Trustees of Princeton University
The Rationale of Japanese Surrender
Japan Subdued: The Atomic Bomb and the End of the War in the Pacific. by Herbert Feis
Review by: Harold Stein
World Politics, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Oct., 1962), pp. 138-150
Published by: Cambridge University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2009572 .
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THE RATIONALE OF
JAPANESE SURRENDER
By HAROLD STEIN
Herbert
Feis,JapanSubdued:TheAtomicBombandtheEnd oftheWarin
thePacific,
Princeton,
N.J.,Princeton
University
Press,i96i, I99 pp. $4.00.
JAPAN
SUBDUED
is thelastofthefiveadmirable
studies
in which
HerbertFeis has set forththe diplomatichistoryof the United
Statesfromthe eventsthatled to Pearl Harbor to the surrender
ceremony on the U.S.S. Missouri."Diplomatichistory"in the conventionalsenseis actuallyan inadequatedescription,
forJapanSubdued
is not limitedto thedoingsof the diplomats;it followsthe actionsof
the extraordinary
congroupof men in theUnitedStatesgovernment
cernedwithwinningand endingthewar,usingor notusingtheatomic
in sharpcontrast,
thedoingsof theunhappygroup
bomb;it describes,
of vacillatingand conflicting
statesmen,
militaryand civilian,who surroundedthe Emperorof Japanand the Emperorhimself.To Feis
diplomacyencompassesthe actionsof scientists,
politicians,and genand
is
limited
to
erals
never
and the formal
diplomaticnegotiations
of diplomaticmessages.
interchange
In the openingchaptersof the book, Feis lays out with brilliant
claritythe threeseparatebut overlappingplans for securingJapanese
had decidedon in thespringof i945:
surrender
thatourgovernment
CombinedAssault.Thiswas thedirectmilitary
with
(i)
approach,
an initiallandingon Kyushu,
followedby a finalattackon Honshu.
this
were
final
andourarmedforces
Theplansfor
were
given
approval,
turned
in thisdirection
afterV-E Day. Originally
immediately
it was
of thisplanthatRussianentrance
intothewarseemedso
in support
important;by May i945 neitherMarshallnor King regardedSoviet
mindfulof the
participationas essential,but Marshall particularly,
lossesthatwe mightwell sustain,wantedRussianhelp to reduceour
burdenand speedup theend.
There is no doubtthatan Americaninvasionwould have brought
to believe,
abouttotalJapanesedefeat;and it is hard,almostimpossible,
regardlessof the Japanesemilitarycode (Dulce et decorumest pro
patriamori!) and the honorablestatusof military
suicide,thatat
on
somepointtheEmperorwouldnothavesteppedin and insisted
RATIONALE OF JAPANESE SURRENDER
139
surrender.
Otherwise-if,
forexample,theEmperorhad beenkilled
in an airraid-theconsequences
mighthavebeenappalling:without
the ImperialRescript,
the Emperor'spersonalorderto surrender,
Japanese
unitcommanders
mightstillbe wagingguerrilla
warfare
on
islandsin thePacific.The basicassumption,
however,
was reasonable:
whatever
theprocessof decision-making,
sooneror latersomeone in
theJapanese
government
wouldspeakforthenationand surrender,
butthetimeofdecisionmighteasilyhavebeen(in ourthinking)
insanelylate.
(2)
Inducement.
The inducements
we had in mindweremercy
and tolerance,
not compromise.
From the Japanesestandpoint,
our
inducements
werenot per se appealing.We wereinsisting
on the
defeat
ofJapan:Japan's
totalwithdrawal
toitshomeislands,
demilitarizationunderoursurveillance,
Alliedtrialsofthosewe considered
war
criminals.
All we werewillingtooffer
wasthepromise
thattotaldefeat
wouldnotincludetheannihilation
ofJapanand theImperialfamily.
Obviously
inducement
ofthislimited
scopewouldhaveno valueuntil
Japanwas readyto acceptdefeat.Nor can one see muchpersuasive
powerin promises
thatRussiawouldnotenterthewar and thatwe
wouldabstainfromdropping
theatomicbomb-possible
alternatives
thatmightbe described
as inducements
inreverse.
As Feisnotes,Stalin
wouldneverhaveagreedto thefirst,
presumably
noris thereserious
reasonto believethata threatof thebombwouldhavebrought
the
agoniesof decisionin Tokyoto thenecessary
climax,sinceeventhe
bombitselfcausedsurrender
onlyafterthepassageof time.One can
add thattheJapanese
armywasstaking
all on thedefense
ofthehome
islandsandwouldhavepretended-and
theturnofthe
didinfact-that
tidewouldcomethen,and onlythen.Therefore,
sincethe Japanese
generals
prophesied
partialvictory
anda compromise
peace,a merciful
defeat
wasno substitute.
(3) Shock:The AtomicBomb.It was thehope of Trumanand
thosemostdirectly
Stimson,
responsible,
thattheatomicbombwould
bringa quickendto hostilities.
It did,and it did so (forreasonsset
forth
surrender
below)in theonlywaythatcouldcausean immediate
and
ofall Japanese
on themainland,
on thehomeislands,
armedforces
on hundreds
of scattered
islandsin thePacific-theImperialRescript.
The carefully
measured
account
thatFeisgivesofthelastdaysinTokyo
showsthattheshockofthebombwasthespurthatcausedtheEmperor
to takehisunprecedented
thesecondbomb,theone
action.Whether
140
WORLD POLITICS
is lesscertain,
onNagasaki,
though
probable,
wasalsoessential
dropped
ended
thataftertheEmperor
and thosewhodoubtshouldremember
the Councilmeetingon Augustio (afterHiroshima)withhis flat
to avoidsurrender
themilitary
werestilltrying
decisionto surrender,
on AugustI4 (afterNagasaki).
theirreversible
byreversing
at
alternative
notgivenseriousconsideration
Therewas a further
staff
without
invasion.
The
and
blockade
continued
bombing
thetime:
ofJapan,
Survey,
havingseenthedevastation
oftheStrategic
Bombing
probablybefore
concludedthat Japanwould have "surrendered"
aDecember
before
November
31. Feissetsthis
i, I945, and"certainly"
alternative
becauseof theburningdesireof all
sideas an unrealistic
thathad
oftheholocaust
American
fora farquickertermination
leaders
Beyondthat,itshould
beengoingon solong;andofcoursehe is right.
conof thedevastating
of thetiming
be notedthatwhilea prediction
cannotbe
ofstrangulation
is reasonable,
thesameassurance
sequences
WhatAmerisurrender.
oftheactofgovernmental
giventopredictions
Japanese
as wellas misery-the
cancansayhowmuchsuffering-death
or requireditspeopleto undergo
mighthavepermitted
government
before
itgaveup thefight?
in respect
There is moresubstantial
foundation
for speculation
of a morerealistic
alternative-invasion
without
to theconsequences
bomb
as
a
the
wayof winningand endingthewar.The American
as ourmilitary
leaders
calculated
in I944 andI945, would
casualties,
up to a millionmen,with,conceivably,
perhaps
havebeensubstantial,
military
lossescan be moreeasily
halfa milliondead.The Japanese
forces
estimated.
thesamekindofdefense
thattheJapanese
Assuming
in thePhilippines,
whichledto 475,000 deadoutof630,ooo
adopted
thehomearmyof I,5oo,ooomenin i945 wouldhavelostin
troops,
about
Butthecivilian
casualties
would
killed onemillionanda quarter.
been
would
also
have
stagand these
havecontinued
simultaneously,
gering.The firebombraidon Tokyoin Marchi945 had killedand
woundedmoremen,women,and children
thantheatomicbombon
of Japanwas on short
Hiroshima.By Julythe civilianpopulation
ofthericefieldswouldhavebeenabletodestroy
firebombing
rations;
of
perhapshundreds
thenew crop.Deathand diseaseof thousands,
thousands,
perhapsmillionsof civilianswerenot faroffunlessthe
for
war endedin theverynearfuture.Such a fateas a substitute
andNagasakiwouldhavemadeJapana nationkilledwith
Hiroshima
kindness.
RATIONALE OF JAPANESE SURRENDER
141
II
Whydidtheatomic
Japantosurrender?
Whycouldwe notpersuade
inso quicklywhatevidentdefeatand continually
bombaccomplish
The
could
not
do?
devastation
and
military
losses
and
creasing
civil
oftheJapanese
preOrdinarily
government.
answerlayintheworkings
tosuroritsarmedforces,
ofwhatwouldcausea government,
dictions
In
aboutgovernmental
"rationality."
renderarebasedon assumptions
Secreour
as
were
Acting
ofearlysurrender based,
thiscase,predictions
that"all sensible
JaptaryofState,Grew,onceputit,ontheassumption
defeatafterthefallofOkinawaand
inevitable
anese"wouldrecognize
It wasquite
we couldthenpersuade
Japanto surrender.
thattherefore
the
wouldorshouldhaveknownafter
truethatany"sensible"
Japanese
lossof OkinawathatJapancouldnotwinthewar; buttheergodoes
mostof theFrenchpeopleand
follow.Quitepossibly
notnecessarily
lookedon Churchill's
chief
assistants
and
his
great
Hitler
certainly
all thequantitative
Dunkirkas a formofsuicidal
nonsense;
speechafter
was
seemedtoliewiththeNazis.ButEngland,likeJapan,
advantages
an islandnationand ardentpatriots
giveup slowly.One can saythat
in theeyesof
was notHitler's;and rationality
Churchill's
rationality
wasfardifferent
fromours.Feis'saccountofthe
theJapanese
military
toward
oftheJapanese
movement
government
stumbling
slow,painful,
a decision
that
reveals
surrender
whytheatomicbombcouldprecipitate
ofa losingwarcouldnot.In summary,
thecontinuing
abominations
theevents
canbe setdownas follows:
by
on Okinawawas announced
fighting
The endingofthedreadful
agreement
us on June22, and thereseemsto havebeena widespread
armedforcescould
thattheJapanese
withintheJapanese
government
no longerkeepus fromentering
theseasaroundJapan.Yet it took
before
theJapanese
twoweeksandtheEmperor's
intercession
personal
wouldagreeto seekanymeansat all of surceasefrom
government
government
continued
fighting.
Then at last,on July7, theJapanese
This
decidedto sendan envoyto Moscowto seekSovietmediation.
moveon thepartof theJapanese
and unrealistic
belated,mishandled,
The meaningof thephraseis
is usuallydescribed
as a "peacefeeler."
moreprecisely,
tomakea
planwasan attempt
theJapanese
uncertain;
deal. Even the mostrealistic
leaders,includingthe
of the Japanese
of the
thoughtquite vaguelythata rescinding
Emperorhimself,
of Korea) or
(but of coursenottheliberation
Treatyof Portsmouth
wouldpersuade
theRussians
to somehow
somesuchpromise
persuade
ustostopfighting.
oftheEmperor
thattheretention
noting
(It isworth
142
WORLD POLITICS
of concernat thispoint;thisshadowydeal would
was nota matter
Alliedoccupation
of Japan.)Sato,Japanothavepermitted
obviously
in
stimulated
neseambassador Moscow,
perhaps
bythegrimbuthopeful
of his abode,unlikethe phantasmagoria
in whichhis
atmosphere
werelivingin Tokyo,warnedthem-againand again,and
superiors
theirproposalwas preposterous.
withgreatcourage-that
tousetheSovietUnionas a shieldoriginated
Thisunrealistic
attempt
of the Cabinet.When,on Julyi6, "the
withthe civilianmembers
andmakinganactive
from
seclusion
wasemerging
hisisolated
Emperor
wasbasedon the
a peace,"hissupport
oftheproposal
effort
toarrange
whosevetopower
fromMarquisKido.The military,
advicehereceived
theproposalonlyafterit
overCabinetdecisions
wasabsolute,
accepted
the
whowastobe theenvoytoarrange
wasagreedthatPrinceKonoye,
and
to
officers
be
deal,was
accompanied
byhigh-ranking
army navy
interests.
One is reminded
ofourown
themilitary
whowouldprotect
comdealon NATO: an American
famousDefense-State
Department
manderplus Americantroopsplus Germanrearmament.
Admiral
AchesontoNewYorkto
"OnePackage"Robbins
shepherded
Secretary
withouralliesin orderto enforce
theagreement;
butour
themeeting
and
alliesrecalcitrantly
acceptedthehoneyof American
participation
thevinegar
The Admiralcoulddo no
ofGermanrearmament.
rejected
morethanstandbywhentheknotson hispackagecameuntied;the
in ourdemocracy
is frequently
In Japan,
roleofthemilitary
difficult.
themilitary
fromsuchdisadvantages.
did notsuffer
The Japanese
an alternative
military
developed
proposalat thistime,
whichwas composedof equal partsof rationalplanningand pure
wishfulthinking.As Feis says," . . . theheadsof theJapanesemilitary
organization
thatwas doomedto extinction,
stillavowed[justbefore
Hiroshima]thattheywouldbe able to repeltheinvasionof Kyushu
withgreatlossesto theattacking
shipsand men,and thatwhenthis
thePresident
andtheAmerican
happened
military
commanders
would
loseface,andthewilloftheenemyto acceptgreatlosseswouldbreak,
andthustheAmerican
government
wouldbe receptive
totheideaof a
compromise
peace"(p. io8).
At leastto an American,
the notionthatthe Americanswould
abandonthefightbecauseofheavylossesseemssheerfantasy.
Yet the
oftheJapanese
conviction
thattheycouldinflict
grievous
losseson us if
we did invadewas thoroughly
realistic.
"Therewereovera million
and a halfmenin theJapanese
HomeArmy.Of these,a groundforce
ofaboutseventeen
ableanddetermined
divisions
werebeingassembled
in Kyushu,
butwithbarelyenoughoil andammunition
foronegreat
RATIONALE OF JAPANESE SURRENDER
143
battle.
... Thousands
ofplanes,mostly
ofa sortthatcouldbeusedonly
werebeinghoarded-asa specialassaultarmada
forsuicideattacks,
in the
ofsecretsmallairstrips
thatwas tobe launched
fromhundreds
interior"
howeverprofound
their
(p. I07). The Japanese,
therefore,
of Americancharacter,
wereon solidgroundwhenthey
misreading
promised
tocauseserious
lossestotheinvading
from
forces;butpartly
understandable
ignorance,
partlyfromwillfulness,
theyrefusedto
readthehandwriting
on thewall: Russia'sobviousmovetowardwar
andourominous
in thePotsdam
Declaration,
and utter
threat
"prompt
destruction."
The Japanese
leadershad no reasonto doubt
military
thesubstantial
evenifbasedmerely
destruction"
on a
reality
of "utter
continuation
ofour conventional
air raids.Thesetheyexpected;and
theywell knewalso thattheiranti-aircraft
defenses
werepractically
destroyed.
Whatever
theweightof thekamikazeattacksagainstour
ships,whatever
the valorof theirgroundforcesimbuedso deeply
withtheBushidoCode,theircitiesand theirpeoplewereboundto
suffer,
destruction
almostunparalleled
Evenifa compromise
in history.
peacehadbeenconceivable,
itspricewouldhavebeenappalling.
Therewerethreecharacteristics
of Japanese
governmental
behavior
thatprevented
anyearlyororderly
movestowardsurrender:
(i) The interrelations
oftheJapanese
leaderswerecharacterized
by
and dishonesty
double-dealing
so standardized
thatmanyindividuals
used dishonesty
probably
as an ambiguouscloak to avoid decision;
similarly,
was of no morethanfleeting
agreement
significance.
Thus
SuzukibecamePrimeMinister
bypromising
"thathe wouldcomply
withthejudgment
oftheArmy"and byassuring
theEmperor"that
. . . he wouldimplicitly
carryouttheEmperor's
wishes."And again,
theCabinetagreedthatthereshouldbe no comment
on thePotsdam
Declarationaboutsurrender
termsfor Japan,pendingword from
Russia,but merelypublication
of a censoredversionwhichomitted
thosepromises
thatwouldhavehadthegreatest
appealtotheJapanese
people.Yet on thefollowing
dayat a pressconference
Suzukisaid,
undermilitary
pressureand withoutwarningTogo, the Foreign
Minister,
thattheDeclaration
was "nothing
but a rehashing
of the
CairoDeclaration,"
so therewas no "recourse
butto ignoreit entirely
and resolutely
fightfortheprosecution
ofthewar."
(2) The secondaspect
ofJapanese
governmental
behavior
thatconditionedthe courseof Japaneseactionstowardsurrender
was the
strange
role,bothconstitutional
andtraditional,
ofthemilitary
leaders
and theirown attitudes
towardwar and peace.UndertheJapanese
a Cabinetfellautomatically
constitution,
if eithertheWar or Navy
144
WORLD POLITICS
Thusin ourtermsitmightbe saidthatthecivilian
Minister
resigned.
Councilcouldarguewith
members
oftheCabinetandoftheSupreme
couldrequestand evenbe grantedlimitedconcessions,
themilitary,
ofpower,
butcouldneverbargainon equalterms.
Usingtheirposition
leaders("almost,"
sinceAdmiralYonai,
thealmostunanimous
military
wantedto end the war and alwaysvotedwiththe
NavyMinister,
thenthenavyhad enteredthewar
civilians-but
almostunanimous
againsttheUnitedStateswithreluctance)consistently
rejectedany
actionsthatwouldleadtosurrender,
practical
basingall on thesuicidal
of theircommitment
to this
of thehomeislands.The extent
defense
to
their
Suzuki
even
objective
was illustrated
by
unwillingnesspermit
of thePotsdamultimatum,
described
to abstainfrompublicrejection
above.Again,the day afterHiroshima,
August8 in Tokyo,when
Suzuki triedto "convokean immediatemeetingof the Supreme
members
saidtheycouldnotbe present."
Council,someofthemilitary
Even in the prolongedmeetings
of the SupremeCounciland the
Cabinetthatwereheldon August9 justaftertheyhad learnedofthe
of warand thefallofthebombon Nagasaki,the
Russiandeclaration
thatanyreplyto Truman'snew ultimatum
military
leadersinsisted
shouldnotonlyrequirethatthenational
be
polityand Imperial
family
forcesshoulddisarmthemselves,
butalsothattheJapanese
preserved,
and thatall war criminals
thattherebe no Allied occupation,
be
itself.
prosecuted
bytheJapanese
government
knewthattheseterms
wouldnotbeaccepted,
Any"sensible"
Japanese
of thepolityand theImperialfamily,
savefortheprotection
which
then
in
the
did
the
was implicit
Declaration;why
military
leaders
demanda policythatwouldmeanmoreatomicbombs,morenapalm
and cruisers,
bombs,moreshellsfromtheAlliedbattleships
partialor
hundredsof thousands
or millionsof deaths,even
totalstarvation,
thatwe wouldnothavecarried
on theabsurdassumption
theinvasion
Feis giveswhatis at leasta partialanswer:"For
on to totalvictory?
themsurrender
meantat leasthumiliation
and lossof career,
at most
and condignpunishment-death"
disgrace
(p. iig).
(3) The positionof theEmperorwas the thirddecisiveelement
The Emperor
in thegovernmental
had a rolethat
process.
customarily
was lookedon bothbyhimand byhisgoverning
officials
as reigning,
in theaffairs
notruling.Imperialintervention
of statewas almostas
unthinkable
as royalintervention
in theUnitedKingdom-almost,
but
notquite.On Junei8, aftertheSupremeCouncildecided(i) that
theinvasionbattleoughtto be riskedand (2) thatKido'splan for
to secureSovietintervention
shouldproceed,
trying
Kido,who knew
RATIONALE OF JAPANESE SURRENDER
145
to
theEmperor
agreedwithhim,had to "persuade"
thattheEmperor
to theSoviets-lest
knowthathe wantedan approach
letthemilitary
on thathalfof theagreefashion
renegein characteristic
themilitary
of the
thecompletion
announced
ment.On June22, ourgovernment
Okinawacampaignand on the same day the Emperorurgedsix
But
oftheCounciltoseekan endofthewarbynegotiation.
members
again
it was notuntiltwoweekslater,on July7, thattheEmperor,
Kido'sadvice,proposedto SuzukithattheSovietsbe told
following
and of theEmperor's
openlyof Japan'sdesireforSovietmediation
to senda specialenvoy.Yet on Julyii, Togo cabledSato,
intention
desireforSovietintervention,
tellinghimnot to revealtheJapanese
thatthatwas exactlywhatwas wanted,a
stating
althoughexpressly
the
Presumably
double-talk.
governmental
vividexampleof Japanese
foron thenextdayTogo sentanother
pursuedhis efforts,
Emperor
tosendKonoye
desires
andhisintention
theEmperor's
stating
message
as Feisputsit,"havingtakenone
AndthentheEmperor,
as emissary.
wasquiescent."
weakinitiative,
arguedwith
theEmperor
thebombfellon Hiroshima,
Thedayafter
of thewar,
a
termination
Togo andSuzukithatthereshouldbe quick
thatbeganon
actionwas delayeduntilthemeeting
buttheessential
ofNagasaki.
intothewarandthebombing
August9-afterSovietentry
and a few civilian
hoursof debate,withthe military
Afterfifteen
at 2:00 in the
stillholdingoutfortheimpossible,
Cabinetministers
Suzukifinallycalledon theEmperorto decide,"in an act
morning
history."
The Emperorhad prein modernJapanese
unprecedented
on
andnowat
request,
Suzuki's
to
act
his
willingness
expressed
viously
longlasthe issuedtheabsolutecommand:theVoice of the Sacred
oftheImperial
mystique.
expression
Crane,theultimate
on Augustio,
The Cabinetmeeting
endedat 4:00 in themorning
the
authorized
drafted
Office
promptly
Tokyo time.The Foreign
whichfullyacceptedthetermsof thePotsdamDeclaration
message,
the
any demandwhichprejudices
so longas it did not "comprise
which
of His Majestyas SupremeRuler."This message,
prerogatives
now finallyrealizedthatthe
government
showedthattheJapanese
a
by theSwedishand Swisslegations,
warwas lost,was transmitted
and not some
clear indicationthatthe messagemeantsurrender
appealsto Russia.
liketheprevious
compromise
negotiated
shadowy
of War was still
on thefollowing
day theMinister
Nonetheless,
to theend in thisholywar."
callingon thearmy"to fightdoggedly
was recondition
theJapanese
WhentheAlliedreplywhichaccepted
Once again
debatewas resumed.
ceivedon AugustI2, theanguished
146
WORLD POLITICS
evenSuzukivacilopposedacceptance;
andtheirsupporters
themilitary
lated.On AugustI3, therewas moredebate.On AugustI4, Kido
(in Japanese)
to theEmperorone of theAmericanleaflets
brought
acof
the
Japanese
the
people
told
Japanese
which
on Tokyo
dropped
ceptanceof thePotsdamtermsand of our reply.Kido warnedthe
was nowknown,he mustactimthatsincethisinformation
Emperor
Once again the Emperor
actionby extremists.
to prevent
mediately
an imhis
with
Imperialauthority
acceptedKido'sadvice,convoked
had
of theSupremeCouncil:thistimethemilitary
mediatemeeting
This
themtoaccepttheAlliedoffer.
ordered
tocome,andtheEmperor
wastheend.
III
in Japanare now knownto all; in I945 the
Thesedevelopments
wereworkingpartlyin the dark,thoughthey
authorities
American
of Stateduringmostof
did havesomelight.Grew,ActingSecretary
hadan
on Japanese
matters,
andDooman,hischiefadviser
thisperiod,
of the
thesignificance
ofJapan.Theyinterpreted
knowledge
intimate
Suzukiand severalof the
Cabinetin Aprilcorrectly:
new Japanese
enoughto seekan
otherswereindeedsaneenoughand open-minded
armyimposed-that
trapthattheJapanese
escapefromthedo-or-die
is,theywishedto escapeiftheycould.Grewand Doomanalsounderpredicted
meaningoftheImperialroleand rightly
stoodthereligious
toretain
allowed
were
wouldcomeonlyiftheJapanese
thatsurrender
overopponents
in
On thiscrucialpointtheywerevictors
theEmperor.
wasthe
thattheEmperor
whoassumed,
wrongly,
theStateDepartment
militarism.
in thearchofJapanese
keystone
of Japanese
The
messages.
Further
lightwas castbytheintercepts
efforts
to
knewoftheclumsyJapanese
andhischiefadvisers
President
somekindof comforthesakeof ensuring
secureSovietmediation
whichwenton untilAugust8 whenMolotov
promisepeace,efforts
ofwar.Fromthesemessages
SatooftheRussiandeclaration
informed
of lossand destruction
recognition
it couldbe deducedthatJapanese
or admission
oftotaldefeatwas stillrejected.
wasreal,butrecognition
surrender"
was citedin
The muchmalignedphrase"unconditional
Trumanhad made it
becausePresident
incorrectly,
theseintercepts
on May 8 thatthewordsappliedonlyto the
clearin his statement
Togo;
notthephrasethatbothered
Butitwasobviously
armedforces.
fully
were
they
before
thedemandshe anticipated
he was rejecting
thembutbecausehe understood
statednotbecausehe misunderstood
to acceptweresuch
themonlytoowell.WhatTogo wasnotprepared
RATIONALE OF JAPANESE SURRENDER
147
as thegivingup ofKoreaand Formosa,theforbidding
requirements
of military
activities,
and American
of thehomeislands.
occupation
It is thussurprising,
in retrospect,
thatat thebeginning
of May such
extremely
knowledgeable
peopleas Grewthought
could
thatsurrender
be inducedby makingour termsclearerand by promising
thatwe
wouldnotseekto eliminate
theImperialdynasty.
Grewand someof hiscolleagues
wereundulyoptimistic;
theiroptimismseemsto havereflected
a kindof unwillingness
to recognize
whatwas well known,theultimate
of powerin
military
monopoly
theJapanese
Cabinetand SupremeCouncil-saveonlyforunpreceTheinarticulate
dented
intercession
bytheEmperor.
wasthatif
premise
sanemendesirepeace,theycan persuadeor outvote
thebitter-enders.
Recenthistorians
have takena similarposition.Thus Feis quotes
Ehrman'sGrandStrategy
aboutthesituation
on August2: "It was
indeedas reasonable
to deducefromthelatestdevelopments
thatan
atomicbombmightnowenablethepeacepartyto forcesurrender
on
as it was to deducethatthetwopartieswouldtogether
itsopponents
it. Togo and theEmperorweredesperate;
acceptdefeatwithout
but
seemedto havereachedthe
theystillcouldnotprevail.The situation
pointwherethebomb-andperhaps
thebombalone-wouldhavethe
effect"
in termsof persuasion,
required
(p. I04). Ehrmanis thinking
whenthesituation
required
something
quitedifferent.
The basic conclusion-that
a quick endingturnedon the bomb
alone-is sharedregretfully
by Feis and seemsundebatable;
but the
reasonforthisconclusion
maybe putin a slightly
different
wayfrom
his statedrationale.
The "peaceparty"-Togoand his variably
vacilnotforcesurrender
latingcolleagues-could
on the"warparty,"
because
thewarparty's
spokesmen,
had thepower
Anami,theWar Minister,
ofliberum
veto.Norwasthereanyvisiblechanceofpersuading
Anami.
He was notimmunefromassassination,
thatdarkportent
thathung
overall the Japanese
politicians.
More important,
his conductwas
governed
bya codein whichdeathforthefatherland
wasas honorable
as victory
and surrender
foranyreasondishonorable.
The Minister
of
War could hardlybe persuadedto seek peace by the prospectof
of thousands
hundreds
ofmilitary
deaths,
evenlessbytheprospect
of
thedeathsofmillions
ofcivilians.
Seenin theseterms,
thepeace-party-war-party
explanation
is hardly
fitting,
forwhatwas neededwas nota stimulant
forintellectual
reconsideration,
forpersuasion,
forarousing
thepeople,forencouraging
theopposition:
itwasan actthatwouldcausetheEmperor
toperform
hisunprecedented
act:tospeakwiththeVoiceoftheSacredCrane.
148
WORLD POLITICS
IV
of theJapanese
Feisgivesus notonlythisvividdescription
governmentin action,butalsoan accountofthedoingsof ourowngovernbetween
the
is theextraordinary
contrast
ment.Mostsignificant
perhaps
that
butreasonedmeetings
dismaldaysin Tokyoand theworrisome
precededthe decisionto droptheatomicbombon Hiroshimaand
Nagasaki.
oftheatomic
It shouldbe unnecessary
to notethatthedevelopment
bombin theUnitedStateswas notsetin motionby a "powerelite."
movedbya burning
desire
wasmadebyscientists
Theoriginal
proposal
to destroy
Hitlerand Nazism:theman who carriedthemessageto
of livingscientists,
mostlovingand
Roosevelt
was Einstein,
greatest
in Europecauseda questioning.
Feis
ofmen.The victory
kind-hearted
in Chicago
givesa fascinating
accountof a groupof atomicscientists
who in earlyJuneI945 suggested
knownas theFranckCommittee
livesachieved
thateven"thesavingofAmerican
bythesuddenuseof
atomicbombsagainstJapanmaybe outweighed
bytheensuinglossof
confidence
and waveof horrorand revulsion
sweepingovertherest
publicopinionat home"(pp.
oftheworldandperhapsevendividing
ifthebombhadbeenreadya yearearlier,
thesame
4I-42).
Presumably,
who raisedthesequesscientists
groupof eminent
and public-spirited
on to useit without
tionsin Junei945 wouldhaveurgedthemilitary
hesitation
to wreakvengeance
on Hitlerand destroy
theNazi power.
This guess,however,
The groupin factknewquite
is parenthetical.
wellthatno American
couldtossasidea weaponthatwould
president
a
termination
bring quick
of thewar and save Americanlives;he
whichcouldbe triedwithout
might,however,
acceptan alternative
recourse.
thepossibility
Theirproposedalterof ultimate
abandoning
ofthebombbefore
a groupofUN observers,
nativewasa demonstration
followedup byvariousfurther
to Japan
steps,suchas an ultimatum
eitherto surrender
or to evacuatea namedarea,or a sharingof reforthedecisionwith"publicopinion"at homeand with
sponsibility
othernations.
Theseviewswerenotlightly
On therecommendation
of
rejected.
President
Trumanhad earlierappointed
whatwas knownas
Stimson,
the InterimCommittee,
Byrnes
composedof Stimsonas chairman,
thePresident,
Bardand ClaytonforNavyand State,and
representing
scientists
whowereleadersin ourwartime
thethreeeminent
research,
ofHarvard,
of MIT, and thePresident
thePresident
thePresident
of
as Feis emphasizes,
theabtheCarnegieInstitution
of Washington;
RATIONALE OF JAPANESESURRENDER
149
withthepro(The contrast
members
was deliberate.
senceofmilitary
was
The Committee
in Tokyois dramatic.)
cessesofdecision-making
whichwouldbe raisedby
(i) thewholerangeofquestions
toconsider
of thebomb,and (2) theuse
disclosure
oftheexistence
theeventual
Panel
Advisory
wiselysetup a Scientific
ofthebomb.The Committee
whohadbeenmakingmajorcontributions
offourphysicists
composed
and threeNobel
of thebomb:RobertOppenheimer,
to thedevising
Prize winners,
ArthurH. Compton,E. 0. Lawrence,and Enrico
Fermi.
thePanel
itsconclusions,
wasreaching
WhentheFranckCommittee
it
the
Interim
whatto recommend
to
Committee;
was considering
delayedmakingitsfinalreportuntilafterit had studiedtheFranck
It thenproposed(i) thattalksbe inCommittee
recommendations.
itiatedwiththe UnitedKingdom,Russia,France,and China imto
in "making
contribute
thisdevelopment
aboutcooperation
mediately
the
international
but (2) on thebasicquestion,
relations";
improved
use."
todirectmilitary
advicewas "We canseeno alternative
reluctant
come
has
over
and
these
deeply,
who
has
long
questions
pondered
Feis,
thatwe shouldhaveantoagreewiththisadvice,thoughhe suggests
weaponwasandwhatitwoulddo.
nounced
toJapanwhatourterrible
theJapanmighthaveinfluenced
Feisfeelsthatsuchan announcement
his
of
the
but owndescription proceedings
esegovernment
tosurrender,
so improbable
in Tokyomakesthisconclusion
seem,to thisreviewer,
On theotherhand,Feis'sopinionthatan announceas tobeimpossible.
as theysay,is hardto
"fortherecord,"
mentwouldhavebeenprudent
dispute.
dayon whatwouldhave
Misconceptions
fromI945 to thepresent
causedJapanto surrender
seemto havebeenpartlycreatedbya disof historical
astasteforthehorror
factand partlyby an underlying
thatall nationssurrender
forthesamereasonsand in the
sumption
glanceat WorldWar II surrenders
sameway.Yet,as evena cursory
willshow,thesamefactors
do not
to surrender
thatlead one country
problem
surrender
applyto others.DuringWorldWar II, thefirst
battleat all,
facingus was in NorthAfrica;here,afterno substantial
theFrenchsurrendered
acceptedDarlan'sclaim
becausetheirofficers
Petain'sactualpublic
of legitimacy
in ordering
themto surrender;
thought
either
becausetheofficers
statements
ofdenialwereoverlooked
the"true"Petain,or becausetheexcusewas
thatDarlanrepresented
all theyreallysought.
of
In thecaseofItaly,surrender
on (i) thedisplacement
depended
Mussolini
thenewgovernand (2) ourassurance
thatwe wouldprotect
150
WORLD POLITICS
ment.The Italianslongsincehadhad no needforproofoftheirown
folThe Italiannavy,whichhad remained
intact,
incapacity.
military
dismerely
en masse;thegroundforces
lowedordersandsurrendered
integrated.
of
Heresurrender
was a consequence
Germany
was quitedifferent.
defeat.Whatwas notablewas thespeedyand effective
vastmilitary
capableof
withno real centralgovernment
of surrender
execution
taken
not
seriously.)
was
legitimacy
(Doenitz's
surrender.
ordering
continuathehopeless
The Germanmilitary
tradition
didnotenvisage
sawno virtuein mass
and theGermanfieldmarshals
tionoffighting
wholearmieseven
suicide.Theywerequitecapableof surrendering
without
Hitler'sapproval.
and menwouldnot
Officers
situation.
In Japanwe faceda different
government
to do so; no onein theJapanese
surrender
unlessordered
as DarlandidforPetain;and
fortheEmperor,
couldserveas surrogate
dominance
of military
by popularuptherecouldbe no overthrow
risingor byvoteof theCabinetor Council(as withMussolini).The
than
notonlytowantpeacerather
onlywaywastoforcetheEmperor
to
enforce
even
earlier-but
probably
April-and
as
he
did
in
victory,
therewas no
WithouttheImperialRescript
his wantby command.
Whatwe neededwasnotmereadditional
meansofsurrender.
effective
serveas justificathatwouldsomehow
butsomething
defeats,
Japanese
to endthefighting.
fashion
tionfortheEmperor
in an unprecedented
Andthatwaswhattheuseoftheatomicbombaccomplished.
V
questionforwhicha speculative
Thereis one moretormenting
answercan be suggested:
ofhow
ofI945 Pandora's
boxwasopen;theknowledge
Bythespring
to makean atomicbombcouldnotbe unlearned;usedor notused
dangerwas equallyreal.Whatthenwas
againstJapan,itspotential
tosecureinterattempts
theeffect
ofactualuseofthebombon postwar
"But
themind. . .
control?
answer:
a
persuasive
national
Feissupplies
powerofthebombhadnot
iftheexterminating
maywonderwhether,
tomake
beenactually
wouldhavebeenimpelled
thenations
displayed,
tosave
an effort
evenasfaltering
as theyhavemadetoagreeonmeasures
frommutualextinction
weapon"(p. i87).
themselves
bythisultimate