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Theses and Dissertations (Comprehensive)
1979
The Rationality of Plato’s Theory of Good and Evil
Allan A. Davis
Wilfrid Laurier University
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ABSTRACT
Plato
has
theology."
been
This
called
thesis
is
the
an
"father
of
attempt to examine in the
light of contemporary Platonic scholarship five
essentially
of
good
and
evil
4 attempts to give this doctrine credence by
analysing those aspects of it which seem
5
and
6
consider
Plato's
conclude that, although some of his
lack
credibility,
his
least
theory
beliefs
interpretation
the
rationality
of
Plato's
convincing.
of
in
of
function of soul is basically plausible.
examine
is rational.
Chapter 3 states briefly his theory of Forms,
Chapter
Chapters
Plato's
and 2 examine the plausibility of Plato's theory
of knowledge.
while
of
religious doctrines insofar as they support the
idea that Plato's theory
Chapters 1
rational
the
soul and
this
nature and
Chapters 7
Idea
area
of
the
and
8
Good.
Chapter 9 sketches his notion of balance and proportion and,
in conclusion, Chapter 10 attempts to show how
provides
an
underlying
credibility
not
only
theories discussed but also to Plato's theory
evil in its entirety.
i
this
of
theory
to all the
good
and
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This
generous
help
insistence
unending
study
on
of
Professor
genuine
patience
experienced
would not have been possible without the
in
my
for
Jose
scholarship
the
research.
Huertas-Jourda.
was
numerous
My
coupled
His
with
an
difficulties
I
thanks to Professor Ron
Grimes for his extensive comments on each of the
drafts
as
the manuscript matured, and for his advice on the format and
style
of
the
completed work.
My thanks also to Professor
Aarne Siirala for his reading and comments, and to Professor
Hart Bezner for his technical assistance
finished thesis.
ii
in producing
the
THE RATIONALITY OF PLATO'S THEORY
OF GOOD AND EVIL
By
ALLAN A. DAVIS
B.A. University of Toronto, 1973
THESIS
Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements
for the Master of Arts degree
Wilfrid Laurier University
1979
iii
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Plato was one of the greatest philosophers, and that largely
because
he
combined,
dialectical skill
belief
in
a
with
a
simultaneously
and
uniquely,
metaphysical,
indeed
religious
supra-sensible
realm of divine essences, and
came nearer than anyone else to relating
the world of human experience.
iv
it
rationally
(W.K.C. Guthrie).
to
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction
i
1. Plato's Theory of Knowledge
1
2. The Rationality of Plato's Theory of
Knowledge
7
\\3. Plato's Theory of Form
14
4. The Rationality of Plato's Theory of
Form
19
5. Plato's Theory of Soul
49
6. The Rationality of Plato's Theory of
Soul
55
" X 7 . Plato's Idea of the Good
8. The Rationality of Plato's Idea of the
Good
9. Plato's Theory of Balance and
Proportion
10. The Rationality of Plato's Theory of
Balance and Proportion
Conclusions
v
64
71
85
90
INTRODUCTION
This
study
good and evil.
rather
is
an
examination of Plato's theory of
Because this theory is "all of Plato" it
broad to be handled adequately within the scope of a
study of
arbitrary
explain
this
length.
limitations
the
treatment
Platonic
of
each
is
I have,
on
therefore, put
its content.
theories
as
First,
I present
very brief.
dialogues
is
very
selective.
several
although I
them,
my
Secondly, because I am
viewing the dialogues as a whole, my exegesis of
particular
For this reason, also, I do
not differentiate between the point of view of Socrates
that
is
of
and
Plato, nor do I make a distinction between Plato's
early and late periods, unless, of course, this is necessary
for the understanding of the topic.
use
of
secondary
Thirdly,
although
my
sources is somewhat limited, I do try to
include wherever relevant the comments of Aristotle, Plato's
greatest pupil.
As this paper progresses, some questions emerge. The
first
is, What do I mean by "rational"?
to what criteria?
Rational according
Rational according to logic and reason?
appears
to
be
so
Rational according
to
scientific
Rational because it
or seems to make sense?
result from the fact that Plato's theory is
well
fact?
These problems
ontological
as
as logical, metaphysical as well as scientific and, as
such, must often be
talked
vi
about
in
terms
of
religious
metaphor
and
analogy.
Sometimes
terms
with
implications must be used, because they seem the
not
the
only,
ones
available.
In
definition of the word "rational"
English
Dictionary
(Vol
VIII,
theistic
best, if
general, however, my
is
that
of
the
Oxford
169): "sensible," "sane,"
"reasonable," "not foolish," or "absurd."
For example, when
I say a particular point is rational, I mean
according
one's
The idea that
experience
it
seems to "make sense."
killing a spider will cause it
"absurd."
to
rain
is
"foolish"
and
It does not correspond to any experience we have
in life and is, therefore, not "reasonable."
idea
to
that
good
actions
and
fair
play,
However,
the
honesty
and
consideration generally are conducive to harmony both within
one's self and one's society, while their opposites are not,
does seem to
correspond
with
life's
experience
and
is,
therefore, "sensible" and "sane."
This
brings
mean by "good"
standard
of
up
and
good
other questions. What exactly do I
"evil"?
or
a
Am
I
relative
Although Plato employs the terms
assuming
standard
"good"
and
an
of
absolute
goodness?
"evil"
in a
variety of ways in the dialogues, in general he means by the
term "good" that which one objectively considers beneficial,
and
"evil"
that
ideas of "good"
important
and
which
and
one considers not beneficial.
"evil"
which
he
deems
to
be
The
most
which, consequently, we must most frequently
consider, are the negative and positive exemplifications
moral absolutes.
vii
of
Within
these
limitations,
examine in the light of
five
of
this
contemporary
thesis attempts to
Platonic
scholarship
Plato's essentially religious doctrines insofar as
they support the idea that Plato's theory of good
is
rational.
of
Forms, while
Chapter 3 states
Chapter
4
doctrine credence by analysing those
seem
least
evil
Chapters 1 and 2 examine the plausibility of
Plato's theory of knowledge.
theory
and
convincing.
theory of soul and
briefly
his
attempts to give this
aspects
of
it
which
Chapters 5 and 6 consider Plato's
conclude
that,
although
some
of
his
beliefs in this area lack credibility, his interpretation of
the
nature
and
function
of
soul is basically plausible.
Chapters 7 and 8 examine the rationality of Plato's Idea
the
Good.
Chapter
9
sketches
his notion of balance and
proportion and, in conclusion, Chapter 10 attempts
how
of
to
show
this theory gives an underlying credibility not only to
all the theories discussed but also
good and evil in its entirety.
vii
to
Plato's
theory
of
1.
PLATO'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE
Before we can determine the degree to which Plato was
able to provide a rational analysis of the meaning
and
evil,
good
we must understand his theory of knowledge, part
of which he borrowed from Socrates.
all
of
virtues
exist
as
fixed
Socrates believed
standards,
that
or paradigms,
independently of any transitory examples of virtuous conduct
(1).
According to Socrates, to have knowledge of virtue one
must have knowledge
example
of
these
paradigms.
Any
particular
of virtue, whether it be piety, courage, temperance
or friendship, is simply an imperfect example, or
the
paradigm.
If
one
does
not
have
paradigm, one will not know the virtue.
think
that
v. i- r- t_ i —i m—i s.
opinions
this
act
R
wi
_ u
—t
. . ^ t—h„n—n t
.
are
"...in
of
courage
r(*fe>r(*-nre*
tn
^ _ ^ . _»
_
__
a
state
of
copy
of,
knowledge
of the
Granted, one
might
or that act of piety is
fivfifl
na rarl i am<i, .
r
0
n n p ' _<;
transition and there is
nothing abiding (Cratylus 440 a ) . "
Building upon Socratic teaching, and upon elements of
Heraclitean (2) and Pythagorean (3) philosophy, and upon the
teachings of Parmenides (4), Plato developed the theory that
knowledge, not only of virtues but of all reality, could
found
only
be
in reference to transcendent absolutes existing
apart from the material world as a realm of fixed principles
(5).
Germane to this theory was
Plato's
belief
that
the
Davis:
Plato
2
senses failed to give one true knowledge of reality.
hearing
and
more than
touch,
inaccurate
material
world
maintains that
material
(6).
one
world,
he
and
stated, gives to the mind nothing
unreliable
impressions
of
the
In the Theaetetus (185e-186e), Plato
must
not
Sight,
understand
through
the
objects
of
the
the sensual impressions, but
through reflection upon sensual impressions (7).
Perhaps we can understand Plato's idea of
upon
the
impressions
if we compare the mind to a computer
assimilating information.
work
The sense organs, we
conveys
its
own
the ear sound.
say,
once,
Yet we don't think of the object as
organ
several
for the mind sorts the impressions into concepts.
themselves, but through the mind.
about
grasps reality.
them
the
organs
In other words, it is
not by receiving passively what the senses
reasoning
Each
impression of the object--the eye colour,
The resulting concepts are created, not through
by
might
as individual perceptors receiving data--an individual
eye sees, and individual ear hears, and so on.
at
reflection
convey,
but
by
(reflecting upon them) that the mind
A good example of this notion is
the Theaetetus (186b):
SOCRATES:
Wait a moment. The
hardness of something hard and the
softness of something soft will be
perceived by the mind through touch,
will they not?
THEAETETUS: Yes.
found
in
Davis:
Here
Plato
3
SOCRATES:
But their existence
and the fact that they both exist, and
their contrariety to one another and
again
the
existence
of
this
contrariety are things which the mind
itself undertakes to judge for us,
when it reflects
upon
them
and
compares one with another.
THEAETETUS: Certainly.
Plato states that a hard and a soft apple exhibit a
contrariety which the mind perceives by comparing them.
Yet
the hard one may become soft and that instance of contariety
vanish.
But through reflection, or reason,
realize
that contrariety remains
the
mind
will
as an unchanging reality,
a reality reached only by the mind after some reflection
on
the impressions of the hard and the soft apples. Therefore,
claims
Plato,
apples
come
from
impressions,
but
contrariety.
not
only
this
also
does knowledge of such objects as
sort
of
reflection
knowledge
of
upon
concepts
the
like
In fact, states Plato in the Phaedo (78e), all
of knowledge, whether of quantities, measurements, shapes,
colours,
moral
or
aesthetic concepts, comes to us through
reflection:
Well, what about the concrete
instances of beauty-- such as men,
horses, clothes, and so on--or of
equality, or any other members of a
class corresponding to an absolute
entity?
Are they constant, or are
they, on the contrary, scarcely ever
in the same relation in any sense
either to themselves
or
to
one
another?
With them, Socrates, it is just
the opposite;
they are never free
from variation.
Davis:
Plato
4
And these concrete objects you
can touch and see and perceive by your
other senses, but
those
constant
entities you cannot possibly apprehend
except by thinking; they are invisible
to our sight.
Plato's meaning can be made clearer if we refer to a
common geometric example.
one's
mind
When one's
eye
by
circularity.
itself
Only
does
not
give
one
through
the
mind's
impressions of the circle does one come
of
circularity.
circularity includes
simply
sees.
the
knowledge
Knowledge
knowledge
of
the
of
to
of
nature
or
important.
What is
know
the
true
circles,
and
not
circle which the eye
of
determining
is perhaps more perfect than some
circles and less perfect than others.
or
of
essence of the circle in itself. For
example, this circle O
perfection
knowledge
the true nature of
all
particular
But this
reflection on the
This act of reflection is a process
true
a circle,
receives an impression of the circle.
impression
nature
sees
But knowledge of
the
imperfection of the particular circle is not
important
is
that
this
circle,
which is very imperfect and untrue, suggests another circle,
a perfect circle.
One recognizes this particular circle not
as the perfect circle or the only circle in existence but as
a
In
copy
of
other
particular
the true or perfect circle which it represents.
words,
concept
the
or
diagram
idea
of
the
circle
elicits
a
or principle — that of perfect
Davis:
circularity.
circle.
All
But no
Plato
particular
particular
circles
5
circle
are
is
the
simply
one
true
copies of a
constant standard of absolute circularity.
This analogy to the circle serves as a stepping stone
to Plato's more abstract analogy of equality
given
in
the
Phaedo (74b):
Well, now, have you ever thought
that things which were
absolutely
equal were unequal, or that equality
was inequality?
No, never, Socrates.
Then these equal things are not
the same as absolute equality.
Not in the least, as I see it,
Socrates.
And yet it is these equal things
that have suggested and conveyed to
you
your
knowledge
of
absolute
equality, although they are distinct
from it?
With this analogy Plato introduces at Phaedo (74d) the
that we have a priori knowledge of these absolutes:
This
idea
*
Suppose
that
when
you
see
something you say to yourself, This
thing which I can see has a tendency
to be like something else, but it
falls short and cannot be really like
it, only a poor imitation. Don't you
agree with me that anyone who receives
that impression must in fact have
previous knowledge of that thing which
he says that the other resembles but
inadequately?
passage presents us with Plato's belief that a priori
knowledge of transcendent absolutes is contained within
immortal souls (8). In the Phaedo (75c) Plato states:
our
Davis:
6
Plato
Then if we obtained it before our
birth , and possessed it when we were
born, we had knowledge, both before
and at the moment of birth, not only
of equality and relative magnitudes,
but of all absolute standards. Our
present argument applies no more to
equality than it does to absolute
beauty,
goodness,
uprightness,
holiness, and, as I maintain, all
those
characteristics
which
we
designate in our discussions by the
term 'absolute.'
So we must have
obtained
knowledge
of
all these
characteristics before our birth.
That is so.
And unless we invariably forget
it after obtaining it we must always
be born knowing and continue to know
all through our lives, because 'to
know' means simply to retain
the
knowledge which one has acquired and
not to lose it. Is not what we call
'forgetting'
simply
the
loss of
knowledge, Simmias?
In summary, Plato's theory of knowledge maintains,
that,
or
of
circularity can be found only after reflective reference
to
an
just
as
independent
a
and
priori
knowledge
absolute
principle
circularity and not by a purely
the
particular
circle
of
sensory
equality
of equality or of
interpretation
of
or the particular instance of equal
things, and just as a priori knowledge of the qualities like
beauty, goodness, uprightness, holiness can
after
reflective
reference
be
found
only
to a transcendent and absolute
principle, so a priori knowledge of all reality can be found
only by referring to a realm of transcendent absolutes (9).
Davis:
Plato
7
2.
THE RATIONALITY OF PLATO'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE
Plato's
theory
of
complementary hypotheses.
knowledge
is
based
The first is that the
not give us a true representation of reality.
that
the
on
senses
immortal soul contains a priori knowledge and the
of absolutes.
blue sky which we see does not
visualizes it.
our life, we won't
exist
the
apart
The clear
from
the
reach that flat blue ceiling called sky,
short
blue
is,
wave
in
fact,
lengths)
only
light
refracted and
dispersed as it passes through the earth's atmosphere.
particular image results from
sensitive
only
to
a
the
fact
sky
the
Thus , a band
eye
is
of
a few
thousandths of a centimeter in wavelength makes the
difference between what is visible and
The
that
This
narrow band of radiation that falls
between the red and the violet.
hundred
eye
If we fly straight up for the rest of
for the blueness, the flatness,
(especially
system
That Plato's first hypothesis is credible can
suggested if we refer to an everyday example.
which
do
The second is
third that this a priori knowledge is knowledge of a
be
thfee
would
appear
entirely
what
is
invisible.
different if we could see
light rays beyond these two parameters (10).
Davis:
Plato
8
Plato's belief that the senses are not able
to
give
us a correct representation of reality becomes more profound
if
we
consider
for
a moment the teaching of Einstein who
stated that, since every object is "...simply the sum of its
qualities...",
the
senses,
and since qualities are perceived
of
the
senses
exist
(11).
except
impressions
clouded
by
our
as a
Because of this, says
Einstein, knowledge of the universe "...is simply a
of
via
"...the whole objective universe of matter and
energy, atoms and stars...." does not
construction
only
imperfect
residue
senses
Einstein claims that "...the barrier between
(12)."
man , peering
dimly through the clouded window of his senses, and whatever
objective
reality
may
exist...."
is nearly impossible to
penetrate (13). Echoing the words of
states
that
the
world
exists
as
experienced in consciousness (14).
Einstein,
such
only
Matter
Carl
as
itself
Jung
it
is
is an
hypothesis, claims Jung (15). When you say "matter" you are
really
"...creating
a
symbol for something unknown (16)."
Jung declares that "...everything thought, felt or perceived
is a psychic image, and the world itself exists only so
far
as we are able to produce an image of it (17)."
The
first
fact
hypothesis
considered
a
that Einstein
suggests
credible
to
notion
and Jung agree with Plato's
us
that
(18).
it
ought
However,
to be
Plato's
Davis:
second hypothesis--that a priori knowledge is
the
immortal
soul--
9
Plato
contained
does not seem, at first glance, to be
credible at all. We might argue that when Socrates
Meno
shows
that
the
of
the
square
is
the original square's area, he does so by using very
leading questions.
The boy looks at the
in
says
the
sand
and
suggest the answer.
not
in
the slave boy knows, without having been
taught, that the square on the diagonal
double
in
"yes"
or
diagram
"no" to questions which
His evidence is based on
on a priori knowledge.
scratched
eyesight
The slave boy gives the correct
answers, not because he realizes that they must be
because
they
look
as
if
and
they
ought
to
demonstrates the process of reasoning from
be
so, but
so.
particular
This
fact
to general conclusions, but it does not demonstrate a theory
of
a priori knowledge existing in an immortal soul.
Moravaski
in
his
article
"Learning
and
Julius
Recollection"
correctly states:
Plato
has
All that Plato can conclude from
his experiment is that something
in
addition
to
a deductive
reasoning capacity must be given
to the mind innately in order to
bridge the gap between input and
understanding (19)
no right, says Moravaski, "...to assume that he
has proven that knowledge is given innately (20)."
easily
But Plato's
theory
dismissed.
Flew
of
recollection
states
that
cannot
"...what
be
so
has to be
Davis:
Plato
10
recognized is that whoever taught Meno's slave, no one
taught
Pythagoras
(21)."
ever
As Moravaski himself admits, it
seems probable "...that something in addition to a deductive
reasoning capacity must be given to the mind innately...
Findlay
rightly
points
out
that
often goes far beyond
the
methods
knowledge.
can
agree
(22) We
especially relevant when
vehicle
we
."
the process of learning
used
that
consider
in
this
that
communicating
statement
is
language, the
of learning, does not necessarily give us knowledge
(23).
Plato's belief in innate knowledge of
becomes
Carl
more
Jung's
understandable
theory
that
the
absolutes
if we compare his theory with
Plato's
"forms"
are
inherited
psychic archetypes:
Among
these inherited psychic
factors there is a special class
T.IVI l /-.1-.
mill-ll
In
view
i r.
J-3
•***•
11U L
„„—.c:
a
1_<J11J_ _L U C U
_.:.».'u_—
C L LJ1C1
J. L(J
family or to race. These are the
universal dispositions of
the
mind,
and
they
are
to be
understood
as
analogous
to
Plato's
forms
(eidola),
in
accordance with which the mind
organizes
its
contents.
One
could also describe these forms
as categories analogous to the
logical categories
which
are
always and everywhere present as
the basic postulates of reason
(24).
of this statement, we might be able to say that
perhaps Plato's theory of recollection as
outlined
in the
Davis:
Meno
would
be
more
understandable
Plato
if he had stated that
knowledge was recollected in the way that innate
abilities
are
inherited.
just
as
conceptual
For example, we could argue that
knowledge of equality comes to
information
11
us as part
of
our
genetic
does knowledge of the colour pyramid.
Any child, providing he is not colour-blind, can distinguish
without being taught the difference between red
If
and
the child knows this difference innately, perhaps in the
same manner he might have innate knowledge of such
as
green.
concepts
near and far, high and low, big and small, one and many.
Cornford, in support of this idea,
judgements
that
we
in
infancy
(25).
Aristotle
declares
the soul at conception or at birth has within it a set
of ideals which it strives to achieve.
contains
within
Just
as
the
aesthetic
acorn
itself the characteristics of an oak tree,
an individual soul already contains within itself the
and
make
like equality and inequality as soon as we begin
to use our senses,
that
suggests
absolutes.
A
man's
moral
soul, therefore, is a
source of knowledge in the sense that it contains
pre-natal
knowledge of specific human ideals (26).
For Plato, as for Socrates, knowledge meant knowing a
moral
ideal
something.
with
or
knowing
the
essence
Plato's theory of knowledge
knowing
a
fact
or
true
nature of
was
not
concerned
or knowing how to do something (27).
» Davis:
Therefore, we can realize that
state
that
knowledge
Plato's
Plato
theory
particular
baking
or
certain
formula for a
examples
not
of
cake,
drug.
He
recipe
for
recall the chemical
For
example, particular
of what constitutes equality, the child must learn
Australian
the
type
particular
from his culture.
For
does
of particulars must be recalled.
does not mean that one can recall a
a
12
In a primitive culture like that
aborigine,
Canadian
two
of
the
pinches of salt would be equal.
chemist,
however,
measuring
grams
of
Demorol into a tiny capsule, two pinches would not be equal.
For
both the Australian and the Canadian, absolute equality
would be the same.
What constitutes a particular example of
equality is learned but, in Plato's terms, the
not.
Similarly,
we
could
particular
bones
of
examples
culture to culture (28).
In
beauty,
of
some
although
what
differs
from
women
with
beauty
cultures
through their noses are considered beautiful.
culture
they
would
be
is
argue that anthropologists say
that all cultures have the idea
constitutes
absolute
considered
not
In our
beautiful.
This
suggests that what constitutes particular examples of beauty
is learned.
learned.
It does not mean, however, that the absolute is
The
particulars are variable but the absolute is
not.
If we could
say
that
knowledge
of
absolutes
for
» Davis:
colour
need
not
be
learned,
and
if
Plato
we
could say that
knowledge of absolutes of near and far, high
and
small,
13
and
one and many, need not be learned;
low, big
if we could
say that knowledge of absolutes of equality and beauty
not
be
learned,
we
might
also say that knowledge of all
absolutes need not be learned
inherited.
of
and that perhaps they
of
a
priori
normal intelligence and
conceptualize
without
knowledge
proper
is
prove is that given
stimulation
a
acquire
these
can
abstract
to exercise a "universal human faculty."
it men could not use "...terms like horse and
Without
triangle
and
The ability to form concepts is what distinguishes
man from animals.
"power
person
being taught certain abstract ideas.
Guthrie rightly points out that to
piety."
are
Unfortunately all that these arguments in favour
existence
ideas
need
of
But this ability is
generalization,"
and
not
more
than
the
the ability to generalize
about a number of instances, states Guthrie, is not the same
as
Plato's
doctrine
Furthermore,
even
if
of
we
a
priori
could
prove
absolutes is inherited, this would
doctrine
is
not
knowledge
that
mean
(29).
knowledge of
that
Plato's
plausible since it is based, not upon a theory
of genetic inheritance, but upon a belief in the immortality
of the soul.
theory
of
Therefore,
a
priori
we
must
knowledge
conclude
that
Plato's
presents us with a serious
Davis:
Plato
14
problem.
For the time being, however, we must set this problem
aside.
We
cannot
considered Plato's
be
examined
hypothesis,
it
further
until
we
have
theory of soul, and this theory cannot
until
his
consider
we
theory
have
of
discussed in the next chapter.
discussed
absolutes,
the
Plato's
third
topic
to be
Davis:
15
Plato
3
PLATO'S THEORY OF FORMS
To
give a precise definition of Plato's absolutes is
difficult.
In Socrates' conversation with Parmenides in the
Parmenides (132b), he
"thoughts."
suggests
Later
in
the
that
same
they
might
be
conversation,
maintains that they are like "patterns"
(132d).
like
Socrates
Further on
(135b), Parmenides states that they must be like "essences."
In book VI of the Republic
absolute
is
like
(507),
"being"
Plato
claims
Euthyphro
likens
absolutes
(6d-7),
he
the
that
Gorgias
particulars.
to
"true
In the Phaedrus
being ."
In
the
describes them as "essential forms,"
"standards" or "ideals."
suggests
the
or "essence," like an "aspect,"
"unity," "idea," or "that which really is."
(247c), he
that
In the Greater Hippias (300b),
he
the absolute is like a "common quality."
In
(497e) , he
In
the
claims
they
Cratylus (440c),
are
"present
in"
he states they are
"the eternal nature of things."
Plato's commentators employ a variety of
referring
to
his "absolutes."
names
when
Lodge uses the term "idea."
Lodge maintains that "Idea" could mean for Plato a "group of
sensuous
experiences"
intelligible
unit"
or
or
a
"an
ideal
"conceptual
concept";
essence
"an
of meaning
Davis:
(30)."
Like Lodge, Hoernle uses the term
claims
that
for
Plato
the
"Ideas"
"standards of perfection (31)."
"Universal."
He
says
Plato
16
"Idea."
are
Hoernle
"principles" or
Woltersorff uses
the
term
that for Plato the "Universals" are
"perfect examples of themselves (32)" R.G.
Cross
and A.D.
Woozley in their article, "Knowledge, Belief and the Forms,"
state
that
Plato
uses
the
Greek
word "eidos and idea"
interchangeably.
The English word
Woozley,
exact translation of the Greek "idea." It
is
an
"idea,"
say
Cross
tends to carry with it the notion that ideas exist
the
mind,
that
subjective.
are
only
But, state Cross and
mean this.
(33).
they
thoughts
Woozley,
and
only
are
Plato
not
Therefore, the English word "form" is preferable
We
a
in
only
did
cannot
say, however, that any one term is the
right one, for no exact and precise definition can be
for
and
given
concept which Plato himself called by various names.
But since most commentators use the term "Form," it
is
the
one which will be used in this study.
As
I have
pointed
variously described as
out in Chapter One, these Forms
"patterns,"
"essences," "aspects,"
"unities,"
"paradigms," "ideals" are apprehended not by the
senses but
by
Because
is
found
thought
(reflection
on
the
impressions).
one apprehends the Forms through thought, knowledge
not
only
in
the
relationship
of
the
actual
Davis:
particular
to
the
Form,
thought to the Form.
circle
to
the
The
Plato
but
17
also in the relationship of
relationship
of
the
Form circle is of secondary importance. Of
primary importance is the mind's ability
to
Form
a
of
particular
Circle
through
thought.
As
apprehend
result
the
of this
relationship between the particulars, the Forms and thought,
Plato divides reality into two
"variable"
class
class
(the
these
equal sections.
"intelligible"
the
"visible" or
(the particulars), and the "intelligible"
Forms).
represents
classes,
In
two
the
Republic
regions
(509d-511a)
by a line divided into four
The Forms occupy the first section
class , numbers
"visible" class,
the
third
Plato
the
next
section
of
(34).
consists
the
In the
of plants,
animals
and
objects, and the fourth contains their images,
shadows
and
reflections.
sections
are
four
Corresponding
to
these
methods of cognition (51ia-e).
four
Thought
(reason) is the highest, understanding is the second, belief
is the third and
fourth.
The
thinking
or
conjecture
is
the
first two he calls intellection, the last two
he calls opinion.
intellection
picture
Opinion
cognizes
the
material
world,
cognizes the Forms. All this is nicely summed
up in the Republic (533e-534b) :
Are you satisfied then, said I,
as before, to call the first
division science, and the second
understanding, the third belief,
and the fourth conjecture
or
Davis:
Plato
picture thought — and the last two
collectively
opinion, and the
first two intellection, opinion
dealing
with
generation
and
intellection with essence, and
this relation expressed in the
proportion: as essence is
to
generation, so is intellection to
opinion, and as intellection is
to opinion, so is science to
belief,
and
understanding to
image thinking or surmise?
To state the same idea more simply, we can
thought
occupies
itself
achieve opinion only.
one
say
that
if
with the "visible" world, it will
But if it directs
the Forms, it will achieve knowledge.
that
18
its
attention
to
For example, to think
girl is more beautiful than another is to have an
opinion (35) of beauty, or to think that
courageous
than
another
one
act
is more
is to have an opinion of courage,
but it is not at all the same thing as having
knowledge
of
the Form of Beauty or the Form of Courage.
Plato
claims
undesirable
even
Symposium (202a),
is
better
than
that
though
it
opinion
is
is
knowledge.
ignorance.
namely,
Larissa"
In the
In the Meno (98b-c), Socrates
in
the
lead
direction
one
in
the
proper
ofthe Forms. Right
opinion is not, however, as good as knowledge.
to
necessarily
Diotima declares that a "correct opinion"
remarks that "right opinion" can
direction,
not
not
In the
"way
analogy in the Meno (7a-b), for example, Plato
points out that when one has knowledge, one knows
not
only
Davis:
that
something is true but why it is true.
been told the right way to Larissa might
tells
him differently and go astray.
road, because he has been there (has
will
not
be
knowledge
led astray.
19
Plato
The man who has
meet
someone
who
The man who knows the
a priori
knowledge),
The essential difference between
and true opinion,
says
Plato,
is
that, while
knowledge always represents "stable and unchanging reality,"
true opinion does not, for opinions, founded on the material
world,
the
Heraclitean
world
of
flux, are not permanent
(36).
We can now
consider
information for this study.
know
what
Forms.
For
Courage
we
goodness
courageous.
importance
of
the
above
According to Plato, we can only
is insofar as we have knowledge of the
example,
will
the
through
know
reference
whether
to
the
Form
of
or not a particular act is
If we do not have direct knowledge of the
Form
of Courage, we might nevertheless have a correct opinion of
what
courage
courageous
act
is
like
(37).
and,
therefore,
Conversely,
if
will
we
initiate
have
a
neither
knowledge nor true opinion of the Form we will not know what
courage is and will not initiate a courageous act.
Before we can determine if this idea is credible, we
must
determine
whether
Forms is plausible.
or
not this notion of a system of
Commentators
from
Aristotle
to
the
Davis:
present
have
been
examining
this
problem.
nearer to resolution now than it was
In
the
following
chapters
dilemma will be examined
some
insofar
Plato
20
It is not
in Aristotle's
of
as
the
they
time.
aspects of this
relate
rationality of Plato's theory of good and evil.
to
the
Davis:
Plato
21
4.
THE RATIONALITY OF PLATO'S THEORY OF FORMS
One
of
the first arguments we might present against
the rationality of the theory of Forms is that, despite
the
metaphysical claims made in Chapter One and Two, Forms might
be nothing more than thoughts in one's mind.
Granted we can
only know this circle is a circle because we have seen other
circles,
and
by using reason, can compare it with them and
find it is like an absolute
Similarly,
principle
circularity.
we can conclude that the word "equal" stands for
a principle called equality just as the
for
called
a principle called redness.
word
"red"
But, as we suggested above
(page 13), all we have been talking about so far
of
classes,
that
is
to
say,
concepts.
concepts need exist as transcendent
thinking
mind,
and
absolute principles
theory
of
if
of
Forms
are
None
apart
ideas
of these
from
the
they do not, the Forms will not be
goodness,
in
which
case
Plato's
good and evil will immediately lose any credence
we have thus far given it.
Parmenides
stands
(132b)
the
Plato himself points out in
the
possibility that the Forms are only
thoughts:
But, Parmenides, said Socrates,
may it not be that each of these
forms is a thought, which cannot
properly exist anywhere but in a
mind.
Davis:
Plato
In answer to Socrates' question, Parmenides states
22
(132b-c)
that a thought must be of something that is, namely a form:
Then, is each form one of these
thoughts and yet a thought of nothing?
No, that is impossible.
So it is a thought of something?
Yes.
Of
something that is, or of
something that is not?
Of something that is.
In fact, of some one thing which
that thought observes to cover all the
cases,
as being a certain single
character?
Yes.
Then will not this thing that is
thought of as being one and always the
same in all cases be a form?
That again seems to follow.
Parmenides' answer reminds us of a
comment made
earlier (page 10), namely, that Plato proves in the
Sophist
that
In this
language
cannot by itself give us knowledge.
dialogue (262c), Plato states that for
verb
must
be
mingled
with
noun
"weaving together" of verb with
thinking
one
Forms
"'Theaetetus,
combined
(262c).
that
exist,
It is in this
the
which
whom
should
not
be
saying
joined.
or
To
say
I am talking to at this moment, flies'"
is to combine verbs and nouns which ought not to be
(263d).
Even when words or thoughts are combined
incorrectly, argues Plato, the separate thought
to
to
what is not happens. When one thinks what is not,
joins
(263a)
noun
language
the separate
can say what
corresponds
form and this corresponds to what is. One
is not, therefore, just as easily as
one
can
Davis:
think
what
is
not.
Based
on
Plato's
Plato
23
argument, we can
conclude, therefore, that it is incorrect for Parmenides
state
that
Forms
must
exist
since
to
a thought must be of
something that exists (38).
The possibility that Forms might simply
appears
to
theory
Forms.
brought
Some
commentators,
for
on
of
Forms.
example, says that all that Parmenides' argument
operates
with
general
Forms,
then thought is at an end.
claims Rist, do not
prove
the
Philosophy,
propositions,
particulars cannot be classed, whether or
are
basis
transcendent
proves is the existence of class concepts.
states,
the
up in the Parmenides, have suggested that
Plato himself doubted the existence of
Rist,
thoughts
do serious damage to the credibility of Plato's
of
problems
be
not
the
and
he
if
classes
But class concepts,
existence
of
transcendent
Platonic Forms (39).
Cornford,
Parmenides
does
transcendent
on
the
maintain
Forms.
He
other
the
hand,
full
claims
Platonic
reiterates
Parmenides
that, because Forms are necessary "... as objects
to
the
view
of
argument
on which
fix our thoughts...", and because they are "... constant
meanings of the words used in all discourse...",
not
that
be
"...wholly
immersed
in
the
flow
things..." and must, therefore, have "...an
of
they
must
sensible
unchanging
and
Davis:
independent
existence,
however
Plato
24
hard it may be to conceive
their relation to changing individuals (40)."
Guthrie concurs with Cornford.
idea
that
a
Form
should
factor" of the particular
be
is
He
states
(41).
the
nothing more than a "common
"at
variance
with"
Theory of Forms as set down in the dialogues
Parmenides
that
Plato's
other than the
"I cannot think," states Guthrie, "that
Plato would in the Parmenides give up "...the sense given to
Form in all his previous arguments, which depend
force
on
(42)."
Plato
the
separate
and
Like Cornford and
for
their
independent existence of Form
Guthrie,
Hackforth
states
that
believed the Forms to exist apart from and "...indeed
before the particulars (43)."
Similarly, Ross
states
that
Plato considered the Forms to be "perfectly objective (44)."
The
consensus
among
Plato's commentators, then, is
that Plato does believe in transcendent forms.
I
agree
with
Rist's
Personally,
statement that the Parmenides proves
that Plato believed in the existence of class concepts only,
and not
of
Cornford,
transcendent
Forms, but
I
also
with
Guthrie, Hackforth and Ross who conclude from the
dialogues as a whole that Plato did believe in
Forms.
agree
For
transcendent
example, in the Phaedo (74a) Plato states that
equality is something "beyond" and "distinct" from two equal
sticks.
Also in
the
Phaedo
(79a-80a),
when
he
divides
^avis:
Plato
25
existence into two categories, the "visible" contrasted with
the
"invisible,"
he
is
claiming
that
the
Forms
exist
independently of their instantiations:
In
Or does each one of these uniform
and independent entities remain always
constant
and
invariable,
never
admitting
any
alteration
in any
respect or in any sense?
They
must
be
constant
and
invariable, Socrates, said Cebes.
Well, what about the concrete
instances of beauty--such as
men,
horses, clothes, and so on-- or of
equality, or any other members of a
class corresponding to an absolute
entity? Are they constant, or are
they, on the contrary, scarcely ever
in the same relation in any sense
either
to
themselves
or to one
another?
With them, Socrates, it is just
the opposite; they are never free from
variation.
addition, Plato asserts in the Republic with his analogy
of the Good (507b-509c), of the divided line (509b-511c) and
of the cave v.514a-519b^
Similarly ,
that the
Forms
are
transcendent.
in the Cratylus 454b, Plato argues in favour of
transcendent Forms when he states
that
if
there
were
no
permanent entities, "no eternal nature of things," knowledge
would be impossible.
In
view
dialogues, we
transcendent
rational?
of
must
Forms.
the
above
conclude
textual
that
Plato
evidence
did
from the
believe
in
But, we must now ask, Is such a belief
It was one of Aristotle's objections
to
Plato's
Davis:
theory
of
26
Forms that he (Plato) made them exist apart from
the particulars (44). Yet, Aristotle admits,
Forms
Plato
the
idea
of
is necessary if we are to come to an understanding of
the particulars.
Aristotle
claims
(Metaphysics
1042a24)
that sensibles are a combination of Form with matter:
Now a substance is an underlying
subject; and in one1 sense, this is
matter (by 'matter I mean that which
is not a this in actuality but is
potentially a this); in another sense,
it is the formula or the form, which
is a this and separable in formula; in
a third sense it is the composition of
the two, of which alone there is
generation and destruction, and which
is separate without qualification, for
of instances according to formula some
are separable but others are not.
In his Metaphysics (999b 34-9) he states that
if
Form
not exist there would be no knowledge of particulars:
If
nothing exists apart from
individual things, and
these
are
infinite, how is it possible to get
knowledge of an infinite number of
individuals? For insofar as something
is one and the same and belongs to
things universally, to this extent we
know
them
all.
But if this is
necessary and something must exist
besides the individuals, it would also
be necessary that the genera, whether
the lowest or the ultimate, exist
apart from the individuals. But we
have just discussed the impossibility
of this.... If nothing exists besides
the individuals, there would be no
intelligible object, but all things
would be sensible and there would be
no knowledge of anything, unless by
'knowledge' one means sensation.
did
Davis:
In
his
Posterior
Analytics, Aristotle
Plato
states
27
that only
universals can be defined and known in the scientific sense.
He distinguishes in 71b33 the
(in Plato's term
the
"more knowable in its nature"
"essence
of
a
thing")
from
"more
knowable to us:
Things are prior and better known
in two ways: for the same thing is not
prior by nature and prior to us, or
better known by nature and better
known to us.
The things nearer to
sense are prior and better
known
relatively to us, those that are more
remote prior and better known without
qualification.
The most universal
things are farthest from sense, the
individual things nearest to it; and
these are opposed to each other.
It was Aristotle's conclusion in Metaphysics (1018b32) that
logically
speaking,
universals
are
prior, but
perception the particular comes first.
While
we
in our
perceive
the individual, perception is of the universal.
If
we
summarize Aristotle's logic on this point, we
can see that according to his line of reasoning
exist
because:
Forms
must
(1) sensibles are a combination of Form and
matter, (2) there must be a Form if knowledge is
to
exist,
(3) that only the Form can be known in a scientific way, (4)
perception
is
of
the
universal.
statements are the same as those outlined
and
In
essence,
in Chapters
Two dealing with Plato's theory of knowledge.
these
One
There we
sought to prove the rationality of Plato's theory that
true
Davis:
knowledge
was
knowledge
Aristotle's
logic, we
rationality
of
the
of
have
the
Plato
Forms.
attempted
28
Now, using
to
prove
idea that Forms ought to be considered
transcendent (even though Aristotle objected to this
That
circle.
involved:
If we see a circle, there are three factors
a thinking mind, the particular
concept
of
circularity.
Now
circular designs were removed
would
if
individual
minds
on
this
from
and
earth
consequently
the Form Circle would not.
independent
a
and
the
objects
and
world,
our
minds
If we were to die,
to
all
die,
the
all
the
individual
But, according to Plato,
Circle as
a Form
would
exist
of any circle and independent of any individual
idea or thought of circularity.
only
the
were
concepts of circle would die also.
circle
circular
still have the concept of circle.
and everyone else
C_J
idea).
this idea is plausible can be illustrated by reference
to the
into
the
slightly
different
Or
put
context.
will exist for only a short
the
same
analogy
Although this circle
period of time,
in fact
as long as this paper exists, and although the concept
of this circle will exist for only
as
long
as
our
minds
exist, nevertheless the Form Circle, after which all circles
are
copies, will
exist
thoughts or concepts.
(1)
the
independently
of
mind
From these examples, we can
and
its
discern:
particular circle, (2) the concept circle, (3) the
Davis:
Form of Circle,
argument)
and
that
can
transcendent.
of
29
conclude
while
(variable), (3) is not
Plato
only
(1)
(according
and
permanent
(2)
to
are
but
impermanent
is, as
well,
The above examples can be substituted for any
the other Socratic virtues like courage, justice, piety,
or beauty.
realize
If we consider the Form Beauty, for example, we
that
that which seems beautiful today perhaps will
not seem beautiful tomorrow, and that which looks
in
Plato's
one
light
beautiful
will not look beautiful in another.
(3) Form of Beauty exists unchanged and independent
But the
of
any
(2) concepts of beauty and independent of the existence of a
(1) particular example of beauty (46).
However,
even if we can conclude that Plato's belief
in transcendent Forms is plausible, we are not yet free from
problems with his theory of Forms.
in fact, not permanent, as
impossible
both
to
Plato
recognize
If the particulars were,
maintains,
it
inconsistent
with
be
them and describe them and,
therefore, impossible to posit from them a Form.
argument, Gulley claims that
would
Plato's
theory
of
Using this
Forms
is
his theory that sensibles are in a state
of flux:
This doctrine clearly
assumes
that
there
are
determinate
and
recognisable sensible characteristics;
indeed it is a doctrine that sensibles
are determinate and recognisable in so
far as they 'participate in' and hence
'resemble' Forms.
Davis:
Plato
There is a serious inconsistency,
then, between this doctrine and the
consequences drawn by Plato from the
fact that sensibles are in flux (47).
But I do not believe that Gulley is correctly
Plato's
idea
permanent in
building
of
flux.
the
more
sense.
permanent
than
For
a
because the permanence of the building was
slow
motion.
interpreting
In Plato's view, particulars were
Heraclitean
seemed
30
Particulars
are
Heraclitus, a
flower
but only
impermanence
sufficiently
establish true opinion, claims Plato, but not
in
permanent to
to
establish
knowledge.
We
have
seen
from
particular and the Form
realm,
and
respectively.
transcendent,
in
exist
the
But,
the
above
in
the
discussion that the
variable, material
intelligible,
we
must
existing
now
invariable
ask,
independently
if
the
realm,
Form
is
of the particular,
How exactly is
the particular related
Form?
And
precisely
is the Form related to the particular?
When
how
to
the
asked in the Euthydemus (301a) whether beautiful objects are
identical with the Beautiful, Socrates replies that they are
not but that there is present to each of them
"Then,"
beauty.
said Dionysodorus, "If you have an Ox with you, you
are an ox....?"
different
some
simply
In other words, how can one thing
by
the
be
made
presence of something different?
Socrates suggests an answer to this question in the Gorgias
Davis:
Plato
31
(497e):
This
Do you not call good people by
that name because of the presence
in them of things good just as
you call beautiful things those
in whom beauty is present?
answer is similar to Socrates' comment in the Phaedo
(lOOd):
At
I
cling
simply
and
straightforwardly and no doubt
foolishly to the explanation that
the one thing that makes that
object beautiful is the presence
in it or association with it, in
whatever way the relation comes
about, of absolute beauty. I do
not go so far as to insist upon
the precise details — only upon
the fact that it is by beauty
that
beautiful
things
are
beautiful.
glance I must conclude that Socrates' statements
first
that something is beautiful because beauty is present in it
or
it
"partakes"
helpful.
has
or
"associates" with beauty is not very
I concur with Allen who states that
failed
to
understand
no
one
who
"This rose is beautiful," would
find it illuminating to be told that
the
expression
means
"This rose partakes of beauty (48)."
In
the
Parmenides
(132d),
however,
Socrates does
offer a credible answer: that the particular is an imperfect
copy of the Form:
But, Parmenides, the best I can make
of the matter is this-- that these
forms are as it were patterns fixed in
the nature of things.
The
other
things are made in their image and are
Davis:
Plato
likenesses,
and this participation
they come to have in the forms is
nothing but their being made in their
image.
Socrates' solution is the most logical way to
relationship
of
the
Form
to
the
32
construe
particular.
the
This
relationship, however, leads in the Parmenides (132e) to the
famous problem of "the third man" which
Form
must
be
a
copy
suggests
that
the
of a second Form and it a copy of a
third and so on:
And must not the thing which is
like share with the thing that is like
it
in
one
and
the same thing
(character)...?
Certainly.
If so, nothing can be like the
form, nor the form be like anything.
Otherwise a second form will always
make its appearance over and above the
first form, and if that second form is
like anything, yet a third. And there
will be no end to this emergence of
fresh forms, if the form is to be like
the thing that partakes of it.
Runciman writes that the "third man" argument reduces
the Form to the status of a particular.
whiteness
is
He argues
that
white, which must follow if white objects are
white by resembling whiteness, then whiteness is one of
class
of
white
objects
(49).
will
not
find
the
But I do not believe that
Runciman has taken into account the fact that
not an object.
if
whiteness
is
He might search for the rest of his life but
whiteness.
Runciman's comments on
"the
Guthrie, addressing himself to
third
man,"
agrees
with my
Davis:
Plato
33
conclusion:
Whiteness is an Intelligible (not
visible)
Form.
When it enters a
material object (say a face)
its
combination with body produces visible
whiteness, an imperfect imitation of
the transcendent Form in the only
medium in which material objects can
reflect it. The face, which was never
perfectly white, may turn red
by
•receiving' (Phaedo 102d-e) Redness
instead of Whiteness, but Whiteness,
whether 'by itself or in us, will
always be itself and nothing else
(50).
I do not believe that Guthrie clarifies the problem
But
either.
To speak of whiteness entering faces and
receiving
redness
is
like
of
faces
saying that the Form of Circle
enters the particular circle or the Form of Equality
two
unequal
sticks.
man", I think
we
must
To
enters
answer the problem of the "third
simply
return
to
the
discussion
offered earlier of the Forms in which, by the example of the
circle, we concluded that, since the Forms are transcendent,
they
can
exist
imitates them.
Form,
thing.
independently
of
the
particular
The particular is an imperfect copy
but the Form is not a copy of anything.
which
of
It is
the
that
This conclusion is similar to Findlay's solution
the problem of "the third man:"
...a
Form's
genuine
self-predication or
being
itself,
while
being
in
a
sense
the
paradigmatic source of its connection
with
self in its instances, is none
the less to be distinguished from the
latter, and so will not give rise to
an infinite regress (51).
to
Davis:
34
Plato
Although we may solve the problem of "the third
man"
by resorting to the fact that the Forms are transcendent, we
are
left
with
the
question, How did Plato think that the
particulars were related to the Forms?
seen,
Socrates'
answer
(page
1 ) , Plato
light as did Socrates.
have
already
(see page 28 above) was that the
particulars are copies of the Forms.
above
As we
But, as we
have
seen
did not view the Forms in the same
Guthrie quotes Stallbaum who makes a
distinction between the logical doctrine of universals
by
Socrates
Plato.
and the metaphysical doctrine of Forms held by
Guthrie
Euthyphro,
states
Laches,
that
in
dialogues
is
the
Apology,
All
Socrates
is
within
each
one
(52).
maintains in Metaphysics (1078B30)
not
posit
the
states
in
that if two things are to be called by
the same name, they must share some common form
which
Crito,
Greater Hippias the Ion, Socrates makes
no mention of transcendent Forms.
these
held
or
essence
Similarly, Aristotle
that
Socrates
"...did
universals as separate." Likewise, Ross, in
considering this difference in viewpoint
between
concludes:
In the early dialogues, written
while Plato was completely dominated
by the influence of Socrates, it is
natural that there should be no trace
of transcendentalism; for Socrates was
interested, as Aristotle says, only in
ascertaining
the nature which was
common to all just acts, to
all
beautiful objects, and the like; but
the
two,
Davis:
Plato
as Plato's mind matured he
moved
gradually
towards a transcendental
view of the Ideas as entities existing
on their
own
account
and
only
imperfectly
mirrored
in
sensible
things and in human actions (53).
Therefore, because Socrates did not believe in
Forms,
his
explanation
of
their
35
transcendent
relationship
with
the
particular will not be the same as that of Plato.
But
relating
to
precisely
to
answer,
terminology
how
for
to
he
uses
such
describe
vague
them
had
that
in
of
the
Forms
and
it
mind.
is
complicated
difficult
For
to
example, in
(6d-e) he states that Forms are in things and are
that by which the particulars
Greater
conceived
the particulars is not an easy question for us
discover exactly what he
Euthyphro
Plato
Hippias
are
characterized.
In
the
(300a) he claims that Forms are that which
make the particulars have it.
In the Lysis (217d-e) he says
particulars are characterized by the presence of the Forms.
In
the
Forms.
Gorgias (467e) he suggests particulars share in the
In the Greater Hippias (292d) he declares things are
made beautiful when beauty is added.
That Plato
immanent
believed
(54), however,
the
can
Forms
were
in
be concluded from his use of
expressions like "in things," "characterized,"
and
"being
added,"
but, because
precisely how, I conclude, as
some way
did
Plato
Ross
"share
in,"
did not specify
(55), that
these
Davis:
terms
are
all
used
Plato
metaphorically.
Circles can be
thought of as "sharing" the Form of Circularity.
things
can
be
thought
Form of Beauty.
the
Beautiful
of as being "characterized" by the
Fighting,
by
"shares" in the Form of Bravery.
regarding
36
rationality
of
the
addition
of
courage,
The answer to the question
the
relation ship
of
the
particular to the Form and the Form to the particular, then,
is that Plato considered the Form
particular
but,
due
to
be
immanent
in
the
to his metaphoric use of language, we
cannot determine exactly how.
From this lengthy digression upon
of
the
the
transcendence
Forms and their relationship to the particulars, we
can now return to the statement made at the end
Three,
namely,
that
one
can
only
of
Chapter
know what goodness is
insofar as one has knowledge of the Forms.
This
discussion
of the immanence of the Forms allows us to understand with a
greater
degree of clarity the idea that one's own goodness,
or lack of it, is dependent upon knowledge of, or
of,
the
Forms,
for
we now see that goodness is dependent
upon the degree to which the transcendent Form
in
any
particular,
ignorance
be
it
a
quality,
an
is
immanent
aspiration, a
decision, an action, and that evil results from lack of Form
in the particular.
can
conclude
that
From what we have discussed so
far, we
Plato's idea that knowledge of good and
Davis:
evil is
dependent
especially
upon
our
having
of
knowledge
37
of
Forms,
of ethical and aesthetic Forms, seems plausible.
But two difficult problems remain.
Form
Plato
Firstly, if there
is
a
a mathematical object, like circle, must there not
be also a Form of Stone and of Hair and even of Mud?
Among Plato's commentators there is some disagreement
about Plato's belief in Forms for what might
"neutral
substances."
Cherniss,
Plato's writings provide
evidence
to
conclude
no
or
and
regards
clay
and
as "indeterminate objects," matter "...left to its own
devices corresponding to no definite ...
Lodge
"unambiguous"
not he believed in such
Forms (56). Crombie suggests that Plato
hair
considered
for example, states that
"definite"
whether
be
maintains
(58).
Ross
that
(57).
Plato recognized ideas of all things
agrees
with
by
stating
inclusiveness"
character"
Lodge
but
qualifies
that when Plato wishes
his
"all
to cite
typical ideas, he refers either to moral or aesthetic values
or to mathematical
concludes,
are
though they are
Plato's
common
entities.
nowhere
involved
Ideas
prominent
with
the
of
substances,
except
theory
Ross
in the Timaeus,
since
it
was
belief that there is an idea corresponding to every
name
(59).
Frazer agrees with Ross.
He claims
that the ideas which Plato primarily idealized and which
considered most important
he
were not concrete ideas of things
Davis:
but
abstract
values
ones
(60).
1070al8,
of qualities
According
and especially of moral
to Aristotle
Aristotle
by nature."
(Metaphysics
By positing
logically
committed
Forms,
1078b30), Plato had to say
there were Forms for everything-- in other
was
in Metaphysics
Plato believed that "...there are Forms as many as
the things that exist
claimed
38
Plato
words,
that he
to the position, not that he held
it:
For, in seeking the causes of the
sensibles,
Plato
proceeded
from
these to the Forms, which are more
numerous , so to say, than the
individual sensibles; for there exists
a Form bearing the same name as that
which is predicated of many sensibles,
of
substances
as well
as of
non-substances, and of these things as
well as of eternal things.
If we consider for a moment specific passages in the
dialogues we find that Plato definitely did posit Forms for
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there are Forms for everything:
Now everything that becomes or is
created must of necessity be created
by some cause, for without a cause
nothing can be created. The work of
the creator, whenever he looks to the
unchangeable and fashions the form and
nature
of his work
after an
unchangeable pattern, must necessarily
be made fair and perfect....
Similarly, in the Cratylus (423e) he affirms that there are
Forms for everything:
Davis:
Plato
SOCRATES: Again, is there not an
essence of each thing, just as there
is a color, or sound?
And is there
not an essence of color and sound as
well as of anything else which may be
said to have an essence?
Plato's belief in Forms for everything
with
a serious problem.
he
has
been
presents
us
How can a theory be rational which
posits that goodness depends upon absolutes
necessarily good?
39
which
are
not
In the Parmenides (130d), Socrates admits
puzzled
by
this
question.
In
response,
Parmenides states (130e)
that when Socrates has gained more
experience in philosophy
he
substances .
by
the
will
Stranger
in
the
Sophist
than is the "vermin
(227b).
a
more
is
not
The art of the
the
for the truth.
Form
of
Similarly, in the
that
a
than
the
philosophical
greater
with
but
makes
These three examples suggest to us
that Plato felt the problem to be simply one of
of
form
concerned with degrees of dignity and does
not despise the smaller more
straight
unpleasant
superior
destroyer."
Statesman (266d) the Stranger states
enquiry
despise
A similar answer to the same question is given
general is not to be considered
hunting
not
unpleasantness
or
association
triviality.
illustrate Plato's point, we might argue that it is easy
To
to
associate a particular example of beauty with a metaphysical
idea
of beauty because it is easy to attribute metaphysical
properties
to
beauty.
It
is
also
easy
to
assign
Davis:
metaphysical
Plato
40
properties to geometric figures, like circles.
It begins to be difficult for us to ascribe these properties
to mud and hair.
But the problem would not exist if we felt
differently about hair or
about
Aborigine
to patch the cracks in his house,
who
there will
uses
be
hairdresser
mud
ideal
there
or
mud.
perfect
To
mud.
the
Probably
is ideal or perfect hair.
mud
and
clay
with
Plato's own
ideal shuttle in the Cratylus (389b).
a
shuttle
but is a tool
carpenter,
no purpose,
example
same as our
perfect
mud
ideally
suited
not
for
making
clothing.
he
knows what a shuttle is for.
saying
that
The
a philosopher with the knowledge of
the
Aborigine
would
should
be
This is the
know
what
is like because he knows what mud is for (62).
According to this line of reasoning,
shuttles,
the
is not a piece of wood such and such a shape
though
because
is
The proper definition
the Forms, has an idea of what a perfect shuttle
like
the
which bricks are made and in which
cattle cool themselves (61)?"
of
to
Commenting on
this problem, Guthrie asks "...does hair serve
or
Australian
have
a
utilitarian
common
purpose,
objects, like
a
goodness
of
function.
The importance of this idea of goodness
to
of
function
this treatment of Plato's doctrine of good and evil will
hopefully be made clear in future chapters. At this point,
Davis:
however,
41
we can conclude that the idea of Forms for trivial
and unpleasant substances is
substances
do
have
a
not
irrational,
utilitarian
purpose.
Forms of substances or artifacts are not
dialogues,
since
most
In any case,
prominent
in
the
but because Plato's theory was based on rational
inquiry, he found it necessary,
posit
Plato
Forms
for
everything.
as
Aristotle
claimed,
to
Yet Plato's primary interest
was in moral, aesthetic, and mathematical Forms.
However, one problem remains.
of Mud and of Hair must we
ought
to
be
evil such
not
If there can be a Form
conclude
also
that
there
Forms for qualities which might be considered
as injustice, cowardice or hate?
And if
we
can, doubt is cast upon Plato's theory that goodness depends
upon
knowledge
of
the
Forms.
Ross states that there is
evidence that Plato did believe in the existence of Forms of
evil:
For
It might be possible for a theory
of Ideas to dispense with an Idea of
evil and with Ideas of its species,
and to explain all evil
in
the
sensible world as due to the fact that
the relation of the phenomenal to the
ideal is
never
one
of
perfect
instantiation
but
always
one of
imitation which falls short of its
pattern. But there is nothing to show
that Plato ever took this line (63).
proof of this point, Ross cites the Republic (476a and
403b), the Sophist (257e and 258b), the Euthyphro
the Theaetetus (176e).
(5d)
and
Davis:
I
agree
Plato
42
that in the Republic (402b) Plato does seem
to state that there are Forms for the opposites of qualities
like soberness, courage, liberality, and high-mindedness:
Then, by heaven, am I not right
in saying that by the same token we
shall
never
be
true
musicians
either —neither we nor the guardians
that
we
have
undertaken
to
educate —until
we
are
able
to
recognize the forms of
soberness,
courage,
liberality
and
high-mindedness, and all their kindred
and their opposites, too, in all the
combinations that contain and convey
them....
I agree that in the Sophist (257e) Plato does
seem
to
say
that there is a Form for the "not beautiful":
STRANGER: So it appears that the
not-beautiful
is
an
instance of
something that exists being set in
contrast to something that exists.
THEAETETUS: Perfectly.
STRANGER:
What then?
On this
showing has the not-beautiful any less
claim than the beautiful to be a thing
that exists?
THEAETETUS: None whatever.
After this passage he goes on to suggest, seemingly, at 258b
that any "what-is-not" must have a Form:
STRANGER: Has it then, as you
say, an existence inferior to none of
the rest in reality? May we now be
bold to say that 'that which is not'
unquestionbly is a thing that has a
nature of its own—just as the tall
was tall and
the
beautiful
was
beautiful, so too with the not-tall
and the not-beautiful --and in that
sense 'that which is not' also, on the
same principle, both was and is 'what
is not,' a single form to be reckoned
among the many realities? Or have we
Davis:
Plato
43
any further doubts with regard to it,
Theaetetus?
THEAETETUS: None at all.
I also agree that in the Euthyphro (5d) Plato seems to imply
that unholiness has a Form:
I
Is not the holy always one and
the same thing in every action, and,
again,
is
not the unholy always
opposite to the holy, and like itself?
And as unholiness does it not always
have its one essential form, which
will be found in everything that is
unholy?
EUTHYPHRO: Yes, surely Socrates.
must admit that in the Theaetetus (176e) Plato does seem
to state that there is a system of Forms for the
evil
just
as there is for the Good:
SOCRATES:
There
are
two
patterns,
my
friend,
in
the
unchangeable nature of things, one of
divine happiness, the other of godless
misery-- a truth to which their folly
makes them utterly blind, unaware that
in doing injustice they are growing
less like one of these patterns and
more like the other. The penalty they
pay is the life they lead, answering
to the pattern they resemble.
Yet in spite of the above examples, I do not
that
Plato posited Forms of evil qualities.
that there is reference to Forms of evil in
believe
I do not agree
the
Theaetetus
(176e).
Plato
is referring here to the ungodliness of the
material
world
as
intelligible
opposed
(64).
To
to
explain
the
divinity
referring
to
the
the reference to Forms of
unholiness in the Euthyphro (5d), I doubt that
be
of
Plato
could
Forms here because at this early stage in
Davis:
the dialogues the theory had not
believe
that
of evil.
evolved.
44
I
do
not
Plato in the Sophist (257e) is positing forms
The
collective
yet
Plato
"not
terms
beautiful"
for
all
the
and
the
Forms
"not
just"
are
other than the Form
Beautiful or Just (65). The Sophist as a whole argues for a
sort of "not-being" throughout the whole realm of the Forms.
Every Form is different from countless
"not-being"
is
not
in
any
merely different from it
Sophist
are
like
way
(66).
Forms.
This
opposite to being, it is
These
statements
in
the
the ones in the Phaedo (105d-e) in which
the "uneven," the "unjust" and the
for
other
"uncultured"
are
terms
those conditions that do not admit (the "particular" is
not "immanent in") the respective Forms .
Insofar
concerned,
as
I
the
feel
definite reference
resolved.
Republic
that
to
the
Forms
(402b)
problem
of
evil
same
problem
in
the
Plato's term "beautiful" can
itself
(the
form
beautiful (67)."
occurs
in
(476a)
is
of
Plato's
fairly
is
not
easily
so
The difficulty here is in knowing whether or not
Plato is referring to his theory of
this
and
the
of
I
other
Sophist,
mean
beauty),
should
Forms.
point
dialogues
etc.,
as
instances it is more easily resolved.
on
Seligman states that
"...both
out
Commenting
and
that
well,
the
beautiful
that
this
but
For example,
which is
problem
in
these
in
the
Davis:
Theaetetus
(186a-c)
Plato
refers
to
Plato
45
"honourable" and
"dishonourable" and "good" and "bad" as though there were
Form
for
each.
But
here
a
he is discussing his theory of
dialectic, not his theory of Forms:
SOCRATES: And also likeness and
unlikeness
and
sameness
and
difference?
THEAETETUS: Yes.
SOCRATES:
And
how
about
'honorable'
and 'dishonorable' and
'good' and 'bad'?
THEAETETUS: Those again seem to
me, above all, to be things whose
being is considered, one in comparison
with another, by the mind, when it
reflects within itself upon the past
and the present with an eye to the
future.
Similarly, in Laws X (900d), Plato discusses good and evil
in terms not of Forms but simply of contrary qualities:
ATHENIAN: Then let them join us
in asking what we mean by the goodness
in virtue of which we confess the gods
to be good. Come, now, prudence, may
we say, and understanding belong to
goodness, their opposites to badness?
CLINIAS: We may.
ATHENIAN: And again that valor
is part of goodness, cowardice of
badness?
CLINIAS: Assuredly.
ATHENIAN:
And
the
latter
qualities we shall call shameful, the
former noble?
CLINIAS: No doubt we must.
Likewise, a few pages later in the same dialogue
Plato
states
that righteousness, temperance and wisdom are
good while their opposites, wrong, arrogance and
bad,
but
(906a-d)
again,
he
is
not
folly
are
referring to Forms, only to
qualities. Section
pasages
(402b)
of
the
Davis:
Plato
Republic
is
46
like
the
from the Laws X and the Theaetetus in that Plato is
referring to contraries but not to Forms.
However, this
is
not the case with the Republic (476a) in which he definitely
states that "the unjust" and "the bad" have Forms:
This
And in respect of the just and
the unjust, the good and the bad, and
all the ideas or forms, the same
statement holds, that in itself each
is one, but that by virtue of their
communion with actions and bodies and
with
one
another
they
present
themselves everywhere
each
as
a
multiplicity of aspects.
Right, he said.
statement supports a theory that Plato believed in
Forms for evil qualities.
the only evidence
unequivocal
Consequently, if these texts were
available,
we
would
be
left
with
no
answer as to whether Plato believed in Forms of
evil.
Fortunately, however, there
Plato
states
definitely
the passage from the
are
passages
that he did not.
Theaetetus
(176a-b)
in
which
For example, in
he
states
most
emphatically that there is no evil in the world of Forms:
SOCRATES:
Evils, Theodorus, can
never be done away with, for the good
must always have its contrary, nor
have they any place in the divine
world, but they must needs haunt this
region of our mortal nature.
That Plato did not assume Forms of evil we can
verify
by
referring to the following passage in the Phaedrus (250a) in
which
Plato
states
that
if
souls
become
involved with
Davis:
Plato
47
unrighteousness they forget what they saw in
the
world
of
the Forms:
Now, as we have said, every human
soul has, by reason of her nature, had
contemplation
of true being; else
would she never have entered into this
human creature; but to be put in mind
thereof by things here is not easy for
every soul.
Some, when they had the
vision, had it but for a moment; some
when
they
had
fallen
to earth
consorted unhappily with such as led
them
to deeds of unrighteousness,
wherefore they forgot the holy objects
of their vision.
Had unrighteousness, in other words, evil, been one
Forms,
men
by
participating
forget these Forms.
unjust
in
the
in
(479d),
the
it, would recollect, not
In his reference to the
Republic
of
Plato
belong to that region between "being"
ugly
and
the
states that these
and
"not-being",
in
other words, not to the region of the Forms:
Do you know what to do with them,
then?
said I.
And can you find a
better place to put them than that
midway between existence or essence
and the not to be?
For we shall
surely not discover a darker region
than not- being that they should still
more not be, nor a brighter than being
that they should still more be.
In Socrates' discussion with Parmenides (130c-d)
various
kinds
of
about
the
Forms, he makes no mention of evil forms
but only of trivia:
Are you also puzzled, Socrates,
about cases that might be thought
absurd, such as hair or mud or dirt or
any other trivial and
undignified
objects?
Are you doubtful whether or
Davis:
Plato
48
not to assert that each of these has a
separate form distinct from things
like those we handle?
We can conclude from the preceding, then, that:
there are many passages in
there
which
Plato
definitely
in
opposites
Forms
of evil.
of
suggest
If we consider this problem in the light of
Plato's theory of Forms as a whole, we
Forms
but
the context of his theory of Forms and (3) there is
one passage in the Republic in which Plato seems to
must
conclude
that
evils of any sort could not possibly exist since,
according to the theory, Forms are principles
and
states
are no Forms for evil, (2) there are many passages in
which Plato refers to evil in the context of
not
(1)
of
goodness,
evil results from lack of immanence of these Forms.
must deduce from this argument,
therefore, that Plato
We
did
not posit Forms of Evil.
I think that there are two main reasons why there are
passages
evil.
for
in
the
dialogues which seem to suggest Forms for
As I stated above (page 31), Socrates posited a
every
group
of
particulars
which have the same name
because to use names, he thought, was
nature
among the things named.
Form
to
assume
a
common
But in Socrates' use of the
term, "form" meant a common essence, whereas Plato used
term
to
mean a transcendent Form.
which seem to suggest forms
reflecting
the
Socratic
of
use
Therefore, the passages
evil
of
the
are
only,
in
fact,
the term "form," meaning
Davis:
"common essence."
Plato
49
Secondly, Plato shared in the Greek habit
of seeing the world in terms of opposites and, consequently,
often referred to good and evil in this
context,
without
being careful to specify when he meant Forms and when he did
not (68). With the above conclusions Frazer agrees:
...that in the case of pairs of
contraries, Plato made an Idea of only
one of the pair; for
where
the
contraries were not (like justice and
injustice, courage and
cowardice )
opposed as good and evil, he had no
hesitation in making ideas of both
contraries,
eg.
of greatness and
smallness, heat and cold.
But of
qualities distinctly bad, Plato never
really constructed Ideas (69).
Guthrie maintains that we are left with much uncertainty
the
subject
question.
although
because the dialogues
But, in spite of
the
Forms
are
this,
either
on
never squarely face the
Guthrie
concludes
negatively
that
or positively
exemplified, Plato does not make Forms of evil:
That
...two things can be said at
once:
first, the question was of no
great interest to Plato; second, at no
period did he allow a place for evil
of any kind in the realm of the
divine, which was the home of the
eternal, changeless Forms (70).
a particular may exemplify the Form either negatively
or positively means it may be an example of Form, or a lack
of
Form.
This
line of thought is essentially Aristotle's
system of form, matter and privation (Physics, 191bl5).
first is
perfection,
the
second
is
that
which
The
desires
Davis:
perfection,
Plato
50
the third is not a third component but a way of
referring to the degree to which the Form is not
actualized
(71):
Now we, too (who recognize both
'form' and
'lack
of
form,'
or
shortage,
as factors in becoming)
assert that nothing can 'come to be,'
in the absolute sense, out of the
non-existent,
but
we
declare
nevertheless that all things which
come to be owe their existence to the
incidental
nonexistence
of
something; for they owe it to the
'shortage' from which they started
'being no longer there.'
This statement brings us back to our earlier discussion
which
we stated that evil results from lack of immanence of
the Forms (page 33 above).
discussed
In view
of
all
we
The goodness of the particular is
upon the degree of immanence of the Forms.
good
that
have
since then, we can now rephrase Plato's theory of
good and evil.
dependent
Our knowledge of
and evil is dependent upon our having knowledge of the
Forms,
particularly
those
aesthetic qualities.
in
in
Forms
relating
to
moral
and
Evil is lack of immanence of the Forms
the particulars; evil is the result
of our ignorance
of the Forms.
To summarize thus far,
preceding
chapters
we
have
we
can
state
attempted
Plato's belief in a system of transcendent
the
particulars
are
copies
to
that
in
the
determine that
Forms
seems rational.
of
which
We have also
Davis:
attempted to give
knowledge
causes
of
Forms.
is
In
considered
to
Plato'<s
theory
51
that
to
be
good,
dependent
discussing
the
or
of
what
constitutes
upon one having knowledge of these
the
above
two
ideas,
we
particular.
have
rationality of the theory that evil results
from our lack of knowledge of the Forms, or lack of Form
the
true
any sort and, consequently, knowledge of what
something
goodness,
credence
Plato
We
are
left, however, with one doctrine
which has proven to be irrational, namely, the
the soul is immortal.
in
theory
To this we shall now turn.
that
Davis:
Plato
52
5.
PLATO'S THEORY OF SOUL
In the preceding chapters we examined the rationality
of Plato's theory of knowledge and his theory of Forms as it
related to his theory of good and evil.
of
Now the credibility
these theories can be examined in the context of Plato's
theory
of
soul.
Before
proceeding,
however,
we
must
determine exactly what Plato means by his term "soul." Lodge
states
that for Plato "...'soul' and 'mind' are intended to
coincide in all respects (72)."
uses
the
word
"soul"
vital functions like
Guthrie states
that
Plato
to mean "...that which performs all
nourishment,
reproduction,
sensation
and thought, through the medium of the body." Guthrie claims
that,
for
Plato,
intelligence
Hamilton
or
and
the
that
term
which
"soul"
animates
the
mind
body"
or
(73).
Cairns state the word "soul" is a translation
of the Greek word "psyche."
It is more properly translated,
depending on the context of the
Mind,
"...meant
Intelligence,
dialogues,
as
"...Reason,
Life, the vital principle in things as
well as in man (74)."
For the purposes
definition
give n
of
this
study
we
will
the
by Hamilton and Cairns since it seems to
come closest to the rather complex notion of soul
by
use
Plato in the dialogues.
suggested
In the Timaeus (51d) and in the
Davis:
Plato
Theaetetus (186a), for example, Plato declares
the
he
mind that apprehends the Forms.
affirms
that
intelligence
and
concludes that
Therefore,
the
Forms
thought.
the
Forms
according
are
are
to
it
is
In the Philebus (59d),
in
by
reason,
the Phaedo (66b-e) he
apprehended
Plato,
that
apprehended
But
53
by
the
soul.
mind, thought, reason and
intelligence, commonly referred to as nous (75), are in some
way a function of the soul.
states
that
fears and
thought
the
all
of
soul
sorts
In the
contains
of
same
passage
he
also
"...loves and desires and
fancies...",
qualities
commonly
as emotions, and that these come from the body.
According to Plato, therefore, the soul
contains
not
only
mind, intelligence, thought and reason, but also emotion.
In
Laws
X
(897a),
Plato states that souls contain
such "motions" as "...wish, reflection, foresight,
judgement...
pleasures,
We can divide
these
reflection ,
category; pleasure, pain,
another.
The
pain, hope, fear, hate, love...."
"motions"
foresight,
into
two
classes :
of
the
wish,
counsel and judgement fit into one
hope,
fear
and
hate
fit
into
former are activities of the mind; the latter
of the body, being related to emotion and desire.
IV"
counsel,
In
"Book
Republic (439a-e), Plato outlines this idea of
duality within the soul in more detail.
Here he divides the
soul into distinct sections: the higher soul and
the
lower
Davis:
soul.
Reason
and
(439e)
spirit,"
a
54
rationality, he declares, reside in the
higher; appetites and desire in the lower.
notes
Plato
In addition,
he
that the soul contains something called "high
term
which
means
"the
passionate"
(550b).
According to Plato, high spirit sometimes aligns itself with
reason, and sometimes with desire (440a-e).
In
the
Phaedrus (253-257), Plato illustrates in his
story of the charioteer how these parts
Here
function
together.
the soul, which is analogous to the two horses and the
driver, consists of three
passionate
parts
(76):
the
rational,
or "spirited", and the "appetitive."
the
The reason
or rational part is the governor of the
soul
driver
The appetitive part
is the governor of the chariot.
of the soul is like the black
reason
and
control.
The
horse
which
just
rebels
and
the
against
black
and the driver, follows first one, then the other.
emotional
the
emotional or passionate part is
like the white horse which, caught between the
the
as
appetitive
horse
But both
are governed by reason
(nous), just as the two horses are governed by the driver.
Because the Forms are apprehended through
the
mind,
thought, reason and intelligence, Plato cannot mean that the
soul
in
its
entirety
perceives the Forms; rather he must
mean the Forms are perceived only through
higher
part.
the
reason,
the
This statement can be verified if we refer to
Davis:
the dialogues.
Plato
55
In the Apology (23a) and in Phaedrus (278d),
Plato states that nous is the immortal part of the soul, the
part which links man to the divine.
He says the same
in more complicated terms in the Sophist (248a).
touch
"We are in
with becoming by means of the body through sense," he
states, "...whereas we have intercourse with real
means
thing
of
the
Soul
through reflection."
being
by
In the Symposium
(211c) and in the Republic (532a), Plato describes cognition
of the Forms as not simply remembering, as in the Meno, but
realizing
through "visionary experience (77)."
to Plato's description of the activities
the
being
soul,
the
therefore,
and
According
functions
of
it is generally dual in nature, nous
controlli ng
part,
emotion
and
desire
the
controlled.
This is not different from our definition (page
49)
divides
which
soul
principle of things."
into
"psyche"
and
"the
vital
This two-fold division corresponds to
the two classes of reality pointed out in Chapter Four,
"visible"
(the
and
Republic
variable,
the
"intelligible."
(507d-511c),
while
the
soul
(invisible and invariable).
the
The body, states Plato
belongs
to
the
visible
belongs
to
the
intelligible
The soul, then, belongs to
and
the
same class as do the Forms and, as stated above, serves as a
link between the material and the intelligible
worlds.
According to Plato in the Phaedo (67a), attachment by
Davis:
the
lower
soul
to
Plato
56
the pleasures of the "variable" causes
"contamination" of the entire soul:
It seems that so long as we are
alive, we shall continue closest to
knowledge if we avoid as much as we
can all contact and association with
the body, except
when
they
are
absolutely necessary, and instead of
allowing ourselves to become infected
with its nature.
he explains that there are "true pleasures" and "false
Here
pleasures."
to
True pleasures are those which draw one
closer
the Forms, learning for example, and those which through
"self-mastery" are controlled
limit
(Philebus
unlimited,
appetite
63a,
desire
or
(Philebus
(soul) chooses to control
Therefore,
measure, proportion
or
claims
evil
or
good.
uncontrolled
emotion,
27e, 31a). The individual
not,
its
Plato,
through self-mastery (78), or lack
either
and
52c). False pleasures, he adds, are
disproportionate,
or
desire.
by
own
the
of
appetite
and
individual (soul)
it, chooses
to be
"For as a man's desires tend," says
Plato, "...so and such does everyone of us come to be
(Laws
X, 904c)."
From
this
lengthy
digression
soul, we can now understand how
good and evil.
it relates to his theory of
Plato maintains that
(nous)
reaches
attain
knowledge
the
and
Forms,
on Plato's theory of
if
the
higher
soul
the soul in its entirety will
consequently,
goodness.
But,
he
Davis:
states,
if
variable, if
emotions
and
Plato
57
the soul fixes its attention on the visible and
the
soul
desires
is
controlled
by
the
appetites,
for pleasure, in other words, if the
soul is controlled by its own
lower
nature,
there
is no
chance of its ever attaining the Forms and, consequently, of
its ever attaining knowledge.
Davis:
Plato
58
6.
THE RATIONALITY OF PLATO'S THEORY OF SOUL
It
is
not
difficult
for us to relate this concept
that good and evil are dependent upon
earlier
statement
that
good
knowledge or ignorance of the
whether
self-mastery
and
the
evil are dependent upon
Forms.
In
most
instances,
or not we choose a life of appetite and lust can be
dependent upon
wisdom
of
ignorance
one's
and
choice.
knowledge,
But,
we
choice.
For
i.e.,
could
appetite, desires and emotions come upon
us
with
upon
argue,
the
often
regardless
of
example, even though one has knowledge of the
Forms, one will nevertheless be jealous if one's
away
to
someone else.
wife
runs
Plato's answer to this problem is
given in the Symposium (210e).
Having had a
"...vision
of
the very soul of beauty...." one will never again be seduced
by the beauty of any individual.
The
idea
of
transcending
most of us basically irrational.
that this
kind
experience
is
of
material beauty seems to
We must remember, however,
"self-transcendence"
central
John
of
the
mystical
to the Eastern religious traditions
(Advaita Vedanta) and is certainly a
(St.
through
Cross,
Thomas
part
of
Christianity
Merton, St. Augustine).
Davis:
Plato
59
Therefore, since every religious tradition has instances
this
type
of
self-transcendence,
we
statement that emotions and desires of
can
be
transcended
might
can
the
of
agree that the
material
world
be given credence, although the
"mystical life" is not, for the most of us,
very
rational.
However, there are more causes of evil than ignorance
and
lack
of self-mastery.
For example, even if we are not
susceptible to our emotions and desires,
have
knowledge,
we
still
and
surely
these
must
be
considered
realize that evil often seems to
which
man
has
no
if
we
must face personal tragedy like
sickness or death, or calamities like floods or
And
even
control.
result
For
evil.
from
hurricanes.
Plato does
forces
over
example, in the Timaeus
(86d), he states that bodily disorders
cause
disorders
of
The
truth
is
that
sexual
intemperance is a disease of the soul
due
chiefly
to the moisture and
fluidity which is produced in one of
the elements by the loose consistency
of the bones. And in general all that
which is termed the incontinence of
pleasure and is deemed a reproach
under the idea
that
the
wicked
voluntarily do wrong is not justly a
matter of reproach.
For no man is
voluntarily bad, but the bad by reason
of an ill disposition of the body and
bad education-- things
which
are
hateful
to
every man and happen
against his will.
Plato maintains in the Timaeus (87a-b) that malfunctions
in
the soul:
Davis:
Plato
60
the body cause an infinite variety of evil conditions in the
soul
such
as
"cowardice,"
these
"ill
temper,"
"forgetfulness,"
"meloncholy,"
and
"rashness,"
"stupidity."
Besides
causes of evil, Plato names in the Republic (617-618)
one other.
Evils like personal disease and calamity,
Plato
says, result from a force called "necessity."
According
to Wheelwright (79), the Greeks of Plato's
time believed necessity was
outside
the
responsible
"range of human planning."
necessity was accidental, something
chance
(80).
Guthrie
"necessity" a cause
chance
for
results
designed but just happen.
had
happened
values."
by
states that Plato meant by his term
of
order.'"
reason
These
producing
events
are
not
Matter, explains Guthrie, has its
own "...necessary characteristics indifferent to
to
lay
An event caused by
that
"...'destitute
without
whatever
reason
or
Fire for example "...may warm a house and cook
meals, or it may destroy the house and kill its owner (81)."
In
two
the Laws V (732b-d), Plato
antagonistic
sort of
caught
principles—reason
"divine battleground"
between.
Sometimes
the
with
declares
that
and necessity--form a
the
individual
and
soul
soul of the individual is
under control of the one and sometimes under control of
other,
these
the
the best he can do is hope that his misfortunes
will not last:
Davis:
Plato
It should be our constant hope
that God, by the blessings he bestows,
will lighten the troubles that come
upon us, and change our present state
for the better, while, with Heaven's
favor, the very reverse will always be
true of our blessings.
But, maintains Plato, even when the soul
over
by
is
taken
necessity, in which case the evil is not the fault
of the individual, nevertheless he is
own
61
responsible
conduct and is required to become good.
for
his
In the Timaeus
(90a-e), Plato states that the "creator" has done
his
best
within the limits set by necessity to facilitate the rule of
the
rational
part, but whether reason or necessity emerges
superior in the end is left to the individual.
Up to this point Plato's theory of soul,
it
relates
rational.
of
We cannot doubt the rationality of Plato's theory
destructive,
and
Greed
for
certainly
pleasure
soul.
our
own
self-centered
happen,
almost
cause
our
ability
his
calamities
theory
to
Similarly, we can
disease
occur
chance.
Physical
of
the
for no reason.
diseases
But in the
Timaeus (91d-92c) Plato links his doctrine of selfwith
always
we must agree, much of what appears to be
evil is caused by accident and
just
drives.
that disease of the body can
Likewise,
is
we all know through experience
that goodness, or lack of it, depends upon
agree
as
to his theory of good and evil, seems basically
self-mastery.
control
insofar
of
immortality.
He
states
mastery
that
the
Davis:
Plato
62
consequences of not achieving self-mastery are reflected not
only in this life but also in the future life. He
will
attain
after
who
death
has
cherished
knowledge
divine
happiness.
But he who has not, will be reborn as a bird
or
an animal or a fish (82).
Plato
attempts
in
three
instances
to
prove this
theory (83). In the Phaedo (78b-84b), he states that
since
one's soul (nous) belongs to the same realm as do the Forms,
like
the
Forms it is immortal.
By way of proof, he argues
that a Form will never receive a contrary
Form.
The
Form
Snow, for example, will never receive the contrary Form Heat
just
as
Odd.
Soul, Plato argues, is what gives life
Life
always accompanies soul.
of it.
the Form Even will never receive the contrary Form
Life, he concludes
contain
its
opposite,
in
to
the
body.
It is an essential attribute
the
Phaedo
(106b),
cannot
death and still remain soul.
It is
essentially deathless as snow is heatless:
Are we not bound to say the same
of the immortal? If what is immortal
is also imperishable, it is impossible
that at the approach of death soul
should cease to be. It follows from
what we have already said that it
cannot admit death, or be dead--just
as we said that three cannot be even,
nor can odd; nor can fire be cold, nor
can the heat which is in the fire.
Certainly, neither I nor any of Plato's commentators
could be convinced by this
discussion.
Although
snow
is
Davis:
heatless
Plato
63
and fire is coldless, this does not mean that snow
cannot melt or fire be put out.
Besides, for such a
theory
to be tenable at all, Plato would have to believe that soul
is a Form.
of
Form
Hackforth states that Plato gave soul the status
for
this
argument
states that Plato does not
Personally,
I
do
not
only (84). Guthrie, however,
regard
see
soul
as
a
Form
how the tripartite soul of the
Phaedrus and the Republic, divided as it is between
and
nous,
could
be
considered
definition is unified goodness.
evil
soul — a n
evil
soul
to
be
Form,
emotion
which
The whole idea of good
transmigrating
by
and
from one body to
another or souls through pursuit of pleasure
down
(85).
being
brought
to earth and reborn as animals—is contrary to Plato's
definition of Form.
Form
(a
perfect
Even if we argue that only
particular),
problem, for both evil and
this
good
nous
is
a
would not resolve the
souls
are
considered
by
Plato to be immortal.
Plato
tries
Republic (609-610).
which
destroys
it,
a
second
For
as
proof for immortality in the
everything,
eyes
by
there
ophthalmia,
is
an
evil
the body by
disease, crops by blight, timber by rot, metals by rust, and
so on.
If there is
anything
whose
destroy it, it must be indestructible.
specific
specific
evil
cannot
The soul has its own
evil, wickedness, which though it depraves, cannot
Davis:
destroy.
Therefore,
destroyed
by
its
claims
natural
Plato,
evil,
Plato
64
though
the
body
is
disease,
the
soul
is
equally
unconvincing.
indestructible.
I
think
Wickedness
this
does
not
argument
destroy
is
the
soul,
disease necessarily destroy the body.
argument,
we
According to
Plato's
could say that life—an essential attribute
of both body and soul — h a s its
Consequently,
but neither does
own
specific
evil:
death.
it is death that destroys both body and soul,
not disease and wickedness.
In
the Phaedo (85eff) Plato's analogy of the soul to
the melody
of
immortality.
the
Plato
lyre
also
suggests
an
argument
explains that a melody exists eternally
independent of any instrument and is brought into
by
anyone
who
but
not,
unfortunately,
the
Neither does Plato's discussion in
attempts
to
existence
discovers the correct combination of notes.
This discussion may prove the immortality
song
for
prove
not
only
a
particular
immortality
the
that
of
Meno.
of
soul.
Here
Plato
soul contains a priori
knowledge, but also that it is immortal.
In Chapter Two
we
saw that, although the Meno might suggest the existence of a
priori
knowledge,
it
does
not
prove
the
existence
of
immortality.
However, even though Plato believed
in
immortality,
Davis:
he
Plato
65
himself regards his theory of soul with some misgivings.
For example, in the Phaedo (85c), he states that
very
"...it
is
difficult if not impossible to achieve certainty about
these questions."
A few pages later in the Phaedo (107c) he
states that even if the soul is not immortal, one
treat
it
ought
to
as though it were since it would be "...extremely
dangerous to neglect it."
Plato goes on to say (114d) that
the facts are not necessarily as he describes them, but they
must be something like this:
In
Of
course, no reasonable man
ought to insist that the facts are
exactly as I have described them. But
that either this or something very
like it is a true account of our souls
and their future habitations—since we
have clear evidence that the soul is
immortal—this I think, is both a
reasonable contention and a belief
worth risking, for the risk is a noble
one.
the Phaedrus (246a) he states that what the soul is we
cannot
say
conclude,
but
only
therefore,
"...what
that
it
resembles."
Plato
When
in
the
Meno
states "I would not take the oath on the whole
story...," he
dogmatic
must
Plato never intended us to take
his figurative language dogmatically.
(86b)
We
surely
about
metaphorically.
means
something
that
which
he
chooses
can
only
be
Similarly, in the Timaeus (72d)
that he is only suggesting a "probable" answer:
not
to be
discussed
he
admits
Davis:
Plato
Concerning the soul, as to which
part is mortal and which divine, and
how and why they are separated, and in
what company they are placed, if God
acknowledges that we have spoken the
truth, then, and then only, can we be
confident; still, we may venture to
assert that what has been said by us
is probable, and will be rendered more
probable by investigation.
Let us
assume thus much.
Although
we
must
admit that Plato's theory
66
of
the
immortality of the soul is not rational, we must deduce that
Plato's point of view is.
is
to
take
To admit that he "does not
a rational stance.
know"
But, we might argue, since
the credibility of the theory of good and
evil
depends
on
the credibility of the theory of Forms, and this depends, to
a
certain extent, on the credibility of his theory that the
Forms are recollected by the immortal soul, our
give
attempt
to
Plato's theories a rational basis has ended in defeat.
Fortunately, however, we are not so easily
beaten,
for
we
are able to overcome this problem by turning to Plato's idea
of
dialectic,
the theory which we will discuss in the next
chapter as part of our discussion on Plato's the Good.
Davis:
Plato
67
7.
PLATO'S IDEA OF THE GOOD
In "Book VI" of the Republic, Plato states
Good
is
the
cause
and
the
that the good is
reason,"
truth
to
the
objects
of
of
power of knowing to the knower (508e),"
the
"...authentic
source
of
truth
and
that the Good is the cause of all"...that is right
and beautiful (517c)," that it is through reference
idea
the
"...of knowledge, and truth insofar as
known," that the Good "...gives
knowledge
that
the
Good
that
"...just
become useful and beneficial (505a)."
to
the
things and all the rest
The Good,
therefore,
according to Plato, is the cause of the Forms as well as the
cause
of knowledge and reason.
In other words, the Good is
the cause of the exact qualities which we have
up
to
this
point found essential to the grasp of what goodness is.
But
what,
"the Good"?
we
must ask, does Plato mean by his term
Plato himself repeatedly warns that formulating
a definite description of the
Consequently,
of analogy.
"objects
of
his
Good
is
beyond
his
power.
attempt to define the Good is by the use
The Good, states Plato, is to
reason,"
as
"objects of vision" (508b).
the
sun
is
reason
and
the
to vision, and the
The objects of
reason,
namely
Davis:
the
Forms,
derive
their
Plato
"existence and essence" from the
Good just as the objects in the visible world
"generation
and
growth" from the sun.
derive
the
Good
provides
"reason
enables the soul to see the Forms.
itself
their
And just as the sun
provides light which enables the eye to see the
vision,
68
and
objects
of
knowledge" which
But
just
as
the
sun
is not "generation and growth," nor is it the object
of vision, the Good is not the Forms, nor is it "reason" and
"knowledge" (509a).
an
analogy
beautiful
for
what
flower
qualities,
In other words, if we
is
cannot
already
be
an
seen
might
introduce
analogy,
just as a
if
light
is
absent,
virtues, assets will not be used to good purpose
if reason
and
knowledge
are
absent.
beautiful
flower derives its generation and growth from the
sun, the Forms derive their goodness
example,
we
will not know justice
And
from
just
the
as
Good.
the
For
to be just, nor courage
to be courage, nor bravery bravery, without reference to the
Good as a standard of goodness against which one can know in
what respect justice or courage or bravery are "good."
Plato's allegory of the
the
same
cave
theory as that of the sun.
(514-519)
illustrates
In this analogy Plato
is explaining that the "visible," "variable" world
the
sun.
is
like
wall of the cave, and the light of the fire is like the
The prisoners represent ordinary
man
blind
to
the
Davis:
Forms.
The
objects
and
shadows
of
Plato
objects
69
represent
particulars and concepts of the particulars of the "visible"
"variable" world.
cave,
is
The ascent of the
prisoner
like
the
the
soul's
ascent
away
from
last
to
the
"visible,"
Just as the sun
the
idea
of
the
(517c).
With
these
two
analogies
in
definitions given above (page 63), we
thought
mind, along with the
can
see
that
Plato
of the Good as a first principle, a super-form, the
Form from which all other
Forms are generated.
Ross states
that for Plato the Good is a supreme principle in the
that
the
be seen by the prisoner after leaving the
cave, the last to be seen by the soul is
Good
of
and his contemplation of the things outside the cave,
"variable" world to the realm of the Forms.
is
out
it
is
"the
supreme object of desire (86)."
says that for Plato the Good
is
"...the
object
sense
Stenzel
of
human
perfection," "the function of a thing," "the purpose a thing
serves (87)."
Good
is
Lodge states that for Plato the idea
"...a
system
of
all
of
the
the ideas unified and made
intelligible in their interrelations (88)."
From the above sources taken
state
that
the
of
a
we
can
now
Good is (1) the first principle or supreme
Form, (2) the supreme object of
function
together,
human
endeavour,
(3)
the
thing and (4) the unified system of all the
Davis:
Forms.
the
The next question we must ask is, How
Good
Plato
70
does
Plato's
relate to his theory of Good and Evil?
this question, we must turn to Plato's theory of
In
the
Meno
and
the
Phaedo,
To answer
dialectic.
Plato's
theory
knowledge involves the questionable doctrine that Forms
recollected
by
the
immortal
Phaedrus, the Sophist
reformulates
this
and
soul.
the
of
are
In the Republic, the
Symposium,
however,
Plato
doctrine along less irrational lines and
replaces it with his theory of dialectic.
In
the
Republic
(534b), he states that dialectic is (1) the science which is
able
"...to
exact
an
account
of
the
essence
of
thing...." In the Phaedrus (265d), he claims that
each
dialectic
teaches one to (2) collect "...a dispersed plurality under a
single Form," and it teaches the
we
are
enabled
species.
to
divide
into
In the Sophist (253d),
dialectician
teaches
"...according
to
different
"reverse
one
one
kinds,
or
a
not
(3)
taking
different
declares
divide
some
forms,
entirely
marked
the
the
forms
for
a
one for the same" and see
off
wholes,
apart."
according to Plato's definitions, dialectic is a
discover
that
forms
"...one form connected in a unity through many
many
whereby
Forms...." the different
Plato
to
of this
and
Therefore,
method
to
and comprehend through reasoning the unity of all
the Forms in a single system.
In other words, dialectic
is
Davis:
Plato
71
a method to attain the Good (see #1 and #4 page 109
In
the Symposium and the Phaedrus, Plato presents us
with a theory of dialectic somewhat different from
given
above.
the
because
through
appreciation
Using beauty as an
example, Plato shows in the Symposium (210b-211) that
apprehending
of
Beauty is a Form whose counterpart on earth
is obvious to the eye (Phaedrus 250b-d).
to
one
Here, Plato maintains that the recognition of
the Forms is most easily achieved
beauty
).
the
Forms,
one's
something like a "need," a "longing
prior
soul (nous) must have
for, "
a
"desire" to
reach the truth, to know what "really is," just as the lover
has
a
need
or
longing (eros) to reach the object of love
(89):
Next he must grasp that
the
beauties of the body are as nothing to
the beauties of the soul, so that
wherever he meets
with
spiritual
loveliness...
he
will
find
it
beautiful enough to fall in
love
with...
And
from this he will be led to
contemplate the beauty of laws and
institutions.
And when he discovers
how nearly every kind of beauty is
akin to every other he will conclude
that the beauty of the body is not,
after all, of so great moment...
Whoever has been initiated so far
i n the mysteries of Love and has
viewed all these aspects
of
the
beautiful in due succession, is at
last
drawing
near
the
final
revelation.
And now, Socrates, there
bursts upon him that wondrous vision
which is the very soul of the beauty
he has toiled so long for....
navis:
In both the Symposium and in the
Beauty
and
as
the
Plato
Phaedrus,
72
Plato
portrays
the paradigm of the Forms (90). In fact, Beauty
Good
are
regarded
as
interchangeable
in
the
Never mind, said Socrates, it was
a lovely speech, but there's just one
more point. I suppose you hold that
the good is also beautiful?
I do.
Then, if Love is lacking in what
is beautiful, and if the good and the
beautiful are the same, he must also
be lacking in what is good.
Just as you say , Socrates, he
replied.
I'm afraid your're quite
unanswerable.
Thus, with his theory of dialectic, Plato provides us
with
Symposium (201c):
a
method
of reaching both the Forms and the Good, a method
not dependent upon a theory
only
upon
(1)
the
of
reasoning
immortality
power
of
but
dependent
the intellect to
discern the Forms and the Good, and (2) the desire (eros) of
the soul for goodness.
In the Republic (510d-c), Plato provides
second
example
of his theory of dialectic.
us
basic
a
Mathematicians
posit various kinds of figures and angles which they
as
with
regard
and known and with these work out their theorems.
They make use of mathematics as models and diagrams, knowing
that these are only reflections
of
the
Forms,
i.e.,
the
circle itself, which is the actual subject of their inquiry.
Plato
gives
a
third
example
of his theory in the Phaedo
Davis:
Plato
73
(75d-c). Here, in explaining that the sensible objects point
the way to realities beyond them, he links
the
example
of
the mathematical Forms with the moral and aesthetic Forms.
Plato's
idea
that
through dialectic one is able to
comprehend the Forms in the
manner
that
comprehend
mathematical
plausible.
But when he includes in this
that
knowledge
vision
(Symposium
credibility.
considered a
cannot.
of
the
his
can
detail
both
able
to
basically to be
analogy
theory
to
activity,
dilemma
seems
is
the
idea
bursts upon us in "wondrous
reasoning
rational
examine in more
Forms
210c),"
While
This
principles
one
be
the
seems
to
lose
first principles can be
having
wondrous
resolved,
however,
rationality
theory of dialectic and of his idea of the Good.
of
visions
if we
Plato's
Davis:
Plato
74
8.
THE RATIONALITY OF PLATO'S
IDEA OF THE GOOD.
G.E.
Mueller
states
that
Plato's idea of the Good
consists of a dialectical movement called metaxy which means
"in-between".
Mueller,
The
meaning
of
human
existence,
is a struggle from lack of Form to
states
Form.
Because
we desire a good and not a bad life, we are in-between these
dialectical
goodness.
opposites
In
becoming
Mueller, we become
excellence.
attempting
Every
aware
good
aware
of
lack
achieve
our
own
of this dialectic, declares
the
possibilities
of
human
action is a reminder of the Forms
and of the idea of the Good.
of the lack of Forms.
to
Every bad action is a reminder
We discover our
own
excellence,
or
of it, through reference to the Forms and to the Good.
If we did not have these, says Mueller, we would not be able
to become good (91).
Lodge relates Plato's
theory
There
theory
of
dialectic
to
his
of good and evil in the same manner as does Mueller.
is
conflict
in
human
nature,
suggests
Lodge,
an
eternal
going on and, according to its outcome, men may be
described as mastering themselves or sinking into slavery to
Davis:
themselves.
the
These conflicts are resolved
"competing
and
fluctuating
Objectively, he concludes, the
by
Plato
rising
sensations"
Good
is
75
above
to the Good.
ultimate
reality.
Subjectively, it is the building up within the individual of
the qualities embodied in the Good:
When conduct is directed by the
idea of good, so that, in
every
situation which life brings, a maximum
of
positive
value is sought...it
passes
over
into
the
positive
self-unfolding of the potentialities
of the organism as a whole, and is
thus indistinguishable from complete
excellence, i.e., from
the
ideal
life
(92).
Martin Buber presents an interpretation of Plato's
dialectic similar to those offered by Mueller and Lodge:
Plato
has
repeatedly
called
thinking a voiceless soliloquoy of the
soul with itself.
Everyone who has
really thought knows that with this
remarkable process there is a state at
which an inner court is questioned and
replies.
There, he who is approached
for judgement is not the empirical
self but the spirit I am intended to
become (93).
Support for this thesis can also be found in
Aristotle's
interpretation of Forms, according to which their perfection
excites
the
development
of
human
according to Aristotle (Metaphysics
that
can
actualize
itself
potentialities.
1048b),
is
a
Soul,
potency
either in the direction of the
Forms, or away from them (94).
Before I discuss how this gives a rational
basis
to
Davis:
Plato
76
Plato's theory of good and evil and to his idea of the Good,
I
must
point
out
that
there
is
a textual basis in the
dialogues for the above interpretation of Plato's theory
dialectic.
that
of
For example, in the Symposium (202b), Plato says
eros, considered to be the upward impulse to goodness,
is intermediate between beautiful and ugly, good and bad:
Very well, then, she went on, why
must you insist that
what
isn't
beautiful is ugly, and that what isn't
good is bad?
Now, coming back to
Love, you've been forced to agree that
he is neither good nor beautiful, but
that's no reason for thinking that he
must be bad and ugly.
The fact is
that he's between the two.
In the Theaetetus (109a), he states that thought is a silent
debate
of
the psyche with itself, with final pronouncement
being right belief (95):
...when the mind is thinking, it
is simply talking to itself, asking
questions and answering them,
and
saying yes or no. When it reaches a
decision —which may come slowly or in
a sudden rush--when doubt is over and
the two voices affirm the same thing,
then we call that its 'judgement.' So
I
should
describe
thinking
as
discourse,
and
judgement
as
a
statement pronounced, not aloud to
someone else, but silently to oneself.
In the Lysis (217c-21'8b), Plato claims that the philosopher,
desiring wisdom, must be neither wise nor ignorant.
the Lysis (217b),
Plato,
in
attempting
to
Also in
discover
the
nature of friendship, explains that there are three classes:
good,
evil,
and
that
which
is
neither.
That which is
Davis:
Plato
77
neither evil nor good becomes friendly with good because
the
presence
of
evil.
For
example,
neither good nor evil, is compelled
(evil)
to
take medicine (good).
can say that evil (disease)
(medicine).
Similarly,
the body, which is
when
it
the
soul,
way
says
Plato
(220d),
is
it
appears
is
the
towards
because
good
of
evil.
loved on account of evil by
souls who are intermediate between good and
then
sick
in a state of becoming
good or evil, becomes friendly with good
Good,
becomes
Thus, concludes Plato, we
points
the
nature
evil:
of good.
This
It is loved on
account of evil by us who are intermediate between evil
good
but
in itself and for itself it is of no use^
Gorgias (472d-476), Plato states that to
worse
inflict
and
In the
wrong
is
that to suffer wrong, since the more evil one is, the
more one injures one's self.
says
of
Plato,
The
greatest
of
all
evils,
is to do wrong and escape punishment, since he
who is punished is made better because he is rid of the evil
in his soul.
who
needs
The man who flees from punishment is like
an
operation
but
is
afraid
one
of the pain and,
consequently, is blind to the benefit it will bring.
This interpretion of Plato's theory of
also
central
in
the
Republic
divides existence into three
Forms),
(509d-511e).
regions:
the
dialectic
Here
existent
is
Plato
(the
the non-existent, and that which is between the two
Davis:
(the particulars).
corresponding
corresponding
soul,
struggling
somewhere
78
Corresponding to existence is knowledge;
to
to
Plato
non-existence
the
ignorance;
and
intermediate region is opinion.
to
reach
between
is
knowledge,
knowledge
essentially the meaning
of
and
Plato's
is
always
ignorance.
story
in
The
caught
This
the
is
Phaedo
(253-257) in which the soul is analogous to the black horse,
the
white
horse
and
the
charioteer.
similar picture in Laws V (732b-d).
principles,
reason
and
necessity,
Here
Plato
two
form
presents a
antagonistic
a sort of divine
battleground with man's soul caught in between.
At the end of the last chapter we
the
belief
that
gave
credence
to
knowledge of the Forms and the Good might
come through a process of dialectical
reasoning.
when
that knowledge of the
we
considered
Plato's
notion
However,
Forms and the Good could also come through a sudden burst of
"wondrous vision" we expressed some
the
above,
skepticism.
which
an
from
we can see that the process of dialectic is one
of "grappling with values," as Buber maintains
at
But
inner
court
is
"...a
state
questioned and replies...."
William James, in giving a rational account of such a sudden
illumination, explains that ideas previously
peripheral
in
our consciousness sometimes suddenly take a central place in
our
psyche.
Ideas,
states
James, work subconsciously or
Davis:
Plato
79
unconsciously and tend to ripen in silence, a phenomenon
calls
"unconscious
cerebration"
he
in which "...on a certain
day the real meaning of the thought peals
through
for
the
first time (96)."
Findlay
accounts
for this process of "illumination"
in a similar manner:
Our sense of values, moreover, as
pervasively
present
in
the
intellectual as in any other sphere,
makes us feel that what is standard,
graspable, light-giving, directive, is
not any and every mixed state or
condition but only certain priviliged
sorts of state or condition, which
stand out from others, and about which
and between which other unprivileged
states or conditions cluster and have
their nearer or further place (97).
Therefore, when Plato's idea of "wondrous vision" is
in
stated
the more commonplace terms of James and Findlay, it does
become plausible.
Most of us at one time
wrestled with a decision.
answer
It is
or
another
have
At some point in this process, an
to the question being grapled with must materialize.
not
improbable
that
this
would
be
like
Plato's
"wondrous vision."
The
above considerations have shown how Plato's idea
of dialectic both is central to his theory of good and
and
is,
basically, plausible.
of dialectic, we can now
theory
of
the
Good.
With the help of his theory
examine
To
evil
begin,
the
we
rationality
have
of
his
seen that the
Davis:
Plato
80
contradiction between Forms and lack of form is the same
the
contradiction between good and evil.
as
The nature of the
relationship between the Form and the individual is not only
one of thought, as I outlined in chapter Three, but also one
of need, desire and aspiration for goodness
the
Symposium),
(the
Lysis,
different
as
the
well
Phaedrus,
as one of guilt, remorse, misery
Gorgias).
manner,
(the
Or,
stated
in
a
slightly
the extent of the goodness of one's life
is determined by one's awareness of evil (the Gorgias),
this
one
mposium
in
realizes
through
, the Phaedrus).
and
reference to the Forms (the Sy
As we stated earlier
(page
70),
order for one's conscience to do it's job of telling one
that one's
principle
actions
of
are
one's
or
evil,
it
must
have
ideality (the Forms and the Good) upon
to base its decisions.
within
good
Thus,
conscience
this
could
principle
be
of
considered
a
which
ideality
a
sort of
"internal psychical cause."
In order to understand this idea of cause
must
return
to
an
must
be
understood
in
terms
of
If one wants to know what courage is, one
ask someone who excels in that virtue, a great general
for example (the Laches 1908).
the
we
earlier discussion (page 1 ) . Socrates
believed that things can only
their excellence.
fully,
virtue
of temperance,
If one wants to
know
about
one asks a person who excels in
Davis:
that virtue
Phaedo
(the
(97c),
Charmedides
Socrates
158e).
says
Plato
Similarly,
in
the
if one wants to discover the
cause for anything the question to ask is, How
for
81
is
it
best
that thing "...to be or to act or to be acted upon...?"
In the Greater Hippias (296e),
which
is
"beneficial."
In
he
relates
cause
to
that
the Gorgias (475a), he states
that "...superior excellence is due to superior pleasure
usefulness or both."
is
not
The term "cause" for Plato, therefore,
like our meaning of cause which normally is thought
of as cause and effect.
of
or
For Plato, to understand the
cause
something one must understand to what extent it is good.
We can readily understand
idea
the
rationality
of cause by referring to an analogy.
Orr
this
If there were no
difference in degree between the hockey-playing
Bobby
of
ability
of
and of Eddie Shack it would be impossible for us
to really understand what hockey-playing was.
Without
the
principle of excellence or ideality we could never learn the
difference between the success or failure of an activity and
would
be
unable
to
understand
the
activity itself.
Platonic terms, we understand something by reference to
excellence.
The
degree
difference of degrees.
of
In
its
excellence we discover by the
It is precisely
because
Bobby
Orr
does come closer to the idea of excellence in hockey playing
that
we are able to understand hockey playing.
The Form of
Davis:
Plato
82
Hockey Player, therefore, causes us to understand the hockey
playing of both Bobby Orr and
Eddie
Shack.
This
is
not
different from saying that the Form of Circle causes the two
imperfect
circles
insofar
understood as circular.
that
outlined
in
as
the
This position
Chapter
Two.
circles
are
to
be
is
reverse
of
There, we stated that the
difference of degree of circularity caused
the
idea
of
the perfect circle.
causes both of the above
understandable.
circles
the
us
to
project
Here, the Form of Circle
in
that
it
makes
them
If we consider that the good for the hockey
player is to score goals, we can understand that the Good is
cause insofar as it is the end of an endeavour, the ideal on
which the heart (eros) is set.
This point is illustrated in
the Gorgias (468b):
SOCRATES:
It is in pursuit of
the good, then, that we walk when we
walk, thinking this the better course,
and when on the contrary we stand, we
stand for the same reason, for the
sake of the good. Is it not so?
This definition of the Good brings us back to our definition
given
earlier
(page
65), that
object of human endeavour."
Forms
and
the
Good
are
the
Good is "the supreme
Thus, we can conclude that
cause
in
the
that they allow us to
understand objectively both the endeavour
and
its
intent.
If we add to this definition that the Forms and the Good are
subjectively
operative within the human psyche as "internal
Davis:
psychical cause," we are brought back to the
page
71
of
the
idea
of
soul
Plato
83
discussion
on
as self-moving principle.
There, we suggested that souls could be at the same time
actuality
and in potency.
Now we see that the good and the
Forms are both objective cause and
cause.
in
that
psychical
are
be
internal
psychical
The soul, therefore, can be considered self- moving
self-motion
cause,
results
being
from
directed
eros,
summed
up
by
i.e.
towards
objective cause (the Symposium 204). The
can
in
internal
the
Good, i.e.
above
discussion
a quote from Aristotle (Metaphysics
1072b25):
And since that which is moved
and
is
a
mover
is
thus
an
intermediate, there is something which
causes motion without being moved, and
this is eternal, a substance, and an
actuality.
And this is the way in
which the object of desire or the
intelligible
object moves, namely,
without itself being moved. Of these,
the primary objects are the same, for
the object of desire is that which
appears to be noble, and the
primary
object of wish is that which is noble.
We desire because it seems rather that
it
seems
because we desire, and
thinking is the starting-point.
Now
the
intellect
is
moved
by the
intelligible, and things which are
intelligible in virtue of themselves
are in one of the two columns of
opposites, and of these, substances
are primary, and of substances, that
which is simple and in actuality is
primary.
Conversely, we must add that just as the Good
is
cause
in
Davis:
that it provides
of
the
good
84
an "actuality" towards which we move, lack
is
which we move.
Plato
also
cause for it provides a
In this sense evil
must
be
lack from
considered
to
perform a positive function in that it points to the Good.
With
all
this in mind we can entertain Plato's idea
that the Good is not simply cause for
is,
in
fact, universal cause.
the
individual,
Plato's claim that all life
must function according to a principle of goodness does
mean
that
every
inanimate
but
not
thing is conscious of the good
towards which it grows, but that life as a whole seems to be
arranged according to the principle of what is best for
survival.
This
notion
seems to me to be plausible.
does seem to be arranged
intelligence,
in
in
such
a
way
that
reason
its
Life
or
the case of man, or instinct in the case
of animals, or simple biological drives in the case of plant
life,
is directed towards
Ultimately,
the
determining the
survival.
results.
only
the
survival
criterion
desirability
of
any
of
any
the
entity
action
is
species.
has
for
its
own
An action is desirable only if it will give good
The
frog
survives
because
it
instinctively
arranges its life according to the principle of what is good
for the frog's survival.
Mention
of
the
frog
reminds
association mentioned in Chapter Three.
us of the proftem of
There we
discussed
Davis:
the
Plato
85
fact that it is difficult to imagine that stones or mud
could have Forms.
Stone
can
have
Now we can see how the Form of Mud or
principles
would view a rock against the
of excellence.
principle
of
of
The stonemason
excellence
in
terms of building just as the frog would view the mud with a
mind to the principle of excellence in terms of hiding.
or
stones
are
part of Plato's universal scheme insofar as
they are used for some good purpose.
mud,
we
do
so
because we think it
When we pick
Gorgias 468b).
up
some
good, just as when we
stand or sit or walk we do so because we think
(the
Mud
it
is
good
As stated in the Symposium (205e), the
cause of all that we do is the Good:
Love never longs for either the
half or the whole of anything except
the good.
For men will even have
their hands and feet cut off if they
are once convinced that those members
are bad for them. Indeed I think we
only prize our own belongings insofar
as we say that the good belongs to us
and the bad to someone else, for what
we love is the good and nothing but
the good.
Consequently, the idea of the Good is for Plato a
universal
teleological principle (98).
If the Good were absent from Plato's scheme, we might
consider
it
nothing
self-assertion.
is
to
score
more
than
a
fanciful
After all, the good for the
goals and make money.
rationale of
hockey
player
If the Good is what we
want or think most worth having, then the
Good
is
nothing
Davis:
other
than egotistical desire.
But, as outlined in Chapter
5, egotism and its accompanying train
and
want
through
can
only
end
self-mastery
subjective
goods
of
in
of
appetite,
self-destruction.
must
be
directed
the
ego,
but
to
ourselves and others, in other words, to
whole.
The
good
for
self
86
Plato
cannot
be
Self
does
including the good for others.
desire
Our drives
not
towards
the
good of both
the
good
of
realized
not
the
the
without
live
in
a
vacuum.
Beyond
concludes
existence,
Goodness
Plato.
like
It
itself
is
happiness
the
in
we
do
not
justification
need
to
go,
of
its
own
the Symposium (205a).
does not need to ask, Why does one want to
be
happy?
One
The
answer is obvious:
Well, then, she went on, suppose
that, instead of the beautiful, you
were being asked about the good. I
put it to you, Socrates. "What is it
that the lover of the good is longing
for?"
To make the good his own. Then
what will he gain by making it
his own?
I can make a better
shot at answering that, I said.
He'll gain happiness.
Right, said
she, for the happy are happy
inasmuch
as they possess
the good, and since
there's no need for us to ask why men
should want to be happy, I think your
answer is conclusive.
Now the rationality of Plato's idea of the Good and
its importance to the rationality of Plato's theory of
good
Davis:
and
evil
as
virtues, moral
assets
are
states
that
a
whole becomes clear.
qualities, physical
good.
For
"righteousness,"
in
and
are
good.
In the
qualifies these statements.
material
and
"valour";
"wisdom" are good.
the Gorgias (467e), he states that "wisdom,"
"wealth"
and
Laws X (900d), Plato
"understanding,"
"temperance,"
87
Plato considers that
assets,
example,
"prudence,"
Plato
Euthydemus
"health,"
In
and
(280), however, he
Good things, he says, cannot be
good if they are not used rightly.
Anything,
in
be considered good be it
Laws
II
"...sight,
(661c),
that
hearing,
superlatively
might
sensation,
evil..."
if
not
life
used
the
qualities
principle
of
are
excellence
excellence
can
principle
for our decisions are
to
function
which
state
to
Plato
that
which
choice, implementing any action,
ability
things
not good in themselves but are good only
then, we
teleological
Our
In the
Therefore, declares Plato,
insofar as their uses and their
summary,
Lack of
are
pruning knife—dullness in other words-- is an evil
which can harm the vine.
or
Plato
itself,
properly.
Republic (353), Plato cites an example.
in
claims
we
conform
to
that
calls the Good.
the
look
performing
Good
in
any
is
In
the
making any
function,
made on the basis of what is the best
be good or evil, therefore, depends on
whether or not our reason has understood what is best.
Even
Davis:
a failure to achieve good results can be
consequence
Plato
explained
88
as
the
of our being mistaken about what would be best.
It is for this reason that
Socrates
(77e)
choose to do evil is contrary to
that
human nature.
to
willingly
insists
If we do, we are choosing what
good, ignorant of the fact that it is evil.
in
we
the
think
Meno
is
Davis:
Plato
89
9.
PLATO'S THEORY OF BALANCE AND PROPORTION
In
the
Timaeus
(46d-47e)
and
in Laws X (897a-d),
Plato attempts to explain the existence of good and evil
using
cosmic and religious myth.
maintains that the fact
sameness
and
that
by
In these dialogues, Plato
there
is
a
general
order,
regularity in the universe, as exemplified in
the regularity and mathematical perfection of the movement s
of
the
planets, proves that a principle of intelligence or
reason maintains
harmony.
Reason
the
must
cosmos
in
a
unified
and
balanced
be more powerful than chaos, claims
Plato, for if it were not the universe would not survive.
Reason or intelligence is called by Plato either God,
Nous or the Demiurge (the Republic 530a, 507c,
265c,
the
Statesman
the
Sophist
270, the Timaeus 41a, 42e, 68e, 69c).
In the Timaeus (27d-30c), Plato states
that
God
made
the
visible cosmos in imitation of the Form Cosmos and put it in
the
invisible
world-soul
to
maintain
mathematical balance and proportion
time
to
(46d-47e)
cosmos
(99).
in
From
time, however, reason or world-soul is subject to,
or overcome by, evil.
Epinomis
the
In the Laws X
(896d-e)
and
in
the
(988e), Plato posits world-souls with two natures,
Davis:
the evil nature sometimes overpowering
Timaeus
(49e)
and
the
world-soul which is at
force,
Statesman
times
the
Plato
good.
In
he
posits
(270a),
overcome
by
90
an
the
a
independent
necessity, causing natural calamities such as floods
or hurricanes.
maintains
in
responsible
But apart from these small differences Plato
all
for
four
good
dialogues
(order,
that
harmony,
world-soul
is
balance) but
is
subject from time to time either to necessity or
bad
souls
which cause evil (chaos, disorder) (100).
The
idea of reason or world-soul directing existence
according to a principle
reminds
of
harmony,
comparison
can
be
drawn
In
between
fact,
is
caused
by
unlimited
a
Plato's
individual soul and of the cosmic soul.
evil
and
For
step-by-step
ideas
the
cosmic
appetites
and
evil
the
just
desires
53), evil
soul is caused by the presence of bad souls
overcoming the Nous of the cosmos. And
produces
of
example,
overcoming the nous of the particular soul (page
in
order,
us of the description of the soul as a principle of
self-motion in Chapter 8 (101).
as
balance
consequences
just
as
necessity
such as sickness and misery in
the individual (page 56), necessity produces calamities like
floods, in the cosmos.
Similarly, when nous
is master
of
the individual, he will be good (page 53); so also when Nous
is master of the cosmos, it will be harmonious.
Conversely,
Davis:
if
91
nous is controlled by the unlimited and disproportionate
drives of the
if
Plato
Nous
lower soul, evil results (page 53); so
is
also
controlled by the bad soul, chaos and disorder
result.
Plato's idea of a cosmic soul analogous to
soul
(see
also
the
Philebus
30a)
cosmic craftsman (102) analogous to
According
This
dialogues.
shipwrights
just
as
mortal
craftsman.
individual
creates
an
idea is mentioned frequently by Plato in the
Socrates
and
talks
other
of
"...painters,
craftsmen..."
Gorgias
builders,
modelling
503e).
the
raw
Similarly,
in the Timaeus (28c-29a) describes "the artificer" as
modelling
the
universe
Statesman(200d),
Plato
after
says
"the
that
works of divine art just as things
human art.
that
the
the
materials after the Forms (the
Plato
is like his idea of a
to Plato, the Divine Craftsman created the cosmos
by copying the Forms
object.
a mortal
God
In the Sophist
(265c),
is a Divine Craftsman.
left, we can refer to the Republic
eternal."
products
In
the
of nature are
made by man are works of
Plato
states
outright
If there can be any doubt
(596c)
in
which
affirms that God is related to the mortal craftsman:
But now consider what name you
would give to this craftsman.
What one?
Him who makes all the things that
all handicraftsmen severally produce.
A truly clever and wondrous man
you tell of.
Plato
Davis:
Plato
Ah, but wait, and you will say so
indeed, for this same handicraftsman
is not only
able
to
make
all
implements, but he produces all plants
and animals, including himself, and
thereto earth and heaven and the gods
and all things in heaven and in Hades
under the earth.
Therefore, according to Plato, the mortal
fashions
his
art
by
copying
conclude that, just as the
strives
to
achieve
the
soul
happiness
of
Craftsman
is
analogous
Thus
mortal
we must
craftsman
world
soul
of
the
strives to achieve harmony and balance by
ordering itself towards the Good.
God
the
craftsman
by limiting its desires and
directing itself towards the Good, the
Divine
forms.
92
Thus,
in
Plato's
view,
to man, and the soul of God analogous to
the soul of man.
But, we may exclaim, surely we
this
talk
ought
not
take
all
of a Divine Craftsman maintaining harmony in the
cosmos through mathematical order seriously.
Besides,
we
might add, Plato's theory is based on his observation of the
movements of the planets, which means that Plato is assuming
that the geometry of the cosmos must be Euclidian.
is not so.
forever
Two parallel lines will not travel through space
without
meeting.
that his cosmic theory
(29d),
he
But this
Yet Plato himself did not intend
be taken as fact.
In
the
Timaeus
states that one cannot hope to give a completely
precise account of such subjects as gods and the origins
of
Davis:
the
universe.
Plato
93
He is, he states, giving a probable account
(103):
Enough if we adduce probabilities
as likely as any others, for we must
remember that I who am the speaker and
you who are the judges are only mortal
men, and we ought to accept the tale
which is probable and inquire
no
further.
Even though cosmic geometry may not
principles of Euclid, we must admit
organized
for
that
the
follow
universe
the
is
according to a very definite mathematical scheme,
modern physicists emphasize that the universe
operates
entirely on mathematical principles . According to Barnett,
it
is
the
mathematical
universe which
allows
precision of the movements of the
scientists
to
investigate
natural
laws:
Modern
physicists...emphasize
that nature mysteriously operates on
mathematical principles.
It is the
mathematical orthodoxy of the universe
that enables theorists like Einstein
to predict and discover natural laws
simply by the solution of equations
(104).
In view of this statement, therefore, we might conclude that
Plato's belief in a mathematically ordered universe has some
credibility.
Precisely how this belief relates to our study
is the topic of the next chapter.
Davis:
Plato
94
10.
THE RATIONALITY OF PLATO'S THEORY
OF BALANCE AND PROPORTION
As we have seen, Plato believed that reason maintains
cosmic
harmony
states
that
universe
man
and
balance.
through
could
understanding
the
harmony
of
the
reach an individual harmony within his
own soul and "...become
(105)."
In the Timaeus (47c), Plato
like the divine so far as
man
can
In this, Plato thought, lay the secret of goodness:
God invented and gave us sight to
the end that we might behold the
courses of intelligence in the heaven,
and apply them to the courses of our
own intelligence which are akin to
them,
the
unperturbed
to
the
perturbed, and that we, learning them
and partaking of the natural truth of
reason, might imitate the absolutely
unerring courses of God and regulate
our own vagaries.
Similarly, in the Gorgias (508a), Plato states that both man
and the cosmos are bound together by order:
Wise men, Callicles, say that the
heavens and the earth, gods and men,
are bound together by fellowship and
friendship, and order and temperance
and justice, and for this reason they
call the sum of things the 'ordered'
universe, my friend, not the world of
disorder or riot. But it seems to me
that you pay no attention to these
things in spite of your wisdom, but
you
are
unaware
that
geometric
equality is of great importance among
gods and men alike
Davis:
In
"Book
IV"
of
the
individual
justice
appetites,
emotions
Plato
95
Republic
(444d-e), Plato describes
a
of
as
state
inner
harmony,
the
and reason working together in perfect
unity and order:
And is it not
likewise
the
production of justice in the soul to
establish its
principles
in
the
natural relation of controlling and
being controlled by one another, while
injustice is to cause the one to rule
or be ruled by the other contrary to
nature?
The Republic, in fact, is not just
political
theory
but
is
an
allegory
well-ordered and harmonious psyche.
virtues
of
the
Plato
a
piece
illustrating
shows
that
Wisdom resides in
soul's
reasoning
faculty
Guardians of the city who
and
keep
the
as
wisdom
ought
to
take
relationship
the
resides in the
control
between
of
the
As health
the
three
of the soul, so the balanced relationships between
the elements of the city
Evil
just
their appetites within bounds.
results from a harmonious
elements
a
individual citizen ought to be the same as
those of the state as a whole (106).
people
of
results
when
create
a
condition
of
justice.
either the state or the individual lose
their unity.
Plato
(644e-645c).
presents
a
According
appetites must be
ordered
similar
idea
in
the
Laws
to the Athenian, man's unwholesome
by
law
(107).
Just
as
each
Davis:
individual
should
maintain
soul, so also should
within
itself.
The
the
Plato
balance and harmony within his
city
better
96
maintain
classes,
order
and
unity
declares Plato (the
Republic 410c), should control through education, culture or
law the worse, just as the better part of
control
the
worse
through
the
soul
self-mastery (440e).
For this
reason, philosophers should be the guardians of the
for
only
should
people,
they contain within themselves that knowledge (of
the Good) which leads to balance, limit and unity (540a).
From the
individual
above,
can
see
that
for
Plato
the
Earlier, we saw
was analogous to the cosmos.
Now
see that, for Plato, goodness of the individual, of
the state and of the cosmos
being
can
soul is analogous to the state.
that the individual soul
we
we
directed
towards
was
dependent
upon
the
soul
balance, order and harmony, limit,
unity and proportion, just as earlier we saw
that
goodness
was dependent upon the soul being directed towards the Forms
and the Good.
Therefore, we can conclude, as does Aristotle
(108), that Plato's notion of the limited and the unlimited,
unity
and
diversity,
one
and
the
many
(the
Philebus
64e-65a), are really just different terms for the Forms
the
and
particulars, and Plato's idea of measure and proportion
is really the same as his idea of the Good:
SOCRATES: So now we find that
the good has taken refuge in the
character of the beautiful,
for the
Davis:
Plato
qualities of measure and proportion
invariably, I
imagine,
constitute
beauty and excellence.
PROTARCHUS: Yes, indeed.
SOCRATES:
And of course we said
that truth was included also with
these qualities in the mixture.
PROTARCHUS: Quite so.
SOCRATES: Then if we cannot hunt
down the good under a single form, let
us secure it by the conjunction of
three,
beauty,
proportion,
and
truth....
Similarly,
in
the Philebus (64e), Plato
"measure" and "proportion" are essential
the
Timaeus
(87d),
he
states
to
that
states
and
proportion
causes
Socrates demands an explanation of
demonstrate
evil.
the
that
goodness.
In
"symmetries"
and
"proportions" are essential to goodness, and
symmetry
97
that
In
lack
the
world
which
of
Phaedo,
would
that what holds it all together is the power of
the good expressed in terms of geometric proportion.
In the
Sophist (228a-c), Plato states that evil is a discord of the
soul.
Deformity of the body is called want of measure.
ignorant
soul,
An
he says, does not find its mark, the Forms,
because it is suffering from "lack of symmetry."
According to Plato, everything
mixture
of
the
Form
and
in
the
world
is
a
the particular, just as it is a
mixture of the limited and the unlimited (109), and of order
and
chaos.
something
Insofar
is
good
not, it is evil.
as
(the
finitude
or
Timaeus 87c).
order
prevails,
Insofar as it does
From the preceding point of
view
we
can
Davis:
sum
up
Plato's
entire
theory of good and evil.
because the Forms impose unity, limit, form,
the
unlimited
and
the
Plato
First
and
variable, knowledge
98
order
,
on
is possible
(Chapters 1-4). Secondly, when we attain through
dialectic
the Forms, we realize that they are the principles of unity,
limit,
and form (Chapters 3-8). Thirdly, the actualization
of unity and form,
measure
and
proportion,
in
the
soul
produce goodness in the individual, harmony in the state and
order
in
the
cosmos,
just as do the actualization of the
Forms and the Good (chapters 5-10).
Fourthly, if we
recall
our original definition of the Good as the "...system of all
the
Ideas
unified
and
made
intelligible
in
their
interrelations...(110)" we can understand that for Plato the
Good
is
the
unity
of
the Forms in their entirety, hence
Plato's definition of the Good in the Sophist (253d) as "the
One".
STRANGER: And the man who can do
that
discerns
clearly
one
form
everywhere extended throughout many,
where each one lies apart, and many
forms, different from one another,
embraced from without by one form, and
again one form connected in a unity
through many wholes, and many forms,
entirely marked off apart.
Finally, and consequently, evil is lack of unity,
lack
of
Form, lack of order and harmony (Chapters 1-10).
Plato's
whole
concept of good and evil rests on his
conviction that existence is rationally ordered by
a
force
Davis:
which
aims
at
goodness.
and
Essentially,
goodness,
or
"formula."
correct,
balance
lack
of
proportion,
what
Plato
it,
is
is
Plato
99
and through them
saying
is
that
dependent upon the Form as
If the ingredients are right, if the measure
then
the
product
will
be
good.
This
is
is not
different from saying that the formula for a melodious song
is its notes and bars in proper measure, or that the formula
for a healthy human
balanced
information
being
is
of
the
the
correctly
D.N.A.
ordered
and
With interpretation
Findlay agrees:
...it
is
by
no
means
unintelligible to ourselves that being
water, or earth, or air, or wood, or
gold, or
purple,
or
angry,
or
intelligent,
or
a
man,
or
a
dwarf-star, or an electron are all
basically
a
matter
of
specific
proportions or quantitative measures;
this is the creed of modern science,
for which we need not here argue
rim
v — — — ./ •
We
may
choose
to
call
the
sustains this order by names
Demiurge,
Nous
or reason.
such a principle exists.
for
millions
principle
other
than
which creates and
the
Good,
God,
We may even choose to deny that
But we cannot deny the
fact
that
of years a balanced universe has allowed life
not only to continue, but to continue in a manner which, for
the most part, is ordered and unified.
Indeed, if
not,
It is this fact that
all
life would perish in chaos.
prompted Einstein to state that:
it
were
Davis:
Plato
My religion, ... consists of a
humble admiration of the illimitable
superior spirit who reveals himself in
the slight details we are able to
perceive with our frail and feeble
minds.
That
deeply
emotional
conviction
of
the presence of a
superior reasoning power, which is
revealed
in
the
incomprehensible
universe, forms my idea of God (112).
I agree, therefore, with Plato, as did Einstein, that it
rational
to
suppose
that
teleological explanation.
a balanced
100
is
universe demands a
Davis:
Plato
101
CONCLUSIONS
It is rational
particular
to
say
that
particular
to
or
circles are what they are and not something else
because of the specific proportion and measure
them
stones
be so.
which
cause
Similarly, it is rational to say that they
are rendered intelligible by the Forms which represent these
specifications.
It is also rational to say that these Forms
together create a single systematically ordered pattern
that
this
pattern
makes
possible
knowledge
not only of
particular stones, circles but of all existence because
specificity
of
certain
aesthetic
and
It is also rational
to
evil.
by
which
we
moral
are able to distinguish good from
Finally, it is rational to say that the supreme Form,
the Good, is the teleological principle to which we look
making
say
moral Forms contained in this
pattern provide us with a set of stable and permanent
directives
the
the Forms gives stability and permanence to
the flux of these particulars.
that
and
any
in
choice, implementing any action, performing any
function, for our decisions are made on the basis of what is
the best.
succeed
For the above reasons I conclude that Plato
in
does
relating rationally his theory of good and evil
to "the world of human experience."
In fact, it is
because
Davis:
Plato
has
been
in
102
able to give a rational basis, not only to
this theory but the other essentially
considered
Plato
this
study,
"father of rational theology."
"religious"
theories
that Plato has been called the
. Davis:
Plato
103
ENDNOTES
1. Socrates did not believe in the transcendence of the
Forms.
The function of the Forms for Socrates was: (1) to
bring widely scattered things under one form so that the
individual may make clear by definition whatever it is that
he wants to say (the Phaedrus 265c-e), (2) to divide things
according to their kind and "embrace" each one under a
simple form (the Phaedrus 273d-c), and (3) to know the truth
about everything on which one speaks or writes and to be
able to isolate everything into a definition (the Phaedrus
277b-c).
2. According to Heraclitus, "permanence" is simply an
example of change in slow motion.
All structures are
dissolving slowly, says Heraclitus, everything is in process
of coming-to-be and passing-away. (Wheelwright, Heraclitus,
29).
3. Guthrie states that the Pythagoreans' changeless world
of mathematics influenced Plato's belief in a system of
changeless and perfect entities outside the material world.
Where Plato differed in philosophy from the Pythagoreans,
Guthrie attributes to the combined influence of Socrates and
Heraclitus. (History of Greek Philosophy, Vol. 5, 426, Vol.
4. 251.)
4. According to Parmenides, intelligible being is the only
reality. The sensible world is "...names that mean nothing,
senseless babble..." (Seligman, Being and Not-Being, 5).
5.
In opposition to Parmenides and Heraclitus, Plato
believed in neither a completely changeless world or in a
world of total change. (The Sophist, 249). See Seligman's
treatment of this. (Being and Not-Being, 36).
6. For A complete treatment of this topic see Hamilton
Cairns, Dialogues of Plato, 474, 856f, 868f.
7.
and
See also the Phaedo 78d-79d.
8.
In the Theaetetus, the example given is the birds in
the aviary (197b-200cJ. A man may possess knowledge in the
sense that he has it stored in his mind, although he might
not remember it. A man possesses all the birds (pieces of
» Davis:
Plato
104
knowledge) in his aviary. To catch a particular bird is to
recall a piece of knowledge but there may be birds he cannot
catch for the moment, in other words, cannot recall.
9.
10.
See also the
Republic 490b, the Phaedo 78d-79d.
Barnett, The Universe and Dr. Einstein, 21.
^-VISIBLE LIGHT
WAVEUNQTH (CENTIMETERS)
11.
Ibid., 19.
See below.
The circles do not look really round. You would never think
they were true circles, for they seem to be
almost
egg-shaped.
But —they
are perfect circles.
Using a
compass, or a coin, you can prove this.
The curving
checkerboard fools the eyes.
. Davis:
Plato
12.
Barnett, The Universe And Dr. Einstein, 19.
13.
Ibid., 35.
105
14.
Jung, The Undiscovered Self, 58.
I should point out
that Plato, unlike Parmenides, gave partial being to the
sensible world.
In the Republic , "Book V," (477a), he
states that the sensible world both is and is not.
It
resides half-way between being (the Forms) and not-being
just as opinion lies midway between knowledge and ignorance.
{See also the Phaedo 102b, Aristotle's Metaphysics 987b8.)
Protagarus, by contrast, states that only "what seems" is.
He claims in the Theaetetus 152a: "...as each thing seems
to me, such it is for me and as it seems to you, such it is
for you..." According to this doctrine "...my truth is
private to me and your truth private to you."
15.
Jung,
Psychology and Religion, 477.
16.
Ibid., 477.
17.
Ibid., 479.
18.
That matter is unknowable is stated by Aristotle in
Metaphysics 1036a2:
"I mean the bronze or wooden circle, of these there
is no definition, but they are known by being thought or
sensed; and when the actuality of this knowledge ceases, it
is not clear whether they exist any longer or not, but they
are always spoken of and known by the universal formula. As
for matter, it is unknowable in itself." In a more poetic
manner Hoernle says "What a man knows is not a sun and an
earth but only an eye that sees the sun, and a hand that
feels the earth.
The world which surrounds him is there
only as an idea" (Idealism as a Philosophy, 162).
19.
Vlastos, "Learning
as
Recollection",
Collection of Critical Essays, 69.
20.
Ibid., 69.
21.
Flew, Introduction to Philosophy, 404.
Plato:
A
22.
Findlay,
Ascent
to
the
Absolute,
80.
The
intelligibility of the notion that knowledge is recalled
rather than learned is well illustrated by Findlay:
A man- might learn what it is for something to be so
and so, or for such and such to be the case, by being shown
something that illustrated the exact opposite
of the sense
.Davis:
Plato
106
we desired to impart, or by being shown something that
vaguely approximated to it or pictured it, or by being shown
something of which it was in some sense
a
natural
complement, or even by wild words and ritual gestures that
somehow 'got it across' (81).
23. See Bluck's detailed treatment of this topic in Mind,
1963, page 261. In the Sophist, Plato proves this point by
showing that language can say what is not.
24.
Jung,
Psychology and Religion, 517.
25.
Cornford, Principium Sapientia, 52.
26.
Gould, Platonic Love, 139.
27. See Guthrie, History of Greek Philosophy, Vol.
Also see the Theaetetus, 147a-c.
5, 69.
28.
Dobzhansky, Mankind Evolving, 214-18.
29.
Guthrie, History of Greek Philosophy, Vol. 4, 427.
30.
Lodge, Plato's Theory of Ethics, 139.
31.
Hoernle, Idealism as a Philosophy, 52f.
32.
Woltersorff, On Universals, 265f.
33.
Vlastos, Plato:
A Collection Of Critical Essays, 81.
34.
Whether or not mathematical entities do occupy the
second section has been the subject of much dispute.
Ross
states that the lower section of the intelligible world
contains mathematical ideas, and the higher section contains
ethical ideas. (Ross, Plato's Theory of Ideas, 64). Gould
says that Plato thought of mathematical entities as a kind
of reality intermediate between
the
Forms
and
the
particulars because mathematical entities were the best
examples of the Forms.
Therefore,
Gould
concludes,
mathematicals do occupy the second section. (Platonic Love,
97).
Both Frazer and Guthrie maintain that Plato believed
the second section to contain
mathematical
entities.
(Frazer, The Growth of Plato's Ideal Theory, 72. Guthrie,
History of Greek Philosophy, Vol. 5~i 509). Even Aristotle
held such a view.
(Metaphysics, 987b 14-15). Cherniss,
however, claims that Plato does not posit an "intermediate
class"
of
mathematicals.
(Guthrie, History of Greek
Philosophy, Vol. 4, 343.) In my opinion it
is not clear
t
Davis:
Plato
107
from the dialogues whether or not Plato believed that
mathematical entities occupied the second section of the
intelligible world, but I conclude that in view of the fact
that mathematicals can be considered
to
be
perfect
particulars, Plato did posit mathematical entities between
the Forms and the particulars. Certainly mathematicals are
of primary importance to Plato since, as in the Meno, they
exemplify his theory of Forms. This is the case in the
Republic 510d and
in the Phaedrus 75a-d. Here the
thesis that the sensible objects point the way to the
realities beyond them is extended from the mathematicals to
the moral and aesthetic Forms.
35.
Guthrie states that the word A©*a
is
variously
translated as opinion, belief, and judgement. (History of
Greek Philosophy, Vol. 4, 262.)
36. See the
79e-80b.
Euthyphro
lib,
the
Laches
194b,
37.
Guthrie
points out that true opinion
"unwitting apprehension" of the Forms.
(History
Philosophy, Vol. 5, 491.)
the
Meno
might be
of Greek
38.
Seligman points out in Being and Not-Being: "We need
to remember here the basic position that some Forms blend,
while some do not, i.e. are incompatible..." (95). The
"weaving together" of Forms which ought not to be joined can
produce either 'what is false' or 'what is not'.(14).
39.
Rist, Parmenides and Plato's Parmenides, 221-9.
40.
Cornford, Plato and Parmenides, 100.
41.
Guthrie, History of Greek Philosophy, Vol. 5, 51.
42.
Ibid., 51.
43.
Hackforth, Plato's Phaedo, 9.
44.
Ross, Plato's Theory of Ideas, 15.
45.
See
Aristotles'
Metaphysics
101b
32,
Posterior Analytics, 100al7-bl. Also Guthrie, History of
Greek Philosophy,~Vol. 5, 414 and 117.
46.
See also the Phaedo 78d-79b.
navis:
Plato
108
47.
Gulley, Plato's Theory of Knowledge, 74.
48.
Guthrie, History of Greek Philosophy, Vol. 4, 119.
49.
Runciman, Plato's Parmenides, 158.
50.
Guthrie, History of Greek Philosophy, Vol. 4, 355.
51.
Findlay, Ascent to the Absolute, 255.
52.
Guthrie, History of Greek Philosophy, Vol. 5, 188.
53.
Ross, Plato's Theory of Ideas, 233.
54. Seligman states: "The sensible world was after all the
place where Socratic morality was to be put in practice..."
(Being and Not-Being, 6, n.3j.
55.
Ross, Plato's Theory of Ideas, 231. Ross writes: He
Plato may have had an inkling of the fact that the
relation
is
completely unique and indefinable.
Both
'sharing' and 'imitating' are metaphors for it, and the use
of two complementary metaphors is better than the sole use
of either.
56.
Cherniss, Aristotle's
Academy, 241.
57.
330.
Crombie, An
Criticism
of
Plato
and
the
Examination of Plato's Doctrine, Vol. 2,
58. Lodge, Plato's Theory of Ethics, 127. On the extent of
the world of Forms see Guthrie, History of Greek Philosophy,
Vol. 4, 359, 548-51; Vol. 5, 22.
See also "loss! Plato's
Theory of Ideas, Ch. 2.
59.
Ross, Plato's Theory of Ideas, 24.
60.
Frazer, The Growth of Plato's Ideal Theory, 39f.
61.
Guthrie, History of Greek Philosophy, Vol. 4, 549.
62.
63.
See
Guthrie, History of Greek Philosophy, Vol.4, 549.
Ross, Plato's Theory of Ideas, 169.
64. With this conclusion Guthrie agrees.
Greek Philosophy, Vol. 5, 99.
See
History
of
. Davis:
Plato
109
65.
See Cornford, Plato's Theory of Knowledge,
293.
Guthrie, History of Greek Philosophy, Vol.5, 153.
Findlay,
Written and Unwritten Doctrines, 268".
66.
See the Sophist 257-259b.
Seligman in Being and
Not-Being states: Nor is the not x a species of anything.
It is not a form with a nature of its own, but an umbrella
under which we collect an indefinite number of kindred forms
in virtue of a meta-formal character which they all possess,
viz, participation in difference in relation to x. (83).
67.
Seligman, Being and Not-Being, 81.
68. See Guthrie's treatment of this
Greek Philosophy, Vol. 5, 99.
69.
70.
topic
in
History
of
Frazer, The Growth of Plato's Ideal Theory, 50.
Guthrie,
The History of Greek Philosophy, Vol.5, 100.
71. Gould, Platonic Love, 121f.
Cherniss states that
"...the phenomenal world is...negative evil...in the sense
that it is the contrary of good."
(The Sources of Evil
According to Plato, Plato: A Collection of Critical Essays).
72.
73.
74.
Lodge, Plato's Theory of Ethics, 440.
Guthrie,
History of Greek Philosophy, Vol.4, 95, 327.
Hamilton and Cairns, Dialogues of Plato, XX.
75. Guthrie describes Plato's meaning of the word nous as
that
part of soul
which gives an "...intuitive and
immediate grasp of reality, a direct contact between mind
and truth." History of Greek Philosophy, Vol.4, 253.
76.
In explaining Plato's tripartite soul, Guthrie states
that since we cannot attribute both the desire and the
restraint to the same psychological source, there must be at
least two elements in the soul. The first, appetite, is
controlled by reason. But reason by itself is not always
strong enough to resist appetites. If we yield to them we
feel anger or remorse. This suggests a "...third element,
the spirited or passionate..." which normally helps reason
or nous but is not identical with it."
History of Greek
Philosophy, Vol. 4, 474.
77.
See also the
Republic (532a).
Meno
(81c), the Symposium (211a), the
„ Davis:
Plato
110
78.
For a complete treatment of Plato's concepts of
self-mastery see the Laws 734b, the Gorgias 491d, the
Republic 430e, the Phaedrus 237d-c, the LacEes 191d-3, the
Republic 473d-e.
79.
Wheelwright, Heraclitus, 36.
80. *Book x' of the Republic (617-618) illustrates this.
Lots are thrown out to waiting souls by Lachesis, one of the
daughters of Necessity. All lots are mixed up: some are
high birth, some are low birth, some beggars, some tyrants,
some animals, some man, all
mixed up with wealth and
poverty, sickness and health.
Whatever lot each soul
chooses, that is its destiny for life. Once the lot has
been chosen, the individual soul is taken to Clotho, a
second daughter of Necessity who ratifies its destiny. Then
the soul is led to Atropis, a third daughter to make the
destiny irreversible. After that it is passed beneath the
throne of Necessity to be born.
81.
Guthrie, History of Greek Philosophy, Vol.5, 273.
82.
See also the Phaedo, 81d-82b.
83.
Guthrie claims that Plato borrows his doctrine of
immortality and reincarnation from Pythagoreanism, but that
he transformed their religious dogmas to support his own
philosophy (History of Greek Philosophy, Vol.4, 249).
84.
Hackforth, Plato's Phaedo, 162, 165.
85.
Guthrie, History of Greek Philosophy, Vol. 4, 360.
86.
Ross, Plato's Theory of Ideas, 40.
87.
Stenzel, Plato's Method of Dialectic, 39F.
88.
Lodge, Plato's Theory of Ethics, 80.
89.
See also the Philebus, 58d.
90. This point is also mentioned in the Lysis (216d), the
Protagarus (460d), the Timaeus (87c) and the Meno (77b).
91.
Mueller, Philosophy of Dialectic, 131f.
92.
Lodge, Plato's Theory of Ethics, 414.
„ Davis:
93.
Plato
111
Buber, I and Thou, 26.
94.
See also Guthrie, History of Greek Philosophy, Vol.5,
146, Vol.4, 349.
95.
See also the Sophist 263e.
96.
James, Varieties of Religious Experience, 162.
97.
Findlay, Ascent to the Absolute, 253.
98. With the above conclusion Guthrie agrees (History of
Greek Philosophy, Vol. 4, 351). For the view that Forms are
not teleological see Vlastos, Plato I, 138, 141f.
99.
The idea that the unordered cosmos preceded God
suggests that God was created.
However, in the Timaeus
(52dff) Plato suggests that God, who has always existed,
had not yet asserted his influence.
"Things were all
together in such a way and condition as one may expect to
find whenever God is absent."
Space and becoming, Plato
says in the Timaeus, "...existed before the heavens came
into being..." and "...the contents of space were tossed
hither and thither or at random in irregular and unbalanced
movement without reason or measure" until touched by the
hand of God.
In other words, Plato is stating that chaos
existed before God put it all in order.
For Plato the
cosmos as a whole was made in the likeness of the supreme
generic Form. Guthrie cites Less, who states that Plato
must mean a complete system of Forms containing within
itself all the subordinate Forms whose likeness we can trace
in the world of becoming (Guthrie, History of
Greek
Philosophy, Vol.5, 258). Many commentators have suggested
that the Forms are thoughts in the mind of God.
This
notion, claims Guthrie, cannot be substantiated. In every
dialogue in which they appear, their existence separate from
and independent of any mind conceiving them is a leading
feature.
(Guthrie, History of Greek Philosophy, Vol. 5,
262)
~~
100.
There is a very interesting parallel between a
statement made in the Statesman and a theory by Dr. Fred L.
Whipple. In the Statesman Plato says that when the cosmos
has moved for aeons in one direction under the hand of God,
he withdraws his control and it reverses its movement.
All
sorts of evils spring up and threaten to destroy it until
God, to prevent this, takes control once more (269cff).
Fred L. Whipple of Harvard described in his "Dust Cloud
Theory Hypothesis" how tiny dust particles are
blown
„ Davis:
Plato
112
together by the delicate pressure of starlight. As the
particles cohere an aggregate is formed, then a cloudlet and
then a cloud. When the cloud attains gigantic proportions,
its mass and density will be sufficient to set a new
sequence of physical processes into operation. Gravity will
cause the cloud to contract and its contraction will cause
its internal pressure and temperature to rise. Eventually,
in the last states of its collapse, it will begin to radiate
as a star. Theory holds that our solar system might have
evolved from such a process. Assuming the possibility of
such events as these, one might arrive ultimately at the
concept of a self-perpetuating universe renewing its cycles
of formation and dissolution, expansion and contraction,
life and death, light and darkness, order and disorder
through never-ending eons of time (Barnett, The Universe and
Dr. Einstein, 104.
101. The credibility of Plato's idea of world-soul should
also be mentioned in the light of modern physics. In the
Laws (896a), Plato states that soul is the source and
principle of motion. The definition for Plato of soul was
the vital principle of things.
(See page 54 above).
Compare this with Einstein's unified field theory in which
he states that all motion in the cosmos is simply change in
the structure of the primordial field of matter and energy,
which are in fact the same thing, for matter is simply
concentrated
energy.
(Barnett, The Universe and Dr.
Einstein, 14, 65.). Compare this
also
with
Jung's
suggestion that God is an eternally flowing current of vital
energy (Psychology and Religion, 361).
102.
One question which must be asked is how does Plato
relate God to the Good? Frazer maintains that the question
cannot be answered because the Platonic writings do not
supply material for judging the problem since Plato never
attempted to explain the personality of God. (The Growth of
Plato's Ideal Theory, 79). Ross claims that Plato believed
the Good and God to be not the same (Plato's Theory of
Ideas, 43). on philological grounds the two terms are
apparently different, but on philosophical grounds the terms
may be equated. (Plato's Theory of Ethics, 497). Guthrie
cites Wilamowitz, Hager, de Vogel and Archer-Hind as all
maintaining that the Good and God are the same. (History of
Greek Philosophy
, Vol.5, 559). Guthrie himself ,
howe ver, claims that tKere is no hint anywhere that the
Forms of the Good can be equated to God.
(Vol.5, 260).
From the above conflicting statements we must conclude that
the basic problem for Plato's commentators is his ow n
ambiguity on his theory of God. Recognizing the difficulty
0
Davis:
Plato
113
in the Timaeus (29a) he states ..."that the maker and Father
of the universe is hard to discover and even when we do is
impossible to explain to all men." He goes on to state that
he is positing a probable account of the nature of the
cosmos, not an account which he intends one to take with
dogmatic seriousness (72d).
103.
See also the Timaeus 29c, 30b, 49b, 53d. I should
point out that contemporary scientific theories of the
creation of the universe are almost as speculative as
Plato's and the proponents of these theories would be the
first to say that explanations of cosmic beginnings ought
not to be taken as dogmatic fact:
"And upon examination such concepts as gravitation,
electromagnetism, energy, current, momentum, the atom, the
neutron, all turn out to be theoretical substructures,
inventions, metaphors which man's intellect has contrived to
help
him picture the true, the objective reality he
apprehends beneath the surface of things" (Barnett,
The
Universe and Dr. Einstein, 115).
104.
Barnett, The Universe and Dr.
Einstein, 22.
105.
See also the Theaetetus 176b, the Phaedrus 253a, the
Timaeus 90c, the Phaedo 82b-c. Barnett expresses a similar
idea:
Man's inescapable impasse is that he himself is part
of the world he seeks to explore; his body and proud brain
are mosaics of the same elemental particles that compose the
dark, drifting clouds of interstellar space. (The universe
and Dr. Einstein, 117).
106. That virtue and right conduct can be legislated is
like saying that they can be taught.
The message of
Socrates' discussion with both Protagarus and with Meno is
that, although virtue can not be taught, right opinion can
(381-382). The Laws reflect virtue if they reflect right
opinion.
107.
Every law carried its appropriate penalty, ranging
from a reprimand to loss of civil rights to
death.
According to Plato, any measure is right that will heal the
diseased soul. Only if the criminal is judged incurable
must he be put to death. By our standards, however, Plato
is extremely free with the death penalty.
One is put to
death for murder, sedition (854b-c), open atheism(909a),
temple robbery (854e) persistent perjury (937c), acceptance
of bribes (955d), perversions
of justice (938c), and
dissenting harmful notions (952c-d).
„ Davis:
Plato
114
108. Aristotle states (Metaphysics 1078b):
It is also
evident what the underlying matter is in virtue of which the
Forms are predicated of the sensible things, and the One is
predicated of the Forms; this is the Dyad, or the Great and
the Small.
109.
See also the Parmenides 128f, The Theaetetus 180c.
110.
Lodge, Plato's Theory of Ethics, 80.
111.
Findlay, Ascent to the Absolute, 256.
112.
Barnett, The Universe and Dr. Einstein, 109.
„ Davis:
Plato
115
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