the old’.
134 A military rule of thumb is that an attacker requires a 3:1 advantage over a defender in terms of applied combat
power.
135 An amalgam of physical strength (eg number and quality of tanks), moral strength (eg motivation and resilience of
the soldiers) and intellectual strength (eg sophistication of the doctrine for employing the forces).
31
c.
An Excuse? There is also the argument that since it is impossible to predict the
outcome of a war, the difficulty of confirming a reasonable hope of success could be used as
a pretext for avoiding an ethical duty, such as defending an ally. This raises the prospect of a
situation where ‘freedom has died from the fear of dying’ (Hegel).
JUS IN BELLO – THE CONDUCT OF WAR
81.
Double Effect. The notion of ‘Double Effect’ was set out by Catholic scholars in the Middle
Ages. As normally stated, it justifies the killing of non-combatants when this is the unintended
result of an attack on a legitimate military target. However, Walzer suggests that the principle of
Double Effect needs to be refined to encompass ‘double intention’. He suggests that it is not enough
for non-combatant deaths to be unintended, but that there must be a positive commitment to save
civilian lives136. To illustrate this, he cites the allied attack on the Norsk Hydro works at Vemork,
explaining how it was carried out by commandos in order to avoid bombing the area and hence
killing Norwegian civilians137. Indeed, a subsequent attack by the same group of SOE agents on the
electrolysis equipment when it was being moved by ferry on the Tinnsjo, resulted in the foreseeable
deaths of 14 Norwegians and 4 Germans. However, this was deemed proportionate given the need
to prevent the development of a German atomic weapon, and the method of attack was only chosen
when the agents had established that there was no other method that could have spared the lives of
their countrymen; and so: ‘In this case an act of war was to be carried out which must endanger the
lives of a number of our own people – who were not soldiers’.138
82.
Non-Combatant Immunity. The principle of non-combatant immunity would appear to be
relatively straightforward and to be derived from the notion of innocence. In this case, innocence is
not ‘moral innocence’ (as opposed to moral guilt139) but should rather be seen in terms of being
‘currently harmless’. Few would consider that the deliberate attack of the very old or infirm could
be morally justified since they are harmless and cannot contribute to a war. Similarly, young
children would not be considered as legitimate targets by most people, because they are currently
harmless, even though they may grow up to be soldiers in due course. However, the working adult
population poses a complex problem. A civilian munitions worker is directly contributing to the
war effort and so might reasonably be considered not to be harmless and therefore to be a legitimate
target whilst engaged in his work in a factory. Whether the same worker is still a legitimate target
when he is at home with his family is less clear. Furthermore, is a worker who produces food for
the army a legitimate target? He is contributing to the war effort in as much as he is helping keep
soldiers fed but he is not adding to offensive fighting ability. Some commentators have tried to
draw a distinction between those who contribute to an Army’s arms and logistics, who might
reasonably be seen as legitimate targets to some degree, and those who merely contribute to
soldiers’ existence as men. However, even here there are no clear distinctions: what of the worker
136 Walzer (p 151-159)
137 The Norsk Hydro works at Vemork, near Rjukan was producing ‘Heavy Water’ (D20) by electrolysis, which was
required for the development of an atomic weapon. Bombing was considered impractical at first, as the large quantities
of liquid ammonia contained at the site, if hit by bombs, would have destroyed the town. It was first attacked by a group
of Royal Engineers on 19-20 November 1942 in two Horsa gliders; both gliders and one of their tow planes crashed.
The survivors were captured by the Germans and shot. A successful attack was subsequently carried out by Norwegian
agents trained by the Special Operations Executive (SOE). Details in: Haukelid, Knut, Skis Against the Atom, Fontana
Books, 1973
138 Ibid (p127)
139 If ‘moral guilt’ were to be taken as a suitable cause for action it would be justifiable to kill an old man who
supports a war yet cannot contribute to it in any way, but not justifiable to kill the pilot of an enemy transport aircraft
who is morally opposed to the war.
32
producing chemical protection suits, or someone building military trucks that can be used for
delivering bread or bombs? There are also difficult questions concerning those further back down
the production chain: could a steel worker whose steel is used to make both artillery shells and
hospital beds be considered to be a legitimate target alongside the docker who is unloading fruit and
tanks? Therefore, even if one accepts the idea that non-combatant immunity should refer to those
who are currently harmless, defining who is and who is not a legitimate target is still fraught with
difficulty.
83.
Proportionality and Risk. The notion of proportionality in the conduct of war seeks to limit
the means employed in relation to the ends sought; it is a counsel of restraint. Combatants are
required to employ only sufficient force as is necessary to achieve a legitimate military objective.
The concept contains a natural authority but there are several problems associated with its
observance. In the first instance, determining proportionality before the event is extremely difficult,
whilst judging it afterwards is all too easy. No soldier will willingly commit scarce resources to an
operation if he is convinced that they will be redundant. However, determining the exact limit of
what is required is difficult. It is axiomatic that committing too few resources to an enterprise can
result in failure, whilst too many resources are just likely to make victory easier. There is therefore
a natural tendency to use force that is, in the eyes of those involved, absolutely sufficient for the task
(assuming sufficient resources are available). This creates an inbuilt predisposition towards using
disproportionate force. The military maxim ‘don’t dribble – clout’ similarly encourages the decisive
use of concentrated force rather than allowing it to be dissipated. In an article in the Daily
Telegraph concerning the conduct of the Second Gulf War, John Keegan asked whether the efforts
to minimise civilian casualties could be ‘mortality counter-productive’, and that ‘slow and careful
operational procedures actually increase the number of civilian deaths and the amount of suffering,
when a more peremptory approach might achieve the same, or even a better effect, by hastening the
end’140. In order to achieve a significant effect it is often necessary to allocate significant resources.
a.
The Somme 1916. A case in point is the battle of the Somme which commenced on
1 July 1916, and which by 18 November of that year had cost 420,000 British, 200,000
French and over 500,000 German casualties. The allied advance over this period measured
just 7 miles. Coates uses this to illustrate disproportionate losses compared with the gains
achieved: ‘it is difficult to imagine any realistically achievable military objective that would
have justified casualties on this scale’141. However, this is to ignore the strategic situation in
which efforts to ease the pressure on the French at Verdun, and hence prevent the collapse of
the French Army (which by 1915 had suffered 1.43 million casualties), were deemed
essential. In any case, the Somme offensive was not planned as a bloodletting contest but
rather as ‘the Big Push’ that would allow the Allies to escape from the deadlock of trench
warfare. In order to exploit the expected success, the British Reserve Army, which included
3 cavalry divisions, was expected to exploit towards Arras, almost 30 miles away. In any
case, some historians believe that the Somme was ‘a necessary, even an inevitable battle that
hurt the Germans more than the British and pushed them towards making strategic decisions
that would eventually lose them the war’142. In many respects, far from being a pointless
waste of life, the Somme has more recently been seen as a battle that was necessary to set the
conditions for subsequent success. Whilst it is true that Lloyd George saw the Somme as ‘a
ghastly failure’ ironically, the same view was taken by the Kaiser who sent a general to the
140 Daily Telegraph, 27 March 2003, John Keegan: Will trying to avoid civilian casualties cause more deaths?
141 Coates (p216).
142 Sheffield (p xii)
33
Somme to discover who was responsible for the repeated defeats of the German First Army,
who were opposite the British. Even at lower levels of the German Army the toll extracted
by the Somme fighting was recognised: ‘The Somme was the muddy grave of the German
field Army’143.
b.
Attrition. Coates also uses the example of the Battle of the Somme to assert that a
war of attrition cannot be justified even in extremis because it is, by definition,
disproportionate to any justifiable military goal144. However, this seems to overlook 3
fundamental issues. First, as presaged in the American Civil War, by the time of the First
World War, technology had developed to a state where the defender enjoyed a significant
superiority. This advantage remained until technology (principally better communications)
delivered some redress later in the war. However, in 1916, rifled artillery and machine guns
meant that a significant element of attrition was both inevitable and unavoidable. Second, if
an opponent commences a war of attrition it is very difficult, if not impossible, to find an
alternative response. Finally, it is the great paradox of the First World War that it is
characterised as a war of trenches and static defence, yet in its conception both the Germans
(in the form of the ‘Schlieffen Plan’) and the French (in ‘Plan XVl’) intended a war of grand
manoeuvre in which attrition played little part. In recent military doctrine, attrition, with its
connotations of a futile loss of life, has almost become a ‘dirty word’. However, even in the
most imaginative exposition of Manoeuvre Warfare, it is likely that attrition will play an
inevitable part.
c.
The Preserve of the Powerful. Another difficulty associated with proportionality is
that it is the preserve of the powerful. A nation with unlimited resources and military power
can afford to employ proportionate force, secure in the knowledge that it has reserves
available should it be required to deal with contingencies or failure. From a position of
strength it will be able to adapt its use of force to changing circumstances. Conversely, a
weak power may have to ensure that its every action is decisive. Therefore, it has little
option but to employ all its available resources, even when the results could be deemed
disproportionate. In his examination of the British bombing of German cities, Walzer argues
that it might be possible to contend that the policy was justified at a time of ‘supreme
emergency’ in the early years of the war. However, from 1942 onwards, when as Churchill
said, ‘the enormous injuries inflicted on the German Army and manpower by the Russians,
and the accession of the manpower and munitions of the United States, have rendered other
possibilities open’145, the policy could not be justified.
Indeed, with the benefit of hindsight it is easy to suggest, as Coates does, other more proportional
means for achieving the desired effect. However, such options may seem wholly inappropriate or
wildly optimistic to those actually engaged in operations. And, as noted earlier, where the resources
or methods are not sufficiently proportionate, defeat is the only possible outcome.
84.
Technology. The impact of technology on the ability of forces to conduct war justly is
significant. ‘Smart’ munitions enable the crude brutality of the ‘strategic air offensive’ to be
replaced by precision strike. Sophisticated surveillance and targeting means allow legitimate targets
to be discriminated and attacked. As demonstrated in both Gulf wars, ‘smart’ munitions allow
143 Ibid (p 155) quoting Captain von Hentig, German Guard Reserve Division.
144 Coates (p 220).
145 Quoted in Walzer (p261). Walzer’s notion of Supreme Emergency is discussed in pages 251- 268).
34
highly selective targeting such that military targets in urban areas can be attacked discretely146.
However, there are problems associated with sophisticated weapons that do not apply to older
systems.
a. Not so Dumb Bombs. In Bosnia, when trying to find a way of attacking a tank which
was firing from amongst an area of occupied civilian houses, General Sir Michael Rose was
forced to use ‘dumb bombs’ rather than ‘smart’ munitions. This was because the ‘area of
probability’ within which a ‘dumb bomb’ would land was clearly established and could be
factored into the planned attack. On the other hand, if a ‘smart’ munition had gone ‘rogue’ it
would have been impossible to predict where it would land147.
b.
Cluster Bombs. Some modern weapons are being viewed as intrinsically
disproportionate as they are likely to cause civilian casualties. In the Second Gulf War, the
use of Cluster Bombs by coalition forces was deemed by some to be wrong since a
proportion of the sub-munitions were likely to malfunction and then injure civilians. A
diplomatic row developed between the US and Belgium, when Jan Fermon, a Belgian lawyer
representing Iraqi civilians, used Belgium’s ‘universal competence’ law148, to file charges
against the US commander, General Tommy Franks on 14 May 2003. In response, the US
Defense Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld threatened that Washington would block further
funding for NATO’s new headquarters in Belgium until the legal threat was withdrawn.
c.
Replacing Banned Weapons. Weapons that cause unnecessary suffering, such as
flamethrowers, are banned under the Geneva Convention149. Similarly, because of their
indiscriminate nature anti-personnel mines were banned under ‘The Ottawa Convention on
the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines
and on their Destruction’ signed on 18 September 1997150. However, the pursuit of such
policies is not without cost; an anti-personnel mine is cheap to produce, is designed to injure
(not kill151) the victim, and in doing so will provide both an indication of the victim’s
presence and his location (by virtue of the explosion). It is therefore a valuable defensive
weapon as it not only attacks the enemy but also alerts a defender to the site of an impending
assault. In order to replicate these various effects in a discriminatory weapon is proving both
technically difficult and potentially very costly.
d.
New Weapons. The emergence of new weapons that have significant battlefield
utility, such as thermo-barric weapons or dazzle lasers, causes a significant ethical problem.
Although such weapons may be capable of accurate targeting, their method of attack could
be deemed unethical. However, to fail to develop or adopt such technologies could leave
British Servicemen highly vulnerable, and ultimately ethically pure but physically dead.
146 Although, during the First Gulf War the US Air Force destroyed Public Shelter No 25 in Amiriya, (a suburb of
Baghdad) and a British ‘smart bomb’ missed a bridge and hit a shopping area in Faluchia.
147 As related to the author. Details of General Rose’s command in Bosnia are contained in: Rose, M, Fighting for
Peace, Harvill, 1998.
148 Which allows charges to be brought regardless of where crimes are alleged to have been committed.
149 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to
be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects. Geneva, 10 October 1980. See
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/52d68d14de6160e0c12563da005fdb1b/f6426235883f9d62c125641e0052d53d?
OpenDocument
150 See http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/mine/UNDocs/ban_trty.htm
151 Most Anti-personnel mines are deliberately designed not to kill, since a badly injured soldier will require other
soldiers to evacuate him, thus further depleting an enemy force.
35
Faced with this difficult choice it appears sensible to continue to develop such weapons.
This would enable their characteristics to be studied in detail so that effective counters to
them can be researched. It would also enable the search for comparable, yet more
acceptable, weapons to be conducted and for suitable Rules of Engagement to be developed.
It would also mean that ultimately, if a case of supreme emergency presented itself, the
Armed Forces would have the necessary weapons to deal with it.
However, by renouncing weapons that are of dubious morality but high utility, a country may end
up paying for its moral stance with the lives of its servicemen when they encounter less scrupulous
adversaries. In this case, as in the arguments surrounding the British Strategic Air Offensive as a
response to the bombing of British cities by the Luftwaffe, or the treatment of Prisoners of War by
the Japanese, to adopt such measures would be to trade morality for simple vengeance.
THE JUST WAR TRADITION IN THE 21st CENTURY
85.
It can be seen, from the issues outlined above, that there are a number of areas where Just
War does not provide a definitive guide for the commencement or conduct of modern warfare and
requires intelligent interpretation. This confirms the nature of Just War as a tradition, since it makes
for a very imprecise theory. However, it would be wrong to suggest that because it is not definitive
and requires interpretation that it is redundant. Rather, it lies very much in the realm of ‘dirty hands
and defining moments’. It provides a very useful framework to guide consideration of profoundly
difficult ethical choices that must be carefully evaluated in conjunction with the demands of
realpolitik, and whilst engulfed in the smog of intelligence and political uncertainty. In order to
tread an ethical path through such complexity it is essential that military and, perhaps more
importantly, political leaders are familiar with the territory of the Just War tradition. Reflecting on
the debate over the Second Gulf War, one commentator observed: ‘we’re going to see a
development of inherited doctrine concerning just war, whether it’s the elimination or eclipse of the
notion of imminence or whether it’s a modification of rightful authority…. that can only come about
in a legitimate way by reaching down to the principles152’. Furthermore, the adoption of ethical
behaviour is not like finding the correct solution to a particularly difficult conundrum. As history
shows, unethical behaviour is rarely met with little more than bluster and rhetoric153.
HOW TO INCULCATE ETHICAL VALUES
‘There wasn’t a single soldier who didn’t at some stage have to decide, to choose, to make a
moral decision … quick and modern though (the war) was, the soldier was not turned into a
mere technician. He had to make decisions that were of real significance’154
152 Professor Gerard Bradley, speaking at the Pew Forum on Religion& Public Life.
153 On 10 July 1985, French DGSE agents Alain Marfart and Dominique Prieur sank the Rainbow Warrior in
Auckland harbour, killing a Portuguese crewmember in the process. The ship was preparing to lead a protest against
French nuclear testing at Mururoa Atoll in the Pacific Ocean. The agents were subsequently arrested by New Zealand
Police but were handed over to the French authorities after the French made various thinly-veiled threats to New
Zealand's trade access to the EEC. Marfart and Prieur were released shortly after they returned to France. Similarly, the
only man convicted for the My Lai massacre (Lt William Calley) had his sentence: ‘To be confined at hard labor for the
length of your natural life; to be dismissed from the service; to forfeit all pay and allowances’ commuted to being placed
under house arrest, following intervention by President Nixon. During his period of house arrest he continued to work
for the US Army; he was paroled in 1974.
154 An Israeli officer who fought in the Six Day War, quoted in Walzer (p 304).
36
86.
The preceding arguments have attempted to show that ethical leadership is desirable, and
that it has a vital role in the military context in enabling informed decision making. Furthermore,
military commanders need to be decisive and speed of decision making is a key factor in military
success. This, and the complexity of military considerations, means that there is little, if any,
opportunity for ethical reflection by the soldier or commander. It is clearly impractical to expect or
require military commanders to conduct an ‘ethicality’ check after having come to a decision; in any
case by then it would be nugatory. Therefore, in order to avoid ethical considerations being ignored,
it is necessary to rely on intuition to guide servicemen’s decisions and actions. Just as the
development of military intuition can be aided by artificial ‘rehearsal’, so too, ethical intuition could
be developed in the same way. Thus, requiring servicemen to discuss difficult ethical problems on a
regular basis would equip them to make ethical decisions intuitively when under pressure.
However, the absence of a single clear military ethic that can deal with wrong / wrong choices
means that ethics cannot be taught by rote. Rather, a broader understanding is required so that
military men can evaluate ethical problems from an informed position. Furthermore, the Just War
tradition provides a suitable foundation from which to assess modern military ethical problems,
although like any ethical code, it is not definitive and requires careful and intelligent interpretation.
87.
If these arguments are accepted, it is necessary to consider how such ethical leadership can
be promoted within the British Armed Forces and what its aim should be. From the above, it
appears important that servicemen receive both education (which develops a knowledge of concepts
and principles), and training (which develops decision making expertise) in ethics. Thus, they must
first be educated in the Just War tradition and other appropriate ethical concepts so that they are able
to make informed ethical judgements. They must then receive training to allow them to consider
difficult ethical problems and to practice decision making within an ethically challenging context.
88.
However, whilst all Servicemen need an understanding of military ethics, they do not require
the same level of understanding. The General needs to have a command of the ethical arguments
governing strategic choices concerned with both jus ad bellum and jus in bello, so that he can
provide guidance to ministers and direction to his troops. The Soldier, on the other hand can argue
that whilst as a citizen he is concerned with jus ad bellum, as a Soldier he is excused judgement for
the recourse to war, as he can have no influence over the decision. It is therefore often assumed that
considerations of jus ad bellum are not the concern of the Soldier and that he can be confident of the
justice of his cause. Although recent events have suggested that there may be debate over jus ad
bellum, the current military wisdom is that: ‘just cause is relatively easy to identify in war but all the
more important to assert in other operations with more complex moral circumstances’155.
Therefore, Soldiers ‘are not responsible for the overall justice of the wars they fight; their
responsibility is limited by the range of their own activity and authority’.156 This position, whilst
excusing the Soldier from some responsibilities, is not without cost, as Benjamin Franklin observed:
It has been for some time a generally receiv’d opinion that a military man is not to enquire
whether a war be just or unjust; he is to execute his orders. All princes who are disposed to
become tyrants must probably approve of this opinion . . . but is it not a dangerous one?
Since, on that principle, if the tyrant commands his army to attack and destroy not only an
unoffending neighbor nation but even his own subjects, the army is bound to obey. . . . The
slavery, then, of a soldier is worse than that of a negro.157
155 ADP Soldiering (Para 0304)
156 Walzer (p 304)
157 Benjamin Franklin, 1785.
37
89.
The Soldier does, however, need to have an understanding of jus in bello, so that his conduct
during a war, be it just or unjust, is ethical. This understanding needs to be sufficiently deep so that
when faced with a ‘My Lai’, whatever the provocation and despite direct orders and peer pressure,
he would recognise and follow the ethical course. The Soldier’s task may seem easier, but whilst
the General’s considerations may be made in an atmosphere of reasoned debate, the Soldier may be
fighting for his life when he is called on to make an ethical choice. However, in both cases the
individuals will be answerable for their actions; the Soldier cannot blame the General’s orders for
his crimes.
90.
If, then, all ranks in the Armed Forces need to have an ingrained understanding of ethics,
how can this be delivered? Within the military, there is increasing emphasis being placed on setting
out the ethos of a particular arm or service158. Could a simple exposition of an ethical code, perhaps
as part of a statement of ethos, be sufficient to create the necessary ethical framework?
Unfortunately, the very nature and complexity of the issues surrounding military ethics means that
more is required than a short statement within a document dealing primarily with ethos, as opposed
to ethics.
91.
Alternatively, it could be argued that the individual should be responsible for developing a
personal ethical code that is in accordance with the relevant legal requirements. However, this
would appear to be an abrogation of both a duty of care (the Serviceman will be held responsible if
his personal code is not lawful) as well as command responsibility159. That is not to say that an
ethical code should not have a personal aspect. Indeed, one of the key criteria for assessing ethical
judgements is that of intent (often allied to ‘reasonable behaviour’ in legal assessments). Since
intent cannot be truly known except by the individual, an ethical code must be personalised, an
intrinsic part of personality, if it is to guide actions. However, this does not remove the onus from
the organisation, under whose orders the serviceman acts, to provide suitable education and training.
Furthermore, as noted earlier, an ethical foundation is necessary to support and interpret legal
requirements
92.
It has been suggested that ‘modern military training relies on a rule-following approach to
character training, rather than employing a more Aristolean method of promoting key virtues and
providing strong role models’.160 Therefore, it seems appropriate that the education element of
ethical leadership should be delivered both by practical example (leaders behaving ethically) and by
formal instruction. Indeed, the role of leadership here is already acknowledged: ‘The thing that sets
a good army or a good soldier apart from an effective one is its ethos, its ethical basis; and in
achieving this as in all else, leadership is the key’161.
93.
However, the function of leadership is exercised by soldiers of all ranks from Lance
Corporal upwards and as noted above, they have different requirements, so how can such a policy
pragmatically be introduced? Furthermore, how can the Armed Forces provide soldiers with
sufficient ethical awareness without making them pre-occupied with ethical concerns? Clearly, the
military cannot afford to justify every action to every Serviceman involved, and so it is important for
their to be a bond of trust, based on practical ethical leadership, such that the soldier feels that he can
158 The Army have published the ‘Values and Standards of the British Army’; the Royal Air Force issue Core Values
and Standards in the Royal Air Force’; whilst the Royal Navy issues officers with the ‘Britannia Guide for Young
Officers’ (as well as the Britannia Guide to Military Ethics’).
159 See the case of General Yamashita below. (cited in Walzer p 319-322).
160 ‘The Warrior’s Code’, a paper given by Prof. Shannon E. French, Ph.D. U.S. Naval Academy Dept. of Leadership,
Ethics, and Law at JSCOPE 02 (http://www.usafa.af.mil/jscope/JSCOPE02/French02.html),
161 Army Doctrine Publication: Soldiering (para 0318)
38
rely on his superiors to act ethically, whilst not losing sight of the fact that he is ultimately
responsible for his own actions.
THE ROLE OF OFFICERS
The chain of command, from the government downwards, is responsible for articulating and
sustaining the morality and justice of the cause in question. Only on this basis of absolute
confidence in the justice and morality of the cause, can British soldiers be expected to be
prepared to give their lives for others.162
94.
It appears appropriate that officers should be the focus for inculcating an ethical awareness
that includes the Just War Tradition. This is not because soldiers do not need to understand ethical
problems (as noted above they most certainly do) but rather because officers are better placed to
receive instruction and gain a detailed ethical awareness.163
95.
Furthermore, when on operations, officers are privy to far more information with which to
make judgements since: ‘ignorance is the common lot of the common soldier’164. As a result of this
access to information, officers’ motives are often more highly respected than those of soldiers. Thus
if a soldier refuses to obey an order he may be accused of cowardice, whilst if a General refuses, it is
automatically assumed that his decision is based on nobler or higher considerations.165
96.
The sanctions arising from such refusals are also likely to be different for the soldier and the
officer. Walzer outlines the case of Colonel William Peters166, a Confederate officer who refused to
burn the town of Chambersburg. Although relieved of his command and placed under arrest, Peters
was never brought before a court martial. More recently in Kosovo, Lieutenant General Sir Michael
Jackson refused to send British troops to prevent a Russian Parachute Brigade from securing Pristina
Airport in 1999. Although he had been directly ordered to do so by General Wesley Clark, the
Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR), this was hailed not as wilful disobedience but
shrewd generalship in recognising the political implications of taking such action. Walzer also notes
that ‘officers are far more capable than enlisted men of weighing the dangers they face’.167
However, that is not to suggest that officers only act ethically when they judge that they will not
receive sanction. On the Somme in September 1916, the Commanding Officer of the First Battalion
of the Duke of Cornwall’s Light Infantry reported his nominally Regular battalion as ‘unfit to go
into action’. This was because 200 men were sick due to the conditions of their trenches and a
breakdown in the supply chain. However, ‘to take such a stand was, as a fellow battalion
commander of 5th Division commented, an act of ‘great moral courage’.168
162 ADP Soldiering Para 0304.
163 Whilst the initial training of British Army recruits is 12 weeks, Army officer training is 12 months. Furthermore,
whilst soldiers are not required to have any formal academic qualifications, this is not the case for officers, where the
majority are now graduates.
164 Walzer (p312)
165 This assumption may be partially based on the likelihood that the soldier will be in closer proximity to danger than
the general.
166 Ibid P 315, citing Telford Taylor.
167 Ibid.
168 Sheffield p83.
39
97.
Thus officers are in a position where they are both well equipped to make ethical decisions
but also under an obligation to take action to defend the moral and physical well-being of their
soldiers, who may face harsher sanctions if they speak out. They are also, through their position of
authority, responsible for ensuring that ethical standards of behaviour are maintained by their
subordinates; for setting the ‘tone’ of their commands. Japanese General Tomoyuki Yamashita was
executed in February 1946 after being accused of ‘failure to discharge his duty as commander to
control the operations of the members of his command, permitting them to commit brutal atrocities’.
That Yamashita was probably unable to communicate or otherwise influence his forces during the
time that the atrocities were committed did not save him. In confirming the death sentence, General
MacArthur commented that: ‘The soldier, be he friend or foe, is charged with the protection of the
weak and unarmed. It is the very essence and reason of his being. [a] sacred trust’.169
98.
However, not only do military leaders have to consider whether the orders they give and
receive require unethical behaviour, it is also necessary to deal with those occasions where orders
are either absent or insufficient to cater for changed circumstances. Furthermore, some feel that one
of the most important roles of an officer is to know when to disobey orders. Indeed it has been said
that: ‘In war the first principle is to disobey orders. Any fool can obey orders’170
99.
Srebrenica. The report by the Netherlands Institute for War Documentation into the events
surrounding the massacre of Muslims by Bosnian Serbs in Srebrenica in 1995, highlighted a number
of failures of leadership within the Dutch Battalion (DUTCHBAT III) and its superior commanders
in the UN. The report noted that within the unit were men ‘who displayed .. extreme right-wing
tendencies´ although it assessed that ‘there is no demonstrable link between any alleged anti-muslim
sentiments and ... . reports of misconduct. Furthermore, apart from a few isolated incidents of
smuggling or prostitution, such misconduct rarely involved the local population itself’. Major
Franken, who was effectively commanding DUTCHBAT III operations, and who did not prevent the
separation of Muslim men and women, later said: ‘We accepted that the men faced an uncertain
fate, and that they might indeed come to suffer the most appalling conditions’. Furthermore, despite
receiving reports of groups of 9 or 10 bodies, and indications that interrogations being conducted in
a house near the DUTCHBAT compound involved the use of physical violence, no action was
taken. The report concedes that: ‘it remains unclear why the battalion command did not make more
effort to determine the true nature of events.’ It goes on to assess that: ‘Even if the instructions and
orders from above were followed to the letter, the battalion’s actions do not reflect favourably upon
them.’ The report ends by asserting that: ‘The question of whether another battalion, in a different
condition, would have acted differently is impossible to answer’. However, the fact that a Dutch
official investigation could not answer this question definitively in the negative, is significant. The
report acknowledges that it was conceivable that the Bosnian Serb Army under General Mladic
would have held back in the face of armed resistance. Furthermore, that his decision to occupy the
whole Srebrenica enclave was primarily motivated by a lack of any significant resistance by both
Muslim forces and the UN. However, it concludes that ‘action by DUTCHBAT on its own initiative
contrary to the instructions was not an available option; the initiative for that would have had to
come from the higher UN echelons’. The events at Srebrenica could be seen as an example of when
ethical considerations should have led to orders either being ignored or exceeded, in order to save
innocent lives.
169 Ibid (p 319 – 322)
170 Admiral Sir John (Jackie) Fisher after Dogger Bank 1915.
40
INCULCATION AND EDUCATION
100. Within the British Armed Forces, consideration of ethics is conducted to varying degrees by
the Services, although none of the Initial Officer Training Establishments appear to conduct an indepth study of the practicalities of ethical choices in the military171. If ethical military leadership is
desirable, it would seem that it must be woven into the fabric of officer training. Indeed, in many
ways it appears remarkable that a civilised society can train its citizens how to kill efficiently before
it has ensured that they are aware of the ethical considerations of taking a human life.
101. Therefore, it would seem appropriate for officers to be educated in ethics and exposed to the
Just War Tradition, and to be trained through debating difficult ethical issues throughout their
military careers. The inculcation of ethical values and understanding would commence with initial
training and would be continued during Junior and Advanced Staff Training. It would also be useful
for there to be fora in which military ethics can be debated and developed. In the US, a group of
officers who had been involved in the Vietnam War, set up the Joint Service Professional Officers
Committee on Ethics (JSPOKE)172 as a forum for the discussion of ethical issues. There are also
various publications aimed at outlining ethical problems and how they should be resolved173. These
could easily be used as resources to assist in the development of ethical military leadership within
the UK Armed Forces. Officers thus suitably educated and trained would be equipped to provide
ethical leadership and to educate and train those under their command.
CONCLUSION
102. The need for ethical leadership within the military is more marked than ever before. Modern
warfare is politically, technologically and practically complex174. At the same time, military
operations are subject to ever increasing levels of media scrutiny and the UK public rightly requires
the military forces that act on its behalf to operate in accordance with the highest ethical standards.
This can only be achieved if the UK Armed Forces are inculcated with a strong ethical awareness
and exercised in ethical decision making. The most effective way of achieving this is by focussing
efforts on educating officers during their Initial Officer Training and subsequent formal courses; and
training them through the exercise of ethical analysis throughout their careers. History has
demonstrated that it is vitally important that officers have a sophisticated understanding of military
ethics and appreciate their responsibility to take positive action to ensure that their men act ethically.
171 At Britannia Royal Naval College, a guide to ethics is issued to cadets and the question of ethics is discussed as part
of the Britannia Forum. Normally, the question of ethics is subsumed within consideration of the Law of Armed
Conflict. During the Advanced Command and Staff Course, the major education package for mid-seniority officers
(OF3 – OF4), there is only one lecture and one discussion period allocated to the question of ethics.
172 See: http://www.usafa.af.mil/jscope
173 Examples are: Montor, K (ed), Ethics for the Junior Officer: Selected Cases from Current Military Experience,
Second Edition, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis Maryland, 2001 (ISBN: 1-55750-241-2). [This outlines various
ethical problems from travel claims to TAILHOOK 91 (a Naval Aviation Convention in 1991 that became legendary for
the lewd and aggressive conduct of the delegates)] and The Journal of Military Ethics (www.tandf.no/jme) a periodical
that is funded by the Norwegian Government.
174 For example, it is assessed that at the beginning of the 20th Century only 10%-15% of those who died in war were
civilians. In World War 2 more than 50% of those who died were civilians; by the end of the century over 75% of those
killed in war were civilians.
41
SUMMARY
103. There is a need for leadership in most human endeavours and there are many arguments to
suggest that ethical leadership is beneficial. The roles and responsibilities of leaders are wide but
include an element of responsibility for the ethical conduct and well-being of their team. Public
Office further increases these responsibilities. It is, however, difficult to discern a single overarching ethical code and it appears that leaders cannot always avoid having to make unethical
choices. (Paras 2 – 29)
104. The desirability of ethical leadership is applicable in a military context, since a reliance on a
purely legal framework is not sufficient. In any case, soldiers wish to be seen as moral creatures
despite having to display aggression, decisiveness and other military virtues. (Paras 30 – 62)
105. The tradition of Just War may provide suitable guidance for modern Servicemen. Just War
originated amongst the Romans and Greeks but was refined by St Augustine and Thomas Aquinas.
Hugo Grotius developed a secular version of Just War in the 15th century; this was later added to by
the UN Charter. (Paras 63 – 71)
106. Just War, which is better considered as a tradition rather than a theory, sets out the
conditions for just recourse to war (jus ad bellum) and the just conduct of war (jus in bello). In
applying the Just War Tradition to modern warfare, it is clear that there are a number of areas of
ambiguity. However, this does not invalidate the utility of the Just War Tradition, rather it
establishes it as any other ethical construct, requiring careful and informed interpretation. (Paras 72
– 85)
107. The necessity of rapid decision making means that ethical considerations must be intuitive.
This can best be achieved through inculcating ethical values in the armed forces. Officers are the
most appropriate focus for training and education in ethical leadership and should be responsible for
its further dissemination. (Paras 86 – 102)
Ian Huntley
July 2003
42
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Adair, John: Effective Leadership, Pan, 1983
Adair, John: Inspiring Leadership, Learning from Great Leaders, Thorogood, 2002.
Aristotle: Ethics, Penguin Classics, 1976.
Army Doctrine Publication: Soldiering.
Badaracco, Joseph L Jr: Defining Moments: When Managers must choose between Right and Right,
Harvard Business School Press, Boston, Mass, 1997.
Boulton, Wayne G; Kennedy, Thomas D & Verhey, Allen: From Christ to the World: Introductory
Readings in Christian Ethics, William B Eerdemans Publishing Company, Grand Rapids,
Michigan,
1994.
British Defence Doctrine (2nd Edition).
Coates, A J: The Ethics of War, Manchester University Press, 1997.
Curran, Charles: Themes in Fundamental Moral Theology, University of Notre Dame Press, 1977.
Dupuy, R Ernest & Trevor N: The Collins Encycopedia of Military History (4th Edn), Collins, 1994
Fiedler, Fred E: A Theory of Leadership Effectiveness, McGraw-Hill Book Coy, 1967.
Fuller, Maj Gen J F C: The Conduct of War 1789 –1961: A Study of the Impact of French, Industrial
and Russian Revolutions on War and its Conduct, Eyre Methuen, London, 1972.
Hampshire S (Ed): Public and Private Morality, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978.
Hathaway, Eileen: A Dorset Soldier: The Autobiography of Sergeant William Lawrence,
Spellmount,
1993.
Hauerwas, Stanley: Dispatches from the Front, University of Notre Dame Press, 1994.
Hauerwas, Stanley with Bondi, R & Burrell, David B: Further Investigations in Christian Ethics,
University of Notre Dame Press, 1977.
Haukelid, Knut: Skis against the Atom, Fontana Books, 1973.
Hogg M & Vaughan, G: Social Psychology, 3rd Edn, 2002.
Howard, Michael & Paret, Peter (Eds): Clausewitz: On War, Princetown University Press, 1989.
Keegan, J (Ed): Penguin Book of War, Penguin, 2000.
Machiavelli, Niccolo: The Prince, Penguin Classics, 1999.
MackIntyre, Alasdair: After Virtue, Notre Dame, University of Notre Dame Press, 1984.
McAlpine, A (Ed): The Ruthless Leader, John Wiley and son, 2002.
Montgomery, B L: The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery, Collins, 1958.
Montor, K (Ed): Ethics for the Junior Officer: Selected Cases from Current Military Experience (2nd
Edn), Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Maryland, 2001.
Morgenthau: Scientific Man vs Power Politics, University of Chicago Press, 1989.
Patton, George S: War as I Knew it, Allen, 1948.
Pavalko, Ronald M: Sociology of Occupations and Professions, F E Peacock Publishers, 1971.
Perret, Bryan: A History of Blitzkrieg, Hale 1983.
Rose, M: Fighting for Peace, Harvill, 1998.
Sheffield, G: Leadership in the Trenches: Officer-man relations, morale and discipline in the British
Army in the Era of the First World War, Cassell, 2000.
Sheffield, G: The Somme, Cassell, 2003.
Smith, Eliot R & Mackie, Diane M: Social Psychology (2nd Edn) Taylor and Francis, 2000.
Stogdill, Ralph M: Handbook of Leadership: A survey of Theory and Research, The Free Press,
1974.
Strachan, Hew (Ed): The British Army, Manpower and Society into the Twenty First Century, Frank
Cass, London 2000.
43
Thibon, G: Love and Violence, Sheed and Ward, London 1954.
Walzer, M: Just and Unjust Wars, Basic Books, 2000
Warnock, Mary: An Intelligent Person’s Guide to Ethics, Duckbacks, 2001.
44
WEB RESOURCES
United Nations Charter: http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/
Geneva Conventions: http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/WebCONVFULL?OpenView
Internet Encyclopaedia of Ethics: http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/
Web Resources on Just War Theory: http://ethics.acusd.edu/Applied/Military/Justwar.html
Grotius: ‘On the Law of War and Peace’: http://www.geocities.com/Athens/Thebes/8098/
St Thomas Aquinas on War: http://ethics.acusd.edu/books/texts/aquinas/justwar.html
Thomas Hobbes: ‘The Leviathan’: http://oregonstate.edu/instruct/phl302/texts/hobbes/leviathancontents.html
Thucydides, The History of the Peloponnesian War:
http://www.ibiblio.org/gutenberg/etext04/plpwr10.txt
Defence Leadership Centre: https://da.mod.uk/DLC/Home/
Joint Services Command and Staff college: http://www.jscsc.org/index.html
Army Doctrine Publications: http://www.army.mod.uk/doctrine/resources/Publications/index.html
United States Joint Services Conference on Professional Ethics: http://www.usafa.af.mil/jscope/
United States Military Academy: Professional Officers’ Reading Guide 2002:
http://www.dean.usma.edu/history/pdfs/OPRG02FINAL.pdf
The Journal of Military Ethics: www.tandf.no/jme
My Lai Massacre: http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/mylai/MYLAI.HTM
Netherlands Institute for War Documentation: Srebrenica: http://www.srebrenica.nl/en/index.htm
Institute for Business Ethics: http://www.ibe.org.uk/
Winston Churchill’s Speeches: http://www.winstonchurchill.org/
45