How individuals evaluate other nations.
The role of cultural values, corruption, and economic performance in
generating transnational trust
Tuuli-Marja Kleiner
Department of Political Science
Philipps-University of Marburg
[email protected]
Paper presented at the ECPR General Conference, September 3-6, 2014
Abstract:
Assuming that trust in nations is a function of a nation’s image, this article explores
why citizens of one nation trust other nations. The underlying factors for the development of a
nation’s image and its ascribed trustworthiness are seen in its cultural spheres and in its
economic strength, but also in its moral conduct. Using data from the European Election
Study, the European Values Survey, and Eurostat, multi-level fixed effects are conducted to
test this hypothesis. Looking at Europe, the article analyses whether and to what extent a
nation’s political, societal, economic, and moral features influence its assumed
trustworthiness. Results indicate that the ascribed transnational trustworthiness of nations can
be interpreted as an outcome of admiration, which occurs if all of these features work together
to create a positive image. Surprisingly, cultural excellence and moral standards seem to bear
more weight than economic performance.
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1.
Introduction
In 2012, ten days after images of Greeks burning the German flag were aired on
television, 50,000 holiday bookings were cancelled: “Most were Germans fearing the
consequences of being seen as the source of the austerity regime enforced in return for EUInternational Monetary Fund rescue loans to prop up Greece's moribund economy”
(Smith/Connolly, 2012). Apparently, if there had been a trustful inter-national relationship, it
now was at stake.
This incident shows how perceptions of other nations and stereotyped pictures of their
citizens – i.e. what personality they are typically assumed to have – lead to individual
decisions and actions. Political and business leaders know that the image of their nation can
have an impact on tourism, exports, industry as well as inward investment, and economists
have proved that country images influence people’s behavioral choices concerning products
and services (Lehtonen 2006, 321; Laroche et al. 2005).
One of the reasons for this is that a positive image increases the likelihood of the
attribution of trustworthiness. Trust can be understood as the belief that expectations will be
fulfilled, or at least not intentionally violated (Misztal 1996, 24). It is aimed at future action of
the other and serves as a heuristic to decide whether the risk for defection can be taken or not.
I can trust the Germans to produce their cars conscientiously or I can entrust the Swedish
bank to carefully take care of my money.
Therefore, trust in another nation means the belief that the other nation’s (future)
behaviour toward the focal nation is not meant to exploit the in-group’s vulnerability or harm
the group or its members in any other way. For this, available information which is defined as
relevant is being overemphasized which reduces the complexity of the world and enables
remaining able to act (Luhmann 2000, 31).
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Trusting aims the social relationship per se and is therefore related to a series of
individual as well as societal consequences, making trust one of the most valued human
characteristics (Andersen, 1968; Busz 1972). For example, economic approaches usually
stress the subjective profit from trusting relationships like saving costs of control and
monitoring or achieving an objective more efficiently (Barnard 1938; Blau 1964; Rousseau /
Sitkin / Burt / Camerer 1998; Alesina / Ferrara 2000; Coleman 1988; Deutsch 1958; Hoffman
2007; Raub 1992). As such, trust is often seen as a personal resource (Doney / Cannon /
Mullen 1998). Social sciences, on the other hand, have worked out how trust enables
collectives to produce public goods and to overcome dilemma situations (Coleman 1990;
Putnam 1999). For Putnam, a high trust level is the “key” to economic prosperity and a good
political performance in societies (Putnam 1993: 169). Sztompka argues that „trust cultures“
(Sztompka 2003, 9) improve social cohesion and societal stability, since the individuals’
commitment to the community as a whole is higher if people tend to trust its structures and
fellow citizens (Sztompka 2003, 10).
Concerning inter-group relations, foremost psychologists have analysed how trust
between social groups fosters mutual cooperation orientation (e.g. Alesina / La Ferrara 2000)
and determines out-group behavioural tendencies (Tam et al. 2009), while the lack of trust can
lead to a tendency to deny support (Fiske / Cuddy / Glick 2002, 258). Similarly, political
scientists argue that beliefs about how trustworthy other nations are form public opinion about
foreign policy and influence the forming of international regimes (Keohane 1993). Brewer
has shown that the amount of trust in other nations can be related to support for specific
military interventions (Brewer et al. 2004,319). Genna (2009) has demonstrated that trust
between the Europeans is vital for the EU, because individuals’ support for European
integration depends, in part, on the level of trust in other member states.
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Taking all these advantages of trust into account, it is not surprising that, every year,
governments spend countless millions attempting to create the impression that their society
deserves to be trusted (Anholt, 2010).
But how can such an impression arise? What makes nations trustworthy in the eyes of
others? According to the marketing researcher Simon Anholt (2007, 2010) nations can be
treated as brands whereby the reputation of this ‘brand’ is made up on the basis of six
different ‘channels’ of communication and behaviour: tourism, product brands, people,
policy, investment and culture (Anholt 2007: 26). Unfortunately, Anholt does not make any
statements about contents of these channels. What kind of people makes a nation trustworthy?
How exactly does a trustworthy culture look like?
Martin Schweer (2003, 8) argues that people usually have some kind of ‘implicit trust
theory’, that means that individuals have general notions about the ‘trustworthy’ potential
interaction partner. Asking for the prototype of a ‘good person’ research has shown that there
are indeed criteria that people apply to everyday judgments of goodness. For example, while
conformity and traditionalism is valued positively, but rather unimportant, an honourable
person must be benevolent (Schwartz / Bardi 2001). This seems to be consistent even over
cultures (Smith et al. 2007).
It follows that concerning trust in other nations, we can assume that people also have a
subjective knowledge about the trustworthy nation. Furthermore, we expect a certain cultural
prototype to be considered desirable in Europe, and we argue that if this desired culture is
met, the people hold positive evaluated stereotypes about the typical personality living in this
country which heightens the nation’s likelihood of being seen trustworthy.
There are empirical studies that have identified mechanisms underlying the emergence
of trust in other nations (Inglehart, 1991; Delhey, 2007; Delhey/Newton 2005), but there is
still a lack of research pertaining to the influence of cultural features on transnational
ascription of trustworthiness. Therefore, this paper explores whether and to what extent
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cultural (moral) features of nations additionally influence their perceived trustworthiness. It is
argued that besides economic and political aspects, it is cultural excellence which lends
nations trustworthiness. It is further argued that national features do not lead directly to trust,
but to a certain national image on the basis of which trustworthiness is derived from. Positive
evaluated cultural stereotypes facilitate individuals’ trust in the nation in question.
The article consists of ten parts. We begin by reviewing research that revealed
mechanisms leading to trust in nations and describe the corresponding research gap in this
field. Next, we develop our argumentation by illustrating why culture does play such an
important role if nations are evaluated, what we mean if we are talking about cultural
excellence, and why it is a basis for external evaluations leading to trust. It is argued that
nations who have been able to achieve internationally-preferred cultural goals are appreciated
and seen as honourable or even admired. In our view research on national images delivers the
hitherto lacking theoretical framework to conceptualize the reputation mechanism. Therefore,
we deduce our argument from the international relations research and describe how culture
leads to an image which in turn facilitates trust.
The following section addresses the question which kind of cultural goals are regarded
as being highly desirable in Europe. Subsequently, the role of moral conduct in international
relations is discussed, since we believe that not only contents, but also modes do play a role in
these evaluation processes. Section seven and eight describe the operationalisation of the
structural and cultural characteristics of nations and the methodological design used for
empirical analyses. Following that, multilevel fixed-effects regressions are conducted on
cross-national European data to analyse whether or not a highly regarded culture plays a
significant role in the creation of individuals’ trust in nations. Empirical results are presented
and interpreted. The findings indicate that in addition to a nation’s economic performance,
cultural and moral features do foster a sense of individuals’ trust in nations if the nation in
6
question matches a certain ideal. Finally, the main findings of this paper are summarised and
conclusions are offered.
2. Sources of trust so far
Generally, scholars distinguish between trust in social objects (persons, nations) and
political objects (government, parliament). In addition, so˗called thick trust in well˗known
persons is differentiated from thin trust in distant acquaintances or strangers. The latter refers
to the fact, that in a modern (western) world people often face uncertainty, contingency and
interdependence leading to situations in which they are forced to trust strangers (Warren
1999; Stolle 2002).
The decision to trust must be based upon specific grounds which are read as signals
for trustworthiness. Such signals can range from physical appearance to knowledge about
personal traits, reputation or certain past behavior whereby these dimensions cannot be seen
as independent from one another, but coalesce into an overall valued picture.
Trust in nations can be interpreted as a special form of thin trust. Present approaches
distinguish two mechanisms leading to trust in nations. The first line of argument suggests
that a tendency to trust or not is part of an individual’s personality. From this perspective
during their socialization, individuals acquire a disposition to trust their environment or to be
skeptical. This implies that individuals growing up in trusting societies are inclined to become
trusting poeple (Allport 1961; Erikson 1950; Inglehart 1997; Mishler/Rose 2002, 6; Rothstein
2000; Stolle 2002; Uslaner 1999, 2002).
The second line of argument follow the so-called attribution approaches (Kelley 1967;
Seligman 1996) which assume that the decision to trust an object depends on characteristics
attributed to this object. Attribution approaches in the research field concerning trust between
nations (inter-national trust) or individuals’ trust in other nations (transnational trust) is not of
a very broad range.
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In 1991, Ronald F. Inglehart asked why citizens of the European Union trust each
other as well as the Chinese, the Japanese, the Luxembourgians, the Russians, the Swiss and
the US-Americans. Conducting multivariate analyses by means of data from the European
Commission’s Eurobarometer survey programme (EB) from 1970 to 1986, he could show that
a strong economic performance, the possibility to communicate through a common language,
the absence of past conflicts and the population size have an impact on trust in nations
(Inglehart 1991, 148). According to Inglehart, a common language stands for a common
culture (Inglehart 1991, 154). On the contrary, he come to the conclusion that race, religion
and geographical proximity are not associated to trust in other nations (Inglehart 1991: 182).
Reflecting Inglehart’s work, Jan Delhey (2007) examines the extent of social trust the peoples
of the European Union show in each other. By means of data from the EB and the related
Central and Eastern Eurobarometer (1990-1997), he analyses the influence of several macro
features on inter-national trust. Testing the contact hypothesis, he assumes that spatial
distance could have an effect as well as the own country’s EU membership. Second, he
analyses whether cultural similarity, measured by dummy variables for different religious
affiliations (Orthodoxy, Catholicism, Protestantism and Islam) and by dummy variables for
belonging to the same language family, heightens trust between nations. Since religion and
language are only proxies for a values-based understanding of culture, he also tests postmaterialist value differences. As third mechanism Delhey analyses threat as a mechanism.
Like Inglehart, he argues that big and powerful nations are perceived as a threat, and thus
population size is his measure of power, as well.
The third way to gain national trust is prestige. Reflecting Piotr Sztomkpa (1999),
Delhey argues that modern nations are trusted more, and he examines whether the level of a
nations’ modernity – operationalized by the Human Development Index (HDI) as a measure
of socio-economic development, the Freedom House index as a measure of democratic
freedom and the corruption perception index (CPI) as an inverse measure of good governance
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– positively affects levels of national trust. His empirical results show that all mechanisms
work, but especially the political and economic dimensions measuring prestige do show a
significant impact on the dependent variable.
To sum up, what has been identified so far, is that cultural similarity, power threat, and
economic as well as political prestige seem to influence how much nations in Europe trust
each other. In our few, first, there is another mechanism which has theoretically been
suggested, but never empirically tested. We suggest that besides economic or political traits
nations can also be admired for their excellent (modern) culture. Second, previous work uses
the concept of prestige/admiration without describing it or explaining how it leads to trust.
Succinctly, Delhey cites: “it is obvious that modern (rich, democratic) nations are trusted
more, which is close to the idea that prestige and reputation are the main criteria for attributed
trustworthiness (Sztompka, 1999)”. We think the question why this is obvious needs a little
bit more attention. Third, macro relations are important, but what also needs to be analyzed is
the robustness of these associations, that is, whether they also work for the individual level.
In our view, culture is a very central part of a nation’s reputation and therefore, in the
next section, we are going to explain why it is plausible to assume that central cultural
features are important when nations they are being evaluated first, and second, we make a
suggestion how this could work.
3. Cultural comparison and what differences are made of
Friedrich Tenbruck (1992) describes how societies always have reciprocally compared
each other. At all times people as well as peoples have observed and assessed their
neighbours. According to Tenbruck, this is a political necessity because foreign countries and
cultures are a potential external danger. But this is not the only reason. Cultures that differ
from the own one can become a major challenge for the own world view, identity, tradition
and self-conception (Tenbruck 1992, 27f.). On this account, every cultural encounter begins
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and ends with comparisons as well as evaluations, and people try to establish an order and
find their place in that order. By this means, self- and public images arise (Tenbruck 1992,
28). According to Tenbruck, such processes are not to be condemned; concepts like
ethnocentrism (e.g. Sumner 1906) rather overlook the fact that cultural dissimilarity does not
necessarily mean a degradation of the other culture and a classification of the own one as
superior. Encounters can also lead to respect, appreciation or even admiration, not only
because of the other’s technical or socio-economic advantage, but also because of its societal
ideology or national mentality: “There are always those who want to belong to the other
culture […]. In this way nations can begin to orientate towards other ones even without
noticing it themselves“(Tenbruck 1992, 31). For example, the Japanese and the Koreans
recognized the Chinese culture as superior and Christianity could only spread like that
because it gave answers to hitherto unanswered vital questions (Tenbruck 1992, 30).
If we follow Tenbruck and assume that cultural distance does not automatically lead to
a negative image of the other nation, but can lead to appreciation or even admiration as well,
we have to answer two further questions. First, what makes a nation’s culture attractive,
which part of it must be special to make up a nation’s excellence leading to appreciation? And
second, how does cultural success of nations lead to trust from foreign citizens?
Let’s begin with the first question. According to Levy (1972) and Lenski et al. (1972,
28f.) all societies face similar challenges such as satisfying the biological needs of their
residents, establishing a welfare system, implementing mechanisms to regulate conflicts, and
storing as well as distributing generated knowledge. In addition to these, humans also have
the need for meaning (Taylor 1997). Therefore, for each society it is a necessity to have some
type of shared concept about how to handle these needs in acceptable way. Social values
serve this purpose. A value can be defined as “a conception, explicit or implicit, distinctive of
an individual or characteristic of a group, of the desirable, which influences the selection from
available modes, means, and ends of action” (Kluckhohn 1996[1951], 395). As such, values
10
are cultural ideals of how to deal with needs in a (socially) acceptable way (Hitlin and Piliavin
2004, 361). By suggesting certain types of attitudes, decisions, and actions, they provide the
orientation toward and justification for action (Rokeach, 1973, 13; Schwartz, 2006, 139;
Schwartz and Ros, 1995, 94). Internalized values are not experienced as external coercion;
rather compliant behaviour corresponds with some kind of intrinsic reward. As a result,
values connect the individual with society. As ‘benchmarks of the social’ values influence
citizens’ aims, attitudes, and behaviour and their significance lies in their perpetuation of
social cohesion and order (Parsons 1971).
The values that have “worked” in the past are remembered and are “to society what
memory is to individuals” (Triandis, 1994, 1). Therefore, the “prevailing value emphases in a
society may be the most central feature of culture,” (Schwartz, 2006, 139) and consequently,
several authors have defined a society’s culture by its system of shared values (Hofstede,
1980; Schwarz, 2006; Smith and Bond, 1993).
From the above it follows that if we talk about differences in culture we basically
mean value differences. Since differences in culture/cultural values are of relevance in
practical terms, this paper argues that – besides the mechanisms already shown – it is cultural
success that leads to trust. First, a stable economy and cultural excellence promote a positive
image. Second, trust is derived from a good image – as a by-product. To say it in other words,
being successful in a morally accepted way grants nations a ‘cloud of trustworthiness’
(Anholt, 2010, 20).
In the following, we have to describe how values can coalesce into pictures of
stereotypical members of a nation and national images, respectively. But first we will give a
short overview of the findings theories of international relations have worked out in the field
of national image so far.
4. National images in international relations research
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Pictures of prototypical members of other nations are conglomerates of gathered
contents such as notions of traits and behaviours that may be deemed typical. They can be
quite complex and of inner inconsistency. Both aspects, however, do not mean that
individuals’ views of other nations are random or without grounding. People rather latch onto
the most salient features and evaluate them (Hurwitz and Peffley 1990, 4). While literature
about individuals’ images of other countries relies on a variety of theoretical perspectives
(e.g. Holsti 1962; Jervis 1976; Eldrigde 1979) they are in general agreement on the major
function the resulting images serve: Images are broad generalisations that help to summarise,
simplify and order complex groups of people (Anholt, 2010). Perceivers have limited
cognitive abilities and limited capacities for acquiring, storing, retrieving, and using
information (Ajzen and Fishbein, 1980, 5; Fiske and Taylor 1984). Therefore, citizens cope
with these limitations by simplifying the world (Lippmann 1922) and relying on general
beliefs (Hurwitz and Peffley 1990, 6). Images serve as instruments that help to do so by
suggesting judgments and attributions as well as assumptions about the “group’s intentions
and motivations,” (Alexander et al, 2005, 31). As a result, images help to predict and explain
future behaviour under the terms of reduced time and energy and further to create and
legitimise policy strategies that concern other nations (Boulding, 1959, 120; Herrmann and
Fischerkeller, 1995).
Early works about crucial factors in predicting policy decisions emphasized the
assessments of hostility or friendliness and the perceived strength or weakness of a unit
(Boulding 1959, 124; Holsti 1962; Jervis 1976; Eldrigde 1979; Hurwitz 1990, 7). Subsequent
scholars of international relations have enumerated this notion into different types of images
by distinguishing three structural factors of the international system that underlie national
images: relative power, cultural status, and goal (in)compatibility between nations. These
three dimensions determine threat or opportunity appraisals of the focal nation, which then
evokes specific images of the nation in focus and generates behavioral tendencies towards it
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(Herrmann and Fischerkeller 1995; Alexander, Levin, and Henry, 2005; Brewer and
Alexander, 2002; Herrmann, Voss, Schooler and Ciarrochi, 1997). For example, Herrmann et
al. (1997, 407-8) assume three different perceptions guiding basic foreign choices: (1) the
perceived relative capability of the other nation, (2) the perceived threat another nation
represents, and (3) the perceived culture of the focal nation (see also Alexander et al. 2005
who has a very similar concept). The first one follows the Hobbesian logic applied by the
theory of realism, assuming that the relative power of a nation is based on its economic and
military strength as well as its population size (Morgenthau 1973). But different from realism
Herrmann et al. (1997) don’t accept power automatically going along with threat and
perceived bad intentions against the own nation within an archaic international system. They
rather differentiate whether the other’s intentions are being perceived as threatening the own
country’s interests or not: Does the nation in question seem to use its options to exploit the
observer’s country, or does it represent an opportunity for allied cooperation that benefits both
parties likewise (Herrmann et al. 1997, 408)? Concerning the latter, the authors assume that
policy choice is affected by judgments regarding the relative cultural sophistication of the
other nation, as well. Thereby, Herrmann et al. (1997) suspect that a judgment about the
cultural sophistication of the other affects the expected threat or opportunity it poses. If the
other is seen as culturally backward, their relative power may be reduced by the assumption
that they cannot manage complicated technology and organization, or the perceived threat
might increase since it seems that civilized norms of restraint and reciprocity will not apply in
any relationship with it (Herrmann et al. 1997, 408).
Different combinations of the dimensions power/capabilities, culture and threat lead to
different images, named (1) enemy, (2) ally, (3) colony, and (4) degenerate. In a variation of
this classification, Alexander, Levin, and Henry (2005, 29) distinguish (1) ally, (2) enemy, (3)
barbarian, (4) imperialist, (5) dependent (colonial). We will not discuss these typology in
detail, but what is important is the assumption that perceived cultural status seems to
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moderate the judgments about relative power which hence leads to an enemy image or an ally
image supporting the inclination to trust or not to trust, to cooperate or not to cooperate.
Seeing the other nation as being lower in status and power or as inferior and suspected of
obstructing the goals of the in-group, antagonistic attitudes towards the focal nation arise
(Devos et al, 2002; Brewer and Alexander, 2002, 215). An ally image, however, occurs
“when an international relationship is defined by positive goal interdependence, similar
capability, and similar cultural status” (Alexander et al. 2005, 30). Only in this situation will
intergroup emotions such as admiration and trust occur, and cooperative behavioural
orientation will become probable.
Unlike earlier studies, these considerations are quite more sophisticated following the
conception of liberal institutionalisms according to which perceived opportunities for mutual
advantages are highlighted, in an international political system in which hierarchy cannot be
enforced (Keohane / Nye / Hoffmann, 1993). But like the studies on inter-national trust –
whose results not coincidentally strongly reminds to the ones just presented – research on
international relations does also not consider the possibility that another nation may be of
higher (cultural) status for which it is appreciated or even admired.
Therefore, in the next section, we are going to describe how other groups, regarded as
superior in cultural terms without being seen as a threat, can lead to a positive image from
which trust is derived from. We argue that besides economic and political features also
cultural values constitute national images and that not only cultural similarity or comparable
cultural status, but particularly cultural excellence (i.e. a culture that is regarded as having
positively defined moral features and behaviours) eases individuals’ trust in nations.
5. How pictures of prototypes and national images lead to trust
We previously described how important shared cultural values are for societies and
declared them as the central part of a society’s culture. We also argued that societies tend to
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memorize the values that worked in the past. It is important to state that every society
develops a characteristic value system with its own value patterns and specific priorities
(Schwartz and Ros, 1995; Inkeles, 1997). Individuals who grow up and are socialised within a
nation’s specific value system usually adopt and internalize the prevalent values and norms.
This is because individuals learn through social relationships and especially if the other
provides benefits or penalties and thus has sanctioning possibilities. As a result, individuals
learn which ideologies, beliefs, values, attitudes, and behaviour patterns are legitimate and
which are not (Linton, 1999 [1947]; Inkeles 1997, 45).
Thus, societies hold a rather high level of homogeneity concerning not only typical
values, but also behaviour patterns which lend a nation something that has been described a
nation’s character (Smith, 2008; Williams, 1972 [1968])1. We argue that this national
character, in turn, is perceived by other nations via actions, decisions, codified rules,
institutions, organisations, symbols, and even goods and services. Those elements of a
nation’s features that are experienced frequently or are assessed as relevant and belonging to
the nation in question are communicated and interpreted in complex communicating
processes, and may end up in a picture of the prototypical member of the focal nation. Such
pictures consist of as ‘typical’ classified characteristics, motives, underlying values and
behaviours expected from the nation in focus. They are inspired by structural, economic,
political, cultural, as well as mental sources and are probably distorted in some kind. But
according to Anholt, national images are rather ‘reality with delay’ (Anholt, 2010, 31) since
in the long run all images must be based on grounds of reality which are feeding these
pictures of others always being in progress. Especially, for Europe, we can assume that the
1
We do not argue that there isn’t heterogeneity within societies. Of course, values and behavior patterns depend
on different factors like social class or milieus. But since “the deeper levels of personality are conditioned by
environmental factors” (Linton, 1999 [1947]: xi), there are strong arguments in favour to assume that there is
indeed some kind of national system values and behavior. Most of a nation’s individuals, at least in Western
countries, attend the same kind of educational system, experience similar political and social infrastructures
(e.g., family structures), consume the same public discourses, and have other similar experiences (Hofstede and
Hofstede, 2005, 22; see also Inkeles, 1997; Kuipers, 2012).
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density of interactions is high and there are countless sources of information which makes it
difficult to manipulate or preserve wrong information about each other for a long time.
Keeping previous research in mind, we argue that both, economic and political success
(good governance) on the one hand, and a sense of cultural excellence on the other hand
promote a good image of a nation and its members. That is, if other groups are regarded
superior without being seen as a threat, they are likely to be acknowledged for their
exceptionality and regarded as meeting all of the perceiver’s expectations which can lead to
appreciation and even admiration, and, this is true not only with economic, but also with
cultural aspects. Being trustworthy, then, is not part of the picture, but is derived from it as a
by-product. Thus, having a good image enhances ascribed trustworthiness.
Why is this a plausible assumption? The first point is that because there are “no
peoples […] who fail to distinguish between ideal and actual patterns” (Levy, 1972, 35) and
there are also no peoples who do not understand that they do not meet the ideal model
(provided there is one) estimating their distance to this ideal, there are also no peoples who do
not estimate possible paths to the desired final state. The second point is that Tajfel et al
(1971) have shown that in a given system, social groups attempt to heighten their relative
status; since groups with a higher status are typically better off and better able to control and
provide resources, this seems a desirable aim. One possible way to achieve this aim and
realise one’s own national goals can be to maintain positive relationships with successful
societies. Since successful societies have already experienced how to fruitfully achieve
excellence, cooperating with them promises to be very educational. This does not mean that
trust is based on the human desire to improve the situation of the in-group; it rather means
that the desire to improve the relative status of the in-group can reduce the tendency to regard
others with only jealousy or fear, and provides the motivation to see a successor in a positive
light as well as the desire for fruitful cooperation. Therefore, success can lead to positive
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judgements, and strengthens the desire to establish a good relationship with the appreciated
nation or even become a little bit more like that nation.
Thus, we can conclude, if neither competition nor threat plays a decisive role in the
relationship, economic beneficiary or cultural excellence does not necessarily lead to jealousy
or fear, but can lead to appreciation and admiration as well. To see the other nation in such a
positive light then goes along with the perception that the focal nation is a trustworthy
potential cooperation partner or is even regarded as role model.
However, regarding out-group evaluations, another aspect needs to be kept in mind.
To be associated with cultural excellence, we think that achieving desired cultural goals is
only one half of the story. Cohen (1979) argues that a key source of threat perception is the
belief that the other does not abide by the common rules. Phalet and Poppe (1997) found out
that concerning the evaluation of other groups, in addition to competence criteria and
excellence, another dimension is of importance: „[...] outgroup morality is more desirable
than outgroup competence, and immorality in outgroups is more undesirable than outgroup
incompetence” (Phalet and Poppe, 1997, 706). This is not hard to comprehend, since the type
of conduct can directly affect the in-group either in a profitable or harming way. In
international relations, parties that violate generally accepted norms are unpredictable and
therefore frightening. Therefore, an indicator for morality is needed. One such indicator in
liberal democracies relates to corruption. In liberal democracies, governments have to
safeguard common rules; they have to protect the freedom of their citizens, and ensure fair
opportunities for all. Countries with dysfunctional governmental institutions are trapped in a
situation of continuing inequality and mistrust within societies (Rothstein and Uslaner, 2005,
71). If ‘extra’ payments are a secure way of getting children into good schools, then the public
learns that the only way to succeed is through dishonesty, and that being poor takes away any
chance to raise your status (Rothstein and Uslaner, 2005, 56; 69). Being at somebody’s mercy
17
breeds class envy and exacerbates economic inequalities, which in turn leads to social
conflicts and mistrust (Rothstein and Uslaner, 2005, 53f).
Therefore, concerning national images, the level of corruption in a society is not only a
measure for political success (as Delhey uses it), it is also a measure for morality within a
society sending a clear signal about its ‘common behaviour’ to the environment which means
that high corruption levels undermine the idea that a nation is trustworthy. We therefore
expect that corruption is negatively associated with individuals’ trust in other nations.
Summing up, nations that incorporate economic strength, modern cultural values and a
moral type of conduct are seen as trustworthy. The theoretical argumentation has been
graphically summarised in Figure 1.
– Figure 1 about here –
One question has still been left unanswered. To get a chance to test our theoretical
argument empirically, we need to specify expectations that have to be met to make a nation
appear trustworthy. Only, if there is a commonly acknowledged notion of a ‘cultural right’
and no aggression or fear, it can be assumed that meeting these expectations is a clear
indication for cultural excellence and probably makes nations appear trustworthy. For Europe,
we are able to identify such a cultural ideal.
6. Cultural ideals in Europe
Europe seems to fulfil two requirements, which makes this region suitable for testing
our assumption and analysing the impact of certain nation-based cultural features on the trust
accorded to them. First, we can largely exclude the existence of jealousy or threat. From the
end of the Second World War until 2008, the situation in Europe was quite extraordinary in
that there were no severe international conflicts that made other nations appear as enemies.
18
Instead, European nations were (and still are) undergoing an idiosyncratic, historical
experience in which many countries are part of an enterprise that is explicitly based on
collaboration and cooperation, including associated members.
Second, although there are economic, political and cultural differences between
European nations, the EU-Treaty, and especially its Charter of Fundamental Rights, sets out
an internationally acknowledged ideal concept which defines desired ends, expressly shared
by all involved. That is, the members of the European Union have conspicuously developed
and committed themselves to an agreement reflecting desired ends.
What are the specific components of this commonly acknowledged European ideal?
European notions about ‘right and wrong’ are closely linked to the concept of modernity
(Norris, 1999). Modernity can be understood as an epoch turned to the future (Therborn,
1995, 3), which consists of ideas about progress, social evolution, and prosperity. Thus, the
‘European ideal’ is related to both economic performance and specific cultural values.
These values reflect the culturally ‘right’— a ‘template’ of a common understanding
about inalienable rights and values that are based on European historical roots such as Greek
philosophy, the Roman justice system, Christianity, and the Enlightenment period. This
template is collected from a variety of sources and based upon the national charters with their
different constitutional traditions, as well as their diverse protocols and treaties, and thus can
be considered reflecting the ‘essence’ of the cultures in the member states. Of course, in a
way, there are quite different cultural peculiarities between the citizens in Europe, but
democratic constitutions and treaties reflect the ideals held by political elites as well as by the
general populations and thus enjoy democratic legitimacy.
The values which the EU member states have formulated their ideal conception
strongly reminds one of the conception of Individual Modernity articulated by Welzel (2007)
following Inkeles’ term of individual modernity (Inkeles 1978, 1997) and Inglehart’s
postmodernism approach as well. Inkeles identifies dominant psychological traits that become
19
the modal type of personality in the wake of modernization processes, such as openmindedness, secularism, positivism, rationalism, activism towards politics and community
affairs, as well as nationalism (Inkeles 1978, 49, citied in Welzel 2007, 186). He has shown
that modern attitudes emerge primarily within certain socioeconomic forces, regardless of a
specific culture (Welzel 2007, 191). Inglehart assumes that individual orientations are adopted
during the formative years and stay relative stable. According to him, these orientations are
hierarchically ordered, and the lower-ordered need to be satisfied before higher-ordered can
emerge. So-called ‘materialist’ orientations can be pleased with material products (food,
shelter, commodities). Higher-ordered ‘post-materialist’ orientations are grounded in
psychological self-actualization needs (Welzel 2007, 192). Socioeconomic development and
educational expansion lead to a fulfilment of materialistic needs, and individuals, who have
not experienced material deprivation during their formative years, develop post-materialistic
orientations as the desire for independence, freedom and self-expression (Inglehart 2008). On
the macro level materialistic values are gradually displaced by postmaterialistic priorities.
Following the idea of evolutionary development Welzel expects that there are
psychological orientations becoming ever more dominant among individuals as societies
move through socioeconomic transformations known as individualization processes (Welzel
2007, 185). Following the postmaterialistic conception, Welzel claims that during the postindustrial phase of modernization, individualizing tendencies and de-standardization give rise
to a human-centric worldview that nurtures emancipative values (Welzel 2007, 202). Such
emancipative values do not legitimate authority, they rather internalize authority into the self,
and the ultimate goal is decision-making freedom of the individual human being in all life
spheres. This implies the absence of obedience, political freedom, democratic orientations,
equality between all citizens, personal autonomy, but also open-mindedness (Welzel 2007,
201-2).
20
In sum, it seems that the development of emancipative values which are considered to
be a consequence of the socio-economic postmodern development of societies and which are
going along with economic prosperity appears in some kind of ‘shining light’. It is these
orientations that are reflected in the European value debates and official treaties, and such
values seem indeed desirable, including primarily:
•
Democratic orientations
•
Attitudes toward authority reflecting autonomy
•
Notions of role models (within the family)
•
Gender equality (especially in employment)
•
Separation of church and state (laicism)
•
(Post)materialism concerning marriage
The last dimension is not quite being debated officially but we think it is a valid
indicator for emancipation orientation directly affecting day-to-day life. Living a selfdetermined life also means free choice of partner. Financial independence enables the
emergence of the motif of romance. The institutionalized model is substituted by the
collaborative model which is based upon mutual solidarity. Thus, modern partnerships are
defined by love and mutual understanding, not money.
In consequence, a certain pattern of these value dimensions—reflecting autonomy,
support for democracy, equal gender roles, laicism, and the prevalence of a romantic rather
than material motives for marriage—is considered to be ‘postmodern-emancipative’.
Approaching these orientations can be interpreted as an indicator for cultural modernity.
To sum up, given that 1) a positive national image which facilitates trust is based on
both economic and cultural factors; 2) the cultural excellence of another nation does not
necessarily lead to jealousy or fear, but can lead to appreciation; 3) between 1945 and 2008,
in Europe there was no severe international conflict preventing the Europeans to see each
21
other as enemies or too hard competitors; 4) in Europe, there is a common concept of cultural
ideals and finally, 5) cultural excellence is defined by postmodern-emancipative values, this
article hypothesises that within Europe, greater cultural modernity is an indicator for cultural
excellence which is associated with increased trust.
7. Data and Variables
In order to operationalise individuals’ trust in other nations, data from the European
Election Study (EES, 2004) is used. The EES is a cross-national comparative survey focusing
on voting behaviour in Europe. People in 25 countries were asked to judge up to 31 other
nations via the following question:
Now I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in people from
various countries. Can you please tell me for each, whether you have a lot of trust of
them or not very much trust. If you do not know a country well enough, just say so
and I will go on to the next.
Concerns the data could be too old, are not necessary. First, investigating a social
mechanism—literally, the association between cultural orientations and transnational trust—
the quality of the empirical findings will not be reduced by using data from 2004. Second, this
is the only survey we are aware of enabling the application of our methodical design which
we explain below. Third, one should note that before the financial crises, the political
situation in Europe was widely peaceful and stable; no one perceived the other as a military or
economical threat. Additionally, to a certain degree even corrupt structures could be ignored.
Today, things have changed and corruption plays an increasing role when thinking about each
other’s perceptions (of Germans and Greeks, for example).
22
As it needs some time until national features are ‘translated’ into an image, we use
orientations from a time point before the ESS survey. To measure cultural orientations data
from the third wave of the European Values Study (1999/2000) is used. The EVS project on
human values in Europe is a large-scale, cross-national survey research program on how
Europeans think about family, work, religion, politics and society, repeated every nine years.
Since we cannot be sure which value dimensions actually flow into a nation’s image,
we try to depict culture broadly using value dimensions from the different societal spheres
represented above. The value dimensions were combined to create an additive index of
‘cultural modernity’. For this purpose, first, the six orientation dimensions were coded in a
pro-logical direction, which reflects the expected positive association between value increase
and trust increase; this means that higher values reflect autonomy, support for democracy,
equal gender roles, laicism, and the prevalence of romantic rather than material motives for
marriage2. Second, the national values for the six orientation dimensions were determined by
calculating the aggregated mean of all valid answers for each nation. Next, these national
values were standardised and additively combined to calculate an index for cultural
modernity. Since there is no theoretical reason why one dimension should be of more
significance than others, by this means, every dimension equally flows into the index. On this
index, each nation is scored corresponding with its cultural modernity. The higher the value
(score) the more culturally modern the nation can be categorized. Unfortunately, it was not
possible to determine a cultural modernity score for all nations for which a received trust
value could be calculated; rather, a ‘cultural modernity’ index was calculated for 25 European
countries.
Corruption is measured via the inverted Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), delivered
by Transparency Internationali which indicates an ascending level of corruption. Taking
2
The literal wording of the items used is reported in the appendix. The different independent dimensions created
by additive indexes as well as the overall data structure were confirmed by a confirmative factor analysis (see
also appendix).
23
previous findings into consideration, two structural variables are also considered as controls: a
country’s absolute population size (per million) and its economic performance, as measured
by its gross domestic product (GDP)ii. As described above, it has been shown that
economically powerful nations are seen as trustworthy (Inglehart, 1991; Delhey, 2005). The
population size argument is that great nations threaten other societies, while small ones do not
(Delhey and Newton, 2004). Structural data was collected from Eurostat (2004), which is the
statistical office of the European Union situated in Luxembourg providing harmonised
statistics at European level that enable comparisons between countriesiii.
8. Methods
The association to be analyzed addresses the question of whether the cultural
excellence of nations heightens their chance of being seen as trustworthy by the individuals of
other nations. Since our study is concerned solely with explaining intra-individual (within)
variance of respondents in judging different other nations, we control for inter-individual
differences, that is the variance between the respondents’ attributes like age, sex, income,
nationality etc.
– Figure 2 about here –
We address this fact by applying fixed effects (FE) regressions (Wooldridge, 2002,
266), in which we differentiate between the individual (macro) level and the judgment level
(micro) level. The fe method uses a dummy variable for each respondent. As a consequence,
all individual characteristics are ‘controlled’ due to their perfect collinearity with these
dummies (Andreß et al, 2006, 544). Only persons delivering within variance are estimated,
while those judging all nations likewise as trustworthy or not trustworthy are excluded from
the estimation.
24
In other words, the interview is one clear-cut situation in which respondents are asked
to answer questions and in this one situation the single respondent does not change in terms of
his/her gender, age, wealth, education or preferences. Therefore, almost all unobserved
heterogeneity can be considered as controlled, which means that effects can be seen as
extremely reliable since the estimations are unbiased (Brüderl, 2010, 975). A further
advantage of the fe-design lies in the fact that we are also controlling for the disposition
approach introduced above in which we are not interested here. Given that every respondent
was asked to evaluate up to 31 different nations, it can be determined whether differences in
nations’ features co-vary with differences in individuals’ evaluations. That is, the results of
the following analyses can be interpreted as relating only to the independent variables
features. The independent variables used are the ‘cultural modernity’ index and the corruption
rate of the nations judged. The economic strength and population size of the focal nations are
used as controls. In the next section, the empirical findings are presented and discussed.
9. Empirical Findings
To measure the strength of trust a nation is accorded by the citizens of other European
nations, the proportion of respondents answering ‘a lot of trust’ in the EES survey is reported.
– Figure 3 about here –
Figure 3 illustrates that Eastern Europeans (i.e., Serbs, Romanians, Croats, Bulgarians)
and the Turkish are trusted relatively little, while Northern Europeans (i.e., Swedes, Danes,
the Dutch, Finns, Norwegians) as well as the Luxembourgers are considered comparatively
trustworthy. For example, 80% of all respondents showed a lot of trust in the Swedish. At first
glance, the trusted societies seem to be those that are rather small and rich. To examine
whether this is a matter of fact and what kind of influence cultural values and corruption are
25
exerting, in the next step, fixed effects regression models are conducted. Again, the central
question is whether ‘cultural modernity’ is the key to trust.
- Table 1 about here -
Table 1 presents the results of different fixed effects regression models. We see that
15,852 individuals discriminated between the nations queried – that is, their answers varied
depending on the nations queried – and that these nearly 16,000 respondents altogether
expressed 299,422 judgments about the trustworthiness of different European nations3.
Since the dependent variable is dichotomous, logistic regressions were conducted.
Effect coefficients are presented in terms of odds ratios as well as standardized coefficients.
Odds ratios are expressed as the ratio between the probability of an occurrence in relation to
the probability of its non-occurrence. All effects show significance on the 0.001-level.
For each model, the proportion of explained within variance is reported. Again, the
results of the analyses can be interpreted as relating only to differences between the particular
judgments of the respondents while controlling for all kind of inter-individual differences,
including their nationalities.
The first model (m1) shows the influence of the cultural modernity index on
individuals’ decision to trust or not to trust other nations. For a one-unit increase in cultural
modernity, the odds of being trusted are multiplied by 1.247. This means that nations with
greater levels of cultural modernity have a significantly better chance of being regarded as
trustworthy. Conversely, the probability that a nation will be trusted seems to be significantly
affected by a country’s level of corruption (m2); the value lower than one indicates that a
rising corruption level lowers the chances that the nation will be trusted by individuals of
3
The countries involved are Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Estonia, Finland, France,
Great Britain, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Latvia, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal,
Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, and Sweden.
26
other nations. In both instances, pseudo-R2 (McFadden) indicates a decrease of the
unexplained within-variance of the dependent variable of about 11 to 12 percent (m1 and m2).
In direct comparison, the influence of the corruption level and the level of cultural modernity
show comparable strength with regard to individuals’ decision to trust other nations (m3).
One should note that the McFadden value does not really rise when putting both variables into
one model. As argued above, corruption and cultural excellence are strongly interconnected
which is empirically true (Pearson’s r = 0.79***, macro corr.)iv. However, since both
determinants are highly significant, both show independent effects on trust in nations.
Comparing the beta values indicates that corruption has a slightly higher impact on trust in
nations than the orientation index (m3); however, by incorporating the GDP-indicator and
population size into the model, the ranking changes (m5). Now, cultural modernity has the
strongest effect (beta = 0.792***), indicating that corruption and economic strength are highly
interrelated (r = 0.76***, macro corr.). In the fourth model, the effects of the controls on the
dependent variable are examined (m4). For a one-unit increase on the GDP scale, the odds for
trust are multiplied with 1.020, which cannot be interpreted per se, since the effect size
depends on the basis probability. To evaluate its influence, again we have to compare the beta
values and we see that the nation’s GDP has a lot stronger effect on trust than the population
size does. In the last model shows that the GDPs association with trust is strong, but weaker
than the one concerning corruption and cultural orientations, respectively (m5). Finally, the
population size variable also has a significant influence on the dependent variable (m4, m5).
The smaller a nation is, the higher the chance it will be trusted. However, compared to the
other determinants, population size does not greatly influence trust in nations.
10. Discussion
First, empirical results suggest that all three different societal dimensions are
important to generate individuals’ trust in other nations. Economic and cultural factors as well
27
as moral conduct are all significant when citizens of one nation decide about the
trustworthiness of another nation. Second, in direct comparison, cultural values turn out to be
the most influential factor for trust. Our results suggest that cultural values play a greater role
in generating trust than economic strength. This is rather surprising, since previous research
suggests that economic performance is the strongest factor affecting trust in nations.
Third, a further dimension, moral performance, is likewise of great importance, and its
influence is also greater than economic performance. This is comprehensible when thinking
that non-ethical conduct could directly harm the own nation. In sum, the empirical analyses
show that cultural modernity has the strongest effect on the decision to place trust in nations,
followed by corruption and economic strength.
Following up on our theoretical model, we can conclude that trust is a by-product of a
nation’s image, which in turn originates from two different types of sources: aspects of
content and aspects of process. The first type belongs to different societal spheres, namely
social, political, and economic dimensions. For cultural factors to affect the national image,
some common idea of the perfect society and thus some agreement about what is expected are
necessary; when considering Europe, we find this agreement in the declared and formalized
self-conception of the European Union following a certain concept of modernity. The current
analyses suggest that economic strength and cultural modernity are both integrated into a
nation’s image, which in turn leads to trust.
The second type of image source refers to the conduct facet. Identical content can be
evaluated either positively or negatively, depending on the intergroup-relationship and based
on the assumed motives of the other. Given that the level of corruption is a valid indicator of
morality, the present results show that moral conduct is very important for the attributed
trustworthiness.
Finally, one more aspect could be revealed by the empirical analyses: all independent
dimensions tested are interrelated to each other. In other words, for a good image to develop
28
and thus to be considered trustworthy, it is not enough to be culturally or economically
affluent; a nation has to be politically sovereign as well (i.e., to be able to effectively mitigate
immoral conduct). Only if nations meet standards in content and morality, they are regarded
with respect, perhaps even admiration, and not with envy or anxiety. If all these conditions
operate together, then nations have a real chance of obtaining a good image and consequently
be considered trustworthy. Bearing European integration in mind, this last point seems to be a
clear precondition for transnational solidarity to find widespread support.
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12. Appendix
Cultural orientations used from the European Values Study (1999/2000)
Support for democracy
I’m going to read off some things that people sometimes say about a democratic political system.
Could you please tell me if you agree strongly, agree, disagree or disagree strongly, after I read each
of them?
 Democracy may have some problems but it’s better than any other form of government
1 = disagree strongly: 2 = disagree; 3 = agree; 4 = agree strongly
I’m going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of
governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very
bad way of governing this country?
 Having a democratic political system
1 = very bad; 2 = fairly bad; 3 = good; 4 = very good (after recoding)
Consistency coefficient Cronbach’s Alpha = 0,69
Obedience
I’m going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of
governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very
bad way of governing this country?
 Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections
 Having experts, not government, make decisions according to what they think is best for the
country
 Having the army rule the country
1 = very good; 2 = fairly good; 3 = bad; 4 = very bad
Consistency coefficient Cronbach’s Alpha = 0,53
Laicism
How much do you agree or disagree with the following:
 It would be better for [COUNTRY] if more people with strong religious beliefs held public
office
 Politicians who do not believe in God are unfit for public office
1 = agree strongly; 2 = agree; 3 = neither agree nor disagree; 4 = disagree; 5 = disagree strongly
Consistency coefficient Cronbach’s Alpha = 0,77
Notions of gender roles
People talk about the changing roles of men and women today. For each of the following statements I
read out, can you tell me how much you agree with each. Please use the responses on this card:
 A pre-school child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works
 A job is alright but what most women really want is a home and children
 Being a housewife is just as fulfilling as working for pay
1 = agree strongly; 2 = agree; 3 = disagree; 4 = disagree strongly (after recoding) 3 = disagree
Consistency coefficient Cronbach’s Alpha = 0,59
33
Gender equality in employment
Do you agree or disagree with the following statement?
 When jobs are scarce, men have more right to a job than women
1 = agree; 2 = neither; 3= disagree (after recoding)
Materialism concerning marriage
Here is a list of things which some people think make for a successful marriage. Please tell me, for
each one, whether you think it is very important, rather important or not very important for a
successful marriage …
 An adequate income
 Good housing
1 = very; 2 = rather; 3 = not
Consistency coefficient Cronbach’s Alpha = 0,64
34
Figure 1: Schematic model of the development of transnational trust
cultural values
&
moral conduct
Typical attitudes,
descisions and
behaviour (national
habitus)
picture of
prototypical
citizen
national
image
trust/ no
trust
in other
nation
Figure 2: Structure of ESS data regarding trust in other nations
Figure 3: Trust in nations – levels
Trustofinreceived
nationsnational trust in Europe by comparison
20
40
%
60
80
Levels of received national trust by comparison
CS RO BG SK PO EE HU CZ MT FR PT NO IE CH FI DK
TR HR CY SI LT LV GB IT GR DE AT ES BE LU NL SE
Proportion of interviewees answering ‘a lot of trust.’ Data source: EES 2004; author’s
calculations.
35
Table 1: The impact of cultural modernity, corruption, population size, and economic strength
on individuals’ trust in other nations.
m1
m2
FE (OR)
FE (OR)
m3
m4
FE (OR) BETA
m5
FE (OR) BETA
FE (OR) BETA
Constant
Cultural modernity
1.247 ***
1.126 0.891 ***
(0.001)
Corruption
1.111 0.792 ***
(0.002)
0.681 ***
(0.002)
(0.002)
0.796 -0.971 ***
0.851 -0.686 ***
(0.003)
(0.004)
GDP
1.020 1.748 ***
(0.000)
Population size
1.006 0.524 ***
(0.000)
1.000 -0.241 ***
1.000 -0.124 ***
(0.000)
(0.000)
Log likelihood_0
-139,027
-139,027
-139,027
-139,027
-139,027
Log likelihood
-123,551
-123,087
-121,405
-125,266
-120,701
McFadden(R2)
0.111
0.115
0.127
0.099
0.132
No. of obs
No. of groups
299,422
299,422
299,422
299,422
299,422
15,852
15,852
15,852
15,852
15,852
Logistic fixed effects regressions. Reported are odds ratios (or), standardized coefficients
(beta), and standard errors in brackets. All effects are significant on the 0.001-level. Data:
European Election Study (2004), European Value Study (1999/2000), Transparency (2004),
and Eurostat (2004); author’s calculations.
Table 2: Factor analysis conforming data structure for cultural values
Komponente
Laizismu Demokratie- Materialismus Frauenrolle AutoritätsGleichheit auf
Kommunaliät
s
unterstützung
orientierung dem Arbeitsmarkt
Politicians who do not believe in God are unfit for public office
It would be better for [COUNTRY] if more people with strong religious beliefs
held public office
Having a democratic political system is very bad … very good
Democracy may have some problems but it's better than any other form of government
Good housing it is very important … not very important for a successful marriage
An adequate income it is very important … not very important for a successful marriage
A job is alright but what most women really want is a home and children
Being a housewife is just as fulfilling as working for pay
A pre-school child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works
Having experts, not government, make decisions according to what they think is
best for the country
[Agree … diagree] Having a strong leader who does not have to bother
with parliament and elections
It is a very good … bad having the army rule the country
When jobs are scarce, men have more right to a job than women
0,890
0,889
N
,793
,795
38922
38487
0,827
,741
,729
,734
,726
,648
,604
,472
,729
36805
37075
40788
40803
33469
33339
34767
35581
0,723
,593
36883
,441
,975
37658
40030
0,858
0,851
0,855
0,852
-0,782
-0,761
-0,663
0,519
0,982
Source: European Values Study 1999/2000; Principle Components Analysis method; Oblimin
rotation; missing pairwise. Overall explained variance: 69,1 %.
36
i
Transparency International is a global coalition against corruption. For more information see
http://www.transparency.org
ii
GDP is an indicator of a nation´s economic situation reflecting the total value of all goods and services
produced less the value of goods and services used for intermediate consumption in their production. Expressing
GDP in PPS (purchasing power standards) eliminates differences in price levels between countries which allows
for the comparison of economies significantly different in absolute size.
iii
See http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/about_eurostat/introduction
iv
Corruption has been discussed as an indicator of moral conduct. Of course, low corruption rates also indicate
good governance and democratic consolidation, which is one reason why we decided to use two separate
concepts. But it is also true that post-modern values can hardly develop when corruption is prevailing.
37