W HAT IS THE U LTIMA R ATIO ?
T HE LIMITS OF R EALIST POWER ANALYSIS AND THEIR
IMPLICATIONS WITH REGARD TO U.S. GRAND
STRATEGY
Paper presented to the British International Studies Association
(BISA) United States Foreign Policy Working Group Annual
Conference
University of Leeds, September 14-15, 2010
This is an early draft: please forgive the poor referencing, and please do
not cite without the author’s permission.
Edward Lock
UWE, Bristol
email: [email protected]
1
I NTRODUCTION
Debate regarding the future of U.S. grand strategy centers most obviously on the
question of how America can best secure its interests in the face of certain
threats. One might therefore expect such debate to rest upon a divergence of
opinion with regard to the nature of America’s interests, the nature of that which
threatens those interests, or the best means available to counter such threats.
The starting point for this article, however, is the belief that, even deeper than
such disagreement, lies a divergence of opinion regarding the nature of power.
Power is central to each of the elements of grand strategy considered above.
Defining interests without some conception of a state’s power makes little sense.
Given that the identification of one’s interests must logically precede that of the
threats to those interests, the definition of threat is likely to be shaped by prior
understandings of a state’s power. Finally, to examine the means available to a
state is, in a sense, to examine that state’s power.
Despite the centrality of the concept of power to debate regarding U.S. grand
strategy, within this context the concept remains under-theorized. One of the key
purposes of this article is to highlight this problem particularly as it pertains to
Realist scholarship on U.S. grand strategy. There are two reasons why
highlighting this problem is important. It is important in conceptual terms
because many scholars – and especially Realist ones – rest considerable analytic
weight upon the concept of power when discussing American grand strategy. It is
also important in practical terms because poor theory can lead to bad practice:
misunderstanding the concept of power can thus lead to the production of
flawed grand strategy.
My argument is as follows. Put simply, there is a conceptual flaw within Realist
power analysis, one that holds important practical and political implications.
This flaw has to do with the materialist assumptions made by Realists in their
identification of power-as-capabilities. This understanding of power has not
always been central to Realist thought, and it is not exclusive to Realist thought,
but it has become increasingly central to Realist scholarship in general and to
that regarding U.S. grand strategy in particular. The problem is that this
conceptualization of power can only ever be partial; it may account for material
structures\forces, but it cannot account for cultural formations that constitute
the meaning of material resources. Interestingly, there is ample evidence within
Realist scholarship of the encountering of this problem, but there is no effective
response to it, largely because Realists routinely fall back on the claim that, at the
end of the day, material power capabilities will determine outcomes.
2
This conceptual problem poses two practical problems, both of which relate to
U.S. grand strategy: firstly, if you don’t understand power then you are unlikely
to be able to wield it; secondly, this conceptual “gap” in the Realist model of
power represents a political problem for Realists. In the last decade or more,
Realists have sought to challenge advocates of Liberal internationalist and
Neoconservative grand strategies. However, their unwillingness/inability to
account for the meaning of military force leaves open to exploitation their claims
regarding the ultimate importance of force. If Realists are to effectively challenge
such positions – and if they are to resolve important issues and differences
within Realism – they must complete their account of power by acknowledging
and accounting for the cultural formations that constitute the meaning of
material power resources.
The article is organized into four sections. The first section seeks to explain why
the model of power-as-capabilities has come to occupy such a prominent
position within Realist scholarship. This is achieved through a brief historical
review of the shift from the Classical Realism of Morgenthau to the Neorealism of
Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer. The second section reviews some of the
literature associated with a more recent shift in Realist thought; that which is
understood as constituting the emergence of Neoclassical Realism. My purpose
in this section is to show that Realists have encountered the problems thrown up
by the conceptualization of power-as-capabilities, but that they have failed to
adequately address them.
The final two sections identify what is wrong with this model of power and why
it matters. Section three argues that the model of power-as-capabilities is
incomplete and therefore inadequate, because it does not account for the cultural
formations that necessarily constitute the meaning of material forces and
capabilities. In short, this Realist model of power is flawed because it is
materialist in nature and cannot account for the processes by which meaning
mediates between capabilities and outcomes. The final section examines the
practical and political implications that follow from the flawed conceptualization
of power. It is at this point, therefore, that the limits of Realist power analysis
will be demonstrated with regard to U.S. grand strategy.
3
S ECTION 1: T HE RISE TO PROMINENCE OF
THE MODEL OF POWER - AS - MILITARY
CAPABILITIES
One of the challenges facing any analysis of a Realist model of power is the
diversity of the scholarship that falls under the mantel of Realism. This challenge
has become increasingly significant in the post-Cold War years as new divisions
within the school of Realism have sprung up. The terminology used to capture
this diversity is itself bewildering: we can identify Neorealists (Waltz 1979),
Structural Realists (Buzan, Jones and Little 1993), Defensive Realists (Walt 1987;
2005), Offensive Realists (Mearsheimer 2001), Neoclassical Realists (Dueck
2006; Layne 2006), Democratic Realists (Krauthammer 2004), and (even)
Ethical Realists (Lieven and Hulsman 2006).
Yet at the heart of much if not all of this literature is a common vision of what it
means to be powerful. For Realists, a state’s power has come to be understood
primarily in terms of its military capabilities. In order to appreciate this point, it
is worth briefly reviewing the move from the Classical Realism of scholars such
as Hans Morgenthau to the Neorealism of Kenneth Waltz and, in particular, John
Mearsheimer. One of the consequences of this move was a gradual shift within
Realist scholarship with regard to the conceptualization of power. In particular,
this saw a decline of the influence within Realism of the relational model of
power and an increasing emphasis being placed on the model of power-ascapabilities. This shift also saw the rejection from much Realist scholarship of a
concern for intangible or ideational aspects of international politics; Realism
became grounded in a materialist view of politics.
In order to illustrate this shift in Realist theory, it is necessary to briefly explain
the two models of power referred to above. The first of these is a relational
model of power, which conceives of power as an attribute of a relationship
rather than as a possession of an agent (Baldwin 2002: 178). This model of
power is often associated with the work of political scientist Robert Dahl (1957:
202), who conceived of power as the ability of A to get B to do something that
they otherwise would not have done. Here, power is understood in causal terms
and as operating to the extent that A can cause a change in the behavior of B
(Schmidt 2007: 48). A second model of power, and one which is sometimes (and
perhaps too often) seen as the only alternative to the relational model of power,
is that which equates power with resources, or capabilities. This model of power
suggests that we can identify those actors that are powerful through, firstly, the
identification of the capabilities (or power resources) that are thought to
generate power and, secondly, the measurement of the quantity (and quality) of
4
such capabilities possessed by each actor. The importance of this model of power
is that it appears to offer us the possibility of measuring objectively the power of
an actor prior to their engagement in any particular relationship, something that
the relational model of power would appear unable to do. In addition, and as will
be discussed further below, the model of power-as-capabilities also makes
possible the comparison of the power of numerous actors and, therefore, their
ranking relative to one another (Hart 1976: 303-304).
Brian Schmidt (2007) has recently argued that each of these models of power is
discernible in the writings of Classical Realists such as Hans Morgenthau. At
times, Morgenthau appears to endorse the relational model of power. He does so,
for example, when he suggests that “Political power is a psychological relation
between those who exercise it and those over whom it is exercised” (1993: 30).
Yet this is not the only model of power evident in Politics among Nations.
Morgenthau is also famous for having popularized within IR the model of poweras-capabilities.1 This model of power is most evident in the context of his chapter
on the “elements of national power” (1993: 124-165).
Despite the fact that it can easily lead to confusion, the emergence within
Morgenthau’s work of two different conceptions of power is not, I would argue, a
product of mere error, but is instead a consequence of his attempt to utilize the
concept in (at least) two different ways. Morgenthau sought to engage in both
systemic theorizing and foreign policy analysis. This matters because the
different purposes towards which the concept of power is put demand its
conceptual differentiation. For example, when, in chapter five, Morgenthau
(1993: 75-83) discusses “how to detect and counter an imperialistic policy” he is
interested in the utilization of power in the context of foreign policy. Here, a
relational concept of power is necessary in order to explain how one state can
achieve a given outcome in its relations with another. Alternatively, when
Morgenthau (1993: 183) turns to the examination of the operation of the balance
of power, he is engaged in systemic theorizing, and systemic theorizing is made
possible only through the adoption of a model of power that allows the
measurement, comparison, and ranking of state power (Hart 1976; Keohane
1986). It is in this context that Morgenthau turns to the conceptualization of
power as capabilities.
Recognition of the reasons behind this move in Morgenthau’s work also help us
to appreciate why the shift from Classical to Neorealism resulted in the rejection
of the relational model of power and the resulting emphasis on the model of
1
It is worth noting that he was neither the first nor the only scholar to draw on this model of power
within IR (eg. Sprout and Sprout 1945).
5
power-as-capabilities. As all students of IR will know, one of the primary
purposes of Waltz’s Theory of International Politics was to remedy the
reductionist, unsystematic and unscientific work of Classical Realists through the
development of a structural Realist theory. There are two key elements of this
move, at least in so far as the conceptualization of power is concerned. Firstly,
whereas Morgenthau’s work drifted between different levels of analysis, Waltz
sought to concentrate solely on the third such level of analysis; that of the
international system. As is noted above, enquiry into this level of analysis
demands a particular mode of power analysis; one that can allow for the
measurement and ranking of multiple states. It is for this reason that Waltz
dismisses the relational model of power (1979: 191-2) and opts instead for the
model of power-as-capabilities (1979: 131).
The second major shift in the conceptualization of power that occurred in the
move from Classical to Neo-realism involved the emergence of an overriding
emphasis on material as opposed to intangible or ideational power resources.
Morgenthau, in his discussion of the elements of national power, considers a
range of intangible resources to be relevant to the determination of a state’s
power and finally settles on diplomacy as being the most important (1993: 155).
Waltz’s theory is materialist, however. The capabilities or resources that he lists
are predominantly material and he appears to regard military force as the most
important of them (Baldwin 2002: 183).
Again, it is important to appreciate why this is so. Waltz’s objective is to conceive
of power in a manner that allows the objective measurement and comparison of
each state’s power. This requires both an emphasis on material and observable
power resources and the capacity to measure different power resources against
a single standard. As Keohane (1986: 184 and 191) has explained, a single,
“lump” notion of power is necessary if Waltz is to make reference to a single
structure within international politics (as opposed to making reference to
multiple structures, distinguishable in terms of issue areas or capabilities). And,
as David Baldwin (2002: 183) has noted, this lumping together of different
power resources (wealth, geography, military force, etc.) is conceptually
problematic unless there is a single standard against which each state’s
possession of certain capabilities can be assessed. Waltz does not explicitly
address this issue, but, as Baldwin (2002: 183) argues, a “careful reading of
Waltz generates a strong suspicion that war-winning ability is the unstated
standard by which states are being ranked.” This point is put most strongly
within Waltz’s (1979: 113) work in the following oft-quoted statement: “in
international politics force serves, not only as the ultima ratio, but indeed as the
first and constant one.”
6
The implications of the move from Classical to Neo-realism with regard to the
conceptualization of power are evident in the work of Waltz, but they are not as
clear as they might be, largely due to the somewhat shallow and confused
account of power within Waltz’s work (Keohane 1986: 202 n 23; Baldwin 2002:
183). These implications are made much clearer in the work of Mearsheimer,
however, who in some ways presents a more internally consistent and complete
Structural Realist theory. Firstly, Mearsheimer (2001: 55 and 60) makes
absolutely clear both that he prefers the model of power-as-capabilities to the
relational model of power and that he does so because it allows him to measure
and compare the power of states “outside” of their engagement in any particular
relationship. Secondly, while Waltz is somewhat ambiguously materialist in his
definition of capabilities, Mearsheimer is unashamedly so. Finally, while Waltz
(1979: 189 and 191) sometime seems willing to acknowledge the limited
relevance of military force when it comes to the exercising of power, for
Mearsheimer (2001: 56) no such qualification is necessary: force is the ultima
ratio of international politics.
Mearsheimer’s work thus provides something of an ideal vision of the model of
power-as-military capabilities. His conception of power is much more coherent
and consistently advanced than is that of Waltz, and it helps us to appreciate an
assumption that is fundamental to much Realist scholarship; that, at the end of
the day, control over outcomes can be determined through material means,
primarily, those associated with military force. This assumption rests on the idea
that, while a state may choose not to submit to entreaties, threats, promises or
the proffering of incentives, they can be made to submit through the utilization of
military force.
S ECTION 2: F ROM N EOREALISM TO
N EOCLASSICAL R EALISM : T HE
RECONCEPTUALIZATION OF POWER ?
However necessary the model of power-as-capabilities might be for the systemic
theorizing undertaken by Neorealists, there is no doubting the limitations of this
mode of conceptualizing power. The problem of equating power to the resources
with which it may be exercised has long been recognized. To equate power to
military resources is to fall afoul of what scholars such as Steven Lukes and Peter
Morris term the “vehicle fallacy” (Morris 1987: 18; Lukes 2005: 70). The vehicle
7
fallacy results from the confusion of power with those resources that are
presumed to give rise to it. According to Steven Lukes:
This idea has led sociologists and military analysts, for example, to
equate power with power resources, such as wealth and status, or
military forces and weapons. But having the means of power is not the
same as being powerful. As the United States discovered in Vietnam
and postwar Iraq, having military superiority is not the same as
having power…[C]ounting power resources can be a clue to [power’s]
distribution, but power is a capacity, and not the…vehicle of that
capacity (2005: 70).
As Lukes also notes, the identification of the vehicle fallacy represents a rather
elementary point in any thorough consideration of the concept of power, yet this
error has been repeatedly made by scholars and practitioners alike.
I have argued above that there is a very clear reason why Neorealists adopted
this model of power; it was necessary to their task of systemic theorizing (Hart
1976). This purpose made necessary the adoption of this model of power, and it
also shaped the standards against which Neorealists evaluated the strength of
this model. Waltz has long argued that Neorealist theory ought not to be judged
in terms of its capacity to explain (let alone predict) specific outcomes in the
relations between states. The purpose of the theory is instead to explain general
trends in international politics, such as the reoccurrence of war on the one hand,
and balancing behavior on the other. Thus, while the example of the Vietnam
War is often used to show the explanatory and predictive limitations of the
model of power-as-capabilities, Neorealists can argue that this is just one
example and, as such, is not enough to invalidate a systemic theory of
international politics.
Whether or not this represents a powerful defense of the use of the model of
power-as-military capabilities within Neorealism remains debatable, but this is
not a debate I seek to enter here (see instead Baldwin 1993; Keohane and Nye
1977; Keohane 1986; Waltz). Instead, what is at issue is whether or not this
model of power is viable within the context of policy analysis and advocacy with
regard to U.S. grand strategy. And in this context, there are very real reasons for
doubting the utility of the basic model of power-as-military capabilities. David
Baldwin (2002: 185-6) explains cogently why this model of power is not suited
to the purpose of foreign policy analysis:
It is the elements of national power approach that has proved useful in the
Correlates of War Project. Various studies based on this project of
numerous wars during the past 500 years have produced useful
8
knowledge about the causes and outcomes of war. Policy-makers,
however, tend to have notoriously short time horizons. If they are
considering going to war, it is not very helpful to point out that if they fight
fifty wars during the next century, they are likely to win most of them. Nor
are they likely to care much about what factors were important in most of
the wars for the past 500 years. Most policy-makers are likely to be
involved in only one war. They want to know whether their country is
likely to win a particular war, fought in a particular context, during a
particular time period, against a particular adversary.
In short, while the model of power-as-military capabilities may be acceptable for
use in systemic theorizing, its use in the realm of foreign policy analysis and
prescription is deeply problematic.
A review of contemporary Realist literature suggests that many Realists are well
aware of the limitations of the basic model of power-as-capabilities. Thus, while
Mearsheimer’s publication of The Tragedy of Great Power Politics may represent
the culmination of the dismissal of the relational model of power and the rise to
prominence of the model of power-as-military capabilities, by the time of its
publication a shift away from the strict emphasis on systemic theorizing was
already well under way within Realism. This shift can be associated with the
general turn towards foreign policy analysis that has emerged as a hallmark of
much Neoclassical Realist scholarship (Rose 1998), but it is also strongly evident
in Realist writings regarding U.S. grand strategy.2 The remainder of this section
engages in a review of some of this literature in order to evaluate the attempts by
Realists to remedy the flaws in the model of power considered above.
The term “Neoclassical Realism” was first coined by Gideon Rose (1998) in his
review article within the journal World Politics. Rose used the term to describe a
body of work that appeared intent on the explanation of state actions and
outcomes in international politics that could not be explained by Neorealism
alone. The problem, at least in so far as it is perceived by Neoclassical Realists, is
that Neorealism is good at explaining long term trends in international politics,
but poor at explaining particular instances of state behavior and particular
outcomes (Rose 1998: 152). The objective of Neoclassical Realism has been to
develop “intermediate” theory that can aid in the explanation of these more
detailed aspects of international politics. Originally, Rose used the term
2
Indeed, there are considerable overlaps between these two categories of scholars. Some of those
who identify themselves as Neoclassical Realists focus on U.S. grand strategy, and many Realists who
have written on U.S. grand strategy within the past two decades adopt approaches that are either
explicitly or implicitly informed by Neoclassical Realism.
9
“Neoclassical Realism” as a label in order to highlight the similarities between
the works of a number of scholars. Since then, however, a considerable number
of scholars have chosen to identify their work with this term and, as a result,
Neoclassical Realism has become a coherent research program (see especially
Lobell, Ripsman and Taliaferro 2009).
What the rise of Neoclassical Realism has meant with regard to the
conceptualization of power is less clear, partly because the works grouped
together under the label Neoclassical Realism are actually quite diverse in
orientation. In general, it is quite common for Neoclassical Realism to be
distinguished from Neorealism on the grounds that it seeks to combine a concern
for “unit-level,” (Rose 1998: 146) “internal” (Taliaferro, Lobell and Ripsman
2009: 4) or “domestic” (Sterling-Folker 1997) variables with a vision of
international structure that is essentially Neorealist in nature. Despite the
seemingly coherent nature of this approach, Neoclassical Realism holds varied
implications with regard to the (re)conceptualization of power.
Perhaps the least radical reconceptualization of power evident in Neoclassical
Realist scholarship is that which attempts to add to the basic Neorealist model a
concern with regard to the domestic processes by which the power resources of
a nation are converted into power resources that may be utilized by a
government in its pursuit of foreign policy objectives. Fareed Zakaria’s From
Wealth to Power offers an excellent example of this form of Neoclassical Realist
work. Zakaria’s key insight is that “there is a great disparity in the ability that
governments have to extract resources from society to put to use in the pursuit
of foreign policy objectives” (Schmidt 2007: 59). Zakaria’s approach modifies the
measurement of power resources, but it in no way challenges the basic model of
power employed by Neorealists. This does little to modify the basic Neorealist
model of power-as-military capabilities. As Keohane (1986: 185) noted some
time ago, conversion-process explanations such as that introduced by Zakaria
constitute “auxiliary hypotheses” that serve to protect the basic assumptions
underpinning the Neorealist model of power.3
Another approach to the reconceptualization of the Neorealist model of power
has involved the disaggregation of this concept of power into its component
parts. Steven Lobell’s work on threat assessment advances such a position. For
Lobell, aggregate notions of power employed by Neorealists sometimes fail to
3
Interestingly, John Mearsheimer uses just such an “auxiliary hypothesis” when explaining the failure
of outcomes such as the Vietnam War to accord with the expectations of Neorealism. Mearhseimer
(2001: 60?) states that “intangible variables” such as the strategies employed by states explain such
variation in outcomes.
10
explain actual state behavior because different constituencies within a state are
interested in and affected by different elements of the national power of other
states. Thus, Lobell (2009: 62) argues that:
In focusing on shifts in a component power rather than net power, state
leaders respond to shifts in the relative distribution of particular
capabilities that threaten specific strategic interests. Furthermore,
increases in different components of relative power do not threaten an
opposing state’s interests equally.
Lobell then considers how the effects of “shifts in the relative distribution of
particular capabilities” influence domestic politics and, more importantly, the
capacity of the foreign policy executive to respond in a timely fashion to the
emergence of threats within the international system.
To what extent do such efforts to disaggregate components of national power
affect the Neorealist model of power-as-military capabilities? On one reading, the
significance of such a shift is relatively limited. To some extent, Lobell’s approach
applies within a foreign policy context an approach advanced some decades ago
by Keohane and Nye. One of the many arguments advanced in their famous work,
Power and Interdependence, was the claim that what was flawed with regard to
existing accounts of the structure of the international system was the tendency of
Realists to aggregate different power resources within a single “lump” concept.
The great problem with this approach, according to Keohane, was that in doing
so one tended to vastly over-estimate the fungibility of particular – and
especially military – capabilities. Keohane and Nye sought to show that military
power, while a relevant power resource in some contexts, was irrelevant in
others. In order to remedy this problem, one of Keohane and Nye’s suggestions
was to disaggregate power resources and to consider each as being relevant only
within particular “issue structures.” This argument threatened the parsimony of
Neorealist theory, particularly by claiming that the international system is
constituted by multiple structures rather than just one. However, what was not
challenged was the reliance on a largely materialist notion of power-ascapabilities. A similar limitation is evident in Lobell’s (2009: 54) work, especially
in his listing of relevant power resources which include: “territory, population,
ideology, industry, land-based military, or naval and air power.”
The disaggregation of power components advocated by Lobell (and before him
by Keohane and Nye) has the potential to encourage a more radical shift in the
conceptualization of power than that which is typically noted in the literature.
Underlying the call for the disaggregation of power components is the
assumption that the relevance of particular power resources may shift from
context to context. On the one hand, this might merely suggest that certain
11
capabilities are materially applicable in some contexts but not in others. To
borrow an illustration from Baldwin (2002), a plane carrying a nuclear weapon
may be useful in deterring another nation-state, but it may be useless if what is
required is a tactical strike on enemy forces that are closely engaged with one’s
own troops. On the other hand, however, Baldwin (2002: 179) also suggests that
“the same stockpile of arms that is useful for deterring one country may trigger
an arms race with another;” or, one might add, may be used to extend a
deterrence guarantee to another. This suggestion places a great deal more
importance on the context in which power resources are employed, because it
suggests that the meaning of power resources is not determined wholly by their
material properties.
These leads us neatly on to a third manner in which Neoclassical Theory might
be thought to challenge the Neorealist model of power-as-capabilities; the idea
that policy-makers’ perceptions of power matter in the explanation of foreign
policy choices and outcomes. Before considering this claim in more detail,
however, it is necessary to briefly describe how it emerges within Neoclassical
Realist thought. One of the key claims made by some Neoclassical Realists is that
states are not coherent “individuals” that engage in foreign policy. Instead, states
are political communities in which various institutions, groups and individuals
are involved in the formation and implementation of foreign policies. The
recognition of the role of domestic politics within Neoclassical Realism is utilized
in a number of ways, the first two of which do not impact heavily on the
conceptualization of power. On the one hand, scholars such as Lobell hold a
concern for domestic politics because they recognize that changes in the
international distribution of material capabilities may affect different elements
of society in different ways. On the other hand, Christopher Layne incorporates
within his explanation of U.S. grand strategy a concern for domestic politics
because, he argues, domestic political ideology can cause states to identify and
pursue interests that are far more extensive than their material capabilities can
be used to achieve. By themselves, neither of these aspects of Neoclassical Realist
thought radically alters the model of power-as-capabilities.
An alternative role for domestic politics is opened up by Neoclassical Realists
such as William Wohlforth. Wohlforth, writing in the tradition of Robert Jervis,
argues that recognizing that decisions are taken by specific individuals and not
states is important because the policies that such individuals devise may depend
less on the actual material distribution of capabilities than they will on the
perceptions of such capabilities held by those individuals. In his book The Elusive
Balance, Wohlforth goes to considerable effort to show both that perceptions of
capabilities matter in determining outcomes, and that perceptions of the
distribution of capabilities at any given point in time may differ between
12
individuals and communities. This position holds potentially radical implications
with regard to the conceptualization of power because it challenges the assumed
link between material capabilities and outcomes. In practical terms, the question
raised by Neoclassical Realists such as Wohlforth has to do with the role of
meaning in international politics. In one sense, this is an ontological question
about what power resources are. Are power resources material or ideational, or
are they some combination of the two? In another sense, this is an
epistemological question: how is knowledge generated – both by policy-makers
and by scholars – regarding the constraints and opportunities posed by the
international distribution of material capabilities?
There is some semblance of ambiguity in Neoclassical Realist scholarship
regarding these questions. Rose (1998: 146-147), for example, argues that:
there is no immediate or perfect transmission belt linking material
capabilities to foreign policy behavior. Foreign policy choices are made by
actual political leaders and elites, and so it is their perception of relative
power that matter, not simply relative quantities of physical resources or
forces in being. This means that over the short to medium term countries’
foreign policies may not necessarily track objective material power trends
closely or continuously.4
Note the qualifications that are employed throughout the quote above. There is a
transmission belt linking material capabilities to foreign policy behavior, but it is
neither “perfect” nor “immediate.” Physical resources and forces in being do not
operate “simply”; perceptions also matter. Foreign policies track objective
material power trends, but they need not do so “closely” or “continuously.”
Wohlforth too is ambiguous regarding the relationship between material
capabilities and foreign policy. Note in the following statement the diversity of
his explanations for uncertainty regarding the meaning of material power
capabilities:
Power cannot be tested; different elements of power possess different
utilities at different times; the relation of perceived power to material
resources can be capricious; the mechanics of power are surrounded by
uncertainty; states possess different conversion rations and comparative
advantages; the perceived prestige hierarchy and the military distribution
may not coincide for prolonged periods; states adopt asymmetrical
strategies to maximize their positions and undercut rivals; signals get
4
On the notion of a “transmission belt”, see also Schweller (2004: 164).
13
confused among allies, rivals, and domestic audiences (Wohlforth 1993:
306-307).
Identifying all the different articulations of the relationship between capabilities
and outcomes advanced by Wohlforth in this brief quote – let alone considering
their implications with regard to the conceptualization of power – would take far
more time than is available here. What is clear is that Neoclassical Realists such
as Wohlforth are aware of the disjuncture between material capabilities and
outcomes; what is not clear is that they are willing to address this “gap” in a
comprehensive manner.
Indeed, Neoclassical Realists have displayed a remarkable unwillingness to
address this issue primarily if doing so requires them to depart significantly from
the Neorealist model of power-as-military capabilities. The tendency of
Neoclassical Realists to stick closely to the Waltzian model of power is easily
discernible. According to Rose (1998: 146), proponents of Neoclassical Realism
argue that “the scope and ambition of a country’s foreign policy is driven first
and foremost by its place in the international system and specifically by its
relative material power capabilities.” Similarly, the editors of a recent collection
of Neoclassical Realist essays state that “systemic forces ultimately drive external
behavior” (Taliaferro et al. 2009: 25). It is equally clear that when Neoclassical
Realists affirm their commitment to the notion that the primary source of
influence on state behavior is the distribution of power in the international
system, they understand the concept of power in terms of material capabilities
(see Wohlforth 1993: 1-17; Rose 1998: 151).
The commitment of Neoclassical Realists to this model of power makes the goal
of explaining the gap between material capabilities and foreign policy outcomes
very difficult for them to achieve. What we are left with are qualifications and
hedged bets. The typical way this problem is dodged by Neoclassical Realists is
to put it off for another day. As Rose noted in the quote included above “over the
short to medium term countries’ foreign policies may not necessarily track
objective material power trends closely or continuously.” Similarly, Taliaferro et
al. (2009: 7 and 7-8) suggest that “The calculations and perceptions of leaders
can inhibit a timely and objectively efficient response or policy adaptation to
shifts in the external environment” and therefore that “While the international
system may socialize states to respond properly to its constraints over time…it
cannot alone explain the shorter-term policy choices that states make.” What is
suggested by Neoclassical realists such as these is that, in the short term, the
relationship between material capabilities and foreign policy outcomes may
appear a complicated one; what is presumed but often left unsaid is that, in the
long run, material forces will have their way.
14
S ECTION 3: M EANING AND MILITARY FORCE
Neoclassical Realists, and others, have highlighted the gap between material
capabilities and outcomes in international politics, yet they remain wedded to
the notion that, at the end of the day, material forces determine state behavior.
But do they? The remainder of this article seeks to demonstrate the gap – both
conceptual and practical – between material resources (especially military ones)
– and foreign policy outcomes. Furthermore, I argue that in order to fill this gap
we need to account for the social structures that constitute the meaning of power
resources and thereby shape their role in international politics.5 I focus here on
the relationship between military capabilities and outcomes because it provides
the toughest test of my argument. After all, surely if there is any purely material
force that shapes international political outcomes it is the destructive potential
of military capabilities.
I want to make this argument in a number of stages, each of which considers the
relationship between material military capabilities and social structures of at a
progressively more detailed level. I shall start at the most abstract level, by
briefly discussing Alexander Wendt’s work on the relationship between material
and ideational factors within IR more broadly. This move highlights the debt that
my argument owes to constructivist theorizing in general. I shall then move on to
the consideration of the relationship between military capabilities and social
structures in the context of various types of strategy, including those of
deterrence and compellance, coercion, and finally limited and absolute warfare. I
do so in order to demonstrate that the gap between military force and political
power is well known to students of strategic studies. In general, this section
argues that it is only in the rarest and most extreme instances that the use of
military capabilities can be adequately understood through reference to solely
material factors. The broader lesson that can be taken from this argument is that
the model of power-as-military capabilities is inadequate because it lacks the
capacity to account for the importance and the effects of the meaning of material
resources.
One of the many objectives pursued by Alexander Wendt in his well known work
Social Theory of International Politics is the challenging of the materialist
It is important to clarify two points here. Firstly, I do not argue that ideas matter “all the way
down” and that material resources and forces are irrelevant. My objective below is to argue that
both components are necessary to an adequate explanation (see Sorensen 2008). Secondly, I do
not advocate the adoption of a competitive approach in which the relative importance of material
and ideational factors are tested. I believe that both are necessary.
5
15
assumptions underpinning much contemporary theorizing in IR. In seeking to
highlight the importance of ideational factors within international politics,
however, Wendt follows an approach that is markedly different from that taken
by Neoliberal scholars. Wendt (1999: 93-94) articulates the key difference
between these two approaches to the study of ideas as follows:
The causal approach favored by Neoliberals assumes that ideas matter only
to the extent that they have effects beyond effects of power, interest, and
institutions. This…social constructivist approach inquires into the extent to
which ideas constitute those ostensibly “material” causes in the first place.
Wendt goes on to argue that the goal of this part of his work:
is to show that much of the apparent explanatory power of ostensibly
“materialist” explanations is actually constituted by suppressed
constructivist assumptions about the content and distribution of ideas. The
central thesis is that the meaning of power and the content of interests are
largely a function of ideas. As such only after the ideational conditions of
possibility for power and interest explanations have been exposed and
stripped out can we assess the effects of materiality as such.
Wendt seeks to achieve this general aim through a two part assault on Waltz’s
Theory of International Politics. Wendt’s (1999: 96) first step is to “show that the
explanatory power of Waltz’s materialist theory of structure, the explicit
elements of which are anarchy and the distribution of material capabilities, rests
on implicit assumptions about the distribution of interests.” Wendt (1999: 113130) makes a further move by going on to show that interests are not material
and that they are instead constituted by ideas. The combination of these two
points allows Wendt to conclude that the causal power of the material structure
of international politics (understood in terms of the distribution of material
capabilities) is constituted as meaningful by the social structure of international
politics (understood in terms of the distribution of ideas). Importantly, Wendt
accepts that his is not the only route by which this conclusion can be reached;
alternatively, one could seek to “identify cultural formations at the systemic level
– shared ideas making up norms, institutions, threat-systems, and so on – that
constitute the meaning of the distribution of power” (Wendt 1999: 104). It is this
strategy that informs the discussion below.
Rather than fill the pages below with references to texts on constructivist theory,
however, I seek to show the importance of what Wendt terms “cultural
formations” through an examination of works on strategic theory, and
particularly those concerned with the relationship between the material
application of military capabilities and the achievement of political outcomes. In
16
one sense, the distinction drawn in the sentence above ought to be redundant for
at least since Carl von Clausewitz (1976: 87) strategic scholars have understood
war to be nothing more than the continuation of politics though with the
application of other means. Yet, as Colin Gray (1999: 48) suggests, while
Clausewitz’s early and widely acknowledged recognition of this point might lead
us to believe that the relationship between war and politics would be well
mapped, “nothing could be further from the truth.” Indeed, strategic theorists
have, like Realists, too often fallen into the trap of assuming that political power
and material force are ultimately the same thing.6 However, certain branches of
strategic theory help to highlight the distinction between material force and
political power and, in doing so, they serve to undermine the Realist assumption
that power can be understood in a purely materialist manner.
The conceptual gap between force and power is more or less evident depending
on which element of strategic theory one examines. Let us start, then, with the
branch of strategic theory in which it is most clear; that regarding theories of
deterrence. According to Lawrence Freedman (2008: 28), it is deterrence which,
amongst all the branches of strategic theory, has emerged as “the most
thoroughly considered power relationship.” Deterrence, at its most simple,
involves the prevention of another actor from taking a proscribed course of
action through the use of the threat of harm. The key point with regard to this
strategy is that its successful utilization as an instrument of power is absolutely
dependent upon the absence of the (threatened) use of force. One carries out the
threat only when one’s threat has failed to deter the other from acting. One of the
most important conclusions that was drawn by theorists of deterrence was that
the deterrer who possessed the material means of harming the deterred was not
the actor most responsible for the success of the strategy of deterrence. As
Freedman (2008: 28) notes, “all deterrence is self-deterrence in that it ultimately
depends on the calculations made by the deterred, whatever the quality of the
threats made by the deterrer.”
This highlights a more general point made by Peter Morriss: most resources are
resources only if others recognize them as such (Morris 1987). In short, it is
meaning – or, more precisely, cultural formations that constitute meaning – that
“fills the gap” between the possession of the material means needed to harm
another and the successful use of deterrence as a means of exercising power.
6
It is possible that this flaw can even be traced back to Clausewitz’s suggestion that war is analogous
to a wrestling match. This analogy makes the potentially dangerous assumption that a political
community is analogous to an individual human being, and that the relationship between the parts –
the army (arms), society (heart) and political leadership (brain) – is ultimately material rather than
being at least partly social in character.
17
Baldwin makes a similar point in arguing that if, in A’s efforts to exercise power
over B, A threatens B with a beating, the exercise of power by A will be
dependent upon (amongst other things) the meaning that B attributes to the
threatened beating itself. In this context, if B “is a masochist, A’s threat was
doomed to fail from the beginning” (Baldwin 1979). Furthermore, Guzzini argues
that meaning, being dependent upon language, can never be finally fixed (Guzzini
2005). Importantly, the place of cultural formations that constitute meaning
between material capabilities and outcomes constitutes a resource that can be
actively exploited in order to negate attempts to exercise power. Guzzini gives
the example of President Truman’s efforts to “impress Joseph Stalin in Potsdam
in 1945 by telling him that the United States had developed an atomic bomb.
Stalin, however, by feigning indifference, reduced the impact of this possible
bargaining chip” (Guzzini 1993).
The practical importance of this point can be appreciated if one examines the
historical development of nuclear deterrence during the Cold War. Early works
on this topic assumed that the very material properties of nuclear weapons
carried their own inherent and unambiguous meaning: war must be avoided at
all costs (Brodie 1946). Later, such assumptions were jettisoned and deterrence
strategy became a massively complex subject as theorists and practitioners
addressed the challenges associated with effectively translating material
capabilities into effective power. (Wohlstetter 1959). While concerns regarding
the development and deployment of material capabilities remained central to
such strategy, these concerns were complemented by those regarding what
certain material deployments or capabilities might mean to one’s opponents.
It may be thought that the absence of the actual utilization of force within
(successful) strategies of deterrence makes the place of meaning within this
particular form of strategy unique. This is not the case, however, as can be
demonstrated if we move from the examination of deterrence to that of a related
field; coercion. As Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman (2002: 3) have noted in a
major recent work on the subject, coercion, like deterrence, is not destruction.
The two draw upon Schelling’s classic work Arms and Influence in order to
attempt to highlight the distinction between coercion (or, in Schelling’s terms,
the power to hurt) on the one hand and the use of “brute force” on the other.
According to Schelling (1966: 3), “brute force succeeds when it is used, whereas
the power to hurt is most successful when held in reserve. It is the threat of
damage, or of more damage to come, that can make someone yield or comply.”
This means that the success of coercion, like that of deterrence, is ultimately
determined by the actor who is being coerced.
18
On first inspection, the concept of coercion may seem to add little to our
discussion of the role of meaning in strategic affairs. Indeed, this perception
would be reinforced by the recognition that deterrence is often treated as one of
two subcategories of coercion, the other being that of compellance. If this is the
case, most of the points raised above regarding the importance of meaning
within the context of deterrence strategy would also seem to be applicable to the
more general category of coercive strategy. To return again to the illustration
cited by Baldwin; using the threat of a beating to prevent a masochist from doing
something (deterrence) is likely to be just as ineffective as doing so to get a
masochist to do something (compellance), and for the same reasons.
Thinking about coercion is important, however, because while we might find it
easy to conceptually isolate deterrence from the remainder of strategic affairs,
and to argue that the role of meaning in the context of deterrence is peculiar to
this form of strategy, distinguishing coercion from other instances of the use of
force is not so simple. Indeed, any reading of the literature on coercion makes it
immediately apparent how difficult it is to figure out where coercion ends and
brute force begins. As Byman and Waxman (2002: 5) note “Most crises involving
coercion fall along a continuum between pure brute force and coercion,” which
leaves those seeking to distinguish between the two in a position similar to those
debating whether an image “constitutes pornography or art: coercion is often in
the eye of the beholder.” In short, coercion incorporates, but is not limited to, the
use of brute or material force. Furthermore, the extent of the use of force is not
what distinguishes a strategy of coercion from one of brute force, a point which
has led some to conceive of the Korean and Second World Wars as examples of
the coercion.
What ultimately distinguishes brute force from coercion is in one sense the
purpose to which force is put. The following example, though less than politically
correct in its terminology, is one of several used by Schelling to demonstrate this
point:
The difference between coercion and brute force is as often in the intent as
it is in the instrument. To hunt down Comanches and to exterminate them
was brute force; to raid their villages to make them behave was coercive
diplomacy, based on the power to hurt. The pain and loss to the Indians
[sic] might have looked very much the same one way as the other; the
difference was one of purpose and effect. If Indians were killed because
they were in the way, or somebody wanted their land, or the authorities
despaired of making them behave and could not confine them and decided
to exterminate them, that was pure unilateral force. If some Indians were
killed to make other Indians behave, that was coercive violence (1966: 5).
19
The crucial point here is that, to the extent that force is used coercively, one
cannot negate the importance of the cultural formations that constitute the
meaning of that force. Indeed, when discussing the nature of coercion Schelling
(1966: 3) speaks of the importance of the communication of a threat to one’s
adversary, acknowledging that, “Unhappily, the power to hurt is often
communicated by some performance of it.” The notion that one’s use of force
constitutes a “performance” implies an equally if not more important role for the
act of interpretation by one’s target audience. Interpretation is necessary
because the meaning of force is not inherent in its material properties. Thus, in
the vast majority of conflicts, the relationship between material capabilities,
forces and properties on the one hand, and outcomes understood in terms of
power on the other, is necessarily mediated by cultural formations of meaning.
Only when the utter extermination of one’s adversary is contemplated – and this
has only rarely ever been done – can the importance of such cultural formations
be ignored.
S ECTION 4: R EALIST POWER ANALYSIS AND
U.S. GRAND STRATEGY
What does all this have to do with U.S. grand strategy? What I have tried to do in
the first three sections of this article is to demonstrate two key points. Firstly, I
argued (in sections 1 and 2) that Realist scholarship, including much of that
which engages in debate regarding U.S. grand strategy, is founded on the
assumption that power can be equated with the possession of material
capabilities (and, especially, military force). Secondly, I have argued (in section
3) that the model of power-as-military force is flawed because it ignores the role
of cultural formations in terms of the constitution of the meaning of force; a role
that is necessarily played by such formations in any instance of the use of force
barring those in which the total annihilation of one’s adversaries is sought.
This is an important problem in general, because it suggests that Realist models
of power and Realist analyses of power relations are incomplete and, by
themselves, inadequate. This is, in and of itself, a conceptual or academic
problem, but it is one with potentially practical and political implications. In this
final (and brief) section, I wish to consider these in turn.
20
An appreciation of the practical implications that this flawed model of power has
with regard to U.S. strategy is more easily gained when one recognizes that
something like this model of power has been in active use by policy-makers
during the past two decades. In discussing recent U.S. policy debates, Walter
Russell Mead argues that “[o]ver time, there has been a distinct shift in American
strategic thinking toward the need for overwhelming military superiority as the
surest foundation for national security” (Mead 2004: 29). Most recently it has
been the policy statements and rhetoric of President George W. Bush which have
served to articulate this understanding of US power. The 2002 National Security
Strategy report (NSSR) stated that “[i]t is time to reaffirm the essential role of
American military strength. We must build and maintain our defenses beyond
challenge” (The White House 2002). Bush asserted this point, perhaps somewhat
more astringently, during his speech at West Point in June, 2002. There, he cited
General George C. Marshall who looked forward to the day when the American
flag “will be recognized throughout the world as a symbol of freedom on the one
hand, and of overwhelming power on the other” (Bush 2002). Later, Bush went
on to explain that power in terms of America’s possession, and intention to keep
“military strengths beyond challenge” (Bush 2002).
Finally, it is worth noting that the articulation of this vision of American power as
resting upon military forces was not an innovation of either the post-9/11
political landscape or the Bush administration. As Robert Kagan argues:
Americans before September 11 were augmenting, not diminishing,
their military power. In the 2000 election campaign, Bush and Gore
both promised to increase defense spending, responding not to any
particular threat but only to the general perception that the
American defense budget – then running at close to $300 billion per
year – was inadequate to meet the nation’s strategic requirements
(Kagan 2003).
Many of the ideas advanced by the Bush administration regarding the centrality
of military resources to national power had been circulated in the early 1990s,
particularly within a 1992 “Defense Planning Guidance” draft submitted by Paul
Wolfowitz (though this was later disavowed by the first Bush administration)
(Gaddis 2002). Similarly, it is worth noting that the administration of President
Barack Obama has reiterated claims regarding the utility of force within
American grand strategy, stating that the U.S. “will maintain the military
superiority that has secured our country, and underpinned global security, for
decades” (The Whitehouse 2010: i).
Two practical problems follow from the utilization of what has been shown to be
a flawed model of power. The first such problem is linked directly to the
21
conception of military capability as being synonymous with power itself. To
equate military capability with power is, almost inevitably, to vastly
overestimate the power of the United States. This conception of power became
particularly prominent in the post-9-11 era, where neoconservative calls for
increased spending on military forces and the active use of those forces for the
purposes of regime change found their way into the policies of the Bush
administration, most obviously in the case of the invasion of Iraq in March, 2003.
Two arguments deployed by policy makers illustrated the Bush administration’s
expectations regarding the linkages between the application of military
capabilities and the exercising of power regarding political outcomes. Within
Iraq, it was argued that the use of force would destroy the regime of terror led by
Saddam Hussein and allow democracy to flourish. Beyond Iraq, administration
officials argued that the use of force would serve as a warning to other states
concerning the development of weapons of mass destruction (Bush 2003). The
seven challenging years since that invasion have led even some who initially
endorsed it to acknowledge the danger of assuming a direct link between
military capability and power. Thus, Francis Fukuyama has contended that,
“despite the fact that the United States spends roughly as much on its military as
the rest of the world put together, the Iraq war has demonstrated that there are
clear limits to the U.S. military’s effectiveness” (Fukuyama 2006).
A second major failing that can result from the conceptualization of power in
terms of the possession of military capabilities is also highlighted by the
apparent consequences of the Iraqi invasion. The more that one conceives of
power as something that can be possessed, the more one is likely to conceive of
“the other” as a passive subject who can be controlled through the exercise of
power. Such a narrow focus on oneself represents a major flaw in any strategic
undertaking, as numerous strategic theorists have suggested. Central to the work
of both Clausewitz (1976) and Schelling (1980), for example, is the assumption
that strategy involves the interplay between (at least) two actors. Furthermore,
strategic theorists have sought to warn policy makers against the danger of
ignoring the relational nature of conflict and, therefore, of strategy (Luttwak
2001). Such warnings have not always been heeded: as Colin Gray writes,
“strategic history demonstrates the prevalence of the error of neglect of the
enemy” (Gray 1999).
Most recently, this tendency for neglect of the enemy has been evident within the
debate that has taken place regarding the security policy of the United States.
Perhaps most obviously, we have witnessed this tendency in the growing
fascination with technological developments associated generally with the
purported revolution in military affairs (RMA) (Arquilla and Ronfeldt 1997), and,
often more specifically, with the linkage of airpower and precision-guided
22
munitions (PGMs) (Kaldor 2003). In the 1990s, Joseph Nye and William Owens
articulated what had become a common vision of the future of US military
capability – one based on the possession of “dominant battle space knowledge”
that would enable those forces to exert power efficiently and precisely, even
across great distances (Nye and Owens 1996). While such accounts of this most
recent RMA have focused on the edge held by the US in terms of information
technology, a more recent focus – this time articulated by the then Secretary of
Defense, Donald Rumsfeld – has been less on transforming the US military in
light of particular technological advances, but instead upon constructing a
military that is constantly undergoing a process of transformation and
adaptation (Rumsfeld 2002). However, what is also evident in Rumsfeld’s article
is the absence of any sustained discussion of the adversary against whom US
military forces may be utilized. Indeed, Rumsfeld introduces this uncertainty
regarding the identity of the enemy as one of the prerequisites of the systemic
transformation that he advocates (Rumsfeld 2002). The transformation of the
capabilities of the US is intended, according to Rumsfeld, to aid in the exercise of
power over unidentified and unknown adversaries. This position had previously
been articulated by neoconservative scholars. Frederick Kagan, for example,
lambasted the Clinton administration for (amongst other things) adopting a
“mechanical” approach to the design of strategy that focused on the identification
of existing and potential threats (Kagan 2000). Instead, Kagan – like Rumsfeld –
supported the development of a military force that was designed to deter or
defeat all future threats, regardless of their character or origin. As a result, the
overriding emphasis here remains on the capabilities of the armed forces of the
United States; the enemy is – purposefully – ignored.
This emphasis on technical capabilities has been criticized on a number of
grounds. Colin Gray, for example, has argued that such examples illustrate the
utopian quest for the “golden city of guaranteed strategic riches” that is
particularly evident within US writings on strategic matters (Gray 1999). Gray,
drawing upon Clausewitz’s notion of “friction”, is quick to note that such a quest
can never succeed due to the inherent role of chance and unpredictability within
war. More to the point, however, infatuation with the RMA reinforces the
conception of power as equating to military capability and encourages neglect of
one’s enemy. Putting aside the more basic issue of accounting for the adversary’s
will to resist (Gray 1999), the key point here is that the very meaning of the
capabilities that one employs in a particular conflict cannot be determined solely
by those who possess those capabilities. Put simply, an adequate account of
power requires both material and cultural elements. Ignoring the latter can lead
policy-makers to overstate the utility of force and to ignore the role of one’s
23
adversary in the political construction of the meaning of instances of the use of
force.
What one might immediately note with regard to the discussion above is that
many of the policies and positions that are critically examined were directly
challenged by Realists. How, then, can I criticize Realists for the implementation
of policies to which they were opposed? It is here that I wish to consider a final
point, one that has to do with the political implications that follow from the
flawed model of power advanced by Realists.
My argument is not (for a minute) that Realists supported such policies; it is that
the conceptual flaw in the Realist model of power discussed above can be linked
to the opening up of the political space in which the policies and positions
described above could be advanced. Over the past four or five decades, Realists
have powerfully advanced the argument that power equates to the possession of
military force. What is absent from their work has generally been a means of
accounting for the cultural formations that constitute the meaning of material
(military) capabilities. This gap makes the Realist model of power incomplete
and inadequate from an academic perspective, but it also leaves it incomplete in
a political sense as well. The result is room for contestation over what America’s
military capabilities mean, both to the U.S. and to others.
One might even suggest that some of the disagreement between Realists and
Neoconservatives (and even between different Realists) has to do with exactly
this point. Realists such as Walt (2005) and Layne (2006) claimed that the
expansion of American military capabilities would represent a threat to other
states and would cause them to balance against the U.S. Neoconservatives such
as Kristol and Kagan (1996) claimed that just such an expansion of American
military capabilities would generate a (benevolent) hegemonic order. The
difference between these two claims has little to do with disagreement regarding
material capabilities; it has almost everything to do with their meaning.
Furthermore, the apparent success of the Neoconservative message, at least in
the early 2000s, suggests that their articulation of the meaning of military force
was more in tune with the broader cultural formations operating within the U.S.
at the time. If we agree with Andrew Bacevich (2005) that American attitudes
towards their military forces are to be characterized in terms of “militarism,” we
can begin to see both why the Realist message was less than successful and how
important it is – politically – for the Realist model of power to take into account
the cultural formations that constitute the meaning of military capabilities.
24
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