States of Change
Demographic Change, Representation Gaps,
and Challenges to Democracy, 1980-2060
By Robert Griffin, William H. Frey, and Ruy Teixeira
February 2017
W W W.AMERICANPROGRESS.ORG
States of Change
Demographic Change, Representation Gaps,
and Challenges to Democracy, 1980-2060
By Robert Griffin, William H. Frey , and Ruy Teixeira
February 2017
Contents
1 Introduction and summary
3 The contours of demographic change, 1980–2060
6 Representation gaps by race, gender, age,
and education, 1980–2060
26 Representation gaps, demographic change,
and alternative scenarios
38 Demographic change and representation gaps
in the states
47 Components of voter representation gaps
50 Education, gender, and race representation gaps
52 Conclusion
53 About the authors
54 Endnotes
Introduction and summary
In the past four decades, the United States has undergone significant demographic
changes.1 Immigration patterns have altered our racial composition, medical
advances have aged our population by prolonging our lives, and economic forces
have driven us to educate ourselves at unprecedented levels. Transformations of
this magnitude will shape this century’s social and political landscape as well as
test many of society’s institutions.
Among these tests, perhaps the most important will be representational in nature.
To represent people, as Hanna Pitkin was wont to point out, is to make them present again. It is injecting the people’s voices and perspectives into our public policy
process. It is speaking and advocating for their interests. It is the countless symbolic and substantive acts that contribute toward their inclusion in society.
Historically, our political institutions have struggled to represent a society that
is demographically different than its electorate. The systematic disenfranchisement of women and communities of color, for example, contributed to a public
policy process that ignored and underserved large portions of the population.
Functionally, they created what we will refer to as representation gaps—the difference between the percentage of voters who belong to a given group and the
percentage of the whole population that belong to that same group. While an
electorate that resembles the general population is no guarantee of a representative polity, we believe it creates conditions favorable to one.
Representational gaps such as these persist in modern America politics. They are
obviously different in size and arise as the result of different processes, but the
problems they induce are similar. Given their continued existence, the goal of this
report is as follows:
1 Center for American Progress | Brookings Institution | Bipartisan Policy Center | States of Change
• Document the representation gaps we have observed along age, education, gender, and race lines over the last several decades.
• Predict what those gaps might look like going into the future using the best
available demographic projections and turnout data.
• Facilitate a conversation about the representational challenges the United States
is likely to face in the coming decades and what solutions might work best to
confront them.
Our analysis finds the white overrepresentation and minority underrepresentation has been a defining feature of American politics for decades. In fact, we may
currently be at peak levels of both overrepresentation and underrepresentation.
We also find that white overrepresentation is likely to decline in the future, as
underrepresentation of Latinos and Asians declines significantly due to projected
increases in citizenship among these groups. This trend will be especially noticeable
in states that currently have the highest white representation gaps, such as Arizona,
California, and Texas. By 2060, we expect the states with the highest white representation gaps to be interior states, such as Kansas, Utah, and Wyoming.
However, while representation gaps will likely decline in future decades, they
will by no means be eliminated. Significant white overrepresentation and Latino
and Asian/other underrepresentation will likely remain, primarily because of
participation gaps reflecting the relatively low registration and turnout rates of
the latter groups. Simulations indicate that the most successful route for minimizing future representation gaps lies in equalizing registration and turnout
rates across races, perhaps due to some combination of registration reform and
changes in mobilization practices. Progress in this direction would leave only a
small representation gap due to the younger age structure among Latinos and
Asians/others. It would also tend to equalize representation gaps across presidential and congressional elections in contrast to the current situation where
gaps in congressional representation are much larger.
2 Center for American Progress | Brookings Institution | Bipartisan Policy Center | States of Change
The contours of demographic
change, 1980–2060
We will begin by reviewing the basic demographic landscape of the American
population and how it is likely to change in the coming decades. The vast majority of early American immigrants were of European descent. This resulted in a
20th century populace that was mostly white—about 80 percent of the whole
population in 1980.
However, newer immigrants have been coming from different places—mainly
Asia and Central and South America. In addition, we have seen rates of interracial
marriage increase, going from about 7 percent of all new marriages in 1980 to
15 percent in 2010.2 These concurrent and interrelated trends have resulted in a
modern U.S. population that is significantly more diverse, with about 61 percent
identifying as white3. If current trends persist, this number will fall below 50 percent sometime in the mid-2040s, and by 2060, we project that white Americans
will constitute less than 44 percent of the population.
FIGURE 1
Coastal and southern border states are changing more quickly than interior states
Minority percentage of state population, 1980, 2016, and 2060
1980
2016
0 to 9
10 to 19
20 to 29
2060
30 to 39
40 to 49
50+
Source: Estimates based on Ruy Teixeira, William H. Frey, and Rob Griffin, "States of Change: The Demographic Evolution of the American Electorate, 1974–2060" (Washington: Center for
American Progress, 2015), available at https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/progressive-movement/report/2015/02/24/107261/states-of-change/.
3 Center for American Progress | Brookings Institution | Bipartisan Policy Center | States of Change
This 36-point drop over 80 years has been and will mainly be the result of growing
Hispanic and Asian/other4 racial communities, each growing about 22.5 points
and 12.5 points, respectively. African Americans5 have held and will largely hold
steady, growing only 1 point over this time period.
An important feature of these racial changes is that they have not and will not be
evenly distributed—places and age groups are shifting at different rates. Looking
at Figure 1, we can see that states along the coasts and the southern border have
diversified at a much faster pace, with New Mexico, California, and Texas becoming so-called majority-minority states between 1980 and 2016. In contrast, the
Midwest, Plains, Rocky Mountain, and upper New England states generally
started off less diverse and shifted more slowly. As we go forward, this same general geographic patterns holds, with 18 more states becoming majority-minority
over the next 44 years.
The nation’s diversification can also be described as bottom-up, with younger
cohorts changing at a faster rate than older age groups. Those age groups below
30 will become more than 50 percent nonwhite in the 2020s, 30- to 44-year-olds
joining them in the mid-2030s, and 45- to 64-years-olds flipping in late 2040s.
FIGURE 2
Bottom-up racial diversification in the United States
Minority percentage of the whole population by age group, 1980–2060
75%
50%
25%
0%
1980
1990
2000
2010
2020
2030
2040
0–17
18–29
30–44
45–64
65+
2050
2060
This chart displays the racial makeup of each age group over time. The youngest age groups are the most racially diverse and will
become majority-minority sooner than the older age groups.
Source: Estimates based on Ruy Teixeira, William H. Frey, and Rob Griffin, "States of Change: The Demographic Evolution of the American
Electorate, 1974–2060" (Washington: Center for American Progress, 2015), available at https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/progressive-movement/report/2015/02/24/107261/states-of-change/.
4 Center for American Progress | Brookings Institution | Bipartisan Policy Center | States of Change
Accompanying this racial diversification has been the aging of the population. As
shown in Figure 3, the two age groups that compose those younger than 30 both
drop as a percentage of the whole population dramatically between 1980 and
2060—15 points collectively. Over this same time period, we see the oldest age
groups increase in size as life-expectancy gains trickle up and the large Baby Boom
generation ages. Those aged 45 to 64 and 65 and up go from 20 percent to 24 percent and 11 percent to 23 percent of the whole population, respectively.
FIGURE 3
The graying of the American population
Age composition of the whole population, 1980–2060
100%
75%
50%
25%
0%
1980
1990
2000
2010
2020
2030
2040
0–17
18–29
30–44
45–64
65+
2050
2060
This chart displays the share of the U.S. population that falls into each age group. The youngest age cohorts have been shrinking in size,
while the oldest age groups have been growing.
Source: Estimates based on Ruy Teixeira, William H. Frey, and Rob Griffin, "States of Change: The Demographic Evolution of the American
Electorate, 1974–2060" (Washington: Center for American Progress, 2015), available at https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/progressive-movement/report/2015/02/24/107261/states-of-change/.
Finally, we have also the seen the U.S. population become more educated. From
1980 to 2014, the percent of the voting age population with a college degree has
roughly doubled—going from 15 percent to 30 percent—with two-thirds of that
growth coming from an increase in the number of college-educated whites.
Among whites, this has coincided with an incredible 25-point decline in adult
noncollege whites among the voting age population, going from 69 percent to 44
percent. The black noncollege population has also shrunk but only by less than a
point. On the other hand, noncollege Hispanics and Asians/others have actually
increased as a percentage of the overall voting age population—8 points and 3
points, respectively. This is happening despite rising educational levels among all
races because these groups are, more generally, growing quickly.
5 Center for American Progress | Brookings Institution | Bipartisan Policy Center | States of Change
Representation gaps by race, gender,
age, and education, 1980–2060
Taken together, these trends constitute a level of change that can only be
described as transformative. In some ways, we are just beginning to come to grips
with the ways these changes have already altered our society—and many of the
largest changes are yet to come. There is no doubt that they will challenge the
country’s policies, institutions, and people.
Among these challenges, perhaps the most important will be representational in
nature. How well have different groups in the United States been represented in
the electorate, and how will that change going into the future?
To tackle these questions, we rely on what we refer to as total representation
gaps—a measure that captures the level of overrepresentation or underrepresentation experienced by a demographic group in the electorate. Functionally, it is
calculated by taking the difference between the percent of the whole population
that belongs to a given group and the percent of voters who belong to that group.
Positive values indicate overrepresentation among voters while negative values
indicate underrepresentation.6
Race gaps
White overrepresentation has been one of the defining features of American
politics over the past several decades. With the exception of blacks in the 2012
election, communities of color have been consistently underrepresented in the
electorate. Beginning in 1980, the levels of underrepresentation we witnessed
among these groups were driven in roughly equal measure by the older age distribution, higher citizenship rate, and higher political engagement levels of whites.
In the past three decades, the immigration-based growth of the Hispanic, Asian,
and other race populations has lowered the citizenship rates of these groups and
increased the overrepresentation of whites in the electorate. As we move forward
into the future, we can expect some of this white overrepresentation and Hispanic
6 Center for American Progress | Brookings Institution | Bipartisan Policy Center | States of Change
underrepresentation to taper off. As growth from Hispanics, Asians, and those of
other races comes increasingly from native births, political participation deficits in
the form of registration and turnout gaps will come to be the key drivers of underrepresentation between racial groups.
Here is how these broad trends will evolve. Start with how well different racial
groups—whites, blacks, Hispanics, and Asians/others—have been represented
in the electorate. As we can see in Figure 4, whites have been consistently overrepresented among voters in both presidential and midterm elections for past 36
years. Even as their share of the population has declined, their overrepresentation
has actually increased, going from a 7-point gap in the 1980 and 1982 elections
to a 10- and 14-point gap in 2012 and 2014. This is notable because we generally expect representation gaps to grow as a population grows and to shrink as a
population shrinks.
FIGURE 4
Total representation gaps by race and election type, 1980–2060
Presidential
Midterm
20
10
0
-10
1980
2000
2020
2040
White
2060
Black
1982
Hispanic
2002
2022
2042
2058
Asian/Other
This chart displays the total representation gaps by racial group in presidential and midterm elections. Positive values indicate that a
group makes up a larger percentage of the voting population than the whole population, while negative values indicate the opposite.
Sources: Estimates based on authors’ analysis of Ruy Teixeira, William H. Frey, and Rob Griffin, “States of Change: The Demographic
Evolution of the American Electorate, 1974–2060” (Washington: Center for American Progress, 2015), available at https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/progressive-movement/report/2015/02/24/107261/states-of-change/; November supplements of 2012 and 2014
data from Miriam King and others, “Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, Current Population Survey: Version 3.0,” available at
https://cps.ipums.org/cps/index.shtml (last accessed July 2016).
7 Center for American Progress | Brookings Institution | Bipartisan Policy Center | States of Change
The steady overrepresentation of whites during these years was mirrored by the
underrepresentation of communities of color. For blacks, the underrepresentation gaps in presidential and midterm elections hovered around -2 points between
1980 and 1994. However, after 1996, these gaps began to shrink, especially for
presidential elections. During the election and re-election of America’s first black
president, Barack Obama, we saw underrepresentation reduced to essentially zero
in 2008 and actually flip to a slight overrepresentation in 2012. There’s been a
similar movement in the past two midterm elections, where we saw black representation gaps move above -1 for the very first time.
In contrast to whites and blacks, Hispanics’ representational fortunes have moved in
the opposite direction. In 1980 and 1982, there were representation gaps of -3 and
-4 points, respectively; by 2012 and 2014, these gaps had grown to -8 and -10 points.
This makes Hispanics the racial group that is most underrepresented as well as the
group that has seen the largest increase in their underrepresentation over time.
A similar pattern of underrepresentation has occurred for Asians and those of
other races. There has been an increase in the level of underrepresentation, going
from about -1 point in 1980 and 1982 to just about -3 points in 2012 and 2014.
Using the data created in the first two years of the States of Change project, we can
also project these gaps forward into the future, indicated in Figure 4 by the dotted
lines going out to 2060. These projections assume that the underlying demographic features of the U.S. population continue to change but that the political
behavior of various demographic groups remains the same. In this case, the same
means that relatively fine-grained demographic groups7 register and turnout at
rates identical to those from the most recent election for which we have data—
2012 for presidential elections and 2014 for midterm elections.
These are not predictions nor should they be considered in that light. Rather, they
are thought experiments that we can use as a baseline for understanding what the
future might hold for the country’s representational challenges.
All of that said, these projections suggest that representation gaps will shrink substantially in the future but remain with us well into the 21st century. For whites,
we project that underlying demographic shifts by 2060 could push their overrepresentation gap down about 3 points for both presidential and midterm elections.
Specifically, they would drop to 7- and 11-point gaps by 2060 and 2058. For presidential elections, this brings overrepresentation roughly back to its 1980 levels.
8 Center for American Progress | Brookings Institution | Bipartisan Policy Center | States of Change
For blacks, we project demographic changes to increase their level of overrepresentation in presidential elections only slightly, going up about a point over this
44-year period to about 1.4 points. In midterms, we project a gradual reduction of
black underrepresentation in these elections until slight underrepresentation flips
to slight overrepresentation by the 2030 election.
For Hispanics, underrepresentation will continue but there will also be significant
strides toward a more representative electorate. These changes will not be overwhelming—a 3-point improvement in presidential elections and a 2-point shift in
midterms over the next 44 years—but these changes occur even as their population share is projected to grow by about 11 points. All things equal, we would
normally expect an increase in population size to result in a larger representation
gap. That we actually see the opposite occurring suggests some rather favorable
trends for Hispanics over the next 44 years.
In contrast, our projections for Asians/others indicate that we should expect
a steady level of underrepresentation as we move into the middle of the 21st
century. Once again, this number can be somewhat deceptive if we do not take
population growth into account: Stability in this representation measure, even as
the group grows about 7 points as a share of the population, suggests relatively
favorable demographic changes.
Race gaps: Decomposition
An additional feature of the data we have built is that we can decompose these
total representation gaps into their constituent parts. Both underrepresentation
and overrepresentation occur for a variety of demographic and behavioral reasons.
This analysis allows us to pinpoint these sources and see how they fluctuated over
time and between different types of elections. These constituent parts are roughly
divided into demographically oriented pieces—the age and citizenship gaps—and
behaviorally oriented pieces—the registration and turnout gaps. See text box for a
full description of these concepts.
9 Center for American Progress | Brookings Institution | Bipartisan Policy Center | States of Change
The four parts of the total representation gap
The age gap represents that portion of the total
The registration gap represents that portion of
representation gap attributable to unequal age
the total representation gap attributable to unequal
distributions between groups. For example, compared
levels of voter registration between groups. Function-
to whites, Hispanics and Asians/other have a larger
ally, it is calculated by subtracting the percent of the
portion of their population under the age of 18.
eligible population that belongs to a group from their
Thus, part of the total representation gaps for these
percentage of the registered population—those who
two groups is due to a relatively large share of their
are registered to vote.
population being too young to vote. Functionally, it
is calculated by subtracting the percent of the whole
The turnout gap represents that portion of the total
population that belongs to a given group from their
representation gap attributable to unequal levels of
percentage of the voting age population—those 18
registrant turnout between groups. Functionally, it is
years of age and older.
calculated by subtracting the percent of the registered population that belongs to a group from their
The citizenship, or eligibility, gap represents
percentage of the voting population—those who
that portion of the total representation gap attribut-
actually voted in a given election in a given year.
able to unequal levels of citizenship between groups.
Hispanics and Asians/others are groups with relatively
Together, the total representation gap equals the sum
high immigrant populations and, as a result, lower
of these components—the age gap, the citizenship
citizenship rates. Therefore, a lower percentage of
gap, the registration gap, and the turnout gap.
their population are eligible to vote. Functionally, it
is calculated by subtracting the percent of the voting
age population that belongs to a group from their
percentage of the citizen population—those 18 years
of age and older who are also citizens.
Taking these in turn, Figure 5 displays our four racial groups’ age gaps—the portion of the total representation gap that exists due to unequal age distributions
between different groups. Since 1980, whites have had a far lower percentage of
their population in the zero to 17 age category, and this has resulted in a positive
age gap for them and a negative gap for all other racial groups. While demographic
shifts have caused blacks to become less underrepresented during this time period,
Hispanics and Asians/others have seen relatively large increases in their age gaps.
As we project out into the future, this trend should reverse course as blacks and
10 Center for American Progress | Brookings Institution | Bipartisan Policy Center | States of Change
Hispanics have larger and larger portions of their population age into the voting
age population. Asians/others will continue to see their age gap increase, but the
change will be less dramatic than what we’ve seen in the last three decades.
FIGURE 5
Age gaps by race
Difference between voting age population and whole population, 1980–2060
6
4
2
0
-2
-4
1980
1990
2000
White
2010
Black
2020
Hispanic
2030
2040
2050
2060
Asian/Other
This chart displays the age gaps for each racial group. This is the part of the total representation gap that exists due to some groups
having a disproportionate percentage of their population in the 0–17 age category. Positive values indicate that a group makes up a
larger percentage of the voting age population than the whole population, while negative values indicate the opposite.
Source: Estimates based on authors’ analysis of Ruy Teixeira, William H. Frey, and Rob Griffin, “States of Change: The Demographic
Evolution of the American Electorate, 1974–2060” (Washington: Center for American Progress, 2015), available at https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/progressive-movement/report/2015/02/24/107261/states-of-change/.
Next, we will examine the citizenship gap—the portion of the total representation gap that exists because of unequal levels of American citizenship between
groups—which is displayed for our groups in Figure 6. Although there are
a number of stories to tell here, the most consequential is about the rising
Hispanic population. High levels of immigration in the decades after 1980
resulted in a rapidly growing population—but also one that had relatively low
levels of citizenship. During this time period, the citizenship gap for Hispanics
more than doubled, going from -1.5 points in 1980 to about -3.5 points in 2016.
This underrepresentation growth was mirrored with a roughly identical growth
in overrepresentation among whites.
11 Center for American Progress | Brookings Institution | Bipartisan Policy Center | States of Change
FIGURE 6
Citizenship gaps by race
Difference between eligible population and voting age population, 1980–2060
6
4
2
0
-2
-4
1980
1990
2000
White
2010
Black
2020
Hispanic
2030
2040
2050
2060
Asian/Other
This chart displays the eligibility gaps for each racial group. This is the part of the total representation gap that exists due to some
groups having lower citizenship rates. Positive values indicate that a group makes up a larger percentage of the eligible population than
the voting age population, while negative values indicate the opposite.
Source: Estimates based on authors’ analysis of Ruy Teixeira, William H. Frey, and Rob Griffin, “States of Change: The Demographic
Evolution of the American Electorate, 1974–2060” (Washington: Center for American Progress, 2015), available at https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/progressive-movement/report/2015/02/24/107261/states-of-change/.
According to our projections, these two large deviations from representational
equality will shrink substantially over the next 44 years, especially the citizenship
gap. The reason for this is that the majority of the growth among Hispanics will
come from native births rather than immigration. As more native-born Hispanics
enter the voting age population, they will start to bring their citizenship rate into
alignment with that of whites and blacks. Accompanying this will be a similar
trend among Asians/others, who will see a smaller but still substantial drop in
their underrepresentation levels due to citizenship issues. Even absent any legislative action, we expect the citizenship gaps of both Hispanics and Asians/others to
return to their 1980 levels in the 2030s and 2020s, respectively. By the 2050s, both
these groups will have effectively zeroed out their eligibility issues.
Before presenting the remaining measures—registration and turnout gaps—it is
worthwhile to give them a little context. For the purposes of this report, we felt
it necessary to separate them into distinct parts of the total representation gap,
given that they do, technically, represent different steps of political participation.
Furthermore, there is a value in determining how much of the underrepresentation and overrepresentation gaps we see among groups is attributable to the
12 Center for American Progress | Brookings Institution | Bipartisan Policy Center | States of Change
difference between the eligible population and the registered population—the
registration gap—versus the difference between the registered population and the
voting population—the turnout gap.
That said, we do not wish to be misleading in regard to what these measures
might mean. Hypothetically, say that the registration and turnout gaps for a
given group collectively constituted a large portion of the total representation
gap but that the former was significantly bigger than the latter. For those interested in reducing representation gaps, a common but likely mistaken interpretation of this data might be something akin to, “If we can just get X group
registered to vote, then we can close most of the gap.”
The reason this interpretation is suspect is that these two gaps are part and parcel of
the same behavioral characteristic—political engagement. Individuals who register to vote and then vote have a higher level of engagement than those who do not
register to vote and, subsequently, do not vote. Closing a part of the registration
gap—say, by making registration easier—would not necessarily produce individuals
who turn out to vote at the same rate. In fact, we would almost certainly expect these
individuals—who are less politically engaged than individuals who were able to
register themselves previously—to turn out at a lower rate. Instead of being entirely
eliminated, a significant portion of the total representation gap you might close
through higher registration could simply manifest itself as a higher turnout gap.
All of this is to say the following: While we do present the registration and turnout
gaps separately, there is considerable value in thinking about them as highly interrelated measures that cannot be divorced from one another easily.
That throat clearing aside, we can see the past and projected registrations gaps for
presidential and midterm elections in Figure 7. For most of the presidential elections after 1980, we saw whites systematically overrepresented among registered
voters as a result of their higher registration rates. While the white registration gap
in presidential elections has moved from a low of 1.4 in 1984 to 2.5 in 2012, we
have seen the registration gaps of Hispanics and Asians/others increase by about a
point each due, mainly, to population growth.
In contrast, the black registration gap that hovered between -1 and -0.5 between
1980 and 2004 essentially zeroed out in 2008 and flipped from underrepresentation to overrepresentation by 2012. Spurred on by the election of America’s first
black president, the relative registration rates of this group rose dramatically and
contributed to one of the few flips we see anywhere in our data.
13 Center for American Progress | Brookings Institution | Bipartisan Policy Center | States of Change
FIGURE 7
Registration gaps by race and election type
Difference between registered population and eligible population, 1980–2060
Presidential
Midterm
6
4
2
0
-2
-4
1980
2000
2020
2040
White
2060
Black
1982
Hispanic
2002
2022
2042
2058
Asian/Other
This chart displays the registration gaps for each racial group in presidential and midterm elections. This is the part of the total
representation gap that exists due to some groups having higher or lower registration rates. Positive values indicate that a group makes
up a larger percentage of the registered population than the eligible population, while negative values indicate the opposite.
Sources: Estimates based on authors’ analysis of Ruy Teixeira, William H. Frey, and Rob Griffin, “States of Change: The Demographic
Evolution of the American Electorate, 1974–2060” (Washington: Center for American Progress, 2015), available at https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/progressive-movement/report/2015/02/24/107261/states-of-change/; November supplements of 2012 and 2014
data from Miriam King and others, “Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, Current Population Survey: Version 3.0,” available at
https://cps.ipums.org/cps/index.shtml (last accessed July 2016).
The story for midterm registration gaps is very similar for the elections between
1982 and 2014 except that all the gaps tend to be slightly larger than their presidential counterparts. Whites were overrepresented while Hispanics and Asians/
others were underrepresented. Each of those groups has seen their representation
gaps grow larger and move away from zero. Blacks have been underrepresented at
relatively low levels in midterms and have seen smaller gaps in the last several election cycles, but unlike in presidential elections, these improvements have not yet
resulted in a positive representation gap.
Projecting out to 2060, what can we expect if registration rates are identical to the
ones we observed in 2012 and 2014? Unlike the more demographically oriented
pieces of the total representation gap, registration issues will generally make racial
registration gaps larger as we move forward.
One reason for this is that there is a strong relationship between age and registration—with younger Americans tending to register at a lower rate than older
Americans. However, not all racial groups are aging at an equal rate. With their
14 Center for American Progress | Brookings Institution | Bipartisan Policy Center | States of Change
bottom-up growth driven primarily by relatively high fertility rates, Hispanics
and Asians/others will age more slowly as a group than whites and blacks.
Additionally, as eligibility gaps close during this time period, that now-larger
eligible voter population will register at a lower rate than whites and blacks. In this
way, diminishing eligibility gaps can turn, in part, into increasing registration gaps.
We expect that white registration gaps will go up from 2.8 and 4.1 points in 2016
and 2018 to 3.9 and 5.1 points in 2060 and 2058. Similarly, blacks will continue
to increase their positive registration gaps, although these changes will be much
smaller at 0.4 and 0.1 to 1.0 and 0.6 during the same timespan. Mirroring the
growth of those two groups’ gaps, the projections indicate that we should anticipate larger, negative registration gaps for Hispanics—from -2.2 and -2.7 to -3.2
and -3.6—and Asians/others—from -1.1 and -1.4 to -1.6 and -2.0.
FIGURE 8
Turnout gaps by race and election type
Difference between voting population and registered population, 1980–2060
Presidential
Midterm
6
4
2
0
-2
-4
1980
2000
2020
2040
White
2060
Black
1982
Hispanic
2002
2022
2042
2058
Asian/Other
This chart displays the turnout gaps for each racial group in presidential and midterm elections. This is the part of the total
representation gap that exists due to some groups having higher or lower turnout rates. Positive values indicate that a group makes up
a larger percentage of the voting population than the registered population while negative values indicate the opposite.
Sources: Estimates based on authors’ analysis of Ruy Teixeira, William H. Frey, and Rob Griffin, “States of Change: The Demographic
Evolution of the American Electorate, 1974–2060” (Washington: Center for American Progress, 2015), available at https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/progressive-movement/report/2015/02/24/107261/states-of-change/; November supplements of 2012 and 2014
data from Miriam King and others, “Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, Current Population Survey: Version 3.0,” available at
https://cps.ipums.org/cps/index.shtml (last accessed July 2016).
15 Center for American Progress | Brookings Institution | Bipartisan Policy Center | States of Change
Finally, we’ve displayed the turnout gaps for presidential elections and midterm
elections in Figure 8. For whites, we have observed two markedly different trends
since 1980—a modestly declining level of turnout overrepresentation in presidential elections and a substantially increasing level in midterms. In 1980 and 1982,
the presidential and midterm gaps were nearly identical at 0.7 and 0.5, but by 2012
and 2014, they had become quite distinct at 0.1 and 2.6. Interestingly, 2012 and
2014 represent both the lowest—presidential—and highest—congressional—
turnout gaps we have observed in the past 36 years.
For blacks, the story varies somewhat depending on the start year one uses, but it
is clear that negative turnout gaps have been the norm since 1980. However, since
the late 1980s to early 1990s, those gaps have been shrinking significantly as black
turnout has increased. The midterm turnout gap for blacks actually turned positive
in 2010, though it slipped back to very slightly negative in 2014. The presidential
turnout gap for blacks went from negative to positive starting in 2008 and, strikingly,
was actually larger than the white registrant turnout gap in both 2008 and 2012.
In contrast, Hispanics started with negative turnout gaps and have seen those gaps
grow larger over the last 36 years. Their presidential and midterm turnout gaps
were essentially equal in 1980 and 1982—hovering around -0.2—but changed
at notably different rates over time. As of the 2012 and 2014 elections, these gaps
stood at -0.5 and -1.7. We can tell a nearly identical story for Asians/others from
the roughly similar negative gaps in 1980 and 1982—both were below -0.1—to
the divergent rates of change leading up to 2012 and 2014—in which the gaps
stood at -0.2 and -0.6.
Assuming that the turnout rates of registered voters remains the same, we see relative stability in the turnout gaps for presidential elections and larger changes afoot
for midterms. By 2060 whites, blacks, Hispanics, and Asians/others are expected
to shift 0.4, 0.2, -0.4, and -0.2 from their presidential baselines in 2016, respectively. In midterms, we would anticipate changes rough twice that size at 0.8, 0.5,
-1.0, and -0.3 from 2014 to 2058.
Taking a step back, we might ask about the relative impact of each of these factors
over time and how they might change in the future as the American population
shifts. To assess this, let us take the single racial group that is consistently overrepresented during our analysis—whites—and see how each of the gaps contributes
to their overrepresentation in a given year. Figure 9 displays those composition
values for every presidential and midterm election between 1980 and 2060.
16 Center for American Progress | Brookings Institution | Bipartisan Policy Center | States of Change
FIGURE 9
Composition of total representation gap for whites by election type,
1980–2060
Presidential
0%
50%
Midterm
100%
1980
0%
50%
100%
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014
2016
2018
2020
2022
2024
2026
2028
2030
2032
2034
2036
2038
2040
2042
2044
2046
2048
2050
2052
2054
2056
2058
2060
Age gap
Citizenship gap
Registration gap
Turnout gap
This chart displays the composition of white overrepresentation in presidential and midterm elections. While eligibility issues have
played a role in the past, political participation will play an increasingly important part in the future.
Sources: Estimates based on authors’ analysis of Ruy Teixeira, William H. Frey, and Rob Griffin, “States of Change: The Demographic
Evolution of the American Electorate, 1974–2060” (Washington: Center for American Progress, 2015), available at https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/progressive-movement/report/2015/02/24/107261/states-of-change/; November supplements of 2012 and 2014
data from Miriam King and others, “Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, Current Population Survey: Version 3.0,” available at
https://cps.ipums.org/cps/index.shtml (last accessed July 2016).
In general, the early 1980s were a time when age, citizenship, and participation—
registration plus turnout gaps combined—played roughly equal roles in explaining the overrepresentation of whites. In presidential races, the citizenship gap grew
larger between 1980 and 2012 as a result of immigration-driven growth among
Hispanics and Asians/others, going from roughly 30 percent of the total representation gap to 45 percent. At the same time, the impact of the participatory gaps—
registration and turnout—collectively shrunk by a roughly equal amount.
17 Center for American Progress | Brookings Institution | Bipartisan Policy Center | States of Change
In contrast, the participatory gaps made up a larger percentage of the total
representation gaps in midterm elections over this time period. Given that age
and citizenship gaps are roughly the same size during midterm and presidential
elections, this increase suggests that registration and turnout gaps grew substantially—enough to overwhelm an increasingly large citizenship gap. Between 1982
and 2014, the combined impact of the participatory gaps in midterms went from
35 percent of the total representation gap to 46 percent.
As we project forward, the increasingly native-born Hispanic and Asian/other
communities will have higher citizenship rates. As this occurs, the impact of the
citizenship gap will also decline and participatory issues will go from explaining
29 percent and 50 percent of their representation gaps in 2016 and 2018 to 65
percent and 78 percent in 2060 and 2058.
In sum, while eligibility issues have played an increasingly prominent role in
explaining racial representation gaps in presidential elections to date, participatory
elements will explain the lion’s share of future gaps.
Age gaps
If we break the American population down by age, we find that the youngest
age groups are generally underrepresented while the oldest are overrepresented.
Given the incredibly strong relationship between age and political participation,
this should come as little surprise. While the past three decades have seen middleaged Americans become increasingly underrepresented and seniors increasingly
overrepresented, the coming demographic changes will likely shift the population
slightly back toward more equal levels of representation.
Understanding these general age gap trends starts with understanding the specific
and substantial differences between how well different age groups are represented.
These differences are displayed in Figure 10 for our four age groups—those ages
18 to 29, 30 to 44, 45 to 64, and 65 and older.
18 Center for American Progress | Brookings Institution | Bipartisan Policy Center | States of Change
FIGURE 10
Total representation gaps by age and election type, 1980–2060
Presidential
Midterm
12
6
0
-6
-12
1980
2000
2020
2040
18–29
2060
30–44
1982
45–64
2002
2022
2042
2058
65+
This chart displays the total representation gaps by age group over presidential and midterm elections. Positive values indicate that a group
makes up a larger percentage of the voting population than the voting age population, while negative values indicate the opposite.
Sources: Estimates based on authors’ analysis of Ruy Teixeira, William H. Frey, and Rob Griffin, “States of Change: The Demographic
Evolution of the American Electorate, 1974–2060” (Washington: Center for American Progress, 2015), available at https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/progressive-movement/report/2015/02/24/107261/states-of-change/; November supplements of 2012 and 2014
data from Miriam King and others, “Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, Current Population Survey: Version 3.0,” available at
https://cps.ipums.org/cps/index.shtml (last accessed July 2016).
As we might expect given the important part age plays in predicting the likelihood
of voting, younger age groups are generally underrepresented while older age groups
are overrepresented. Starting with the 18- to 29-year-olds, we can see that they have
been systematically underrepresented among voters and that this representation gap
is notably worse in midterm elections. Both midterm and presidential gaps for this
group showed significant improvement after 2004 and shrunk to their smallest level
in 2008 and 2010 at -4.8 and -9.5 points, respectively. However, these gaps grew in
subsequent elections, sliding back to -6.0 and -11.2 points in 2012 and 2014.
For 30- to 44-year-olds, there has been a clear trend over time toward underrepresentation. In 1980 and 1982, this group was overrepresented by a little over 1.3
points and .4 points, respectively. This flipped to underrepresentation by the elections of 1994 and 1996, with these gaps growing to around -2.5 and -5.2 points by
2012 and 2014. This change is due in part to the shifting racial composition of this
group but, more importantly, due to a decline in turnout among 30- to 44-year-old
whites since the 1980s.
The older age ranges have been consistently overrepresented in federal elections
for the last 36 years. As one would expect, overrepresentation of these age groups
is generally higher in midterm than in presidential years.
19 Center for American Progress | Brookings Institution | Bipartisan Policy Center | States of Change
The 45- to 64-year-old age group saw relatively little change between 1980 and
2014. Levels of overrepresentation during presidential elections have remained
fairly constant, hovering between 3.5 and 5. Midterms have varied a bit more—
still centered about 7 or so—but there has not really been a discernable trend.
In contrast, those in the 65 and up age group have seen rising levels of overrepresentation in both presidential and midterm elections. In 1980 and 1982, this
group’s representation gaps were 1.5 and 3.6, respectively. These grew to 4.1 and
9.3 by 2012 and 2014.
Looking at projected representation gaps for age groups, we see far less change over
time than we did for racial groups. Holding registration and turnout rates constant
over this time period, we expect representation gaps for all age groups to decline
somewhat between 2016 and 2060, with underrepresented age groups becoming
less underrepresented and overrepresented age groups becoming less overrepresented. This indicates there will be some small return toward a more age-representative electorate in the future simply as a function of changing demographics.
Compared to their 2016 and 2018 baselines, we expect the representation gaps
of 18- to 29-years-olds to shift 0.7 and 1.3 points, 30- to 44-years olds to shift 1.1
and 0.4 points, 45- to 64-years-olds to shift -1.8 and -2.4 points, and those 65 and
older to shift -0.03 and -0.7 points.
Education and gender gaps
Over the past three decades, we have observed representational divides between
those with and without college educations. With strikingly higher levels of
participation, college-educated voters have been consistently over-represented in
the electorate in both midterms and presidential elections. However, two groups
have driven a significant portion of this overrepresentation and underrepresentation: college-educated whites and Hispanics without a degree. Equally interesting
are the gender divides among those without college degrees. Among whites and
blacks in our most recent elections, we actually see overrepresentation across the
board except for one group—men without college degrees.
Looking ahead several decades, future demographic trends suggest a more equitable future where Hispanics, Asians, and those of other races without college
degrees are still underrepresented but at a much lower relative rate.
20 Center for American Progress | Brookings Institution | Bipartisan Policy Center | States of Change
To illustrate this broad story, we will start with the basic representation trends
for Americans with and without college degrees. As shown in Figure 11, collegeeducated Americans have been consistently overrepresented among the voting
population, and the size of that gap has grown over time, particularly in midterms.
The total representation gap for college graduates has gone from around 5 and 6
points in 1980 and 1982 to 8 and 11 points in 2012 and 2014. Most of this growth
has been due to the steady increase in the size of the college-educated population.
FIGURE 11
Total representation gaps by education level and election type,
1980–2014
12
6
0
-6
-12
1980
1986
College degree
1992
Presidential
Midterm
1998
2004
No college degree
2010
2014
Presidential
Midterm
This chart displays the total representation gaps by education group in presidential and midterm elections. Positive values indicate that a
group makes up a larger percentage of the voting population than the voting age population, while negative values indicate the opposite.
Note: Degree refers to individuals with a four-year college degree or higher.
Source: Estimates based on authors’ analysis of Ruy Teixeira, William H. Frey, and Rob Griffin, “States of Change: The Demographic
Evolution of the American Electorate, 1974–2060” (Washington: Center for American Progress, 2015), available at https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/progressive-movement/report/2015/02/24/107261/states-of-change/.
Among Americans without college degrees, we see the opposite trend—a growing underrepresentation gap, even as the population itself has shrunk over time. In
1980 and 1982, noncollege Americans were underrepresented by -5 and -6 points,
gaps which grew to -8 and -11 by 2012 and 2014.
21 Center for American Progress | Brookings Institution | Bipartisan Policy Center | States of Change
However, if we also break these data down by race, we can see that this original
cut of the data actually hides a tremendous amount of variance. Looking at
Figure 12, which displays the total representation gap by college education and
race for presidential elections, we can see that the vast majority of overrepresentation and underrepresentation is actually coming from just two racial groups—
whites and Hispanics.
FIGURE 12
Total representation gaps by education level, race, and election type,
1980–2014
Presidential
Midterm
10
5
0
-5
1980
1988
1996
White
College degree
No college degree
2004
2012
Black
College degree
No college degree
-10
1982
1990
Hispanic
College degree
No college degree
1998
2006
2014
Asian/Other
College degree
No college degree
This chart displays the total representation gaps by race and education groups in presidential and midterm elections. Positive values
indicate that a group makes up a larger percentage of the voting population than the voting age population, while negative values
indicate the opposite. The vast majority of underrepresentation and overrepresentation exists because of white, college overrepresentation and Hispanic, noncollege underrepresentation.
Note: Degree refers to individuals with a four-year college degree or higher.
Source: Estimates based on authors’ analysis of Ruy Teixeira, William H. Frey, and Rob Griffin, “States of Change: The Demographic
Evolution of the American Electorate, 1974–2060” (Washington: Center for American Progress, 2015), available at https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/progressive-movement/report/2015/02/24/107261/states-of-change/.
In 2012, white college graduates alone had a representation gap that was larger than
the collective overrepresentation gap of college graduates. Notable here is that,
despite being college educated, nonwhite groups do not have an apparent representational advantage. In fact, Hispanic as well Asian/other college graduates are actually underrepresented among voters, mainly as a result of low citizenship rates.
22 Center for American Progress | Brookings Institution | Bipartisan Policy Center | States of Change
Similarly, noncollege Hispanics alone had a representation gap that accounts for
82 percent of the total underrepresentation of all noncollege Americans, a function of both their low citizenship and participation—registration and turnout—
rates. Interestingly, the former is actually why noncollege whites experience a
representation gap that hovers around zero despite having low participation rates:
The ineligibility of the Hispanic and Asian and other noncollege population floats
the white and black population.
Finally, we can also break down the data by gender, once again revealing some
subgroup variance hidden in the larger groups we have analyzed above. In addition, we can project these groups out into the future. While these projections are
less defensible than the ones used in the rest of this report, they still constitute a
very good estimate of the future populations of the country might look like.8 In
Figure 13, we display the total representation gaps broken down by gender and for
whites, blacks, and Hispanics.
FIGURE 13
Total representation gaps by education level, race, and gender, 1980–2060
White
Black
Hispanic
4
4
2
2
0
0
-2
-2
-4
-4
1980
2000
2020
2040
2060
1980
College degree
2000
Men
Women
2020
2040
2060
No college degree
1980
2000
2020
2040
2060
Men
Women
This chart displays the total representation gaps by race, education, and gender groups. Positive values indicate that a group makes up a larger percentage of the voting population than the
voting age population, while negative values indicate the opposite.
Note: Degree refers to individuals with a four-year college degree or higher.
Sources: Estimates based on authors’ analysis of Ruy Teixeira, William H. Frey, and Rob Griffin, “States of Change: The Demographic Evolution of the American Electorate, 1974–2060”
(Washington: Center for American Progress, 2015), available at https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/progressive-movement/report/2015/02/24/107261/states-of-change/; 2008–2013
American Community Survey data from Miriam King and others, “Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, Current Population Survey: Version 3.0,” available at https://cps.ipums.org/cps/index.shtml (last accessed July 2016).
23 Center for American Progress | Brookings Institution | Bipartisan Policy Center | States of Change
There are several stories to unpack within this new cut of the education data, but
perhaps the most interesting is the difference between white noncollege men
and women from 1980 to 2012. As previously noted, the overall representation
gap for noncollege whites tended to hover around zero in this period as a function of both positive citizenship gaps and negative participation gaps. What we
can see in these data is that this balance varies by gender, with white noncollege
men underrepresented due to very low participation rates and white noncollege
women overrepresented due to relatively higher rates. Notably, their participation gaps of these women are still negative but not negative enough to outweigh
the eligibility advantages.
There is a similar story to be told about black noncollege men and women. As we
have noted several times in this report, the flip among blacks from underrepresentation to overrepresentation is one of the most interesting stories we have in
regard to political behavior in the past 30 years. What our data reveal is that this
overrepresentation was not evenly distributed across education and gender. While
college-educated blacks and black noncollege women were all overrepresented
among voters, black men without college degrees were still underrepresented.
As we project into the future, one of our original expectations was that the shrinking eligibility gap among Hispanics would eventually make white noncollege men
and women less represented among voters. The logic here was that if the eligibility
gap was one of the only things floating these populations, then its disappearance
would cause their total representation gaps to diminish considerably.
However, our own projections surprised us. While this does hold true for white
women without college degrees—their representation gap declines from 0.5 to
.01 between 2016 and 2060—we see the opposite trend amongst men. Their
representation gap goes from -1.0 to -0.4 during that same time period. This is
because the aging of the white male noncollege population more than offsets its
shrinking eligibility gap.
Among whites with college degrees, we project declines in their representation
gaps, going from 3.8 to 3.1 for men and 3.9 to 3.0 for women between 2016 and
2060. This occurs because their shrinking citizenship gap is not counterbalanced
by increases in their registration and turnout gaps during this time period.
24 Center for American Progress | Brookings Institution | Bipartisan Policy Center | States of Change
Among blacks, we see a universal positive movement in their representation gaps.
Notably, black men without college degrees will see enough of an increase to go
from underrepresented to overrepresented by 2052. We see a similar movement
among college-educated Hispanic men and women, both of whom should see
enough change in their representation gaps to become overrepresented by 2020.
Interestingly, our projections indicate a roughly flat trajectory for noncollege
Hispanics despite the dramatic increases in citizenship we expect to occur over
this time period. Again, it is important to consider these gaps in the context
of their population size. If not for the projected decline in the citizenship gap,
increasing population size would drive the total representation gap for this
group up substantially. So maintaining stability in the face of rapid growth
should be viewed positively.
25 Center for American Progress | Brookings Institution | Bipartisan Policy Center | States of Change
Representation gaps, demographic
change, and alternative scenarios
In the last section, we laid out the effects of projected changes in the demographic
composition of the population on total representation gaps. That is, using our
baseline assumptions, we assessed, for example, what the difference in the representation of Latinos among the population as a whole versus their representation
among actual voters would be in 2060, given our projections of demographic
change in United States.
Our baseline assumptions were based on the most recent data available for us
from the American Community Survey and Current Population Survey Voting
and Registration Supplement, including eligibility, registration, and turnout rates
from the 2008 to 2014 elections. A given baseline only uses registration and turnout rates from one election; we could not use 2016 as a baseline because Census
data are not yet available. But we did not take into account policy changes such as
immigration and registration reform that might alter those rates in a systematic
way and therefore produce different representation gap outcomes.
This is, of course, of considerable interest, so in this section, we simulate what the
effects of these policy changes might be. We cannot know in advance exactly how
these policy changes would affect underlying eligibility, registration, and turnout rates, so instead we make different assumptions about how these rates might
change, including what would appear to be the maximum and minimum effects of
these policies. Based on these different assumptions, we are able to give a sense of
the range of effects on representation we might see if the country did move down
the path of registration and/or immigration reform.
The basic scenarios we investigated, and the assumptions they entailed, are
outlined below.
26 Center for American Progress | Brookings Institution | Bipartisan Policy Center | States of Change
• Immigration reform I: Full eligibility
In this scenario, all groups are assumed to have full eligibility—that is, all voting
age members of a given group are assumed to be citizens and therefore eligible
to vote. Turnout and registration rates by state, race, age, and gender are held
constant. This represents an ideally effective implementation of immigration
reform since all voting age noncitizens become citizens and these newly enfranchised noncitizens register and vote at the same rate as their already enfranchised peers.
• Immigration reform II: Full eligibility, half current registration rates
Here, again, all groups are assumed to have full eligibility, so all voting age noncitizens become citizens. But in this scenario, we do not assume that these newly
enfranchised citizens will register at the same rate as currently enfranchised
citizens. Instead, we assume that the registration rate of the newly eligible is
only half that of the old eligible population by state, race, age, and gender group.
Finally, we assume that the turnout rates of newly enfranchised citizens, once
registered, match those of currently enfranchised citizens.
• Registration reform I: Registration equalized over race
In this scenario, all racial groups have their registration rate set equal to the
highest rate of registration in their state for their age group and gender. For
example, for 18- to 29-year-old men in California, if white male 18- to 29-yearolds have a higher registration rate than black male 18- to 29-year-olds, Latino
male 18- to 29-year-olds, and Asian and other male 18- to 29-year-olds, we
set the registration rate for all these 18- to 29-year-old male groups equal to
the white 18- to 29-year-old male rate. Turnout rates by state, race, age, and
gender are held constant. This represents an upper bound of effectiveness for
registration reform implementation since we are assuming that differences
in racial registration rates will disappear among eligible voters within a given
age/gender category and that newly registered voters will turn out at the same
rate as their already registered peers.
27 Center for American Progress | Brookings Institution | Bipartisan Policy Center | States of Change
• Registration reform II: Registration equalized over race, half current turnout rates
Here, again, all racial groups have their registration rate set equal to the highest rate of registration in their state for their age group and gender. But in this
scenario, we do not assume that newly registered voters will turn out at the same
rate as currently registered voters. Instead, we assume that the turnout rate of
the newly registered is only half that of the old registered population by state/
race/age/gender group.
• Mobilization reform: Turnout equalized over race
In this scenario, all racial groups have their turnout rate—among registered
voters—set equal to the highest rate of turnout in their state for their age group
and gender. For example, for 18- to 29-year-old men in California, if white
male 18- to 29-year-old registrants have a higher turnout rate than black male
18- to 29-year-olds, Latino male 18- to 29-year-olds, and Asian/other male
18- to 29-year-olds, we set the turnout rate for all these 18- to 29-year-old male
registrant groups equal to the white 18- to 29-year-old male registrant rate.
Registration rates by state/race/age/gender are held constant.
• Mobilization plus registration reform: Turnout and registration rates equalized
over race
In this scenario, all racial groups have both their turnout and registration rates
set equal to the highest rates of turnout and registration in their state for their
age group and gender. This scenario represents the holy grail for election reformers, since it eliminates racial disparities that currently affect both the registration
process and voter mobilization process—disparities that, together, drive the
widely noted participation gaps between eligible voters of different races.
Immigration reform I: Full eligibility
What would happen to projected representation gaps if immigration reform were
implemented and was suddenly and wildly successful, transforming voting age
noncitizens into voting age citizens, and therefore eligible voters, en masse. This
scenario allows us to answer that question.
28 Center for American Progress | Brookings Institution | Bipartisan Policy Center | States of Change
The first thing to note is that this change produces an immediate decline in the
level of white overrepresentation in presidential elections, relative to our 2012
baseline (for clarity of exposition, we concentrate here on presidential elections;
congressional elections show the same pattern of decline, just from a higher initial
level). In 2020, overrepresentation drops from 10 points under the baseline to less
than 7 points. The reason the gap does not disappear entirely is because there are
still gaps due to superior white turnout of registrants, more substantially from an
older age structure of whites and, most substantially, from considerably higher
registration rates among whites.
The flip side of this outcome is largely about Latinos.9 Their underrepresentation
drops immediately from -8 points in 2020 to -5 points in 2060. For the opposite
reasons to whites, the gap does not completely disappear: lower turnout of registrants, a younger age structure and, especially, lower registration rates.
The second thing to note is the full eligibility scenario does not have much effect
on projected representation gaps toward the end of our projection period. In
2060, white overrepresentation in this scenario is projected to be 6.4 points.
Under our baseline, it is 6.8 points. Similarly, Latino underrepresentation under
this scenario is -5.3 points in 2060, identical to the baseline figure for that year.
This is because the Latino and Asian voting age population is projected to become
overwhelmingly citizen based—over 90 percent—in the coming decades.
Therefore, most of the all-at-once effects on eligibility we have simulated in this
full eligibility scenario should happen gradually to these populations anyway, with
representation gaps winding up at roughly the same level under both our baseline
and the scenario.
By 2060, the most salient part of representation gaps under this scenario will be
registration gaps: 3.8 of the 6.4 points for white overrepresentation and -3.2 of
-5.3 points for Latino underrepresentation. For Latino underrepresentation, the
rest of the representation gap will be accounted for about equally between an age
gap—Latinos will be still be younger—and a registrant turnout gap—we assume
Latino registrant turnout rates remain relatively low.
29 Center for American Progress | Brookings Institution | Bipartisan Policy Center | States of Change
FIGURE 14
Change to representation gap: Immigration reform 1
2020
2060
White
Baseline
Alternative
scenario
Hispanic
Baseline
Alternative
scenario
Asian/Other
Baseline
Alternative
scenario
-10
-5
0
Age gap
5
10
Citizenship gap
-10
-5
Registration gap
0
5
10
Turnout gap
This chart displays the age, citizenship, registration, and turnout gaps for racial groups under our baseline scenario and our Immigration
Reform I scenario. In this scenario, all noncitizens are assumed to be eligible to vote and their participation rates are set equal to their
eligible counterparts.
Sources: Estimates based on authors’ analysis of Ruy Teixeira, William H. Frey, and Rob Griffin, “States of Change: The Demographic
Evolution of the American Electorate, 1974–2060” (Washington: Center for American Progress, 2015), available at https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/progressive-movement/report/2015/02/24/107261/states-of-change/; November supplements of 2012 and 2014
data from Miriam King and others, “Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, Current Population Survey: Version 3.0,” available at
https://cps.ipums.org/cps/index.shtml (last accessed July 2016).
Immigration reform II: Full eligibility, half current registration rates
As noted, the assumption that all newly eligible voters would register at the same
rate as currently eligible voters is probably unrealistic. So, in this scenario, we still
assume that immigration reform will be hugely successful at turning voting age
noncitizens into citizens but set these new citizens’ registration rate at only half
the current rate for their state, race, age, and gender group, reflecting their relative
disconnection from the political system.
Compared to the previous scenario, this scenario has a significantly smaller immediate effect on representation gaps, because, while it eliminates the eligibility gap,
it sharply increases the registration gap due to the lower registration rate of new
eligibles. Thus, the scenario only produces half of the immediate 3-point decline
in white overrepresentation seen in the earlier scenario. And, while the previous
scenario brought projected Latino overrepresentation down from -8 to -5 points
in 2020, this scenario only brings it down to -7 points by 2020.
30 Center for American Progress | Brookings Institution | Bipartisan Policy Center | States of Change
However, these relatively high representation gaps should shrink over time as the
number of voting age noncitizens declines and eventually arrive in roughly the
same place as the first immigration reform scenario. And, as before, the key driver
of future representation gaps in this scenario will be registration gaps, reflecting
the assumption that Latinos and Asians, whether affected by immigration reform
or not, will continue to register at lower levels than whites. Continuing age and
registrant turnout gaps will be of considerably less importance.
FIGURE 15
Change to representation gap: Immigration reform 2
2020
2060
White
Baseline
Alternative
scenario
Hispanic
Baseline
Alternative
scenario
Asian/Other
Baseline
Alternative
scenario
-10
-5
0
Age gap
5
10
Citizenship gap
-10
-5
Registration gap
0
5
10
Turnout gap
This chart displays the age, citizenship, registration, and turnout gaps for racial groups under our baseline scenario and our Immigration
Reform II scenario. In this scenario, all noncitizens are assumed to be eligible to vote but they register to vote at half the rate of their
eligible counterparts.
Sources: Estimates based on authors’ analysis of Ruy Teixeira, William H. Frey, and Rob Griffin, “States of Change: The Demographic
Evolution of the American Electorate, 1974–2060” (Washington: Center for American Progress, 2015), available at https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/progressive-movement/report/2015/02/24/107261/states-of-change/; November supplements of 2012 and 2014
data from Miriam King and others, “Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, Current Population Survey: Version 3.0,” available at
https://cps.ipums.org/cps/index.shtml (last accessed July 2016).
Registration reform I: Registration equalized over race
This scenario allows us to estimate the effects of registration reform on future
representation gaps if reform fully succeeded in eliminating racial disparities
in registration rates. The contrast with the first immigration reform scenario is
instructive. In this, our first registration reform scenario, the immediate effect on
representation gaps in the 2020 election is not as large: White overrepresentation comes down 2 points, from 10 points in the baseline to 8 points, and Latino
31 Center for American Progress | Brookings Institution | Bipartisan Policy Center | States of Change
underrepresentation improves by 2 points, from -8 points to -6 points. These are
solid improvements, but in the first immigration reform scenario, the respective
figures were 3 points in each case.
But the most interesting contrast is that, unlike the immigration reform scenario,
registration reform produces representation gap improvements that, relative to the
baseline, persist—in fact, widen—all the way to 2060. By that time, this registration reform scenario reduces white overrepresentation to just under 4 points,
Latino underrepresentation to just under -3 points, and cuts Asian/other underrepresentation in half to -1.5 points. What drives what is left of representation
gaps at this point are, first, that the Latino and Asian populations are still younger
than the white population and, second, that their registrant turnout rates are still
assumed to be lower than white rates.
As noted earlier, this represents an upper bound of effectiveness on racial disparities
for registration reform since we assumed both that differences in racial registration
rates will disappear among eligible voters within a given age/gender category and that
newly registered voters will turn out at the same rate as their already registered peers.
FIGURE 16
Change to representation gap: Registration reform 1
2020
2060
White
Baseline
Alternative
scenario
Hispanic
Baseline
Alternative
scenario
Asian/Other
Baseline
Alternative
scenario
-10
-5
0
Age gap
5
10
Citizenship gap
-10
-5
Registration gap
0
5
10
Turnout gap
This chart displays the age, citizenship, registration, and turnout gaps for racial groups under our baseline scenario and our Registration
Reform I scenario. In this scenario, all voters are registered at the same rate by state and age group while the participation rates of the
newly registered are set equal to their already registered counterparts.
Sources: Estimates based on authors’ analysis of Ruy Teixeira, William H. Frey, and Rob Griffin, “States of Change: The Demographic
Evolution of the American Electorate, 1974–2060” (Washington: Center for American Progress, 2015), available at https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/progressive-movement/report/2015/02/24/107261/states-of-change/; November supplements of 2012 and 2014
data from Miriam King and others, “Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, Current Population Survey: Version 3.0,” available at
https://cps.ipums.org/cps/index.shtml (last accessed July 2016).
32 Center for American Progress | Brookings Institution | Bipartisan Policy Center | States of Change
Registration reform II: Registration equalized over race, half current
turnout rates
The assumption that all newly registered voters would turn out at the same rate as
currently registered voters is probably very unrealistic. Those who have registered
without benefit of reform are likely more motivated and attuned to politics than
those who have not and, therefore, are more likely to actually cast a ballot than
those who are newly registered due to a reform process.
This view is supported by recent results from Oregon’s new system of “opt-out”
voter registration, where those who interact with the state’s Department of Motor
Vehicles are automatically registered and then have to actively respond to a postcard notification to opt out of being registered. If they do nothing, they remain
registered. In 2016, those registered by this method in Oregon turned out at a rate
that was roughly half of those registered by conventional means.10
So, in this scenario, we still assume that registration reform will be hugely successful at elevating and equalizing registration rates, but we also assume that
these new registrants will turn out at only half the current rate for registrants
in their state, race, age, and gender group. Compared to the first registration
reform scenario, this scenario, as we would expect, has a significantly smaller
immediate effect on representation gaps, reducing it by just a percentage point
in 2020, relative to our baseline. And, while this registration reform scenario
does produce representation gap improvements that, relative to the baseline,
continue and widen slightly to 2060, the overall effect is quite a bit smaller than
the first registration reform scenario.
In the year 2060, in this simulation, white overrepresentation is still about 5 points
and Latino underrepresentation is about -4 points. What drives representation
gaps at that point is primarily a significant registrant turnout gap point with an
ongoing age gap being of secondary importance.
This scenario can be taken as the probable effect of an extremely successful registration reform if turnout of the newly registered under reform continues to lag
turnout of the already registered.
33 Center for American Progress | Brookings Institution | Bipartisan Policy Center | States of Change
FIGURE 17
Change to representation gap: Registration reform 2
2020
2060
White
Baseline
Alternative
scenario
Hispanic
Baseline
Alternative
scenario
Asian/Other
Baseline
Alternative
scenario
-10
-5
0
Age gap
5
10
Citizenship gap
-10
-5
Registration gap
0
5
10
Turnout gap
This chart displays the age, citizenship, registration, and turnout gaps for racial groups under our baseline scenario and our Registration
Reform II scenario. In this scenario, all voters are registered at the same rate by state and age group while the participation rates of the
newly registered are set to half of their already registered counterparts.
Sources: Estimates based on authors’ analysis of Ruy Teixeira, William H. Frey, and Rob Griffin, “States of Change: The Demographic
Evolution of the American Electorate, 1974–2060” (Washington: Center for American Progress, 2015), available at https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/progressive-movement/report/2015/02/24/107261/states-of-change/; November supplements of 2012 and 2014
data from Miriam King and others, “Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, Current Population Survey: Version 3.0,” available at
https://cps.ipums.org/cps/index.shtml (last accessed July 2016).
Mobilization reform: Turnout equalized over race
The previous scenario raises the issue of what would happen if we could eliminate differences in the turnout of registrants by race, say, through technical
improvements in mobilization practices and perhaps enhanced interparty competition for these voters.
However, this turns out to the least effective intervention in terms of reducing
representation gaps if it occurs in the absence of any reduction in registration differences across race and age groups. Initially—looking at 2020—it has very little
effect, reducing white overrepresentation by only one-tenth of percentage point
and Latino underrepresentation by half a point relative to our baseline. Over time,
the effect becomes somewhat larger, reducing projected white overrepresentation
by .5 points and Latino underrepresentation by .8 points in 2060.
34 Center for American Progress | Brookings Institution | Bipartisan Policy Center | States of Change
These modest results reflect the continued salience of registration gaps, which, in
this scenario, are not touched by equalizing the turnout of registrants. Obviously,
solving the problem of racial disparities in turning out registered voters, while
making a contribution to reducing representation gaps, will be of limited value in
the absence of practices that also narrow continuing registration gaps.
FIGURE 18
Change to representation gap: Mobilization reform
2020
2060
White
Baseline
Alternative
scenario
Hispanic
Baseline
Alternative
scenario
Asian/Other
Baseline
Alternative
scenario
-10
-5
0
Age gap
5
10
Citizenship gap
-10
-5
Registration gap
0
5
10
Turnout gap
This chart displays the age, citizenship, registration, and turnout gaps for racial groups under our baseline scenario and our Mobilization
Reform scenario. In this scenario, all registered voters turn out at the same rate by state and age group.
Sources: Estimates based on authors’ analysis of Ruy Teixeira, William H. Frey, and Rob Griffin, “States of Change: The Demographic
Evolution of the American Electorate, 1974–2060” (Washington: Center for American Progress, 2015), available at https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/progressive-movement/report/2015/02/24/107261/states-of-change/; November supplements of 2012 and 2014
data from Miriam King and others, “Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, Current Population Survey: Version 3.0,” available at
https://cps.ipums.org/cps/index.shtml (last accessed July 2016).
Mobilization plus registration reform: Turnout and registration
rates equalized over race
Our final scenario eliminates racial disparities that currently affect both the registration process and the voter mobilization process—disparities that, together,
drive observed participation gaps between eligible voters of different races. This
would be the result if both registration reform and new mobilization practices
were highly effective and, in that sense, the scenario represents an upper bound
for the effects of reforming participation processes, as opposed to eligibility for
participation, covered in the first two scenarios.
35 Center for American Progress | Brookings Institution | Bipartisan Policy Center | States of Change
FIGURE 19
Change to representation gap: Mobilization and registration reform
2020
2060
White
Baseline
Alternative
scenario
Hispanic
Baseline
Alternative
scenario
Asian/Other
Baseline
Alternative
scenario
-10
-5
0
Age gap
5
10
Citizenship gap
-10
-5
Registration gap
0
5
10
Turnout gap
This chart displays the age, citizenship, registration, and turnout gaps for racial groups under our baseline scenario and our Mobilization
and Registration Reform scenario. In this scenario, all eligible voters are registered and turn out at the same rate by state and age group.
Sources: Estimates based on authors’ analysis of Ruy Teixeira, William H. Frey, and Rob Griffin, “States of Change: The Demographic
Evolution of the American Electorate, 1974–2060” (Washington: Center for American Progress, 2015), available at https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/progressive-movement/report/2015/02/24/107261/states-of-change/; November supplements of 2012 and 2014
data from Miriam King and others, “Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, Current Population Survey: Version 3.0,” available at
https://cps.ipums.org/cps/index.shtml (last accessed July 2016).
The immediate—in this case, 2020—effect on representation gaps is substantial.
White overrepresentation relative to the baseline drops by almost 3 points to
7 points and Latino underrepresentation drops by 2 points to -6 points. These
changes are substantial, but they are still less than the immediate narrowing of
representation gaps we saw with the first, full eligibility scenario.
Unlike with the full eligibility scenario, however, the narrowing of representation
gaps under this scenario continues to 2060 and, in fact, intensifies. By 2060, projected representation gaps are down to 3 points—overrepresentation—for whites
and just -1.6 points and -1.1 points—underrepresentation—for Latinos and
Asians/others, respectively. The driver of what remains of representation gaps at
this point will be the age gap: Whites are likely to still have an older age structure
that will give them a slight representation advantage, given the propensity of older
voters to register and turn out at higher rates.
36 Center for American Progress | Brookings Institution | Bipartisan Policy Center | States of Change
It is also worth noting that this scenario comes close to eliminating the representation gap differences between presidential and congressional elections. The white
representation gap in the latter elections would be down to 4 points—not far off
the projected 3-point gap in presidential elections.
Thus, eliminating participation disparities by race through better election practices and reforms could come very close to solving the representation gap problem
in the future, leaving only a small residual attributable to differing race-ethnic age
structures. This is a potential—and highly desirable—outcome worth serious consideration by policy makers and politicians.
37 Center for American Progress | Brookings Institution | Bipartisan Policy Center | States of Change
Demographic change and
representation gaps in the states
The voter representation gaps for the nation as a whole provide an overall benchmark of how changing demographics, along with registration and voting behavior, have affected and will affect various groups’ representation among voters on
Election Day. However, these demographic and behavioral shifts differ sharply
across states, particularly in light of the broad dispersal of minorities from coastal
melting pot areas for Hispanics and Asians to interior parts of the country, and the
continued migration of African Americans toward prosperous Southern states.
Trends in white representation gaps across states
These demographic shifts across states, when accompanied by delayed patterns
of voter eligibility—and distinctive patterns of registration and turnout among
Hispanics and Asians—bring about changes in the geography of overrepresentation and underrepresentation by racial groups. This is illustrated in the map
shown in Figure 20, which depicts white total representation gaps among states
for 1980, 2016, and 2060
Not unexpectedly, the highest positive white representation in 1980 was evident in states that had large minority, especially Hispanic, populations, led by
California, Texas, and Arizona, with white overrepresentation gaps of 17, 15, and
11 points, respectively. The District of Columbia, with a large black population,
had a gap of 16 points. The only other states that had a larger white representation
gap than the nation as a whole, at 7 points, were New Jersey, New York, Alaska,
North Carolina, and Nevada—a mix of states where minorities were primarily black, such as New Jersey, New York, and North Carolina; Hispanic, such as
Nevada; and Asian and other races, such as Alaska. Seven states had positive white
representation gaps equal to that of the United States, and in 36 of the 50 states,
the white representation gap between voters and their resident populations was
less than for the nation as a whole
38 Center for American Progress | Brookings Institution | Bipartisan Policy Center | States of Change
FIGURE 20
White overrepresentation
Total representation gaps for whites, 1980, 2016, and 2060
1980
2016
0 to 3
3 to 6
6 to 9
9 to 12
2060
12 to 15
15+
These maps display the total representation gaps for whites in all 50 states. Darker colors indicate higher levels of overrepresentation.
Sources: Estimates based on authors’ analysis of Ruy Teixeira, William H. Frey, and Rob Griffin, “States of Change: The Demographic Evolution of the American Electorate, 1974–2060”
(Washington: Center for American Progress, 2015), available at https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/progressive-movement/report/2015/02/24/107261/states-of-change/; November
supplements of 2012 and 2014 data from Miriam King and others, “Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, Current Population Survey: Version 3.0,” available at https://cps.ipums.org/cps/index.shtml (last accessed July 2016).
Because in 1980, racial minority populations, particularly new minorities—
Hispanics and Asians—were heavily concentrated in just a few states, only those
states tended to have high white voter representation gaps. Yet, in subsequent
decades, this began to change as minorities started to disperse. By 2016, the
national white representation gap had increased to 10 points and, fully, 21 states
showed gaps at that level or higher. Arizona rose to number one, with a representation gap of 18 points for whites. Also rising to the top echelon were New Mexico,
Colorado, Kansas, Utah, Washington, Connecticut, and Oregon. All told, 39 states
registered increases in white representation gaps between 1980 and 2016. In 20 of
those, the increases exceeded 5 points.
Moving to 2060, a different story emerges as racial minorities take on a larger presence in so-called interior new destination states, while the racial profiles of voters
in more established melting pot states come more to resemble the overall population. By 2060, the nationwide white representation gap is projected to decline to
7 points, and just 16 states, as well as the District of Columbia, should have lower
values than the nation as a whole.
The spreading out of the representation gap across more states is evident in the fact
that 31 states showed gains in that gap between 2016 and 2060, while 19 states and
the District of Columbia showed declines. States with the largest declines in this gap
39 Center for American Progress | Brookings Institution | Bipartisan Policy Center | States of Change
are the long standing melting pot states of California, Nevada, and Texas. California
and Texas ranked first and second among states in 1980 on the white voter-resident
population representation gap. In 2060, they will rank 27th and 16th, respectively, as
their voting populations more closely represent their resident populations.
At the other extreme are states that are projected to rank highest in this gap by
2060: Utah, Wyoming, and Kansas with values of 18, 16, and 16 points, respectively. While these states’ populations will still be less racially diverse than those
of other parts of the country, by then, they will have developed significant minority populations that, unless current patterns change, will still encounter gaps in
eligibility, registration, and turnout.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that one politically consequential state in presidential elections displayed a low and relatively unchanged white representation gap
over the entire period. Ohio’s positive white representation gap began at just 1 percent in 1980 and rose modestly to 2 points in 2016. This small change results from
the fact that its population is largely white and its minority population continues
to be primarily black, a population which tends to show relatively high registration
and turnout. The subsequent, very slight rise in the white representation gap to 3
points in 2060 is attributable to the gradual increase in the size and delayed voter
participation of this state’s much smaller Hispanic and Asian populations.
Representation gap trends for selected states
To dig deeper into how these representation gaps affected groups other than
whites, this section focuses on four racially diversified states in the Sun Belt South
and West regions of the country and four somewhat more white states in the Snow
Belt Northeast and Midwest regions.
Sun Belt states
The Sun Belt states focused on here are Arizona, Texas, Florida, and Georgia. The
populations of each of these states become decidedly more diverse over the course of
the 1980 to 2060 period. This is especially the case for Arizona, whose white population drops from 83 percent in 1980 to 31 percent in 2060. Over these years, Hispanics
become a plurality of the state’s population, rising from 13 percent to 48 percent.
40 Center for American Progress | Brookings Institution | Bipartisan Policy Center | States of Change
Texas was already racially diverse in 1980 at 66 percent white, 21 percent
Hispanic, and 12 percent black. By 2060, the Lone Star state’s white population
is projected to dip to 25 percent, while its Hispanic and black populations should
comprise 55 percent and 11 percent shares, respectively.
Florida also shows a decline in its white population from 75 percent to 35 percent
over the 1980 to 2060 period. Both the Hispanic and Asian/other population
should rise from 7 percent and 1 percent to 40 percent and 8 percent, respectively.
Finally, of this group of states, Georgia’s minority profile is dominated by blacks
who should rise from 27 percent in 1980 to 38 percent in 2060; at the same time, its
Hispanic share is projected to rise from 1 percent to 17 percent. Over this period,
the Peach State’s white share should be cut in half, from 72 percent to 36 percent.
These racial shifts provide the backdrop for examining past and projected trends
in race-specific representation gaps in these states, shown in Figure 21. As discussed in the previous section, Arizona’s positive white representation gap has
always been in the highest echelon across states, but it reached a peak with a value
of 21 points in 2008, after which it should consistently fall to a value of 14 points
in 2060, when it should still rank fourth among all states.
FIGURE 21
Total representation gaps for whites and Hispanics
Arizona, Texas, Florida, and Georgia, 1980–2060
White
Hispanic
20
10
0
-10
-20
1980
2000
2020
2040
Arizona
2060
1980
Texas
Florida
2000
2020
2040
2060
Georgia
This chart displays the total representation gaps for whites and Hispanics. Positive values indicate that a group makes up a larger
percentage of the voting population than the whole population, while negative values indicate the opposite.
Sources: Estimates based on authors’ analysis of Ruy Teixeira, William H. Frey, and Rob Griffin, “States of Change: The Demographic
Evolution of the American Electorate, 1974–2060” (Washington: Center for American Progress, 2015), available at https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/progressive-movement/report/2015/02/24/107261/states-of-change/; November supplements of 2012 and 2014
data from Miriam King and others, “Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, Current Population Survey: Version 3.0,” available at
https://cps.ipums.org/cps/index.shtml (last accessed July 2016).
41 Center for American Progress | Brookings Institution | Bipartisan Policy Center | States of Change
This pattern of rise and fall in positive white representation closely mirrors the
negative representation gap for Hispanics in the state. As Hispanics became a
larger share of the state’s population, and many of its members stayed below voting age, the negative Hispanic representation gap grew from a value of -7 in 1980
to -20 in 2008. While remaining negative throughout the projected period, the
Hispanic gap should close somewhat, a result, largely, of more Hispanics reaching
voting age and becoming eligible to vote.
Both Asians/others as well as blacks, which comprise much smaller parts of
Arizona’s population throughout the period examined, register tiny representation gaps. The Asian/other gap is negative throughout, ranging between -1 to -3
points; the black gap ranges between 0 and -1 points until 2012, when it turns
positive at levels below 1 through the remainder of the projection period to 2060.
Texas’s positive white representation gap started as one of the largest in the nation,
but, after peaking at 18 points in 2008, started declining and should decline
through 2060. These trends mirror the negative representation gap for Hispanics
in the state, which also reached a low of -20 in 2008 and should become steadily
more modest over time for the same reasons that Arizona’s negative Hispanic gap
is projected to diminish.
Texas’s black population showed modest negative representation gaps until after
2000, when it began to register positive gaps that got as high as 4 points in some
years. This small rise reflects blacks’ comparatively greater representation among
voters than Hispanics, as the latter population swelled over time. As compared
with blacks, Asians/others in Texas had even smaller representation gaps, always
negative, ranging between 0 and -2.
Florida’s positive white representation gap pattern follows the general trend
shown for Arizona and Texas but remains at generally lower levels. Its peak value
of 13 points occurred in 2004, and like the two previous states, mirrors the negative representation gap of the sizeable Hispanic population in the state. The relative magnitude of these negative Hispanic gaps are more modest in Florida than in
Arizona or Texas, with a lowest value of -9 points in 2004 and a projected change
to just -3 points in 2060.
42 Center for American Progress | Brookings Institution | Bipartisan Policy Center | States of Change
Florida’s black population registers negative representation gaps throughout
the entire time span examined but shifts from levels in the -3 to -6 points range
through 2004 and is projected to diminish to below -2 after 2032. Florida’s Asian/
other population also shows modest negative representation gaps throughout
the time span examined. However, unlike for blacks, the negative values become
slightly larger over time.
Georgia, with its substantial black minority population, exhibits a somewhat different pattern than the states just reviewed. Its positive white representation gap
is lower overall, though still shows a peak of 10 points in 2004 before declining
thereafter. Black representation starts out as negative with a value of -7 in 1980 but
becomes positive at low levels from 2008 through 2060, coinciding with the rise
of the Hispanic population, which shows an increasingly negative representation
gap. The much smaller Asian/other population registers a small but continuously
negative representation gap, which shifts downward from less than -1 point in
1980 to a projected -2 points in 2060.
Overall, these Sun Belt states indicate that white overrepresentation is heavily
affected by the changing racial demographic makeups of each state over time.
States with heavily Hispanic populations start out with relatively high white overrepresentation that declines as their Hispanic populations become more eligible
to vote. This dynamic is less pronounced in Georgia, where the primary minority
population is black, and in Florida, where the relative representation of whites is
affected by both the Hispanic and black populations.
Snow Belt states
The Snow Belt states focused on here are Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, Michigan, and
Ohio. Each of these states was politically consequential in recent presidential elections and also significant because of their low levels of racial diversity.
As with the other Snow Belt states, Wisconsin remains relatively white over the
examination period, though it becomes more racially diverse over time, from
95 percent white in 1980 to 67 percent white in 2060. Over this timeframe,
Wisconsin’s Hispanic population rises from less than 1 percent to 15 percent. An
over the same period, its black population should rise from 4 percent to 8 percent.
43 Center for American Progress | Brookings Institution | Bipartisan Policy Center | States of Change
Pennsylvania should show the greatest rise in diversity of these four states, with its
white share declining from 90 percent in 1980 to a projected 59 percent in 2060.
Already 9 percent in 1980, its black population should rise very gradually to just
13 percent in 2060. In contrast, the Keystone state’s Hispanic population should
rise sharply from less than 1 percent to 18 percent over the same period, while the
Asians/other population should rise from 1 percent to 10 percent.
Michigan starts out less white than the other Snow Belt states, at 85 percent in
1980, a share that should decrease to 59 percent by 2060. Over this period, its
black population remains its largest racial minority, rising from 13 percent to 17
percent, while its Hispanic population should increase from 1 percent to 12 percent. Michigan’s Asians/other population should also rise sharply, increasing from
1 percent in 1980 to 13 percent in 2060.
Ohio is whiter than Michigan, with its white share shifting from 90 percent in
1980 to a projected 65 percent in 2060. Like Michigan, Ohio’s minority population is predominantly black, with its black share shifting from 9 percent to 16
percent, its Hispanic population from 1 percent to 10 percent, and its Asian/
other population trending from less than 1 percent to 10 percent over the 1980
to 2060 time period.
As indicated earlier, whiter states like Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, Michigan, and
Ohio tend to have smaller positive white representation gaps. This is because the
white representation in the total populations of these states will be much closer
to their voting age populations than is the case in states with large populations of
minorities—especially Hispanics and Asians, groups who are less represented in
the eligible voting age population and are somewhat less likely to register and turn
out to vote than whites. These relative small white representation gaps are depicted
in Figure 22 for the four states.
44 Center for American Progress | Brookings Institution | Bipartisan Policy Center | States of Change
FIGURE 22
Total representation gaps for whites and Hispanics
Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, Michigan, and Ohio, 1980–2060
White
Hispanic
20
10
0
-10
-20
1980
2000
2020
2040
Wisconsin
2060
1980
Pennsylvania
2000
Michigan
2020
2040
2060
Ohio
This chart displays the total representation gaps for whites and Hispanics. Positive values indicate that a group makes up a larger
percentage of the voting population than the whole population, while negative values indicate the opposite.
Sources: Estimates based on authors’ analysis of Ruy Teixeira, William H. Frey, and Rob Griffin, “States of Change: The Demographic
Evolution of the American Electorate, 1974–2060” (Washington: Center for American Progress, 2015), available at https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/progressive-movement/report/2015/02/24/107261/states-of-change/; November supplements of 2012 and 2014
data from Miriam King and others, “Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, Current Population Survey: Version 3.0,” available at
https://cps.ipums.org/cps/index.shtml (last accessed July 2016).
Similar representation trends are shown for Wisconsin and Pennsylvania. Both
states show positive white representation gaps which increase over time—a contrast with the patterns shown in the Sun Belt states discussed above, where white
representation began to decline after the 2004 to 2008 period. Also, unlike in the
Sun Belt, the negative representation gaps of Hispanics become more negative
over time. This can be explained by the fact that Hispanic populations in these
states are newly emerging and represent a delay in entering into eligible voter
status that spans the entire projection period to 2060. Thus, while both white
positive gaps and Hispanic negative gaps show different trajectories than they did
in states like Arizona and Texas, they do show patterns which mirror each other,
just as they did in those two states.
Blacks as well as Asians/others, as smaller sized populations in these states,
register relatively small representation gaps. Blacks trend from small negative
representation to modest positive representation. Asians’/others’ representation
remains negative in both states throughout the examination period but falls from
miniscule levels in 1980 to a projected -3 points in 2060 in both states.
45 Center for American Progress | Brookings Institution | Bipartisan Policy Center | States of Change
Michigan, like the prior two states, shows gains over time in its positive representation gap for whites. It differs, however, in that the negative representation gap for
its small Hispanic population is modest throughout the period—as should be its
mostly negative black representation gap. Larger negative representation gaps are
indicated for Michigan’s modest Asian/other population, which should grow from
-1 points in 1980 to -5 points in 2060.
Ohio stands out among these states with its much smaller white representation
gap. As noted in an earlier section, Ohio has shown the most consistently low white
overrepresentation of all states over the observation period, with its very modest
increase over time to a value of 3 points in 2060. Similarly, Ohio’s black population
shows low gaps in representation, shifting from slightly negative to slightly positive
in 2008, and rising to only 2 points by 2060. The state’s small Hispanic and Asian/
other populations both show small negative representation gaps over the whole
1980 to 2060 period, ending up at values of -3 and -2 points, respectively.
In sum, although these whiter Snow Belt states show relatively low gaps in voter
representation, there are clear differences. States that are showing significant rises in
their Hispanic populations—Wisconsin and Pennsylvania—bring with them continued increases in their white representation gaps, since their Hispanic residents
tend to have sharp differences from whites in their age structure and voter eligibility. Other states, where blacks are the predominant racial minority—Michigan and
Ohio—should register more modest changes in white overrepresentation.
46 Center for American Progress | Brookings Institution | Bipartisan Policy Center | States of Change
Components of voter
representation gaps
The earlier analysis of voter representation gap components does not necessarily
represent how these components—age, eligibility, registration and turnout—play
out in individual states. To provide a sense of state variation, two states with very
different demographic profiles are examined: Arizona and Ohio.
As indicated above, the rapidly diversifying state of Arizona showed upturns, then
downturns, in its positive white representation gap, mirroring changes in the negative representation for Hispanics. The underlying components, shown in Figure
23, provide an explanation.
FIGURE 23
Composition of total representation gaps for whites and Hispanics
Arizona, 1980–2060
White
Hispanic
10
5
0
-5
-10
1980
2000
2020
Age gap
2040
2060
Citizenship gap
1980
2000
Registration gap
2020
2040
2060
Turnout gap
This chart displays the age, citizenship, registration, and turnout gaps for whites and Hispanics. Positive values indicate overrepresentation, while negative values indicate underrepresentation.
Sources: Estimates based on authors’ analysis of Ruy Teixeira, William H. Frey, and Rob Griffin, “States of Change: The Demographic
Evolution of the American Electorate, 1974–2060” (Washington: Center for American Progress, 2015), available at https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/progressive-movement/report/2015/02/24/107261/states-of-change/; November supplements of 2012 and 2014
data from Miriam King and others, “Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, Current Population Survey: Version 3.0,” available at
https://cps.ipums.org/cps/index.shtml (last accessed July 2016).
47 Center for American Progress | Brookings Institution | Bipartisan Policy Center | States of Change
As the figure indicates, the overall pattern reflects countervailing forces. First,
eligibility—citizenship—components drive strong mirror image trends among
whites and Hispanics: A sharp positive representation peak for whites and negative peak for Hispanics around 2004, which quickly diminish over time as more
Hispanics of voting age become eligible to vote. This general pattern is also reinforced by a more modest pattern of representation gain and loss associated with
the age component as a larger share of Hispanic residents become of voting age
over time. Together these two effects—eligibility and age—affect both the overall
upward/downward positive representation gap for whites and the overall downward/upward negative representation gap for Hispanics.
Yet, countering this pattern somewhat are the registration and turnout components, which increase their impact over the projection period. Together, they
contribute to a continued increase in white overrepresentation and Hispanic
underrepresentation over time. This is because even as Hispanics become of age
and eligible to vote, they are projected to still show lower rates of registration and
turnout than whites.
These countervailing patterns of age and eligibility as well as registration and
turnout contribute to the overall patterns reviewed above and shown in Figure 21.
While the patterns for blacks and Asians do contribute, the primary dynamic in
Arizona is associated with the Hispanic components of voter representation and
their impact on whites.
For Ohio, the story is different for two reasons. First, Ohio’s white representation
gap is tiny compared with most other states. Second, Ohio is a much whiter state,
and blacks, rather than Hispanics, make up a larger part of its population.
Figure 24 presents the components associated with Ohio’s representation gaps for
whites and blacks. What these data indicate is that the rising white representation
gap in Ohio is largely due to the aging and eligibility components—the result of
the state’s small Hispanic and Asian populations getting larger over time.
48 Center for American Progress | Brookings Institution | Bipartisan Policy Center | States of Change
FIGURE 24
Composition of total representation gaps for whites and blacks
Ohio, 1980–2060
White
Black
10
5
0
-5
-10
1980
2000
2020
Age gap
2040
2060
Citizenship gap
1980
2000
Registration gap
2020
2040
2060
Turnout gap
This chart displays the age, citizenship, registration, and turnout gaps for whites and blacks. Positive values indicate overrepresentation,
while negative values indicate underrepresentation.
Sources: Estimates based on authors’ analysis of Ruy Teixeira, William H. Frey, and Rob Griffin, “States of Change: The Demographic
Evolution of the American Electorate, 1974–2060” (Washington: Center for American Progress, 2015), available at https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/progressive-movement/report/2015/02/24/107261/states-of-change/; November supplements of 2012 and 2014
data from Miriam King and others, “Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, Current Population Survey: Version 3.0,” available at
https://cps.ipums.org/cps/index.shtml (last accessed July 2016).
Somewhat surprisingly, the components of registration and turnout serve to
depress the positive white representation gap. This is due to the effect of greater
turnout and representation among Ohio’s black population. This means that the
tiny overall white representation gap for Ohio is being damped down by the trend
toward greater voter participation of African Americans. Nonetheless, it should
be borne in mind that Ohio’s white representation gap remains and should remain
among the lowest in the country.
49 Center for American Progress | Brookings Institution | Bipartisan Policy Center | States of Change
Education, gender, and race
representation gaps
The representation gaps shown earlier for education, gender, and race nationally
also take different forms across states. Again, it is useful to see how these play out
in Arizona and Ohio, given their different demographic profiles. This analysis
focuses on the years 1980 to 2012.
The picture for Arizona is shown in Figure 25. A broad overview indicates that
there are only two racial groups that show wide variations in representation by
education—whites and Hispanics. For whites, in each year, all whites except white
noncollege men show positive representation gaps with white college men and
white college women generally registering the highest gaps. There are fluctuations
FIGURE 25
Total representation gaps by education for whites and Hispanics
Arizona, 1980–2012
White
Hispanic
10
5
0
-5
-10
1980
1988
1996
2004
College degree
2012
Men
Women
1980
1988
No college degree
1996
2004
2012
Men
Women
This chart displays the total representation gaps for whites and Hispanics by gender and education level. Positive values indicate that a
group makes up a larger percentage of the voting population than the voting age population, while negative values indicate the opposite.
Note: Degree refers to individuals with a four-year college degree or higher.
Source: Estimates based on authors’ analysis of Ruy Teixeira, William H. Frey, and Rob Griffin, “States of Change: The Demographic
Evolution of the American Electorate, 1974–2060” (Washington: Center for American Progress, 2015), available at https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/progressive-movement/report/2015/02/24/107261/states-of-change/.
50 Center for American Progress | Brookings Institution | Bipartisan Policy Center | States of Change
for white noncollege women showing the highest representation gaps in 1996
and 2004 and the lowest gaps in 1980 through 1988. Noncollege white men show
modest negative representation gaps for most years, except for 1992 and 2012,
when they registered modest positive representation gaps.
These patterns are countered for Hispanics, which show only two groups with
noticeable representation gaps: Hispanic noncollege men and women. Both
show negative gaps ranging from -4 to -8 points, with the lowest in 2008. Thus,
these two groups contribute heavily to the overall negative Hispanic representation gaps observed earlier.
African Americans as well as Asians/others in Arizona register extremely modest representation gaps. Thus, the main representation differences in Arizona are
across white education groups and for less educated Hispanics.
Ohio’s very modest representation gaps, overall, do show some clear divergences
within the white population. (see Figure 26) White college men and white college
women consistently show positive representation gaps, whereas, among noncollege whites, men consistently show the strongest negative representation gaps and
women more modestly negative gaps.
FIGURE 26
Total representation gaps by education for whites
Ohio, 1980–2012
10
5
0
-5
-10
1980
1984
1988
College degree
1992
Men
Women
1996
2000
No college degree
2004
2008
2012
Men
Women
This chart displays the total representation gaps for whites by gender and education level. Positive values indicate that a group makes
up a larger percentage of the voting population than the voting age population, while negative values indicate the opposite.
Note: Degree refers to individuals with a four-year college degree or higher.
Source: Estimates based on authors’ analysis of Ruy Teixeira, William H. Frey, and Rob Griffin, “States of Change: The Demographic
Evolution of the American Electorate, 1974–2060” (Washington: Center for American Progress, 2015), available at https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/progressive-movement/report/2015/02/24/107261/states-of-change/.
51 Center for American Progress | Brookings Institution | Bipartisan Policy Center | States of Change
Conclusion
This report documents the complex evolution of representation gaps in the United
States, starting in 1980 to the present day—where representation gaps are likely of
peak magnitude—followed by a projected period of decline to 2060, where they
will still be significant but diminished from current levels. Our data indicate that
eligibility issues should become progressively less important in the future to representation gaps, with issues of participation—registration and turnout—becoming
progressively more important.
Simulations conducted for this report suggest that eliminating participation
disparities by race through better election practices and reforms could come very
close to solving the representation gap problem in the future—both in presidential and congressional elections—leaving only a small residual attributable to
differing race-ethnic age structures. This is a potential—and highly desirable—
outcome worth serious consideration by policymakers and politicians.
52 Center for American Progress | Brookings Institution | Bipartisan Policy Center | States of Change
About the authors
Robert Griffin is a Senior Policy Analyst at the Center for American Progress,
focusing on demographic change and American political behavior. He also teaches
courses on research methodology, statistics, and public opinion at The George
Washington University.
William H. Frey is an internationally regarded demographer, known for his
research on urban populations, migration, immigration, race, aging, and political
demographics, as well as his expertise on the U.S. census. He is a senior fellow
at the Brookings Institution, a research professor in population studies at the
University of Michigan, and a co-director of the States of Change project. His new
book is Diversity Explosion: How New Racial Demographics are Remaking America.
Ruy Teixeira specializes in the study of demographic change, voting behavior, and
public opinion. He is a Senior Fellow at both The Century Foundation and the
Center for American Progress and a co-director of the States of Change project.
His forthcoming book is The Optimistic Leftist: Why the 21st Century Will Be
Better Than You Think. His other books include The Disappearing American Voter;
America’s Forgotten Majority: Why the White Working Class Still Matters;
The Emerging Democratic Majority; and Red, Blue, and Purple America: The Future of
Election Demographics.
53 Center for American Progress | Brookings Institution | Bipartisan Policy Center | States of Change
Endnotes
1 See Ruy Teixeira, William H. Frey, and Robert Griffin,
“States of Change: The Demographic Evolution of
the American Electorate, 1974-2060” (Washington:
The Center for American Progress, 2015), available
at https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/
uploads/2015/02/24060014/SOC-reportAugust15.
pdf; William H. Frey, Diversity Explosion: How New Racial
Demographics Are Remaking America (Washington:
Brookings Institution Press, 2015).
2 Paul Taylor and others, “The Rise of Intermarriage”
(Washington: Pew Research Center, 2012), available at
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2012/02/SDTIntermarriage-II.pdf.
3 We use the Census definition for white: white alone,
non-Hispanic.
4 We define Hispanic as those who designate themselves
as such in a question on Hispanic ethnicity. Our Asian/
other category collapses Asians, Native Americans,
Pacific Islanders, and multiracial individuals who
are not of Hispanic heritage. This was necessary to
create a consistent racial category we could use both
retrospectively and prospectively. For some detail on
Census racial categories, see Ruy Teixeira, “Defining
‘white’ and ‘Hispanic’ in majority-minority America,”
Think Progress, Center for American Progress, June 18,
2013, available at https://thinkprogress.org/definingwhite-and-hispanic-in-majority-minority-americae5fe78dfdc4d#.506vyqbjv.
5 Black alone, non-Hispanic.
6 See explainer page for a more detailed discussion of
the measure.
7 Specifically, there are 2040 demographic groups
broken down by 51 geographies (50 states plus the
District of Columbia), five racial groups (whites, blacks,
Hispanics, Asians, and other race), four age groups (1829, 30-44, 45-64, and 65 and older), and two genders.
8 For further details, see Ruy Teixeira, John Halpin,
and Rob Griffin, “Path to 270” (Washington: Center
for American Progress, 2015), available at https://
www.americanprogress.org/issues/democracy/reports/2015/12/17/127403/the-path-to-270-in-2016/.
9 In the charts in the section, we only show shifts for
whites, Hispanics, and Asians/others to maximize
legibility of the charts. Shifts among blacks from these
scenarios are not shown and are generally negligible.
10 Niraj Chokshi, “Automatic Voter Registration a ‘Success’
in Oregon,” The New York Times, December 2, 2016,
available at https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/02/us/
politics/oregon-voter-registration.html.
54 Center for American Progress | Brookings Institution | Bipartisan Policy Center | States of Change
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