Soviet Counterinsurgency in the Soviet Afghan War Revisited: Analyzing the Effective Aspects of the Counterinsurgency Effort A thesis presented by Andrei A. Doohovskoy to the Standing Committee on the A.M. in Regional Studies – Russia, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of the Arts in the subject of Regional Studies – Russia Eastern Europe, and Central Asia Harvard University Cambridge, Massachusetts September 2009 Soviet Counterinsurgency in the Soviet‐Afghan War Revisited: Analyzing the Effective Aspects of the Counterinsurgency Effort Abstract In October 2001, over 10 years after the withdrawal of Soviet troops from across the Friendship Bridge, American forces launched Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. As a result, there has been increased focus in the ensuing years both on Afghanistan and on counterinsurgency. As U.S. and coalition forces find themselves conducting counterinsurgencies in both Iraq and in Afghanistan, historical examples of similar operations have renewed relevance for current policy. While it is problematic to attempt to draw parallels between Soviet and U.S. experiences in Afghanistan, the Soviet experience is useful for understanding general themes that recur for large powers facing insurgencies. Many analyses have focused on the flaws of Soviet counterinsurgency strategy and the ultimate failures of Kremlin policies in Afghanistan. Soviet political and military leaders made many mistakes in formulating and implementing counterinsurgency strategy, and these mistakes had significant and damaging effects both on Afghanistan and on the USSR. Focusing solely on Soviet failures, however, does not yield a complete or accurate understanding of the conflict. Dwelling on severe and ineffective Soviet military efforts, can lead to overlooking the military, political, social and economic initiatives that were well‐
formulated and indicated understanding of counterinsurgency principles on the part of Soviet leaders. This thesis evaluates the effective aspects of Soviet counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan in the context of classical and modern counterinsurgency theory. This work does not seek to rewrite the failures of the Soviet government and military in Afghanistan, but merely to point out the effective elements in their efforts. Understanding elements of the Soviet strategy that held promise, even if they were not fully or successfully implemented, provides a more nuanced understanding of the challenges and questions counterinsurgency presents for large powers. Many of these same challenges and questions are facing the United States today. 2 Acknowledgements I would like to thank Lisbeth Tarlow and Donna Griesenbeck for their patience and accommodation. I am very grateful to Mark Kramer, who promptly responded to my every question and request for guidance. I am thankful to him for helping me conceptualize my project, assisting me with sources and remaining consistently positive about my work. I greatly appreciate the mentorship and kindness of Colonel Gilberto Villahermosa and his wife Natalie – their example was very instructive for me. I would also like to express my thanks to Major Robert Schaefer, who convinced me to choose Harvard in the first place, and whose expert advice inspired me to study counterinsurgency. I am thankful for the energy, helpfulness and leadership of Lieutenant Colonel Leo McGonagle, who supported me as a cadet and as a graduate student. I am also thankful to Lieutenant Colonel Timothy Hall, whose flexibility, guidance and appreciation for my studies helped me tremendously in balancing military training and academics. I also deeply appreciate the help of Mary DiMatteo, whose perspective and understanding was a source of motivation for me. I would also like to acknowledge the support and friendship of my siblings: Katya, Alexei, Laryssa and Dimitry. Most of all, I am deeply indebted to my parents, Alexander and Helena, who never wavered in their support, encouragement and sacrifice. 3 TABLE OF CONTENTS Acknowledgements .................................................................................................... 3 Introduction ............................................................................................................... 5 Chapter 1. Counterinsurgency Theory ......................................................................... 9 Enemy‐Centric Counterinsurgency .................................................................................... 12 Population‐Centric Counterinsurgency ............................................................................. 14 Soviet‐Afghan War and Counterinsurgency ....................................................................... 22 Chapter 2. Overview ................................................................................................. 25 Soviet‐Afghan War ........................................................................................................... 25 Soviet Counterinsurgency................................................................................................. 30 Chapter 3. Soviet Counterinsurgency: Non‐Military Aspects ...................................... 35 Political Initiatives............................................................................................................ 35 Social Initiatives ............................................................................................................... 39 Propaganda Initiatives ..................................................................................................... 42 Propaganda Within Afghanistan ........................................................................................... 44 Propaganda Directed at the International Community and Soviet Population .................... 49 Economic Initiatives ......................................................................................................... 55 Chapter 4. Soviet Counterinsurgency: Military Aspects ............................................. 62 Decentralization .............................................................................................................. 62 Zones of Responsibility .......................................................................................................... 62 Role of Junior Officers ............................................................................................................ 66 Limiting Outside Support for the Insurgency ..................................................................... 69 Monitoring the Population ............................................................................................... 74 Units and Training ............................................................................................................ 78 Intelligence ...................................................................................................................... 86 Tactical Adjustments ........................................................................................................ 91 Bronnegruppa Concept ......................................................................................................... 92 Enveloping Movements ......................................................................................................... 94 Ambushes .............................................................................................................................. 96 Convoy Security Techniques .................................................................................................. 98 Equipment ........................................................................................................................... 101 Conclusion ............................................................................................................. 106 Appendix I. Statistics of Soviet‐Afghanistan Credit/Aid Agreements ....................... 109 Graphic 1. Non‐Military Aid Levels in Soviet‐Afghan Formal Agreements ......................... 109 Graphic 2. Soviet Economic Aid Disbursements to Afghanistan ........................................ 110 Graphic 3. Soviet Economic Aid and Expenditures in Afghanistan .................................... 111 Graphic 4. Soviet‐Afghan Agreements on Energy, Oil, Natural Gas ................................... 112 Graphic 5. Soviet‐Afghanistan Agreements on Agriculture, Construction ......................... 113 Appendix II. Map of Afghanistan ........................................................................... 114 Bibliography ........................................................................................................... 115 4 Introduction Current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have directed considerable focus to the questions of insurgencies and counterinsurgencies. Understanding the historical examples of insurgency conflicts and the regions in which they have occurred is of vital importance for those who wish to understand present‐day events. The Soviet‐Afghan war is one such historical example. Attempts at drawing direct parallels between the Soviet and U.S. experiences in Afghanistan are problematic, as there are many substantial differences between the two cases. Nevertheless, understanding the Soviet case is useful for identifying basic themes that are common in the experience of large powers conducting counterinsurgency campaigns. The Soviet‐Afghan war also represents an important step in the evolution of insurgency warfare in the context of globalization and accelerating technological progress. Many current phenomena such as transnational extremist networks and information warfare were in a unique stage of development during the Soviet‐Afghan war. A nuanced understanding of this conflict, therefore, is helpful for comprehending current insurgencies and counterinsurgencies. In February of 2009 I found myself at the corner table of a popular Cambridge pub, translating for a group of Russian and American generals. In the midst of facilitating conversation during their cocktail hour, the conversation turned to the Soviet‐Afghan War. One of the senior Russian Generals at the table, a veteran of the conflict, said to me, ‘let me tell you the thing about Afghanistan, the Afghans – mostly they loved us – we were able to do whatever we wanted every day, we owned the place, but at night, everything would change… the night was all theirs’. Regardless of the bias or oversimplification of this statement, it does represent a valuable metaphor for the Soviet‐Afghan conflict of the 1980s. The Soviet efforts in Afghanistan generally followed the paradigm of ‘three steps forward and three steps back’. On the one hand Soviet forces were able to dominate in the 5 field, but on the other hand they could never achieve the level of organizational coordination necessary to sustain their gains. Tactical accomplishments were routinely reversed whenever and wherever Soviet forces were absent. The reversals and ultimate failures of Soviet policies in Afghanistan are well documented. The Soviet‐Afghan war is often described as a victory for the mujahedeen1 over the larger, but ineffective, Soviet army. There is much attention given to the ingenuity and resilience of the Afghan mujahedeen and the Soviets’ inability to defeat them. Many analyses of this conflict have dwelled on the mistakes made by Soviet leaders and the inability of Soviet forces to defeat the Afghan insurgency. The strategy and conduct of the Soviet counterinsurgency in Afghanistan from 1979‐1989 certainly lend themselves to negative critiques. Over the course of the conflict, the Soviet armed forces killed or maimed some 2.5 million civilians, were the cause of millions more displaced persons and refugees and lost a reported 14,453 killed, 53,753 wounded, and millions of dollars worth of equipment.2 In 1989 when General Gromov evacuated the country with the last troops in a highly orchestrated show of propaganda, the situation was far from optimal from the Soviet point of view. Most key urban centers were under the control of Soviet supported government troops, while the rest of the country was subject to the influence of an insurgency that was supported by the majority of the population. The Kremlin had taken on a challenging mission by invading a Central Asian country known for its resistance to outside influence and centralized rule. Moreover, Soviet troop levels were limited by political considerations, and trained and equipped to do battle with NATO forces in the European theater and not with irregular fighters in a mountain 1 Mujahedeen is a term for the fighters that opposed the Soviet troops and Soviet‐backed government in Kabul. 2 Krivosheev, G. F. (1997). Soviet Casualties and Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century. London: Greenhill Books, 287‐288. The Russian Staff reports a higher number killed – 26,000. This statistic can be found in the 2 Krivosheev, G. F. (1997). Soviet Casualties and Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century. London: Greenhill Books, 287‐288. The Russian Staff reports a higher number killed – 26,000. This statistic can be found in the following source: Russian General Staff (translated and edited by Lester W. Grau and Michael A. Gress). (2002). The Soviet­Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 44. For additional statistics, see: Liakhovsky, A. (1995). Tragedia i Doblest' Afgana. Moscow: GPI Iskona, Appendix 14. 6 environment. Partly due to the ideological origins of the Red Army and to simple negligence, the Soviet military initially did not have an adequate counterinsurgency strategy. An enduring insurgency was not anticipated; it was presumed that Soviet forces would win a ‘quick war’ in similar fashion to the actions in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. While the Soviet ‘Limited Contingent’ was clearly not ready for the mission in Afghanistan, it is an oversimplification to fault the Soviet security forces for the overall failures of Kremlin policies in Afghanistan. It is undeniable that flaws in Soviet counterinsurgency strategy and deficiencies in Soviet military capabilities seriously hindered operations against the mujahedeen. However, from the earliest moments of the invasion of Afghanistan, Soviet military leaders began to transform the 40th Army into a more effective force for counterinsurgency missions in challenging terrain, and political leaders worked to strengthen the Kabul government through political programs. Partially due to the complex nature of counterinsurgency operations, the lack of success of Soviet policies in Afghanistan is sometimes attributed to utter incompetence on the part of both military and political leaders. Counterinsurgency requires a delicate balance of both political and military efforts. While the military aspect of counterinsurgency operations is crucial, complementary political progress is necessary for success. Highly developed cooperation between military, intelligence and political actors is essential for lasting gains. This coordination was lacking in the Soviet effort, and disconnects between military and political actions led to efforts that did not result in the synergy necessary for counteracting persistent insurgency movements. Nevertheless, many aspects of the Soviet political and military campaign held promise. My research and analysis show that, although the Soviets were at times quite severe in their actions, they did not rely solely on military might and conventional power to achieve their goals; they attempted to develop effective military and political counterinsurgency initiatives. This paper will identify and analyze those aspects of the Soviet counterinsurgency that were effective, and put them in the context of 7 counterinsurgency theory, noting where Soviet policies were consistent with accepted counterinsurgency approaches. These aspects of the Soviet effort are often overlooked. This paper has three major parts organized into four chapters. First, is a discussion of counterinsurgency theories, and placement of the Soviet experience in Afghanistan into that context. Second, is an overview of the Afghan insurgency and Soviet involvement in the region in the late 1970s and 1980s. And third, is an examination of the Soviet counterinsurgency strategy. I divide the counterinsurgency effort into two broad categories: non‐military and military. The non‐military category includes analysis of Soviet initiatives in politics, social programs, programs for propaganda, and economic assistance. The military category includes analysis of Soviet strategy, tactics, and force structure. I pay particular attention to the aspects of the Soviet campaign that adhered to accepted principles of counterinsurgency as outlined by theorists and practitioners, and indicated effective efforts on the part of Soviet leaders. My analysis of this topic will rely on the literature of counterinsurgency theory, declassified U.S. and Soviet documents, and personal accounts of Soviet‐Afghan war veterans. Examination of what the Soviets did effectively in Afghanistan is an area that has received little attention in literature on the Soviet‐Afghan war. Understanding the effective elements in the Soviet counterinsurgency effort provides a balanced view of the conflict and a more nuanced perspective on counterinsurgency in general. In a time when counterinsurgency is a highly relevant and politically charged topic, it is vital to have an accurate analysis of the Soviet counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. 8 Chapter 1. Counterinsurgency Theory “Political power is the central issue in insurgencies and counterinsurgencies; each side aims to get the people to accept its governance as legitimate. Insurgents use all available tools… to overthrow the existing authority…. Counterinsurgents, in turn, use all instruments of national power to sustain the established or emerging government” – U.S Army and Marine Counterinsurgency Manual.3 The dynamic nature of insurgencies and counterinsurgencies is highly complex, as every expert is quick to note. Moreover, this inherent complexity and the accelerated pace of events and modern communications make it very difficult to propose viable generalizations or establish any hard and fast rules in counterinsurgency. In the recently published US Army and Marine Counterinsurgency Field Manual, an entire section is devoted to the paradoxes of counterinsurgency, impressing the reader with the elusiveness of an effective strategy in this form of irregular warfare.4 Given the resurgent interest in the subject, it is important to remember that the popularity of counterinsurgency scholarship has waxed and waned as a result of many political and institutional factors. Surprisingly little was written on the topic after the 1960s; there were even movements that limited its study within the United States military. In the United States some posit that squelching the study of counterinsurgency was part of a reflexive reaction to the war in Vietnam – a way of avoiding entanglement in similar conflicts in the future. 5 The notion that the study of counterinsurgency begets misadventures in counterinsurgency warfare recurs in the United States and abroad, and is a subtle, though important, factor in militaries’ formulation and implementation of counterinsurgency strategy both in western countries and in Russia. 3 Nagl, J., Petraeus, D., & Amos, J. (2007). The U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1‐3. 4 Nagl, J., Petraeus, D., & Amos, J. (2007). The U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1‐148‐1‐157. 5 Eliot, C., Crane, L. C., Horvath, L. J., & Nagl, L. J. (2006, March‐April). Principles, Imperatives, and Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency. Military Review , 49‐53. Also see: Cassidy, R. M. (2006). Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror. London: Praeger Security International, 99. 9 Independent of institutional and scholarly interest in the subject, however, governments continue to find themselves embroiled in irregular wars6 and in need of methods for conducting counterinsurgency warfare. In the case of the United States and the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, the need for counterinsurgency expertise was not sufficiently anticipated. Large militaries primarily trained for conventional war are often obliged to learn (and relearn) the complex craft of counterinsurgency ‘on the job’. The study of counterinsurgency has become especially relevant in the current day. Not only do the conflicts facing the United States and NATO necessitate renewed focus on the topic, but unprecedented developments in technology and dynamic changes in world ideologies change the very nature of the subject itself. As I will discuss below in greater detail, the principles discussed by authorities such as Callwell, Lawrence, Thompson, Trinquier and Galula do not fully address the realities of today or those of tomorrow. As is often repeated in relation to counterinsurgency, ‘If it works today, it is obsolete’.7 The insurgency and counterinsurgency in the 1980s in Afghanistan represent an important step in this progression toward modern realities. Many phenomena that distinguish modern insurgencies from their antecedents began to reveal themselves in the mountains and deserts where the mujahedeen fought against the Soviet 40th army.8 In this section I will outline the main elements of insurgency and counterinsurgency as put forth by historical authorities as well as by modern scholars and practitioners. I will address the main debates and developments in the field. With this basic foundation it will be possible to place Soviet efforts in Afghanistan into the broader context of insurgency and counterinsurgency, allowing a clearer and more fruitful analysis of the conflict. In reading about counterinsurgency, it is interesting to note that most authors on the subject have significant personal experience in irregular warfare dealing with insurgencies and counterinsurgencies. John Nagl writes that “The best writings on counterinsurgency 6 ‘Irregular warfare’ is one of the many terms used to describe non‐conventional war i.e. war that does not comprise two regular armies seeking to defeat one another, but rather a larger regular army pitted against a smaller, less‐organized guerilla‐like opponent. Other common terms are limited war, revolutionary war, fourth generation war, guerilla war, and small war. 7 This quotation is attributed to Bernard Fall. 8 The 40th Army refers collectively to the Soviet troops deployed to Afghanistan in the 1980s. 10 share with the best sex manuals the fact that their authors generally have some personal experience of their subject matter”.9 Divergence of opinion among authors with comparable experience in the field is a testament to the highly variable, and at times subjective, nature of conducting counterinsurgency campaigns. Two major schools of thought on counterinsurgency are: population­centric and enemy­
centric. The former stipulates that winning the support of the local population must be the first priority. Once the support of the population has been won through the provision of physical security and social and economic opportunities, the insurgent forces will cease to be relevant; at this point, one can easily eradicate whatever part of the insurgency that has not already withered away. Experts of the mid‐20th century, such as David Galula and Roger Trinquier, subscribe to this approach to varying degrees. The principles of population‐
centric strategy are currently widely accepted in the field. Enemy‐centric counterinsurgency theory maintains that engaging and destroying the enemy should be the main focus of effort, and that after this has been accomplished, other needed developments will proceed naturally. This approach has its roots in imperial and colonial wars, such as those carried out by Russia, Britain and France in the 18th, 19th and early 20th centuries. The character of enemy‐centric counterinsurgency generally tends to be closer to that of conventional war in that it emphasizes fighting more than winning ‘hearts and minds’. The principles of enemy‐centric counterinsurgency are far less popular today than those of population‐centric counterinsurgency due to their sometimes‐severe character, and due to powerful arguments for population‐centric strategies.10 In the context of many new developments in technologies, ideologies and the geopolitical landscape, a new ‘hybrid’ approach to counterinsurgency is also emerging. This approach, discussed by experts such as David Kilcullen, requires a highly adaptive posture in counterinsurgency that employs the principles of both enemy and population‐centric 9 See Nagl’s foreword to this edition of Galula’s book: Galula, D. Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. London: Praeger Security International. 10 High profile officers such as General David Petraeus, Lieutenant Colonel John Nagl and others subscribe to the population‐centric approach. This approach has largely been accepted in the U.S. government – at least in its rhetoric. 11 strategies depending on the situation. This pragmatic counterinsurgency approach further emphasizes the need for military institutions to cultivate an ethos of learning and adaptability.11 Enemy­Centric Counterinsurgency Colonel C.E. Callwell’s treatise, Small Wars, is a classic enemy‐centric counterinsurgency manual, and is still relevant to those with preference for this school of counterinsurgency theory. While current scholars tend not to accept Callwell’s ideas wholesale, those who favor the enemy‐centric approach support many of the principles he sets forth.12 Callwell formulated his ideas in an era when large powers projected their power around the globe with a heavy hand. Small Wars, first published in 1896, was his most famous work, and is one of the most substantial treatises that espouse an enemy‐centric approach to counterinsurgency. An officer in the British Army with experience combating insurgents in Afghanistan and elsewhere, Callwell does not express the sensitivity for the population so carefully detailed in other manuals for counterinsurgency. Changes in press coverage and geopolitics explain some of these differences; nevertheless, many principles that he sets forth were still supported after his death in 1928 and in the current day. Callwell phrases the essence of counterinsurgency as such: “The enemy must not only be beaten. He must be beaten thoroughly”.13 This remains the core of the enemy‐centric approach to counterinsurgency. Callwell states that the small war differs from the conventional one in that “The mere expulsion of the opponent from ground where he has thought fit to accept battle is of small account; what is wanted is a big casualty list in the 11 Most theorists and practitioners would agree that the adaptability of the military in counterinsurgency entails including civilian institutions and actors in the effort. Even the harshest enemy‐centric approach includes wise and concerted political policies that are necessary for overcoming an insurgency. 12 This is evident in the following article: LTC Gentile, G. P. (2007, September). Eating Soup With A Spoon. Retrieved July 2, 2009, from Armed Forces Journal: http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2007/09/2786780 13 Callwell, C. C. (1990). Small Wars: A Tactical Textbook for Imperial Soldiers. London: Greenhill Books, 151. 12 hostile ranks”.14 Callwell is primarily concerned with finding ways to engage the enemy in battle and not with securing the population’s compliance. Generally, adherents to the enemy centric approach maintain that the larger power plays to its advantage by seeking out battle with the insurgent so that it can utilize its superiority in firepower, troop numbers and discipline. Callwell asserts that decisiveness and violence of action by the counterinsurgent will win the support of those who are wavering and looking to align themselves with the strongest side. Callwell details the methods of bringing the fight to the enemy, laying out a framework for dividing the territory so that a relatively autonomous, local unit is responsible for a particular geographical area.15 Callwell also emphasizes the idea of encircling the enemy’s flank to prevent his retreat and maximize the casualties inflicted.16 When the enemy refuses to fight and continues to elude capture, Callwell prescribes the destruction of villages, crops and the appropriation of livestock and other goods: “If the enemy cannot be touched [on the battlefield]… he can be touched through his pocket”.17 These harsh measures are aimed at crushing resistance quickly and avoiding a prolonged conflict, which introduces problems for the counterinsurgent in terms of supply and care for troops in long deployment. Callwell’s approach embodies the main points of the enemy‐centric theory of counterinsurgency: finding, engaging and destroying the enemy. It is interesting to note that Callwell continuously includes cases from the Tsarist military’s actions in Central Asia to illustrate his points. He quotes the famous general Mikhail Skobelev to articulate the necessity of quick and powerful action against the insurgent, “Do not forget that in Asia he is 14 Callwell, C. C. (1990). Small Wars: A Tactical Textbook for Imperial Soldiers. London: Greenhill Books, 151. 15 This principle of dividing area is also used in the population‐centric approach, but the intent of the forces in each section is different. The emphasis on enveloping movements for fighting against guerrilla forces is echoed by later writers who promoted kinetic approaches to counterinsurgency; it was also a significant element in Soviet counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. 16 Callwell, C. C. (1990). Small Wars: A Tactical Textbook for Imperial Soldiers. London: Greenhill Books, 152. 17 Callwell, C. C. (1990). Small Wars: A Tactical Textbook for Imperial Soldiers. London: Greenhill Books, 40. Soviet forces in Afghanistan adopted this approach in the form of an air war on the countryside, designed to destroy the mujahedeens’ sanctuaries and sources of supplies. 13 … master who seizes the people pitilessly by the throat and imposes upon their imagination”.18 Callwell’s take on counterinsurgency is the starting point for many proponents of the enemy‐centric school of counterinsurgency. Large powers such as Britain and Russia that waged wars in Central Asia employed many enemy‐centric principles. The enemy‐centric approach is appealing to those of a more typically ‘military’ mind in the sense that it includes more kinetic action and actual fighting than the population‐centric school of counterinsurgency. Imperial armies did incorporate population‐centric principles as well. No counterinsurgency campaign can be categorized as strictly enemy or population‐centric. For example, in the 18th and 19th Centuries, Tsarist forces in the Caucasus and Central Asia pursued highly kinetic and enemy‐centric tactics aimed at decimating resistance to their rule, but also worked to co‐opt the local population, and create religious and economic structures that were acceptable to the populace and designed to preserve stability.19 Counterinsurgencies generally continue to incorporate varying approaches into their campaign. This can be observed both in the Soviet counterinsurgency in Afghanistan as well as in current US and NATO operations. Population­Centric Counterinsurgency The enemy‐centric model for counterinsurgency warfare focuses on decisive victories through the use of military power. The main thrust of the theory is to crush the insurgency as effectively as possible, usually through military means. It does not exclude the ideas of winning over the population, but the population is not the main priority. The population‐
centric model for counterinsurgency is more nuanced. According to this theory, the 18 Callwell, C. C. (1990). Small Wars: A Tactical Textbook for Imperial Soldiers. London: Greenhill Books, 72. 19 See: Crews, R. D. (2006). For Prophet and Tsar. Cambridge: Harvard University Press; Khalid, A. (2007). Islam after Communism: Religion and Politics in Central Asia. Berkeley: University of California Press. 14 participation and compliance of the population is the single most important element in defeating the insurgency. The population‐centric approach does not exclude the use of military force against the insurgent, but firmly asserts that this is only one piece of the strategy, and, if relied upon solely, will not produce lasting results. Population‐centric counterinsurgency theory was significantly developed in the French army, which acquired substantial experience with irregular warfare in French colonies in the 19th and 20th Centuries. Military officers returning from these theaters would share their experiences of foreign cultures with inquisitive ethnologists and other academics, often gaining insights from the scholars that they found useful for conducting counterinsurgency operations.20 Two French officers, Marshals Hubert Lyautey and Henri Gallieni compiled principles of irregular warfare in treatises based on their experiences fighting small wars in Africa and Asia. Gallieni and Lyautey were instrumental in establishing the Ecole Militaire Spécialisée dans l’outre‐Mer et l’etranger in 1906, a school devoted to integrating the study of foreign cultures into training for officers deploying to theaters of irregular war.21 Gallieni and Lyautey were important figures in the development of population‐centric counterinsurgency theory in the French Army. Both Gallieni and Lyautey maintained that excessive reliance on force could be counterproductive in counterinsurgency, as collateral damage and resulting harm to the army’s public image could undercut important working relationships with the indigenous population. The population‐centric approach stresses the need for officers to understand the surrounding culture and complete non‐military tasks aimed at winning the support of the people. The British officer T.E. Lawrence also held to this attitude, emphasizing that the officer working in the context of irregular warfare must learn the culture of the area. Lawrence notes that the only way to influence the indigenous 20 Bore, C. H. (2009, March‐April). Complex Operations in Africa: Operational Culture Training in the French Army. Military Review , 65‐71. 21 Bore, C. H. (2009, March‐April). Complex Operations in Africa: Operational Culture Training in the French Army. Military Review , 65‐71. 15 people is through “unremitting study of them”.22 For Lawrence, as well as for others who tended towards population‐centric counterinsurgency, the ability to comprehend the human terrain was paramount and understood as the basis for finding ways to convince the population to withdraw support from the insurgency. Population‐centric counterinsurgency orients focus away from the goal of destroying the enemy, establishing the officer’s first priority as the painstaking and careful process of developing mutually beneficial relationships with the local people. Lawrence comments on this process in his notes on working with Bedouin tribesmen: “hear all that passes, search out what is going on beneath the surface, read their characters, discover their tastes and their weaknesses…. Bury yourself in Arab circles, have no interests and no ideas except the work in hand, so that… you realize your part deeply enough to avoid the little slips that would counteract the painful work of weeks. Your success will be proportioned to the amount of mental effort you devote to it”.23 This intellectual vector in military thinking greatly influenced two prominent French officers and scholars of the mid 20th century, Roger Trinquier and David Galula, who both completed important works on counterinsurgency based on combat experience in Indochina and Algeria in the 1940s and 1950s.24 Whereas the enemy‐centric theory seeks to capitalize on the counterinsurgent’s fire superiority by finding ways to engage and destroy the insurgent, Galula and Trinquier argue that such a strategy is ineffective.25 They point out that the insurgent can generally choose the time and place of such an engagement, waiting for conditions that will give him the advantage.26 According to Galula and Trinquier, whose 22 Lawrence, T. (1917). The 27 Articles of T.E. Lawrence. Retrieved July 1, 2009, from http://www.d‐n‐
i.net/fcs/lawrence_27_articles.htm 23 Lawrence, T. (1917). The 27 Articles of T.E. Lawrence. Retrieved July 1, 2009, from http://www.d‐n‐
i.net/fcs/lawrence_27_articles.htm 24 See: Trinquier, R. (1961). Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency. London: Praeger Security International; Galula, D. Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. London: Praeger Security International. 25 The enemy‐centric approach is embodied in Callwells statement that it is “necessary… to force him [the insurgent] into decisive action”. Callwell, C. (1977). The Dangers of Guerilla Warfare‐1900. In W. Laqueur, The Guerilla Reader: A Historical Anthology. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 114. 26 Trinquier cites the battle of Dien Bien Phu to illustrate this point. He notes out that that French commanders, who had so persistently sought a conventional battle with the enemy, were defeated when the Viet Minh finally 16 theories are now referred to as ‘classical’ counterinsurgency theory, the counterinsurgent’s power should primarily be employed to protect the civilian population rather than chasing down the insurgent forces. The shift from offensive to defensive focus, according to Galula, plays to the counterinsurgent’s strengths. The counterinsurgent will likely fail in hunting down insurgent forces that are typically very mobile and familiar with the terrain. By focusing on protecting the population in a more static posture, the counterinsurgent’s relative immobility is not such a disadvantage and he can rely on superior firepower to repel attacks.27 More importantly, the primary objective in this model is not the annihilation of insurgent forces, but the support of the population: “the sine qua non of victory in modern warfare is the unconditional support of a population”.28 This being the stated goal, military actions are only important insofar as they help secure the support of the people. Winning civilian support is outlined as a political endeavor that must be started by the military and then continued by civilians.29 This endeavor requires that the counterinsurgent convince the people that his rule is 1) legitimate and 2) that it will provide a better life than the rule of the insurgent. The persuasion of the population requires traditional military action to provide security, but relies most on a comprehensive program of non‐military activities. Such activities include publicizing the counterinsurgent message, supporting political institutions and developing economic opportunities. As Galula famously repeated, “a revolutionary war is only 20 percent military action and 80 percent political”.30 It is thus important that military officers function effectively in non‐military roles; cooperation with civilian development workers is crucial. Galula posits that a counterinsurgency is “not an addition but a multiplication of… various programs; they are all essential and if one is nil, engaged them in battle after having amassed superior forces. Trinquier, R. (1961). Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency. London: Praeger Security International, 3. 27 See: Galula, D. Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. London: Praeger Security International, 58, 65. Also: Trinquier, R. (1961). Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency. London: Praeger Security International, 63. 28 Trinquier, R. (1961). Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency. London: Praeger Security International, 6. 29 Galula famously states that counterinsurgency is “20 percent military action and 80 percent political”. Galula, D. Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. London: Praeger Security International, 63. 30 Galula, D. (2006). Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. London: Praeger Security International, 63. 17 the product will be zero”.31 Classical population‐centric theory generally prescribes that the counterinsurgent start his operations in limited areas where he can concentrate his attention and where he considers success readily attainable. Once the counterinsurgent has achieved success in these areas he expands his sphere of influence incrementally. Lyautey coined the term ‘ink blot’ or ‘ink stain’ to describe this incremental expansion of influence.32 Galula, Trinquier and others advocate that the counterinsurgent systematically divide territory into zones, appointing administrative teams for each zone.33 The division of territory implicitly suggests the decentralized nature of counterinsurgency, where more junior leaders have more control over the course of events in any given area. The importance of the junior leader and local solutions to issues in counterinsurgency is echoed by David Kilcullen, who notes that programs should be specifically oriented to each area.34 Population‐centric counterinsurgency theory would suggest that operations in a given area proceed in the following general pattern: the counterinsurgent expels the main body of armed insurgents, establishes posts for maintaining security in the area, makes contact with and controls the population with the intent of isolating it from the insurgents, gathers intelligence from the population and uses it to target the insurgent organization, holds elections and tests new leaders, organizes local defense units, eradicates remaining insurgents with help of indigenous forces.35 Theorists such as Bernard Fall, Frank Kitson and Roger Trinquier emphasize other key aspects of vital importance such as: 31 Galula, D. Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. London: Praeger Security International, 61. 32 Hansen, J. (1966). The Case Against "Pacification". International Socialist Review , 27 (4), pp. 131‐136. (Accessed at this URL: http://www.marxists.org/archive/hansen/1966/xx/pacification.htm , on 10 July; this is part of the Joseph Hansen Internet Archive) 33 Trinquier, R. (2006). Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency. London: Praeger Security International, 73. Also: Galula, D. (2006). Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. London: Praeger Security International, 63. 34 Kilcullen, D. (2006). Twenty­Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company­level Counterinsurgency, 9. 35 Galula, D. Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. London: Praeger Security International, 55‐56. 18 establishing an apparatus for collecting and handling intelligence, proactively infiltrating and eliminating active sanctuaries for insurgents, disseminating information in support of the counterinsurgent’s cause and promoting political and economic progress.36 The population‐centric theory is complex and regularly requires the military to act in non‐military capacities. The diversity of tasks and the necessity to cooperate with so many entities make population‐centric counterinsurgency hard to execute successfully.37 In some ways the military mentality is more comfortable with the offensive nature of the enemy‐
centric approach. Some of the principles of enemy‐centric theory, however, are too harsh to be viable for many countries in the modern context. For this reason, the principles of population‐centric counterinsurgency theory are most widely accepted today. Current U.S. military counterinsurgency doctrine is largely based on the theories of Galula, though adapted somewhat for current operations. There is considerable debate about the efficacy of enemy‐centric counterinsurgent strategy versus that of the population‐centric approach, however. This is a longstanding debate that is almost inherent to discourse amongst military professionals and theorists and often rooted in deeply held beliefs about foreign policy and the role of the military. Some military officers and theorists claim that emphasizing population‐centric counterinsurgency is a denial of basic truths about the nature of warfare, negatively affects the capabilities of militaries that should remain ready for conventional battle, and ultimately leads to long entanglements in conflicts that do not serve greater security needs. Conclusions vary, ranging from support for more kinetic enemy‐centric counterinsurgency campaigns to avoidance of counterinsurgency altogether.38 36 The term ‘Active Sanctuary’ is Bernard Fall’s. Fall emphasizes the importance of eliminating such sanctuaries even if they are located within the borders of a nieghboring state. Fall, B. B. (1963). Street Without Joy: Insurgency in Indochina, 1946­63 (3rd Revised Edition). Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, USA: The Telegraph Press, 357. 37 Any irregular warfare at all is challenging for a regular army. Callwell notes that “Guerilla warfare is what the regular armies always have to dread”. Callwell, C. (1977). The Dangers of Guerilla Warfare‐1900. In W. Laqueur, The Guerilla Reader: A Historical Anthology. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 115. 38 See the following articles for examples of such perspectives: Gentile, G. P. (2007, September). Eating Soup with a Spoon. Retrieved July 2, 2009, from Armed Forces Journal: http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2007/09/2786780 ; Gentile, G. P. (2008, March‐April). Listen to the Airman. Military Review , 114‐115 ; Gian P. Gentile, "Our COIN Doctrine Removes the Enemy from the Essence of War," 2008, Armed Forces Journal, Army Times Publishing Co. , 3 June 2009 19 In response to prevailing support for population‐centric counterinsurgency, some military theorists, such as Gian P. Gentile and Ralph Peters, point out that many historical cases routinely used to show the merits of population‐centric counterinsurgency included many enemy‐centric qualities.39 It is also posited that successes in many cases, such as during the surge in Iraq, are not necessarily a result of protecting the population, but of other factors such as reconciliation with key tribes and successful operations against the enemy.40 Paul Dixon points out that the British counterinsurgency in Malaya – a case used to argue for population‐centric approaches ‐ included many coercive aspects. Dixon suggests that winning over ‘hearts and minds’ was not the driving force behind the success in Malaya, and that coercive measures fundamentally shaped the situation.41 It is argued that coercive measures are extremely necessary in counterinsurgency and that softer approaches are often touted for public consumption. As insurgencies, international politics and the political goals of nations and non‐state actors evolve and while debates continue, some form of counterinsurgency is unavoidable, at least in the near term. It is also clear that theories based on past counterinsurgency experience are not always effective in the context of current realities. Many of the insurgencies experienced by twentieth century counterinsurgency theorists and practitioners centered on the insurgents’ efforts at developing their forces sufficiently to obtain power through military action. Some theorists who work within the framework of generational warfare, however, claim that fourth generation warfare has introduced an evolved kind of insurgency. Military action is often only one tool in the hands of insurgents http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2008/01/3207722; Bacevich, A. (2009, February 2). Raising Jihad. Retrieved July 22, 2009, from National Interest Online: http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=20932; Etheridge, E. (2009, March 5). New York Times. Retrieved July 22, 2009, from Why Containment Beats Counterinsurgency: Times Is on Our Side: http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/03/05/why‐
containment‐beats‐counterinsurgency‐time‐is‐on‐our‐side/ 39 According to such writers, the campaigns in Algeria, Malaya and elsewhere were more brutal than corresponding counterinsurgency doctrine suggested. The main point being that doctrine may have dictated one approach, but commanders on the ground routinely resorted to enemy centric practices. This is discussed in the following article: Gentile, G. P. (2009, January). Think Again: Counterinsurgency. Retrieved July 8, 2009, from Foreign Policy: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=4631 40 Ralph Peters, "Dishonest Doctrine," December 2007, Armed Forces Journal, Army Times Publishing Co. , 18 June 2009 <http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2007/12/3144330>. 41 Dixon, P. (2009). 'Hearts and Minds'? British Counter‐insurgency from Malaya to Iraq. Journal of Strategic Studies , 32 (3), 353‐381. 20 for shaping the opinions of distant governments and peoples. The war of information is increasingly the determining factor in asymmetrical conflicts involving major powers. Victory for the insurgent in this situation is persuading the counterinsurgent’s nation that, “their strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly for the perceived benefit”.42 Despite the merits or demerits of the generational war paradigm, developments in world politics and technology affect insurgencies in significant ways. General David Petraeus acknowledges such developments and their impact on insurgencies, “If you look, as we did, at what [French military officer] David Galula faced in Algeria, you find, obviously, that he and his colleagues did not have to deal with a transnational extremist network enabled by access to the Internet”.43 Many theorists and practitioners maintain that the highly agile and technologically adept character of modern insurgencies calls for a hybrid and adaptive approach to counterinsurgency – one that is neither solely population‐ or enemy‐centric. Representative of this trend toward ‘whatever works’ is the attitude expressed by David Kilcullen, a retired military officer closely working with the United States military on questions of counterinsurgency. He claims that “my experience has been that both [enemy‐centric and population‐centric approaches] are applicable in varying degrees in most insurgencies…. The real art is to "read the battle" and understand how it is developing, fast enough to adapt. Neither the enemy‐centric nor the population‐centric approaches are always or universally appropriate…. the correct approach is situation‐
dependent”.44 While Kilcullen cannot be separated from the ongoing debate on counterinsurgency strategies, many of his views do indicate a shift in the discourse towards comprehensive solutions that involve elements from a wide range of approaches. There are certain aspects of counterinsurgency strategy that remain important regardless of what approach is favored. Using the many tools of the state and not only 42 COL Hammes, T. (2007, May‐June). Fourth Generation War Evolves, Fifth Emerges. Military Review, 14. Targetting the population of policy makers of an occupying nation is not new, however. It was was certainly the case in Vietnam and other insurgencies, though the importance of information campaigns is increasingly obvious now. See, COL Hammes, T. (2007, May‐June). Fourth Generation War Evolves, Fifth Emerges. Military Review , 15. 43 Glasser, S. (2008). Counterinsurgency Field Manual: Afghanistan Edition. Retrieved July 11, 2009, from Foreign Policy: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=4587&page=3 44 Kilcullen, D. (2007, January 27). Two Schools of Classical Counterinsurgency. Retrieved June 19, 2009, from Small Wars Journal: http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/01/two‐schools‐of‐classical‐count/ 21 military force is crucial. Integrating political, social and economic initiatives in a coordinated effort is important for addressing the many levels upon which insurgencies challenge the counterinsurgent’s power. Such aspects include: understanding the local culture and people, cultivation of networks for intelligence, control of the population, elimination of active sanctuaries, adopting local solutions through junior leaders, information campaigns to support the counterinsurgent effort, and development of governmental and economic structures. Soviet­Afghan War and Counterinsurgency The Soviet counterinsurgency and the Afghan insurgency of the 1980s occupy an interesting place in the development of insurgencies and counterinsurgencies. This conflict can be viewed as a pivotal step between the traditional insurgencies of the earlier twentieth century and the more modern insurgencies, which are sometimes categorized as fourth generation war. Both the mujahedeen insurgency and the Soviet counterinsurgency included elements of the older paradigm mixed with elements of emerging new forms. The Afghan insurgency was a movement of the people like many traditional insurgencies, but did have transnational elements, being significantly affected and supported by outside funding and the influx of Muslim fighters from around the world.45 While most operations were conducted by Afghan tribesmen who were fighting the Soviet invader, the insurgency was affected by a globally oriented Islamic ideology that transcended the particular fight for Afghanistan. While most of the fighting was carried out by small mujahedeen units and military superiority was not the determining factor in the struggle between insurgent and counterinsurgent, some insurgent organizations fielded 45 David Kilcullen discusses of ‘traditional’ vs. ‘modern’ insurgences, noting that traditional insurgencies generally aim at controlling a fairly defined nation or territory, while ‘modern’ Islamic insurgencies often seek to control a vastly larger area that is global in proportion. See: Kilcullen, D. (2009). The Accidental Guerilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One. New York, USA: Oxford University Press, Inc, 13. 22 sizable military formations and functioned in ways similar to conventional military units.46 Although the press and the freedom of speech was significantly limited in Soviet Russia, persistence on the part of the insurgents did affect the will of Soviet policy makers and the populace through various means.47 Even though the internet was not a factor and insurgent forces were not able to broadcast victories or messages to the world instantaneously, propaganda campaigns were conducted throughout the world with the purpose of attracting funds, volunteers, and broadcasting the insurgent ideology against the Soviets. Soviet counterinsurgency – as a reaction to the insurgency that contested the government supported by the Kremlin – was also a synthesis of varying approaches. On the one hand, Soviet forces adopted many enemy‐centric principles into their strategy: they sought to engage and kill as many insurgents as possible and went to great lengths to bring the fight to their enemies. Often unable to apprehend elusive insurgent forces, Soviet forces routinely decimated crops, livestock, and villages in an effort to weaken insurgent supply sources and sanctuaries.48 On the other hand, Soviet strategy did include non‐coercive principles aimed at persuading the population to support their cause. Significant funds were invested in Afghan infrastructure and education in an effort to build institutions and human capital. Soviet politicians worked to influence the Kabul government to support reforms aimed at improving conditions in Afghan society. Soviet leaders supported substantial propaganda initiatives for promoting and publicizing the message and interests of the Kabul government. It is interesting to note that earlier Soviet counterinsurgency experience in Central Asia against the Basmachi movement was characterized by a similar synthesis of 46 Russian General Staff. (2002). The Soviet­Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 58. 47 The effect of the Soviet population on policymakers is evident in a Politburo meeting, in which Gorbachev read letters from Soviet citizens decrying the Soviet war in Afghanistan: Anatoly Chernyaev's Notes from the Politburo CC CPSU Session of October 17, 1985. (2001, October 9). Retrieved from The September 11th Source Books, Volume II: Afghanistan, Lessons from the Last War (The National Security Archive, Edited by Svetlana Savranskaya): http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB57/r17.pdf 48 Callwell specifically advocates the practice of destroying crops as a means of weakening an insurgency: Callwell, C. C. (1990). Small Wars: A Tactical Textbook for Imperial Soldiers. London: Greenhill Books, 40. 23 ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ approaches.49 The nature of the Afghan insurgency as an indigenous and international movement with mixed ideologies and motivations was extremely hard to counteract. The hybrid form of the mujahedeen movement highlighted the need for a comprehensive, adaptive and tailored approach to counterinsurgency. The challenge that the Afghan resistance posed to the Soviet Union vividly underscored the requirement that the counterinsurgent use political, economic and military measures in good proportion in order to achieve success. In the following chapters I will show in greater detail where the Soviet strategy coincided with many of the accepted theories outlined in this chapter, and to what extent Soviet leaders used the necessary tools of counterinsurgency in the Afghan conflict. As I will show, many aspects of the Soviet strategy corresponded to the general advice outlined by experts in counterinsurgency. However, lack of coordination between the various players in the Soviet effort, disjointed execution, and differing visions of the conflict, the mission and the strategy led to ineffectiveness despite the promise of many Soviet initiatives. To set the stage for further analysis, the next chapter provides a brief overview of the Soviet–Afghan war and the Soviet response to the Afghan insurgency. 49 Oliker, O. (2008, February). Soft Power, Hard Power and Counterinsurgency: The Early Soviet Experience in Central Asia and its Implications (RAND working paper). Retrieved August 25, 2009, from http://www.rand.org/pubs/working_papers/2008/RAND_WR547.pdf 24 Chapter 2. Overview Soviet­Afghan War Centrally located amidst large countries with competing interests, Afghanistan has often been the location of proxy struggles between rival governments and ideologies. Afghanistan has seen the armies of Alexander the Great, Genghis Khan and the British Empire. The interests of Tsarist Russia and the British Empire chaffed at one another in Afghanistan in the 19th Century – an episode that is popularly known as the ‘Great Game’. After World War II, the United States and the Soviet Union both projected influence into Afghanistan, undertaking a variety of projects and aid programs. During this time American money was supporting various efforts in the country, such as the Helmand Valley Project, and there were attempts on the part of the United States to bring Afghanistan under Western influence. Concurrent to these efforts, the Soviet Union was cultivating a relationship with Kabul based on trade and military aid. In the period after World War II Afghanistan turned to the Soviet Union for support for a variety of political and economic reasons. This support came largely in the form of military aid. In this context, economic and cultural ties between Moscow and Kabul strengthened. Afghan leaders began to rely more and more on Soviet military supplies and support. Growing numbers of Afghans travelled to the USSR for education and training ‐ many for military instruction. For example, in 1979, before the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, there were 460 Afghans studying in Soviet military institutions.50 In this way, officers and other urban elites were increasingly exposed to Soviet life and ideologies, and added new vitality to progressive socialist urban movements in Afghanistan. Many of these movements were centered on Kabul University and consisted of Marxist pro‐Moscow students. In 1965 these groups and others formed the People’s 50 “Zasedanie
Politbyuro TsK KPSS 17 marta 1979 goda: Ob obostrenii obstanovki v Demokraticheskoi Respublike Afganistan i nashikh vozmozhnykh merakh,” 17 March 1979, in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 25, D. 1, Ll. 24. 25 Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), which was a communist organization with strong ties to the USSR. In April of 1978, the PDPA wrested control of the government from Mohammad Daoud Khan in a coup and emplaced Nur Muhammed Taraki as the leader of Afghanistan. The new regime went ahead with a program of economic and social reform inspired by socialist‐Marxist ideas. Many of the new initiatives, which related to issues such as agriculture, landowning, and literacy, were foreign to the majority of the Afghan population that lived in a society governed by tribal and Islamic traditions. The PDPA government alienated many segments of the population through ““administrative inadequacy, as well as…regimentation which did not compensate for the absence of legitimacy”.51 The PDPA was also severely hindered by an internal division between the Parcham and Khalq factions. Opposition movements that worked against the PDPA‐run government had developed in parallel – in counterbalance ‐ to those of the communists of the PDPA. Men who would later fight the Soviet Army in the 1980s, such as Ahmad Shah Massoud and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, had mounted a failed attempt at a coup in July 1975, before Soviet troops even deployed to the region.52 The armed struggle between the mujahedeen and the Soviet‐supported PDPA government was a conflict that had been developing for some time and was not entirely a spontaneous response to the appearance of Soviet forces in Afghanistan, “The conflict between the communist government and the mujahedeen resistance was as much a manifestation of political polarization in the country as a struggle for the liberation of Afghanistan from Soviet occupation. The dominant groups that led the Afghan resistance represented an old ideological conflict which took shape during the constitutional period (1964‐73)”.53 51 Dorronsoro, G. (2005). Revolution Unending, Afghanistan: 1979 to the Present. New York: Columbia University Press, 94. 52 Ruttig, T. (2006). Islamists, Leftists ­ and a Void in the Center: Afghanistan's Political Parties and Where They Come From (1902­2006). Kabul: Konrad‐Adenauer‐Stiftung, 14. 53 Jalalzai, M. K. (1996). Sectarianism and Ethnic Violence in Afghanistan. Lahore: Vanguard Books, Ltd., 74. 26 In the face of growing opposition the PDPA leadership sought to tighten links to the USSR, and asked for increased military aid, as well as the arrival of Soviet troops.54 Soviet leaders initially refused these requests, but after significant unrest in the city of Herat and the murder of Taraki and seizure of power by Hafizullah Amin in September of 1979, Soviet leadership decided to take military action in Afghanistan. Select special units were already in the country near Kabul, and in December 1979 Soviet units stormed the presidential palace, killed Amin and installed Babrak Karmal as president of Afghanistan. Soviet troops streamed into the country, working quickly to secure provincial capitals and to quell opposition from the Afghan army and other resistance units. By January 1980, Soviet troop levels in Afghanistan were over 50,000.55 Initially the Soviet aim was to keep a low profile, secure main infrastructure and urban centers, and give the Afghan army the freedom to focus on crushing the resistance. It turned out, however, that the presence of Soviet troops inspired increased support for the mujahedeen and that the Afghan army proved incapable of effectively engaging and destroying mujahedeen forces. It soon became clear that Soviet units would have to undertake most of the combat missions. Soviet troop levels subsequently increased to 110,000‐120,000 by 1982, which was the level at which they remained for the duration of the conflict.56 The fighters that opposed Soviet troops were diverse. Among the factions of the Afghan mujahedeen there was a varying emphasis on Islam, nationalism and other ideologies. The Russian General Staff reports that in the Afghan resistance in 1982 there were seven Islamist parties, allied in the ‘Group of Seven’, and three Traditionalist parties, allied in the ‘Group of Three’.57 The presence of Soviet troops served to overcome many 54 Afghan leaders made multiple requests for Soviet troops to deploy to Afghanistan. The following document is one example: Transcript of Telephone Conversation between Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin and Afghan Prime Minister Nur Mohammed Taraki, 17 or 18 March 1979. (2001, October 9). Retrieved August 24, 2009, from The September 11th Source Books, Volume II: Afghanistan, Lessons from the Last War: Russian Documents and Memoirs (The National Security Archive, Edited by Svetlana Savranskaya): http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB57/r2.pdf 55 McMichael, S. R. (1991). Stumbling Bear:Soviet Military Performance in Afghanistan. London: Brassey's (UK), 8. 56 McMichael, S. R. (1991). Stumbling Bear:Soviet Military Performance in Afghanistan. London: Brassey's (UK), 13. 57 Russian General Staff. (2002). The Soviet­Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 53. Traditionalist parties, while still consisting of Muslim members, placed less 27 internal divisions in these groups, and inspired support for them with many segments of the Afghan population. In addition to financial support from the U.S., Europe, China and the Middle East, many Muslims came to join in the fight against the Soviets. Leaders such as Abdullah Azzam and Osama bin Laden established organizations and training sites in Pakistan to facilitate the Muslim world’s participation in the fight against the Soviets. These foreign fighters did not make a very large impact tactically, but their presence spoke to the broader themes and implications of the Soviet‐Afghan War. In 1979 Azzam issued a fatwa, Defense of the Muslim Lands, which formalized Islamic support and encouragement for the jihad against the Soviets in Afghanistan. Azzam traveled the world ‐ even to Europe and the US ‐ inspiring audiences with elaborate descriptions of the Afghan jihad in order to win their monetary and political support.58 The narrative that ensued from this aspect of the Afghan resistance was important for the broader propaganda campaign and represented a growing tendency in insurgencies to direct information campaigns towards global audiences. This manner of information campaign had been a factor for the United States in the Vietnam conflict as well.59 Despite the large powers that supported the mujahedeen, however, most fighting was conducted by Afghan combat units organized in the context of tribe or village.60 Early in the conflict Soviet troops mounted large conventional offensives that encountered very limited success. Soviet troops, equipment and tactics were ill‐suited for the terrain and enemy in Afghanistan. As Soviet forces became familiar with the conditions in Afghanistan, many adjustments were made. It became clear that there would be no quick victory in Afghanistan and that battling the mujahedeen would take years. The Soviets attempted to implement a counterinsurgency strategy that involved political and military emphasis on Islam as a political ideology than Islamists. In their view, Islam was an important component for Afghan government and society, but not a blueprint for it. It should also be noted that factions of the resistance fluctuated often over the course of the conflict, and that this is only a snapshot of the categories of the resistance. 58 In 1986, Azzam and Osama bin Laden even opened an office in Arizona where there was a large Arab community. Coll, S. (2004). Ghost Wars. New York: The Penguin Press, 155. 59 COL Hammes discusses this phenomenon in the following: COL Hammes, T. (2007, May‐June). Fourth Generation War Evolves, Fifth Emerges. Military Review , 15. 60 Rashid, A. (1987). The Afghan Resistance: Its Background, Its Nature, and the Problem of Unity. In K. Rosanne, Afghanistan:The Great Game Revisited (pp. 203‐229). New York: Freedom House, 216. 28 components, but lack of resources and coordination caused these efforts to yield limited results. Some successes were sustained, however, due to increased use of specialized units and utilization of KGB‐trained Khad units.61 Increased bombing of the Afghan countryside as an effort to destroy mujahedeen sources of support resulted in many civilian casualties and millions of refugees both inside the country and in neighboring Pakistan and Iran.62 Mujahedeen forces, however, were able to survive due to extensive outside support from a coalition of anti‐Soviet countries. This support was predominantly funneled through Pakistan. Soviet attempts to close the border with Pakistan were extensive, but ultimately did not succeed due to long distances, exceedingly difficult terrain, and lack of sufficient numbers of troops. Babrak Karmal, who had dissatisfied leaders in Moscow by his unresponsiveness to recommendations and inability to remedy divisions within the PDPA, was removed from power in 1986. He was replaced by Mohammad Najibullah, the former head of the Khad. Najibullah pursued a program of national reconciliation, aimed at widening support for the government and finding a way to end conflict within the country. This effort was unsuccessful, as foreign‐backed mujahedeen sought a decisive victory in Afghanistan, and foreign powers saw continued fighting in Afghanistan as furthering their objective of weakening the Soviet Union. The Soviet government, led by Mikhail Gorbachev, increasingly saw the troop commitment to Afghanistan as an impediment to both foreign and domestic political objectives. In the context of unsuccessful political initiatives in Afghanistan and lack of a decisive military victory, Soviet leadership decided to withdraw its troops. Withdrawal was completed in February of 1989. 61 ‘Khad’ is an Afghan security agency formed along the lines of the Soviet KGB. 62 McMichael, S. R. (1991). Stumbling Bear:Soviet Military Performance in Afghanistan. London: Brassey's (UK), 54. 29 Soviet Counterinsurgency The Soviet Union was at a disadvantage going into Afghanistan. Soviet leaders misunderstood the social and political dynamics of the country’s situation, and entered the country expecting a relatively quick war against predominantly foreign‐backed fighters.63 Temporary military help, it was hoped, would install a more effective regime, put an end to foreign meddling and allow the Kabul government to proceed forward with support from the people.64 Instead, Soviet troops faced an increasingly popular insurgency that had widespread support throughout the country. Soviet leaders also lacked a doctrine and a military force suited for counterinsurgency. This was partly a result of focusing on conventional threats in the context of the Cold War. As Robert Cassidy notes, large powers are forced to retain high‐
level conventional capabilities to maintain parity with rivals.65 Due to the conditions of the Cold War, Soviet focus on conventional capabilities was especially strong. The situation in Afghanistan was considered primarily through the lens of the struggle against the United States and NATO – Soviet leaders were afraid of ‘losing’ Afghanistan to the influence of the West. Rumors that President Hafizullah Amin was making overtures to the CIA may not have been central to the decision to deploy Soviet troops, but represented underlying 63 This misunderstanding is evident in Politburo discussions, in which there is continuing emphasis that Afghan resistance fighters are mostly from Iran and Pakistan, religious fanatics and exploiting class tensions in Afghanistan. In effect, there was an element of denial of the roots of the insurgency that held appeal with large segments of the Afghan population. Also, in at least one instance the border with Pakistan is described as ‘peaceful’ or ‘under control’. In fact the border was exceedingly porous and a central problem. See: “Zasedanie
Politbyuro TsK KPSS 17 marta 1979 goda: Ob obostrenii obstanovki v Demokraticheskoi Respublike Afganistan i nashikh vozmozhnykh merakh,” 17 March 1979, in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 25, D. 1, Ll. 2, 19. See also: “Vypiska iz protokola No. 149 zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS ot 12 aprelya 1979 goda: O nashei dal’neishei linii v svyazi s polozheniem v Afganistane,” 12 April 1979 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 42, D. 4, Ll. 2. 64 In a meeting of the Politburo on 7 January 1980, Soviet leaders were already discussing how they would be going about withdrawing troops after the issue was complete. As Alexander Liakhovsky notes, this indicates they really did not understand the situation fully. See documentation of this meeting of the Politburo in Liakhovsky’s history of the Soviet‐Afghan War: Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 448. 65 Cassidy, R. M. (2006). Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror. London: Praeger Security International, 21. 30 concerns of Soviet leaders.66 In a Politburo discussion, Andrei Gromyko demonstrated this Cold War mentality, arguing that “under no circumstances can we lose Afghanistan…. If we lose Afghanistan now, it will move away from the Soviet Union, that will be a blow to our politics”.67 Soviet ideology at the time cultivated a perception that actions in Afghanistan were in support of workers and peasants, which promoted the underlying assumption that counterinsurgency was not all that needed, because Soviet policies aligned with the desires of the ‘people’. Therefore, due to distractions of the Cold war and ideological bias, Soviet leadership initially did not pay necessary attention to the requirements of conducting an effective counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. After the invasion in 1979, the Soviets quickly felt the effects of misreading the situation. The Kabul regime did not win widespread or enthusiastic support, and Soviet actions were sharply criticized in the international community. The Soviet army found its heavy equipment and conventional tactics of little use against irregular forces in challenging terrain. Continuing support from outside Afghanistan funded a largely Afghan insurgency that benefitted from open borders between Afghanistan and sanctuaries in Pakistan and Iran. Ultimately, the Kremlin was unable to address the causes of the insurgency adequately. Despite some successes, the Soviet side was unable to outlast and outdo the mujahedeen in the struggle for Afghanistan. They were not forced to leave due to military necessity, however. Soviet forces regularly dominated the field, and the stalemate between the Soviets and the mujahedeen was a result of a combination of factors. The popular argument that Stinger missiles68 tipped the balance is also problematic. Gorbachev had 66 In a conversation With A.A. Gromyko in 1980, Afghan Foreign Minister mentions the rumor that Amin was a U.S. Agent: “Zapis’ Osnovnogo Soderzhaniya Besedy A.A. Gromyko s Ministrom Inostrannykh Del DRA Sh.M. Dostom 4 janvarya 1980 goda,” 4 January 1980 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 42, D. 11, Ll. 2. 67 “Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 17 marta 1979 goda: Ob obostrenii obstanovki v Demokraticheskoi Respublike Afganistan i nashikh vozmozhnykh merakh,” 17 March 1979, in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 25, D. 1, Ll. 3. Gorbachev repeated this sentiment in 1986, when he mentioned in a meeting of the Politburo in reference to Afghanistan, that “it is important that the Americans don’t make inroads there”: “Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 13 noyabrya 1986 goda: O dal’neishikh merakh po Afganistanu,” 13 November 1986 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 14, D. 41, Ll. 10. 68 Stinger missiles are personal portable surface‐to‐air weapons. The United States made them available to Mujahedeen forces in Afghanistan. The Mujahedeen used them with some success to shoot down Soviet 31 already expressed the need to withdraw from Afghanistan in October of 1985; Stinger missiles took down the first Soviet helicopter in September of 1986.69 Many accounts imply that the Soviet side attempted to rely only on brute force to deal with the situation, mindlessly pursuing ineffective political and military policies, and counting on the overwhelming might of the Soviet Union to force the desired outcome.70 As I will show, this is not entirely the case. As discussed in subsequent sections, Soviet initiatives addressed the ‘three pillars’ of counterinsurgency, that have been outlined by David Killcullen: political, economic and military.71 Soviet political and military leaders developed a counterinsurgency strategy covering all these categories, including initiatives aimed at winning the support of the Afghan population through political means. Brute force and mindlessness did not characterize the substantial attempts at encouraging strong governmental and social institutions and a less repressive regime in Kabul. The Kremlin put forth considerable effort to support unity within the PDPA, and to influence it to broaden its base of support through active broadcast of a positive and accommodating political message. Soviet initiatives were also designed to stimulate the Afghan economy as a way to support the government, win support with the population and sustain military gains. helicopters. Stinger missiles were widely heralded as making the key difference in the struggle against the Soviets. 69 Record of Gorbachev discussing withdrawal in 1985 is found in Anatoly Chernyaev’s notes of a politburo meeting on 17 October 1985: Anatoly Chernyaev's Notes from the Politburo CC CPSU Session of October 17, 1985. (2001, October 9). Retrieved from The September 11th Source Books, Volume II: Afghanistan, Lessons from the Last War (The National Security Archive, Edited by Svetlana Savranskaya): http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB57/r17.pdf. Also, Milt Bearden, a CIA officer who worked closely on a project supporting the mujahedeen, writes an account of the first Stinger missile strike in Afghanistan which occurred 25 September 1986: Bearden, M., & Risen, J. (2003). The Main Enemy: The Inside Story of the CIA's Final Showdown with the KGB. New York, New York, USA: Random House, 248. 70 There are numerous examples of analyses that ignore the positive aspects of the Soviet counterinsurgency effort in Afghanistan. The following are examples: Riedel, B. (2009, May 9). Comparing the U.S. and Soviet Experiences in Afghanistan. Retrieved July 25, 2009, from CTC Sentinel: http://www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/CTCSentinel‐Vol2Iss5.pdf . Also, Stephen Blank’s handling of the subject likewise skims over Soviet initiatives that held promise, sharply criticizing Soviet leadership for poor performance in Afghanistan. Many of these criticisms are legitimate, but my analysis will indentify those areas where Soviet leadership worked at good solutions to the situtation: Blank, S. J. (1991). Operational and Strategic Lessons of the War in Afghanistan, 1979­90. Strategic Studies Institute U.S. Army War College, xi‐xvi. 71 Kilcullen, D. D. (2006, September 28). Three Pillars of Counterinsurgency. Retrieved September 1, 2009, from Remarks delivered at U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Conference: http://www.tamilnation.org/armed_conflict/3pillars_of_counterinsurgency.pdf 32 Although initially unprepared, Soviet military leaders worked to adapt the army to the situation in Afghanistan. Some conventional and harsh tactics did persist. However, strategy, force structure and tactics were re‐evaluated and adjusted to the conditions in Afghanistan. Improved and specialized training, changes in military formations, organization of efforts and increased use of non‐linear tactics were all designed specifically for the Afghan theater. As I will outline below, these adjustments correspond with the advice of both classical and modern counterinsurgency theorists and practitioners. While Soviet leaders pursued many effective policies, there are several factors that limited their success. First, many of the policies were poorly implemented. For example, despite significant Soviet pressure on the PDPA and insistence that the party be unified, internal divisions between Parcham and Khalq factions persisted and severely impeded all political efforts.72 Likewise, in the military context, new training and tactics were not sufficient to cultivate a pervasive ethos of initiative and independent action within the officer corps or instill comfort within motorized rifle troops for working in small units away from armored vehicles. Second, resources were limited due to political concerns. As evidenced in the name, the Soviet ‘Limited Contingent’ did not have the numbers to effectively control all the borders and regions of Afghanistan. Third, lack of coordination between military and political efforts caused Soviet gains to be consistently reversed. As General Akhromeev noted in a Politburo session in 1986, “there hasn’t been a military task that… hasn’t been completed…. our military successes have just not been supported by political ones”.73 Political initiatives were likewise often left unsupported by military action. Despite lack of success in implementing policies, claims that the Soviets ignored the fundamental ideas of counterinsurgency are inaccurate. Many Soviet efforts both in political and military areas align with the recommendations of counterinsurgency theorists, who 72 In this account of a discussion with Babrak Karmal, it is noted that remedying divisions within the party was stressed as a priority. However, after several years it became overwhelmingly clear that Karmal was perpetuating the problem: “Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS ot 4 iyunya 1981 goda: O besede s tov. Babrakom Karmalem,” 4 June 1981 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 42, D. 60, Ll. 2. 73 “Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 13 noyabrya 1986 goda: O dal’neishikh merakh po Afganistanu,” 13 November
1986 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 14, D. 41, Ll. 8. General Gromov also notes this in his memoir, mentioning that after an area was cleared attempts to hold, and govern the area were typically ineffectual: Gromov, B. (1994). Ogrannychenyi Kontingent. Moscow: Progress, 128. 33 actively stress the importance of political work, information campaigns and non‐
conventional military techniques. Soviet leaders addressed all of these aspects of counterinsurgency. In the following sections I will examine both military and non‐military Soviet policies. In the non‐military section I will address political, social, propaganda and economic programs. In the military section I will examine strategy, force structure and tactics. 34 Chapter 3. Soviet Counterinsurgency: Non­Military Aspects “I repeat again that in the present situation… what will play a main role will be your ability to use political and economic means to attract to your side the widest circles of the population” – Leonid I. Brezhnev to the Afghan leader Nur Muhammed Taraki74 Political Initiatives There is currently much discussion about the important role of politics and institution building in counterinsurgency. Many point to the Soviet‐Afghan war as an example of a government forgetting the importance of non‐military measures in counterinsurgency. The Soviet military did use severe tactics, such as intensive bombing campaigns and excessive mine laying. However, many Soviet political initiatives were consistent with the idea of winning over the population through strengthening political institutions and processes. While these objectives were not achieved fully, documents show that Soviet leaders facilitated social initiatives, encouraged Afghan leaders to pursue a moderate political program, and advocated a conciliatory political approach. Soviet leaders also actively encouraged Afghan government leaders to adopt policies aimed at broadening their political base with as many social groups as possible. This contrasts with popularly held impressions that Soviet policies in Afghanistan were ruthless across the board. More significantly, this approach, and the explicit and implicit importance that Soviet leaders assigned to political and social programs is an illustration of effective elements in the Soviet counterinsurgency strategy. David Galula notes that it is important to strengthen political institutions, support and test local authorities, encourage and educate leaders in a political movement and preserve unity of effort with other aspects and entities in the counterinsurgency campaign.75 Soviet leaders made significant efforts in all of these 74 “Zapis’ Besedy L.I. Brezhneva s N.M. Tarki 20 marta 1979 g. (V besede prinyali uchastie t.t. A.N. Kosygin, A.A. Gromyko, D.F. Ustinov i B.N. Ponomarev),” 20 March 1979 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 42, D. 2, Ll. 5. 75 Galula, D. (2006). Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. London: Praeger Security International, 56, 72. 35 areas. Despite some forceful features of Soviet military actions in Afghanistan, it is clear that Soviet leaders understood the importance of pursuing an effective political program. Even before committing troops to the region, Soviet leaders worked against the resistance by employing moderate policies and accommodating as many parts of the society as possible. In March of 1979, Brezhnev told Taraki, “I repeat again that in the present situation… what will play a main role will be your ability to use political and economic means to attract to your side the widest circles of the population”.76 Brezhnev was insistent that Taraki pursue a comprehensive political and social program in Afghanistan, insisting that it was imperative to broaden the political support for the PDPA, starting at the grassroots level. To this end, Brezhnev advocated the use of socio‐political groups to work with peasants, workers and women.77 He also suggested the creation of organizations for working against poverty and other problems in agricultural regions where the PDPA traditionally had the least support.78 Repressive and harsh measures were discouraged and winning support within the ranks of religious leaders was emphasized; the Kremlin urged leaders in Kabul to make it clear that they were friendly to Islam.79 It was also suggested that increased training go to PDPA members in order to facilitate their political activities.80 In 1980, the Afghan minister of foreign affairs assured Andrei A. Gromyko that work was being done to achieve unity in the PDPA and to rid the party of corruption and excessive 76 “Zapis’ Besedy L.I. Brezhneva s N.M. Tarki 20 marta 1979 g. (V besede prinyali uchastie t.t. A.N. Kosygin, A.A. Gromyko, D.F. Ustinov i B.N. Ponomarev),” 20 March 1979 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 42, D. 2, Ll. 5. 77 “Zapis’ Besedy L.I. Brezhneva s N.M. Tarki 20 marta 1979 g. (V besede prinyali uchastie t.t. A.N. Kosygin, A.A. Gromyko, D.F. Ustinov i B.N. Ponomarev),” 20 March 1979 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 42, D. 2, Ll. 2. It is interesting to note here that the Soviets developed similar programs in their counterinsurgency in Ukraine (1944‐1956). See, Potichnyj, P. J. (1987, October 2‐3). Pacification of Ukraine: Soviet Counterinsurgency, 1944­
1956. Retrieved September 13, 2009, from Chronicle of the Ukranian Insurgent Army: http://www.infoukes.com/upa/related/uf.html 78 “Zapis’ Besedy L.I. Brezhneva s N.M. Tarki 20 marta 1979 g. (V besede prinyali uchastie t.t. A.N. Kosygin, A.A. Gromyko, D.F. Ustinov i B.N. Ponomarev),” 20 March 1979 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 42, D. 2, Ll. 2. 79 “Zapis’ Besedy L.I. Brezhneva s N.M. Tarki 20 marta 1979 g. (V besede prinyali uchastie t.t. A.N. Kosygin, A.A. Gromyko, D.F. Ustinov i B.N. Ponomarev),” 20 March 1979 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 42, D. 2, Ll. 3. 80 “Vypiska iz protokola No. 149 zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS ot 12 aprelya 1979 goda: O nashei dal’neishei linii v svyazi s polozheniem v Afganistane,” 12 April 1979 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 42, D. 4, Ll. 10. 36 violence.81 These assurances, whether or not they represented actual progress in Kabul, underscore the Kremlin’s pressure on the Afghan government to make positive changes. Understanding Pakistan’s influential role in the Afghan resistance, Soviet leaders made specific recommendations to open talks with Islamabad to limit interference and to normalize the situation of Afghan refugees in that country.82 In the first months of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, the Central Committee was very insistent that Afghan government leaders be proactive in creating and publicizing a political program. In May of 1980, the Central Committee of the CPSU discussed the need for “Afghan leadership to articulate a comprehensive program of political stabilization”.83 Soviet recommendations included an accelerated process for creating a constitution, and the inclusion of tribal representatives in political processes.84 Soviet leaders also continued to voice the need to reach out to religious leaders and other socio‐economic classes, which were not naturally inclined to side with the PDPA.85 It was also suggested to isolate radical elements within these segments of the population.86 Incorporating tribal and religious leaders was a particularly important aspect of the political program. David Kilcullen mentions this point as well, noting that “influential local tribal leaders and village chiefs – regardless of whether they formally support the government – are the key”.87 The Soviet advice to isolate the radical elements within these 81 “Zapis’ Osnovnogo Soderzhaniya Besedy A.A. Gromyko s Ministrom Inostrannykh Del DRA Sh.M. Dostom 4 janvarya 1980 goda,” 4 January 1980 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 42, D. 11, Ll. 2. 82 “Vypiska iz protokola No. 195 zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS ot 8 maya 1980 goda: O predlozheniyakh po politicheskomu uregulirovaniu v svyazi s Afganistanom,” 8 May 1980 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 34, D. 8, Ll. 3‐4 (v Prilozhenii I; in Appendix I of this document). 83 “Vypiska iz protokola No. 195 zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS ot 8 maya 1980 goda: O predlozheniyakh po politicheskomu uregulirovaniu v svyazi s Afganistanom,” 8 May 1980 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 34, D. 8, Ll. 2 (v Prilozhenii I; in Appendix I of this document). 84 “Vypiska iz protokola No. 181 zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS ot 28 janvarya 1980 goda: O dal’neishikh meropriyatiyakh po obespecheniyu gosudarstvennykh interesov SSSR v svyazi s sobytiyami v Afganistane,” 28 January 1980 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 34, D. 3, Ll. 6. 85 “Vypiska iz protokola No. 181 zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS ot 28 janvarya 1980 goda: O dal’neishikh meropriyatiyakh po obespecheniyu gosudarstvennykh interesov SSSR v svyazi s sobytiyami v Afganistane,” 28 January 1980 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 34, D. 3, Ll. 6. 86 “Vypiska iz protokola No. 181 zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS ot 28 janvarya 1980 goda: O dal’neishikh meropriyatiyakh po obespecheniyu gosudarstvennykh interesov SSSR v svyazi s sobytiyami v Afganistane,” 28 January 1980 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 34, D. 3, Ll. 6. 87 Kilcullen, D. (2009). The Accidental Guerilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One. New York, USA: Oxford University Press, Inc, 69. 37 categories is consistent with Galula’s admonition that the counterinsurgent “isolate the population as much as possible… from the guerillas”.88 The Soviet‐promoted goal was to strengthen the Kabul government by broadening its political base, and to curb violence through “establishing contacts and talks with the leaders and elders of the most warring tribes in the DRA89 in the search of ways to achieve… a compromise”.90 In talks with Babrak Karmal in 1981, Soviet leaders continued to emphasize the importance of strengthening Afghan political institutions using the considerable experience and support from the USSR.91 Andropov underscored the importance of addressing divisions between the Parcham and Khalq factions within the PDPA, building a strong army and police force, and fostering greater coordination between Afghan and Soviet military units.92 Similar political themes continued throughout the duration of the conflict. In 1986, Andrei Gromyko stressed the need to “get down to the business of working at political stabilization more actively”.93 Expanding support for the PDPA was a central theme in the Soviet approach. The need to focus on political initiatives that concretely improved the lives of rural populations was emphasized and reiterated at this time.94 In 1986 in a meeting of the Politburo, Gorbachev voiced this sentiment, 88 Galula, D. (2006). Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. London: Praeger Security International, 81. 89 Democratic Republic of Afghanistan 90 “Vypiska iz protokola No. 181 zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS ot 28 janvarya 1980 goda: O dal’neishikh meropriyatiyakh po obespecheniyu gosudarstvennykh interesov SSSR v svyazi s sobytiyami v Afganistane,” 28 January 1980 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 34, D. 3, Ll. 6. 91 “Postanovlenie Sekretariata TsK Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza: O dopolnitel’nykh merakh pomoshchi Narodno‐demokraticheskoi partii Afganistana v razvertyvanii ideologicheskoi raboty,” 16 December 1980 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 46, D. 74, Ll. 2. 92 “Postanovlenie Sekretariata TsK Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza: O dopolnitel’nykh merakh pomoshchi Narodno‐demokraticheskoi partii Afganistana v razvertyvanii ideologicheskoi raboty,” 16 December 1980 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 46, D. 74, Ll. 2. 93 “Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 13 noyabrya 1986 goda: O dal’neishikh merakh po Afganistanu,” 13 November
1986 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 14, D. 41, Ll. 4. At this time, Gorbachev was already leading the USSR towards finding ways to withdraw. He sought political measures to neutralize the situation enough to allow for troop withdrawal. Such proceedings, however, indicate that leaders clearly understood the importance of the political aspects of counterinsurgency and attempted to implement programs in this area. The problem, however, was that military gains were not sufficiently supported by the projection of political influence (General Akhromeev makes this point in this same document ). This was primarily the fault of disjointed coordination between military and political efforts, and the inability of the army to provide security to all areas of the country. It was not the result of ignoring the political aspect of counterinsurgency. 94 “Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 13 noyabrya 1986 goda: O dal’neishikh merakh po Afganistanu,” 13 November
1986 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 14, D. 41, Ll. 8­9. 38 maintaining that “it is necessary to expand the social base of the [Kabul] regime by accounting for an effective allocation of political energy”.95 As outlined above, Soviet emphasis on normalizing relations with neighboring countries and strengthening domestic Afghan political institutions was substantial. These initiatives are consistent with classical and modern counterinsurgency theory that stresses the importance of creating conditions that assure the population that the government offers a better alternative to the rule of the insurgent. The recommendations put forth by Soviet leaders were well founded and addressed significant obstacles to the success of the Kabul government. They also illustrate that Soviet leaders understood the importance of the political component of the counterinsurgency effort. Social Initiatives In addition to measures meant to affect Afghan political policies directly, the Soviet government undertook a broad range of social programs intended for supporting the Afghan counterinsurgency. Increased support in the areas of education, culture and youth were meant to help in winning support for the PDPA. Some of these programs had limited effect, since they were only available to those in areas controlled by the government. Nevertheless, these programs speak to the Soviet government’s understanding of the softer elements of counterinsurgency, and incorporation of elements of the ‘hearts and minds’ approach.96 The Soviet Union was active in working to influence Afghan society and culture by providing materials, infrastructure and opportunities designed to foster social welfare and gain support for the PDPA. In 1980 Soviet analysis discussed the need for the Afghan 95 “Zasedanie
Politbyuro TsK KPSS 13 noyabrya 1986 goda: O dal’neishikh merakh po Afganistanu,” 13 November
1986 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 14, D. 41, Ll. 10. 96 Broadly used in current discourse, the term ‘heart and minds’ is Field Marshal Sir Gerard Templer’s. It was used to describe the softer elements of counterinsurgency that the British military employed at times in Malaya. See: Dixon, P. (2009). 'Hearts and Minds'? British Counter‐insurgency from Malaya to Iraq. Journal of Strategic Studies , 32 (3), 354. 39 government to undertake programs to increase the influence of the PDPA on youth, especially students, and create athletic, cultural and other organizations to support progressive movements in the DRA.97 Soviet leaders also advocated working to stop discrimination against Shiite Muslims in Afghanistan, hoping that reaching out to this group would add support to the regime. Other social programs included summer camps in the USSR for Afghan school children – one particular project provided almost eight hundred slots per year for summer camp in the USSR.98 In a similar vein, Soviet leaders approved the creation of eight automobile clubs for the Democratic Organization of Youth of Afghanistan in 1980.99 With the goal of stimulating Afghan cultural life, the Soviet Union of Journalists, Union of Writers, Union of Artists, Union of Composers, Union of Directors were each instructed to present one prize per year to an Afghan citizen in their field.100 Soviet organizations were also instructed to coordinate the purchase of Afghan art and other crafts for museums in the USSR.101 Building the human capital and economic potential of the DRA was important to Soviet leadership, as employment and prosperity were seen as steps toward peace and stability. Although these goals were not fully achieved, the Soviet government did work to establish many training and educational opportunities for Afghan citizens. For example, in 1980, the Ministry of Culture was instructed to organize a program for thirty Afghan 97 “Vypiska iz protokola No. 181 zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS ot 28 janvarya 1980 goda: O dal’neishikh meropriyatiyakh po obespecheniyu gosudarstvennykh interesov SSSR v svyazi s sobytiyami v Afganistane,” 28 January 1980 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 34, D. 3, Ll. 6. 98 TsK KPSS: O khode bypolneniya reshenii TsK KPSS ob okazanii pomoshchi Narodno‐demokraticheskoi partii Afganistana v rasvertyvanii ideologicheskoi raboty,” 4 December 1981 (Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 46, D. 74, Ll. 19. 99 TsK KPSS: O khode realizatsii postanovlenii TsK KPSS ob usilenii informatsionno‐propagandistkoi raboty na Demokraticheskuiu Respubliku Afganistan,” 26 February 1981 (Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 46, D. 74, Ll. 16. 100 “Postanovlenie Sekretariata TsK Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza: O dopolnitel’nykh merakh pomoshchi Narodno‐demokraticheskoi partii Afganistana v razvertyvanii ideologicheskoi raboty,” 16 December 1980 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 46, D. 74, Ll. 2. 101 “Postanovlenie Sekretariata TsK Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza: O dopolnitel’nykh merakh pomoshchi Narodno‐demokraticheskoi partii Afganistana v razvertyvanii ideologicheskoi raboty,” 16 December 1980 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 46, D. 74, Ll. 3. 40 citizens per year to study in the USSR.102 In a formal agreement between the USSR and the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan it was specified that in the years 1980‐1982 the USSR would organize specialized fifteen‐day training programs for groups of up to 25 managers from the DRA ministry of water resources and energy and the ministry of agriculture and land reform.103 It was also agreed that fifty agricultural specialists a year (from 1981‐1983) would attend three‐month training courses.104 Similar programs were implemented for hundreds of mining, mechanic, driving and manufacturing specialists.105 Training and educational exchanges continued throughout the conflict. In a 1984 agreement, Afghan workers were tasked to go to the USSR for specialized construction training.106 In 1985, technical training in manufacturing was provided for Afghan workers.107 Such training opportunities were ongoing and were incorporated in many Soviet development projects in Afghanistan. In addition to providing numerous training opportunities in the Soviet Union, Moscow also adopted programs meant to strengthen educational institutions in Afghanistan. In 1980, a Soviet‐Afghan agreement for the years 1981‐1985 designated that eighty five instructors from the USSR would come to work in Afghan schools in the fields of social and economic sciences, engineering and Russian language.108 Soviet help for producing textbooks in Dari and Pashto, and expertise for creating a chemistry laboratory at Kabul University was also specified in these agreements.109 The establishment of boarding 102 “Postanovlenie Sekretariata TsK Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza: O dopolnitel’nykh merakh pomoshchi Narodno‐demokraticheskoi partii Afganistana v razvertyvanii ideologicheskoi raboty,” 16 December 1980 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 46, D. 74, Ll. 2. 103 Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del SSSR. (1982). Sbornik Mezhdunarodnykh Dogovorov SSSR (Vol. XXXVI). Moscow, Russia, 98‐99. 104 Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del SSSR. (1982). Sbornik Mezhdunarodnykh Dogovorov SSSR (Vol. XXXVI). Moscow, Russia, 98‐99. 105 Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del SSSR. (1982). Sbornik Mezhdunarodnykh Dogovorov SSSR (Vol. XXXVI). Moscow, Russia, 98‐99. 106 Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del SSSR. (1986). Sbornik Mezhdunarodnykh Dogovorov SSSR (Vol. XL). Moscow, Russia, 77‐79. 107 Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del SSSR. (1987). Sbornik Mezhdunarodnykh Dogovorov SSSR (Vol. XLI). Moscow, Russia, 129‐132. 108 Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del SSSR. (1982). Sbornik Mezhdunarodnykh Dogovorov SSSR (Vol. XXXVI). Moscow, Russia, 98‐99. 109 Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del SSSR. (1982). Sbornik Mezhdunarodnykh Dogovorov SSSR (Vol. XXXVI). Moscow, Russia, 98‐99. 41 schools in Kabul over the course of 1981‐1985 was also included.110 In an agreement projected for 1986‐1990, the Soviet government agreed to build ten professional technical schools with a capacity for four thousand students.111 In further support of educational infrastructure, there were exchanges set up between the Lenin State Library in Moscow and the libraries of Kabul University, the Kabul Academy of Sciences and the Afghan Historical Society.112 As illustrated in the programs above, Soviet leadership made significant efforts to support the counterinsurgency campaign through social programs, supporting numerous policies and programs for strengthening Afghan political, educational and social institutions and processes. While success was limited in some areas, it is clear that the Soviet leadership was aware of the importance of this aspect of counterinsurgency and attempted to make progress in it. Although some Soviet policies were certainly coercive, Soviet leaders did incorporate soft approaches into their counterinsurgency effort as well. Propaganda Initiatives It has been repeated that counterinsurgency is “20 percent military action and 80 percent political”.113 In his influential work on counterinsurgency, Galula instructs the counterinsurgent how to proceed in the political sphere. According to Galula, much depends on the relative strengths and dynamics of either side; for varying cases, he advocates powering through on force alone or adopting elements of the insurgent’s political platform in an effort to win the support of the population. Regardless of approach, Galula stresses the 110 Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del SSSR. (1982). Sbornik Mezhdunarodnykh Dogovorov SSSR (Vol. XXXVI). Moscow, Russia, 98‐99. 111 Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del SSSR. (1987). Sbornik Mezhdunarodnykh Dogovorov SSSR (Vol. XLI). Moscow, Russia, 129‐132. 112 TsK KPSS: O khode realizatsii postanovlenii TsK KPSS ob usilenii informatsionno‐propagandistkoi raboty na Demokraticheskuiu Respubliku Afganistan,” 26 February 1981 (Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 46, D. 74, Ll. 18. 113 Galula, D. Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. London: Praeger Security International, 63. 42 need for the counterinsurgent to declare his political program at an opportune time and in a way aimed to “take as much wind as possible out of the insurgent’s sails”.114 Winning in information warfare is crucial for the counterinsurgent. Losing this battle can negate gains made in other areas of the counterinsurgency. Colonel Thomas X. Hammes makes this point, noting that the insurgent can potentially circumvent military means by targeting “the minds of the enemy decision makers to destroy the enemy’s political will…. [which] when properly employed can defeat greater economic and military power”.115 In the case of Afghanistan, influencing the opinions of three broad categories of people was important for determining the course of the conflict: first, the Soviet population and leaders who formed policy and bore the burdens of the conflict; second, the international powers that backed the mujahedeen, and whose support was important for sustaining the insurgency; and third, the Afghan population itself, which had to decide whether to side with the Kabul government or the mujahedeen. Soviet leadership worked diligently in the area of information and propaganda to target all of these groups. In many respects propaganda work came naturally to the Soviets, as the USSR was a country based on the ideology of revolution, and had utilized propaganda campaigns extensively in its history. In the Afghan context, Soviet experience both in domestic and in foreign propaganda was very useful.116 Soviet leaders often referred to these historical examples while working with the Afghan government. While it is clear that, for a variety of reasons, the political message of the PDPA did not inspire the broad support that was desired, it is undeniable that the Soviet government pursued substantial measures in this area. In discussing these efforts, I will focus on two categories: propaganda initiatives 114 Galula, D. (2006). Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. London: Praeger Security International, 72. 115 Hammes, C. T. (2008). Information Operations in 4GW. In T. Terrif, A. Karp, & R. Karp, Global Insurgency and the Future of Armed Conflict (pp. 200‐208). New York, New York, USA: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 200. 116 Soviet leaders took into account experiences in Eastern European countries such in Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria when approaching the situation in Afghanistan. This is evident in the following document: “Vypiska iz protokola No. 181 zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS ot 28 janvarya 1980 goda: O dal’neishikh meropriyatiyakh po obespecheniyu gosudarstvennykh interesov SSSR v svyazi s sobytiyami v Afganistane,” 28 January 1980 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 34, D. 3, Ll. 6. 43 focused on the Afghan population, and propaganda initiatives directed at the international community and Soviet population. Propaganda Within Afghanistan Even before the invasion in 1979, the Soviets were very active in Afghanistan and aware of the importance of propaganda. A Soviet analysis of the situation in the spring of 1979 criticized Afghan PDPA members for being outdone by the ‘counter‐revolutionaries’, whose work was “much more active and on a larger scale than the work conducted by party members”.117 After the deployment of Soviet troops, Soviet leaders made it even more of a priority to supply the Kabul government and the PDPA with all the tools necessary to spread their message and compete in information warfare both domestically and in the international arena. As noted in 1980 in a resolution of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), “with the permission of the CPSU…Soviet ideological institutions began to provide operational help to the PDPA in propaganda… aimed at counteracting the anti‐afghan campaign in the UN and in the media abroad”.118 In 1981, the Soviet government passed a resolution On the Support for the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan in Propaganda Work.119 Development of the propaganda effort was a central aspect of the USSR’s relationship with the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA).120 The Soviets worked hard to develop newspapers, journals and radio stations that supported the Kabul government. Radio, in 117 “Vypiska iz protokola No. 149 zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS ot 12 aprelya 1979 goda: O nashei dal’neishei linii v svyazi s polozheniem v Afganistane,” 12 April 1979 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 42, D. 4, Ll. 6. 118 TsK KPSS: O khode bypolneniya reshenii TsK KPSS ob okazanii pomoshchi Narodno‐demokraticheskoi partii Afganistana v rasvertyvanii ideologicheskoi raboty,” 4 December 1981 (Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 46, D. 74, Ll. 19. 119 TsK KPSS: O khode bypolneniya reshenii TsK KPSS ob okazanii pomoshchi Narodno‐demokraticheskoi partii Afganistana v rasvertyvanii ideologicheskoi raboty,” 4 December 1981 (Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 46, D. 74, Ll. 19. 120 Democratic Party of Afghanistan (DRA) was the title given to Afghanistan by the PDPA after the Saur Revolution in 1978. 44 particular, was emphasized both by Afghan and Soviet government leaders due to the high rate of illiteracy in Afghanistan.121 As early as March 1979, president Taraki asked Leonid Brezhnev for help in creating capabilities for a radio station in Afghanistan.122 A few days later, Yuri Andropov repeated the need to supply the Afghans with means for radio broadcasting.123 In January 1980 Soviet officials approved the building of a radio station in the region of Kabul, allocating ten million rubles for the job and agreeing to send equipment and specialists to facilitate the project.124 In December of 1980 Soviet leaders approved the distribution of megaphone and loudspeaker assemblies to all administrative zones in Afghanistan as a way to facilitate spreading information.125 The Soviet government also made efforts to broadcast radio programs from nearby Central Asian republics in Afghanistan. In 1981, Soviet leaders approved the broadcast of programs in Uzbek for the benefit of listeners in Afghanistan.126 Moscow also ordered the support of other forms of media. In one instance, the Soviet media agency Tass was tasked with sending materials and equipment for creating a dark room and photo studio for the Afghan news agency Bakhtar.127 Initiatives in television were discussed between the USSR and Afghanistan as well. In a 1980 resolution of the Secretariat of the Central Committee there were conversations regarding the relay of broadcasts from a Tajik TV studio to Afghanistan.128 In the same year, the film “Conspiracy Against the Republic” was filmed with Soviet help in Dari and Pashto, clearly for government use as a 121 “Vypiska iz protokola No. 149 zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS ot 12 aprelya 1979 goda: O nashei dal’neishei linii v svyazi s polozheniem v Afganistane,” 12 April 1979 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 42, D. 4, Ll. 11. 122 “Zapis’ Besedy A.N. Kosygina, A.A. Gromyko, D.F. Ustinova, B.N. Ponomareva s N.M. Taraki 20 marta 1979 g.,” 20 March 1979 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 42, D. 3, Ll. 12. 123 “Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 17 marta 1979 goda: Ob obostrenii obstanovki v Demokraticheskoi Respublike Afganistan i nashikh vozmozhnykh merakh,” 17 March 1979, in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 25, D. 1, Ll. 24. 124 “Postanovlenie Sekretariata TsK Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza: Ob okasanii tekhnicheskogo sodeistviya Demokraticheskoi Respublike Afganistan v stroitel’stve radioveshchatel’noi srednevolnovoi radiostantsii moshchnost’iu 1000 kVt,” 29 January 1980 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 32, D. 20, Ll. 2,3,11. 125 “Postanovlenie Sekretariata TsK Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza: O dopolnitel’nykh merakh pomoshchi Narodno‐demokraticheskoi partii Afganistana v razvertyvanii ideologicheskoi raboty,” 16 December 1980 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 46, D. 74, Ll. 4 (Under subheading “Sovet Ministrov SSSR: Rasporyazhenie”). 126 TsK KPSS: O khode realizatsii postanovlenii TsK KPSS ob usilenii informatsionno‐propagandistkoi raboty na Demokraticheskuiu Respubliku Afganistan,” 26 February 1981 (Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 46, D. 74, Ll. 13. 127 TsK KPSS: O khode realizatsii postanovlenii TsK KPSS ob usilenii informatsionno‐propagandistkoi raboty na Demokraticheskuiu Respubliku Afganistan,” 26 February 1981 (Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 46, D. 74, Ll. 14. 128 TsK KPSS: O khode realizatsii postanovlenii TsK KPSS ob usilenii informatsionno‐propagandistkoi raboty na Demokraticheskuiu Respubliku Afganistan,” 26 February 1981 (Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 46, D. 74, Ll. 16. 45 propaganda tool.129 An agreement between the two countries for 1983 established cooperation on creating three TV studios in Afghanistan.130 Several Afghan newspapers were set up under Soviet guidance. Khambastegi was created in 1980, based on the Soviet newspaper “Socialism: Theory and Practice”, and had a circulation of 3000 copies.131 ‘Iunost’, a youth newspaper, was also created in 1980 and had a circulation of 10,000 copies.132 Soviet programs were also formulated for the purpose of training Afghan specialists in the skills necessary for media and propaganda operations. The Soviet Union sent many advisors and trainers in journalism to help strengthen Afghan capabilities. This had been an ongoing effort for many years but intensified after the April Revolution and the subsequent Soviet invasion.133 For example, from November 1980 to February 1981 ten Afghan media interns (five in radio and five in television) were sent to the USSR for training.134 The Soviet government also directed leading press agencies to send personnel to train their counterparts in Afghanistan. Editors from the newspapers Pravda, Izvestia, and Komsomolskaya Pravda were each ordered to send a representative to train and advise cadres in the Afghan newspapers Pravda Aprelskoi Revolutsii, Khivad and Znamya Molodyozhi.135 Soviet political leaders also discussed the promotion of journalism amongst Afghan students, working out plans to send professors in Journalism from the USSR to Kabul 129 TsK KPSS: O khode realizatsii postanovlenii TsK KPSS ob usilenii informatsionno‐propagandistkoi raboty na Demokraticheskuiu Respubliku Afganistan,” 26 February 1981 (Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 46, D. 74, Ll. 16. 130 Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del SSSR. (1985). Sbornik Mezhdunarodnykh Dogovorov SSSR (Vol. XXXIX). Moscow, Russia, 212. 131 TsK KPSS: O khode realizatsii postanovlenii TsK KPSS ob usilenii informatsionno‐propagandistkoi raboty na Demokraticheskuiu Respubliku Afganistan,” 26 February 1981 (Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 46, D. 74, Ll. 14. 132 TsK KPSS: O khode realizatsii postanovlenii TsK KPSS ob usilenii informatsionno‐propagandistkoi raboty na Demokraticheskuiu Respubliku Afganistan,” 26 February 1981 (Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 46, D. 74, Ll. 14. 133 A document in 1976 on sending of Soviet personnel to Afghanistan to advise on propaganda is an example of this relationship: “Postanovlenie Sekretariata TsK Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza: Sovet Ministrov SSSR, Rasporyazhenie noyabrya 1976 g.,” November 1976 (Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 27, D. 27, Ll. 9. Of course, personnel exchange with Afghanistan increased after the Soviets committed troops to the country. 134 TsK KPSS: O khode realizatsii postanovlenii TsK KPSS ob usilenii informatsionno‐propagandistkoi raboty na Demokraticheskuiu Respubliku Afganistan,” 26 February 1981 (Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 46, D. 74, Ll. 13. 135 Postanovlenie Sekretariata TsK Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza: O dopolnitel’nykh merakh pomoshchi Narodno‐demokraticheskoi partii Afganistana v razvertyvanii ideologicheskoi raboty,” 16 December 1980 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 46, D. 74, Ll. 1. 46 University.136 The Ministry of higher education was directed to send professors to work directly with the PDPA on journalism, clearly indicating that the subject was understood as a tool for use in the political context.137 Substantial amounts of media and propaganda materials were sent from the USSR to Afghanistan to explain and spread the message of the PDPA. In 1980, the publishing house ‘Plakat’ was instructed to send 50,000 rubles worth of flyers and other publications in Dari and Pashto.138 The newspaper Novosti was directed to publish a series of brochures in Dari and Pashto that explained the principles of domestic and foreign policy of the DRA, with the specific instructions that they be oriented towards the ‘average’ Afghan.139 In October of 1980 a Soviet news agency created the textbook “Course in the Basics of Politics” in Pashto and Dari.140 The textbook “Guidebook of a Party Worker” and “Political Parties of the World” were also created around the same time.141 Soviet leaders persistently advised their Afghan counterparts in propaganda, reminding them to be sure to broaden their base of political support through engaging key segments of the Afghan population. The Soviet intention was that the PDPA explain their platform in terms understandable and compelling to the average Afghan. This dovetails with David Galula’s point that the counterinsurgent should avoid abstract policies that do not interest the population, and that it is important for the counterinsurgent to ascertain what the people really want, and then promote corresponding policies.142 136 Postanovlenie Sekretariata TsK Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza: O dopolnitel’nykh merakh pomoshchi Narodno‐demokraticheskoi partii Afganistana v razvertyvanii ideologicheskoi raboty,” 16 December 1980 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 46, D. 74, Ll. 2. 137 TsK KPSS: O khode realizatsii postanovlenii TsK KPSS ob usilenii informatsionno‐propagandistkoi raboty na Demokraticheskuiu Respubliku Afganistan,” 26 February 1981 (Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 46, D. 74, Ll. 15. 138 “Postanovlenie Sekretariata TsK Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza: O dopolnitel’nykh merakh pomoshchi Narodno‐demokraticheskoi partii Afganistana v razvertyvanii ideologicheskoi raboty,” 16 December 1980 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 46, D. 74, Ll. 2. 139 “Postanovlenie Sekretariata TsK Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza: O dopolnitel’nykh merakh pomoshchi Narodno‐demokraticheskoi partii Afganistana v razvertyvanii ideologicheskoi raboty,” 16 December 1980 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 46, D. 74, Ll. 2. 140 TsK KPSS: O khode realizatsii postanovlenii TsK KPSS ob usilenii informatsionno‐propagandistkoi raboty na Demokraticheskuiu Respubliku Afganistan,” 26 February 1981 (Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 46, D. 74, Ll. 14. 141 TsK KPSS: O khode realizatsii postanovlenii TsK KPSS ob usilenii informatsionno‐propagandistkoi raboty na Demokraticheskuiu Respubliku Afganistan,” 26 February 1981 (Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 46, D. 74, Ll. 14. 142 Galula, D. (2006). Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. London: Praeger Security International, 72. 47 Soviet leadership pushed this same recommendation with the Afghan government. One example is Soviet advice that PDPA members articulate clearly to Afghan peasants that they receive land due to the reforms of the PDPA, and that this land will remain with them only if the government remains strong.143 For the purpose of continuing to explain the Kabul government’s policies, the publication Novosti published 10,000 of each of the following brochures in Dari and Pashto: “Domestic Politics of the DRA”, “Stories about the Reforms” and “Speeches of Babrak of Karmal”.144 One Soviet document refers to the number of copies of varying pamphlets, books and other publications sent from the USSR to Afghanistan at 290,00 in 1979, and at 720,000 in 1980.145 These Soviet‐PDPA programs came in the context of an active propaganda campaign on the part of the mujahedeen. As General Gromov recounts in his memoirs, there was “active anti‐Soviet propaganda, which was conducted amidst the whole population in Afghanistan. In every village and small city they set people against us”.146 It was of vital importance to convince the Afghan people that the Kabul government meant well and would bring them good things.147 This objective was not fully achieved, but certainly strived for as evidenced by the many programs enumerated above. 143 “Vypiska iz protokola No. 149 zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS ot 12 aprelya 1979 goda: O nashei dal’neishei linii v svyazi s polozheniem v Afganistane,” 12 April 1979 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 42, D. 4, Ll. 9. 144 TsK KPSS: O khode vypolneniya postanovleniya TsK KPSS ‘O dopolnitel’nykh merakh pomoshchi Narodno‐
demokraticheskoi partii Afganistana v rasvertyvanii ideologicheskoi raboty’,” 4 November 1981 (Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 46, D. 74, Ll. 23. 145 TsK KPSS: O khode realizatsii postanovlenii TsK KPSS ob usilenii informatsionno‐propagandistkoi raboty na Demokraticheskuiu Respubliku Afganistan,” 26 February 1981 (Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 46, D. 74, Ll. 14. 146 Gromov, B. (1994). Ogrannychenyi Kontingent. Moscow: Progress, 117. 147 The following article includes a case of the U.S. general McChrystal spreading his message in hopes of winning the support of the population. In a translated message he said that “As commander of the International Security Assistance Force, nothing is more important than the safety and protection of the Afghan people”. This is an illustration of the need to broadcast a message. The importance was the same for the Soviets as it is now for U.S. forces. Leaders in both cases were aware of the real effects that information could have on their mission: Farrel, S., & Oppel, R. A. (2009, September 4). NATO Strike Magnifies Divide on Afghan War. Retrieved September 4, 2009, from The New York Times: http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/05/world/asia/05afghan.html 48 Propaganda Directed at the International Community and Soviet Population International propaganda surrounding the conflict in Afghanistan cannot be separated from the realities of the larger Cold War. The war in Afghanistan was yet another reason for the United States and other countries to discredit the Soviet Union, and, in turn, a reason for the Soviet Union to strike back.148 This was an expected aspect of international relations at the time. This propaganda struggle was also a battle for legitimacy and global sympathy for which both the mujahedeen and the Soviet‐backed PDPA were vying. The Soviets were seeking to gain tolerance for their actions in Afghanistan in the international community; they were also interested in sustaining support for the effort within the USSR. The mujahedeen were seeking to erode the will of the Soviet leaders and people, to gain sympathy and funds internationally, and to win support within the Afghan populace. Success or failure in the propaganda struggle would have major consequences for both sides. The politics of Pakistan and Iran and the larger powers working with them had a very real effect on the Soviet counterinsurgency effort. Mujahedeen forces made use of these governments’ finances, equipment and sanctuaries. The Soviet population also played an important role in the Soviet counterinsurgency. Although living in a society of restricted press and having limited effect on government processes, the Soviet population was the source for the conscript 40th Army deployed in Afghanistan, and the sentiments of the people did ultimately influence Soviet policymakers.149 Winning the ‘hearts and minds’ of these audiences, therefore, would be a significant advantage in the struggle for Afghanistan. In discussing evolved insurgencies in the context of fourth generation warfare, Colonel Hammes highlights the importance of international information campaigns even in localized 148 In a declassified U.S. government memo from 1979, President Carter clearly outlines U.S. propaganda goals against the Soviet Union in the context of Afghanistan: White House Memo of 3 July 1979, President Carter on Situation in Afghanistan (accessed from CSPAN.Org, Declassified 25 June 1999). (1979, July 3). Retrieved August 29, 2009, from http://www.c‐span.org/PresidentialLibraries/Content/Carter/CarterAfghanistan.pdf 149 Anatoly Chernyaev's Notes from the Politburo CC CPSU Session of October 17, 1985. (2001, October 9). Retrieved from The September 11th Source Books, Volume II: Afghanistan, Lessons from the Last War (The National Security Archive, Edited by Svetlana Savranskaya): http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB57/r17.pdf 49 conflicts, noting that a wide variety of international institutions and networks can spread a political message quickly throughout the world, and with great consequences.150 Soviet strategy took into account various international institutions when considering the information campaign for Afghanistan, placing great importance on achieving success in this area. Soviet leaders repeatedly discussed the Afghanistan situation in the context of the global arena and their standing vis‐à‐vis competing powers. This is illustrated in a letter from Leonid Brezhnev to Fidel Castro in march of 1980: “You are right, Fidel, that in the current complicated circumstances, there is an opportunity for Cuba to move towards implementing a more active attempt… to support international security. This is even more important, because the imperialistic powers try to place all causes of international tension in Afghanistan, using it to distract attention away from their own dangerous activities”.151 In a conversation with a western reporter in 1981, the Soviet representative expressed the government stance and prevailing understanding of the situation at the time, “literally everyday in the US there is spread new fabrications about the foreign policy of the USSR, and this is done not only by the press, but even more by official representatives of the administration”.152 During the war in Afghanistan Soviet analysts would often mention that the United States and China saw the situation simply as an opportunity to hurt the USSR and promote the spread of anti‐Soviet sentiments around the globe.153 The Soviets viewed such countries to be uninterested in stabilizing Afghanistan, and focused primarily on inflicting damage on 150 Hammes, C. T. (2004). The Sling and the Stone. St. Paul, MN, USA: Zenith Press, 212. 151 “Vypiska iz protokola No. 187 zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS ot 10 marta 1980 goda: O nashei dal’neishei vneshnepoliticheskoi linii v svyazi s Afganistanom i ob otvete na obrashchenie F. Kastro,” 10 March 1980 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 34, D. 5, Ll. 6 (v Prilozhenii I; in Appendix I of this document). 152 “TsK KPSS: O besede s rukovoditelem amerikanskoi kompanii ‘Taim‐Laif’,” 22 October 1981 (Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 76, D. 31, Ll. 2‐3. 153 “Vypiska iz protokola No. 181 zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS ot 28 janvarya 1980 goda: O dal’neishikh meropriyatiyakh po obespecheniyu gosudarstvennykh interesov SSSR v svyazi s sobytiyami v Afganistane,” 28 January 1980 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 34, D. 3, Ll. 2. 50 the Soviet Union.154 Afghan leaders felt themselves to be victims of propaganda aimed at weakening their government as well. In a conversation with A. N. Kosygin on 20 March 1979, President Taraki complained that “Pakistani propaganda twisted our programs regarding social freedoms for women… and turned to politics of sabotage…against us”.155 This battle for propaganda, of course, was conducted with greater global political objectives in mind, but it was also an important aspect in insurgency and counterinsurgency. As I have noted above, the information battle is vital in counterinsurgency: the insurgent wins if he can convince the counterinsurgent’s population or policymakers that the pursued “strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly for the perceived benefit”.156 The counterinsurgent must therefore attempt to thwart such an information campaign. In the context of the Soviet‐Afghan war, the Soviet Union had to counteract attempts conducted by a broad and powerful coalition of countries. Accordingly, Soviet leaders undertook substantial measures in propaganda directed toward international audiences. These strategies included exploiting the differences between the allies in NATO and hindering the development of ties between the United States and China in an effort to weaken solidarity on the question of Afghanistan.157 Also, there were initiatives to gain support for the Soviet Union amongst the leaders of Socialist countries and other large socio‐political organizations.158 The Central Committee of the CPSU sent letters of explanation of the Afghanistan situation to communist affiliated organizations all over the world; in one document forty‐six such organizations are listed as 154 This sentiment is clear in the following meeting of the Politburo: “Zasedanie
Politbyuro TsK KPSS 13 noyabrya 1986 goda: O dal’neishikh merakh po Afganistanu,” 13 November 1986 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 14, D. 41, Ll. 4. 155 “Zapis’ Besedy A.N. Kosygina, A.A. Gromyko, D.F. Ustinova, B.N. Ponomareva s N.M. Taraki 20 marta 1979 g.,” 20 March 1979 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 42, D. 3, Ll. 5. 156 COL Hammes, T. (2007, May‐June). Fourth Generation War Evolves, Fifth Emerges. Military Review , 14‐21, 14, 29. 157 “Vypiska iz protokola No. 181 zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS ot 28 janvarya 1980 goda: O dal’neishikh meropriyatiyakh po obespecheniyu gosudarstvennykh interesov SSSR v svyazi s sobytiyami v Afganistane,” 28 January 1980 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 34, D. 3, Ll. 3. 158 “Vypiska iz protokola No. 181 zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS ot 28 janvarya 1980 goda: O dal’neishikh meropriyatiyakh po obespecheniyu gosudarstvennykh interesov SSSR v svyazi s sobytiyami v Afganistane,” 28 January 1980 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 34, D. 3, Ll. 2‐3. 51 recipients of such a letter.159 The Soviets also sought to court Middle Eastern countries in hopes of preventing Islamic movements from assuming an anti‐Soviet posture.160 In 1980 the Soviet government encouraged the Kabul regime to publicize their political platform because it “would be timely from the perspective of… having an effect on the positions of countries that are participants in the… session of ministers… of Islamic governments”.161 The support for anti‐American elements in Iranian foreign policy was also encouraged, as it would potentially weaken support for the US‐backed opposition movement in Afghanistan.162 It was also noted that it would be helpful to discredit pro‐
mujahedeen leaders in the Afghan émigré community, as well as highlight the destructive effects of US and Chinese‐backed fighters in Afghanistan.163 The effort to uncover and discredit foreign support for the Afghan insurgency had been part of policy since the beginning of the conflict. Even before the invasion, top Soviet leaders agreed that an element of their Afghan strategy would be “preparing materials, revealing meddling in Afghanistan’s affairs on the part of Pakistan, Iran, the U.S., and China, and publicizing these materials through a third party”.164 Soviet ambassadors received explicit instructions about how to present the issue of Afghanistan. These instructions urged them to point out that Soviet and Afghan cooperation against insurgent groups was consistent with article 51 of the UN’s charter, which supports 159 “Vypiska is protokola No. 177 zasedaniya Politbyuro TsK KPSS ot 27 dekabrya 1979 goda: O nashikh shagakh v svyazi s razvitiem obstanovki vokrug Afganistan,” 27 December 1979 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op14, D. 33, Ll. 26 (this list comes at the end of the document under the heading: “Spisok kommunisticheskikh i rabochikh partii nesotsialisticheskikh stran, kotorym napravlyaetsya pis’mo TsK KPSS”). 160 “Vypiska iz protokola No. 181 zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS ot 28 janvarya 1980 goda: O dal’neishikh meropriyatiyakh po obespecheniyu gosudarstvennykh interesov SSSR v svyazi s sobytiyami v Afganistane,” 28 January 1980 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 34, D. 3, Ll. 4. 161 “Vypiska iz protokola No. 195 zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS ot 8 maya 1980 goda: O predlozheniyakh po politicheskomu uregulirovaniu v svyazi s Afganistanom,” 8 May 1980 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 34, D. 8, Ll. 2 (v Prilozhenii I; in Appendix I of this document). 162 “Vypiska iz protokola No. 181 zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS ot 28 janvarya 1980 goda: O dal’neishikh meropriyatiyakh po obespecheniyu gosudarstvennykh interesov SSSR v svyazi s sobytiyami v Afganistane,” 28 January 1980 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 34, D. 3, Ll. 4. 163 “Vypiska iz protokola No. 181 zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS ot 28 janvarya 1980 goda: O dal’neishikh meropriyatiyakh po obespecheniyu gosudarstvennykh interesov SSSR v svyazi s sobytiyami v Afganistane,” 28 January 1980 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 34, D. 3, Ll. 4‐5. 164 “Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 17 marta 1979 goda: Ob obostrenii obstanovki v Demokraticheskoi Respublike Afganistan i nashikh vozmozhnykh merakh,” 17 March 1979, in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 25, D. 1, Ll. 12. 52 the right of individual or collective self‐defense in the case of an attack.165 The Soviet representative at the United Nations was explicitly ordered to thwart all attempts at including the issue of Afghanistan in the daily agenda.166 A list of explanations and arguments was provided in case the matter was accepted for formal discussion.167 In such a circumstance, it was to be emphasized that Soviet troops were in Afghanistan only for the purpose of helping the government and people of Afghanistan against outside aggression in accordance with the Soviet‐Afghan treaty of 1978, and that these troops would leave as soon as the threat subsided.168 In 1980, the Central Committee of the CPSU gave special instructions for lobbying the Soviet perspective on Afghanistan at a conference of the Inter‐Parliamentary Union in response to anti‐Soviet bias in the organization.169 Afghan representatives were advised to send a letter of protest to the Union’s chair, declaring such discussions to be meddling in internal Afghan affairs.170 Overall, the Soviet leadership supported the propaganda campaign on all fronts. In a document of the Central Committee of the CPSU a plan was outlined to “continue the broad publication of counter‐propaganda materials of Soviet and foreign authors, that expose the falsifications of the western media”.171 165 Charter of the United Nations. (n.d.). Retrieved August 11, 2009, from UN Website: http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/index.shtml 166 “Vypiska is protokola No. 177 zasedaniya Politbyuro TsK KPSS ot 27 dekabrya 1979 goda: O nashikh shagakh v svyazi s razvitiem obstanovki vokrug Afganistan,” 27 December 1979 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op14, D. 33, Ll. 9 (v Prilozhenii 3; in Appendix 3 of this document (a letter to the representative in NY). 167 “Vypiska is protokola No. 177 zasedaniya Politbyuro TsK KPSS ot 27 dekabrya 1979 goda: O nashikh shagakh v svyazi s razvitiem obstanovki vokrug Afganistan,” 27 December 1979 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op14, D. 33, Ll. 9 (v Prilozhenii 3; in Appendix 3 of this document (a letter to the representative in NY). 168 “Vypiska is protokola No. 177 zasedaniya Politbyuro TsK KPSS ot 27 dekabrya 1979 goda: O nashikh shagakh v svyazi s razvitiem obstanovki vokrug Afganistan,” 27 December 1979 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op14, D. 33, Ll. 15 (v Prilozhenii 6; in Appendix 6 of this document (“O propagandistkom obespechenii nashei aktsii v otnoshenii Afganistana”). 169 “Postanovlenie Sekretariata TsK Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza: O merakh protiv obsuzhdeniya na 67‐I Konferentsii Mezhparlamentskogo soyuza proekta rezolyutsii, soderzhashchei antisovetskoi I antiafganskoi napravlennosti,” 9 September 1980 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 43, D. 31, Ll. 1. 170 “Postanovlenie Sekretariata TsK Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza: O merakh protiv obsuzhdeniya na 67‐I Konferentsii Mezhparlamentskogo soyuza proekta rezolyutsii, soderzhashchei antisovetskoi I antiafganskoi napravlennosti,” 9 September 1980 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 43, D. 31, Ll. 3. 171 “Perechen’ svedenii, razreshaemykh k otkrytomu opublikovaniu, otnositel’no deistvii ogranichennogo kontingenta sovetskikh voisk na territorii DRA (v sootvetsvii s Postanovleniem TsK KPSS P206/2 7.6.85g.),” 25 June 1985 (Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 11, D. 103, Ll. 5. 53 Media coverage of the Afghan conflict was tightly controlled by Soviet leaders, who were interested in cultivating a positive image of the war in the USSR and abroad. Soviet government officials approved various restrictions and guidance for the portrayal of events in Afghanistan. This guidance was clearly aimed at shaping the opinions of the Soviet population. As noted above, retaining the Soviet people’s support for the war was important for leaders whose policies entailed continuing financial expenditures and human sacrifice. Central committee documents specify that Soviet troops were to be portrayed primarily in their daily activities and training alongside their Afghan counterparts; describing Soviet troops providing medical help to Afghans was specifically mentioned.172 Stories, pictures and other mention of PDPA party members and government officials meeting with Soviet troops were also encouraged.173 Describing the danger of surprise attacks on Soviet and Afghan units that were conducting routine activities was encouraged in order to show the destructive nature of the opposition movement.174 Description of the heroism and sacrifice of Soviet soldiers was also to be emphasized, as were award ceremonies, though discussion of actual combat was discouraged.175 Soviet press sources were also directed to accentuate the constructive nature of the presence of the Soviet troops: depictions of Soviet troops building and protecting economic infrastructure were encouraged.176 The Soviet government also encouraged stories and reports about Soviet aircraft and other vehicles disbursing goods and services to local populations.177 172 “Perechen’ svedenii, razreshaemykh k otkrytomu opublikovaniu, otnositel’no deistvii ogranichennogo kontingenta sovetskikh voisk na territorii DRA (v sootvetsvii s Postanovleniem TsK KPSS P206/2 7.6.85g.),” 25 June 1985 (Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 11, D. 103, Ll. 2‐3. 173 “Perechen’ svedenii, razreshaemykh k otkrytomu opublikovaniu, otnositel’no deistvii ogranichennogo kontingenta sovetskikh voisk na territorii DRA (v sootvetsvii s Postanovleniem TsK KPSS P206/2 7.6.85g.),” 25 June 1985 (Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 11, D. 103, Ll. 2. 174 “Perechen’ svedenii, razreshaemykh k otkrytomu opublikovaniu, otnositel’no deistvii ogranichennogo kontingenta sovetskikh voisk na territorii DRA (v sootvetsvii s Postanovleniem TsK KPSS P206/2 7.6.85g.),” 25 June 1985 (Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 11, D. 103, Ll. 3. 175 “Perechen’ svedenii, razreshaemykh k otkrytomu opublikovaniu, otnositel’no deistvii ogranichennogo kontingenta sovetskikh voisk na territorii DRA (v sootvetsvii s Postanovleniem TsK KPSS P206/2 7.6.85g.),” 25 June 1985 (Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 11, D. 103, Ll. 2. 176 “Perechen’ svedenii, razreshaemykh k otkrytomu opublikovaniu, otnositel’no deistvii ogranichennogo kontingenta sovetskikh voisk na territorii DRA (v sootvetsvii s Postanovleniem TsK KPSS P206/2 7.6.85g.),” 25 June 1985 (Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 11, D. 103, Ll. 3. 177 “Perechen’ svedenii, razreshaemykh k otkrytomu opublikovaniu, otnositel’no deistvii ogranichennogo kontingenta sovetskikh voisk na territorii DRA (v sootvetsvii s Postanovleniem TsK KPSS P206/2 7.6.85g.),” 25 June 1985 (Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 11, D. 103, Ll. 3. 54 These restrictions were clearly meant to preserve positive impressions of the situation in Afghanistan amongst the Soviet people. In a 1981 meeting of the Politburo, Yuri Andropov was careful to adopt measures downplaying Soviet combat losses, advising against too many memorials and mentioning that notifications to the families of fallen soldiers “ought to be brief and as standard as possible”.178 Soviet leaders allowed only limited discussion of the sacrifice of Soviet soldiers in the media. The press was authorized to report only one account of a soldier wounded or killed per month.179 Soviet leaders pursued numerous initiatives in the area of information warfare, aimed at various audiences that influenced the outcome of the Afghan conflict. While these measures did not necessarily result in the overall success desired by the Kremlin, it is clear that the Soviets were diligent in their efforts in propaganda as a part of counterinsurgency strategy. These efforts indicate that the Soviets were not relying on force alone, but were cognizant of the need to win support by means of persuasion. Economic Initiatives “The majority of Afghans simply want security, peace, and prosperity and will swing to support the side that appears most likely to prevail and to meet these needs” – David Kilcullen180 The counterinsurgent’s main goal is to win over “the country’s people and their belief in and support of their government”.181 As noted earlier, this support must be earned through a comprehensive and coordinated effort, pursued with tact and consideration for the culture and conditions of each part of the country. Counterinsurgency theorists often 178 Meeting of the Central Committee of the CPSU 31 June: Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 544. 179 “Perechen’ svedenii, razreshaemykh k otkrytomu opublikovaniu, otnositel’no deistvii ogranichennogo kontingenta sovetskikh voisk na territorii DRA (v sootvetsvii s Postanovleniem TsK KPSS P206/2 7.6.85g.),” 25 June 1985 (Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 11, D. 103, Ll. 3. 180 Kilcullen, D. (2009). The Accidental Guerilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One. New York, USA: Oxford University Press, Inc.,66. 181 Sepp, K. I. (2005, May‐June). Best Practices in Counterinsurgency. Military Review , 9. 55 divide the aspects of counterinsurgency into various categories. Economic aid and development is an important category in almost every theory.182 Initiatives in economic aid and development represent an essential tool for winning support for a counterinsurgency, and sustaining military and political gains. Areas that have been cleared of insurgents and are administered by the central government, but remain impoverished, are likely to revert back to insurgent control.183 Like most aspects of counterinsurgency, economic aid must be carried out in a thoughtful and systematic manner to have the lasting effect that is desired. Both short‐term relief and long‐term programs must take place to foster the stabilization that is so important for the counterinsurgent to provide to the population.184As David Kilcullen writes, economic initiatives cannot be separate from political goals: economic assistance must be provided in such a way that it motivates the population to support the government over the insurgency.185 This means that economic initiatives must meet immediate needs as well as provide for future prosperity. As will be outlined below, Soviet economic initiatives in Afghanistan were considerable and included elements designed for addressing these issues. Soviet leaders understood the importance of supporting economic growth in Afghanistan. This is seen in documents from the Central Committee that note the importance of the “establishment of a normal economic situation in the country… and of improving the economic situation of the working class in the city and in the country… [and 182 For works that divide counterinsurgency efforts into various ‘pillars’ or areas, see: Kilcullen, D. D. (2006, September 28). Three Pillars of Counterinsurgency. Retrieved September 1, 2009, from Remarks delivered at U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Conference: http://www.tamilnation.org/armed_conflict/3pillars_of_counterinsurgency.pdf. Also: McFate, P. J., & Jackson, A. (2006, January/February). The Object Beyond War: Counterinsurgency and the Four Tools of Political Competition. Military Review , 56‐69. 183 Such situations occurred in Afghanistan. For example, it was reported in a meeting of the Politburo that mujahedeen‐controlled areas often enjoyed a better supplies (from Pakistan) than government‐controlled areas did. This kind of situation clearly made it less likely that the population would place confidence in the Kabul government. See: “Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 13 noyabrya 1986 goda: O dal’neishikh merakh po Afganistanu,” 13 November 1986 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 14, D. 41, Ll. 8­9. 184 Kilcullen, D. D. (2006, September 28). Three Pillars of Counterinsurgency. Retrieved September 1, 2009, from Remarks delivered at U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Conference: http://www.tamilnation.org/armed_conflict/3pillars_of_counterinsurgency.pdf, 6. 185 Kilcullen, D. (2009). The Accidental Guerilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One. New York, USA: Oxford University Press, Inc., 67. 56 the] balanced, mutually beneficial cooperation between the government and private sector”.186 Soviet leaders understood the need to integrate economic initiatives with political considerations, the importance of which is also noted by David Kilcullen. This understanding was clearly expressed in Soviet government analysis even before the invasion in 1979, which noted the need “to examine… the questions of…economic aid to Afghanistan…[and] which [kind of aid] would best facilitate the strengthening of the political positions of the revolutionary‐democratic regime”.187 In an attempt at gaining support and assuring the population of their goodwill and the bright prospects of siding with the government, Soviet leaders attempted to display the prosperity of Central Asian republics as an example of success by referring “to the achievements in socio‐economic development of the Central Asian republics over the years of Soviet rule”.188 The intentions and understanding of Soviet leaders regarding the need to stimulate the Afghan economy did not translate into success in all cases. Nevertheless, the Soviet leadership made substantial efforts to stimulate the Afghan economy in a range of industries, focused on developing infrastructure, exploiting natural resources, and developing the skills of Afghan cadres in order to make use of increased economic capabilities. There are multiple sources that provide a characterization of the levels of economic support, each with their statistical qualities and characteristics. The data used in this paper cannot be considered an exhaustive or integrated record of Soviet economic aid during this time period, but they clearly support the proposition that both the intention and the implementation of Soviet policies in Afghanistan attempted to complement military efforts with non‐military programs. One of these sources is the record of Soviet formal agreements published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.189 The general proposals and the specific 186 “Vypiska iz protokola No. 181 zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS ot 28 janvarya 1980 goda: O dal’neishikh meropriyatiyakh po obespecheniyu gosudarstvennykh interesov SSSR v svyazi s sobytiyami v Afganistane,” 28 January 1980 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 34, D. 3, Ll. 7. 187 “Vypiska iz protokola No. 149 zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS ot 12 aprelya 1979 goda: O nashei dal’neishei linii v svyazi s polozheniem v Afganistane,” 12 April 1979 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 42, D. 4, Ll. 9. 188 “Vypiska iz protokola No. 149 zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS ot 12 aprelya 1979 goda: O nashei dal’neishei linii v svyazi s polozheniem v Afganistane,” 12 April 1979 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 42, D. 4, Ll. 11. 189 Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del SSSR. (1981‐1990). Sbornik Mezhdunarodnykh Dogovorov SSSR (Vol. XXXV‐
XLIV). Moscow, Russia. 57 projects indicate the breadth of the economic and political goals envisioned by the Soviet and Afghan governments. Graphic 1 in Appendix I shows the proposed levels of support for various categories of economic projects. For multi‐year agreements and projects, an estimated average allocation of proposed funds is used. However, the actual disbursements varied as is seen in other data sources.190 Over the course of the Soviet‐Afghan war, amounts of Soviet economic assistance to Afghanistan were at levels far above those that had existed during the decades‐long relationship between the two countries.191 According to one source, disbursed economic assistance from 1970‐1974 totaled 96 million dollars; this jumped to a total of 467 million dollars from 1980‐1984.192 See Appendix I, Graphic 2 for a graphical representation of this substantial increase in economic aid. This trend indicates a deliberate effort by the Soviet Union to use economic measures in the Afghan counterinsurgency effort. A letter from the chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, N.I. Ryzhkov, to the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, M.S. Gorbachev provides an additional snapshot of Soviet economic expenditures in Afghanistan.193 According to this document, non‐military economic expenditures from the USSR to Afghanistan increased from 453 million rubles in 1986 to 1258 million rubles in 1987.194 This source also indicates that average Soviet daily expenditures (military and non‐military combined) in Afghanistan steadily increased from 1984 to 1987, climbing from 4.3 million rubles in 1984 to 14.7 million rubles in 1987.195 Categories of this assistance included aid intended to stimulate Afghan economic productivity by providing increased prices on Afghan exports bought by 190 Bach, Q. V. (2003). Soviet Aid to the Third World: the Facts and Figures. Sussex, England: The Book Guild Ltd. 191 Afghanistan received aid from the Soviet Union beginning in 1921. Military aid, trade in natural resources, and support for infrastructure development continued on up through the Soviet‐Afghan war: Bach, Q. V. (2003). Soviet Aid to the Third World: the Facts and Figures. Sussex, England: The Book Guild Ltd, 83. 192 See: Bach, Q. V. (2003). Soviet Aid to the Third World: the Facts and Figures. Sussex, England: The Book Guild Ltd, 136 (Appendix V). 193 “Spravka: O raskhodakh SSSR v Afganistane,” 8 January 1988, in: Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 758. 194 “Spravka: O raskhodakh SSSR v Afganistane,” 8 January 1988, in: Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 758. 195 “Spravka: O raskhodakh SSSR v Afganistane,” 8 January 1988, in: Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 758. 58 the USSR, such as gas, wool and other goods (see Appendix I, Graphic 3 for a graphical representation of the statistics from this document).196 As discussed above, both long and short‐term economic initiatives are important in counterinsurgency. Recent U.S. experience in Iraq has illustrated the importance of finding this balance between large‐scale initiatives and those designed to induce more immediate economic stimulation.197 Overemphasis of large‐scale projects can result in the neglect of issues important for inspiring grassroots support for the counterinsurgent. In order to win this support, the counterinsurgent must not only develop the economy at high levels, but also provide employment opportunities and basic goods and services. Soviet government officials understood the need to provide immediate and noticeable improvement to the Afghan economy. An analysis of the Central Committee mentions the need, “to focus Afghan leaders on the development… of those branches of the economy, which would help solve social problems [and] provide for the employment of the population”.198 Soviet leadership did follow through on this point to some extent, providing large amounts of staple foods and other goods to Afghanistan over the course of the war. However, as General Liakhovsky recounts, Soviet troops themselves suffered from shortages in supplies, as many goods were intercepted in the provinces en route to their destinations.199 This, of course, made providing the Afghan population with necessary goods problematic. Nevertheless, General 196 “Spravka: O raskhodakh SSSR v Afganistane,” 8 January 1988, in: Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 758. This kind of assistance had been in place since before the Soviet invasion. For example, Soviet documents show that in March 1979 the price of gas sold by Afghanistan to the Soviet Union was raised in order to give the Kabul government extra funds. See: “Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 17 marta 1979 goda: Ob obostrenii obstanovki v Demokraticheskoi Respublike Afganistan i nashikh vozmozhnykh merakh,” 17 March 1979, in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 25, D. 1, Ll. 5. 197 As illustrated in the experience of the U.S. in Iraq, it is easy for a disconnect to develop between those in the field who see where economic aid ought to be applied and those who decide where that aid actually goes. Those farther away from the field tend to support larger projects, while those in the field tend to support those projects which produce jobs quickly for the local population. While both kinds of projects are necessary, it is fruitless to limit efforts to large economic initiatives that do not benefit local citizens concretely, thus securing their support for the government. General Colin Powell is quoted as repeating that ‘the ‘field’ is always right’, meaning that the instincts of those on the ground ought to be heeded: Mines, K. W. (2006, September 28). Economic Tools in Counterinsurgency and Postconflict Stabilization: Lessons Learned (and Relearned) in al Anbar, Iraq, 2003­04. Retrieved September 4, 2009, from Foreign Policy Research Institute: http://www.fpri.org/enotes/20060928.military.mines.economictoolscounterinsurgency.html 198 “Vypiska iz protokola No. 149 zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS ot 12 aprelya 1979 goda: O nashei dal’neishei linii v svyazi s polozheniem v Afganistane,” 12 April 1979 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 42, D. 4, Ll. 9. 199 Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 757. Also see: Bach, Q. V. (2003). Soviet Aid to the Third World: the Facts and Figures. Sussex, England: The Book Guild Ltd, 84. 59 Liakhovsky notes that the Soviet military command organized the disbursement of basic goods, such as flour and kerosene, which “did improve people’s lives to some extent”.200 Overall, however, due to strained supply lines and limited control over the countryside, initiatives to improve employment or stimulate local economies were not widespread in Afghanistan. This was a significant weakness of the Soviet economic program. Published agreements between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan during the period of the Soviet‐Afghan war include numerous programs and generous credits aimed at stimulating Afghanistan’s economy. To illustrate the overall trend of Soviet programs throughout Afghanistan, a sampling of programs from the following categories will be discussed below: natural resources, construction, agricultural development and training. The use of natural resources was an important category in Soviet‐Afghan economic initiatives. In an agreement totaling covering the years 1979‐1984 and totaling 270 million rubles, there were projects for construction of a mining operation in Ainak, an oil refinery, and oil wells in Angot, Akdarya and Kashkari.201 In another agreement signed in 1988, plans were set to enhance the natural gas industry, to include projects for exploration and construction of facilities.202 See Appendix I, Graphic 4 for a graphical representation of funds allocated to this sector of the economy during the Soviet‐Afghan war. Construction, improvement and maintenance of infrastructure was an aspect of most project agreements. For example, an agreement for the years 1979‐1984 included construction and improvement of an airport in the region of Kabul, and six other airports in northeast Afghanistan.203 Another agreement for 1981‐1985 included plans for the construction of three professional‐technical schools.204 In an agreement signed in 1979, 200 Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 756‐7. 201 Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del SSSR. (1981). Sbornik Mezhdunarodnykh Dogovorov SSSR (Vol. XXXV). Moscow, Russia, 191‐195. 202 Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del SSSR. (1990). Sbornik Mezhdunarodnykh Dogovorov SSSR (Vol. XLIV). Moscow, Russia, 268‐271. 203 Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del SSSR. (1981). Sbornik Mezhdunarodnykh Dogovorov SSSR (Vol. XXXV). Moscow, Russia, 191‐196. 204 Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del SSSR. (1983). Sbornik Mezhdunarodnykh Dogovorov SSSR (Vol. XXXVII). Moscow, Russia, 93‐94. 60 plans were agreed upon for the construction of seven tractor‐manufacturing facilities.205 Included in this same agreement were initiatives to promote the use of modern agricultural methods.206 See Appendix I, Graphic 5 for graphical representation of projects in construction and agriculture. Most projects included exchange and training of Afghan workers. Soviet specialists were routinely sent to Afghanistan, and Afghan workers were also hosted for training in the USSR. One typical project, for 1980‐1984, included provisions for creating five training sites in Afghanistan, the hosting of 350 Afghan workers per year for three month training sessions in the USSR, and the arrival of 115 Soviet specialists to work as instructors in Afghan institutions.207 This aspect of Soviet economic assistance was very widespread – there were numerous opportunities for Afghans to study in the USSR and many Soviet specialists were sent to Afghanistan as trainers.208 Soviet aid to Afghanistan’s economy in the form of economic credits, unremunerated assistance and training was substantial during the Soviet‐Afghan war. Soviet leaders hoped that stimulating the Afghan economy would increase support for the PDPA government and decrease support for the Afghan resistance. Despite many promising elements in this component of their program, however, the potential of economic initiatives was greatly limited by other aspects of the counterinsurgency situation in Afghanistan. Wide‐ranging programs in rural areas were unrealistic due to lack of government influence throughout the country. Centralized decision‐making and poor mechanisms for integrating civil and military operations resulted in economic programs that were not supported by military actions, and vice versa. Nevertheless, it is clear that Soviet leaders understood the importance of economic tools for counterinsurgency and worked at implementing measures in this area. In the latter stages of the Soviet incursion, Soviet leaders came to an 205 Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del SSSR. (1981). Sbornik Mezhdunarodnykh Dogovorov SSSR (Vol. XXXV). Moscow, Russia, 195‐198. 206 Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del SSSR. (1981). Sbornik Mezhdunarodnykh Dogovorov SSSR (Vol. XXXV). Moscow, Russia, 195‐198. 207 Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del SSSR. (1981). Sbornik Mezhdunarodnykh Dogovorov SSSR (Vol. XXXV). Moscow, Russia, 197‐198. 208 Many of these training opportunities are listed in this paper’s sections on propaganda and social initiatives. 61 accommodation by using the U.N. as a channel of distribution. This is evident in some of the large multi‐year plans where half of the allocations were handled through the U.N.209 Increased allocations are seen at the end of the Soviet military involvement. The relation between non‐military initiatives and military actions is worthy of more study. The analysis in this paper indicates a broad range of Soviet non‐military and military efforts. The latter is discussed in the following chapter. Chapter 4. Soviet Counterinsurgency: Military Aspects “The military servicemen themselves, who were in Afghanistan, believed that they were fulfilling the duty of protecting the southern boundary of their homeland and that they were acting on behalf of the Afghan people. After all, the 40th Army was tasked with a peacekeeping mission – to facilitate the stabilization of the situation in the DRA [Democratic Republic of Afghanistan]” – Major General Liakhovsky210 Decentralization Zones of Responsibility Conducting a successful counterinsurgency requires maintaining a balance between coercion and persuasion, coordination between military and civilian entities and a unified effort carried out simultaneously by commanders across a region. It is necessary for military leadership to understand the effect of its actions, when to share responsibilities with civilian or host nation groups and how to instill unity of effort across the entire undertaking. Many counterinsurgency experts, including Roger Trinquier, David Galula and Kalev Sepp, maintain that counterinsurgency campaigns should be managed by one 209 Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del SSSR. (1990). Sbornik Mezhdunarodnykh Dogovorov SSSR (Vol. XLIV). Moscow, Russia, 278‐281. 210 Liakhovsky, A. (1995). Tragedia i Doblest' Afgana. Moscow: GPI Iskona, 617. 62 executive.211 One executive overseeing the counterinsurgency is meant to facilitate progress without confusion, and to coordinate all efforts effectively so that they complement one another. Diffuse leadership generally precludes orderly progress of this sort. In the current day, the United States military tries to incorporate this concept in its own counterinsurgency operations. General David Petraeus in Iraq, and now General Stanley McChrystal in Afghanistan are examples of leaders given substantial latitude in managing efforts across military and civilian agencies.212 One of the weaknesses of Soviet counterinsurgency in Afghanistan was the lack of decisive leadership and vision for the campaign. Leonid Brezhnev, Yuri Andropov, Konstantin Chernenko, and Mikhail Gorbachev were variously too feeble, fleeting or uncommitted to manage the situation in Afghanistan effectively.213 Soviet military leaders, regardless of their abilities or vision for the campaign, were tied to these administrations, as they had to approve plans through Moscow.214 This process was cumbersome, and, as Afghanistan veteran General Bogdanov notes, “limited the independence and initiative of the army command”.215 Bogdanov also writes that the centralization of the Soviet command structure gave Afghan leaders the ability of ceding too much responsibility to the Soviets for failures and overall planning.216 This structure and institutional ethos were not optimal in a 211 See: Trinquier, R. (1964). Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency. London: Praeger Security International, 73. Also: Galula, D. (2006). Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. London: Praeger Security International, 61. Also: Sepp, K. I. (2005, May‐June). Best Practices in Counterinsurgency. Military Review , 8‐12. 212 The following article outlines the high expectations placed on military leaders and the extent to which they answer for the overall counterinsurgency effort. In Afghanistan, newly appointed Gen. McChrystal is expected to make significant progress, but also afforded substantial resources: Chandrasekaran, R. (2009, August 17). Pentagon Worries Led to Command Change. Retrieved August 20, 2009, from The Washington Post: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp‐dyn/content/article/2009/08/16/AR2009081602304.html 213 In 1986 Gorbachev expressed the opinion that the Soviet military involvement should end in “one year – maximum two years”. This short time indicates the Gorbachev was not committed to a genuine counterinsurgency effort, and simply wanted to get out quickly for political reasons: “Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 13 noyabrya 1986 goda: O dal’neishikh merakh po Afganistanu,” 13 November 1986 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 14, D. 41, Ll. 3. 214 General Bogdanov, Gromov and Liakhovsky all describe the process of approving plans through the various levels of Soviet leadership. See: Bogdanov, V. Afganskaia Voina: 1979­1989. Moscow: Soviet Writer, 93‐4. Also: Gromov, B. (1994). Ogrannychenyi Kontingent. Moscow: Progress, 243‐4. Also: Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 492. 215 Bogdanov, V. Afganskaia Voina: 1979­1989. Moscow: Soviet Writer, 94‐5. 216 Bogdanov, V. Afganskaia Voina: 1979­1989. Moscow: Soviet Writer, 94‐5. 63 conflict where empowering host‐nation forces and timely responses to local situations and were highly important. While having one leader in charge of the overall effort is important, counterinsurgency experts such as Galula, Trinquier and Kilcullen also note that it is important to divide a given region into zones of responsibility, allowing subordinate leaders to manage each zone independently in promoting the campaign’s overarching intent. Both Galula and Trinqueir maintain that the commander of a zone should have authority on operations and programs therein, even over more senior officers in matters directly regarding his area of responsibility.217 The idea is that officers in the districts have the perspective needed to produce counterinsurgency efforts that correspond closely to local conditions. This is crucial, since the overarching counterinsurgency strategy must be implemented specially for each locale, as insurgencies tend to be “local… and are mosaic‐
like”.218 David Kilcullen emphasizes this point in his writings, urging that counterinsurgency is best conducted locally, arguing that ‘one size does not fit all’ across many regions.219 This concept is especially relevant in Afghanistan where diverse ethnicities and tribes make one region decidedly different from another. For example, initiatives for co‐opting Sunni Pashtun tribes in Kunar province, would be ill suited for the Shia Hazaras of Bamyan province. The Soviet command did work to incorporate the concept of regional zones and localized efforts. In the summer of 1980, prompted by Soviet leadership, Afghanistan was divided into eight military‐political zones of responsibility.220 A representative of the PDPA Central committee and Revolutionary Council was appointed to each zone to oversee military and political initiatives in the area. These representatives were tasked with 217 Galula, D. (2006). Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. London: Praeger Security International, 65. Trinquier, R. (1961). Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency. London: Praeger Security International, 73. 218 Teamey, K., & Sweet, L. J. (2006, September‐October). Organizing Intelligence for Counterinsurgency. Military Review , 24‐29. 219 Kilcullen, D. (2006). Twenty­Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company­level Counterinsurgency, 9. 220 Mitrokhin, V. (2002, July). The KGB in Afghanistan: Russian Edition. Retrieved May 2, 2009, from Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), www.CWIHP.org, by permission of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/va2/docs/WP40_Russian_Version.pdf, 69. 64 coordinating the activities of the Khad, Sarandoy221 and Soviet and Afghan military units.222 The Soviets augmented zone administrations with their own representatives from the Central Committee of the CPSU, KGB and Soviet army.223 Afghanistan’s area was further divided into twenty‐one smaller ‘regime zones’224, which were divided again into smaller components (uchastki).225 Uchastki included a guard post of about 20‐25 men, as well as Afghan government representatives.226 This structure resembles the one used by the French in Algeria, who divided that territory into six wilayas, and subsections within each wilaya.227 Trinqueir uses this example as an illustration of effective division of area for counterinsurgency strategy. One example of the local approach to counterinsurgency created in conjunction with local commands was the use of pro‐government defense committees to work at the city, village, street and neighborhood level.228 These committees were responsible for monitoring the appearance of newcomers and tracking the general mood of the population.229 As noted by U.S. forces in Iraq, local self‐defense personnel “provide great military value… and could easily pick out those who did not belong”.230 221 Sarandoy is the Afghan police force. 222 Mitrokhin, V. (2002, July). The KGB in Afghanistan: Russian Edition. Retrieved May 2, 2009, from Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), www.CWIHP.org, by permission of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/va2/docs/WP40_Russian_Version.pdf, 69. 223 Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 509. 224 The term in Russian is rezhimnaya zona. 225225 Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 533. 226 Bogdanov, V. Afganskaia Voina: 1979­1989. Moscow: Soviet Writer, 98. 227 Trinquier, R. (2006). Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency. London: Praeger Security International, 57. 228 Mitrokhin, V. (2002, July). The KGB in Afghanistan: Russian Edition. Retrieved May 2, 2009, from Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), www.CWIHP.org, by permission of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/va2/docs/WP40_Russian_Version.pdf, 73. 229 Mitrokhin, V. (2002, July). The KGB in Afghanistan: Russian Edition. Retrieved May 2, 2009, from Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), www.CWIHP.org, by permission of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/va2/docs/WP40_Russian_Version.pdf, 73. 230 Koloski, A. W., & Kolasheski, J. S. (2009). Thickening the Lines: Sons of a Iraq, A Combat Multiplier. Military Review , 89 (1), 41‐53. It is worth noting that the development of local self‐defense units in Iraq coincided with a troop surge that reinforced many of the positive results of the program. The Soviet forces in Afghanistan did not benefit from such a troop increase, one of the reasons their successes were reversed. 65 Role of Junior Officers As noted above, it is very important that counterinsurgency operations correspond closely with political and military conditions at the local level. This often means affording lower‐level officers increased responsibility and autonomy. As is true in any counterinsurgency, the implementation of strategy rests on the shoulders of soldiers and their junior officers. Roger Trinquier made special mention of this point in his book on counterinsurgency, noting that “guerrilla warfare is a war of lieutenants and young captains”.231 The Soviet army was at a disadvantage in this respect, because its command structure was highly centralized.232 Robert Cassidy notes that armies have a tendency to prepare for “the last good war”.233 In the Soviet case this tendency created a rigidly conventional mentality that was primarily focused on large engagements based on the experience of World War II. A centralized command structure was well suited for the large European battles envisioned by Soviet leaders, but the outcome was an institutional culture that tended to discourage junior officers and NCOs from taking the initiative. In Afghanistan, centralized command was a hindrance, because the rugged terrain and the nature of the enemy demanded timely and independent decisions on the part of company commanders and platoon leaders, as well as their NCOs. Junior leaders had heightened influence in the Afghan theater, as most missions were conducted by battalion‐sized units or smaller, and they often had unique knowledge of local conditions.234 The Soviet command did make adjustments to decentralize its structure as it became clear that successful operations required independent‐thinking officers. Commanders at the regiment and battalion level were given increased responsibility and 231 Trinquier, R. (2006). Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency. London: Praeger Security International, 74. 232 Cassidy, R. M. (2006). Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror. London: Praeger Security International, 49. 233 Cassidy, R. M. (2006). Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror. London: Praeger Security International, 49. 234 Bogdanov, V. Afganskaia Voina: 1979­1989. Moscow: Soviet Writer, 185. 66 autonomy in operations. This came in the form of added firepower and assets assigned to the battalion level to support smaller units in a wide variety of situations.235 This was referred to as the reinforced battalion.236 Also, starting in the first few years of the conflict, military leaders at the zone level were given increasing authority to conduct operations independently.237 This was an indication that the Soviet command understood the importance of encouraging autonomous action at all levels. One account of a Soviet senior lieutenant in 1982 illustrates the importance of junior leaders taking the initiative. Having been ordered to conduct a flanking maneuver, lieutenant Zelenskiy lost radio contact with his commanding officer and subordinates. At this point, the mission stalled and eventually had to be aborted. In this situation, both the senior lieutenant and his platoon leaders needed to react independently. The confusion after losing radio contact illustrates the broader theme that junior officers were unaccustomed to functioning without the guidance of officers above them.238 In another instance, an officer in charge of a convoy escort is criticized for insufficient pre‐mission rehearsals and preparations; the fact the officer is criticized for this deficiency suggests that junior officers and NCOs were not sufficiently relied upon to take responsibility for such tasks. Lester Grau correctly points out that NCOs should be responsible for such preparations, allowing officers to focus on other critical tasks.239 In response to such issues, Soviet leaders worked to develop the officer corps by establishing increased training opportunities for officers before and during deployment. In January of 1981, Defense Minister Ustinov issued a plan that included a section on training; the section’s main focus was the incorporation of combat experience into military training 235 Russian General Staff. (2002). The Soviet­Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 35. 236 Bodansky, Y. (1982‐3). The Bear on the Chessboard: Soviet Military Gains in Afghanistan. World Affairs , 145 (3), 283. 237 Mitrokhin, V. (2002, July). The KGB in Afghanistan: Russian Edition. Retrieved May 2, 2009, from Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), www.CWIHP.org, by permission of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/va2/docs/WP40_Russian_Version.pdf, 69. 238 Grau, L. (1991). The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan. Washington, DC, USA: National Defense University Press, 17. 239 Grau, L. (1991). The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan. Washington, DC, USA: National Defense University Press, 138‐9. 67 and the development of mountain and desert training programs.240 In 1982, an expanded training program was created, focusing on developing the skills and knowledge necessary for effective leadership in Afghanistan’s irregular war conditions.241 Officers spent more time learning to coordinate assets assigned to their unit – a very relevant skill, since more assets were being allocated to junior officers in order to facilitate independent action.242 On June 2nd of 1983 directive number 15/085 ordered the implementation of measures for enhanced training for officers.243 This was initially conducted at military academies, but later moved to a site near Tashkent, Uzbekistan.244 Officer training battalions increased in 1984 and 1985, and included the study of mujahedeen tactics and training for independent actions.245 In addition to this, officers went through an intensive course upon arrival to Afghanistan that focused on key skills for planning and combat. There were training segments aimed to help officers develop initiative, independence and creativity in mission planning and execution.246 Developing the NCO corps was acknowledged as important as well, and NCOs were increasingly included in training with commissioned officers.247Integrated training was important for heightening unit teamwork.248 In the final analysis, the Soviet military was unable to fully transition from its centralized and conventional military culture, and create an ethos effective for Afghanistan. Robert Cassidy notes, however, that such cultural change in a military institution often 240 This is found in a declassified document included in the appendix of General Alexander Liakhovsky’s history of the Afghan war: “Plan meropriyatii po povysheniu effektivnosti boevykh deistvii sovetskykh i afganskikh voisk v DRA, obobshcheniu i rasprostraneniu ikh boevogo opyta i sovershenstvovaniu oruzhiya na yanvar’ – mart 1981 goda,” 8 January 1981 (Secret), accessed in: Liakhovsky, A. (1995). Tragedia i Doblest' Afgana. Moscow: GPI Iskona, Appedix 3. 241 Russian General Staff. (2002). The Soviet­Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 45. 242 Russian General Staff. (2002). The Soviet­Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 45. 243 Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 541. 244 Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 541. 245 Russian General Staff. (2002). The Soviet­Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 44. Also: Bogdanov, V. Afganskaia Voina: 1979­1989. Moscow: Soviet Writer, 267. 246 Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 542. Also: Russian General Staff. (2002). The Soviet­Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 45. 247 Russian General Staff. (2002). The Soviet­Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 46. Also: Liakhovsky, A. (1995). Tragedia i Doblest' Afgana. Moscow: GPI Iskona, 193. 248 In translating discussions between Russian and U.S. generals at a Harvard Kennedy School conference in 2008, I noted that the principles of training NCOs remains a topic of interest for Russian military professionals, as this area of the Russian army continues to need improvement. Russian officers were very interested to learn about the organization of this training in the United States Army. 68 occurs over long periods of time, up to ten years – more time than the 40th Army spent in Afghanistan.249 Nevertheless, as I have outlined above, Soviet military leaders pursued many effective policies, attempting changes to better structure their force for the mission in Afghanistan. Limiting Outside Support for the Insurgency It is hard to overstate the significance of outside support for insurgencies. Military and political counterinsurgency initiatives, no matter how well formulated or executed, can have limited effect on an insurgency if it is sustained by substantial support from outside sources. Bernard Fall, Roger Trinquier and others discuss this issue in their works on counterinsurgency.250 Both Fall and Trinquier assert the importance of limiting outside support and the active targeting of enemy supply sources and sanctuaries with the use of guerilla tactics (even if these supply sources and sanctuaries are in other countries). Outside support was a central issue in the Soviet‐Afghan experience. This is evident in a letter from Leonid Brezhnev to Fidel Castro that “On our end we are for political normalization, but genuine normalization, aimed at… the effective and guaranteed cessation of aggression an all forms of interference in the matters of Afghanistan”.251 General Gromov writes that the question of patrolling Afghanistan’s borders was the first item of discussion in the morning meetings of the 40th Army’s headquarters.252 Not only was outside support an incendiary geopolitical issue, it had a great effect on the mujahedeen forces. Weapons, ammunition and fighters from Iran and Pakistan were 249 Cassidy, R. M. (2006). Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror. London: Praeger Security International, 38. 250 See: Fall, B. B. (1963). Street Without Joy: Insurgency in Indochina, 1946­63 (3rd Revised Edition). Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, USA: The Telegraph Press, 357‐362. Also: Trinquier, R. (2006). Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency. London: Praeger Security International, 79‐81. 251 “Vypiska iz protokola No. 187 zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS ot 10 marta 1980 goda: O nashei dal’neishei vneshnepoliticheskoi linii v svyazi s Afganistanom i ob otvete na obrashchenie F. Kastro,” 10 March 1980 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 34, D. 5, Ll. 3 (v Prilozhenii I; in Appendix I of this document). 252 Gromov, B. (1994). Ogrannychenyi Kontingent. Moscow: Progress, 220. Also see: A report on 7 April 1980 for the Central Committee of the CPSU, Situation inside Afghanistan and the Role of Soviet Troops: Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 452‐454. Also, a document of the Central Committee of CPSU, On Foreign Interference in Internal Affairs of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA): Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 466‐467. 69 important logistical supports for the Afghan resistance. This became especially true after the Soviets commenced increased aviation strikes on mujahedeen‐friendly areas within Afghanistan, destroying many domestic bases of support.253 It is also important to note that the outside support extended to the mujahedeen was considerable – as high as hundreds of millions of dollars per year ‐ coming from the United States, China, Saudi Arabia and other wealthy nations.254 Many in the United States saw the situation in Afghanistan as an opportunity to deliver a defeat to the Soviet Union. This is confirmed by Milt Bearden, a CIA officer in charge of a support program for the mujahedeen, who recounts that CIA director William Casey told him to ‘go over there and win’.255 Afghan war veteran Major General Liakhovsky saw the outside support for the mujahedeen as a mean‐spirited campaign perpetrated by those with deep hatred for Russia, considering CIA director William Casey the incarnation of the devil, and noting pointedly that his efforts helped support the rise of Osama bin Laden.256 Soviet leaders understood that eliminating outside support would severely weaken the mujahedeen. Bernard Fall writes, “A guerrilla force’s logistical requirements may be simpler than that of a large regular force, but it has some rock‐bottom needs which must be filled through outside support, or it dies”.257 Accordingly, significant time and effort was devoted to condemning outside support for the Afghan insurgency and coaxing foreign countries to end their activities. In 1980 Brezhnev authorized the withdrawal of certain units from Afghanistan with the expressed intent of using this move to win greater 253 In a report to the Minister of Defense in April 1986, General Varennikov discusses increasing the aerial targeting of mujahedeen sanctuaries: Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 648‐9. 254 Coll, S. (2004). Ghost Wars. New York: The Penguin Press, 65. 255 Bearden, M., & Risen, J. (2003). The Main Enemy: The Inside Story of the CIA's Final Showdown with the KGB. New York, New York, USA: Random House, 214. 256 Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 683‐4. 257 Fall, B. B. (1963). Street Without Joy: Insurgency in Indochina, 1946­63 (3rd Revised Edition). Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, USA: The Telegraph Press, 359. 70 cooperation from Pakistan and Iran and the ceasing of their support for the mujahedeen.258 This did not bring the desired results. Sealing the borders of Afghanistan by military means was an exceedingly difficult task. Roger Trinquier notes that frontier borders are a tough issue for the counterinsurgent; Afghanistan is a particularly difficult case due to difficult terrain and ethnic factors.259 When asked in 1979 why the border was not more closely controlled, President Taraki replied that “We are unable to do it due to the absence of the necessary means. Besides this, closing the Afghan‐Pakistani borders would evoke dissatisfaction on the part of both Afghan and Pakistani Pashtuns and Baluchis, which maintain close family ties, and it would ultimately hurt the prestige of the current government in Afghanistan”.260 These same issues continued throughout the war. Supplies and personnel entered Afghanistan through difficult mountain passes, in small caravans of pack animals, and over a long border unrecognized by tribes on either side. In a Politburo meeting in 1986, General Akhromeev noted this issue saying that “Soviet soldiers are working to seal the border [with Pakistan], but they are unable to close off all channels, through which supplies come across”.261 This task was so difficult, and the border so porous, that it was noted in a Politburo meeting that mujahedeen‐controlled areas often had better supplies (which came from Pakistan) than government‐controlled areas that supposedly had access to the resources of the Afghan state.262 Trinquier stresses the importance of working to combat outside support through closing borders to illicit traffic and attacking enemy bases in the fashion of guerilla fighters.263 The Soviet strategy in Afghanistan followed both these points of 258 “Vypiska is protokola No. 200 zasedaniya Politbyuro TsK KPSS ot 19 iyunya 1980 goda: O meropriyatiyakh v otnoshenii Afganistan,” 19 June 1980 (Top Secret), in Arkhiv Prezidenta RF, F. 3, Op. 82, D. 176, Ll. 9‐17 (accessed in Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 455). 259 Trinquier, R. (2006). Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency. London: Praeger Security International, 79. 260 “Zapis’ Besedy L.I. Brezhneva s N.M. Tarki 20 marta 1979 g. (V besede prinyali uchastie t.t. A.N. Kosygin, A.A. Gromyko, D.F. Ustinov i B.N. Ponomarev),” 20 March 1979 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 42, D. 2, Ll. 8. 261 “Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 13 noyabrya 1986 goda: O dal’neishikh merakh po Afganistanu,” 13 November
1986 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 14, D. 41, Ll. 8. 262 “Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 13 noyabrya 1986 goda: O dal’neishikh merakh po Afganistanu,” 13 November
1986 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 14, D. 41, Ll. 8­9. 263 Trinquier, R. (2006). Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency. London: Praeger Security International, 81. 71 recommendation, indicating sound elements of strategy on the part of Soviet leaders. Soviet leaders were discussing this issue from the beginning of the occupation. In April of 1980 a report to the CPSU mentioned the need for Soviet and Afghan forces to control Afghanistan’s borders to protect the country from outside threats.264 Vasiliy Mitrokhin notes that KGB leaders “insisted on the complete… sealing of the borders with Pakistan, Iran, China”.265 To this end, five thousand additional forces were emplaced on patrol duty, carrying out ambushes and otherwise intercepting mujahedeen caravans.266 In May of 1980, additional border troops were emplaced in the key areas bordering Pakistan and China; these troops were successful in securing a four hundred kilometer stretch of the border, closing off sixteen passes and routes into Afghanistan.267 In 1981, Andropov authorized intensification of efforts against enemy caravans. Five additional border troop brigades were assigned as a second line of intercept against the mujahedeen in 1981 by the order of Defense Minister Ustinov.268 These forces, as well as KGB special units, set ambushes and mined paths used by the enemy.269 These measures were substantial enough to prompt Babrak Karmal to say that, “Now, that in the name of saving the Afghan revolution the Soviet Union has taken such a serious step, the fates of our nations have indeed merged together”.270 264 A report on 7 April 1980 for the Central Committee of the CPSU, Situation inside Afghanistan and the Role of Soviet Troops: Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 452‐454. 265 Mitrokhin, V. (2002, July). The KGB in Afghanistan: Russian Edition. Retrieved May 2, 2009, from Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), www.CWIHP.org, by permission of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/va2/docs/WP40_Russian_Version.pdf, 68. 266 Mitrokhin, V. (2002, July). The KGB in Afghanistan: Russian Edition. Retrieved May 2, 2009, from Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), www.CWIHP.org, by permission of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/va2/docs/WP40_Russian_Version.pdf, 68. 267 Mitrokhin, V. (2002, July). The KGB in Afghanistan: Russian Edition. Retrieved May 2, 2009, from Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), www.CWIHP.org, by permission of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/va2/docs/WP40_Russian_Version.pdf, 68. 268 This is found in a declassified document included in the appendix of Alexander Liakhovsky’s history of the Afghan war: “Plan meropriyatii po povysheniu effektivnosti boevykh deistvii sovetskykh i afganskikh voisk v DRA, obobshcheniu i rasprostraneniu ikh boevogo opyta i sovershenstvovaniu oruzhiya na yanvar’ – mart 1981 goda,” 8 January 1981 (Secret), accessed in: Liakhovsky, A. (1995). Tragedia i Doblest' Afgana. Moscow: GPI Iskona, Appedix 3. 269 Mitrokhin, V. (2002, July). The KGB in Afghanistan: Russian Edition. Retrieved May 2, 2009, from Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), www.CWIHP.org, by permission of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/va2/docs/WP40_Russian_Version.pdf, 68. 270 Mitrokhin, V. (2002, July). The KGB in Afghanistan: Russian Edition. Retrieved May 2, 2009, from Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), www.CWIHP.org, by permission of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/va2/docs/WP40_Russian_Version.pdf, 69. 72 Efforts to close the borders of Afghanistan and limit support for the Afghan resistance continued for the duration of the conflict. Operation ‘Curtain’ began in 1984, and consisted of increased patrolling and ambushing of mujahedeen caravans.271 This effort, in revamped form, was renamed ‘Barrier’ in 1987.272 Special forces and KGB special units were increasingly used for these tasks.273 General Gromov notes that in 1985 two spetsnaz brigades were assigned to reinforce the effort to close off the border with Pakistan.274 Teams of helicopters were also used to patrol from the air, and would land with search crews to inspect caravans.275 Trinquier’s point that “with the methods of modern warfare, we must carry the war to the enemy” is echoed by Bernard Fall, who asserts that infiltrating enemy sanctuaries is necessary for undercutting an insurgency.276 The Soviets actively pursued this approach as well, cultivating agent networks and conducting special operations in Pakistan.277 Soviet efforts to close the border and limit insurgent supply processes did bring some success. Alexander Liakhovsky notes that in many regions in 1985 the mujahedeen “were deprived of large supply bases… military supplies, provisions, [and] medical equipment”.278 Shortages in supply were so intense at times that mujahedeen leadership organized special units specifically for maneuvering caravans past Soviet troops and into Afghanistan.279 Despite all the measures undertaken by the Soviets and their moments of 271 Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 521. 272 Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 521. 273 Major General Luchinsky’s account of this operation mentions this increased use of specialized units. See: Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 521. 274 Gromov, B. (1994). Ogrannychenyi Kontingent. Moscow: Progress, 199. 275 Russian General Staff (translated and edited by Lester W. Grau and Michael A. Gress). (2002). The Soviet­
Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 218‐219. Also: Everett‐
Heath, J. (1992). Helicopters in Combat. New York, New York, USA: Arms and Armour Press, 130. 276 Trinquier, R. (2006). Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency. London: Praeger Security International, 81. Also: Fall, B. B. (1963). Street Without Joy: Insurgency in Indochina, 1946­63 (3rd Revised Edition). Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, USA: The Telegraph Press, 357. 277 Many such operations directed at Pakistan and other countries are outlined in the following document: Mitrokhin, V. (2004, April). KGB Active Measures in Southwest Asia in 1980­82 . Retrieved May 24, 2009, from Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), www.CWIHP.org, by permission of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (document is in translation). : http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=va2.document&identifier=3FF29963‐
ABFA‐30E0‐
344EE1596C121EDF&sort=Subject&item=Soviet%20Union,%20relations%20with%20Afghanistan&print=true 278 Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 644. 279 Gromov, B. (1994). Ogrannychenyi Kontingent. Moscow: Progress, 205 73 efficacy, Afghanistan’s borders were still crossed by mujahedeen reinforcements and supplies throughout the conflict.280 The enduring sanctuaries in Pakistan and influx of support were major reasons the mujahedeen were able to withstand the Soviet army, and persist in spite of military defeats. The Soviet strategy regarding the borders and mujahedeen caravans clearly shows, however, that substantial attempts were made to address this problem. The Soviet command simply did not have enough troops to complete the task. Monitoring the Population Whether one approaches counterinsurgency from the population‐centric or enemy‐
centric approach, or somewhere in between, monitoring the population remains a vital element in the counterinsurgency effort. Monitoring and controlling the population helps the counterinsurgent limit contacts between the insurgent and the population. If the counterinsurgent is successful in limiting these contacts, this becomes a significant blow to the insurgent’s support system.281 Monitoring the population is also a vital element in intelligence gathering; in the context of counterinsurgency, understanding the mood of the population is often as important as accessing more classified information about the enemy.282 Roger Trinquier maintains that establishing strict curfews, issuing census cards and conducting broad ranging searches and interrogations are necessary for controlling the 280 General Akhromeev makes this point in the following document, expressing that even large numbers of Soviet troops are “unable to seal all channels across which supplies cross the border”, implying that there were just too many routes: “Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 13 noyabrya 1986 goda: O dal’neishikh merakh po Afganistanu,” 13 November 1986 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 14, D. 41, Ll. 8. 281 David Galula notes the importance of isolating the population from the insurgency, placing it in his ‘Strategy of Counterinsurgency. See: Galula, D. (2006). Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. London: Praeger Security International, 55‐56. 282 Teamey, K., & Sweet, L. J. (2006, September‐October). Organizing Intelligence for Counterinsurgency. Military Review , 24‐29. 74 population and isolating it from the insurgency.283 Soviet forces implemented all of these measures. Afghan war veteran and historian Major General Alexander Liakhovsky notes that all males over the age of thirteen were required to register with the Soviet authorities overseeing the area; it was required to carry documentation of this registration at all times.284 Curfews were maintained, as well as a mandatory registration process for any visitors or supplies entering the area.285 General V.A. Bogdanov notes that curfews were typically set for eleven pm and that the implementation of a personal identification document was completely new for Afghanistan.286 It was also necessary for Afghan citizens to receive special permission to host non‐family members in their homes.287 Law enforcement and intelligence agencies played an important role in monitoring the population. KGB‐trained Afghan law‐enforcement and security agencies were built up to significant numbers. In a meeting of Soviet leaders in 1986, General Akhromeev mentioned that there were 115,000 Afghan police troops and 20,000 Khad and other agency forces.288 Training local law enforcement and participating in police work is vital to the counterinsurgent, even though it is not traditionally a role played by the military. Trinquier notes that in counterinsurgency “Police action will… be actual operational warfare”.289 Security agencies conducted extensive search and interrogation operations in areas where the Kabul government projected its influence.290 Vasiliy Mitrokhin notes that these agencies helped create some two hundred self‐defense units that acted in support of the government, 283 Trinquier, R. (2006). Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency. London: Praeger Security International, 38‐41. 284 Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 532. 285 Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 532‐3. 286 Bogdanov, V. Afganskaia Voina: 1979­1989. Moscow: Soviet Writer, 96. 287 Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 532‐3. 288 “Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 13 noyabrya 1986 goda: O dal’neishikh merakh po Afganistanu,” 13 November
1986 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 14, D. 41, Ll. 8. 289 Trinquier, R. (2006). Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency. London: Praeger Security International, 41. 290 Mitrokhin, V. (2002, July). The KGB in Afghanistan: Russian Edition. Retrieved May 2, 2009, from Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), www.CWIHP.org, by permission of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/va2/docs/WP40_Russian_Version.pdf, 83. 75 providing agents and information.291 For example, in the first quarter of 1983 Afghan government agencies were using eight hundred agents that had infiltrated insurgent groups.292 Their information directed government forces in 140 air strikes and 360 local attacks.293 These forces also conducted many search operations to locate and destroy insurgent organizations. While the Soviets had a sound strategy in this area in many respects, they did not project influence into enough of the country to see the benefits of these measures. Lack of troops, poor infrastructure and Afghanistan’s rural society made it very difficult to sufficiently control the peaceful Afghan population and isolate them from the mujahedeen.294 One of the reasons that Soviets had difficulty projecting their influence throughout the country was that their forces were too few and spread too thinly. Soviet forces were often spread out in small remote outposts, having as many as 862 guarded objectives manned by some 20,200 troops.295 In order to address this problem, the Soviet command tried to consolidate forces and efforts in specific areas, as it was clear that relatively low troop levels precluded effective control of the entire country.296 Soviet leaders started with more peaceful regions in northern Afghanistan, establishing good surveillance of the 291 Mitrokhin, V. (2002, July). The KGB in Afghanistan: Russian Edition. Retrieved May 2, 2009, from Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), www.CWIHP.org, by permission of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/va2/docs/WP40_Russian_Version.pdf, 83. 292 Mitrokhin, V. (2002, July). The KGB in Afghanistan: Russian Edition. Retrieved May 2, 2009, from Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), www.CWIHP.org, by permission of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/va2/docs/WP40_Russian_Version.pdf, 83. 293 Mitrokhin, V. (2002, July). The KGB in Afghanistan: Russian Edition. Retrieved May 2, 2009, from Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), www.CWIHP.org, by permission of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/va2/docs/WP40_Russian_Version.pdf, 83. 294 Trinquier notes that insurgents are typically most vulnerable in towns, and difficult to counteract in more rural areas. Afghanistan, being mostly rural, was a difficult place to wage a counterinsurgency: Trinquier, R. (2006). Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency. London: Praeger Security International, 60. Also, the following article about current missions in Afghanistan illustrates the role that poor infrastructure plays in complicating efforts to project influence throughout the country: Dreazen, Y. J. (2009, March 4). U.S. Strategy Hinges on Far­Flung Outposts. Retrieved March 5, 2009, from The Wall Street Journal: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123611818947423107.html 295 Bogdanov, V. Afganskaia Voina: 1979­1989. Moscow: Soviet Writer, 98. Also, for an interesting description of conditions in U.S. outposts in Afghanistan, see: Chivers, C. (2008, November 9). G.I's in Remote Outposts Have Weary Job, Drawing Fire. Retrieved August 7, 2009, from The New York Times: http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/10/world/asia/10outpost.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1 296 Mitrokhin, V. (2002, July). The KGB in Afghanistan: Russian Edition. Retrieved May 2, 2009, from Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), www.CWIHP.org, by permission of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/va2/docs/WP40_Russian_Version.pdf, 73. 76 population, local self‐defense watch groups, and promoting economic and social initiatives.297 It was envisioned that sustained success in these regions would spread incrementally through the country.298 The attempt at consolidating aligns exactly with the recommendations of classical and modern counterinsurgency theorists. Starting efforts in the more peaceful areas follows the paradigm of the ‘ink blot’, a term used by Marshal Hubert Lyautey as a metaphor for the slow spread of the counterinsurgent’s influence throughout a region. The Soviets’ strategy in this respect also dovetails with David Kilcullen’s recommendation that the counterinsurgent “start from secure areas and work slowly outwards”.299 David Galula also promotes this method of incrementally spreading control over the country as well, noting that “Order having been re‐established in the area, the process may be repeated elsewhere”.300 In modern‐day Afghanistan, U.S and NATO forces are encountering issues similar to those that faced the Soviets: there are not enough troops to provide adequate security over the entire country. Counterinsurgency experts are advocating consolidation of efforts in key areas in similar fashion to the Soviet strategy described above.301 In a report on Afghanistan from June 2009, experts recommended that the military “focus available forces where the fewest number of government and coalition troops can protect the greatest number of Afghans. This will require the coalition to depart some areas it currently occupies”.302 As outlined above, Soviet forces did adopt sound strategy aimed at controlling the population and concentrating their resources on defined areas. The Soviets, however, were unable to implement these measures effectively or broadly enough to see overall success. 297 Mitrokhin, V. (2002, July). The KGB in Afghanistan: Russian Edition. Retrieved May 2, 2009, from Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), www.CWIHP.org, by permission of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/va2/docs/WP40_Russian_Version.pdf, 73. 298 Mitrokhin, V. (2002, July). The KGB in Afghanistan: Russian Edition. Retrieved May 2, 2009, from Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), www.CWIHP.org, by permission of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/va2/docs/WP40_Russian_Version.pdf, 73. 299 Kilcullen, D. (2006). Twenty­Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company­level Counterinsurgency, 5. 300 Galula, D. (2006). Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. London: Praeger Security International, 56. 301 For interesting overview of current strategy regarding outposts, and the perspectives of various experts, see: Dreazen, Y. J. (2009, March 4). U.S. Strategy Hinges on Far­Flung Outposts. Retrieved March 5, 2009, from The Wall Street Journal: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123611818947423107.html 302 Exum, A. M., Fick, N. C., Humayun, A. A., & Kilcullen, D. J. (June 2009). Triage: The Next Twelve Months in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Center for a New American Security, 16. 77 Units and Training As it became increasingly apparent that the Soviet army was ill‐suited to the conditions in Afghanistan, the Soviet command worked to restructure the force to be more effective. One area of adjustments involved changes to units and training. Early on in the Soviet occupation it became clear that motorized rifle units of conscript soldiers were not well suited to the tough guerilla fighting and infantry tasks necessary to engage and destroy the mujahedeen in difficult terrain.303 The Soviet military suffered not only from an overall lack of troops in Afghanistan, but also from a lack of qualified troops. Overall, it became clear that mobile, highly trained, and fit troops were needed to carry out the difficult missions required in Afghanistan. As a result, the Soviet command expanded the use of elite units, re‐
oriented the mission and use of motorized rifle troops, and changed military training to better prepare soldiers for duty in Afghanistan. While these adjustments were well thought out, institution‐wide change was difficult to achieve. The Soviet command’s shift towards the use of elite units aligns with classical counterinsurgency theory. David Galula, who is often cited regarding the need to win over the support of the population, did not exclude the use of military force. He advocates the need for elite units that are “highly mobile and lightly armed”.304 These mobile units, according to Galula, should be used to engage the enemy, while other static units should provide security for key infrastructure and population centers. Roger Trinquier promotes a similar concept of ‘interval troops’ and ‘intervention troops’, mobile units that are tasked with engaging the enemy and operating freely throughout a region; interval troops 303 The Russian General Staff notes that despite the lack of training doctrine for a conflict like the one in Afghanistan, it was clear early on training had to be restructured: Russian General Staff (translated and edited by Lester W. Grau and Michael A. Gress). (2002). The Soviet­Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 43. 304 Galula, D. (2006). Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. London: Praeger Security International, 65. 78 functioned in larger units and in a more defined area than the intervention troops.305 Soviet airborne troops were similar in concept to Trinquier’s interval troops, while the Soviet special forces (spetsnaz) corresponded loosely to intervention units. Soviet troop levels were low for the mission in Afghanistan; this was most felt when trying to hold territory already cleared in large operations. Trinquier designated this task for what he calls ‘grid troops’. Soviet forces or Afghan government units were often too few to effectively maintain security after the bulk of Soviet forces left. For this reason, tactical successes were often reversed because insufficient resources were expended on securing gains.306 Soviet military leaders learned early in 1980 that the situation in Afghanistan would require more effort than initially anticipated. General Gromov writes that Soviet casualties in January of 1980 were a sharp reminder to the Soviet Command that it would be necessary to view the situation in Afghanistan as nothing less than a war.307 The types of units employed in Afghanistan were shifted accordingly. Soviet leaders quickly learned that heavy equipment and tanks were not effective against the Afghan insurgency. The Soviet command therefore relegated many heavy armor units to static security and fire support units; lighter armored vehicles were used to accompany and transport infantry near to their mission objectives.308 In 1980, many tank units were being sent back to the USSR and replaced by lighter troops, reducing their numbers by over half.309 For example, in July 1980, two tank regiments and an anti‐aircraft brigade were sent back to the USSR.310 The Soviet command replaced many of the reserve 305 Trinquier, R. (1961). Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency. London: Praeger Security International, 63. 306 General Gromov mentions this pattern in his memoir, noting that even pro‐Soviet provincial leaders had little ability or motivation to be proactive in political work in the countryside: Gromov, B. (1994). Ogrannychenyi Kontingent. Moscow: Progress, 128. Also, the operations in Nangarhar province by Tora Bora in 1981 are an illustration of this pattern. For detailed description and accounts see the following: Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 504. 307 Gromov, B. (1994). Ogrannychenyi Kontingent. Moscow: Progress, 119. 308 Bogdanov, V. Afganskaia Voina: 1979­1989. Moscow: Soviet Writer, 98. 309309 Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 540. Also: Blank, S. J. (1991). Operational and Strategic Lessons of the War in Afghanistan, 1979­90. Strategic Studies Institute U.S. Army War College, 73. 310 Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 540. 79 troops that had been mobilized for the invasion. General Gromov recounts that in 1980 many units were filled with as much as 80% reservists, which made conducting challenging combat missions very difficult.311 Soviet leaders quickly began to fill the ranks of the Limited Contingent with specialists and full‐time soldiers in an effort to position the Limited Contingent for a more substantial and active role in Afghanistan.312 Despite limited resources and initial miscalculations, the Soviet Command did come to a good understanding of the units necessary for the tasks at hand in Afghanistan. As I will outline in this section, mobile units were expanded and trained for the specifics of Afghanistan’s conflict. For example, Major General Luchinsky recalls that the difficult task of intercepting and ambushing mujahedeen caravans coming from Pakistan came to be conducted almost solely by spetnaz and other specialized forces.313 In an official letter describing the situation in Afghanistan, General Varennikov mentions the need for specialized quick reaction forces to respond to situations around the country.314 Such units were increasingly used for challenging missions against the mujahedeen. This shift aligned with the principles of counterinsurgency theory outlined above. With each passing year airborne and air assault troops were increasingly used in Afghanistan.315 Parachute jumps were not conducted in Afghanistan’s mountainous terrain, but insertion by helicopter was necessary for many of the tactics employed by the Soviets. Extreme terrain often made air landings the only way to emplace troops swiftly enough to block and intercept mujahedeen forces. Airborne troops were not the only troops that were air landed; motorized rifle troops were also used in this manner. The increased use of airborne troops had more to do with their level of training and mentality than parachuting capabilities. The Soviet army had significantly developed training and selection for airborne 311 Gromov, B. (1994). Ogrannychenyi Kontingent. Moscow: Progress, 118. 312 Gromov, B. (1994). Ogrannychenyi Kontingent. Moscow: Progress, 118. 313 The mission described here concerns the zone ‘Zavesa’ or ‘Curtain’, which was formulated in 1984 and was aimed at sealing the border with Pakistan. For Luchinsky’s full remarks see: Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 521. 314 “Nekotorye itogi boevykh deistvii v provintsiyakh Kunduz i Takhar v avguste 1988 g.,” 1 September 1988 (Secret), in Arkhiv generala armii V.I. Varennikova (accessed in: Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 728). 315 Gromov, B. (1994). Ogrannychenyi Kontingent. Moscow: Progress, 273. 80 units since World War II, and as a result the quality of soldier was much higher in these units than in others. Soviet airborne units were akin to United States Army Ranger units in terms of training and mindset. Airborne units chose from top‐quality conscripts when augmenting their units. General Gromov notes that airborne troops went through specialized and very rigorous training.316 The contrast between airborne soldiers and those of other units was very noticeable. One Soviet conscript recounts that: “A landing­assault brigade differs from a motorized rifle regiment in that it has more people who also have better training and more specialization. Their assignments are more serious and strict than for the regular units. Many of these fellows were good athletes and some even knew karate”.317 The Soviet command increasingly relied on these tougher troops to conduct combat operations in Afghanistan. Missions in Afghanistan were exceedingly difficult. Soldiers had to carry 30‐40 kilograms of weight, and missions often lasted for several days.318 Soldiers would typically lose 7‐10 kilograms of body weight after a week in the field, and after longer missions would require medical help.319 These conditions made it very difficult for average conscripts to remain combat‐effective in the field. This shift in strategy and the contrast between the troops was evident to Afghan insurgent forces as well. A Pakistani officer, who spent time in Afghanistan with the mujahedeen notes that, “The paratroop (air assault) units fought much more aggressively…. In the months following my arrival the Soviets committed more Special Operations Forces to the conflict…. I noticed there was a high proportion of paratroops in the Soviet order of battle, indicating that these units would play a key role in offensive sweeps…. This was invariably the case”.320 Soviet leaders also relied heavily on spetsnaz and KGB special units for missions against the mujahedeen. These troops, even more than airborne, were trained to engage Afghan insurgents on their own terms. General Gromov writes that the officers and soldiers 316 Gromov, B. (1994). Ogrannychenyi Kontingent. Moscow: Progress, 274. 317 Alexiev, A. (1988). Inside the Soviet Army in Afghanistan. RAND. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 29. 318 Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 494. 319 Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 495. 320 Yousaf, B. M., & Adkin, M. M. (1992). The Bear Trap: Afghanistan's Untold Story. London: Leo Cooper, 56. 81 of these units had “fantastic military and physical training”, and worked to receive good intelligence through establishing ties with the local population.321 KGB units, such as ‘Grom’ (literally trans.: ‘thunder’) and ‘Zenit’ (literally trans.: ‘zenith’) proved themselves during operations in Kabul at the start of the invasion in 1979. In 1980, Andropov approved the expansion of such units to one thousand people.322 At this time, two additional units – ‘Kaskad’ and ‘Omega’ – were established.323 In July 1981 the Politburo approved the creation of yet another such specialized group – ‘Vimpel’ – to augment Soviet Special Forces. These units maintained very rigorous selection processes; Soviet Special Forces troops were not only physically and tactically superior to regular forces, but were often trained in foreign languages and cultures.324 The capabilities of these units are similar to those of French SAS units, which were assigned experts in Arabic language and culture, and noted as being successful in counterinsurgency in Algeria for this reason.325 Soviet special units participated in many offensive and intelligence operations, even creating groups of Afghan fighters who posed as mujahedeen.326 Vasiliy Mitrokhin reports that there were eighty‐six such groups by January of 1983.327 Similar groups had success in other counterinsurgencies. General Crook, who fought in the American Indian wars of the 19th century, is known to have planted teams of friendly Apaches into hostile areas in order to foment confusion and conflict.328 The Selous Scouts of Rhodesia were another indigenous outfit used in counterinsurgency with great success: they were credited with more than two 321 Gromov, B. (1994). Ogrannychenyi Kontingent. Moscow: Progress, 199‐200. 322 Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 531. 323 Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 531. 324 Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 531. 325 Cassidy, R. M. (2006). Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror. London: Praeger Security International, 160. 326 Mitrokhin, V. (2002, February). The KGB in Afghanistan ­ Geographical Volume 1 (translation from The Mitrohkin Archive). Retrieved March 12, 2009, from Cold War International History Project: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=va2.document&identifier=CDE50D78‐
CB01‐8B7A‐
D4E5A68856CA3CD9&sort=Subject&item=Soviet%20Union,%20relations%20with%20Afghanistan&print=true . Also: Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 530. 327 Mitrokhin, V. (2002, February). The KGB in Afghanistan ­ Geographical Volume 1 (translation from The Mitrohkin Archive). Retrieved March 12, 2009, from Cold War International History Project: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=va2.document&identifier=CDE50D78‐
CB01‐8B7A‐
D4E5A68856CA3CD9&sort=Subject&item=Soviet%20Union,%20relations%20with%20Afghanistan&print=true 328 Cassidy, R. M. (2006). Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror. London: Praeger Security International, 159. 82 thirds of insurgent casualties within Rhodesia.329 Concrete information regarding particular actions of specialized Afghan units is scarce, but the concept of employing such forces is one that has historically been beneficial to the counterinsurgent. The Soviet command worked hard to improve training both for elite and for regular troops. At the time of the invasion, even spetsnaz forces had very little specialized mountain training or equipment. This was obviously a significant disadvantage for an army waging counterinsurgency in Afghanistan.330 General Gromov writes that the skills previously taught for mountain warfare were ineffective in Afghanistan, and clearly of use only in European areas.331 Directive No. D‐314/3/00655 of the General Staff ordered the creation of special mountain warfare battalions.332 In addition, programs in mountain and convoy operations were instituted in 1980 for cadets and current motorized rifle troops. These programs were run by trainers chosen because of their combat experience in Afghanistan.333 Training sites were established in Central Asian areas near Termez, Ashkabad, Almaty and Fergana, since conditions in these areas were closer to actual conditions in Afghanistan than sites deeper within Russia. In 1981, Defense Minister Ustinov formally directed Soviet troops to enhance training programs based on combat experience in Afghanistan, and top leaders were scheduled to visit Afghanistan in order to better understand the relevant conditions and issues.334 The Soviet military community increasingly studied tactics for irregular warfare and mountain and desert conditions. The appearance of articles on such topics in Soviet 329 Cassidy, R. M. (2006). Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror. London: Praeger Security International, 159‐160. 330 General Gromov notes that lack of preparedness for mountain warfare was a recurring theme in the Soviet Army: Gromov, B. (1994). Ogrannychenyi Kontingent. Moscow: Progress, 126. 331 Gromov, B. (1994). Ogrannychenyi Kontingent. Moscow: Progress, 123. 332 Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 541. 333 Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 541 334 This is found in a declassified document included in the appendix of Alexander Liakhovsky’s history of the Afghan war: “Plan meropriyatii po povysheniu effektivnosti boevykh deistvii sovetskykh i afganskikh voisk v DRA, obobshcheniu i rasprostraneniu ikh boevogo opyta i sovershenstvovaniu oruzhiya na yanvar’ – mart 1981 goda,” 8 January 1981 (Secret), accessed in: Liakhovsky, A. (1995). Tragedia i Doblest' Afgana. Moscow: GPI Iskona, Appedix 3. 83 military journals reflected this shift in focus.335 In October of 1985 specialized officer training was implemented specifically to prepare officers for Afghanistan. The training included classes on Afghan political and cultural aspects, mountain warfare and autonomous and independent action.336 Starting in 1984, basic training for recruits was substantially improved and lengthened (in 1984 it was lengthened to three months, in 1985 it was lengthened to five months).337 Training incorporated more and more concrete tasks necessary in Afghanistan, such as night missions and mountain actions – one source notes that 40% of training time was conducted in a mountain environment.338 Soldiers were trained in tactics like bounding overwatch and encircling movements.339 Training included challenging field exercises and special emphasis on key specialties, such as sniper skills and the use of the AGS‐17 (an automatic grenade launcher).340 Not only did newly developed training programs stress the tactics of irregular warfare and the need for creative and independent solutions to combat challenges, they addressed the acceptance of reasonable risk.341 Accepting risk is a key aspect of counterinsurgency success, as willingness to accept risk often translates into greater security in the long run. For example, Soviet motorized troops that instinctively stayed close to road‐bound armored vehicles actually became more vulnerable targets. Accepting risk by relying less on large fortifications or armor units actually meant greater overall safety. Many counterinsurgency experts make this point, which is just as relevant today as it was for the Soviets. David Kilcullen summarizes the concept well in the following excerpt: 335 Here is a sampling of such articles that appeared around the time the Soviet command was beginning to adjust for a counterinsurgency: Vertoletchiki. (1982). Sovetskoe Voennoye Obozrenie (8), 13. Also: Riazanov, L. (1983). Takticheskie Uchenie v Gorakh. Sovetskoe Voennoe Obozrenie (9), 18‐21. Also: Shevchenko, N. (1982). Tekhnicheskoy Obespechenie Obkhodiashchego Otriada. Sovetskoe Voennoe Obozrenie (9), 37‐39. Also: Sidorenko, R., & Moskalev, V. (1983). Po Gornomu Variantu. Sovetskoe Voennoe Obozrenie (1), 22‐24. Also: Vorobyev, I. (1983). Sovremennyi Boj: Voprosy i Otvety 'Kogda v boevom poriadke sozdaetsya obkhodiashchii otriad? Sovetskoe Voennoe Obozrenie (5), 21. 336 Bogdanov, V. Afganskaia Voina: 1979­1989. Moscow: Soviet Writer, 267‐9. 337 Bogdanov, V. Afganskaia Voina: 1979­1989. Moscow: Soviet Writer, 268. 338 Bogdanov, V. Afganskaia Voina: 1979­1989. Moscow: Soviet Writer, 269. 339 Bogdanov, V. Afganskaia Voina: 1979­1989. Moscow: Soviet Writer, 269. 340 Bogdanov, V. Afganskaia Voina: 1979­1989. Moscow: Soviet Writer, 269. 341 Russian General Staff. (2002). The Soviet­Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 45. 84 “Movement on foot, sleeping in local villages, night patrolling: all these seem more dangerous than they are. They establish links with the locals, who see you as real people… not as aliens who descend from an armored box. Driving around in an armored convoy and day­tripping like a tourist in hell degrades situational awareness, makes you a target and is ultimately more dangerous”.342 This concept is often hard to promote in large armies, however, as they tend to be more reluctant in taking risks in the context of counterinsurgency than in familiar conventional combat.343 The burden on the Soviet military’s training system was considerable. Each year 40,000 to 50,000 soldiers had to receive basic training in order to maintain troop levels.344 In addition to casualties, there was significant turnover in personnel, as soldiers and NCOs had limited service requirements; after time in training, their combat tours lasted eighteen to twenty‐one months.345 Not only was this a significant strain on the Soviet training system, it meant that Soviet soldiers were consistently less experienced than their opponents, since Soviet combat veterans were routinely replaced by inexperienced recruits. Afghan resistance fighters, of course, did not rotate out and became increasingly experienced in fighting the Soviets.346 In the face of these challenges, however, the Soviet command pursued very promising ideas in terms of unit organization and training. The initiatives outlined above indicate that Soviet leaders understood the kinds of units and training necessary for success in Afghanistan. Limited troops and institutional inertia, among other factors, prevented these changes from having the broad effects the Soviet command desired. 342 Kilcullen, D. (2006). Twenty­Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company­level Counterinsurgency, 4. 343 Foust, J. (2009, March 27). Pakistan: Now or Never? Retrieved July 1, 2009, from REUTERS: http://blogs.reuters.com/pakistan/2009/03/27/guest‐contribution‐afghanistans‐garrisons/ 344 Russian General Staff (translated and edited by Lester W. Grau and Michael A. Gress). (2002). The Soviet­
Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 44. 345 Russian General Staff. (2002). The Soviet­Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 43. 346 This continues to be a challenge in the current day for U.S. and NATO troops in Afghanistan. In a recent interview, Admiral Mullen noted that Afghan fighters were showing “a level of sophistication that has improved each year”: Bender, B. (2009, August 26). Top Officer Offers a Dire Assessment on Afghanistan. Retrieved August 26, 2009, from Boston.com: The Boston Globe: http://www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2009/08/26/top_officer_offers_a_dire_assessment
_on_afghanistan/ 85 Intelligence Without good intelligence, a counterinsurgent is like a blind boxer wasting energy flailing at an unseen opponent.347 Soviet intelligence activity and efforts were at substantially high levels during the Afghan conflict. Over the course of the decades‐long Soviet‐Afghan relationship, intelligence services regularly worked with Afghan politicians and security organs to monitor and influence the situation. In this sense, the Soviets were ahead in the counterinsurgency effort, already having intelligence personnel in the country. Months before the invasion, KGB presence was increased in Afghanistan and a special information and analysis group was formed.348 In March of 1979 the Politburo passed a resolution to send even more advisors to various departments of the Afghan government.349 As noted in an earlier section, the ability to monitor and understand an insurgency is the first step to combat it. While mechanisms for intelligence were not perfect, the Soviets put considerable energy into this area. Soviet leaders made distinct efforts at managing the many working parts of the counterinsurgency campaign and the intelligence component in particular. Counterinsurgency experts generally agree that this coordination in intelligence gathering is very important. In the counterinsurgency context, much information is gathered by combat units in the course of their other operations and passed to multiple destinations.350 The diffusion and disconnectedness of separate data flows makes it difficult to organize, 347 Eliot, C., Crane, L. C., Horvath, L. J., & Nagl, L. J. (2006, March‐April). Principles, Imperatives, and Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency. Military Review , 49‐53. 348 Mitrokhin, V. (2002, July). The KGB in Afghanistan: Russian Edition. Retrieved May 2, 2009, from Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), www.CWIHP.org, by permission of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/va2/docs/WP40_Russian_Version.pdf, 16. 349 Mitrokhin, V. (2002, July). The KGB in Afghanistan: Russian Edition. Retrieved May 2, 2009, from Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), www.CWIHP.org, by permission of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/va2/docs/WP40_Russian_Version.pdf, 16. 350 Teamey, K., & Sweet, L. J. (2006, September‐October). Organizing Intelligence for Counterinsurgency. Military Review , 24‐29. 86 analyze and transform raw intelligence into useful information. It requires adequate coordination between agencies and personnel. Soviet intelligence understood this aspect of the counterinsurgency. In 1981, Soviet leaders established a special committee responsible for coordinating intelligence‐related entities, activities, and information.351 General Gromov notes that the 40th Army’s command established the practice of daily meetings of intelligence personnel from the various agencies in order to “sort and analyze… information together”.352 Such cooperation was crucial for making good use of intelligence and applying it to the counterinsurgency effort. Counterinsurgency experts uniformly advise that the creation of host‐nation intelligence and law enforcement agencies is vital for the counterinsurgency effort. From the beginning of the conflict, Soviet leaders supported development of the Afghan security apparatus. This is evident in proceedings of the CPSU in which improving Afghan police and intelligence is a recurring theme.353 The KGB was fairly effective in creating an Afghan security apparatus consisting of the Khad, Sarandoy and other agencies.354 In January of 1980 an excerpt from a Politburo protocol noted that Moscow ought to carry out a “program… of necessary assistance for all lines of work of the security organs, of interior affairs and police, both in the center and in the provinces”.355 Afghan personnel were trained on the territory of the Soviet Union as well as in Kabul.356 The Khad functioned in all 29 provinces of the country, and rapidly expanded as the war continued. From January 351 Mitrokhin, V. (2002, July). The KGB in Afghanistan: Russian Edition. Retrieved May 2, 2009, from Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), www.CWIHP.org, by permission of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/va2/docs/WP40_Russian_Version.pdf, 69. 352 Gromov, B. (1994). Ogrannychenyi Kontingent. Moscow: Progress, 267, 353 “Obstanovka vnutri Afganistana i rol’ sovetskikh voisk,” 7 April 1980 (Top Secret), in Arkhiv Presidenta RF, F. 3, Op. 82, D. 176, Ll. 9‐17 (retrieved from: Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 452.) 354 The Khad was formed on the template of the KGB and the Sarandoy was the Afghan police organization. Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 472. 355 “Vypiska iz protokola No. 181 zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS ot 28 janvarya 1980 goda: O dal’neishikh meropriyatiyakh po obespecheniyu gosudarstvennykh interesov SSSR v svyazi s sobytiyami v Afganistane,” 28 January 1980 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 34, D. 3, Ll. 7. 356 Mitrokhin, V. (2002, July). The KGB in Afghanistan: Russian Edition. Retrieved May 2, 2009, from Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), www.CWIHP.org, by permission of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/va2/docs/WP40_Russian_Version.pdf, 83. 87 1980 to 1982 its staff increased from 700 to 16,650.357 In 1986 General Akhromeev put the numbers of Khad and other security agencies at 20,000 and the number of the Sarandoy at 115,000.358 According to Vasili Mitrokhin’s notes, the Khad and Sarandoy had a network of 9,500 informers, and searched thousands of homes in an effort to locate and quell insurgent activity.359 For example, Mitrokhin reports that 9,600 homes were searched in an operation in February of 1981 in Kabul.360 With the help and training of the KGB, Afghan security units apprehended and interrogated many insurgents. One account mentions the capture of the leader of the organization “Islamic Society of Afghanistan”, who reportedly gave the names of 825 people.361 It was reported that twelve members of this organization were subsequently recruited and used as informers.362 KGB and Khad agencies went to great lengths to spread disinformation and turn mujahedeen groups against each other. Soviet efforts were often centered on attempts to exploit tribal and ethnic rivalries amidst the insurgency.363 Special units of Afghans, posing as insurgents, worked to instigate conflict in the ranks of the mujahedeen or engage them 357 Mitrokhin, V. (2002, July). The KGB in Afghanistan: Russian Edition. Retrieved May 2, 2009, from Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), www.CWIHP.org, by permission of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/va2/docs/WP40_Russian_Version.pdf, 83. 358 “Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 13 noyabrya 1986 goda: O dal’neishikh merakh po Afganistanu,” 13 November
1986 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 14, D. 41, Ll. 8. 359 Mitrokhin, V. (2002, July). The KGB in Afghanistan: Russian Edition. Retrieved May 2, 2009, from Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), www.CWIHP.org, by permission of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/va2/docs/WP40_Russian_Version.pdf, 83. 360 Mitrokhin, V. (2002, July). The KGB in Afghanistan: Russian Edition. Retrieved May 2, 2009, from Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), www.CWIHP.org, by permission of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/va2/docs/WP40_Russian_Version.pdf, 83. 361 Mitrokhin, V. (2002, July). The KGB in Afghanistan: Russian Edition. Retrieved May 2, 2009, from Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), www.CWIHP.org, by permission of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/va2/docs/WP40_Russian_Version.pdf, 83. 362 Mitrokhin, V. (2002, July). The KGB in Afghanistan: Russian Edition. Retrieved May 2, 2009, from Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), www.CWIHP.org, by permission of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/va2/docs/WP40_Russian_Version.pdf, 83. 363 Plans to establish contacts with opposition groups in order to co‐opt and divide them is discussed in a meeting of the Politburo in 1980: “Vypiska iz protokola No. 181 zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS ot 28 janvarya 1980 goda: O dal’neishikh meropriyatiyakh po obespecheniyu gosudarstvennykh interesov SSSR v svyazi s sobytiyami v Afganistane,” 28 January 1980 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 34, D. 3, Ll. 6‐7. Also, Vasiliy Mitrokhin details a particular instance of the KGB exploiting divisions within the insurgency, when they recruited a Shia Muslim Said Hussein sha Masrur: Mitrokhin, V. (2002, July). The KGB in Afghanistan: Russian Edition. Retrieved May 2, 2009, from Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), www.CWIHP.org, by permission of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/va2/docs/WP40_Russian_Version.pdf, 89. 88 by surprise. By 1983 there were eighty‐six such groups.364 Afghan security agents also worked to co‐opt resistance units, and convince them to work with the Afghan government forces. One example of such an operation occurred in 1981, when the ‘Kaskad’ unit near Herat co‐opted Khozhd Shir‐Aga Chungar, the leader of an insurgent unit.365 He began to work for government forces, eventually came to control forty‐eight villages, and participated in numerous operations with Soviet special forces.366 Afghan security services functioned in Pakistan as well, as this was a major platform for the mujahedeen. Bernard Fall notes that the only way to eliminate such insurgency sanctuaries is to infiltrate them, which is precisely what the KGB and Khad worked to accomplish.367 By some reports the Afghan foreign intelligence service had 107 agents in Pakistan.368 In 1980, anti‐Hekmatyar369 pamphlets were distributed in the Peshawar region.370 Thousands of other pamphlets, written in Dari and Pashto, were distributed in refugee camps by the Kabul government.371 The KGB and Khad routinely planted articles in the foreign press, condemning outside support for ‘terrorist’ groups in Afghanistan and supporting the Kabul government.372 Moscow worked hard to support Kabul’s information 364 Mitrokhin, V. (2002, February). The KGB in Afghanistan ­ Geographical Volume 1 (translation from The Mitrohkin Archive). Retrieved March 12, 2009, from Cold War International History Project: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=va2.document&identifier=CDE50D78‐
CB01‐8B7A‐
D4E5A68856CA3CD9&sort=Subject&item=Soviet%20Union,%20relations%20with%20Afghanistan&print=true 365 Mitrokhin, V. (2002, July). The KGB in Afghanistan: Russian Edition. Retrieved May 2, 2009, from Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), www.CWIHP.org, by permission of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/va2/docs/WP40_Russian_Version.pdf, 90. 366 Mitrokhin, V. (2002, July). The KGB in Afghanistan: Russian Edition. Retrieved May 2, 2009, from Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), www.CWIHP.org, by permission of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/va2/docs/WP40_Russian_Version.pdf, 90. 367 Fall, B. B. (1963). Street Without Joy: Insurgency in Indochina, 1946­63 (3rd Revised Edition). Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, USA: The Telegraph Press, 357. 368 Mitrokhin, V. (2002, July). The KGB in Afghanistan: Russian Edition. Retrieved May 2, 2009, from Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), www.CWIHP.org, by permission of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/va2/docs/WP40_Russian_Version.pdf, 86. 369 Gulbudin Hekmatyar was one of the most powerful mujahedeen leaders and a rival of Ahmed Shah Masoud. 370 Pamphlets were also aimed to discredit other leaders such as M. Nabi and S. Mojadeddi: Mitrokhin, V. (2002, July). The KGB in Afghanistan: Russian Edition. Retrieved May 2, 2009, from Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), www.CWIHP.org, by permission of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/va2/docs/WP40_Russian_Version.pdf, 87. 371 Mitrokhin, V. (2002, July). The KGB in Afghanistan: Russian Edition. Retrieved May 2, 2009, from Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), www.CWIHP.org, by permission of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/va2/docs/WP40_Russian_Version.pdf, 87. 372 Such instances are detailed in the earlier section on propaganda. 89 campaign, funding newspapers and allocating funds for creating radio stations.373 Counterinsurgency calls for intelligence work and personnel at lower levels than in conventional warfare; local knowledge of the people becomes as important as classified information in this context.374 The Soviets did work to position intelligence personnel throughout Afghanistan. Each military‐political zone was assigned KGB and Khad representatives.375 General Gromov notes that most commanders cultivated their own networks of intelligence agents, and that spetsnaz units were especially effective in this area.376 He also mentions that the Soviet command quickly understood the kind of intelligence work that was most useful in the context of Afghan counterinsurgency, noting that Soviet leaders “came to the conclusion that effective and painstaking work with the local population brought results….therefore we established this as a practice and required commanders at all levels to continually increase the numbers of their agents and informers”.377 Officer training increasingly emphasized the skills needed to understand mujahedeen groups and gain intelligence about them through working with the local population; this included instruction on Afghan cultural and political themes.378 The KGB and Khad placed great emphasis on learning about and disrupting the Afghan insurgency. However, the mujahedeen had an overwhelming advantage in the area of intelligence, as sympathizers from the population could readily provide information on troop movements and mujahedeen informers infiltrated many Afghan units.379 Nevertheless, the Soviets did make considerable efforts in this area. 373 “Postanovlenie Sekretariata TsK Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza: Ob okasanii tekhnicheskogo sodeistviya Demokraticheskoi Respublike Afganistan v stroitel’stve radioveshchatel’noi srednevolnovoi radiostantsii moshchnost’iu 1000 kVt,” 29 January 1980 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 32, D. 20, Ll. 1‐3. 374 Grau, L. W. (2004, July‐August). Something Old, Something New: Guerillas, Terrorists, and Intelligence Analyis. Military Review , 42‐29. 375 Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 509. 376 Gromov, B. (1994). Ogrannychenyi Kontingent. Moscow: Progress, 200, 264. 377 Gromov, B. (1994). Ogrannychenyi Kontingent. Moscow: Progress, 264. 378 Bogdanov, V. Afganskaia Voina: 1979­1989. Moscow: Soviet Writer, 271 379 Gromov, B. (1994). Ogrannychenyi Kontingent. Moscow: Progress, 121. 90 Tactical Adjustments “The Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces in the Republic of Afghanistan… significantly expanded the theory and practice of combat in mountainous­desert terrain” – Frunze Military Academy380 When the Soviet military invaded Afghanistan in 1979 its operations and tactics were rooted in military thought that was fundamentally influenced by the conventional warfare of World War II and by preparations for combat against western armies.381 The counterinsurgency experience against the Basmachi fighters and later in Ukraine and other Eastern European countries during and after World War II had been put aside by the Soviet military to focus on larger conventional threats.382 These earlier counterinsurgency experiences were not incorporated into doctrine for the Soviet Army, but had many similarities to the Soviet experience in Afghanistan.383 Soviet commanders initially used conventional tactics in Afghanistan, and had very limited success.384 The kinds of operations that were taught and trained in Soviet military universities and training sites were not effective against the mujahedeen or in Afghanistan’s terrain.385 Over the course of the war, 380 Grau, L. (1991). The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan. Washington, DC, USA: National Defense University Press, Foreword xxvii. 381 Cassidy, R. M. (2006). Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror. London: Praeger Security International, 49. 382 Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 490. 383 In Ukraine (1944‐1956), for example, Soviets employed a broad range of tactics and measures against the insurgency, similar to the their later actions in Afghanistan. Just like in Afghanistan, the Soviets fighting the Ukrainian insurgents initially relied on the Red army for conducting operations, but later began to rely increasingly on specialized NKVD units. Tactics, such as cordon and search, combing and raids were employed. Soviets encouraged the use of indigenous ‘self‐defense units’ and groups posing as insurgents, meant to foment confusion and distrust. Political instruction and propaganda were a central aspect of this campaign. Like in Afghanistan, the Soviet emphasis on intelligence was substantial. While these cases are not identical, Soviet security forces and political entities exhibited many similar reactions and mechanisms in both cases. See: Zhukov, Y. (2007). Examining the Authoritarian Model of Counter‐insurgency: The Soviet Campaign Against the Ukranian Insurgent Army. Small Wars and Insurgencies , 18 (3), 439‐466. Also: Potichnyj, P. J. (1987, October 2‐
3). Pacification of Ukraine: Soviet Counterinsurgency, 1944­1956. Retrieved September 13, 2009, from Chronicle of the Ukranian Insurgent Army: http://www.infoukes.com/upa/related/uf.html. 384 One example of the Soviet unpreparedness for irregular combat was illustrated in June 1980, when an entire motorized battalion was caught in a mujahedeen ambush, unable to effectively react and maneuver and subsequently wiped out. See, McMichael, S. R. (1991). Stumbling Bear:Soviet Military Performance in Afghanistan. London: Brassey's (UK), 11‐12. 385 General Gromov notes this in his memoir, writing that Soviet tactics for many situations proved ineffective in Afghanistan, and obviously good only for actions in the European theater: Gromov, B. (1994). Ogrannychenyi Kontingent. Moscow: Progress, 122‐3. 91 however, the Soviet command did adjust and did introduce new tactics and training that were more effective against the mujahedeen. Ultimately, adjustments in the Soviet tactical approach shifted emphasis from heavy sophisticated equipment functioning in a conventional linear fashion towards lighter mobile units executing non‐linear tactics. These tactics required a more decentralized command structure, enhanced assets given to battalion and company‐level commanders and junior leaders who would take initiative in decision‐making. The nature of combat and the terrain itself made functioning in large units very difficult, and therefore necessitated lieutenants and NCOs taking independent action. The subsections below will include the following sample of tactical and operational areas in order to illustrate Soviet adjustment to conditions in Afghanistan: the bronnegruppa, enveloping detachment, ambush, convoy security techniques and equipment. Bronnegruppa Concept The implementation of the bronnegruppa concept was an important tactical innovation in the Afghan theater. The bronnegruppa (literally translated: ‘armor‐group’) was a small reserve formation of four to five armored vehicles that would advance behind a forward group of infantrymen. The bronnegruppa was used to provide immediate fire support to infantry units that moved forward into difficult terrain.386 The development and use of the bronnegruppa came in response to problems experienced by motorized rifle troops, and indicated that Soviet military leaders understood the tactics needed in the counterinsurgency against the mujahedeen. Motorized rifle troops tended to remain close to their armored vehicles, reluctant to venture out as light infantry in combat against 386 General V.A. Bogdanov notes that the abundance of terrain impassable to vehicles forced the Soviet command to adjust to a formation which allowed motorized infantry to function away from their vehicles: Bogdanov, V. Afganskaia Voina: 1979­1989. Moscow: Soviet Writer, 187. 92 Afghan insurgents. This tendency to stay near the perceived safety of armored vehicles actually made Soviet troops more vulnerable as it limited their mobility, making them easy targets and preventing them from inflicting damage on the mujahedeen. The bronnegruppa concept mitigated some of these problems by placing soldiers away from the vehicles, but maintaining the firepower and transportation capability of the armored vehicle nearby. The bronnegrupppa factored into a broad range of Soviet combat operations. An operation aimed at destroying resistance strongholds in the Panjshir region illustrates the bronnegruppa’s use and effectiveness. On the May 17th 1982, after extensive aviation strikes, Soviet motorized rifle troops and Afghan infantry proceeded through the valley working to control the heights to either side and destroy any enemy encountered. The bronnegruppa moved forward on the valley floor providing covering for the infantry.387 In this instance the use of the bronnegruppa provided fire support, and also facilitated the effective functioning of infantry away from the vehicles. Bronnegruppas were also frequently used as independent elements.388 The bronnegruppa was employed to provide fire support for outposts along roads and near other objectives. General Gromov mentions this in his description of road security outposts, noting that particularly vulnerable locations would be reinforced by bronnegruppa formations or other armored vehicles.389 The bronnegruppa was useful as transportation, and used take infantry troops between mission objectives and bases. In an ambush conducted against a mujahedeen supply caravan in March 1986 near Khanabad, a bronnegruppa transported troops close to the objective and remained nearby in order to provide fire support if necessary. After the successful completion of the ambush, the bronnegruppa arrived to transport the unit back 387 Russian General Staff. (2002). The Soviet­Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 79. 388 Bogdanov, V. Afganskaia Voina: 1979­1989. Moscow: Soviet Writer, 187. 389 Gromov, B. (1994). Ogrannychenyi Kontingent. Moscow: Progress, 120. 93 to the base camp. At this time, the bronnegruppa helped destroy another small group of the enemy that was discovered near the ambush site.390 In its supporting role for the infantry the bronnegruppa was also regularly used to block and encircle the enemy. One mujahedeen commander recounts the experience of being cut off by Soviet armored vehicles as part of a cordon and search operation. While some of the Afghan resistance escaped, the blocking movement of the bronnegruppa helped the operation result in the destruction and capture of hundreds of mujahedeen fighters.391 The bronnegruppa was an effective tactical concept developed by the Soviets. The bronnegruppa helped retain Soviet fire superiority, but avoid the negative effects of centering tactics on heavy and immobile equipment. The bronnegruppa helped the Soviet infantry function the way that it needed to – on foot and out against the mujahedeen – but provided the extra advantage of covering fire and quick transport when needed. Enveloping Movements The use of enveloping and blocking techniques was part of a shift towards increased use of non‐linear tactics against the mujahedeen. Mujahedeen groups were usually small and mobile and could readily retreat and avoid destruction by Soviet linear formations. Enveloping movements were necessary to bring the fight to the enemy. The cordon and search was basic tactic that used enveloping and blocking techniques, though blocking elements played an important role in a variety of operations. Soviet tactics in this area align with David Galula’s emphasis that “The destruction of the insurgent forces requires that they be localized and immediately encircled”.392 390 Grau, L. (1991). The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan. Washington, DC, USA: National Defense University Press, 178. 391 Jalali, A. A., & Grau, L. W. (2001). Afghan Guerilla Warfare: In the Words of the Mujahedeen Fighters. St. Paul, Minnesota, USA: MBI Publishing Company, 356. 392 Galula, D. (1964). Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 72, 94. 94 The cordon and search was used to capture or kill the enemy in a specific area. Soviets would encircle the objective, placing blocking units at strategic points, then sweep or comb through the area using ground forces to locate and engage the enemy. When the Soviets entered Afghanistan in 1979, the cordon and search was not considered a form of combat, since this tactic is not very applicable to conventional engagements. The cordon and search and the use of blocking techniques was incorporated into doctrine as an adjustment to combat in Afghanistan.393 The cordon and search was typically conducted in two phases. First, blocking units were emplaced to encircle the enemy. Blocking units were inserted by helicopter or by ground vehicles. Soviet units adopted the practice of dismounting transport a distance away from their ultimate positions in an effort to avoid detection.394 Second, forces would arrive to the objective and begin sweeping the area. Major Gukalov recounts a typical block and sweep operation conducted in the Kunar province. Airborne troops were emplaced undetected as blocking units along escape routes from the targeted village. When the sweeping force moved through the village, a small detachment of mujahedeen fighters attempted to stall their advance to allow the main mujahedeen force to escape; the blocking units intercepted the fleeing mujahedeen.395 Even when operations were well executed, the terrain in the Afghan theater sometimes made it hard to seal off all escape routes. Mujahedeen Commander Haji Abdul Qader recounted a large Soviet cordon and search operation from which his forces were able to escape. His fighters were able to proceed undetected by Soviet blocking forces along a dry irrigation canal.396 The cordon and search proved a highly effective development in Soviet tactics. When executed properly, Soviets encountered success. Blocking forces were the crucial 393 Russian General Staff. (2002). The Soviet­Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 106. 394 Russian General Staff. (2002). The Soviet­Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 108. 395 Grau, L. (1991). The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan. Washington, DC, USA: National Defense University Press, 9. 396 Jalali, A. A., & Grau, L. W. (2001). Afghan Guerilla Warfare: In the Words of the Mujahedeen Fighters. St. Paul, Minnesota, USA: MBI Publishing Company, 260. 95 component of these operations. When they were detected, emplaced hastily, or uncoordinated with sweeping forces, mujahedeen forces were often able to escape with minimum casualties. In Afghanistan’s difficult environment, the incorporation of non‐linear tactics, such as cordon and searches with the use of blocking techniques shows the adaptation of the Soviet command to the conditions in the Afghan theater. Ambushes As the Soviet Limited Contingent adjusted its operational approach to the Afghan theater, emphasis was placed on many tactics used by the mujahedeen themselves. Ambushes are one example of such a tactic. Afghan insurgents routinely harassed and damaged Soviet forces through the use of this tactic, but Soviets also used ambushes effectively against the mujahedeen. Intercepting mujahedeen supply caravans and other troop movements were primary aims of Soviet ambushes. The influx of ammunition, weapons and fighters across the border from Iran and Pakistan was a vital resource for the Afghan insurgency. Borders with Pakistan and Iran were extremely long and in highly challenging terrain, making it difficult to control movement in an out of the country. The Soviet command was well aware of the situation and correctly identified it as one of the main reasons that the insurgency was so resilient. Even in 1979, Soviet leaders were keen on closing the Afghan borders. In a meeting between Presidents Brezhnev and Taraki, Brezhnev said, “Despite…the sending of thousands of people from Iran and Pakistan, your borders with these governments are virtually open, and it seems that even now they are not closed? I will say plainly….this needs to be remedied”.397 Soviet leaders implemented several measures, including a system of guard outposts and intercept operations aimed at ambushing caravans moving through border regions. As confirmed in an account by Major General Luchinsky, guard posts along 397 “Zapis’ Besedy L.I. Brezhneva s N.M. Tarki 20 marta 1979 g. (V besede prinyali uchastie t.t. A.N. Kosygin, A.A. Gromyko, D.F. Ustinov i B.N. Ponomarev),” 20 March 1979 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 42, D. 2, Ll. 5. 96 the border were notoriously ineffective, and Afghan caravans often moved by them with great ease.398 Ambush missions had greater success in apprehending the incoming caravans. Beginning in 1984, operation ‘Curtain’ (later renamed ‘Barrier’ in 1987) was conceived to intercept and destroy enemy supplies and personnel coming in from Pakistan.399 A significant number of troops were devoted to the operation; units generally conducted 30‐40 ambushes per month.400 While motorized rifle and other infantry troops regularly carried out ambushes, such operations were increasingly assigned to airborne, air assault and spetsnaz troops as the conflict continued.401 These troops were more highly trained and better equipped to conduct this kind of operation. Surprise was vital for the success of ambushes. After designating the spot of the ambush based on intelligence, troops would typically be inserted by helicopter or other vehicle ten to thirty kilometers from the planned ambush site, approaching by foot and often at night to avoid detection. Soviets would use decoy ambush teams to draw attention away from where the real ambush was being prepared.402 One veteran recounts that helicopters would often make several landings, but disburse troops only at one spot in order to misdirect enemy intelligence.403 Ambushes would typically be carried out by platoon or company‐sized troop elements, armed with AGS‐17s, heavy‐caliber machine guns and mines.404 Aviation and armored fire support was made available for such operations as well.405 Over the course of the conflict, it became clear that increased helicopter availability was necessary for spetsnaz units, so the Soviet command assigned 398 Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 521. 399 Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 521. 400 Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 521. 401 Major General Luchinsky’s account of ‘Curtain’ indicates that most units conducting ambush missions were spetsnaz or other specialized troops: Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 521. 402 Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 519. 403 Gusinov, T. (2002, March‐April). Soviet Special Forces (Spetnaz): Experience in Afghanistan. Military Review , 105‐107. 404 General V.A. Bogdanov notes that more ambushes were conducted by platoons than companies: Bogdanov, V. Afganskaia Voina: 1979­1989. Moscow: Soviet Writer, 185. 405 Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 519. 97 independent helicopter units exclusively for spetsnaz operations.406 When ambush teams remained undetected they were generally successful. For example, on the night of 13 February 1984, lieutenant S. Kozlov lead a successful ambush in Kandahar province, resulting in the destruction of 47 enemy troops and significant munitions and equipment.407 A former spetsnaz soldier noted that ambushes were more successful the closer they were set to the mujahedeen destination base camp or distribution area. Close to camp, the Afghans’ security was often more relaxed and the group more consolidated. It was also important to intercept caravans before they reached the base camp, because it became much more difficult to track and locate groups carrying supplies after they were distributed at a base camp.408 Increased use of ambushes was part of a larger shift in Soviet tactics in Afghanistan. While they were tactically successful, overall lack of troops and insufficient control of the country prevented the Limited Contingent from benefitting from many tactical successes. Nevertheless, implementation of the ambush in operations showed that Soviet leaders understood how to engage the mujahedeen tactically. US and NATO forces continue to employ ambushes against insurgents in Afghanistan.409 Convoy Security Techniques Maintaining supplies for Soviet forces in Afghanistan was a formidable logistical task. Main supply routes stretched between Termez‐Kabul‐Jalalabad, Termez‐Puli Khumri‐
Kunduz, and Kushka‐Shindand‐Kandahar. Supplies were transported in convoys along many kilometers of poorly maintained roads between Soviet posts. This presented an opportunity for the mujahedeen to hurt Soviet forces by hitting supply lines, placing mines 406 Gromov, B. (1994). Ogrannychenyi Kontingent. Moscow: Progress, 201. 407 Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 526. 408 Gusinov, T. (2002, March‐April). Soviet Special Forces (Spetnaz): Experience in Afghanistan. Military Review , 105‐107. 409 For an interesting account of an U.S. ambush in Afghanistan, see the following article: Chivers, C. J. (2009, April 16). Turning Tables, U.S. Troops Ambush Taliban With Swift and Lethal Results. Retrieved August 2, 2009, from The New York Times: http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/17/world/asia/17afghan.html 98 and attacking unexpectedly at times and locations of their choosing.410 It was necessary for Soviet forces to adapt tactics to address these vulnerabilities. Throughout the conflict it remained a struggle for Soviet forces to protect their supply lines, but they did take measures to improve in this area. In 1981, the Defense Ministry issued an order to improve convoy security by further developing security tactics, and engineer unit support.411 Main security practices included: establishing permanent security outposts along routes, employing motorized rifle troops to provide security, tasking sapper units to clear roads, using helicopters escorts, emplacing infantry units on key terrain to prevent enemy from approaching to key routes. There were 326 permanent outposts emplaced for the purpose of protecting critical supply routes.412 General Gromov describes the process of planning the locations of these outposts, which was carried out by highly trained groups of officers of different specialties, many of whom had extensive graduate degrees.413 These groups conducted comprehensive analysis of terrain and provided recommendations for outpost locations.414 Some 13,000 troops were tasked to man these posts, working to intercept and deter mujahedeen groups from ambushing convoys.415 Guard posts ranged in size – platoon or company‐sized ‐ and typically rotated personnel every three to six months.416 The posts were typically ringed with mines and barbed wire; other physical defenses and amenities were largely the result of the inventiveness of the soldiers – some outposts even had improvised Russian banyas (Russian bath house).417 410 General Gromov mentions this in his memoir, noting that the mujahedeen had “their own… method – they, as a rule, attacked where they were least expected”. Gromov, B. (1994). Ogrannychenyi Kontingent. Moscow: Progress, 120. 411 This is found in a declassified document included in the appendix of General Alexander Liakhovsky’s history of the Afghan war: “Plan meropriyatii po povysheniu effektivnosti boevykh deistvii sovetskykh i afganskikh voisk v DRA, obobshcheniu i rasprostraneniu ikh boevogo opyta i sovershenstvovaniu oruzhiya na yanvar’ – mart 1981 goda,” 8 January 1981 (Secret), accessed in: Liakhovsky, A. (1995). Tragedia i Doblest' Afgana. Moscow: GPI Iskona, Appedix 3. 412 Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 534. 413 Gromov, B. (1994). Ogrannychenyi Kontingent. Moscow: Progress, 120. 414 Gromov, B. (1994). Ogrannychenyi Kontingent. Moscow: Progress, 119. 415 Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 534. 416 Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 533. Also: Gromov, B. (1994). Ogrannychenyi Kontingent. Moscow: Progress, 120. 417 Bogdanov, V. Afganskaia Voina: 1979­1989. Moscow: Soviet Writer, 97. 99 Life in outposts was dreary and often boring; units were often isolated and poorly supplied. General Gromov describes how Soviet soldiers would have to “literally gnaw into the mountain, making trenches….along these [trenches]…the soldier… was often exposed to the enemy”.418 This duty, however, was critical for maintaining Soviet force presence in Afghanistan, and the Soviet command created specialized training for manning outposts.419 On routes without a sufficient network of guard posts, the process for providing convoy security unfolded in similar fashion to other tactical operations. Using motorized rifle troops mounted in BMPs (light armored fighting vehicle) or BTRs (also a light armored fighting vehicle, different make) was a common way to provide security for convoys.420 Helicopters were available for air support if needed and often escorted convoys of particular importance or along especially vulnerable segments of the route.421 Reconnaissance elements or air assault units were at times employed to occupy key terrain near routes.422 This allowed Soviet forces to intercept mujahedeen attempts at ambushing or approaching convoy routes.423 Engineer troops were used routinely to clear roads for mines, and were in high demand during the Afghan conflict.424 Engineer units were also responsible for addressing problems such as water crossings and impassable roads due to rock‐slides or avalanches, etc.425 This was a crucial task, as convoys were especially vulnerable when stopped at obstacles. Mujahedeen would create such obstacles in order to halt vehicle columns and then attack.426 Gromov notes that in the early stages of the war, Soviet columns were especially unprepared for ambushes and obstacles set by the mujahedeen; later, Soviets learned to carry special charges for blowing through obstacles 418 Gromov, B. (1994). Ogrannychenyi Kontingent. Moscow: Progress, 120. 419 Bogdanov, V. Afganskaia Voina: 1979­1989. Moscow: Soviet Writer, 276. 420 Russian General Staff. (2002). The Soviet­Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 286. 421 Everett‐Heath, J. (1992). Helicopters in Combat. New York, New York, USA: Arms and Armour Press, 126. 422 Gromov, B. (1994). Ogrannychenyi Kontingent. Moscow: Progress, 123‐4. 423 Gromov, B. (1994). Ogrannychenyi Kontingent. Moscow: Progress, 123‐4. 424 Gromov, B. (1994). Ogrannychenyi Kontingent. Moscow: Progress, 123. 425 Russian General Staff. (2002). The Soviet­Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 248. 426 Gromov, B. (1994). Ogrannychenyi Kontingent. Moscow: Progress, 123. 100 and reestablishing a roadbed to minimize time that vehicles were halted.427 Engineers organized into groups to help forces proceed through routes, some tasked specifically to key bridges or other objectives, some moving with convoys.428 While the tactics developed for protecting convoys were effective, these tactics were not always executed successfully. Limited numbers of light infantry troops, engineers and available helicopters precluded the consistent implementation of the security measures discussed above. Moreover, Soviet officers were unaccustomed to the concept of defending supply lines against an enemy functioning all around them, and would make mistakes in this area.429 Equipment “The weapons, equipment, and protective equipment determined the combat effectiveness of the LCOSF [Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces] in Afghanistan” – The Russian General Staff430 Understanding the dynamics of the political, social and military situation is vitally important in the complex environment of counterinsurgency.431 The necessity of accurately reading the situation and adapting appropriately applies to the lowest details of the counterinsurgency campaign. As shown in numerous cases, even the smallest cultural or political blunder, or hint of it, can have significant effects on the effort as a whole.432 The details of counterinsurgency often determine success or failure. This principle is extremely relevant to the individual soldier in his personal weapons and equipment. 427 Gromov, B. (1994). Ogrannychenyi Kontingent. Moscow: Progress, 123. 428 Gromov, B. (1994). Ogrannychenyi Kontingent. Moscow: Progress, 123. 429 This analysis is partially drawn from Lester Grau’s commentary on Russian military accounts, and partly from my own anlaysis of them. Grau, L. (1991). The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan. Washington, DC, USA: National Defense University Press, 149. 430 Russian General Staff. (2002). The Soviet­Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 42. 431 Kilcullen, D. (2009). The Accidental Guerilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One. New York, USA: Oxford University Press, Inc, 13. 432 T.E. Lawrence emphasizes such attention to detail in his writings on dealing with insurgency. Lawrence, T. (1917). The 27 Articles of T.E. Lawrence. Retrieved July 1, 2009, from http://www.d‐n‐
i.net/fcs/lawrence_27_articles.htm 101 Counterinsurgency, while very different from conventional war, is still war, and the soldier’s arms and equipment are of utmost importance in the overall effort. The key role played by the most basic aspects of equipment was clearly illustrated in the Soviet army’s earliest operations in Afghanistan. From boots to truck engines, there were many glitches in the Soviet war machine.433 As noted earlier, the Soviet Army was primarily trained for conventional conflict with NATO forces in the European theater. As a result, many aspects of Soviet equipment were poorly suited to the extreme climates and terrain of Afghanistan. In addition, operations in Afghanistan were the first real action the military had seen in some time, and there was equipment untested outside of field exercises. It has even been speculated that Defense Minister Ustinov agreed to deployment of troops in Afghanistan partly because it was an opportunity to test the military’s latest equipment.434 Soviet military staff and supporting officers reacted well to the problems with equipment. There was significant adjustment of the use and design of weapons systems and other gear to function more effectively in unconventional counterinsurgency warfare. While the 40th Army did suffer from some problems in supply and other logistics, ineffective equipment was replaced or improved upon, and weapons and equipment engineers regularly visited Kabul to meet with military officials, continually improving existing models.435 General Gromov writes that the innovations and adjustments made to Soviet equipment to better orient it to the conditions in Afghanistan “had a worth that was impossible to overstate”.436 Heavy weapons and advanced technology are not the decisive tools in counterinsurgency. While technology and superior firepower help in many situations, counterinsurgency is won by the application of intelligent strategy and its execution by 433 Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 494. 434 Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 540. 435 Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 538, 540. Also: Gromov, B. (1994). Ogrannychenyi Kontingent. Moscow: Progress, 149‐50. For discussion of Soviet logistical problems see: Blank, S. J. (1991). Operational and Strategic Lessons of the War in Afghanistan, 1979­90. Strategic Studies Institute U.S. Army War College, 48. 436 Gromov, B. (1994). Ogrannychenyi Kontingent. Moscow: Progress, 150. 102 infantrymen. This has been illustrated in conflicts before and after the Soviet‐Afghan war.437 Regardless of what counterinsurgency strategy is employed, infantrymen almost always do the crucial work of engaging the enemy and assuring that he stays away once defeated. Against a highly agile foe that melts in and out of the population and tough terrain, highly sophisticated weaponry and equipment is seldom useful.438 Light infantry units are needed in large numbers. The Soviet’s increasing use of airborne and air assault troops in Afghanistan is a testament to this inevitability.439 The 40th army found that much of its heavy equipment proved ineffective in the mountainous Afghan terrain.440 Many artillery pieces could not tilt to large enough angles to engage mujahedeen targets perched on bluffs high above windy roads. Tanks and the BMP‐
1 armored personnel carriers were too unwieldy and had guns also hard to aim at high targets. There were problems with mines and minesweeper systems.441 Laser range finders malfunctioned. Tank and other vehicle parts were vulnerable to sand and extreme temperatures. Mine blasts tore readily through the BMP‐1, BMD‐1,BTR‐60PB and BTR‐70 and usually resulted in the death of those inside.442 Engines for vehicles such as the BTR‐
60B and the BTR‐70 lacked the power sufficient for mountain driving, and many high‐
performance aircraft functioned poorly in the Afghan theater as well.443 437 Ali A. Jalali and Lester W. Grau provide an interesting analysis of the role of military technology in examination of the battle of Maiwand between British and Afghan forces in the 1880s. Jalali, A. A., & Grau, L. W. (2001). Expeditionary Forces: Superior Technology Defeated. Military Review , 81 (3), 71‐83. 438 In describing actions in the Panjshir region, General Gromov notes that Soviet infantrymen that were climbing in rough terrain and far from vehicles were often equipped with the same weapons as the mujahedeen: Gromov, B. (1994). Ogrannychenyi Kontingent. Moscow: Progress, 183. Also, for thoughtful analysis of technology in warfare see: Grau, L. W. (1997). Bashing the Laser Range Finder With a Rock. Military Review , 77 (3), 43. Robert Cassidy also makes the argument that the use of sophisticated technology is a hindrance in counterinsurgency: Cassidy, R. M. (2006). Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror. London: Praeger Security International, 55. 439 Large numbers of US light infantry units deploy to Afghanistan currently as well; the environment and enemy call for this just as much now as in the 1980s. In addition, at various junctures in Iraq, US tank units and other specialties found themselves conducting infantry‐like tasks. Even without mountains, counterinsurgency is best conducted ‘light’, whether the force is engaging the enemy or patrolling an area. 440 Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 537; Also see, Oliker, O., Grissom, A., & Johnson, D. E. (2008). In the Middle of the Fight: An Assessment of Medium­Armored Forces in Past Military Operations. Santa Monica, CA, USA: RAND Corporation, 92‐95. 441 Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 537. 442 Russian General Staff. (2002). The Soviet­Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 37. 443 Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 538. 103 Soviet military cadre reacted effectively to such deficiencies by employing new equipment. For example, newer vehicles were introduced, such as the BMP‐2 and the BTR‐
80 in 1985.444 The BTR‐80’s guns could be tilted higher than previous models, allowing for the engagement of aerial targets or those in steep or urban terrain. Soviet crews were known to protect the BTR with makeshift screening and rubber sheeting around the wheels.445 The BTR‐80 also improved upon earlier designs by including hatch doors on the side, which increased the speed with which soldiers could dismount.446 This configuration was more effective for reacting quickly to ambushes or other situations. Heavy firepower was less emphasized, and some infantry units were equipped with the AGS‐17 on the BMP‐2 armored personnel carrier, an automatic grenade launcher that was useful in engagements against an enemy that did not generally use tanks or other armored vehicles.447 The AGS‐17 could also be used independent from a vehicle with a three‐man crew. Soviet forces used this weapon extensively in infantry operations such as raids and sweeps. Capable of firing grenades up to 1700 meters, the AGS‐17 was useful for suppressing the enemy and stopping his advance.448 The BMP‐1’s usual 73mm cannon was replaced by a 30mm automatic cannon on the BMP‐2 with increased aiming angle.449 Machine guns were outfitted with enhanced sights to engage targets at longer range. The ZSU 23‐4 was a weapon system that proved helpful in the Afghan theater. Technically an anti‐aircraft unit, this four‐barreled system could elevate its aim almost vertically and was effective against forces as far away as 2500 meters.450 444 Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 537. Also: Russian General Staff. (2002). The Soviet­Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 36. 445 Russian General Staff. (2002). The Soviet­Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 37. 446 Russian General Staff. (2002). The Soviet­Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 36. 447 Gromov, B. (1994). Ogrannychenyi Kontingent. Moscow: Progress, 121. 448 Russian General Staff. (2002). The Soviet­Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 41. 449 Russian General Staff. (2002). The Soviet­Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 37. 450 Russian General Staff. (2002). The Soviet­Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 38. 104 Varying Kalashnikov rifles were used in the Afghan theater, including the AKM‐74, which was often used with an attached grenade launcher (PG‐15).451 The majority of Soviet forces ultimately moved to the AK‐74 5.45mm rifle from the 7.62mm variation. The AK‐74 was more effective for the counterinsurgent as it was lighter, and had less recoil, facilitating accuracy at long ranges. The use of Soviet aircraft was also adjusted for counterinsurgency. Soviet adjustments mirrored David Galula’s argument that counterinsurgent forces are most benefited by helicopters and slow assault planes.452 Soviet forces employed helicopters in more in Afghanistan than they ever had before and they proved highly effective.453 As mujahedeen gained anti‐aircraft capabilities, tactics such as night flights and low altitude nap‐of‐the‐earth flying were introduced.454 High‐speed planes were replaced with the Su‐25 (nicknamed the grach, or in English the frogfoot), a subsonic aircraft designed for providing close air support. The Soviet staff understood the need for a lighter more mobile force for counterinsurgency. While changes were not made as fully or quickly as might have been desired, the nature of weapons and vehicle modifications indicated that Soviet military leaders where attempting to reshape their force for the situation in Afghanistan. The 40th Army suffered from some of the same backups and supply issues that plagued the rest of the USSR; many soldiers did not receive the benefit of improved equipment. Nevertheless, in the area of equipment and weapons, Soviet military leaders did exhibit adaptability and an understanding of counterinsurgency. 451 Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 538. 452 Galula, D. (2006). Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. London: Praeger Security International, 21. 453 Turushev, A. (2004). Osobennosti Primenenia Podrazdelenij i Chastej 40‐j Armii V Afganistane. Afganistan: Uroki Istorii i Sovremennost' (pp. 21‐25). Omsk: Omskaia Akademia, MVD Rossii. 454 Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 539. Also: Everett‐Heath, J. (1992). Helicopters in Combat. New York, New York, USA: Arms and Armour Press, 127. 105 Conclusion This work does not seek to rewrite the Soviet counterinsurgency in Afghanistan into a success. There were many weaknesses in the Soviet effort. It is clear that Soviet leaders entered into the conflict with an inaccurate understanding of Afghanistan’s social and political realities, and without full appreciation of the resources required to support the Kabul government against the Afghan insurgency. Soviet leaders were not anticipating the need for such a long and comprehensive counterinsurgency campaign after the initial invasion. Coordination between military and non‐military efforts was lacking. Soviet military leaders and politicians blamed each other for failures in Afghanistan. For example, in one meeting of the Politburo, Gorbachev expressed frustration at the military establishment, remarking that military leaders are “doing poorly at learning in this war”.455 In the same meeting General Akhromeev explained that “our military successes have just not been supported by political ones”.456 These two viewpoints illustrate a civil‐military disconnect that undercut many Soviet efforts in Afghanistan. Indeed, political efforts and institutions did not support many of the advances made by Soviet forces, and resulted in frequent reversals of Soviet military gains.457 Soviet political concerns limited the overall number of troops allocated for the counterinsurgency, which made it difficult to achieve country‐wide stability and closed borders with Iran and Pakistan. Considerable and unwavering foreign support implemented across these borders was a fundamental strength of the insurgency. Furthermore, at critical junctures, when increased efforts and resources may have resulted in very significant gains, Soviet political leaders backed off from their commitment to the counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. For instance, after a brief attempt at conducting a counterinsurgency, Gorbachev pursued political and military policies primarily as a way to 455 “Zasedanie
Politbyuro TsK KPSS 13 noyabrya 1986 goda: O dal’neishikh merakh po Afganistanu,” 13 November
1986 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 14, D. 41, Ll. 3. 456 “Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 13 noyabrya 1986 goda: O dal’neishikh merakh po Afganistanu,” 13 November
1986 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 14, D. 41, Ll. 8. 457 Such reversals were also the result of a lack of troops. Not having enough troops to remain in areas for providing static security made them easy for mujahedeen forces to reclaim. 106 expedite disengagement and not as a part of an enduring counterinsurgency effort.458 Compounding Soviet problems, divisions within the PDPA persisted throughout the conflict and were a hindrance to political progress. Despite mistakes and setbacks, however, the Soviets effectively bolstered the PDPA government that in 1979 was in a precarious political and military situation. The Soviet command used political, military and economic initiatives to support this government for nine years in a country where terrain, infrastructure and society are highly unfavorable for foreign powers. And while the Kabul government lost control of many Afghan provinces after Soviet withdrawal, it remained in power for three years until 1992.459 Admittedly, after the withdrawal the subsequent situation was the result of many factors not all relating to Soviet involvement. Nevertheless, the Kabul government’s endurance indicates the presence of effective elements in the Soviet counterinsurgency. Many of these elements correspond to accepted classical and modern counterinsurgency theory. Analysis of primary documents, memoirs and military events shows that Soviet leaders conducted active counterinsurgency efforts in the political, economic and military sphere. Many such programs were designed to win over the support of the Afghan population through persuasion and incentives. Coercion was not the only Soviet method. Extensive support and counsel in the political sphere, development of social programs and promotion of economic initiatives illustrate that Soviet leaders appreciated the need to win the support of the population by means other than force. Soviet military efforts, sometimes described as rigid and unbendingly conventional, were greatly adapted for the Afghan theater. This thesis has illustrated that military leaders, though hindered by an army conventional in structure and mindset, took many concrete steps to adapt their force and tactics for counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. Heavy armor and unwieldy weapons systems were replaced by lighter variations for the fight against the 458 Gorbachev was soon quite committed to expediting withdrawal as evidenced in the following document: “Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 13 noyabrya 1986 goda: O dal’neishikh merakh po Afganistanu,” 13 November
1986 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 14, D. 41, Ll. 3. 459 The Soviet Union continued to provide considerable support to the Kabul government after the withdrawal in 1989. 107 mujahedeen. Non‐linear tactics and new techniques were taught and implemented with some success. Soviet leaders decentralized the Afghan battlespace by dividing the theater into regime zones, and giving increased autonomy and assets to regiment and battalion commanders and their subordinates. Expanded and enhanced training was designed to encourage independence and creativity in junior leadership. Substantial development of intelligence capabilities and population monitoring were also strong aspects in the campaign. These adjustments show that Soviet military leaders understood the nature of counterinsurgency and the need to adapt their force for non‐conventional tasks. Recognizing the effective elements of the Soviet counterinsurgency is important for a comprehensive and nuanced understanding of the Soviet‐Afghan war and counterinsurgency more broadly. Soviet failures in Afghanistan were a result of flawed strategy and poor execution, but were also the result of the extreme difficulty of the task itself. Labeling the Soviet strategy in Afghanistan as categorically flawed is an underestimation of the complexity inherent in counterinsurgency conflicts. Misapprehending this reality can lead to imprecise and biased evaluations of the Soviet campaign and the nature of counterinsurgency. Inaccurate assessments of the Soviet experience in Afghanistan can foster both over‐ and under‐estimation of the difficulties of counterinsurgency. Considering the Soviet efforts utterly narrow‐minded and rigid can lead to the view that counterinsurgency is easy, provided that one simply avoids the ‘gross mistakes’ of the Soviet forces. Conversely, overlooking Soviet gains and overstating their problems can lead to the view that success in counterinsurgency (in Afghanistan or elsewhere) is virtually unattainable. Studying the Soviets in Afghanistan, therefore, has implications for those considering the limitations and possibilities of large powers caught in the dynamics of counterinsurgency. Understanding the elements of the Soviet strategy that held promise, even if they were not fully or successfully implemented, provides a more nuanced understanding of the challenges and questions counterinsurgency presents. Many of these same challenges and questions are facing the United States today. 108 Appendix I. Statistics of Soviet­Afghanistan Credit/Aid Agreements Graphic 1. Non­Military Aid Levels in Soviet­Afghan Formal Agreements Non‐Military Aid Levels in Soviet‐Afghan Formal Agreements
300
Millions (rubles)
250
200
Training/Education
150
Agriculture
Construction
100
Energy,Oil,Natural Gas
50
0
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
Source: Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del SSSR. (1981‐1990). Sbornik Mezhdunarodnykh Dogovorov SSSR (Vol. XXXV‐XLIV). Moscow, Russia. Note: 1. This graph represents funding levels under formal agreements for economic assistance and development programs. All projects have been grouped under the major categories shown in the graph; also, funds associated with multi‐year and multi‐category projects have been allocated appropriate to project category and approximately average yearly allocation based on the duration of the agreement. This graph does not represent the final disbursements which depended on a variety of conditions. 2.
I thank and acknowledge Alexander P. Doohovskoy for his valuable assistance in creating the graphics that appear in the appendices. 109 Graphic 2. Soviet Economic Aid Disbursements to Afghanistan Soviet Economic Aid Disbursements to Afghanistan
250
Millions (rubles)
200
150
100
50
1991
1990
1989
1988
1987
1986
1985
1984
1983
1982
1981
1980
1979
1978
1977
1976
1975
1974
1973
1972
1971
1970
0
This graph is based on data from Quintin V.S. Bach’s book, Soviet Aid to the Third World: the Facts and Figures.460 460 Bach, Q. V. (2003). Soviet Aid to the Third World: the Facts and Figures. Sussex, England: The Book Guild Ltd, 153‐156 (Appendix VII). 110 Graphic 3. Soviet Economic Aid and Expenditures in Afghanistan Soviet Economic Aid and Expenditures in Afghanistan
1400
Millions (rubles)
1200
1000
800
600
400
200
1986
0
1987
This graph is based on data from a document published in Alexander Liakhovsky’s book, Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana.461 461 “Spravka: O raskhodakh SSSR v Afganistane,” 8 January 1988, in: Liakhovsky, A. (2009). Tragedia i Doblest' Afghana. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo, 758. ‘GKES’ stands for ‘Gosudarstvennyi komitet soveta ministrov po vneshnim ekonomicheskim svyazyam’ (Government Committee Counsil of Ministers on Foreign Economic Affairs). 111 Graphic 4. Soviet­Afghan Agreements on Energy, Oil, Natural Gas Soviet‐Afghan Agreements Energy,Oil,Natural Gas
160
Millions (rubles)
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
Source: Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del SSSR. (1981‐1990). Sbornik Mezhdunarodnykh Dogovorov SSSR (Vol. XXXV‐XLIV). Moscow, Russia. 112 Graphic 5. Soviet­Afghanistan Agreements on Agriculture, Construction Soviet‐Afghanistan Agreements
Agriculture and Construction
160
140
Millions (rubles)
120
100
80
Agriculture
60
Construction
40
20
0
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
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