15
BREAKING VERBS IN FRENCH: TWO INTRANSITIVE
CONSTRUCTIONS
on its immediate surroundings. This is illustrated in (5),
where the communicative purpose of the sentence is not
aF? \NFD?FA bcCGCN^ \>d
to depict the breaking of the stem, but to present its
French change of state verbs differ as to whether they destruction as the explanation for the cyclist’s fall:
can participate in an intransitive inchoative construction
(1), a reflexive construction (2), or both (3):
(5) J’ai mis les mains en bas du guidon pour me relancer et la potence a cassé. Je n’avais plus rien
(1) Le pneu a éclaté
pour me retenir et je suis tombé.
‘The tire exploded’
‘I placed my hands on the base of the handlebar
(2) Le verre s’est brisé
to change pace and the stem broke. I had nothing
more to support myself and I fell.’
‘The glass broke’
(3) (a) Le fil a cassé
(b) Le fil s’est cassé
‘The thread broke’
This presentation investigates the semantic import
of these two constructions, as well as their distribution
with briser, casser and rompre, three verbs often translated by the English ‘break’ in a corpus of approximately
750 instances (250 for each verb) of journalistic and literary French. It shows that this distribution results from
a fine interplay between i) the specific semantics of the
breaking verbs and the constructions, ii) the meaning of
the subject (i.e. the entity that undergoes the break),
and iii) the topical or non-topical nature of that subject
in discourse.
The base relative to which the meaning of the two
constructions is characterized (Langacker 1987, 1991)
if the force dynamic configuration (Talmy 1988) that
surrounds the destruction of the subject of the breaking
predicate. Each construction structures that configuration in a specific way. The reflexive construction profiles
the effect of an overwhelming force on an entity that
cannot retain its integrity, as illustrated in (4):
(4) Emporté par une violente vague, le bateau a
heurté un pilier de ciment, et s’est brisé en deux.
‘Caught by a violent wave, the ship hit a cement
post and broke in two’
By contrast, the intransitive inchoative construction
profiles the detrimental effect of the entity’s destruction
In order to investigate the meaning compatibility between the three breaking verbs and these two constructions, 7500 independent examples of briser, casser, and
rompre (2500 for each verb) taken from literary and
journalistic corpora were analyzed. The results show
that the meaning of briser is incompatible with that
of the intransitive inchoative construction because the
verb profiles the direct interaction between the entity
and the force that overwhelms its integrity. The entity’s destruction can only be caused by this interaction. In particular, it cannot be construed as occurring
spontaneously, as the result of normal usage. Consequently, in an intransitive situation, the most natural
outcome of the application of the overwhelming force is
the destruction of the entity itself. A reading where that
destruction would only be seen as the cause for further
developments violates the very direct relation that exists between the entity and the force responsible for its
destruction. This analysis is confirmed by the explicit
mention of the destructive force in a very large majority
of the briser examples. The example in (4) is representative of this strong tendency. The cement post is
directly responsible for the destruction of the ship.
The respective meanings of casser and rompre allow those verbs to be compatible with both constructions. The difference between them primarily concerns
whether or not the communicative purpose of the sentence is directed onto the destruction of the entity itself
or the consequences of the latter’s destruction on its
environment. This distinction is illustrated in (6) and
(7):
16
(6) A Ochten, en plein centre du pays, une digue,
au pied de laquelle vivent 4.500 personnes,
présentait des fissures inquiétantes et menaçait
de se rompre. . . .
‘In Ochten, in the center of the country, a levee at
the foot of which 4,500 people live showed some
troublesome cracks and threatened to break. . . .
(7) Pas de répit sur le front des inondations [. . . ].
Trois barrages sous haute surveillance en Ille-etVilaine; une digue qui menace de rompre dans le
Morbihan; une centaine de communes de SeineMaritime privées d’eau potable. . .
‘No break on the flooding front [. . . ]. Three dams
under surveillance in Ille-et-Vilaine, a dike that
threatens to break in the Morbihan, about a hundred counties in Seine-Maritime without running
water. . . .’
In (6), the communicative purpose of the sentence
is to describe the dike, and present its possible collapse
under the pressure from the water. The use of the
reflexive construction is congruent with this goal. Although the collapse will undoubtedly have further consequences, the force dynamic configuration evoked in
the construction is the direct relation between the dike
and the water. In (7), the sentence presents the overall
danger a region experiences because of flooding. Different examples, including the dike possibly breaking,
are used to illustrate that danger. There is no specific
focus on the direct interaction between the water and
the dike. The latter’s destruction can be presented as
an event that spontaneously occurs when its structural
integrity is overwhelmed. Evidence in favor of this analysis comes from the lexical semantics of the subjects
in the intransitive inchoative construction. The majority of them are component parts of complex machines
(mousqueton ‘snap-hook, mât ‘mast’, ressort ‘spring’,
potence ‘stem’, etc) whose break causes the failure of
the structure that contains them. Furthermore, unlike the subjects of intransitive inchoatives, the subjects
of the reflexive construction tend to be highly topical,
thereby confirming the importance of their own structural integrity to the overall meaning of the sentence.
References:
Labelle, Marie. 1992. Change of State and Valency.
Journal of Linguistics 28: 375–414.
Langacker, Ronald W. 1987. Foundations of Cognitive Grammar (Vol. 1). Theoretical prerequisites. Stanford:
Stanford University Press.
Langacker, Ronald W. 1991. Foundations of Cognitive
Grammar. Vol. 2: Descriptive Application. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Talmy, Leonard. 1988. Force Dynamics in Language
and Cognition. Cognitive Science 2: 49–100.
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17
LANGUAGE ACQUISITION: THE MOTOR THEORY ACCOUNT
Robin Allott
(UK)
language acquisition generally from which answers can
be derived also to these further questions. Why computers so far have been unable to ‘crack’ the language
problem becomes apparent in the light of the motor
theory account: computers can have no natural relation
between words and their meanings; they have no conceptual store to which the network of words is linked nor
do they have the innate aspects of language functioning — represented by function words; computers have
no direct links between speech sounds and movement
patterns and they do not have the instantly integrated
neural patterning underlying thought — they necessarily operate serially and hierarchically. Adults find the
acquisition of a new language much more difficult than
children do because they are already neurally committed to the link between the words of their first language
and the elements in their conceptual store. A second
language being acquired by an adult is in direct competition for neural space with the network structures
established for the first language.
Over the last few decades research into child language
acquisition has been revolutionized by the use of ingenious new techniques which allow one to investigate what in fact infants (that is children not yet able
to speak) can perceive when exposed to a stream of
speech sound, the discriminations they can make between different speech sounds, different speech sound
sequences and different words. However on the central
features of the mystery, the extraordinarily rapid acquisition of lexicon and complex syntactic structures, little
solid progress has been made. The questions being researched are how infants acquire and produce the speech
sounds (phonemes) of the community language; how infants find words in the stream of speech; and how they
link words to perceived objects or action, that is, discover meanings. In a recent general review in Nature of
children’s language acquisition, Patricia Kuhl also asked
why we do not learn new languages as easily at 50 as
Reference:
at 5 and why computers have not cracked the human
Kuhl, P. 2004. Early Language Acquisition: Cracking
linguistic code. The motor theory of language function
the
Speech Code. Nature 5: 831–843.
and origin makes possible a plausible account of child
PRAGMATIC COMPETENCE IN CLOSED HEAD INJURY:
EXTRALINGUISTIC AND PARALINGUISTIC ASPECTS
Romina Angeleri, Francesca M. Bosco,
Livia Colle, Katiuscia Sacco, Marina
Zettin* , and Bruno G. Bara
University of Turin (Italy)
*
Cooperativa Sociale Puzzle (Turin, Italy)
Introduction. Several studies in the literature show
that people with head injury have impaired communicative abilities (Bara, Tirassa & Zettin, 1997; McDonald
& Van Sommers, 1993). Research in this area focuses
on the comprehension of linguistic speech acts, overlooking the extralinguistic and paaralinguistic aspects
of communication: the only exception are a few studies showing that people with head injury also have a
reduced ability to comprehend extralinguistic communicative acts (Bara, Cutica & Tirassa, 2001) and to
comprehend the paralinguistic aspects of communication (McDonald & Flanagan, 2004).
In particular, following the tenets of Cognitive Pragmatics (Airenti, Bara & Colombetti, 1993), a theory
of the cognitive processes underlying human communication, Bara, Cutica & Tirassa, (2001) show that CHI
patients have a deficit in the comprehension of irony
and deceit but not of standard communicative acts, i.e.
direct and indirect speech acts. In accordance with
the Cognitive Pragmatics theory, the authors explain
such data on the basis of the complexity of the cogni-
tive process underlying the investigated phenomena. In
standard communication, default rules of inference are
used to understand one another’s mental states. Default
rules are always valid unless their consequences are explicitly denied. Indeed, in standard communication what
an agent says is in line with his/her private beliefs. On
the contrary, non-standard communication — as for example irony and deceit — involves the comprehension
and production of communicative acts via the block of
default rules and the occurrence of more complex inferential processes, involving conflicts between the beliefs
the actor takes as shared with the partner and the actor’s private beliefs.
The aim of the present study is to investigate CHI
patients’ ability to comprehend and to produce the paralinguistic aspects of communication, that is those aspects that accompany speech acts, such as prosody and
intonation, and extralinguistic communicative acts, that
is acts consisting only of hand gestures and body movements. In particular within the extralinguistic phenomena we investigate the ability to comprehend and produce standard communicative acts, irony and deceit.
In line with the tenets of Cognitive Pragmatics we
expect CHI patients to show a deficit in the comprehension and production of irony and deceit but not of standard communicative acts; we also expect CHI patients
to show a deficit in the comprehension and production
18
of the paralinguistic aspects of communication.
Experimental procedure. Our protocol consisted
of 44 videotaped scenes, each lasting between 18 and
22 seconds, and vis-à-vis interaction with the examiner.
The patients’ answers were assessed by a judge blind to
the aim of the study, who assigned a score ranging from
0 to 3.
Material. Extralinguistic scale: this assesses the
comprehension and production of communicative acts
expressed only in the extralinguistic modality. This scale
includes standard communicative acts (4 items), deceit
(4 items) and irony (4 items). In the comprehension
tasks, the examiner shows the patient short videotaped
scenes where two agents are engaged in a communicative interaction: the first agent asks her partner a question and the partner replies. The patient has to understand the communicative act produced by the partner.
In the production tasks (4 standard, 4 deceits and 4
ironies), the examiner shows the patient scenes similar to the previous ones but in this case the first agent
asks the partner a question. The patient, assuming the
agent’s perspective, has to produce a communicative
act in reply.
Paralinguistic scale: this assesses the comprehension and production of aspects such as facial expressions, prosody and intonation. The paralinguistic scale
includes: (i) Basic communicative acts: the examiner
shows the patient short videotaped scenes where an
agent, speaking an invented language, makes a statement, asks a question, makes a request or gives an order.
The patient has to u n d e r s t a n d (8 items) the type
of act produced by the agent, through the paralinguistic indicators. The examiner provides four possible answers, of which only one is correct. In p r o d u c t i o n
(4 items), the examiner asks the patient to produce
statements, questions, requests and orders, paying special attention to the paralinguistic indicators. (ii) Basic
communicative acts expressing an emotion: the examiner shows the patient short videotaped scenes where
an agent, speaking an invented language, expresses an
emotion (anger, sadness, happiness and fear, for a total
of 8 items). In production (4 items), the examiner asks
the patient to produce communicative acts accompanied by a specific emotion or mood. (iii) Acts characterized by a paralinguistic contradiction (assessed only
in comprehension, 4 items): the examiner shows the
patient short videotaped scenes where two agents are
engaged in a communicative interaction: the first agent
asks her partner a question, and the partner replies. The
act proffered by the agent contrasts with the paralinguistic indicators utilized in its production. The patient has
to understand the agent’s communicative effect on the
partner, detectable by the paralinguistic indicators.
Neuropsychological Test: Theory of Mind: Smarties
Task, Sally-Ann Task and a selection of Strange Stories,
excluding those that include communicative acts such as
metaphors, deceits and ironies. Planning Ability : Tower
of London Test. Memory Ability : Verbal and the Spatial
Span for working memory and Immediate and Deferred
Recall test for long-term verbal memory. Attentional
Ability : Trial Making test and Attentive Matrices.
Participants. Fifteen patients affected by traumatic
brain injury were recruited from a local residential mental health care establishment and their control group.
Patients had a mean age of 36;1 (ranging from 20 to
68) and a mean education of 10;2 years. 2 males and 13
females took part in the experiment. All subjects had to
pass several neuropsychological tests to rule out the possibility of being too seriously cognitively impaired. The
screening battery included the Mini-Mental State Examination, the Denomination scale of Aachener Aphasie
Test (AAT), the Elithorn Maze Test, the Token Test,
Praxis Tasks and Colored Progressive Matrices.
Results. Extralinguistic scale: As expected, patients show no differences when compared with the control group in the comprehension and production of standard communicative acts (T Test: .61 < t < 1.07; .3 <
p < .55) whereas they have more difficulties than normal
subjects in the comprehension and production of deceit
(T Test: t = 2.4; .02 < p < .03). Surprisingly they
show no difference in the comprehension and production of irony (T Test: .07 < t < 1.6; .14 < p < .5). In
the paralinguistic scale, patients show the same ability
as controls to comprehend and produce basic emotions
(T Test: .2 < t < 1.56; .13 < p < .84). Patients
have more difficulty than normal subjects both in the
comprehension and production of basic communicative
acts (T Test: t = 2.07; .04 < p < .05) and in the
comprehension of paralinguistic contradiction (T Test:
t = 2.1; p = .04). We observed differences between
the performance of patients and controls in theory of
mind, attentional abilities and long-term verbal memory (T Test: 6.88 < t < 6.9; p < .001), but not in
planning abilities (T Test: t = 1; p = .33) and working
memory (T Test: t = 1.72; p = .1).
Conclusions. According to our hypothesis the results show that CHI patients are capable of good extralinguistic performance in the comprehension and production of standard communicative acts but not in the
comprehension and production of deceit. Furthermore,
our results show that CHI patients exhibit poor paralinguistic performance in comprehension and production,
both in the comprehension and production of basic communicative acts and in the comprehension of paralinguistic contradictions. In contrast with our hypothesis
we did not find any difference in patients’ ability, when
compared with the control group, to comprehend and
produce irony or in their ability to comprehend and produce basic emotions.
References:
Airenti, G., Bara, B. G. & Colombetti, M. (1993). Cognitive Science, 17, 197–256.
Bara, B. G., Cutica, I. & Tirassa, M. (2001). Brain and
Language, 77, 72–94.
Bara, B. G., Tirassa, M. & Zettin, M. (1997). Brain and
Language, 59, 7–49.
19
McDonald, S. & Flanagan, S. (2004). Neuropsychology,
18, 572–579.
McDonald, S. & Van Sommers, P. (1993). Cognitive
Neuropsychology, 10, 297–315.
Mentis, M. & Prutting, C. A. (1987). Journal of Speech
and Hearing Research, 30, 88–98.
THE PROCESSING OF PROSODIC CUES TO GRAMMATICAL
CATEGORY DURING DICHOTIC LISTENING
Joanne Arciuli1 , Louisa M. Slowiaczek2
1
2
Charles Sturt University, Australia
Bowdoin College, USA
each target was presented to the alternate ear. In Experiment 1 naming times (Please say the word out loud
when you hear it) showed a significant typicality effect
in the left hemisphere with no corresponding typicality
effect in the right hemisphere. In Experiment 2 grammatical classification times (Is this word a noun or a
verb?) showed the same significant pattern of results.
There were no significant differences present in the error data of either experiment. These results indicate
that probabilistic prosodic cues do assist in the processing of nouns and verbs in English and that sensitivity
to stress typicality, in particular, is left lateralised. Interestingly, this pattern of results is demonstrated when
the task requires overt pronunciation (as in naming) but
also when no spoken output is required (as in grammatical classification). These results provide a challenge for
many current theories of spoken word recognition. It
would appear that that suprasegmental information is
likely to be represented l e x i c a l l y at the i n p u t
l e v e l and processed in the l e f t h e m i s p h e r e.
A connectionist model may explain ‘ b o o s t i n g ’ of
typically stressed words.
Several previous studies have indicated that, In English,
disyllabic nouns tend to have first syllable stress (e.g.,
ZEbra) while disyllabic verbs tend to have second syllable stress (e.g., exPLAIN). Such prosodic patterns
may have arisen because, in English, word order and
inflectional constraints impact on nouns and verbs in
different ways. Importantly, it has been shown that listeners are sensitive to these probabilistic prosodic cues in
that words with t y p i c a l prosodic patterns (i.e., disyllabic nouns with first syllable stress and disyllabic verbs
with second syllable stress) exhibit a processing advantage compared to words with atypical prosodic patterns
(disyllabic nouns with second syllable stress and disyllabic verbs with first syllable stress). However, it is not
clear how such cues are processed in the brain. It has
traditionally been thought that prosody is processed in
the right hemisphere. In contrast, more recent research
has suggested that prosodic processing of small linguistic units (as opposed to the processing of larger senReference:
tential units and/or the processing of affective prosody)
is, l e f t l a t e r a l i s e d. In two dichotic listening exArciuli, J., & Cupples, L. (2004). Effects of stress typiperiments we presented typically and atypically stressed cality during spoken word recognition by native and nonnadisyllabic English target words (from Arciuli & Cupples, tive speakers of English: Evidence from onset gating. Mem2004) to one or other ear while a reversed version of ory & Cognition, 32:1, 21–30.
COGNITIVE ASPECTS IN PSEUDO-NEGATIVE FACTORS: THEIR
CONTRASTS IN MEANINGS
Nami Arimitsu
Toyo University (Japan)
In this presentation paper, I aim to investigate the cognitive motivation for the meaning of pseudo-negative
factors in everyday language. Negation is a fundamental
function of our daily language. Direct negative markers
such as not or no function as a denial of an object
or actions. Simultaneously, we can also observe several
negative values through pseudo-negative factors in
various aspects of our speech. My aims are 1: to distinguish negation and negative value, 2: to display
the various pseudo-negative factors which convey negative value, and 3: to illustrate the cognitive motivation of pseudo-negative factors by using some cognitive
models. Negation and negative value are often mixed
up, and they are sometimes treated as a similar function,
but there may be a big difference between them. This
clarification will help us understand the ways in which
we use negation and negative value, and will reveal one
of the bases of our cognition. Number of the usages of
pseudo-negative factors are reflections our perceptions
of our world and environment. Pseudo-negative factors
are not always focused are often used to convey negative
values. However, thus far, their cognitive foundation
characteristics have not been adequately investigated.
This paper investigates the cognitive aspects of negative value that is expressed by pseudo-negative factors.
Negation functions as a denial. Typical positivenegative sentence pair is given below. The negative sentence contains a negative word such as no, not,
nothing, and never.
(1) a. Anna is Japanese. /b. Karen is not
Japanese.
20
Concerning negation, we can illustrate our cognition
through the image schema of in-out. This is evident from the views of Johnson (1987) and Langacker
(1991). Johnson (1987:40) avers that objects, events,
states, properties, relations, etc., are abstract containers. He states that negating some category of experience is equivalent to viewing it as being an outside of
the category. This view is consistent with that of Langacker (1991:132), who offers the following comments
on the phenomena of negation:In the terminology of
cognitive grammar, NEG is conceptually dependent, for
it makes salient (though schematic) internal reference
to the situation whose existence it denies. Also relevant is the dictum that existence is always existence in
some location, which suggests the corollary that nonexistence is always non-existence in some location. He
states, If the there-construction introduces some entity
into a mental space, perhaps the function of negation
is to specify its absence from such a space (e.g., from
present reality.) (ibid.:133) With this in mind, we can
investigate various pseudo-negative factors by drawing
attention to the relationship between our space cognition and negative values.
We can find negative values through the concept
of contrast. The basic concept of negation could be
stated as the contrast between X and NOT X(the
set theory and Venn diagrams). On the other hand,
negative values are based on a bipolar idea. For example, in-and out, high-and-low, long and short,
dead and alive, rich and poor etc., are pairs
that are strongly fixed and convey some positive-andnegative (sometimes reversal in their order) values. Yamanashi (2001a:120) classifies thecontrast by using the
idea of Containment (inside-outside, full-empty, etc.),
Boundedness (here-beyond, etc.) and Distance (nearfar, center-periphery, etc.), and also points out Spatial
Cognition: up-down, wide-narrow, long-short, in-out,
front-back, deep-shallow, straight-curve, far-near, leftright, high-low, thick-thin . . . Bodily Sensation: heavylight, tight-slack. . .
Five Senses: touch: warm-cold, hot-cold. . . sight:
bright-dark, black-white-gray, red, blue, yellow. . . taste:
sweet, spicy, bitter . . .
hearing: noisy-silent . . . smell: smelling . . . Athletic
Sensation: moving-stable, fast-slow . . . (Translation
mine) From this point of view, the sentences (2a) and
(3a) below can be given as an examples that convey the
negative value.
(2) a. The possibility is low/b. high/c. not
high./ d. There is no possibility.
(3) a. He is a shallow person/b. a deep
thinker/c. not a shallow person../ He does
not think much.
There are many other example that are based on
negative values in antonyms.
(4) His conduct was above/beyond reproach./ (5) He is above telling a lie.
(6) She has a short career. (Not long, a
small amount of something)
(7) He is the last person to tell a lie.
(8) Conditions are still far from ideal.
Also, I will focus on negative and pseudo-negative
factors in the form of affixes. Prefixes: un-, in-, non-,
dis-, a-, off-, semi-, half-, sub-, pseudo-, second-, Suffixes: -less, -free, etc., and show their space cognition
based foundations through image shemas.
In this paper, I investigate the cognitive orientation
of the negative values in pseudo-negative factors. I primarily focus on direct negative sentences, then indirect
negative sentences which do not have direct negative
markers such as not or no. We can observe negative values are based on our cognition of contrast and
opposition. I try to reconstruct pseudo-negative factors
in the field of cognitive study.
References:
Arimitsu, Nami, 2000. A Review on Negation in Positive Sentences. Linguistic Science, (KyotoUniv.) No.6,
pp. 41–60.
Arimitsu, Nami, 2003. Opposition, Indirect Negation
and Metonymic Principle. Kansai Linguistic Society, 23.
World OrCooper, W. and J. R. Ross, 1975.
der,Papers from the Parasession on Functionalism, pp.63–
111, Chicago: Chicago Linguistic Society.
Givón, Talmy, 1979. On Understanding Grammar. New
York: Academic Press.
Horn, Laurence R., 1989. A Natural History of Negation.
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Johnson, Mark, 1987. The Body in the Mind. Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press.
Lakoff, George and Mark Johnson. 1980. Metaphors We
Live By. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Langacker, Ronald W., 1991. Foundations of Cognitive
Grammar. Vol. 2, Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Sweetser, Eve E., 1990. From Etymology to Pragmatics.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Opposition as a
Voßhagen, Christian, 1999.
Metonymic Principle. Klaus-Uwe and Panther and Günter
Radden (eds.) Metonymy in Language and Thought,
pp.289–308, Amsterdam / Philadelphia: John Benjamins
Publishing Company.
Yamanashi, Masa-aki, 2000a. Ninchi Gengogaku Genri
(Principles of Cognitive Linguistics). Tokyo: Kuroshio Publishers.
Yamanashi, Masa-aki, 2000b. Negative Inference,
Space Construal, Grammaticalization. in L. R. Horn and
Y. Kato (eds.) Studies on Negation and Polarity, pp.243–
254, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
21
CONSIDERATIONS OF CONTEXT IN CONCEPTUAL
ACQUISITION: A RELEVANCE-THEORETIC PERSPECTIVE
Stavros Assimakopoulos
The University of Edinburgh (United Kingdom)
In the past two decades a great deal of research has
been instantiated by Relevance Theory, a groundbreaking theory of communication and cognition introduced
by Sperber and Wilson in the mid-eighties (1986). In
their attempt to roughly describe relevance as a central
cognitive property of human thinking, Sperber and Wilson approach relevance as a ratio of cognitive effects
and cognitive effort. They, then, put forth two principles of relevance that are psychologically indispensable in any treatment of cognition and communication.
Whereas their communicative principle of relevance has
been dealt with extensively in the relevant literature,
their cognitive principle has received comparatively minimal attention and remains a bold hypothesis the authors of Relevance make with a view to cognition:
The Cognitive Principle of Relevance:
Human cognition tends to be geared to the
maximization of relevance.
In this paper, I will try to add to the substance of
this hypothesis by making a case for the implications this
principle — within the whole picture of the framework
— carries for the acquisition and usage of conceptual
content.
In a bulk of argumentations, around the same time
of Relevance, Barsalou has presented an idea that has
been recently taken up by relevance theorists. His idea
of ad hoc conceptual categories (1987) has been extended to a notion of ad hoc communicated concepts
by Carston (2002). The relevance-theoretic account of
lexical meaning suggests that a lexical form maps to a
conceptual space in memory, the space that contains the
lexical, logical and encyclopaedic entries of a concept,
and the context provides the relevant encyclopaedic information that is attached to the communicated ad hoc
concept in a selective manner. For example, consider
the following utterance:
Mary wants to meet some bachelors.
that the context does play a role in the determination
of conceptual content in communication.
In the case of ad hoc concepts, Barsalou inspired relevance theorists to extend on his view that pragmatic
intrusions in the establishment of conceptual content
are more than merely incidental and in effect essential.
Against the same background, a large variety of research
conducted by Barsalou firmly supports a pragmaticallydriven view of concept formation and content. In this
paper, I will investigate further conclusions from Barsalou’s ongoing research. I will examine his view that
concepts contain perceptual symbols — by which what
is essentially meant is not perceptual per se but rather
experiential. In this account (as in Barsalou et.al. 1993
among others), Barsalou suggests that conceptual content is acquired and mentally stored always in context.
Leaving the question of whether perceptual content
is preferred over propositional content to the experts and
assuming a combination of both types in our cognitive
environment, I will analyse Barsalou’s assumptions from
a relevance-theoretic perspective. I will show that relevance considerations are central in the way we acquire
and use concepts and that the relevance heuristic alone
is adequate in order to address pragmatic intrusions in
both the acquisition and implementation of conceptual
content. I will, thus, try to give a potential answer to
the problem Carston herself posed with respect to ad
hoc concepts: how does a child acquire such an abstract entity as a schema or a pointer, something that
doesn’t play any role in her thoughts? (2002: 363–
364). In conjuction with Barsalou’s insights on perceptual symbols, I present an account of concept acquisition in which the process of storing information is
relevance-based, as the selection of frames that contain
this information is also relevance-based. What guides
both procedures is relevance consideration in a manner
Relevance Theory prescribes:
Check interpretive hypotheses in order of their accessibility, that is, follow a path of least effort, until
an interpretation which satisfies the expectation of relevance (i.e. yields enough cognitive effects) is found;
then stop.
To sum up, I will entertain the idea that context
is essential in concept acquisition and usage and pragmatic considerations as prescribed by the cognitive principle of relevance are central in all mental processing.
Conceptual content is, in this view, not static as theories of semantics would assume, but rather dynamic as
a psychologically realistic view of cognition prescribes.
The standard relevance-theoretic account would
suggest that what is communicated in this utterance
is a set of concepts, from which, if not all, the concept BACHELOR would be an ad hoc concept BACHELOR*. This move is justifiable by certain assumptions
communicated along with the utterance in the context
References:
of situation. From the point of view of Mary and our
knowledge about her, the ad hoc concept BACHELOR*
Barsalou, L. (1987) ‘The instability of graded structure:
refers to unmarried men who are eligible for marriage. Implications for the nature of Concepts’, in Neisser, U. (ed)
In this way, the Pope would not qualify as a bachelor Concepts and conceptual development: Ecological and intelthat Mary wants to meet. It is clear from this example lectual factors in categorization. Cambridge: CUP 101–140.
22
Barsalou, L., Yeh, W., Luka, B. J., Olseth, K. L.,
Mix, K. S., and Wu, L. (1993) ‘Concepts and meaning’, in
Beals, K., Cooke, G. Kathman, D. McCullough, K. E. Kita, S.
and Testen, D. (eds) Chicago Linguistics Society 29: Papers
from the parasession on conceptual representations (23–61).
University of Chicago: Chicago Linguistics Society 23–61.
Carston, R. (2002) Thoughts and utterances: The pragmatics of explicit communication. Oxford: Blackwell.
Sperber, D. and Wilson, D. (1986) Relevance: Communication and cognition (1995:2nd edition).Oxford: Blackwell.
A CORPUS-BASED APPROACH TO POLYSEMY: A CASE STUDY
Elisabeth Aubois
Université Bordeaux 3 (Paris, France)
The English verb make is usually regarded as a polysemeous verb with many distinct senses. The conceptual
framework of the make scenario — and thus the meaning of make — is apparently very different in make coffee, make war, make an appointment, make someone
happy and make someone do something. Since in many
dictionaries the first entry for make is close to the meaning of produce (in sentences such as She makes her
own clothes referring to direct manipulation), the linguist’s intuition might lead him/her to the conclusion
that this is the prototypical meaning of make.
Yet it is only a matter of intuition, and closer examination of the occurrences of make in corpus data
may lead to very different conclusions. Corpus linguistics quantitative methods highlight the fact that make
is much more often used in sentences in which the event
structure encodes a scenario of mental manipulation
rather than one of direct manipulation. Change of state
is also a recurrent feature of the make scenario. Nevertheless are corpus based approaches of any help to
determine if some meanings are more central or prototypical than others when one studies a polysemous verb
such a make?
References:
Aubois, Elisabeth. 2005. A Cognitive Approach to the
semantics of do and make. Presented at the inaugural Conference of the French Linguistics Association: From Gram
To Mind: Grammar as Cognition, Bordeaux, May 2005.
Aubois, Elisabeth. 2005. The Conceptual Framework of
the make-constructions. Presented at the 1st conference of
the UK Cognitive Linguistics Association: New Directions in
Cognitive Linguistics, Brighton, October 2005.
Gilquin, Gaëtanelle. 2004. Corpus-based cognitive study
of the main English causative verbs. A syntactic, semantic,
lexical and stylistic approach. Doctoral dissertation, Université Catholique de Louvain: Centre for English Corpus
Linguistics.
Gries, Stephan Th. and Anatol Stepanovitsch. 2005.
Corpus-based methods and cognitive semantics: The many
meanings of to run. In Corpora in Cognitive Linguistics:
The syntax-Lexis Interface. Berlin, Heidelberg, New York:
Mouton de Gruyter.
Kemmer, Suzanne. 2001. Causative constructions and
cognitive models: The Make Causative. Presented at the
first Seoul Conference on Discourse and Cognitive Linguistics: Perspective for the 21st Century, 803–846. Seoul: Discourse and Cognitive Linguistics Society of Korea.
Lakoff, George. 1987. Women, Fire, and Dangerous
Things, What categories Reveal about the Mind. Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press.
Langacker, Ronald W. 1987. Foundations of Cognitive
Grammar, vol. 1, Theoretical Prerequisites. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999.
Langacker, Ronald W. 1991. Foundations of Cognitive
Grammar, vol. 2, Descriptive Application. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999.
Lapaire, Jean-Rémi. 2002. The conceptual structure of
events: the go-, make and get-/give / have-scenarios. In
Anglophonia. French Journal of English Studies. Issue R12.
Toulouse: Presses Universitaires du Mirail.
Talmy, Leonard. 2000. Towards a Cognitive Semantics, vol.1, Concept and Structuring Systems. Cambridge:
M.I. T. Press. 2001.
Talmy, Leonard. 2000. Towards a Cognitive Semantics,
vol.2, Typology and Process in Concept Structuring. Cambridge: M.I. T. Press. 2001.
Taylor, John R. 2003. Cognitive Grammar. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
OPTIONAL DETERMINERS IN CHILD LANGUAGE AND
HEADLINES
Sergey Avrutin, Joke de Lange
tic properties of the nominal system (Chierchia, 1998).
At the same time, Stowell (1999), Avrutin (1999) and
Utrecht University (The Netherlands)
Schutze (1997) pointed out that such omissions are alChildren acquiring Dutch omit determiners more often, lowed in special registers, such as Headlines:
Kamer Verlengt Fiscale Regeling Voor Film Met Een
and for a longer period of time, than Italian children
Jaar
[Dutch]
of the same age although both languages require overt
Government
extends tax arrangement for film with
determiners in normal adult speech (e.g. Guasti et al
a
year
(3determiners
omitted)
2003). Various existing accounts suggest that the difference is based on differences in the morphosyntactic
system (Roeper and de Villiers, 1995) or on the seman-
23
• Why does it take longer for a Dutch child to reach
the adult stage w.r.t. determiner use?
Questions:
• Do Dutch and Italian headlines exhibit the same
differences as observed in child Dutch and Italian? Method:
CHILDES database (MacWhinney and Snow, 1985).
• What are the language specific properties that are 3 Italian, 3 Dutch children.
reflected in the cross-linguistic differences both in
Headlines: 3 Dutch, 2 Italian newspapers, 2000
child speech and the headlines?
headlines for each language.
Results:
Language
Determiners in Headlines
% produced
Determiners in child speech % produced
(example: Stage 2 from Guasti et al 2004)
Structurally correct use
of determiners, %
Dutch
Italian
12.9
72.1
46
83
100
100
Analyses:
1. We argue that in both languages children, at an
early age, possess grammatical knowledge of the determiner system, which is reflected in their correct use,
whenever a determiner is produced (e.g. correct structural position, presence of a nominal complement).
2. We propose a processing theory of complexity
that is based on the recent work on the application of
the information theory to lexical access (Baayen et al.
2004, Kostic 2003, Moscoso del Prado Martin, 2003).
We show how the rich morphosyntacic paradigm of Italian determiners increases their information load compared to Dutch (in the technical sense proposed in Shannon and Weaver 1948, Baayen et al 2004, see also Caramazza and Schiller 2003, among others). As the child
processing system takes some time to mature, elements
with a higher information load become available before
less informative elements, as confirmed by recent results
(e.g. Baayen et al 2004). Hence the difference between
Dutch and Italian child speech production.
3. The same explanation holds for special registers
(e.g. headlines) where the amount of information determines which elements are more likely to be omitted
in order to facilitate processing of the entire utterance
(e.g. Kostic et al, 2003).
4. In our presentation we further discuss the role
of the structural position (e.g. subject vs. object, the
role of the left periphery (Rizzi 1997, Cinque 1990) for
the possibility of omissions, both for child language and
headlines, as also observed in Stowell (1999).
Figure 1
Delimiter Production In Dutch and Italian Headlines
and Child Speech
100
80
60
40
20
0
000000
111111
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Dutch
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Italian
00
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0000000000000000000000
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000
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0000000000000000000000
1111111111111111111111
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0000
0000000000000000000000
1111111111111111111111
0000000000000000000000
1111111111111111111111
11111
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00000
11111
00
00000 11
11111
00
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00
11
00
11
Headlines
Child Speech
<.0001 p<.0001
References:
Baayen, R. H., Levelt W. J.M., Haverman A., Desserjer G. (2004) Producing singular and plural nouns: evidence
for morphological paradigms, ms. Max Planck Institute for
Psycholinguistics, Nijmegen
Caramazza A., Schiller N. O. (2003) Grammatical Feature Selection in Noun Phrase production, Journal of Memory and Language, 48, (2003) 169–194
Cinque, Guiglielmo (1990) Types of Ā -dependencies,
MIT Press, Cambridge.
Guasti M. T., Gavarro A. (2003) Article Omission across
Child Languages and across Special Registers, to appear in
Proceedings GALA 2003.
Kostic, A. (2003) The effects of the amount of information on processing of inflected morphology, manuscript
submitted for publication, University of Belgrade
24
Rizzi, L. (1997) ‘The Fine Structure of the Left Periphery, in L. Haegeman (ed.), Elements of Grammar, Kluwer,
Dordrecht.
Schütze, C. T. (1997) INFL in Child and Adult Language:
Agreement, case and licensing, MIT Ph.Ddissertation, MITworking papers in Linguistics,
Shannon, C. E., Weaver W. (1948) The mathematical
theory of communication, Bell System Technical Journal 27,
379–423
Stowell T. (1999) Words lost and Syntax Found in Headlines, talk presented at York University November 24, 1999.
NEURONAL SYSTEMS INVOLVED IN SPATIAL MEMORY
Alexander S. Batuev1 ,
Denis N. Artchacov2
1
2
St.Petersburg State University (Russia)
Helsinki State University (Finland)
Unit activity of the monkey’s association cortical area
studied during performance of the delayed spatial choice
allowed us to work out a hypothesis as to the neuronal
systems underlying operative memory. One of them
is based on the principle of the relay-race reverberation.The presentation of the cue elicits the activity of
the population of spatially selective sensory neurons.
By the delay (i.e.operative memory) this information
is transferred to the neurons of SM. Within the delay drief bursts of discharges are observed during which
several populations of cells are involved, one by one,
into the reverberating activity. After this delay, impulsation is transferred to another neuronal ciruits related
to the preparation of a goal-directed movement(neurons
of motor programmes).
Another neuronal system serves to ensure the reability of these transition processes, i.e. (1)information
transfer from sensory neurons to the neurons of SM and
further to the neurons of motor programmes,(2) fixation
of the entire period of the operative memory without the
relay-race reverberation,(3)storing of the information in
the activitry of one neuronal population up to the point
when the goal-directed movement is performed.
Representation of these systems in the prefrontal
and parietal cortex is different. The first system provides an input into the operative memory of the spatiotemporal, signaling and programming features of the
forthcoming movement, while the second system is used
for external (signal) and internal (programming) information which is stored in the same neuronal networks
starting the cue onset.
NEUROPRAGMATICS: BEHAVIOURAL AND NEUROIMAGING
EVIDENCE FOR COMMUNICATIVE INTENTIONS
Bruno G. Bara
terior paracingulate cortex is not necessarily involved
in the understanding of other people’s intentions per
University and Polytechnic of Turin (Italy)
se, but primarily in the understanding of the intentions
Human beings are genetically designed in order to max- of people involved in social interaction (Walter et al,
imize their capacity for social interaction. At birth 2004). Moreover, this brain region showed activation
they already possess complex primitives (like shared- when a represented intention implies social interaction
ness) which allow them to master communication far and therefore had not yet actually occurred. This result
suggests that the anterior paracingulate cortex is also
beyond other animals’ ability.
The most important primitive for communication is involved in our ability to predict future intentional socommunicative intention, which may be formally defined cial interaction, based on an isolated agent’s behaviour.
We conclude that distinct areas of the neural system
as follows:
underlying theory of mind are specialized in processing
CINTA, B p=INTA SharedB, A (p∧CINTA, B p)
distinct classes of intentions, among which there is comA has the communicative intention that p towards B municative intention with its distinctive features.
(CINTAB p) when A intends (INTA ) that the following
two facts be shared by B and herself (SharedBA ): that
References:
p, and that she intended to communicate to B that p
Bara B. G. (2006). Cognitive Pragmatics: Mental pro(CINTAB p).
cesses of communication. MIT Press, Boston, MA.
The developmental evidence of communicative inTomasello M., Carpenter M., Call J., Behne T., Moll H.
tention as primitive is that 9-months-old children per(2005). Understanding and sharing intentions: the origins
form communication acts like declarative pointing. I.e., of cultural cognition. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 28:5,
they are able to express the intention of sharing an ac- 675–691
tion / object between the self and the other (Tomasello
Walter H., Adenzato M., Ciaramidaro A., Enrici I.,
et al., 2005).
Pia L., Bara B. G. (2004). Understanding intentions in soThe neuroimaging evidence consists in a series of cial interaction: the role of anterior paracingulate cortex.
fMRI experiments, where we demonstrated that the an- Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 16:10, 1854–1863.
25
MODALITY-DRIVEN VERSUS MODALITY-NEUTRAL FEATURES
OF DEVELOPING TEXT CONSTRUCTION ACROSS
ADOLESCENCE
Ruth A. Berman, Bracha Nir-Sagiv
Tel Aviv University (Israel)
There is a rich research tradition analyzing language
in the written compared with spoken modality, initially
with mainly pedagogic concern (e.g., Bushnell, 1930;
Lull, 1929), subsequently with more directly linguistic motivations (e.g., DeVito, 1967; Drieman, 1962).
Current comparisons of the two modalities undertaken
from different perspectives include Biber’s (1986, 1988)
corpus linguistics analyses of textual dimensions; Halliday’s (1989) notions of linguistic complexity; communicatively oriented discourse studies (e.g., Chafe, 1994;
Tannen, 1984), and psychologically driven concern with
the conceptual impact of writing and reading (Olson,
1994) or the nature of the cognitive processes and the
mental representations involved in speaking and writing
(Bourdin & Fayol, 1994; Cleland & Pickering, in press).
Developmental analyses in this domain have concerned
mainly writing as a notational system (Gillis & Ravid,
2001; Pacton & Fayol, 2004), on the one hand, and online processes of spoken compared with written language
output, on the other (e.g., Strömqvist et al, 2004).
The present study seeks to contribute to research in
the psycholinguistics of text construction by examining
the impact of modality on text construction. Underlying the study are the assumptions that (1) modality
will affect the how rather than the what of text production and that (2) written language may be harder in
terms of product, but easier in terms of processing.
We compare personal-experience narratives produced in both speech and writing by schoolchildren,
adolescents, and adults, native speakers of two typologically different languages (Californian English and Israeli
Hebrew). The study departs from previous research in
several ways. First, we deliberately compare texts produced in the two modalities along several dimensions
which, to the best of our knowledge, are generally not
considered in tandem: (1) linguistic expression in the
domains of the lexicon, clause-level syntax, and clause
linkage; (2) types of referential information; and (3)
global text organization. Second, our study has recourse
to a large data-base of authentic, specially elicited
narratives (320 texts in all), where the same subject
produced both a written and a spoken text across the
sample (Berman, 2005). Third, the study concerns language development from middle childhood, across adolescence, and into adulthood.
Our analyses involve a wide range of measures across
later language development in order to tease apart features of text construction that contrast as a function
of modality, and hence can be construed as modalitydriven, compared with those that appear modality-
neutral and are relatively indifferent to whether the
text was produced in speech or writing. To this end,
we investigate (1) linguistic features that we assume
will differ as a function of modality: register (level of
usage), word length, lexical density, noun phrase structure, and syntactic voice; (2) types of discourse content and referential information (Berman, 1997) that
are genre-dependent, but assumed to be neutral across
the two modalities; (3) overall organization of information, including text length, clause combining, and global
text structure (Berman & Nir-Sagiv, submitted), again
assumed to remain constant across modalities; and (4)
different types of discourse markers, some of which
will be typical of the spoken modality, whereas others
will occur in both speech and writing (Ravid & Berman,
in press).
We selected personal-experience narratives, since
prior research has shown these to be readily accessible to
analysis along the various dimensions we wish to investigate, in contrast to, say, expository texts (Berman &
Nir-Sagiv, 2004; Berman & Katzenberger, 2004). In
addition to the underlying assumptions noted above,
we make the following predictions: (1) Developmentally, we expect to find modality-driven differences from
the youngest age-group (9 to 10 years), but written
language as a special style of discourse (Ravid &
Tolchinsky, 2002) will consolidate only by high school
age; (2) Cross-linguistically, we expect to find the same
general trends in both languages, but owing to sociolinguistic rather than typological or cognitive factors,
Hebrew speaker-writers may differentiate more markedly
between the two modalities than their English-speaking
peers. (3) We expect to be able to define a cline
of modality-driven to modality-neutral factors ranging
from usage-based features (discourse markers and linguistic register) at the one end via means of local linguistic expression in lexicon and syntax to informational
content and overall discourse structure, at the other.
References:
Berman, R. A. (1997). Narrative theory and narrative
development: The Labovian impact. Journal of Narrative
and Life History 7, Special Issue: 235–244.
Berman, R. A. (2005). Introduction: Developing discourse stance in different text types and languages. Journal
of Pragmatics, 37, 2, 105–124.
Berman, R. A. & Katzenberger, I. (2004). Form and
function in introducing narrative and expository texts: A
developmental perspective. Discourse Processes 38, 57–94.
Berman, R. A. & Nir-Sagiv, B. (2004). Linguistic indicators of inter-genre differentiation in later language development. Journal of Child Language 31, 334–380.
Berman, R. A., Nir-Sagiv, B. (under review). Comparing expository and narrative text construction across adolescence: Developmental paradoxes.
26
Biber, D. (1986). Spoken and written textual dimensions
in English: Resolving the contradictory findings. Language
62 (2), 384–414.
Biber, D. (1988). Variation across speech and writing.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Bourdin, B., & Fayol, M. (1994). Is written language
production more difficult than oral language production? A
working memory approach. International Journal of Psychology, 29, 591–620.
Bushnell, P. P. (1930) An analytic contrast of oral with
written language. Teachers College Contributions to Education No. 451.
Chafe, W. (1994). Discourse, consciousness, and time:
The flow and displacement of conscious experience in speaking and writing. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Cleland, A. A., & Pickering, M. J. (in press). Do writing
and speaking employ the same syntactic representations?
DeVito, J. A. (1967). Levels of abstraction in spoken and
written language. Journal of Communication 17, 354–61.
Drieman, G. H. (1962). Differences between written and
spoken language. Acta Psychologica 20, 36–58.
Gillis, S. & Ravid, D. (2001). Language-specific effects
on developing written morphology. In Morphology 2000,
S. Bendjaballah, W. U. Dressler, & M. Voeikova, eds. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
Halliday, M. A. K. (1989). Spoken and written language.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lull, H. C. (1929). The speaking and writing abilities of
intermediate grade pupils. Journal of Educational Resources
20, 73–77.
Olson, D. R. (1994). The world on paper: The conceptual and cognitive implications of writing and reading.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Pacton, S & Fayol, M. (2004). Learning to spell in a
deep orthography: The case of French. In: R. A. Berman
(ed.) Language development across childhood and adolescence. Amsterdam: John Benjamins
Ravid, D. & Berman, R. A. (in press). Information density in the development of spoken and written narratives in
English and Hebrew. Discourse Processes.
Ravid, D. & Tolchinksy, L. (2002). Developing linguistic
literacy: A comprehensive model. Journal of Child Language, 29, 417–447.
Strömqvist, S., Nordqvist, Å., & Wengelin, Å (2004).
Writing the frog story: Developmental and cross-modal perspectives. In S. Strömqvist & L. Verhoeven (eds.), Relating
events in narrative: Typological and contextual perspectives,
359–394. Mahwah NJ: Erlbaum.
Tannen, D. (1984). Coherence in spoken and written
discourse. Norwood, NJ: Ablex.
THE ECOLOGY OF MYTH. TOWARDS UNDERSTANDING THE
PSYCHOLOGICAL FUNCTION OF COSMOGONIC NARRATIVES
Norbert Bischof
University of Munich (Germany)
Myths have two surprising properties: (1) continual oral
transmission notwithstanding, they are remarkably able
to retain their content; (2) they emerge independently
in astoundingly similar form all over the world. Like
biological organs such as an eye or a wing, they seem
to have successfully adapted to some ecological niche.
We may assume that this niche has something to do
with the human condition, since it is human subjects
who listen to, memorize, and propagate mythological
narratives. Particularly, I wish to argue that the ecology of myth is the constitutionally unstable system of
human motives, drives, and emotions which requires organization and guidance by a suitable cognitive frame
of reference, and selects mythical ideas as far as they
are fit to fulfil this function.
Unfortunately, the moral guidance provided by myth
is based on a view of the world that is inconsistent with
our modern scientific understanding of nature. Obviously, this conflict could only develop because myth and
science took it for granted that they deal with one-andthe-same world. However, the scientific notion of
a physical cosmology reaching from the Big Bang to
Heat Death is only one particular way of interpreting
the term genesis. There is a world emerging and
unfolding wherever an individual consciousness comes
into existence, and its development reaches from the
first dawning of self-awareness via the cognitive and
emotional phase transitions of childhood and adolescence up to the end of personal life. Cosmogonic myths
like, e.g., the biblical creation histories, whilst appearing
naive and anachronistic when played off against Copernicus or Darwin, turn out to be correct down to the detail, albeit temporally misdated, when read as symbolic
recollections of those stages of mental development.
Certainly it has never been the function of myth to
interpret the ontogenesis of consciousness. What disquieted mankind has always been the question of origin
and durability of the objective foundations of our existence. However, as long as natural science did not
know better, the dim recollection of our own mental
ontogeny almost inevitably also became the source of
a meaningful cosmogony. Re-establishing the psychogenetic veridicality of myth will of course not restore
its previous power as a cognitive framework for a meaningful life. Enervated in a hopeless struggle with scientific criticism, it can survive in its ecological niche only
in degenerate form. Surrogates of mythoid nature, in
particular political ideologies, take over its functionality
and exert devastating effects on the affective stability
of those colonized by them.
27
THEORY OF MIND AND MENTAL TIME TRAVEL: SPECIFICALLY
HUMAN ABILITIES
Doris Bischof-Köhler
University of Munich (Germany)
The inventory of specifically human abilities has undergone a severe revision during the last decades. Concerning cognition, there has been an upsurge of enthusiasm
about animal skills. Little remains for humans to be
proud of in this area. Impressive as the evidence is, often overlooked is the fact that behaviors that seem similar from their outward appearance may rely on mechanisms of different complexity. A comparable trend is
present in Developmental Psychology. There, too, is
a tendency to attribute complex competences to small
infants in order to explain the social skills they demonstrate. Simpler mechanisms may apply here as well. A
phylogenetic analysis of how cognition and motivation
evolved will help to provide parsimonious explanations
and increase our understanding of how more complex
capacities emerged from simpler ones.
A thorough analysis of the evidence in question suggests a differentiation between two evolutionary steps
of human cognition. The first step led to the ability to
represent reality on an imaginary basis, in addition to
perceptive representation. Evidence indicates that this
capacity first manifests itself on the level of the great
apes. Imagery allows for symbolic representation and
for mental simulation in problem solving. It is also prerequisite for a rudimentary self-representation. The
cognitive mechanisms allowing to identify oneself with
one’s own mirror-image appear to pave the way for empathic identification with others as well. Again, it is at
the ape level that animals begin to vicariously experience others’ intentions and to understand the subjective
state of conspecifics. The second step, responsible for
the transition to human-specific cognition, is characterized by time representation and the ability to reflect
upon mental states (theory of mind). Both abilities enable humans to go on a mental time travel,
that is, to represent oneself at every possible instant in
the past and in the future and to imagine the desires
and motives at each of those instants independently of
one’s present motivational state. Mental time travel has
fundamental implications for the organization of action,
most importantly, for planning of the future and recapitulation of the past.
Both evolutionary steps can also be taken as developmental transition markers in ontogeny. First, the onset of imagery emerges in the middle of the second year
when toddlers become capable of mental problem solving. Simultaneously, toddlers start learning a language,
understand the symbolic character of representations,
recognize themselves in a mirror, and change their sharing of other’s emotions from mere contagion to true
empathizing. We could show in experiments with 126
children that only children who recognized themselves
demonstrated emotional concern when confronted with
a person in need by offering consolation. Children who
still took their mirror image for a playmate stayed indifferent in this situation. The second transition begins in
the fourth year with the onset of a theory of mind. In
our investigations on 170 three- to five-year-olds, theory of mind correlated highly with the development of
time representation. Also demonstrated were the consequences of these two abilities on the organization and
planning of actions. As soon as children were competent
in both abilities, they could go on time travel. They
were able to delay gratification, to arrange conflicting
desires in a temporal order, and to plan for future needs.
DEVELOPMENT OF EMOTIONAL TALK — A CONSTRUCTIONIST
ACCOUNT
Péter Bodor
ELTE University (Budapest, Hungary)
The paper is devoted to analysing the development of
emotion talk empirically, on the background of a social constructionist account on emotions (Coulter, 1979;
Averill, 1980, 1986, 1992; Harré, 1986). It presents
a detailed CHILDES (MacWhinney, 2000) based case
study on the emergence of three types of lexical emotion markers as they occur in a child’s and his caregiver’s
talk: words referring to emotional display, such as cry or
smile, words conveying the subjective experiential constituent of emotions, such as feel, and emotion words
proper, such as happy or sad. Although frequency data
is relied on to establish certain developmental tendencies, the paper’s general character is rather qualitative
and exploratory than quantitative and explanatory. The
main reason for this is that, in my view, the theoretical
concerns regarding a developmental social constructionist stance towards emotions (Bodor, 1997, 2004) are
not so much to be taken as explaining reality, i.e. data,
rather, the most they can do is to help us to understand
better what is the case. This attitude is taken both in
treating and interpreting data against the background
of available conceptual analysis.
References:
Averill, James R. (1980) A Constructivist View of Emotion. In: Plutchik, Robert and Kellerman, Henry (eds.)
Emotion: Theory, Research and Experience. Vol. 1. Theories of Emotion. New York: Academic Press. pp. 305–341.
pp. 98–120.
Averill, James R. (1992) William James’s Other The-
28
ory of Emotion. In: Donnely, M. E. (ed.) Reinterpreting
the Legacy of William James. Washington, D. C.: American
Psychological Association. pp. 221–229.
Bodor, Péter (1997) On the usage of emotional language: A developmental view of the tip of an iceberg. In:
Niemeier, Susanne and Dirven, René (eds.) The Language
of Emotions: Conceptualization, expression, and theoretical
foundation. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. pp. 195–208.
Bodor, Péter (2004) On Emotions: A Developmentel
Social Constructionist Account. Budapest: L’Harmattan.
Coulter, Jeff (1979) The Social Construction of Mind.
Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield.
Harré, Rom (ed.) (1986): The Social Construction of
Emotions. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
MacWhinney, Brian (2000) The CHILDES project:
Tools for analyzing talk. Third Edition. Mahwah, NJ.:
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
THE RUSSIAN BLUES: EFFECTS OF LANGUAGE ON PERCEPTION
Lera Boroditsky, Jonathan Winawer, and
Nathan Witthoft
Stanford University (Stanford, USA)
Does the language you speak affect the way you perceive the world? Are even low-level cognitive processes,
such as the way we perceive and process colors subject
to linguistic shaping? The idea that the way we perceive the world is shaped by the languages we speak is
most closely associated with the writings of Benjamin
Lee Whorf (1956). Whorf’s ideas have generated much
interest and controversy, with much of the empirical
work focusing on color perception.
Different languages divide the color spectrum differently; does this lead speakers of different languages
to actually perceive colors differently? For example,
English has a color category blue. Unlike English,
Russian makes an obligatory distinction between lighter
blues (‘goluboy’) and darker blues (‘siniy’). There is no
single generic word for blue in Russian that can be
used to describe all of the colors covered by the English
term blue (nor to adequately translate the title of
this paper from English to Russian, for that matter).
Does this difference between the languages lead Russian and English speakers to perceive colors differently?
In particular, does having to make a distinction between lighter and darker blues in language cause Russian speakers to perceive lighter and darker blues as
being more different from one another than they would
appear to an English speaker?
Early studies comparing speakers of different languages claimed no differences in color perception (Heider, 1972), but recent cross-linguistic studies (Davidoff et al., 1999) as well as studies of categorical learning (Goldstone, 1994) have claimed that linguistically
learned categories can indeed affect people’s perceptions
of colors and shapes.
In a set of studies comparing English and Russian
speakers’ color perception we discovered that language
can play a role even in rather simple perceptual decisions
(e.g., deciding which two of a triad of simultaneously
presented color patches are physically identical). In
these tasks, we found that having a language-specified
category boundary in color space makes it easier to make
discriminations that span the linguistic boundary, but
that this advantage can be erased with verbal interference. The same findings hold for English speakers tested
across the English blue / green boundary. It seems that
categories enshrined in language can and do meddle in
relatively simple perceptual tasks.
However, this is not true for all perceptual tasks. For
example, the ability to detect an edge between abutting
squares of color does not appear to differ as a function
of language or verbal interference. The pattern that has
emerged across many different tasks is that the longer
or more difficult a perceptual decision, the more likely
that there will be a measurable involvement of language.
Perhaps because it takes time for perceptual information to be passed on to higher-level processing areas
(where helpful or confusing linguistic information might
be available) and for any decisions or directives to be
passed back down again to bias a response, language
will only be able to play a role in sufficiently difficult
(sufficiently long) perceptual tasks. In an ongoing set
of studies we are parametrically manipulating perceptual
task difficulty to test this explanation.
In addition to work on color perception, I will also
discuss a number of our other findings of cross-linguistic
differences in the perception of shape, objects, space,
causality, time, and the structure of events between
speakers of different languages (including Russian, English, Spanish, Dutch, German, Indonesian, Hebrew,
and Kuuk Thaayorre).
29
ATTENTION AND AUTOMATICITY IN ADULT PERFORMANCE
ON THE RAPID AUTOMATIZED NAMING (RAN) TASK:
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN READING
FLUENCY AND RAN TASK PERFORMANCE
Evgueni Borokhovski,
Norman Segalowitz,
Anna Sokolovskaya,
Christina Tapler
Concordia University (Montréal, Canada)
Introduction. Can measures of cognitive processing efficiency predict reading fluency? In the case of children
learning to read, this question has obvious practical significance; it is useful to know which children are likely to
develop reading fluency problems before they occur. In
the case of adults, it is also useful to know whether low
levels of reading fluency are due to particular cognitive
factors. One widely used test of cognitive processing
efficiency on which performance is found to be associated with reading skill is the Rapid Automatized Naming (RAN) Task (Denckla & Rudel, 1976). This task
requires people to name aloud, as quickly as possible,
50 stimuli (composed of a repeated set of either letters,
digits, color patches or pictures of objects) arranged in
5 rows of 10 items each. Total time to name the stimuli
is used as a predictor of reading fluency. The research
presented here investigated some of the cognitive demand characteristics of the RAN task with respect to
its association with reading fluency in adults.
For more than three decades, empirical research
has demonstrated the RAN task’s diagnostic value.
The link between RAN and reading has been studied
cross-sectionally, longitudinally, and in cross-language
comparisons using languages with degrees of different
grapheme-phoneme mapping transparency (e.g., English, relatively opaque; Spanish relatively transparent).
The results of such studies led Wolf and Bowers to formulate the so-called double deficit hypothesis (Wolf &
Bowers, 1999; Wolf, Bowers, & Biddle, 2000). This hypothesis states that naming speed, as measured by RAN
task performance, is independent of phonological awareness, another strong and reliable predictor of reading
outcomes. The hypothesis further claims that impairment in both naming speed and phonological awareness
can result in the most severe cases of developmental
dyslexia. For this reason, RAN is used as a predictor of
reading development.
Despite the large number of studies using the RAN
task, the cognitive factors underlying its predictive
power for reading outcomes remains largely an enigma.
Most researchers have agreed that the RAN task works,
but they are still uncertain about why or how (Savage,
2004). The present study attempted to address this
issue.
In particular, the study focused whether, as is usually
assumed, the RAN task assesses the automatic nature
of rapid processing believed to underlie fluent reading
or whether the task measures instead attention capacity and efficient management of attentional resources.
Some recent research findings from others (Stringer,
Toplak & Stanovich, 2004) and from our own lab indicate that attention rather than automaticity is the
essential element in RAN task performance. Two experiments make up the present study.
In Experiment 1, 68 adult first language readers of
English were given a test of reading fluency, different
versions of the RAN task, tests of automatic processing
and tests of attention capacity. In Experiment 2, 16
participants from the original sample were given additional tests of the RAN task modified to address specific
questions about possible cognitive processing mechanisms implicated in RAN task performance. These experiments are described more fully below.
Experiment 1. In this experiment there were 68
adult participants (Mean age = 25.3 years). They performed a task designed in our laboratory to measure
reading fluency (reading rate), the Trail Making test
of attention control, two tests of automatic processing
(one based on a test of ballistic or unstoppable processing used by Neely, 1977, and the other of processing efficiency modeled after Segalowitz & Segalowitz, 1993),
and four standard versions of the RAN task (using letter,
digit, objects, colors as stimuli). A series of multiple regression analyses (N=68) revealed that performance on
the attention task accounted for a significant proportion of unique variance (17.4%) in RAN performance
for naming objects (β=.438, p<.001) and a nearly significant proportion (5.0%) for naming letters (β=.234,
p=.067), whereas automaticity measures did not. RAN
performance with letters and digits was significantly associated with reading fluency (r =.44, p<.001; r =.37,
p=.002, respectively) but not with pictures and colors.
Experiment 2. The aim of this experiment was
to assess the contribution of two factors inherent in
the RAN task, as used in Experiment 1, to the RANreading fluency association. One factor was set size;
some stimuli came from a smaller potential set than did
others (e.g., letters of the alphabet versus all possible
picturable objects). The other factor was the special attention demands inherent in the RAN task (e.g., keeping
one’s eye on the correct row of stimuli; taking advantage
of peripheral vision to anticipate the upcoming stimulus, etc.). Experiment 2 investigated the role of stimulus
set size and attention demands by systematically varying
these factors.
Participants were 16 individuals who had taken part
in Experiment 1. They were given eight new versions of
30
the RAN task, modified as follows. In each case there
were five stimuli used repeatedly in the 50-item matrix
of stimuli to be named. The stimuli used were either
symbolic (letters) or non-symbolic (pictures). The sets
from which the stimuli were drawn were either relatively
small or large (vowels versus consonants; animals versus all possible objects). The attention demands were
either low (press a button after naming the last stimulus
in a line) or high (press a button after naming a stimulus occurring after another specific stimulus). These
conditions were combined into a 2×2×2 fully counterbalanced design.
Naming times for the eight conditions were entered into 2×2×2 repeated measures ANOVA. The
analysis revealed significant main effects for stimulus
type (F =94.75, p<.001) and attention load (F =43.25,
p<.001), with faster naming of symbolic stimuli and
faster naming under the low attentional demand condition. Reading fluency measures, obtained for these
participants as part of Experiment 1, were submitted to a correlation analysis with performance on the
more demanding of the two attention tasks. RAN task
performance correlated significantly with reading time
(r =.476, p=.027), suggesting that attention control is
important for both reading and RAN performance.
Conclusions. The results from both experiments
converge on the conclusion that attention, not automaticity, is the factor that underlies performance on the
RAN task and that explains its relationship to reading
fluency.
References:
Denckla, M. B., & Rudel, R. G. (1976). Neuropsychologia, 14, 471–479.
Neely, J. (1977). Journal of Experimental Psychology:
General, 106, 226–254.
Savage, R. (2004). Reading and Writing, 17, 301–324.
Segalowitz, N., & Segalowitz, S. (1993). Applied Psycholinguistics, 14, 369–385.
Stringer, R. W., Toplak, M. E., & Stanovich, K. E.
(2004). Reading and Writing: An Interdisciplinary Journal,
17, 891–914.
Wolf, M., & Bowers, P. (1999). Journal of Educational
Psychology, 91, 1–24.
Wolf, M., Bowers, P., & Biddle, K. (2000). Journal of
Learning Disabilities, 33, 387–407.
(MIS)PERCEIVING THE IMPACT OF EPILEPSY UPON
CHILDREN’S NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL, SOCIAL AND ACADEMIC
FUNCTIONING: A Q-SORT ANALYSIS
Smaranda Boroş, Laura Petra
Babes-Bolyai University (Cluj Napoca, Romania)
Childhood epilepsy is one of the most prevalent neurological conditions in the developing years, with reported rates of 3.6 to 4.2 per 1000 for children in developed countries (Sidenvall et al., 1996), and approximately double rates in developing countries (Christianson et al., 2000). A diagnosis of epilepsy is an insufficient premise for any inference to be made regarding a specific pattern of neuropsychological dysfunction, yet the same diagnosis seems to be an accurate
predictor of cognitive and academic difficulties in the
case of childhood epilepsy (Petra & Benga, 2004). One
of the contributing factors that could account for this
discrepancy between cognitive-behavioral potentialities
and their actual manifestations is circumscribed by the
notion of stigma (Goffman, 1963), which appears to be
one of the most important factors that influence the
impact of epilepsy upon the individual and the family
(Baker, 2002). Several instruments have been developed in order to measure various aspects in the perception of childhood epilepsy as reported by caregivers and
in the general society: health-related quality of life —
for epilepsy (Ronen et al., 2003), social stigma (Stigma
Scale of Epilepsy, Fernandes et al., 2004), self-efficacy
(Seizure Self-Efficacy Scale for Children, Caplin et al.,
2002), parenting difficulties (Parenting Process Questionnaire — Epilepsy, Hoghughi & Nuttycombe, 2005),
etc. Unfortunately, the instruments usually address the
components in the mental representation of this disorder
in a dissociated manner (for an exception see Camfield
et al., 2003), while it has been observed in interviews
that this representation is more unitary and it might
be artificial to disentangle various components at neuropsychological, social or academic levels. Moreover,
there is a clear distinction between knowledge (or lack
of it) concerning various aspects of epilepsy and the attitudes related to its consequences (Siddarth et al., 2005;
Mirnics et al., 2001).
We propose a novel approach in order to investigate the mental representation of the consequences of
epilepsy, relying on Q methodology, term that circumscribes both a data collection (Q-sorting) and a data
analysis technique (Q-factor analysis). The core distinction from classical research methods in social sciences
resides in the fact that this method analyses / correlates people instead of variables, thus building typologies
(Stephenson, 1935, 1953). Q-methodology is qualitative through its assumptions and the logic of research,
and quantitative through the statistical apparatus sustaining data analysis (Q-factor analysis) (Brown, 1993).
Its main asset lies in pointing out the elements that constitute the concourse or the relevant discourse of a
community, namely the sum of all statements that circumscribe a certain topic in that population’s opinion.
A community’s concourse is extracted from individual
or group interviews with members of the community. It
31
is from this concourse that the statements for the Qsort procedure are chosen. The sample of statements is
constructed based on Fisherian principles of experimental design, by picking, as much as possible, statements
for all the modalities of the involved variables. A certain situation must be judged by the people directly
immersed in it; respondents do not make judgments on
a situation that has been created by a researcher, according to a theory, but on their lived situation (Boroş,
2005). The factors obtained in a Q-analysis of the Qsort represent typologies of similar thinking They do not
offer information on how these typologies are numerically represented in the general population. This is why
the subjects sampling is based on qualitative principles
(e.g., to represent different parties that have to do with
a certain situation, different perspectives on it).
This study is a part of a larger ongoing research
project that aims to elaborate more ecological instruments in order to assess the direct and indirect perception of the consequences of a diagnosis of epilepsy by
the child, the parent and the community. According to
the general principles of Q-methodology, we first conducted semi-structured interviews regarding the perception of children with epilepsy; these interviews involved
professionals, parents of children with epilepsy (recently
diagnosed or diagnosed a long time ago) as well as parents of children without clinical disturbances. The interviews tackled 3 main domains: the children’s (perceived) neuropsychological functioning, their academic
performance and their social interactions. For each dimension, two types of statements were included: practical knowledge (both true or false) and stigma statements. The interviews were transcribed verbatim and
several statements were extracted by the interviewer and
validated as relevant by the respondents.
The emerging Q-sort is being completed (currently)
by 22 respondents: professionals, parents of children
with epilepsy and parents of normal children of different
social and educational backgrounds. The statements
from the interviews remained in the same formulation
as they were primarily issued by the respondents, they
were not modified according to the requirements of testitems formulations. People who complete the Q-sort
position these statements in a forced-choice ranking according to their preference / degree of accord with the
statements.
The results will constitute the Q-factors, representing typologies of perceiving children with epilepsy.
These typologies will reflect patterns of thinking, comprising the combination of statements and dimensions
as they appear in reality, in people’s complex judgments,
and not clustered on theoretical basis. Further on, we
shall elaborate on these primary results and analyze
the respondents’ loadings on certain factors, procedure
that will allow us to elaborate some hypothesis regarding the differences between their perceptions, related to
their socio-demographic data (personal and professional
background, as well as their direct contact with children
with epilepsy).
The results of our research will help us elaborate a
more ecological measurement tool, as reflected by the
obtained factors combined information within the field
literature. This type of instrument represents a necessary starting point in forthcoming interventions that try
to improve the child’s and family’s functioning after a
diagnosis of epilepsy, as well as to contribute to a better understanding and acceptance of the consequences
of this disorder in the general population.
References:
Baker, G. A. (2002).
The psychosocial burden of
epilepsy. Epilepsia, 43(6), 26–30.
Boroş, S. (2005). A critical approach of Q methodology
in the study of organizational communication, Studies in Social Sciences of the Romanian Academy, vol. 13, p. 39–46,
Ed. Argonaut, Cluj-Napoca.
Brown, S. R. (1993). A primer on Q methodology. Operant Subjectivity, 16, 91–138.
Camfield, C., Breau, L., & Camfield, P. (2003). Assessing the impact of pediatric epilepsy and concomitant behavioral, cognitive and physical / neurologic disability: Impact
of Childhood Neurologic Disability Scale. Developmental
Medicine and Child Neurology, 45(3), 152–160
Caplin, D., Austin, J. K., Dunn, D. W., Shen, J., &
Perkins, S. (2002). Development of a Self-Efficacy scale
for children and adolescents with epilepsy, Children’s Health
Care, 31(4), 295–309.
Christianson et al. (2000). Epilepsy in rural South Africa
children — prevalence, associated disability and management. South-Africa Medical Journal, 90, 262–266
Fernandes, P. T., Salgado, P. C. B., Noronha, A. L., Barbosa, F. D., Souza, E. A. P., Li, L. M. (2004). Stigma Scale
of Epilepsy: Conceptual Issues. Journal of Epilepsy and Clinical Neurophysiology, 10(4), 213–218.
Goffman, E. (1963). Stigma: Notes on the Management
of Spoiled Identity. New York: Touchstone.
Hoghughi & Nuttycombe, (2005), downloaded
from http://www.epilepsy.org.uk/research/forms/
epilepsyaction_parenting_procedure_questonnaire.
pdf, 09/10/05.
Mirnics, Z., Czikora, G., Zavecz, T., & Halasz, P. (2001).
Changes in public attitudes toward epilepsy in Hungary: results of surveys conducted in 1994 and 2000. Epilepsia,
42(1), 86–93
Petra, L., Benga, O. (2004). Cautions in interpreting
the results of neuropsychological assessment and treatment
implications in the case of childhood epilepsy. Proceedings
of the VIIth European Conference on Psychological Assessment, Malaga, Spain.
Ronen, G. M., Streiner, D. L., & Rosenbaum, P. (2003).
Health-related quality of life in childhood epilepsy: Moving
beyond seizure control with minimal adverse effects. Health
and Quality of Life Outcomes, 1, 1–36.
Siddarth, P., Smith, K., Kratzer, K., & Caplan, R.
(2005). Mental health in pediatric epilepsy: parent knowledge, attitudes, and behaviors, Epilepsia, 45(8), 142–151.
Sidenvall, R., Forsgren, L., & Heijbel, J. (1996). Prevalence and characteristics of epilepsy in children in Northern
Sweden, Seizure, 5, 139–146.
Stephenson, W. (1953). The study of behavior: Qtechnique and its methodology. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
32
METAPHORS, DOMAINS AND EMBODIMENT
M. Elaine Botha
Redeemer University College (Ancaster, Canada),
University of the Northwest, Potchefstroom
Campus (South Africa)
Recent developments in Cognitive Semantics and Cognitive Semiotics address the problem of how metaphorical
meaning is possible through discussions of the grounding of metaphorical meaning. Where metaphors allow
us to understand one domain of experience in terms
of another (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980:117), it is generally argued or assumed that metaphorical understanding
is grounded in non-metaphorical understanding (Lakoff
and Turner, 1989:113), an assumption characteristic of
most reductionist theories of metaphor. The question
I would like to raise in this paper is to what extent
Lakoff, Johnson and Turner’s move from literal language
to autonomous concepts grounded in patterns of bodily
and social experience actually solves the problem of the
grounding of metaphorical meaning without succumbing
to either subjectivism or materialism. I intend to argue
that this move can only escape subjectivism and materialism if it grounds metaphorical meaning in the recognition of the ontological and anthropological stratification
which conditions meaning and meaning variance.
Investigations of metaphorical meaning constitution
and meaning variance has revealed the significance
of semantic and semiotic domains and the contexts
within which they function as basis for the grounding of metaphorical meaning. In this paper I explore
some of the current views concerning the grounding of
metaphorical meaning in experience and embodiment
My provisional agreement with Lakoff, Johnson and others about the conceptual nature of metaphor rests
on an important caveat viz. that this bodily based conceptual structure which lies at the basis of linguistic
articulations of metaphor, is grounded in a deeper ontic structure of the world and of human experience. It
is the metaphorical (actually analogical) ontological structure of this grounding that is of interest here.
I believe that their position needs to be fleshed out
in a more encompassing ontological framework that articulates the multi-ordinality or multi-facetedness of
reality, facts, things, human relationships, human action, human experience and cognition in diverse domains of experience. Such a framework must be able
to ground their notion of conceptual metaphor and
meaning in the ineradicably relational nature of both
human beings and reality and of the relationship of human beings in and to reality. In order to escape the
trap of subjectivism it needs to accommodate the fact
that concepts, conceptual domains and metaphors are
constrained and conditioned by a deeper, ontological
framework which condition the itineraries of meaning
(Ricouer, 1980) which guide and structure the acts of
knowing, These itineraries are not only constitutive
of the human mind, but also of the nature of the world.
One’s access to these constraints and conditions are by
means of human embodied experience and through linguistic or imaginative articulations. Lakoff and Johnson’s anchoring of meaning in the bodily existence falls
short of actually recognizing that all realms of reality
are permeated by and pregnant with meaning which the
knower in community with others opens up and discovers via human interactive experience. It is exactly
this dynamic . . . intrinsic restlessness and relational
insufficiency of reality(Hart, 1984:166), which human
action and cognition participate in and which points to
the ‘expressive’ and ‘referential’ character of all of reality where . . . , meanings refuse to stand still (Van
Hoozer, 1998: 127). Both conceptual metaphor and
the states of affairs on which it is based in reality have
this deferral of meaning built into it. Having said this,
it does not exempt us from the responsibility to track
down the mechanisms by means of which we approximate such meaning.
Conceptual metaphor theory has proved to be most
useful and fertile for the understanding of metaphorical
meaning creation. But it is exactly the architecture of
these domains (Brandt, 2000) at stake in the processes
of cross domain mapping and meaning transfer through
metaphor, that requires further exploration. I suggest
that Lakoff and Johnson’s understanding of domains
require closer exploration, mainly in order to clarify the
nature of domains and to delineate the relationship between conceptual metaphors, the experiential gestalts
they are based upon and the pre-theoretical and preconceptual nomic conditions which condition and constrain domains.
Because their proposal to ground metaphorical
meaning in embodiment and neural processes is open
to being construed as subjectivist and materialist, I
shall attempt to articulate the contours of an alternative
theory of meaning and embodiment which counteracts
these possibilities. This theory grounds metaphorical
meaning and meaning change in an ontological and anthropological framework which recognizes the presence
and conditioning functioning of radially ordered structures for reality. It also suggests a possible solution to
the problems posed by the insistence on literal grounding by proponents of the traditional double-language
thesis. Basic to this proposed notion of embodiment
is an ontology which recognizes the radial, structural
stratification and categorization of both human bodies,
human experience and reality. These categorizations
in which both humankind, human experience, human
knowledge and reality participates, condition and constrain (ground) analogical and metaphorical meaning
transfer, cross domain mappings and blends in cognition
and in language and provide the basis for the analogical
concepts found in the disciplines.
33
References:
Brandt, Per Aage, 2000. The Architecture of Semantic
Domains. A Grounding Hypothesis in Cognitive Semiotics.
Revista Portuguesa de Humanidades, volume 4, 1/2, 11–51.
Dooyeweerd, H. 1954. De analogische grondbegrippen
der vakwetenschappen en hun betrekking tot de structuur
van den menschelijken ervaringshorizon. Mededelingen der
Koninklijke Nederlandsche Akademie van Wetenschappen,
afd. Letterkunde. New Series, Volume 17, no. 6. Amsterdam: Noord-Hollandsche Uitgeversmaatschappij, 171–192.
(Translated by Robert D. Knudsen: The Analogical Concepts. 1954.)
Hart, Hendrik. 1984. Understanding our World. An
Integral Ontology. Lanham: University Press of America..
Lakoff, George and Johnson, Mark. 1980, Metaphors we
Live by. Chicago: University of Chicago University Press.
Lakoff, George and Turner, Mark. 1989. More than
Cool Reason. A Field guide to Poetic Metaphor. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press,
Lakoff, George and Johnson, Mark. 1999. Philosophy in
the Flesh. The Embodied Mind and its Challenge to Western
Thought. New York:Basic Books.
Ricoeur, Paul. 1980 Bible and Imagination. In:Betz,
Hans Dieter. The Bible as Document of the University.
Polebridge Books, Scholars Press.
Van Hoozer, Kevin J. 1998. Is there a Meaning in this
Text? The Bible, The Reader and The Morality if Literary
Knowledge. Grand Rapids: Zondervan.
THE ORIGIN OF RECURSION AND THE UNIQUENESS OF
LANGUAGE
Denis Bouchard
Université du Québec à Montréal (Canada)
What exactly distinguishes human language from the
systems of communication of other animals? Hauser,
Chomsky & Fitch (2002) (henceforth HCF) evaluate
the possibility that all the components of the systems
in the Faculty of Language may be spandrels, in the
sense of Gould & Lewontin (1979), by-products of preexisting constraints rather than an end product of a
history of natural selection. They discuss several traits
of the sensory-motor system (SM) and the conceptualintentional system (CI) which are present in nonhuman
animals. Their presence elsewhere indicates that these
traits did not evolve specifically for human language.
For instance, perceptual discontinuities like those in
SM are found in other species, so they appear not to
have evolved specifically for speech processing. Likewise, even recursion is not unique to language: Fitch et
al. note that mechanisms of CI such as spatial reasoning and navigation exhibit limitless embedding of place
concepts within place concepts. However, there is a mismatch between the conceptual capacities of animals and
the communicative content of their vocal and visual signals, which only coarsely express such complexities. In
contrast, human language shows discrete infinity. The
typical formal element that produces discrete infinity is
recursion. HCF hypothesize that what is unique to human language is not recursivity per se but rather how
recursion is set in Language: a recursive system links
SM and CI, thus allowing humans to express complex
and potentially infinite conceptions by combining words
into sentences.
I argue that this conclusion is too hasty and raises
several problems. First, there are countless cases in
which recursion is not required in linking SM and CI: the
units on which recursion operates are themselves linking rules, signs which link an acoustic image (signifiant)
with a meaning (signifié). The linking between a signifiant and a signifié at the level of words does not
involve recursion. Second, recursion applies to signs,
so signs are logically prior. If the only distinctive property is that nonhuman animals lack this recursive system, this leaves open the possibility that some animals
could develop a large lexicon of signs, since signs do
not involve recursion in linking SM and CI. But this
prediction is not borne out: nonhuman animals do not
even have words/signs. So forming signs is another
constraint which animals have not overcome. Third, it
is logically possible to obtain limitless expressive power
without recursion in the linking of SM and CI. All that
is needed is an infinite set of meaningful units, including units that correspond to complex meanings such as
those expressed by sentences. CI is recursive, so there is
a limitless potential of signifiés: any conception, however complicated, can be the signifié of a sign. However, an infinite lexicon is impossible in practice due
to pre-existing constraints, the most obvious one being
that the brain is finite, so that there are limitations on
the number of words it can store. Moreover, our perceptual system sets upper bounds on the distinctions
which we can perceive or produce as signifiants. Since
these distinctions allow a quite limited number of discrete perceptual elements, recursion operating on these
elements is the means to obtain an unlimited number
of signifiants linked with the unlimited possible signifiés.
Recursion on signs is the way around the storage limitation of the brain, combining words into complex phrases
and sentences.
What is unique to human language is not recursion,
but the fact that it includes signs. Recursion is a byproduct of the limitations on their linking brought about
by the nature of the perceptual and conceptual substances in the sign. There is no mystery in the fact that
other animals, despite their having recursive processes
in other domains, did not apply recursion to communication: other animals simply don’t have the proper kind
of units from which recursion derives in language, they
don’t have signs. Animal calls are not signs, they are
not a link between a signifiant and a signifié. Animal
34
calls are just reflex responses to a perceptual stimulation, as key points indicate: calls are situation-specific,
their repertoire is small, and they are not intentional (in
the sense of taking into account what other individuals
believe or want).
I hypothesize that the only distinctive property of
human language is that it has signs, i.e., a signifiant
linked to a conceptual signifié instead of a behavioral
reflex. The crucial transition is from reflexes which are
immediate and limited to specific situations, to signs
which have a nonimmediate and potentially unlimited
signifié. Once triggered, the transition from reflex to
sign quickly brings about a system that is as expressive
as modern language. As soon as the system goes beyond
the immediacy of reflexes, it opens up to expressing the
complexity of all that is nonimmediate. This domain
comprises all that we can conceive, which appears to be
unlimited.
In language, Type-recursion is involved, i.e., embedding an element of type X within other X elements indefinitely, as opposed to simple concatenation. This follows
from the nature of the sign. Due to memory limitations,
the number of signs that can be stored in the lexicon
is relatively small. So their signifiés tend to correspond
to fairly general and usual categories of things, actions,
qualities, etc. When someone wants to express a signifié which corresponds to a less general and usual category, distinguishing properties are added to the stored
word/sign by combining it with another sign to zoom
in on more specific elements of the same kind. For instance, the set of elements denoted by ‘poodle’ can be
further narrowed as in pink poodle or further again as in
the phrase pink poodle with a top hat. Type-recursion is
the case when one of the restraining elements happens
to be of the same type as the restrained element.
My hypothesis has another important advantage
over the proposal in HCF. They point out several additional novel traits which humans had to acquire for natural languages. In their model, these traits appear to be
unconnected, each of these specific traits constituting a
separate empirical discovery, a novel development in our
recent evolutionary history. This convergence of capacities appears to be fortuitous. In contrast, these traits all
follow from my hypothesis that the distinctive property
of human language is to have signs. For instance:
Novel trait 1: Words can be linked to virtually any
concept. I hypothesize that this is the fundamental
change, the transition from limited situation-specific reflexes to unlimited signifiés. This trait does not follow
from recursion; on the other hand, recursion does follow
from the sign.
Novel trait 2: Humans rapidly acquire a large lexicon. HCF remark that the lexicon requires the storage
of a large number of different ‘phonological images.’
But what is stored is more complex-pairings of a signifiant and a signifié. This irreducible link has a strong
mnemonic effect which facilitates the rapid acquisition
of a large lexicon. We can see this effect when we try
to learn sound bits from lexical items of a language we
don’t know: without the leverage from the meaning associated with the sound bits, we are quite poor at it,
and quickly limited. This trait-a large lexicon- therefore
follows from my hypothesis.
Novel trait 3: Human language is detached from
any specific modality. When human beings lose one
modality (e.g., hearing), they make up for this deficit
by communicating in a different modality (i.e., signing).
Under my view, this trait also illustrates the difference
between a reflex and a sign. Reflexes are a response to
a perceptual stimulation. The fact that they are ‘hardwired’ in this way makes them modality-specific. Thus,
even in humans, the gesture-call system (laughter, sobbing, facial signaling) is modality-specific. In contrast,
the inputs to the language system are signs, which precisely have the property of being arbitrary, without any
connection imposed by ‘nature’ between signifiant and
signifié. This holds internally to a modality, and there is
no reason from nature why it should not also hold across
modalities. So again the trait derives from properties of
the linguistic sign.
HCF consider that the initial conditions that limit
outcomes for language are mainly computational,
whereas I consider the substantive properties of human
physiology and cognition as central factors. I will briefly
discuss how the second of these two views leads to more
explanatory syntactic analyses by comparing how the
two account for adjectives and clitics.
References:
Fitch, Tecumseh, Marc Hauser, Noam Chomsky. 2005.
The evolution of the language faculty: clarifications and implications. Cognition.
Gould, Stephen Jay & Richard Lewontin. 1979. The
Spandrels of San Marco and the Panglossian Paradigm: A
Critique of the Adaptationist Programme. Proceedings of
the Royal Society of London, Series B, Volume 205, no.
1161, 581–598.
Hauser, Marc, Noam Chomsky & Tecumseh Fitch. 2002.
The language faculty; what is it, who has it, and how did it
evolve? Science 298, 1569–1579.
35
ELEMENTARY ENTITIES AND RELATIONS IN A COGNITIVE
ACCOUNT OF ENGLISH TENSES
Frank Brisard
University of Antwerp (Belgium)
status) that are taken to typify the individual tenses encountered in any given language. Such mental spaces
may, but need not, be temporally interpreted, and so the
schematic nature of the proposed semantic analysis at
once accommodates the existence of modal usage types
for many tenses, effectively suggesting a unified basis
for the treatment of temporal and nonveridical meanings. Certain useful generalizations may also be said to
derive from the premises adopted in this analysis, a.o.
concerning the much-observed correlations between the
aspectual notion of imperfectivity and epistemic intimations of irreality, contingency, and narrative vividness.
I will elaborate on this programmatic account by
providing a schematic overview of the meanings of the
English main tenses, each time noting their particular
implementation of general mental-space building mechanisms. In doing this, I refer to the standard Reichenbachian account as an analytical baseline. In particular,
I will be concerned with the relation between an event
time and what is actually designated by a tense, and
between a reference time and the CG conception of
a viewpoint. The discussion of the present tense in English will concentrate on the requirement that a current
viewpoint coincide exactly with the profiled situation,
and how this differentially affects lexically imperfective
and perfective verb types. In passing, I argue for a
characterization of the present perfect as referring to
a present, not past, situation. The discussion of the
past tense will propose the relevance of a notional contrast between perfective and imperfective usage types,
as a formally unmarked yet grammatically consequential distinction related to the location of the viewpoint
vis-à-vis a past situation.
I will present a number of elements and principles that
are claimed to be indispensable for a genuinely cognitive account of tense semantics, in which the meanings
of tenses are treated as conceptual representations imposing a certain construal on a given situation. For
this, I make use of the theory of Cognitive Grammar
(CG), which proffers a so-called grounding model
for the description of certain grammatical markers of
deixis, quantification, and definiteness (Langacker 1991,
2001). I will restrict the discussion to the English tense
system, with its binary opposition between a marker of
past situations (past tense) and one of nonpast situations (present tense). In CG, grounding predications like tense conceptually designate (profile) the
content of the lexical verb they modify, while indicating, in the background, the relationship of that content
with the ground, or the time of speaking. While this relationship may prototypically be considered a temporal
one, of coincidence or precedence with respect to the
ground, no direct appeals to the timeline as an object
of conception are needed to give an integrated account
of the many distinct uses of English tenses.
Fundamentally, there are three cognitive principles
at work in distinguishing the meanings of tense forms:
the internal or external position of a subjective viewpoint on a conceived situation, the epistemic or reality
status that may be attributed to the situation itself, and,
regarding aspectual (perfect, progressive) modifications
of the simple tenses, the construal of the relation between the verb profile and the tense predication’s maximal scope. All of these mechanisms can plausibly
References:
be described relative to the specific viewing relation
Langacker, Ronald W. 1991. Foundations of Cognitive
conjured up by a tense marker. Basic in this viewing re- Grammar, vol. 2: Descriptive Application. Stanford: Stanlation is the position of the ground as the starting point ford University Press.
for setting up configurations of mental spaces (levLangacker, Ronald W. 2001. The English present tense.
els of conceptual designation with differing epistemic English Language and Linguistics 5.251–272.
PSYCHOLOGICAL STATES ASSOCIATED WITH DECEPTIVE
BEHAVIOR: EVIDENCE FROM PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGICAL
RECORDINGS
Ioan Buş1 , George Visu2
different psychological states which in turn are reflected
in different physiological patterns.
1
Babes-Bolyai University (Cluj Napoca, Romania)
Most of the testing formats that try to detect simu2
Court of Appeal (Cluj Napoca, Romania)
lated behavior rely on the comparison between the physiological reactions recorded when answering the control
According to contemporary theories regarding the psyquestions and the physiological reactions recorded when
chophysiological detection of deception there are difanswering the relevant questions (pertaining to the obferences in physiological patterns between honest and
ject of the investigation). According to this rationale,
dishonest subjects. Polygraph testing relies on the asthere are two main strategies that a subject can use dursumption that sincerity and lying consistently determine
36
ing testing in order to appear non-deceptive: the first
one consists in trying to amplify the physiological reactions when answering the control questions, and the
second one refers to trying to dampen the physiological
reactions recorded during the relevant question (Buş,
2000). The Control Question Test — CQT — is the
testing format used in this study and is one of the most
frequently used polygraph test formats; the polygraph
being the widespread techique that permits simutaneous
recording of the potential physiological correlates of deception. Several theories have attempted to justify this
correlation, such as the conflict theory, the theory of
conditioned answer (Davis, 1961) the psychological set
theory (Barland, 1981), but the most relevant of these
theories being the Significance / Attention Model (Department of Defense Polygraph Institute Research Division Staff, 1997).
The rationale of CQT is as it follows: guilty as opposed to innocent subjects will react differently to relevant and control questions. It is assumed that guilty
subjects will react more prominently when answering relevant questions because such questions aim directly to
the issue under scrutiny: Did you shoot John L? It
is assumed then that innocent subjects will show more
pronounced reactions when answering the control questions: Before 2003 did you ever do anything illegal,
immoral or dishonest?, because the control questions
are presented and explained to the subject in such a
manner that a denial from the subject must be obtained,
and therefore an obvious lie (No, I haven’t). For a
more compelling discussion on the role of the control
questions see the resources provided by the Department
of Defense Polygraph Institute Research Division Staff
(1997).
The countermeasures (Cms) used in polygraph testing can be defined as any means (physical, mental or
chemical) used in the attempt to deliberately distort or
alter the tracings recorded in a polygraph testing (Barland, 1994). This way the examiner will reach an Inconcludent or False Negative result; in both situations the
subject would have succesfuly passed the examination.
10 undergraduate students took part at this experiment; they volunteered for the study and they were
randomly distributed in two groups: 4 participants in
control group and 6 participants in experimental group
(control-without prior training regarding the use of Cms,
experimental-with prior training regarding Cms). The
pretest was standardized. We had approximately 30
minutes of theoretical training and approximately 60
minutes of practical training (only the experimental
group). During the theoretical training we presented the
technique, the rationale of CQT and several examples of
Cms. In the practical phase the participants were presented with a combination of physical Cms: self induced
pain and muscle contraction. The Cms were chosen in
order to be very difficult to observe using a behavioral
assessment.
In the polygraph testing phase we used a questionnaire based on the mock crime enacted earlier that day
(in the mock crime the subjects have to steal a cell
phone from a purse situated in a lecture room in witch
a course was taking place). In the post test phase we
questioned each of the subjects regarding their ability
to identify the control questions and to implement the
Cms.
In the control group (no Cms) one subject was classified as Inconclusive, and three were Positives (simulating an correctly identified). In the experimental group
one subject was Positive and the other five Negative.
These results suggest that the combination of countermeasures that they used may be efficient. As we
mentioned earlier, the purpose of the study was not to
show that the Cms can be efficient, but to investigate
if it is possible to identify a deceptive subject that uses
Cms by observing and analyzing the physiological pattern recorded on the charts. This hypothesis was only
in part confirmed by the data and we believe that this
is due to the fact that subjects were not provided with
feedback relative to their performance.
This study suggests that the combination of Cms
can be efficient if the subject is provided with theoretical and practical training (Buş & Visu, 2004). The
implication of this is not just the awareness of the fact
that a number of subjects might use countermeasures.
The examiners that posess this type of information are
not willing to disclose it easily. Instead we tried to show
that a well trained subject can be identified as employing
a type of countermeasures by looking at the physiological pattern recorded on the charts during the control
questions (and therefore the investigator could develop
the so-called counter-contermeasures).
References:
Barland, G. G. (1981). A Validation and reliability Study
of the Counterintelligence Screening Test. Fort George
G. Meade, MD.
Barland, G. N. (1994). Polygraph countermeasures. Unpublished manuscript, Department of Defense Polygraph Institute, Fort McClellan, A. L.
Bus, I. & Visu, G. (2004). Physiological reactions associated with practicing countermeasures during a polygraph
testing. Cognition, Brain, Behavior, 8( 1), Cluj Napoca.
Bus, I. (2000). Psychophysiological detection of simulated behavior. Ingram, Cluj-Napoca.
Davis, R. C. (1961). Physiological responses as a means
of evaluating information. Pp. 142–168 in Manipulation oh
Human Behavior, A. Biderman / Zimmer H., eds. New York:
Wiley.
Department of Defense Polygraph Institute Research Division Staff (1997). A comparison of psychophysiological detection of deception accuracy rates obtained using the counterintellingence scope polygraph and the test for espionage
and sabotage question formats. Polygraph, 26(2), 79–106.
37
THE IMPORTANCE OF NEURAL STUDIES IN FORMING
LANGUAGE TEACHING AND LEARNING THEORIES
Floresita V. Bustamante
Guilan University (Rasht, Iran)
processes language because knowing this will allow them
to form new theories in language teaching and learning.
With the help of neuroimaging techniques, they are able
to explore the brain better and observe it as it functions.
These techniques led to the increase in the number of
researches that aimed at discovering the complex function of the brain.
This paper attempts to answer the questions posed
above and also the following: When is the best age
to learn a new language? What are the researchers’
ideas about brain plasticity? Should theories in language teaching and learning be different for males and
females? What are the results of recent studies using
neuroimaging techniques and up to what extent can we
depend on them? Will the results of the studies conducted using neuroimaging techniques provide new light
in the field of language teaching and learning?
Finding answers to these questions may help linguists form new theories that might bring us closer to
home insofar as language teaching and learning are concerned.
There is an assumption which was based on an array of
literature that tried to probe on how language is represented. This assumption is that: people have only
one language (Bialystok, 2001) and this becomes more
complicated when this question is asked about speakers
who have two or more languages. The complexity is
even more for children who are learning two languages.
Does the brain process language in bilinguals in the same
way that it does for monolinguals?
History of language learning and teaching is full
of approaches with corresponding methods, and techniques, all aimed at helping students learn a new language. Existing teaching methods were replaced by new
ones because of the shortcomings of the previous methods, only to find out later that the replacement has some
shortcomings, too. As a result, books about language
teaching contain a series of methods and techniques but
the question still remains: how does a child learn language? How is a foreign or second language learned?
References:
How does the brain process language? These are just
some of the many questions related to learning or acBialystok, E. (2001). Bilingualism in Development, Lanquiring language which made many researchers busy for guage, Literary and Cognition. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ.
decades. Recent studies conducted by neurologists and Press.
Richards, J. C. (1985). The Context of Language Teachlinguists concerns with the function of the brain in laning.
Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press.
guage learning. It intrigues them to know how the brain
THE TIME-IS-SPACE METAPHOR: SOME LINGUISTIC EVIDENCE
THAT ITS END IS NEAR
Bert Cappelle
K. U. Leuven Campus Kortrijk (Belgium)
According to an influential conceptualist theory put forward by Lakoff and Johnson (1980, 1999), our ability to
reason about time is mediated via a metaphorical mapping from basic concepts associated with our spatial experience onto the more abstract domain of temporal understanding. This mapping (or sets of mappings), commonly referred to as the time-is-space metaphor, has
been argued to be at work cross-linguistically and ties
in with the way spatial terms acquire temporal senses
diachronically (e.g. Haspelmath 1997; Traugott 1974).
While the use of identical words for both spatial and
temporal notions is so pervasive that we hardly notice we
are using spatial terms when we are talking about events
taking place (!) in time, the validity of the time-isspace metaphor (as an on-line cognitive device which
derives temporal usages from basically spatial terms)
is being put into question. Most recently, Kemmerer
(2005) found that brain damage can selectively impair
the spatial or the temporal senses of English preposi-
tions, which suggests that although the spatial and
temporal meanings of prepositions are historically linked
by virtue of the TIME IS SPACE metaphor, they can be
(and may normally be) represented and processed independently of each other in the brains of modern adults
(p. 797).
This paper will adduce some purely linguistic arguments backing up Kemmerer’s findings, thus corroborating the claim (cf. also Rice et al. 1999) that the
time-is-space metaphor is not the powerful interpretative and coding mechanism one might expect it to
be, given its ubiquity in language. My arguments centre on the use of English particles like around, away, on,
etc. to express special kinds of verbal aspect (i.e. special kinds of information on the way an event unfolds
through time), as in mess around, ask away or dream on.
Employing a diagnostic technique proposed by Jackendoff and Aaron (1991), I will argue that these uses do not
invoke spatial imagery in the language user. Moreover,
I will show that these aspectual uses display semantic
and syntactic idiosyncrasies that cannot be explained
by a simple metaphorical projection from their spatial
38
uses. In the process, I will take issue with McIntyre’s
(2004) recent account, relying on the time-is-space
metaphor, for the impossibility of verbs to retain their
direct object argument when combined with certain of
these particles (e.g. *play a silly game around, *sing
the aria on). Cross-linguistic and usage-based data will
further substantiate my claim that the time-is-space
metaphor by itself is incapable of accounting for the
linguistic phenomena presented.
To conclude, my paper will lend support to tentative
results in some recent cognition studies, namely that for
most conventionalized temporal lexical items, the link
with their phonologically corresponding spatial counterparts is not, or no longer, active. In other words, the link
is based, at most, on a dead metaphor. We therefore
need to reconsider the relation between the expression of
time and space in language and formulate a new model
in which the time-is-space metaphor is not assigned
a dominant role.
References:
Haspelmath, Martin. 1997. From Space to Time: Temporal Adverbials in the World’s Languages. München: Lincom Europa.
Jackendoff, Ray S. and David Aaron. 1991. Review article of George Lakoff and Mark Turner. 1989. More than
Cool Reason: A Field Guide to Poetic Metaphor. Chicago
and London: University of Chicago Press. Language 67(2),
320–38.
Kemmerer, David. 2005. The spatial and temporal
meanings of English prepositions can be independently impaired. Neuropsychologia 43(5), 797–806.
Lakoff, George and Mark Johnson. 1980. Metaphors We
Live By. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press.
Lakoff, George and Mark Johnson. 1999. Philosophy in
the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and its Challenge to Western
Thought. New York: Basic Books, 1999.
McIntyre, Andrew. 2004a. Event paths, conflation, argument structure and VP shells. Linguistics 42(3), 523–71.
Rice, Sally, Dominiek Sandra and Mia Vanrespaille.
1999. Prepositional semantics and the fragile link between
space and time. In: Masako K. Hiraga et al. (eds.), Cultural, Psychological and Typological Issues in Cognitive Linguistics. Selected Papers of the Bi-annual ICLA Meeting
in Albuquerque, July 1995. Amsterdam and Philadelphia:
John Benjamins, 107–27.
Traugott, Elizabeth Closs. (1974). Explorations in
linguistic elaboration: language change, language acquisition and the genesis of spatio-temporal terms. In John
M. Anderson and Charles Jones (eds.), Historical Linguistics. Vol. I: Syntax, Morphology, Internal and Comparative
Reconstruction. Amsterdam, Oxford and New York: NorthHolland / American-Elsevier, pp. 263–314.
CONCEPTS, SYNTAX, AND MIRRORS FOR THEORY OF MIND*
Tatiana Chernigovskaya
St. Petersburg State University (Russia)
Outstanding finding of mirror systems by Rizzolatti and
Arbib (Arbib, Rizzolatti, 1996; Rizzolatti, Arbib, 1998;
Rizzolatti et al., 2002; Rizzolatti, Craighero, 2004; Arbib, Mundhenk, 2005) give new dimensions for analyzing biological foundations of cognitive development
and language and for Theory of Mind (ToM) — the
term coined by Premack and Woodruff in 1978 in relation to chimpanzees’ capacity for deception (Premack
& Woodruff 1978) that later become increasingly used
in describing the cognitive deficits in schizophrenia and
autism. ToM is the ability to attribute mental states
to others and thus forms the basis of social interaction and communication; it is critical to understand the
beliefs and intentions of others in social discourse —
for ‘mind reading’ (Bering 2002), and therefore is accepted to be a core aspect of social cognition. Discussions on Theory of Mind in phylogeny and ontogeny,
in norms and pathology gain evolutionary perspective
based on recent brain-imaging data that show a number of activated cortical regions: e.g. the left medial
prefrontal cortex, the orbito-frontal cortex and the left
temporal cortex (Baron-Cohen et al 1994; Goel et al
1995; Fletcher et al 1995; Levine et al 1999; Vogeley et
al 2001), the anterior cingulate cortex (Gallagher et al
2000; Gusnard et al 2001; Calder et al 2002; Castelli et
al 2000; Brunet et al 2000). Occasionally other structures have also shown activation: the paracingulate sulcus, the posterior cingulate, the temporo-parietal junction (Fletcher et al 1995; Gallagher et al 2000; McCabe
et al 2001). Baron-Cohen has especially examined the
neural basis of autistic disturbances, the amygdala being an important center (Baron-Cohen et al 2000) which
is definitely associated with ToM competency. Bering
(2002) and Burns (2002) argue that ToM is the product of a gradual breakdown in cognitive modularity that
characterized the earlier stages of development.
This paper reviews the state of the art in discussions on evolution of mind and brain in Homo sapiens. As revealed recently (Evans et al. 2005; MekelBobrov et al. 2005) microcephalin, a gene regulating
brain size, continues to evolve adaptively in humans.
Various points of view on cerebral basis for cognitive
competence are considered: nativism vs. emergenism,
modular vs. network neurophysiologic organization of
language and cognition, the idea of macromutation vs.
a series of micromutations that have resulted in the appearance of human language. Macromutation chosen
by an anti-Darwinist Chomsky and the view of Pinker
and Bloom insisting on the natural selection that has
led to formation of the language capacity are discussed
in association with Hebb’s and other similar models as a
* The research was supported by grants
06-06 80152a from Russian Foundation for Basic Research and
Russian Scientific Foundation For Research in Humanities.
04-04-00083a from
39
conciliation of the modular and holistic paradigms. The
paper also discusses Jackendoff’s and Pinker’s (2005)
debate with Hauser, Chomsky and Fitch (2002, 2005)
where Universal Grammar is described as a set of attractors causing the human capacity to learn the language
on the basis of the assumption that ‘everything is already there, and the learner has only to set the options’;
and that ‘it is hard to imagine all this structure emerging
in the brain prior to experience, much less being coded
genetically. . . a core of narrow syntax. vs. combinatoriality spread across words and constructions. The
idea of inborn concepts as a basis for cognitive evolution
is also being debated in connection with Fodor’s arguments (2005). Many attempts were made to discuss
mental grammar, actually the inborn a priori knowledge
in general — a set of unrecognized rules that allow not
only acquiring language, but also formulating the life
experience as a whole. The case in point is some preknowledge, which is the basis both for language and for
the non-verbal constructing of the picture that is more
or less isomorphic to the human surrounding. The debates of whether the mental grammar also covers the
specifically language universalia are continuing.
Nobody doubts that language is a set of conventions, some of them more or less explicit, some hidden
within the brain in the form of the algorithms that we
hope to reveal. It is evident that there is something that
we store in the brain and something that we compute.
However, what do we store: lexemes (tens of thousands)
or concepts? In what form and by what means interconnected? And rules too, at least some of them, hundreds
of such, not consciously operated and not reflected — in
case of the native language. It is evident, that languages
differ in the way they code semantic or functional relations: language diversity becomes realized by the majority of brain and language scholars — to make universal
statements we first need data on the wide spectrum of
possibilities. As an example, the long-lasting debate on
single vs. dual mechanism approaches to lexicon organization came to a language specific stage. This paper
presents experimental evidence from data on metarepresentational tools in acquisition and pathology for processing a morphologically rich language.
HOW WOULD HAVE BEEN BETTER IF I HAD CHOSEN
DIFFERENTLY: LEARNING TO AVOID INTENSE NEGATIVE
EMOTIONS
Giorgio Coricelli
Institut des Sciences Cognitives, CNRS
(Bron, France)
Humans use strategies to avoid intense negative emotions, and can anticipate the effects of future thinking about how would have been better if I had chosen differently, which determines the feeling of regret.
Regret is a cognitive-based emotion characterized by
the feeling of responsibility for the negative outcome
of our choice. Anticipation of regret induces changing in behavioral strategies, and characterizes the learning process in decision-making. Using fMRI technique
we demonstrated that activity in the orbitofrontal cor-
tex mediates the experience of adaptive emotions such
as regret. Moreover, learning to anticipate this emotion during choice re-activated the orbitofrontal cortex
in conjunction with the amygdala. We suggest that,
as a result of cumulative experience of regret, inputs
from these regions to decision making processes provide
an updated representation of value that incorporates a
weighting of the relative emotional value of different options for choice. Our data suggest a mechanism through
which comparing choice outcome with its alternatives,
and the associated feeling of responsibility, promotes
behavioural flexibility and exploratory strategies in dynamic environments so as to minimise the likelihood of
emotionally negative outcomes.
SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES BETWEEN COGNITIVE
DEVELOPMENT AND COGNITIVE AGING
Fergus I. M. Craik
Rotman Research Institute (Toronto, Canada)
At first sight the similarities between cognitive development and cognitive aging seem quite striking. Children’s cognitive processes increase in speed, power and
control from birth to late teen-age, and these same processes gradually lose speed, power and control from age
60 on. Further support for a rise-and-fall model is provided by tasks requiring executive control; in general,
performance on such measures as ‘fluid intelligence’ improves rapidly from age 3 to the early 20s, reflecting
the concurrent growth of the frontal lobes. This improvement gives way to a decline in control processes
(starting as early as the late 20s in some cases!) again
reflecting the declining efficiency of frontal and other
cortical regions. A quick check of the underlying neu-
40
rology also supports this inverted-U-shaped picture of
lifespan cognition; both gray matter and myelinizations
increase throughout childhood, and both of these aspects of neural tissue are progressively lost in the course
of aging. There are also very evident d i s s i m i l a r i t i e s however. One obvious point is that knowledge
representations grow rapidly at early ages, but this rapid
growth is not mirrored by rapid losses in aging; on the
contrary, general knowledge (‘crystallized intelligence’)
holds up well at older ages, provided the knowledge is
accessed on a regular basis.
In my view, changes in cognitive performance across
the lifespan may be understood in terms of a balance between the inverted-U-shaped trajectory of executive control processes and the grow-and-hold trajectory
of representational systems (Craik & Bialystok, 2006,
2007). Representations and control should not be regarded as separate entities, however; the addition of
new information to cognitive schemas and the retrieval
of information from them depend heavily on efficient
control processes, and it can be argued that control
processes also depend on schematic representations of
external events acting as a sort of internalized ‘environmental support.’ These ideas will be illustrated by
experimental results from my own and other labs. Lifes-
pan changes in executive control are reflected in performance on Stroop, Simon, and task-switching tests.
Changes in various types of memory task are discussed,
and related to changes in representation and control.
Finally, to illustrate how other factors can affect cognition across the lifespan, I will discuss some current
studies of bilingualism (e.g., Bialystok, Craik, Klein &
Viswanathan, 2004). Bilingual children show a processing advantage on nonlinguistic tasks; this advantage declines up to early adulthood but then re-emerges in older
adults. It seems possible that bilingualism may act like
other factors to provide a ‘cognitive reserve’ that slows
the course of cognitive aging.
References:
Bialystok, E., Craik, F. I. M., Klein, R., & Viswanathan, M. (2004). Bilingualism, aging, and cognitive control:
Evidence from the Simon task. Psychology and Aging, 19,
290–303.
Craik, F. I. M., & Bialystok, E. (2006a). On structure and process in lifespan cognitive development. In
E. Bialystok & F.I. M. Craik (Eds.) Lifespan cognition:
Mechanisms of change (pp. 3–14). New York: Oxford University Press.
Craik, F. I. M., & Bialystok, E. (2006b). Connecting the
dots: Cognitive change across the lifespan. Manuscript under review.
WHY GESTURES MATTER IN LEARNING FROM A DISCOURSE
Ilaria Cutica, Monica Bucciarelli
Experiment 1: Recall Test
Center for Cognitive Science and Department of
Psychology (Turin, Italy)
Hypothesis
Our study concerns the role of gestures that accompany
discourse in deep comprehension and learning. The
Mental Model theory (Johnson-Laird, 1983) provides
a framework for explaining the mechanisms underlying
discourse comprehension and learning: the construction
of a coherent mental model is tantamount to the successful comprehension of a text (e.g., Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998). Several experimental studies suggest that
deep learning benefits from visual presentation of material, such as figures, diagrams and animations, because they are direct systems of representation, with
no abstract syntax interposed between representations
and represented entities (e.g., Moreno & Mayer, 2002;
Stenning 2000); thus, they may facilitate the construction of an integrated mental model of the presented
material (e.g. Glenberg & Langston, 1992). It is also
well known that gestures enrich the mental representation of the discourse for the listener, thus facilitating
speech comprehension (see Goldin-Meadow et al., 1999
for a review). Our main hypothesis is that the speaker’s
gestures aid the comprehension of a discourse because
they favor the construction of a mental model of the
discourse in the listener, leading him/her to a better
retention of the information.
From the above mentioned assumptions, we derive
the predictions that a person listening to a discourse
accompanied by gestures is more likely to build an articulated mental model of the discourse, and then to
learn deeply the material, than a person listening to a
discourse not accompanied by gestures. Some possible indicators of the construction of articulated mental models are: (1) the quantity of correct information
retained; (2) the quantity of correct inferences drawn
from the information explicitly contained in the material (Many & Johnson-Laird, 1982).
As a consequence, we expect that a person listening
to a gesticulating speaker will recollect more information and draw more inferences than a person listening
to a non-gesticulating speaker.
Material
Two videotaped discourses (approximate length: 6
minutes), in which an actor proffers a discourse. In the
Gestures condition the actor accompanies the discourse
with gestures, and in the No-Gestures condition the actor proffers the same discourse without gesticulating.
Participants were invited to watch one of the two
videotaped discourses, and then they were invited to recall as much information as they could. We tested 38
adults (32 females and 6 males, mean age: 23 years),
41
half of them (balanced for age and sex) dealt with the
Results
Gestures condition, and half with the No-Gestures con1. Participants in the No-Gestures condition perdition.
form better in recognizing the sentences actually proffered by the actor (mean=10.64, sd 1.18), as compared
Results
with participants in the Gestures condition (mean=9.56,
1. The number of Correct recollections is higher
sd=3.14, Mann-Whitney test: tied z=−2.201, tied
in the Gestures condition than in the No-Gestures conp=.019).
dition. In particular, in Gestures condition the mean
2.
Participants in the No-Gestures condition
of Correct recollections is 23.4 (sd=3.42), and in No(mean=12.57, sd=1.84) are better in identifying SeGestures condition the mean of Correct recollections is
mantically correct sentences with respect to partici18.9 (sd=18.9: Mann-Whitney test: tied z=2.28, tied
pants in the Gestures condition (mean=10.94, sd=2.09,
p=.026).
Mann-Whitney test: tied z=−2.183, tied p=.017).
2. The number of Correct inferences drawn from the
3. Participants in No-Gestures condition and in
explicit information contained in the discourse is higher
Gestures condition do not differ in terms of Wrong
in the Gestures condition than in the No-Gestures concontents recognitions (mean=10.72, sd=2.38, and
dition. In particular, in Gestures condition the mean
mean=10.06, sd=2.93, respectively: Mann-Whitney
of Correct inferences is 2.21 (sd=0.76), and in Notest: tied z=−2.183, tied p=.017).
Gestures condition the mean of Correct inferences is
0.95 (sd=0.43: Mann-Whitney test: tied z=−3.207,
Conclusions
tied p=.0013).
3. The number of Erroneous recollections does not Results of Experiment 1 reveal that a discourse accomsignificantly differ in the two experimental conditions. panied by gestures favors a greater retention of correct
The mean of Erroneous recollections is 1.26 (sd=0.51) information, and a greater production of correct inferand 1.25 (sd=0.97) in Gestures condition and No- ences by the listener, than a discourse not accompanied
Gestures condition, respectively (Mann-Whitney test: by gestures. Conversely, results of Experiment 2 reveal
tied z=.23, tied p=.84).
that a listener who has no access to the speaker’s gestures has a better retention of verbatim of the discourse
than a listener who has access to the speaker’s gestures.
As a conclusion, a discourse accompanied by gestures,
Hypothesis
as compared with a discourse not accompanied by gesA mental model does not incorporate information tures, facilitates the construction of an articulated menconcerning the superficial level of the stimulus, that is, tal model of the discourse by the listener, thus favoring
in our case, the verbatim level of the discourse. Thus, the deep learning of the material.
the ability to retain the verbatim of a discourse is higher
References:
in individuals who do not build a mental model with
Glenberg, A. M. & Langston, W. E. (1992). Comprehenrespect to individuals who build it (Many & Johnson- sion of illustrated text: Pictures help to build mental models.
Laird, 1982). Therefore, we expect to find that a person Journal of Memory and Language, 31, 129–151.
who listens to a discourse accompanied by gestures has
Johnson-Laird, P. N. (1983). Mental models: Towards
a worse performance in recognizing the verbatim of the a cognitive science of language, and consciousness. Camdiscourse than a person who listens to a discourse not bridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
Goldin-Meadow, S., (1999). The role of gesture in
accompanied by gestures.
Experiment 2: Recognition Test
Material
The experimental material is the same as that used
for Experiment 1, but at the end of the videotaped discourse, participants are presented with a list of sentences. Sentences are of the following sorts: (a) Literally correct sentences; (b) Semantically correct sentences (with the same meaning as the sentences used
in the discourse, but expressed with different words);
(c) Wrong content sentences.
Participants were 30 adults (23 females and 7 males,
mean age: 23 years), half of them (balanced for age and
sex) dealt with the Gestures condition, and half with the
No-Gestures condition.
communication and thinking. Trends in Cognitive Science,
3(11), 419–429.
Mani K. & Johnson-Laird, P. N. (1982). The mental representation of spatial descriptions. Memory and Cognition,
10, 181–187.
Moreno, R. & Mayer, R. E. (2002). Verbal redundancy in
multimedia learning: When reading helps listening. Journal
of Educational Psychology, 94, 156–163.
Stenning, K. (2000). Distinctions with differences:
Comparing criteria for distinguishing diagrammatic from sentential systems. Proceedings Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence, 1899: 132–148.
Zwaan R. A. & Radvansky G. A. (1998). Situation models in language comprehension and memory. Psychological
Bulletin, 123(2), 162–185.
42
DISCRIMINATION OF STUMULUS ATTRIBUTES WITHIN AND
BETWEEN HEMIFIELDS*
M. V. Danilova1 , J. D. Mollon2
1
I. P. Pavlov Institute of Physiology
(St. Petersburg, Russia)
2
Cambridge University (Cambridge, UK)
In the human brain, an extremely complex net of connections carries information from distal sensory inputs
to the central areas where the decisions are made. Current neuroscience considers several hypothesis of how
particular stimulus features are represented within the
brain. One popular theory of perceptual information
processing claims that the activity of a single cell may
represent a particular attribute or object (Barlow, 1972;
Lennie, 1998). A difficulty for such a hypothesis is that
an enormous bulk of dedicated axons would be required
to account for the human ability to compare two stimuli that are presented at arbitrary and distant points in
the visual field. In previous experiments we have shown
that even when two stimuli are separated by large spatial separations, the discrimination of their spatial frequency, of their contrast, of their orientation and of
their colour is almost as good as when the stimuli are
adjacent (Danilova, Mollon, 2003, 2005). Such performance challenges the ‘single cell’ hypothesis mainly because performance based on such ‘labelled lines’ should
deteriorate with separation, since it is known that axons have limited length and their connections become
sparser with distance. Instead, one can postulate that
at high levels of the brain, the sensory properties of the
stimuli (e.g. their spatial frequencies, contrasts, orientations, colours) can be represented by a code that travels on a cerebral bus independently of the neurons that
carry it. We do not know the nature of this code, but in
psychophysical experiments we can ask what information such a code can carry and whether this information
can travel between hemispheres without degradation.
In present study we asked whether discrimination
deteriorates when the two stimuli fall in different hemifields rather than the same hemifield. In the former
case, the comparison requires transmission of information across the corpus callosum. Secondly, we ask is
whether there exist systematic hemifield differences in
the discrimination of spatial frequency, of orientation,
of contrast, or of colour. A widespread view is that
the two hemispheres have different specialisations. A
large set of psychophysical studies of normal subjects
have attempted to reveal such specializations in various
visual tasks by confining stimuli to one or other visual
hemifield.
We carried out two series of psychophysical experiments. In both series, we measured discrimination
thresholds for spatial frequency, orientation, contrast
or colours. In the case of colour, we made separate
measurements for the two cardinal axes of colour space,
* Support:
The Wellcome Trust 072684/Z/03/Z.
which correspond to two morphologically distinct channels in the visual pathway: one channel (L/M) compares
the signal of the long- and middle-wave cones, the other
(S) compares the short-wave cone signal with that of the
other two.
In the first experimental series, discrimination
thresholds were measured as a function of the spatial separation between two stimuli presented simultaneously for 100 msec. A staircase procedure with
a 3:1 rule was used to estimate thresholds. The stimuli were either two Gabor patches (in the case of spatial frequency, orientation and contrast) or sectors of
an annulus centred on the fixation point (in colour discriminations). In order not to confound separation and
eccentricity, the centres of the stimuli lay on an imaginary circle of 5 angular degrees radius. At the minimal
separation the two patches were adjacent, and at the
largest separation (10 degrees of visual angle) their centres were on an imaginary diameter. The position of the
two stimuli was random and one averaged threshold was
measured for all positions in the visual field. This experiment was not designed specifically to measure hemifield
differences, but we recorded each presentation and after the experiments were completed, we reconstructed
the percent of correct responses separately for stimuli
occurring in left, right, upper or lower hemifields, and
also for the cases when two stimuli fell into the same
hemisphere or different hemispheres.
The second experimental series was designed explicitly to test hemifield differences. We presented two
simultaneous stimuli at fixed separation (7.5 degrees
of visual angle) and tested only colour discrimination.
Four thresholds were measured simultaneously using
randomly interleaved staircases. The two stimuli fell
randomly into different hemifields (left, right, upper,
lower).
The first experiments showed no significant differences according to whether stimuli fell in the same or
different hemifields. The second series confirmed this
result for colour discrimination along S and LM axis.
In both series, we also measured response times to
see whether there is a trade-off between accuracy and
speed of performance. In no case was there a significant difference between the case where the comparison
can potentially be completed within one hemisphere and
the case where information must be transmitted across
the corpus callosum. Thus the accuracy of comparison
in the case where the stimuli were addressed to opposite hemispheres was not achieved by longer processing
times.
Given this result, it was unsurprising that neither
discrimination thresholds, nor response times showed
systematic right-left hemifield differences, although previously such differences have been reported (review,
43
Christman, 1989, spatial frequency, different hemifield
advantage in different studies; White, 1971, orientation,
right hemifield advantage; Davidoff 1976, colour, left
hemifield advantage). We suggest that the hemifield
effects reported might arise from attentional biases that
are secondary to the primary task and that the present
experiments more successfully ensured that the subject’s
attention was evenly distributed between hemifields.
There were no systematic differences in the thresholds and response times according to whether the two
stimuli were presented in the upper or the lower visual
field.
The results of our experiments make it unlikely
that the comparison of attributes of spatially separated
objects depends on hard-wired local comparators, or
dedicated local circuits. We have suggested instead
that stimulus attributes are represented by an abstract
code that is independent of the neurons that carry it
(Danilova & Mollon, 2003). The identity of this code is
not, of course, known. The code allows interchange of
information between the two cerebral hemispheres with-
out degradation. Since comparison does not depend on
spatial separation, we can also exclude models in which
the two stimuli are analysed serially and performance is
limited by the rate at which attention is displaced across
the visual field.
References:
H. B. Barlow (1972). Single units and sensation: a neurone doctrine for perceptual psychology? Perception, 1,
371–394.
S. Christman (1989). Perceptual characteristics in visual
laterality research. Brain and Cognition, 11, 238–257.
M. V. Danilova, J. D. Mollon (2003). Comparison at a
distance. Perception, 32, 395–414.
J. Davidoff (1976). Quart.J. Exp.Psychol. 28, 387–394.
M. V. Danilova, J. D. Mollon (2005). The comparison of
spatially separated colours. Vision Research. In press.
Lennie, P. (1998). Single units and visual cortical organization. Perception, 27, 889–936.
M. J. White (1971). Visual hemifield differences in the
perception of letters and contour orientation. Canadian
Journal of Psychology, 25, 207–212.
BEYOND INFORMATIVE INTENTION: REASONING AFTER
INTERPRETING
Louis de Saussure
Universities of Neuchatel and Geneva
(Switzerland)
The paper attempts to make a contribution from a cognitive approach of pragmatics (viewed as the study of
utterance understanding in context), to the domain of
conversation and discourse analysis (viewed as the study
of organised sets of utterances bearing relationships).
The starting point is the basic fact that the interpretation of an utterance by a hearer (partially) determines the next speech turn. I address this determination
through the hypothesis that the logical properties of the
automatic reasoning at work in utterance understanding, being deductive-non-demonstrative in the framework, entail some level of determination in the raising
of a new informative intention. The paper is based on
the Sperber-Wilson relevance-theoretic model and on
previous works by the author on ‘procedural pragmatics’.
Except in dynamic discourse semantics such as DRT
and SDRT, many frameworks in semantics and gricean
pragmatics avoid questioning larger frames of text and
conversation. In particular, approaches in semantics
and gricean pragmatics refrain from questioning the
move from utterance interpretation to utterance production, assuming a ‘mirror’ model which only captures
the choice of a form given an informative intention and a
context, leaving the analysis of production to discourse
analysis and conversational pragmatic approaches —
which are at the same time often regarded as weakly
theoretical or non-theoretical.
Pragmatic theories assume their interface with syntactic or semantic theories: they are dedicated to the
calculus of propositional forms given a previous formal
input and a context. On the contrary, discourse analysis is pretty much about the psychosocial or rhetorical
conditions and rules of speech production which would
guarantee discourse well-formation or coherence. Filling the gap that separates a theory of utterance understanding and a theory of discourse structure has been
the worry underlying serveral approaches, ‘Argumentation theory’ among them; but in the end it comes out
that conflicting views remain attached to discourse seen
as a process and as a whole.
The idea of the paper is to show that a cognitive theory of interpretation can extend to a cognitive theory of
conversation, at least to some aspects of it. The model
I propose takes implicatures as inputs for further nondemonstrative deductions, which in turn produce inferences that are even weaker than ‘weak implicatures’,
since they don’t take any explicit (granted) premiss at
all and may not concern what the speaker overtly communicates; these inferences, that we call ‘free conjectures’, need then to be confirmed, infirmed, forbidden
or held for further conversational purposes.
We suggest that a number of these free conjectures are hypotheses that the hearer makes about the
speaker’s beliefs, intentions (informative and non informative) and goals. Thus, the range of problems concerned with the approach allows for some novel perspectives in the study of interaction, argumentation, negotiation and persuasion in discourse, complementarily to
psychosocial approaches.
44
The paper argues that identifying the frontier between implicatures and free conjectures is as much crucial as it is for complex frontier between explicatures
(propositions explicitly conveyed) and implicatures, for
it links cognitive processes of utterance understanding
to cognitive processes of utterance production.
References:
Saussure L. de (2003), Temps et pertinence, Bruxelles,
De Boeck.
Saussure L. de (2004), ‘Pragmatique, praxis, contexte
social, contexte logique’, Cahiers de linguistique française
26, 437–456.
Saussure L. de (in press), ‘Pragmatique procédurale et
discours’, Revue de sémantique et pragmatique.
Saussure L. de (in press), ‘Manipulation and Cognitive
pragmatics: preliminary hypotheses’ in de Saussure L. &
P. Schulz (Eds), Manipulation and ideologies in the totalitarian regimes of the twentieth century: Discourse, language,
mind, Amsterdam — Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
Sperber D. & Wilson D. (1995), Relevance. Communication and cognition, Oxford, Blackwell (2nd ed).
TOWARDS A COGNITIVE MODEL OF VARIATION AND
LANGUAGE CHANGE CENTERED ON CONSTRUCTIONAL
FUZZINESS
Guillaume Desagulier
Université Paris 8 (Paris, France)
In the wake of Desagulier (2005), this paper explores the
mechanisms of variation and language change within
an integrative cognitive framework that combines the
assets of Cognitive Grammar (Langacker 1987, 1991),
Construction Grammars and Conceptual Integration
Networks.
From a usage-based perspective, a construction is
both conservative and innovative. On the one hand, the
symbolic form / meaning pairing is relatively stabilized
insofar as it is the conventional product of an abstraction from linguistic experience on a collective scale. On
the other hand, speakers do not reproduce exactly the
same pairings, which makes reanalysis possible. That
differential defines what we call a zone of potential development for each construction, which is precisely what
enables grammar to keep pace with language flexibility.
Our working assumption is that it is by studying intermediate forms that we can gain a better understanding of creativity and innovation, from both a linguistic
and a cognitive perspective. That is why we argue in
favor of a Fuzzy Construction Grammar. Our case studies tend to show that form / function reshuffling is best
understood as a grammatical blend (figure 1), for which
we offer a new definition, based on a critical examination of the works by Fauconnier and Turner (1996 and
2001).
We see those constructional integration networks as
the keystone of our model. They hinge on the following principle: a construction that is cognitively salient
provides solid ground for structure of speakers’ mental
grammar. This stable symbolic unit can thus (i) be retrieved wholly or partially to provide a template for the
composition of new constructions (ii) help speakers /
hearers gain access to more complex pairings.
Especially revealing in this regard is the fuzzi-
ness attached to the genitive of measure (Det1 Det2
NP1 measure ‘S NP2 uncount ) exemplified below:
1. (1) He was sentenced to Ø twenty years’ imprisonment.
2. (2) The seats outside us were occupied by two
middle aged women who were going to London for
a week’s holiday (M. John Harrison, The Course
of the Heart, quoted in Larreya 1995)
3. (3) Afternoon 13:30 start from the Crown for a
5 12 miles’ walk through Brackmills Woods.
Owing to the ambiguity concerning the scope of
the determiners, the multifunctionality of <s> (plural/
POSS morpheme/ ‘linking s’ ?) and the instability of
<’> in written discourse, this construction is particularly challenging for speakers / hearers who, in nonexpert situations of communication, will cognitively respond by reanalysing it in light of a similar one which
is more readily accessible. Consequently there can be
considerable variation in the use of this construction, as
in (2): (a) for two weeks holiday, (b) for a two-week’s
holiday, (c) for a two week holiday, (d) for a two-week
holiday, (e) for a two weeks holiday, (f) for two week’s
holiday, etc. Taylor (1996) treats the not so clear-cut
distinction between possessives and compounds in terms
of ‘fudging’ (1996: §11.2). Alternatively, drawing on
and Fauconnier and Turner 1996 and Fauconnier 1997,
I consider that ‘fuzzy’ instantiations of the genitive of
measure are constructional blends that integrate component elements from two inputs, namely the constructional schemas associated with the prototypical genitive
of measure and nominal compounds.
‘Fuzzy’ grammatical categories, which are traditionally perceived as exceptions, may well be the norm when
considered from a constructional (and therefore cognitive) perspective.
45
F
M
F
1
0
0
1
M
1
0
0
1
input 1
input 2
F
M
1
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
F: form
M: meaning
constructional blend
Figure 1. Constructional integration network.
References:
Desagulier G. (2005). Grammatical blending and the
conceptualization of complex cases of interpretational overlap: the case of want to / wanna. To appear in Ruiz de
Mendoza Ibáñez, Francisco José (ed.), Annual Review of
Cognitive Linguistics, Vol. 3, John Benjamins.
Fauconnier, G. 1997. Mappings in Thought and Language. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Fauconnier, G. and M. Turner, 1996. Blending as a
Central Process of Grammar. In Goldberg, A. (ed.), Conceptual Structure, Discourse, and Language. Stanford: Centre for the Study of Language and Information (CSLI). Pages
113–129.
======. 2001. Conceptual Integration Net-
works (Expanded web version, 10 February 2001). http:
//www.wam.umd.edu/~mturn.
Langacker, R. W. 1987. Foundations of Cognitive Grammar: Theoretical Prerequisites (Vol. 1). Stanford, Cal.:
Stanford University Press.
======. 1991. Foundations of Cognitive Grammar: Descriptive Application (Vol. 2). Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University Press.
Larreya, P. 1995. Existe-t-il en anglais plusieurs
types de génitifs? In Dupuy-Engelhardt (ed), Mélanges en
l’honneur de G. Hily-Mane. C. I. R. L. P. C. Reims. 105–121.
Taylor, J. R. 1996 [2000]. Possessives in English. An Exploration in Cognitive Grammar. New York, Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
WAYS OF TRYING IN RUSSIAN: CLUSTERING BEHAVIORAL
PROFILES
Dagmar Divjak1 , Stefan Th. Gries2
1
Katholieke Universiteit Leuven
(Leuven, Belgium)
2
University of California (Santa Barbara, USA)
Virtually all research on near synonymy must address
the following three problems: which words should be
mentioned in one entry, how do those words relate to
each other and how can they be distinguished from each
other? In this paper, we present a largely objective and
verifiable approach to tackle the structuring and description problems. We use the example of near-synonymous
tentative verbs in Russian (i.e., verbs that in combination with an infinitive express ‘trying’) to exemplify our
methodology, but wish to emphasize from the outset
that it is applicable to other areas of lexical semantics.
The set of words considered nearly synonymous
expressions of ‘Try’ in Russian differs considerably
across researchers: Apresjan et al. (1999) list a core
group of four verbs (probovat’, pytat’sja, starat’sja,
silit’sja), Černova (1996) lists nine verbs (probovat’, pytat’sja, starat’sja, norovit’, silit’sja, tščit’sja, iskat’, domogat’sja, ne počesat’sja), and while Evgen’eva (2001)
also lists nine verbs, these verbs are split up into two
groups; the first consists only of pytat’sja and probovat’, the second consists of synonyms of starat’sja,
namely stremit’sja, pytat’sja, norovit’, silit’sja, tščit’sja,
pyžit’sja. Moreover, not only do the above mentioned
studies opt for differently-sized groups, they also structure the sets of verbs differently such that, for example, Apresjan et al. (1999) join probovat’ and starat’sja
within a small central group whereas Evgen’eva (2001)
joins probovat’ only with pytat’sja, leaving all other
verbs for the second group.
The description problem, then, is concerned with the
fact that, while many subtle differences between candidate words have been discovered, much of traditional
semantic / lexicographic analysis is based on largely intuitive classifications and the interpretation of classical
semantic tests rather than on objective and replicable
ways of analysis.
We retrieved 1,585 occurrences of these verbs taken
from corpora and the WWW and hand-coded each particular instance in terms of 87 variables for a maximally comprehensive database for how each verb is used.
These variables include
46
• morphosyntactic characteristics of the tentative
verb: in the citation, what are its tense, aspect,
and mode?
physical, perception, speech, intellectual activity,
etc.
This coding process resulted in a table of approximately 137,000 data points. The absolute frequencies
of occurrence of particular features with particular verbs
were transformed into relative frequencies; the resulting
distance matrix was evaluated by means of two cluster analyses. The first analysis was a regular hierarchical agglomerative cluster analysis, which was sub• semantic characteristics of the adverbs, particles, sequently supported by the results of a phylogenetic
clustering algorithm producing the radial network repand connectors used in the citation
resentation in Figure 1. Both analyses result in identi• semantic characteristics of the infinitive that fol- cal trees with three clusters, that by and large coincide
lows the tentative verb using the domains and with the groupings proposed by the above quoted native
primitives developed by Apresjan et al. (1995): speakers-lexicographers.
• clause-related characteristics for the tentative
verb: in the citation, is the verb used in a main
clause or a subordinate clause and in what type of
sentence (declarative, interrogative, imperative,
exclamative) is it used?
Figure 1. A corpus-based radial network of verbs of TRY-ing.
^
pyzit’sja
^
tuzit’sja
probovat’
[YOU CAN’T SUCCEEED]
^^
tscit’sja
[YOU COULD SUCCEEED]
pytat’sja
norovit’
starat’sja
poryvat’sja
[YOU WON’T SUCCEEED]
silit’sja
The trees are further analyzed in two ways. On the
one hand, we investigate between-cluster similarity, i.e.,
we compare the three different clusters to each other on
the basis of t-values. On the other hand, we describe the
within-cluster (dis)similarities on the basis of z-scores
that reflect differences between verbs. These values reveal which variables are strongly associated with a particular cluster or with a verb. We see, for example,
for adverbs that starat’sja, which stresses intensity, expresses a stronger attempt than pytat’sja that prefers
repetition, and that silit’sja is found with adverbs that
express vainness.
In conclusion, we believe this approach is promising
in at least four respects:
ii. the analysis is more objective than many other
approaches since it is largely based on objective
bottom-up statistical procedures;
iii. the analysis is more precise since even the most
minute distributional or semantic distinctions’ influences is used to investigate the set of words of
interest;
iv. the analysis is more explicit since only explicitly
coded information that has been entered into the
database is involved in determining the structure
of the semantic field.
i. the analysis is comprehensive taking into account
Given all these advantages as well as the fact that
a large number of data;
the variables identified as relevant for the network can
47
immediately be incorporated into different studies —
References:
for example, to what degree do the relevant variables
STC9UV?< W X 9E ?@ ) aid the acquisition of the semantic field by young chil
Y;UZF? [\UUZ>9 &@;F?C>
dren? — we hope that this paper will stimulate reSTC9UV?<
W X 9E ?@ lated research in lexical semantics. In addition, results
9= Y;UZF?
of this type may also be relevant to researchers from ]
&Z;@? W?^_Z> [\UUZ;V `\@aE\C_
neighboring disciplines, such as psycholinguistics, when
A] 9C<;F? &b it comes to formulating and evaluating hypotheses con- !
" # $
cerning the interaction between grammar and lexicon %
& `>C;F %^=?E9@aUEF; bcde
in language acquisition and the mental reality of radial
fFD9<a9F? Sd G9=H ! ' ' 9= g;UZF? SUEC9@a S&7
networks.
HOW TO AVOID ASSIGNING AGENCY IN RUSSIAN
Dagmar Divjak1 , Laura A. Janda2
1
Katholieke Universiteit Leuven
(Leuven, Belgium)
2
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
(Chapel Hill, North Carolina, USA)
This presentation focuses on grammatical constructions
that attenuate or eliminate the expression of agency,
a syntactic pattern that is highly conventionalized in
Russian, but less prominent in other Slavic languages.
Russian has a particularly rich assortment of so-called
impersonal constructions; we will explore in detail those
constructions that consist of a finite verb with neuter
singular agreement and a dative, such as (1), as well
as such constructions that also contain an infinitive,
as in (2). There is sharp disagreement about how the
components of these types of construction interact (for
an overview of scholarship see Guiraud-Weber 1984 or
Bricyn 1990). The disparity of views concerns the structure of the construction as a whole (is it monopartite or
bipartite?), the status of the infinitive (does it function
as a grammatical subject or not?) and the function of
the dative (is it the semantic subject or not?). Our objective is to show that not all impersonal constructions
with a finite verb and dative are equal: depending on
the status of the finite verb (does it function as main
verb of the construction or not?), the elements making
up the construction, here dative and infinitive, interact
with each other in different ways (Croft 2001). Moreover, we intend to measure up the linguistic claims we
make against psycholinguistic evidence.
First, we present the results of a linguistic analysis in
which we look at the way a verb’s argument structure
is construed, at the use of grammatical case in each
construction type and at the implications for agentivity
of the differences in the way these components interact.
Elicitation experiments with 15 native speakers of Russian reveal that the infinitive in constructions such as (2)
does not function as the subject (as in 6) or object (as
in 3) of the finite verb, but is part of the complex predicate that consists of both finite verb and infinitive (cf.
Pocheptsov 1997: 476). On a cognitive linguistic view,
different ways of encoding signal different sorts of relationships between the participants (Langacker 1987).
Making use of the differences in the relations between
the elements in a construction we will show that, in the
case of impersonal constructions, we are dealing with
a scale of deagentivization: the scale ranges from the
typical nominative agent as in the personal construction (4), through a dative agentive experiencer or
an agent who carries out the infinitive action but does
not initiate the finite verb action as in the impersonal
construction (5) to a true experiencer as in (1) and (6).
Next, we plan to present the results of a psycholinguistic experiment in which we test whether the linguistic encoding of agency affects the way in which native
speakers assign responsibility for an event. We will work
with 35 native speakers of English, whose language favors personal constructions with a prototypical nominative agent, and 35 native speakers of Russian, whose
language has a wide range of impersonal constructions
that display a scale of agentivity to express similar concepts. This will reveal whether and to what extent the
personal vs impersonal structure of a language influences the speaker’s perception of the agentive structure
that underlies an event.
Examples:
(1) Emu
Himdat m sg
bylo
xolodno.
it wasimpf ind past 3 n sg
cold
He was cold.
(2) Stariku
Old mandat m sg
chotelos’
vernut’sja
na rodinu.
it wantedimpf ind past 3 n sg refl
returnpf inf
to home country
The old man wanted to return to his home country.
48
Čto
emu
chotelos’ ?
*Vernut’sja
na rodinu.
Whatacc sg
himdat m sg
it wantedimpf ind past 3 n sg refl ?
To returnpf inf
to home country.
What did he want? *To return to his home country.
(3) Kompania
Companynom f sg
planiruet
predstavit’
novuju
igrušku.
plansimpf ind pres 3 n sg
presentpf inf
new
toy
The company plans to present a new toy.
Čto
kompania
planiruet?
Predstavit’
novuju igrušku.
Whatacc sg
companynom f sg
plansimpf ind pres 3 n sg ?
To presentpf inf
a new
toy
What does the company plan? To present a new toy.
(4) My
Wenom pl
pokazalis’
vraču.
to showpf ind past 3pl refl
to doctor
We went to see a doctor.
(5) Nam
Usdat pl
ponadobilos’
pokazat’sja
vraču.
it was necessaryimpf ind past 3 n sg
to showpf inf refl
to doctor
We had to go and see a doctor.
Čto
nam
ponadobitsja?
*Pokazat’sja
vraču.
Whatacc sg
usdat m pl
it is necessaryimpf ind pres 3sg ?
To showpf inf refl
to doctor.
What do we need? *To go and see a doctor.
(6) Rebenku
Kiddat m sg
nadoelo
čitat’.
it boredpf ind past 3 n sg
to readimpf inf
Reading bored the kid / the kid got bored with reading.
Čto
nadoelo
rebenku?
Čitat’.
Whatacc sg
boredpf ind past 3sg
kiddat m sg ?
To read impf inf .
What bored the kid? Reading / to read.
References:
'C>:_< b Y 3 !
- - -33 3 /. `>9F
Croft, W. 2001. Radical Construction Grammar: Syntactic Theory in Typological Perspective. Oxford: Oxford U
Press.
Guiraud-Weber, M. 1984. Les propositions sans nominatif en russe moderne. Paris (Bibliothèque Russe de
l’institut d’études Slaves, vol. LXIX)
Langacker, R. W. 1987. Foundations of Cognitive Grammar: Theoretical Prerequisites. Stanford: SUP.
Pocheptsov, G. G. Quasi-impersonal verbs in Old and
Middle English in Studies in Middle English Linguistics
edited by Jacek Fisiak. Berlin&New York: Mouton de
Gruyter, 469–488.
49
SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE REPRESENTATION
AND THE REPRESENTATION OF SOCIAL ACTORS: WHEN
TALKING ABOUT HUMAN REPRODUCTION MEANS TALKING
ABOUT PARENTHOOD REPRESENTATIONS
Rosana Dolón
Methodological framework
University of Valencia (Valencia, Spain)
I have relied on Critical Discourse Analysis as a multidisciplinary field embracing a diversity of approaches to
and methods for analysing texts critically (e.g. Fairclough, 1992, 1993, 1995; Janks 1997; VanLeeuwen
1996; Wodak & Ludwig 1999). The text is an expression of particular representations, inasmuch as it carries
particular ideologies and in its potential for recontextualising a social practice (Fairclough 1995:57).
More specifically I have drawn on Social Psychology
(e.g. Billig 2001; Gergen 1994; Giddens 1991; Potter
1998, Wetherell 2001). The link between discourse, society and culture is well established through the studies
done by social psychologists, for whom discursive practices embrace the ways in which people actively produce
social and psychological realities. I have studied the dynamic enactment of strategies for self-representational
choices to trace the ways in which underlying cognitively
represented attitudes are related to evaluative practices
of prejudice in our corpus.
Within the general framework of CDA, I have also
relied on Van Dijk’s socio-cognitive approach and his
account of mental models. The author focuses on discourse, cognition and society as three interacting and
mutually dependent factors (e.g. VanDijk 1988, 1997).
He operates with memory as a mental structure where
stored information is organised into various types of
mental representations with distinct schematic structures. The mental model instantiates shared social
knowledge, attitudes and ideologies. Tracing the procedural relations between actions, the relationship between the purpose- and precondition-slot in our corpus
allows us to access the perception-conditioned representation of culturally salient and accepted representations
of parenthood.
This research is based on a corpus of thirty-four
samples comprising popular science books and science
textbooks targeted at children and teenagers, containing explicit information about human reproduction: the
edition of the samples covers the time span from 1995
to 2004. Original Spanish books as well as translations
from English books have been considered.
Introduction
This paper examines the politics at work in the representation of knowledge in popular science when addressing scientific issues related to human reproduction. The present study is part of a larger project*
on a critical discourse analysis of the discursive construction of identities. This specific article provides a
critical investigation of the intersection between scientific knowledge representation and the representation
of parenthood models. Our analysis of bibliographical
sources of popular science and science textbooks explicitly addressed to children and teenagers, and intended
to inform about human reproduction, renders insightful information about representational practices of parenthood relations, which often proves to reveal sources
of stereotypical ideological representations. The study
embraces three interdependent aspects: how are the social actors within the domain of parenthood represented;
how is the representation / non-representation textually
achieved; and what does the representational practice
tell us about underlying power dynamics at work.
Research aim
The aims of this paper are twofold. On the one hand
it illustrates and discusses discursive, rhetorical and
interpretative resources to talk about and legitimate
stereotypical parenthood representations. On the other
hand it documents the constructive ideological processes used to position non-conventional parental models and relations as ‘outsiders’ and beyond acceptable
order. The representation of scientific knowledge serves
in this sense a purpose of narrative positioning strategy
which legitimises stereotypically accepted parenthood
constellations while morally and socially excluding nonconventional parenting forms and relations (e.g. single
parenting, gay parenting). Our concern here is to unveil
the mechanisms of knowledge representation coexisting with an underlying exclusionary discourse practice
that delegitimises specific cultural and social representations. The ultimate aim is, hence, to unveil discriminatory attitudes through educational material, where
ideological processes are constructed based on features
of emotional bonding, which are irrelevant to scientific
knowledge representation.
References (reduced list):
Billig, M. (2001). Discursive, rhetorical and ideological
messages. In: M. Wetherell, S. Taylor & S. J. Yates (eds.).
Discourse Theory and Practice. A Reader. London: Sage
Publications, pp. 210–221.
Fairclough, N. (1992). Discourse and Social Change.
Cambridge: Polity Press.
* This paper is part of a project on The Discursive Construction of Identities, financed by the Generalitat Valenciana: Gestió de
Investigació, 2005–2006.
50
Fairclough, N. (1995). Critical Discourse Analysis. The
Critical Study of Language. London: Longman.
Giddens, A. (1991). Modernity and Self-Identity: Self
and Society in the Late Modern Age. Cambridge: Polity
Press.
Hall, S. (ed.) (1997). Representation: Cultural Representations and Signifying Practices. London: Sage.
Kress, G. & Hodge, R. (1979). Language as Ideology.
London: Routledge.
Langacker, R. W. (1987). Foundations of Cognitive
Grammar, vol.1, Theoretical Prerequisites. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Langacker, R. W. (1993). Grammatical traces of some
‘invisible’ semantic constructs. Language Sciences 15,
323–355.
Langacker, R. W. (1999). Grammar and Conceptualisation. Berlin, New York: Mouton de Gruyter.
Potter, J. (1998). Discursive social psychology: from
attitudes to evaluative practices. In: W. Stroebe &
M. Hewstone (eds.) European Review of Social Psychology
(vol.9, pp.233–266).
Van Dijk, T. A. (1984). Prejudice and Discourse. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
Van Dijk, T. A. (1988). News as Discourse. Hillsdale,
New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Van Dijk, T. A. (1993). Elite Discourse and Racism.
Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
Van Dijk, T. A. (1995). Discourse Analysis as Ideology
Analysis. En: Schaffner, C. & A. Wenden (eds.) Language
and Peace. Dartmouth: Aldershot: 17–33.
VanLeeuwen, T. (1996). The representation of social
actors. En: Caldas-Coulthard, C. R. & Coulthard, M. Texts
and Practices. London: Routledge: 32–70.
Minds, selves and senseWetherell, M. (2001).
making. En: Wetherell, M., S. Taylor & S. Yates (eds.)
Discourse Theory and Practice. A Reader. London: Sage
Publications: 186–197.
Wodak, R. & Ludwig, Ch. (eds.). (1999). Challenges
in a Changing World: Issues in Critical Discourse Analysis.Vienna: Passagenverlag.
THE HIGH-LEVEL LANGUAGE APTITUDE BATTERY
Catherine J. Doughty
University of Maryland (College Park, USA)
The SLA group at CASL is currently addressing the
question of whether adult L2 learners who reach very
high levels of ultimate attainment do so because they
have an aptitude for language. This question is of theoretical interest with regard to explaining observed individual differences and the wide-range of variation in
outcomes in post-critical period language learning. It is
also of practical interest for selection of candidates for
language training programs with the goal of near-native
L2 proficiency, particularly for difficult languages that
require investing several years to learn.
At the outset of the research, we determined that
there are no suitable tests for high-level language aptitude; thus, we have undertaken to develop one. This
presentation will present and demonstrate the HighLevel Language Aptitude Battery (HiLAB) prototype.
HiLAB differs from existing aptitude tests in the following ways:
• The aim is to predict ultimate attainment rather
than rate of success in early stages of SLA.
• HiLAB constructs are hypothesized on the basis
of current SLA theory.
• In the development phase, we contemplate including measures that operationalize aptitude in every
aspect of language: phonology, morphology, syntax, lexicon, semantics, and pragmatics.
This presentation will discuss the systematic approach to HiLAB development and demonstrate the 8–
10 measures that have been developed to date (e.g.,
several types of priming measures, two different stroop
tests, non-word span, speeded category recall, speech
in noise tests; phonemic encoding; processing speed).
I will discuss each HiLAB construct that has been proposed, demonstrate how it has been operationalized into
one or more measures, and argue its relationship to language learning.
In addition to the basic goal of developing a test that
will predict success at high-level attainment, we are also
interested in several aptitude research questions. Time
permitting, I will raise and discuss these issues:
• Is aptitude a separable cognitive trait, or does it
always interact with online processing, such that
what really must be measured are aptitude complexes?
• Does aptitude develop over time?
• Is aptitude for language domain specific?
• Can aptitude be used to determine which type of
instruction will be most effective for a particular
learner?
51
CHALLENGING THE POETICS OF MIND: SOME OBJECTIONS TO
COGNITIVE POETICS’ UNDERSTANDING OF METAPHOR
Thomas Eder
Institut für Germanistik der Universität Wien
(Austria)
Cognitive poetics is an interdisciplinary field of research
in which literature is examined with the methods of cognitive science. The umbrella term cognitive science
combines various different scientific disciplines: cognitive psychology, psycholinguistics, artificial intelligence
research and certain branches of linguistics and theory
of science in general. Cognitive poetics examines how
poetic language and gestalt are influenced by the information processing of human symbol production. Although cognitive poetics tries to avoid a reductionist
view of poetry (poetry cannot be reduced to psychological, neurological and finally physical events), approaches
of cognitive poetics up to now have taken theories from
cognitive science to analyze literary texts without questioning them to the last extent.
This is the point where my criticism sets in: work
in cognitive poetics up to now seems to be based on
an understanding of the poetic that is a bit too narrow, antiquated and unfit particularly for the central
operation of poetry: metaphor and figurative language.
Cognitive approaches dealing with figurative language
believed to have added a new component to general
cognitive science focused on literal language and to have
found a way to describe the actual functioning of human cognition more accurately, as it is supposed to be
structured by figurative and poetic processes even in its
everyday, non-literary components (cf. Gibbs 1994, 1).
In my paper I will try to present some objections to
both, Lakoff’s and Gibb’s approaches to conceptual accounts of metaphor, which are grounded in the notion
of embodiment. I will try to outline a) an empiricalcognitivist objection (Glucksberg / McGlone 1999, Murphy 1997) b) an analytic philosophical objection (Guttenplan 2005, White 1996, Fogelin 1988, Leezenberg
2001) and c) an intermediate position between empirical and philosophical approaches (McGlone 2001, Jackendoff / Aaron 1991). I strictly discern contemporary theory of metaphor from Fauconnier / Turner’s
(2002) concept of conceptual blending, which seems a
more appropriate explanation simply because it copes
with dynamic interpretation of metaphors.
In addition to that theoretical considerations I will
apply the mentioned cognitive approaches to the reading of poetry. In a partial close reading of Hoelderlin’s poem Andenken (Remembrance) I will try to
show that the cognitive account can not entirely come
to grips with the metaphorical dimensions in this poem.
So in the end I ask why literary theory should resort
to cognitive science when reading poetry and dealing
with figurative language. I try to find some answers
which take into consideration Hoelderlin’s poetologi-
cal text Ueber die Verfahrungsweise des poetischen
Geistes. Does Hoelderlin’s poetry provide some kind
of poetics of knowledge which could be made consistent
with nowadays’ cognitive science and neurophysiology?
References:
Fauconnier / Turner 2002 = Gilles Fauconnier, Mark
Turner, Conceptual Blending and the Mind’s Hidden Complexities, Basic Books
Fogelin 1988 = R. Fogelin, Figuratively Speaking, New
Haven: Yale UP
Gibbs 1994 = Raymond W. Gibbs jr., The Poetics of
Mind. Figurative Thought, Language, and Understanding,
Cambridge: Cambridge UP
Glucksberg / McGlone 1999 = Sam Glucksberg and
Matthew S. McGlone, When love is not a journey: What
Metaphors mean, Journal of Pragmatics, 31, 1541–1558
Guttenplan 2005 = Samuel Guttenplan, Objects of
Metaphor, Oxford: Oxford UP
Jackendoff / Aaron 1991 = Ray Jackendoff and David
Aaron, Review of More than Cool Reason, Language, 67,
320–338
McGlone 2001 = Matthew S. McGlone, Concepts as
Metaphors, Sam Glucksberg, Understanding Figurative
Language, New York: Oxford UP, 90–107
Murphy 1996 = Gregory L. Murphy, On Metaphoric
Representation, Cognition, 60, 173–204
White 1996 = Roger White, The Structure of Metaphor:
The Way the Language of Metaphor Works, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing
52
SHORT AND LONG TIME PERCEPTION IN MULTIPLE
SCLEROSIS: INDICATIONS FOR A BEHAVIORAL SHIFT
Hamed Ekhtiari1, 3 , Ali Jannati1, 2 ,
Arian Behzadi1 , Majid Tavajohi1 ,
Jamshid Lotfi2, 3
1
Iranian National Center for Addiction Studies
(Tehran, Iran)
2
Tehran University of Medical Sciences
(Tehran, Iran)
3
Iranian Multiple Sclerosis Society (Tehran, Iran)
Introduction: Time Perception is a cognitive process
related to monitoring and comparing the sequences of
different events in the timeline, capability of anticipating the onset / offset time of events, and also planning
and organizing future behaviors. It consists of two major components: short time estimation and future time
horizon, of which the first is evaluated by Time Perception Tasks and the second by Delayed Discounting
(DD) Task .Time Perception has been assessed using
different methods: 1) Time Estimation (TE): estimating one particular time interval, 2) Time Reproduction
(TR): behaviorally producing a time interval based on
a duration estimated by the subject. DD Procedure
is defined as discounting of the value related to a reward or punishment due to a delay in their presentation.
Executive factors including attention, working memory,
and cognitive load affect this process, but emotional aspects are also involved as of impulsive behaviors. It has
been shown that different neuropsychological disorders
may affect these two abilities including brain injuries,
Parkinsonism, Attention Deficit / Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) and personality disorders. In this study, we
investigated the hypothesized changes in these abilities
in multiple sclerosis (MS) patients for the first time.
Methods: 40 patients (27 female) and 40 healthy
age- & sex-matched controls were included. Some con-
trol tasks were applied in order to match the two groups
including Raven Progressive Matrices, Beck Depression
inventory II. A comprehensive neuropsychological evaluation was performed. The MS clinical manifestations
were evaluated according to Estimated Disability Status
Scale (EDSS). None of the cases and the controls received any drug affecting the neuropsychological function. Time Estimation and Time Reproduction were
evaluated at 5, 8, 11, 14, 17, 21, and 23 seconds. Delayed Discounting Task was evaluated at 6 hours, 1 day,
1 week, 2 months, 6 months, 1 year, 5 years and 25 years
with facsimile monetary rewards in Persian currency.
Results: DDP was significantly lower in MS group
(K=0.043) in comparison with controls (K=0.073),
more prominently in patients with EDSS>3 (K=0.023).
Here K stands for a constant directly correlated with reward discounting. Our patients showed over-estimation
and over-reproduction in all short-time intervals compared with normal controls. Both DD Procedure and
Short Time Perception were fitted with a hyperbolic
function in both groups: F(t) = a/ (1+k∗t), t: time
interval, k: hyperbolic constant.
Discussion: Our findings show that the rewards
related to delay are more valuable for the patients
than the controls (decreased delay aversion in MS patients). Patients showed a lower impulsive trait and also
a more conservative approach in short- and long-time
perception. Less discounting of long-time delayed rewards (long time under-representation); short time overestimation and over-reproduction shows a characteristic
pattern of time perception in patients with multiple sclerosis. These findings reveal a cognitive shift in multiple sclerosis that is correlated with disease severity, but
neither with depression level nor with other evaluated
cognitive deficits.
THE MIRROR-NEURON SYSTEM AND DIFFERENCES
IN CORTICAL ACTIVATION PATTERNS FOR HAND
AND NON-BIOLOGICAL OBJECT MOVEMENTS
IN A WORKING-MEMORY TASK
Annerose Engel, Michael Burke, Siegfried (Rizzolatti, Fogassi, and Gallese, 2001). The directmatching hypothesis postulates that the observation of
Bien, and Frank Rösler
Philipps-Universität (Marburg, Germany)
Theories of code specific memory (e.g., Damasio, 1989)
postulate equally distributed activation patterns for encoding, storage, and retrieval. The observation of hand
or arm actions performed by other humans has been
found to activate inferior frontal areas, the superior temporal sulcus, and the inferior parietal lobe, i.e., structures assumed to comprise the mirror neuron system
movements executed by others activates the same structures as are required for the execution of self-performed
actions (Rizzolatti et al., 2001). Buccino et al. (2004)
suggested that actions that belong to the motor repertoire of an observer are mirrored in the human motor
system, while actions that do not belong to the human
motor repertoire (e.g., the movements of a dog’s snout)
can only be analyzed according to their visual properties.
Moreover, Grèzes, Costes, and Decety (1998) reported
that only the observation of meaningful but not mean-
53
ingless hand actions activated inferior frontal areas —
a fundamental part of the mirror neuron system.
In the present study we compared different types
of visually presented movements in a working memory
task. Stimuli were either meaningless hand movements
(i.e., biological objects and movement trajectories) or
movements of spheres (i.e., non-biological objects and
movement trajectories). We hypothesized that the hand
movements should activate the mirror neuron system,
whereas the object movements should activate only areas typical for visual movement analysis.
Using event-related fMRI, participants (N=12) encoded three meaningless (either hand or sphere) movements (for 6 s), maintained them (over a short delay of
8 s), and decided (by key-press) whether a test stimulus belonged to the memory set or not. For each type
of material (biological or non-biological movement), a
baseline of static hands or spheres and three experimental conditions with increasing complexity were constructed. Increasing complexity was realized by manipulating the memory-set size, i.e., the number of different movements presented in the encoding interval.
FMRI data (recorded by a 1.5 Tesla GE Signa Scanner,
19 slices, TR: 2sec, TE: 60 ms, flip angle: 80◦ , FOV:
240×240 mm2 , Matrix: 64×64) were pre-processed and
analyzed using SPM2 (Welcome Department of Cognitive Neurology, London, UK; http://www.fil.ion.
ucl.ac.uk/spm). A group analysis was calculated using a random effect model, treating participants’ responses as random variable. Statistical activation maps
were calculated for the experimental conditions of the
highest degree of difficulty compared against baseline
condition (three different movements > static hands /
spheres). Contrasts were assessed for the encoding and
retention time interval for each memory material.
Response latencies increased and response accuracies decreased with increasing task complexity (memory load) for both materials while the main effect of
material type was not significant. This indicates that
the behavioral demands were equivalent for encoding
and maintaining of object and hand movements. Second level analysis of fMRI data revealed for encoding of
hand movements activation of the inferior frontal gyrus
and the inferior parietal lobe bilaterally, and the right
superior temporal sulcus. In addition, bilaterally motor
and supplementary motor areas, the occipito-temporal
junction, and the left superior parietal lobe were acti-
vated. The encoding of object movements revealed similar (occipito-temporal junction, superior parietal lobe,
right superior temporal sulcus) but also distinct activation foci (right precentral and postcentral gyrus). During retention the hemodynamic responses were more circumscribed and restricted to the left hemisphere: Hand
movements activated frontal, premotor and parietal areas; object movements the left superior parietal lobe
and premotor area.
On average, the activations for object movements
were less pronounced compared to hand movements.
The amount of activations did not differ substantially
across participants. These results suggest that nonbiological object movements are encoded and stored
in a more idiosyncratic manner than biological hand
movements. Observation of hand movements activated
the mirror neuron system and the occipito-temporal
junction, while observation of object movements activated primarily the motion sensitive area of the occipitotemporal junction. Our results are consistent with the
central claim of the mirror neuron theory that says that
observed movements belonging to the human behavioral
repertoire are mirrored in the observers’ motor system
(Buccino et al. 2004). Our findings disagree with the
observation of Grèzes et al. (1998), who found that
meaningless hand movements did not activate the inferior frontal gyrus. Taken together the different activation patterns for hand and non-biological object movements support theories which assume the existence of
code specific memories.
References:
Buccino, G., Lui, F., Canessa, N., Pastteri, I., Lagravinese, G., Benuzzi, F., Porro, C., and Rizzolatti, G. (2004).
Neural circuits involved in the recognition of actions performed by nonconspecifics: An fMRI study. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 16 (1), 114–126.
Damasio, A. (1989). Time-locked multiregional retroactivation: A system-level proposal for the neuronal substrates
of recall and recognition. Cognition, 33, 25–62.
Grèzes, J., Costes, N., and Decety, J. (1998). Top-down
effect of stratety on the perception of human biological motion: a PET investigation. Cognitive Neuropsychology, 15,
553–82.
Rizzolatti, G., Fogassi, L., and Gallese, V. (2001). Neurophysiological mechanisms underlying the understanding
and imitation of action. Nature Review Neuroscience, 2 (9),
661–70.
54
PERCEPTION OF DOTTED RHYTHMS:
DISCOVERY OF AN AUDITORY ILLUSION
Dorottya Fabian, Emery Schubert
The University of New South Wales (Sydney,
Australia)
The performance of dotted rhythms in baroque music
received much attention from musicologists interested
in historical practices. A tacit assumption of this line
of research is that performance and perception are the
same. Given the conflicting views and interpretations
of the historical discourse on performing dotted rhythm
we chose an experimental approach to re-investigate the
matter. This resulted in the discovery of an auditory illusion which explains why disagreement over the correct
way of performing dotted rhythms is possible. The illusion itself might be explainable in terms of the perception of temporal silent gaps and ‘time shrinking’ effects.
In western musical notation dotted rhythms involve
a pair of notes, one of which is followed by a dot which
prolongs its value by half while the other’s value is reduced by the same amount. For example two consecutive quarter notes may be transformed so that they
become a dotted quarter (equalling 1.5) and an eighth
(equalling 0.5) respectively. Researchers of historical
performance practice debate whether dotted rhythms
should be performed as notated or in an over-dotted
manner according to the desired musical character (e.g.
Donington, 1989; Neumann, 1993). In other words they
suggest that the ratio of 0.75:0.25 (the relative proportion of time allotted to the two notes) for literal or mechanical dotting should be altered to 0.875:0.125 (that
is, proportionally more time allotted to the first of the
two notes), as sometimes indicated in musical notation
by the use of two dots following the long note. In their
focus on musical genres, affects and textures they ignore
other performance features such as tempo and pay only
cursory attention to articulation, that is, the shaping or
duration of notes in performance.
Using especially programmed MIDI sequences as well
as commercially available sound recordings we prepared
a series of studies to investigate the problem from a nonhistorical approach. We chose Variation 7 of J. S. Bach’s
Goldberg Variations which is a short piece with dotted patterns throughout. It is in compound (6/8) metre which means that the beat consists of three eighth
notes, instead of two described in the earlier example.
The repeated rhythmic pattern of the piece consists of
a dotted eighth note followed by a sixteenth and then
an eighth (0.75:0.25:0.5). First we created synthesized
stimuli where we manipulated dotting ratios, tempo and
articulation. We used two levels of dotting (mechanical
and double dotted), two levels of tempo (slow and fast)
and three levels of articulation (legato = all notes held
to full value; staccato 1 = dotted note shortened, and
staccato 2 = last eighth note shortened). The articulation of the middle note was not viable to manipulate be-
cause of its brevity especially at fast tempo. Sixty participants rated the stimuli on perceived dottedness, tempo
and articulation. The results showed that faster and/or
staccato versions were perceived as more dotted even
when the dotting ratio was unaltered. Next we studied 34 original sound recordings of international artists
of the same piece. Ninety-eight participants rated their
perceived dottedness, articulation, tempo and loudness.
Concurrently we made acoustic measurements of the
audio files with sound editing software. The results supported the existence of an auditory illusion: faster, more
staccato performances were rated as more dotted even
when the dotting ratio was lower than in legato interpretations (Fig. 1).
Figure 1a. Mean values of performed dotting ratios
(0.75=mechanical dotting).
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the illusion
is that it occurred most strongly when the third note
of the group (i.e. the eighth note that is independent
of the dotted pair) was played staccato. We are still
looking for a reason but it seems that this unusual phenomenon may be explained in terms of gap perception
and time-shrinking effects (Nakajima, 1987 and 2004).
Figure 1b. Mean values of perceived dotting
(9=very overdotted; 1=very underdotted)
Figure 1: Performed and perceived dotting across
5 groups of interpretations of Variation 7 from
J. S. Bach’s Goldberg Variations. Performances in Clusters A, B and G were similar in tempo with those in B
being more staccato. Cluster C performances were slow
55
and legato. Those in I were fast and staccato. The ception. Perception, 16 (4), 485–520.
Nakajima, Y., ten Hoopen, G., Sasaki, T., Yagraph shows that slow, legato performances were rated
mamoto,
K., Kadota, M., Simons, M., et al. (2004). Time
as less dotted while the fast, staccato I group was not
-shrinking:
the process of unilateral temporal assimilation.
perceived as under-dotted.
References:
Donington, R. (1989). The Interpretation of Early Music. London: Faber & Faber
Nakajima, Y. (1987). A Model of Empty Duration Per-
Perception, 33 (9), 1061–1079.
Neumann, F. (1993). Performance Practices of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries. New York: Schirmer
Books
COGNITIVE CRITERIA IN UNDERSTANDING DIACHRONICAL
CHANGES
Emese Fazakas
Babeş-Bolyai University (Cluj, Romania)
1. The Subject and the Aim of the Thesis
The presentation deals with the changes of the Hungarian verbal prefix alá ‘beneath’ through the history of
Hungarian language. The aim is to answer the questions: how this verbal prefix was used; and why Hungarian language had/has two verbal prefixes (le ‘down
and alá ‘beneath’) expressing the same movement, how
cognitive criteria can make us understand the changes
occured through time in the usage of the mentioned verbal prefix and how these criteria can be used for further
researches?
2. The Analysed Data
The sources of collected data are: the Ist , and VIIth
tomes of Erdélyi Magyar Szótörténeti Tár (Historical
Dictionary of Transylvanian Hungarian Language —
SzT.), the Nyelvtörténeti Szótár (Historical Dictionary
— NySz.), the repertory of letters and documents entitled Középkori leveleink 1541-ig (Letters from the Middle Ages — KLev., ed. by Attila Hegedűs and Lajos
Papp), and the codices of XV–XVIth century. The collected data also contains the prefixated verbs of Magyar Nyelv Értelmező Szótára (Dictionary of Hungarian
Language 1959–1962 — ÉrtSz.), and Magyar Értelmező
Kéziszótár (Concise Dictionary of Hungarian Language
2003 — ÉKSz.) to better illustrate the changes occured
through history.
3. The changes in usage of the verbal prefix alá
‘beneath’
Spatial orientation is a very important of our everyday
life. Naturally, spatial directions play an important role
in the structure of language. The verbal prefix alá appears early, at the second half of the XVth and XVIth
centuries. This is the result of the fact that at the beginning both verbal prefixes, le and alá were used in
Hungarian language to denote downwards movement.
At the end of the XVIth and beginning of XVIIth century changes started to occur, the results of which can
be seen in contemporary language. Alá1 used as a synonymy of le at the second half of the XVIth century
was pressed back it’s place being taken over by le. This
phenomena can be explained by the fact that while alá1
denoted only movements performed by en entire, whole
entity / object, te usage of le was not restricted: it could
denote movements of a part of something / someone or
of an entire substance / body. In support of that on
could see that there could not and cannot be present
in the language such forms as *aláül, *alákucorodik,
*alátérdepel while there are leül ‘to sit down’, lekucorodik ‘to crouch down’, letérdepel ‘to kneel down’.
In the cases in which both prefixes denoted downwards
movement of a part of something / someone, by the
verb prefixated with alá the subject appears as an entire, whole entity (cf. lehajlik ‘he/she bends down’ —
aláhajlik a feje ‘it’s head bends down’). Thus le denoting the primary direction could easily stand for alá1 .
Contemporary language contains only a few verbs prefixated with alá1 , and even these are used only in some
dialects and in literary language. Already at the second
half of the XVIIIth century le started to replace alá1
even in the expression alá (s) fel ‘down and up’ which
is still persisting in the language.
Within the verbs classified as representatives of updown relation — except for the case of ‘M(obil object)
gets above / under S(table object)’ — there are no
verbs prefixated with alá. The dominant verbal prefix
of the group ‘M gets above / under S’ is alá. This
alá2 is present as one of the markers of above-under
relation, and it differs from alá1 by the fact that the direction of movement is not vertical but horizontal, and
by the fact that it is not important which was the position of the M compared to the S before the movement,
but the fact that at the end of the movement the M
ends up under a S surface. While ancient texts contain
only a few verbs prefixated with alá2 the contemporary
data show that today alá2 appears by many verbs and is
present in language as the prototypical marker of the relation under (cf. alátesz ‘to put under’, aláfekszik ‘to
lie down under’, alászánt ‘to plough under’ etc.). The
role of alá2 could not and cannot be taken by le, because
le denotes first and almost a downwards movement, and
alá is used when on expresses that something / someone
gets under something / someone (cf. lefekszik a kocsi
56
alá ‘he/she lies down under a car’ — aláfekszik a kocsinak ‘he/she lies under a car’). The other chacarteristic
of alá2 is that it does not denote only that a M object
gets under a S surface, but it is used to denote that the
M object supports the S surface under which it arrives
(cf. alátámaszt ‘support, shore up’, aládúcol ‘underpin’
etc.). In the XVIIth century the verbal prefix fel got
the same sense (cf. feltámaszt ‘to shore up’, felpolcol
‘to stack up’), however it means only ‘sg supports sg’
and not ‘sg gets under sg’. The prefix fel is not the
synonym of alá2 , but the marker of the same relation
that is perceived in different ways. While the antonym
of alá1 is fel, in the case of alá2 on has the prototypical
term of the relation above fölé ‘(towards) above’.
In the presentation I delimitate two major groups
within the analysis of non-concrete movements: the
value-senses organized around spatial dimensions, and
metaphorical conceptualisation of abstract notions. The
research shows that the usage of verbal prefixes is determined by the perceived direction or relation, and the
changes are conditioned by redistribution of criteria of
categorisation. In the meantime I can state that concrete movements form a basis to metaphorical usage and
there is a close link between spatial relations, spatial dimensions and value-senses. In linguistic perception a
real space can appear in different ways, and it depends
on the speakers which of the linguistic elements are used
in a given context.
SPATIAL COGNITION AND ITS IMPAIRMENTS
Gabriella Felhosi, Rozalia Ivady,
Csaba Pléh
Budapest Technological University (Hungary)
Levinson (1996, 2003) argues that there are three main
frames of reference (intrinsic, relative and absolute).
Language thus is expected to shape spatial cognition
in a predictable way: the more a reference frame type
we use in our language the more that reference frame
shall be active and the more readily it should be triggered. Our investigations were threefold: on the one
hand we were trying to see how this frame usage develops in Hungarian native speaking children. The results
published in an earlier paper were inconclusive (Pléh,
Felhősi, Schnell, 2001), where there was a tendency towards egocentrism, though orienting objects did have
a large effect on performance. In the task children
saw a pencil then they had to turn around and they
saw two identical pencils that had different orientations.
They had to choose which looked in the same direction(Li & Gleitman, 2002). We were trying to see if
we can reproduce a significant effect of age in becoming more egocentric while using an egocentric language.
Also, we would like to show how spatial cognition (as
measured with Corsi blocks), language development (as
measured with TROG), general intelligence (measured
with RAVEN test) and theory of mind test (as measured with RMET-C) are all related to spatial reference
frames. We also measured the effect of an orienting
object, which would prove how superficial traits would
have an effect on a supposedly stable cognitive reference
frame.
Our second question was how the impairment of
spatial cognition in Williams syndrome was related to
performance in the reference frames task. Here unfortunately the results were inconclusive at least without
a carefully matched control group — maybe the lack of
this is due to the small number of participants (12), or
mental challenge that manifests itself in Williams syndrome in the non-verbal domain as well. Here we could
not show any tendency towards egocentrism, nor any
relation with verbal or spatial or general intelligence development, showing that reference frames either aren’t
stable in such an impairment, or children don’t use them
as readily.
References:
Pléh, Cs., Felhősi, G., Schnell, Zs. (2001). Nézzen
a ceruza ugyanarra. A téri vonatkoztatási rendszerek
változásai kisgyermekkorban. In: Andor, J., 161. Szucs, T.
és Terts, I. (eds.): Szı́nes eszmék nem alszanak. II Pécs:
Lingua Franca, 977–990
Levinson, S. C. (1996).
Frames of reference and
Molyneux’s question:
Crosslinguistic evidence.
In:
Bloom, P., Peterson, M. A., Nadel, R., Garrett, M. F. (eds.):
Language and Space. Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press
Levinson, S. (2003). Space in language and cognition.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Li, P., & Gleitman, L. (2002). Turning the tables: spatial language and spatial cognition. Cognition, 83, 265–294.
57
INFORMATION PROCESSING LIMITATIONS
AND LINGUISTIC STRUCTURE
August Fenk & Gertraud Fenk-Oczlon
University of Klagenfurt (Austria)
Cognitive constraints such as capacity limits or limited
time spans are a central issue in cognitive psychology. If
one adopts the view that language developed in adaptation or in co-evolution [1] with cognitive functions,
then information processing limits should also show in
language. This paper offers correlational facts regarding the close interrelationship between cognitive mechanisms and language universals. Such facts can only be
shown in the system of recent languages, thus representing only an instantaneous exposure of a hypothesized
co-evolutionary process. All manifestations of relevant
information processing limits discussed in psychology are
seen in natural languages, too — limits in terms of number of elements, in terms of time spans, and in terms of
the amount of information transmitted:
A central assumption of our previous crosslinguistic
studies was that the number of syllables per clause
will vary within the range of the magical number seven
plus minus two. The clauses used were of a special quality: simple declarative sentences encoding one predicate
argument structure in one intonation unit, such as blood
is red, the sun is shining, I thank the teacher etc. 22
German sentences of this sort were presented to native
speakers of 34 different languages (18 Indo-European,
16 non-Indo-European). Native speakers were asked to
translate the sentences into their mother tongue and
to determine the length of their translations in syllables and in words. The mean number of syllables per
clause, computed for each one of these languages, was
found to be located almost exactly within Miller’s magical number 7±2, ranging from 5 syllables in Dutch
to 10 syllables in Japanese. (Noticeable that human
newborns and Tamarin Monkeys can discriminate sentences from Dutch and Japanese [2], i.e. from those languages marking the endpoints of our distribution: Dutch
showed the highest syllable complexity and the lowest n
of syllables per clause, Japanese showed the opposite relations.) In connection with the rhythmic organization,
syllables and clauses are much more relevant units than
words. But, interestingly, the mean length of sentences
when measured in words was about 3.6. This corresponds to Cowan’s magical number 4 plus minus 1
[3]. Needless to say that in psychological experiments
the units presented and evaluated are most commonly
words, or digits, i.e. again words in (subvocal) articulatory representation. Seven plus minus two was already
in [4] a rather catchy description of a distribution with
a mean of 6.5 and a range from 3 to 15. Some relevant
controversies may also come from different operationalizations regarding the center (median? mean? peak?)
and the spread of a distribution. .
And the whole set of crosslinguistic correlations [5]
found between the 4 parameters n of phonemes per syllable, n of syllables per word and per clause, and n of
words per clause points, first of all, to time-related constraints. E.g.: the more syllables per clause, the fewer
phonemes per syllable; and the more syllables per clause,
the more syllables per word. (Chunking strategies become effective when the number of elements exceeds the
capacity of immediate memory and/or the psychological
present. Thus, the positive correlation between number of syllables per clause and number of syllables per
word suggests that languages producing a larger number of syllables per clause show a stronger tendency
to a chunking of syllables in the sense of polysyllabic
words.) But these time-related constraints do not overrule the magical number 7. This number even shows in
long-term memory materials such as the languages’
repertoire of cases and person distinctions: The average
number of cases in languages seems to be restricted to
5.6 terms with cumulative exponents and to 7.3 terms
with separatist exponents [6], and the average number of personal pronouns (excluding gender specifications) of 71 languages is about 8. This will be discussed
with respect to Mandler’s [7] experimental findings on
subject-imposed categorisation and the mechanisms
proposed in Anderson’s ACT-theory. Very briefly: In
active and in passive language processing one always
has to reactivate long-term memory materials such
as the repertoire of possibilities regarding case, person
etc. Since reactivating and memorizing are characteristic activities of our working memory, such repertoires
should not exceed this working memory’s capacity.
The rhythmic segmentation of our natural languages
corresponds with many spans or limits known from biology — intonation units can be viewed as a special
case of action units [1] — and from psychology. A span
of about 2 sec (cf Fraisse’s psychological present and
Baddeley’s articulatory loop model) and of about 7 syllables seems to be the appropriate size of packages
that can be kept within the focus of attention and that
can be articulated within one intonation unit. Some of
the (negative) correlations mentioned above can be understood in the sense of balancing effects or complexity
trade-offs within the language system providing a rather
constant size of these packages [8]. We think that these
correspondences can best be explained by an intimate
co-evolution of all systems involved in language use, and
that the underlying time spans and capacities have been
increasing during this co-evolution.
References:
1. Fenk-Oczlon, G. & Fenk, A. (2002). The clausal
structure of linguistic and pre-linguistic behavior. In:
T. Givón & B. F. Malle (eds.) The Evolution of Language out of Pre-Language. Typological Studies 53.
Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 215–229.
58
2. Ramus, F., Hauser, M. D., Miller, C., Morris, D., &
Mehler, J. (2000). Language discrimi-ination by human newborns and by Cotton-top Tamarin Monkeys.
Science 288, 349–351
3. Cowan, N. (2001). The magical number 4 in shortterm memory: A reconsideration of mental storage
capacity. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (1), 87–
114.
4. Miller, G. A. (1956). The magical number seven, plus
or minus two: some limits on our capacity for processing information. Psychological Review 63, 81–97.
5. Fenk, A. & Fenk-Oczlon, G. (1993). Menzerath’s law
and the constant flow of linguistic information. In: R.
Köhler & B. Rieger (eds.), Contributions to Quanti-
tative Linguistics. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 11–31.
6. Plank, F. (1986). Paradigm size, morphological typology, and universal economy. Folia Linguistica XX,
29–48.
7. Mandler, G. (1967). Organisation and memory. In:
K. W. Spence & J. T. Spence (eds.), The Psychology
of Learning and Motivation: Advances in Research
and Theory, Vol. 1. London: Academic Press.
8. Fenk, A., Fenk-Oczlon, G., & Fenk, L. (2005).
The balance between word complexity and syllable
complexity. Symposium Approaches to Complexity in Language, August 24–26, Helsinki, Finland
http://www.ling.helsinki.fi/sky/tapahtumat/
complexity/complexity.shtml
DISCURSIVE DIMENSIONS IN THE DYNAMICS OF
CONCEPTUALIZATION: ENRICHING LANGACKER’S VIEWING
FRAMES
Kurt Feyaerts1 , dr. Paul Sambre1, 2 ,
drs. Geert Brône1
1
2
University of Leuven (Belgium)
LESSIUS (Antwerp, Belgium)
1. State of affairs and research question - Recent
research in cognitive science shows a growing interest
in the grounding of meaning in discourse, i.e. in communicative usage events. A major consequence of this
broadening of perspective is that different levels of discursive organization, which are traditionally relegated
to the periphery of cognitive studies, are now treated
on a par with ‘core’ linguistic structures. An advantage of such a perspective is that it can provide a
valuable corrective to the often-assumed dichotomy between cognitively-oriented studies, which often ignore
the interactional aspects of discourse, vs. interaction
models, which often de-emphasize cognitive processes
(Barlow and Kemmer 2000: xvii). Nevertheless, only
little effort has been put into construing a model that
accounts for the interaction of the different levels at
play in actual meaning construction. The present paper presents the results of an ongoing project that aims
to integrate a number of recent theoretical models that
were developed to account for conceptualization in discourse. Insights from all of these models are combined
in order to move one step closer towards a truly cognitive discourse model.
2. Method — As a starting point, we adopt
Langacker’s own extension of Cognitive Grammar (CG,
1987, 1991, 1999) to the so-called current discourse
space (CDS) model (2001). Rather than a full-fledged
model of discourse structure, Langacker presents an argument of how CG and discourse can be integrated, as
a matter of principle. Consequently, the account does
not specify the whole range of relevant levels, but re-
stricts its focus mainly to the structural and dynamic
update of information in the flow of discourse. Given
the current development of the CDS model, we argue
for an elaboration and theoretical fine tuning at at least
the following levels:
(2.1) polyphony in discourse: monologual and dialogual discourse types represent speech and thought
by other persons than the actual speaker / writer. The
CDS model needs to be enriched with a layer of viewpoints (Fauconnier 1997, Roulet et al. 2001, Ritchie, in
press, Brône 2005).
(2.2) representation of time and space: both
in situation semantics (Zwaan & Madden 2004) and in
vectorial text models (Chilton 2005a, 2005b), the systematization of spatio-temporal situatedness of speaker
and hearer play a prominent role in discourse processing,
based on Langacker’s (1991) notion of grounding.
(2.3) hierarchical discourse layers: text hierarchy
displays embedded sequences of exchanges and interventions composed of minimal acts, defined in terms of
cognitive memory (Roulet et al. 2001). Polyphonic and
spatio-temporal conceptual dimensions can be linked to
this coordinating hierarchy.
3. Case studies — The enriched cognitive grammar
model that emerges from the integration of the levels
mentioned above has been tested through the analysis
of 2 larger text portions. The first study focuses on
the creative conceptualization of a novel construct (as
reflected in the definition of the internet in the early
1990’s, Sambre 2005), and the second one deals with
the construction of interactional humor involving conflicting viewpoints (Brône 2005).
The results of the case studies show that the enriched model can systematically account for the gradual
unfolding of conceptual structure on a discursive level.
More specifically, the combination of Langacker’s ba-
59
sic theoretical notion of linear scanning with conceptual information pertaining to enunciative, interactive,
spatio-temporal and hierarchical discourse layers goes
some way towards a truly dynamic model of meaning
construction in discourse. In sum, this paper focuses on
dynamic conceptualization: it shows how concepts are
being dynamically constructed and flexibly updated in
discourse.
References:
Barlow, M. and S. Kemmer (eds.) 2000. Usage-based
Models of Language. Stanford: CSLI Publications.
Brône, G. 2005. Hyper- and misunderstanding in interactional humor. Presentation at the 9th International Pragmatics Conference, July 2005, Riva del Garda.
Chilton, P. 2005a. Discourse Space Theory: Geometry,
brain and shifting viewpoints. Annual Review of Cognitive
Linguistics, vol. 3.
Chilton, P. 2005b. Dimensions of discourse: a geometrical approach to linguistic conceptualisation. Presentation
1st UK Conference on Cognitive Linguistics, October 2005,
Sussex.
Fauconnier, G. 1997. Mappings in Thought and Language. Cambridge (Mass.): CUP.
Langacker, R. W. 1987. Foundations of Cognitve Grammar. Vol. 1: Theoretical Prerequisites. Stanford: Stanford
University Press.
====== 1991. Foundations of Cognitve Grammar.
Vol. 2: Descriptive Applications. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
====== 1999. Grammar and Conceptualization.
Berlin / New York: Mouton de Gruyter.
====== 2001. Discourse in Cognitive Grammar.
Cognitive Linguistics. 12–2, 143–188.
Ritchie, Graeme. In press. Reinterpretation and viewpoints. Humor. International Journal of Humor Research.
Roulet, E. et al. 2001. Un modèle et un instrument
d’analyse de l’organisation du discours. Bern: Lang.
Sambre, P. 2005. Emergence et conceptualisation de
la définition en langue naturelle: une étude de cas sur Internet en néerlandais et en français. Unpublished doctoral
dissertation. University of Leuven.
Zwaan, R. A. & C. J. Madden. 2004. Updating situation models. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning,
Memory and Cognition, 20, 238–288.
EARLY PRODUCTIVITY IN HUNGARIAN MORPHOLOGICAL
ACQUISITION: THE ROLE OF LOCALITY, SYNTACTIC
CATEGORY AND VARIABILITY
Bálint Gábor1 , Ágnes Lukács1, 2
1
Budapest University of Technology and
Economics (Hungary)
2
Research Institute of Linguistics, Hungarian
Academy of Sciences (Budapest, Hungary)
Our paper is going to investigate early productivity of
morpheme use in young Hungarian children. The morphology of Hungarian is rich and can be regarded as the
most important marker of a grammatical functions in
the language. By comparing results for morphological
productivity to earlier results on syntactic productivity
(Akhtar and Tomasello, 1997; Abbot-Smith et al, 2001;
Abbot-Smith et al, 2004), our aim is to examine the
effect of the locality of morphological rules on grammar
acquisition. We also examine the effects of the syntactic categories by comparing productive morpheme use
for nouns and for verbs, as well as the variability of the
language input on morphological productivity.
One of the most important questions in language
acquisition research is how children acquire grammatical functions. Proponents of cognitive-functional and
usage-based linguistics argue that abstract syntactic
constructions are acquired gradually, with the help of
powerful domain-independent cognitive and social abilities, e.g. distributional analysis, analogy-matching
and intention-reading (Tomasello, 2003; MacWhinney,
2003). According to this view, until the age of three,
children’s grammar consists of particular verb-island
constructions connected to unique words. Beyond this
age children are able to form increasingly abstract rules.
The ontogenetic emergence of linguistic categories and
schemas is a gradual process, as is the emergence of
categories in other domains of cognitive development.
The most abstract rules only appear at a later age.
Carefully designed experiments with fully controlled
language inputs, are required to investigate the questions of abstractness and productivity in young children.
If we teach children new words in properly controlled
grammatical constructions, and find that they understand and produce them in other constructions as well,
then their representations of the used grammatical constructions can rightfully be regarded as abstract for the
arguments which are filled by the new word.
Several experiments conducted so far along these
lines seem to suggest that abstract representation of
grammatical functions appear gradually and unevenly.
The results of Akhtar and Tomasello (1997) show that
children under the age of three cannot understand newly
learned verbs in transitive sentences if they only hear
them in intransitive constructions and that their morphological productivity is also limited. Abbot-Smith et
al. (2001) taught children new transitive verbs in incorrect word order (subject-object-verb), and they found
that children under three used the newly taught verbs
in the incorrect word order. The authors come to the
conclusion that children do not have an abstract representation of the transitive construction; instead, they
have acquired several particular verb-island constructions. However, with intensive practice, the productivity in using transitive constructions can be enhanced
60
(Abbot-Smith et al, 2004).
Experiments with English-speaking children focus on
syntax and word order. Although there are some results on morphology, they are constrained by the low
morphological complexity of English. By contrast, rich
morphology in Hungarian makes the language far more
suitable for examining the nature of morphological rule
learning.
Our experiments test young children’s (between age
2;5 to 4) morphological productivity and comprehension with new words and inflections. Our main focus
of interest is the question whether they are capable of
using a newly learned word or inflection in a different
morphological construction than the ones in which they
heard them. We are also interested in the effect of input variability, syntactic category, and the differences
between morphological and syntactic productivity. Our
experiments have three phases: (1) learning phase,
(2) production tests, and (3) comprehension tests.
In the learning phase the meaning of the new language item (word or inflection) is acted out with toys.
It is produced several times in meaningful sentences, in
more or less varying morphological constructions, while
children are asked to repeat them again and again. During the production tests, children are asked questions
which require them to put the new item in a different
morphological construction (e.g. if they were trained
with the accusative, we try to elicit the inessive form).
In the comprehension test, the child is asked to follow
the instruction given by the experimenter, which is a
sentence that contains the new item in a yet unheard
morphological context.
The new language item can be either a word or an
inflection. With words we conduct separate tests for
verbs and nouns, in which the new words are presented
either in only one morphological form, and the children
have to produce it in another (same condition), or with
several inflections, except the one which children are
expect to produce (varied condition).
Similarly, when the new item is an inflection, it is
presented either with a single word, and the children
have to produce it on another (same conditon), or on
several words, except the one on which they have to
produce it (varied condition).
To summarize the possible test types: (1) the new
language item is a either word or an inflection, (2)
the syntactic category of the new item is either verb
or noun, and (3) the linguistic input is either varied or
same.
Since morphology is a more local grammatical function than syntax, we hypothesize that it is easier to
generalize abstract morphological rules than syntactic
ones. This entails that abstract usage of morphological items should appear at a younger age than that of
more complex syntactic constructions. It is also possible
that morphological productivity differs between syntactic categories. Moreover, greater variability of linguistic
input may help children recognize the grammatical category of the new word or inflection, which is necessary
for correct production. These results would imply that
appearance of the abstract representations of grammatical categories and schemas is not a one-time event in
cognitive and linguistic development. It is a process,
whose speed depends on the complexity of grammatical categories and constructions to be acquired on the
one hand, and the richness and quantity of the linguistic
input on the other hand.
References:
Kirsten Abbot-Smith, Elena Lieven & Michael
Tomasello, 2001. What preschool children do and do not do
with ungrammatical word orders. Cognitive Development,
16, 679–692.
Kirsten Abbot-Smith, Elena Lieven & Michael
Tomasello, 2004. Training 2;6-year-olds to produce the
transitive construction: the role of frequency, semantic similarity and shared syntactic distribution. Developmental
Science 7:1, 48–55.
Nameera Akhtar & Michael Tomasello, 1997. Young
children’s productivity with word order and morphology. Developmental Psychology, 33:6, 952–965.
Brian MacWhinney, 2003. A multiple process solution to
the logical problem of language acquisition. J. Child Lang.
31, 883–914.
Michael Tomasello, 2003. Constructing a Language. A
Usage-Based Theory of Language Acquisition. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, London.
PECULIARITIES OF QUANTITATIVE AND LOGICAL THINKING
IN PSYCHOLOGY
Ilya E. Garber
Saratov State Socio-Economic University
(Saratov, Russia)
0. According to Skinner’s classic ‘Behavior of Organisms’ (Skinner, 1938), the phenomena of behavior are
relatively macroscopic and slow, and can be objectively
recorded for subsequent analysis. Where lies the main
problem of psychological description of the inner life?
P. Meehl states that the difficulty is epistemological and,
more specifically, statistical and lies in the lack of an adequate quantification (Meehl, 1998). He refers to Lord
Kelvin that a subject matter is scientific to the extent
that it is quantitative.
The paper is divided into two unequal parts: ‘quantitative’ (1) and ‘logical’ (2).
1.1. We have only three ways of penetration of
quantities into psychology: measurement of primary
psychological traits, summary statistics of data processing and mathematical models. It’s not a secret
61
that most of quantitative models in psychology were
not successful. The relative failure of K. Lewin’s ideas
of introducing the principles of topology into psychology (Lewin, 1936) gives a typical example. Moreno
in sociometry (Moreno, 1951; adopted by sociologists
too) had realized another idea associated with K. Lewin
(1931): the transfer of physical way of reasoning into
psychology. But his utter success looks like an exception to the rule formulated by V. Lefebvre (2001). He
had pointed out that the general reason for the development of psychology was delayed consisted in the absence
of models including ‘the inner world’ of the personality. Indeed, reflexive models advance our psychological
knowledge, but dealing with mathematical models is a
destiny for a relatively small number of university academics. Most of applied psychologists are concerned
with mathematical statistics only.
1.2. The ordinary psychological investigation leads
to the matrix ‘people-traits’. The lines of it are representing participants of investigation and the columns
are representing traits measured. One can discriminate
between two uses of statistics: discriminative-validating
and structural-analytic (Meehl, 1998). First of them is
unavoidable for anyone who talks of something being
typical, or average, or normal although his or her statements are made in natural language or use psychological
terms only. The main problem here is the significance
test controversy (the weakness of null-hypothesis refutation as a means of corroborating psychological theories).
The reason is as follows: in psychology everything is correlated with everything (Lykken’s crud factor). The second approach is associated with attempts to reduce the
size of matrix ‘people-traits’ and is represented by such
procedures as factor analysis (the number of columns
is reduced) and cluster analysis (or taxometric method;
the number of lines is reduced). The factor analysis
was developed by psychologists and gave fruitful results
such as ‘The Big Five’ (Goldberg, 1990) and R. Cattell’s
16 Personal Factors (Pervin, John, 1997). The history
of application of cluster analysis was not so successful. Famous psychological classifications were developed mostly by clinicians without any quantitative tools.
The reason is as follows: most of psychologists give no
credence to multidimensional statistical methods other
than factor analysis.
1.3. The problem of measurement in psychology is
not exhausted by constructing of different scales and
collecting LOTS (life, observer, test, and self-report)
data. The search of ‘the unit of psychical’ is akin to the
search of the philosopher’s stone, or perpetuum mobile
and looks pretty much like a degenerating research program (Lakatos, 1970). But what to do? The progress of
natural sciences in general was closely associated with
the consideration of wittingly not existing ideal constructs (such as material point having mass but not
having size etc.) and postulates that tie them together
and are contrary to the common sense, life experience
and intuition (a heavy body in the absence of air resis-
tance is falling with the same velocity as the light one
etc.). One can explain the enormous S. Freud’s success
in the same terms as in natural sciences (Garber, 2005).
It was defined by wittingly not existing ideal constructs
(‘Ich’, ‘Es’, ‘Uber-Ich’) and by support of postulates
that are contrary to the common sense, life experience
and intuition (Oedipal complex, sexuality in the early
childhood etc.).
1.4. The most intriguing perspectives of quantitative thinking in pure and applied psychology lie above
three described well-known ways. One can find them
in metapsychology understood as in (Garber, 2005) and
cliometric metatheory (Meehl, 2004).
2.1. The logical foundations of psychology are not
so clear as in more developed sciences. The mathematicians have found their roots in G. Cantor’s theory of sets and have met there famous paradoxes like
B. Russel’s. The problems that have disturbed them a
century ago are not alien to modern psychology. In his
study of pathology of communication and schizophrenia G. Bateson had described a ‘double bind’ conception and had appealed directly to the B. Russel’s theory
of logical types that eliminated paradox situations in
such a manner: a class cannot be a member of itself,
and all members of a class cannot be classes themselves
(Bateson, 1972). When people are communicating or in
the case of entering of contradictory data in computer,
such strong prohibition may be impossible or undesirable. M. Rotenberg had found the descriptions of ‘double bind’ situations about 180 times in the biblical literature. In his dia-logic system, by contrast to Russel’s
theory and ‘double bind’, two interpretations may coexist. The principle of paradoxical interpretation may
be formulated as follows: ‘Don’t read the text as it’s
written, but, by switching or changing the letters, read
it in a different way to reveal an alternative meaning’
(Rotenberg, 1991).
2.2. A brilliant logic-contensive analysis of classic psychological conceptions (with the exception of
culture-historical context and social determination of
psychical phenomena) from the position of a theory
of psychical processes is represented in (Vekker, 2000).
L. M. Vekker had demonstrated that every conception
considered was developed naturally, originating from the
phenomenological façade of psychical events; picked out
separate aspects of them in a form of a small number of
categories and then, abstracting from others, no less essential categories, proved its heuristic value; but finally
owing to rejected categories could not make all ends
meet and found itself in a blind alley. ‘Meta-system
transition’ adds dynamics to the whole picture (Turchin,
2000).
References:
Bateson, G. (1972). Steps to an Ecology of Mind. N. Y.
Garber, I. E. (2005). Method and Technology in Psychology. In Transactions of the Yaroslavl Methodological
Seminar. Vol. 3: The Method of Psychology. Yaroslavl.
Pp. 34–46 (in Russian).
62
Goldberg, L. R. (1990). An Alternative ‘Description of
Personality’: The Big-Five Factor Structure. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 59, 1216–1229.
Lakatos, I. (1970). Falsification and the Methodology of
Scientific Research Programs. In I. Lakatos & A. Musgrave
(Eds.), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge. Cambridge,
England. Pp. 91–195.
Lefebvre, V. A. (2001). Algebra of Conscience. Dordrecht.
Lewin, K. (1931). Der Ubergang von der Aristotelischen zur Galileischen Denkweise in Biologie und Psychologie. Erkentnis. Bd. 1. S. 421–466.
Lewin, K. (1936). Principles of Topological Psychology.
N. Y.
Meehl, P. E. (1998). The Power of Quantitative Thinking. Speech delivered upon receipt of the James McKeen
Cattell Fellow award (in Internet).
Meehl, P. E. (2004). Cliometric Metatheory III: Peircean
Consensus, Verisimilitude and Asymptotic Method. British
Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 55, 615–643.
Moreno, J. L. (1951).
Sociometry: Experimental
Method and the Science of Society. N. Y.
Pervin, L. A., John, O. P. (1997). Personality: Theory
and Research. N. Y.
Rotenberg, M. (1991). Dia-Logo Therapy: Psychonarration and PaRDeS. N. Y.
Skinner, B. F. (1938). The Behavior of Organisms: An
Experimental Analysis. N. Y.
Turchin, V. F. (2000). The Phenomenon of Science: Cybernetic Approach to Evolution. Moscow (in Russian).
Vekker, L. M. (2000). Psychics and Reality: A United
Theory of Psychical Processes. Moscow (in Russian).
LECTAL FACTORS AND THE MULTIVARIATE NATURE OF
LINGUISTIC PHENOMENA
Dirk Geeraerts
University of Leuven (Belgium)
Purpose
There is a growing tendency in Cognitive Linguistics to
define its type of linguistics as a form of usage-based
linguistics (Barlow and Kemmer 2000, Tummers et al.
2005a). The methodological consequence of taking a
usage-based approach is to base the analyses on actual language data, as in corpus linguistics, and this in
turn implies that sophisticated techniques of analysis are
called for, viz. multivariate analysis.
The present paper argues that such a multifactorial approach to grammar needs to incorporate lectal
variation (i.e. variation associated with the difference
between dialects, sociolects, registers, idiolects etc.) as
a crucial factor.
Materials
The paper draws together insights from various studies
recently carried out within our research group. By way
of illustration (it is impossible to present all case studies
in the present abstract) we may have a look at De Sutter
et al. (2005). This study presents a corpus-based indepth study of the word order in Dutch clause-final verb
clusters consisting of a past participle and an auxiliary
verb. In subordinate clauses, either the past participle
or the auxiliary may appear as the final element of the
cluster:
dat moordende chauffeurs van de weg
gehaaldpart wordenaux
dat moordende chauffeurs van de weg
wordenaux gehaaldpart
that murderous drivers are removed from
the road
By verifying hypotheses about the underlying factors
for the alternation, as formulated in earlier studies, we
may identify three sets of relevant factors:
• a semantic factor: to the extent that the participle
is more adjective-like, the tendency towards using
the word order for copular constructions increases;
• a set of discursive surface features: the word order is influenced by the features of any postverbal
constituent (in the sense, for instance, that syntactically heavy constituents trigger the auxiliaryfirst word order);
• a set of lectal factors: the word order with the
participle in final position seems to be a sociostylistically marked pattern that is typical for,
among others, more formal circumstances and
texts.
Based on several statistical measures for bivariate
and stratified analysis, we a able to show that all three
types of variables have a statistically significant influence on the choice of word order.
The other case studies involve morphological phenomena (adjectival deflection with definite neutral
nouns in Dutch; see Tummers et al. 2005b), and the
use of the presentative particle er (Grondelaers et al. in
press).
It will be shown that there is a remarkable similarity in the types of factors that emerge as relevant for
the description of the phenomena: in all three cases, the
grammatical phenomena appear to be determined by semantic (or lexical) factors, by discursive and procedural
factors, and by lectal factors.
Relevance
The innovative nature of the work presented here resides in two points. First, in line with work like Gries
(2003), it demonstrates the importance of advanced statistical analysis for corpus linguistics, more specifically,
63
of multivariate techniques of analysis. Second, within
the emergent trend of usage-based multivariate analysis,
it draws the attention to the necessity of adding lectal
variation to the inventory of relevant factors.
The importance of these findings for cognitive science at large and Cognitive Linguistics in particular lies
in the questions it raises about the multivariate nature
of linguistic phenomena. If the distribution of linguistic
phenomena is simultaneously and (as far as we can see
now) irreducibly determined by various types of factors
at the same time, how does this influence our cognitive
model of a grammar? While grammars are traditionally defined with regard to one lectal variety only and
disregarding pragmatic, discursive variation, the advent
of a usage-based linguistics in Cognitive Linguistics
has weakened the isolation of grammar in one direction:
it has drawn the attention to the importance of bringing textual variation and grammatical description closer
together.
Phenomena like the ones discussed here suggest that
this process has to be carried further in the other direction as well, by giving lectal variation a place in our
conception of grammar.
References:
Barlow, Michael and Kemmer, Suzanne (eds.) (2000).
Usage-based models of Language. Stanford: CSLI.
De Sutter, G., D. Speelman & D. Geeraerts (2005). Regionale en stilistische effecten op de woordvolgorde in werkwoordelijke eindgroepen. Nederlandse taalkunde 10/2, 97–
128.
Gries, Stefan Th. (2003). Multifactorial Analysis in Corpus Linguistics: A Study of Particle Placement. London:
Continuum Press.
Grondelaers, S., D. Speelman, D. Drieghe, D. Geeraerts
& M. Brysbaert (in press). Er ‘there’ as an inaccessibility
marker. A procedural approach to presentative sentences.
Discourse Processes.
Tummers, José, Kris Heylen & Dirk Geeraerts. 2005a.
Usage-based approaches in Cognitive Linguistics. A technical state of the art. Corpus Linguistics and Linguistic
Theory 1(2).
Tummers, José, Dirk Speelman & Dirk Geeraerts.
2005b. Inflectional variation in Belgian and Netherlandic
Dutch: A usage-based account of the adjectival inflection.
In Nicole Delbecque, Johan Van Der Auwera & Dirk Geeraerts (ed.) Perspectives on Variation. Sociolinguistic, Historical, Comparative. Berlijn: Mouton de Gruyter. 93–110.
A TWO-STEPS COGNITIVE MODEL OF EXPECTATIONS
Francesca Giardini
University of Siena (Italy) & Institute of Cognitive
Sciences and Technologies (Rome, Italy)
Anticipatory processes, i.e. expectations, forecasts, and
predictions, constitute a well-definite set of mental representations people are endowed with to deal with future events and circumstances. People anticipate how
the future will be and they adjust consequently their behaviours, thus increasing both readiness to act and their
ability to cope with uncertain events. Expectations, defined as cognitively mediated anticipatory representations, stem from an internal simulation of a hypothetical future and of the consequent behaviour the agent
should adopt in that future. When forming expectations people do not simply collect data and memories
to predict, according to past experience, what probably
is going to happen, as suggested by some economic theories (Muth, 1961). Neither they adjust in a mechanical
way their past expectancies in order to form new expectations, including recent events and knowledge (Begg,
1982). Expectations are the result of a complex process
of simulation, which has to be accurate, reliable and as
closer as possible to what will actually happen. Expecting event X, as for instance a promotion, or its opposite,
event Y, e.g. a dismissal, is really different for an individual who needs to make plans and take decisions,
as for example to buy or not a house. In this case, a
wrong expectation, and the related actions, could deeply
affect his well-being, in both directions (loosing the opportunity to buy the house because expecting to be dismissed, or buying the house since expecting a promo-
tion, and then being dismissed). Expectations are more
than generic representations of the future, people revise and adjust from time to time. On the contrary, to
expect something means to run an internal simulation
of what seems to be the most probable and reliable future course of action, and then to take decisions and
to act according to the results of this simulation. The
model we propose allows to keep distinct and to deal
with two separate and essential elements in the process
of anticipating the future, uncertainty and confidence,
whose correct assessment is essential to hold grounded
and appropriate expectancies.
Expectations are vivid and realistic images of what
the future will be, they contain actors and actions, and
individuals take their decisions and behave accordingly
to these images of the future. This kind of simulations
pursue several goals, allowing the agent: a) to be prepared and ready to act (provided the expected state of
the world matches the reality); b) to reduce the amount
of unforeseen consequences; c) to lessen the ambiguous whole of possible future consequences to a smaller
and more tractable set of expected events; d) to isolate
the most salient features of the decision context. Of
course, to be useful, these simulations have to be realistic, i.e. they should resemble the reality as much as
possible, and they need to be believable, that is, people
need to trust them. These requirements are functions of
two variables: uncertainty and confidence, respectively.
Uncertainty is ingrained in forecasting, and simulating
future courses of action stems from uncertainty reduction, usually by intuitive probability assignments. On
the other side, confidence is responsible for the reliabil-
64
ity of the expectation: the higher the confidence in that
expectation, the stronger the belief about the realization
of that consequence in the future.
In our account, forming an expectation is primarily
an attempt to answer, at T0 , the question: What will
happen at T1 ?, or better: Given what I know, what
is rational to believe that will happen at T1 ?. Answering this question requires a two step process, where
the firs step is meant to select probable outcomes, and
the second step is intended to screen among the probable hypotheses in order to select the outcome with the
highest confidence value. In the first step the agent
enumerates possible courses of action, related to the
actual situation and context, which could be realized in
the future (hypotheses generation). This initial phase is
not very structured, it mainly consists of thinking about
all the possible outcomes, provided they are allowed by
the context. In the next phase, the probability of those
hypotheses, previously generated, is evaluated, then the
less probable ones are rejected, and the remaining hypotheses go on to the next step. Therefore, the first step
comprehends hypotheses generation and probability assessment, where the latter process aims to reduce the
set of possible outcomes to the set of probable ones.
This first step provides pre-conditions, but to have a
full-blown expectancy the second stage is the crucial
one (Fig.1). At this point of the process the individual
has to state her degree of belief on the alternative hypotheses put forward by Step 1. Thus, the belief that
the selected outcomes are probable (Step 1) is transformed into the belief that one of this outcome is true,
i.e. that at T1 a certain outcome will occur (Step 2).
The degree of belief affects directly the strength of the
expectation: the highest the confidence in that belief,
the strongest the expectation. This is very important,
since not all expectations share the same importance for
the individual (Miceli & Castelfranchi, 2002). The two
expectations formed so far are mutually exhaustive and
exclusive. We term focal expectation the one with the
highest degree of confidence, and alternative expectation the remaining one. It is worth stressing that the
confidence assessment should not necessarily match the
probability evaluation, thus the most probable hypothesis could become the alternative expectation or the less
probable one could work as the focal expectation. This
happens because probability and confidence are two independent variables, thus people can be very confident
in unrealistic outcomes and vice-versa (Kunda, 1990;
Taylor & Brown, 1988). Once the focal expectation is
defined, the subject can simulate what he believes will
happen at T1 , evaluating pros and cons of the possible
decisions and actions, thus trying to find an answer to
the initial question: What will happen at T1 ?. Here
we are considering the general case of high probability and high confidence, that is, the focal expectation
is perfectly grounded, it is supposed to resemble the
future course of events and the subject’s degree of belief is very high. Anyway, this is not always the case,
since ambiguous situations could lead to hold different
and even contradictory expectations, without any focal
expectancy. In these cases, we claim that people run alternative simulations, trying to identify the most reliable
one.
Fig. 1. The two-steps model of expectations’ formation.
In this model, Step 1 is intended to reduce the vast
array of possible outcomes, previously emerged through
hypotheses generation, to the more limited set of probable hypotheses. On the other side, Step 2 provides a further screening, according to the degree of confidence the
subject attaches to each hypothesis. The process ends
with the creation of a focal expectation, considered as
a grounded and reliable simulation of what will happen,
that will drive people’s decisions and actions. Expectations are complex mental representations, whose formation entails different cognitive processes and whose
results are essential for individual well-being.
References:
Begg, D. K. (1982). The rational expectations revolution in macroeconomics. Philip Allan: New York.
Kunda, Z. (1990). The case for motivated inference.
Psychological Bulletin, 108: 480–498.
Miceli, M. & Castelfranchi, C. (2002). The Mind and
the Future: The (Negative) Power of Expectations. Theory
& Psychology, 12: 335–366.
Muth, J. F. (1961). Rational expectations and the theory of price movements. Econometrica, 29: 315–335.
Taylor, S. E., Brown, J. D. (1988). Illusions and wellbeing: A social psychological perspective on mental health.
Psychological Bulletin, 103: 193–210.
65
LINGUISTIC FREQUENCIES AND PROBABILITIES IN SECOND
LANGUAGE PROCESSING
Kira Gor
University of Maryland (College Park, USA)
(beginners, intermediate, and advanced learners), and an adult native Russian control group. The
results of the study indicate that:
1. There is a developmental tendency in L2 acquisition of complex inflectional morphology. More advanced
learners favor the high-frequency productive conjugational patterns, including the default pattern, more than
beginners, which reflects the differences in the input frequencies to more and less advanced L2 learners.
2. The group of advanced learners, which had not
received explicit instruction in verb conjugation at the
initial stage of their study of Russian and was not taking
classes with verb conjugation as part of the curriculum
at the time of data collection, showed lower rates of
correct responses than the beginning and intermediate
groups.
Taken together, these results support the role of input frequency in the choice of the conjugational pattern
in L2 verb generation. Also, the lack of explicit instruction in rule application resulted in lower accuracy in L2
learners with a relatively higher proficiency level.
The second set of experiments is being conducted at
the University of Maryland as part of the larger, federally
funded, Linguistic Profiling Project. The ultimate goal
of this part of the study is to establish whether there
is a dissociation of grammar and lexicon in L2 linguistic processing, and whether the mechanisms underlying
the integration of grammatical information (rules)
and lexical information (words) depend on the proficiency level of L2 speakers. The underlying assumption
is that lexical frequency (token, or more exactly, stemcluster frequency) will have an effect on L2 processing of the lexical items in a sentence. Token frequency
will correlate with the degree of familiarity of a lexical
item, which in L2 speakers will vary from very familiar to unfamiliar. Experiment 1 presents lexical items
in isolation to L2 speakers with different levels of proficiency in order to establish an independent measure
of familiarity of the lexical items depending on their token frequency and the proficiency level. The study uses
the following frequency ranges borrowed from the study
demonstrating an MEG component that mirrors the lexical frequency effect widely acknowledged in the studies
using behavioral data, such as reaction times in a lexical decision task: 1, 6, 30, and 140 per million (Embick
et al. 2001). In Experiment 2, lexical frequency of the
items will be manipulated in sentences presenting difficulties on the morphosyntactic level and used in online
and offline tasks. This will determine the role of lexical
frequency in L2 morphosyntactic processing.
The role of frequencies and probabilities in linguistic
processing is a controversial issue, which is resolved differently depending on the theoretical perspective. Linguistic theory claims that linguistic operations are computational in nature, and symbolic rule application is
independent of frequencies. For inflectional morphology, the dual-system approach stemming from this theoretical position maintains that the processing of regularly inflected forms is not affected by the frequency
of the rule (type frequency), while the processing of
irregular forms is affected by their token frequencies
(Pinker 1999). Since these listed forms share the properties of all the lexical items stored in the mental lexicon, access to them depends on the frequency of the
form. Thus, in the English past tense, walk-walked are
processed by rule computation, whereas sing-sang are
processed in associative memory, therefore, only walkwalked will show the frequency effects. The opposite
position, maintained by the single-system approach and
grounded in connectionism, claims that symbolic rules
are not involved in linguistic processing. Instead, both
regular and irregular inflected forms (walk-walked and
sing-sang ) are processed by associative patterning, with
frequencies playing a major role (Bybee 1995). Several
positions claim that linguistic processing combines symbolic rules and probabilities in one mechanism (Albright
and Hayes 2003, Gor 2003, 2004, Yang 2002). This paper will adopt the Rules and Probabilities Model (Gor
2003, 2004), which postulates that regular rule application is affected by frequencies and linguistic probabilities
both in native and L2 processing.
The paper will report two types of data on the role
of type frequencies in L2 processing in adult American
learners of Russian. The first set of experiments focuses on L2 generation of Russian verbal morphology
and addresses the role of input frequencies in rule-based
morphological processing (Gor 2003, 2004, Gor and
Chernigovskaya 2005). Previous research has demonstrated that both native and L2 processing of inflectional morphology are based on symbolic rules rather
than associative patterning. The choice of the conjugational pattern both in native and L2 real and nonce
verb generation is governed by the input frequencies to
each group of speakers. Therefore, the data present a
challenge both to the dual-system and single-system approaches to linguistic processing. The focus of a new
experiment is on the exploration of the role of input
frequencies in L2 processing (a) beyond the beginner
References:
level, and (b) in learners with no explicit formal trainBybee, J. L. (1995). Regular morphology and the lexiing in verb conjugation. The study includes four groups con. Language and Cognitive Processes, 10, 425–455.
of speakers: American college students at the end of
Embick, D., Hackl, M., Schaeffer, J., Kelepir, M.,
one, two, and three and above years of study of Russian Marantz, A. (2001). A magnetoencephalographic compo-
66
nent whose latency reflects lexical frequency. Cognitive
Brain Research, 10, 345–348.
Gor, K. (2003). Symbolic rules versus analogy in the
processing of complex verbal morphology. Regards Croisés
sur L’Analogie. Revue d’Intelligence Artificielle, 17(5–6),
823–840.
Gor, K. (2004). The Rules and Probabilities Model of
native and second language morphological processing. In:
L. Verbitskaya, T. Chernigovskaya (eds.). Theoretical problems of linguistics, 51–75. St. Petersburg: Philological Fac-
ulty of St. Petersburg State University Press.
Gor, K., Chernigovskaya, T. (2005). Formal instruction
and the acquisition of verbal morphology. In: Housen, A.,
Pierrard, M. (eds.). Investigations in instructed second language acquisition, p. 131–164. Mouton De Gruyter.
Pinker, S. (1999). Words and rules: The ingredients of
language. New York, NY: Basic Books.
Yang, C. D. (2002). Knowledge and learning in natural
language. Oxford University Press.
COOPERATION IN THE ITERATED PRISONER’S DILEMMA
GAME: EFFECTS OF THE AVAILABLE INFORMATION
Maurice Grinberg and Evgenia Hristova
Experimental design
New Bulgarian University (Sofia, Bulgaria)
In this experiment, three presentation forms of the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game are used to investigate the changes in cooperation and strategy that
occur due to the different amount of information about
the game given to the subjects. Subjects played a series
of 300 randomly generated PD games against a computer opponent. The subjects are instructed to try to
win the maximum number of points they can. In all
three conditions The PD games played are generated
in exactly the same way and the subjects got feedback
about the result of the current game and about their
total payoff. However, we vary the amount and nature
of information available to the subjects in making decisions. The first condition, called Full PD, is used as
a control condition and a basis for comparison the two
other conditions. The subjects are presented with all of
the information about their possible payoffs and moves.
They know that the game is played against a computer
opponent. In the second condition, called Row PD, only
the subject payoffs are displayed in a row. In the third
condition, called Blind PD the subjects don’t see the
game but only two buttons standing for the two possible moves.
Introduction
Player I
Player II
C
D
C
R, R
S, T
D
T, S
P, P
Figure 1. Payoff table for the PD game. In
each cell the comma separated payoffs are the
Player I’s and Player II’s payoffs.
The Prisoner’s dilemma (PD) is a two-person game
used to investigate phenomena like cooperation and
competition in many social situations. The payoff table
for this game is presented in Figure 1. The players simultaneously choose their move — C (cooperate) or D
(defect), without knowing their opponent’s choice. The
payoffs are chosen so that they satisfy the inequalities
T > R > P > S and 2R > T + S. Although move D
is the dominant strategy, experiments demonstrate that
subjects cooperate. There is a wide range of explanations of this phenomenon. Some of them are based
on social interaction or interpersonal relations and use
terms such as ‘cooperation’, ‘defection’, ‘competition’,
‘trust’, ‘reciprocity’, ‘altruism’, ‘temptation’ and ‘greed’
(Rapoport and Chammah, 1965). Another class of theories view the PD game playing as a reinforcement learning process. An alternative perspective, we are sticking
to here, is to focus on the cognitive processes responsible for the observed outcomes like perception of the
game, judgment and decision making based on the payoff magnitudes and relations among them (e.g. like CI)
(e.g. see Rapoport and Chammah, 1965, Erev and Roth
2001).
Here we are especially interested in the influence of
the available information on the decision to cooperate.
Another goal of the present experiment is to test again a
computational model trying to capture the importance
of the different information available in playing the PD
game.
Experimental results and discussion
Contrary to our hypothesis the cooperation was greatest
in Blind PD condition and lowest in Full PD condition
(we expected exactly the opposite). Subjects participating in the Blind PD, Row PD and Full PD conditions
cooperated in average in 41%, 36% and 28% of the
games (see Figure 2). What’s more, if we compare the
points subjects got during the game, subjects in Full PD
condition performed worst. It seems that having access
only to partial information about the game (like in Row
PD and Blind PD experiments) leads not only to more
cooperative behavior but also leads to greater payoffs.
Simple reliance on received payoffs brings the subjects
to better results than interacting with the other player.
We also analyzed our data to see in which condition
subjects were more successful in promoting mutual cooperation (that results in CC game).Mean number of
CC games is significantly different between three ex-
67
periments (F(2,64) = 4.54, p = 0.014), see Figure 3.
Decrease in cooperation in Full PD might be explained
by temptation to get the highest payoff, or by trying
to compete with the other player. Another possibility
might be that these results are due to cognitive limitations of the player. In Full PD experiment subjects have
to deal with a larger amount of information before and
after each game (compared to Row PD condition and
especially in Blind PD condition).
The comparison of the model and the experimental
data is performed and a reasonable agreement is obtained. The model data are presented in Figure 4 and
Figure 5. The experiment and the model presented here
provide insight into the decision making process and
shed light on the importance of different factors in decision making.
Figure 4. Model data: mean cooperation
(%) in different experimental conditions.
Figure 2. Mean cooperation (%) in different experimental conditions.
The model
The model presented here can be viewed as based on
the general framework of the subjective utility theory
but with a dynamic determination of the utilities and of
the expectations about the opponent’s move. Subjective expected values of the possible moves (C and D) are
computed and then used to determine the probability of
move C. The subjective expected value of a given move
is computed as a sum of the subjective expected values
of the two possible game outcomes associated with this
move (CC and CD for move C; DC and DD for move D).
The subjective value of a game outcome (CC, CD, DC,
and DD) is calculated by using (1) the current game
payoff for that outcome; (2) the weight associated with
that game outcome computed on the basis of previous
payoffs received in such an outcome; (3) the estimated
probability that the opponent will make a specific move.
Figure 3. Mean number of different
game types in each experimental condition.
Figure 5. Model data: mean number of
different game types in each experimental condition.
References:
Colman, A. (2003). Cooperation, psychological game
theory, and limitations of rationality in social interaction.
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, in press.
Erev, I. & Roth, A. (2001). Simple reinforcement learning models and reciprocation in the prisoner’s dilemma game.
In G. Gigerenzer and R. Selten (Eds.) Bounded rationality: the adaptive toolbox, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press,
2001.
Rapoport, A. & Chammah, A. M. (1965). Prisoner’s
Dilemma: A study in conflict and cooperation. University of
Michigan Press.
68
THE ROLE OF HUMAN BRAIN IMAGING IN COGNITIVE
NEUROSCIENCE
Riitta Hari
Helsinki University of Technology (Finland)
• Evidence for motor and sensory mirroring between
individuals, suggesting that they form the brain
basis for intersubjectivity.
Modern brain imaging allows to follow brain functions
• Evidence for brain plasticity during learning and
of awake and behaving humans noninvasively and accuduring recovery from disease, and the importance
rately in space and time. Functional magnetic resonance
of the subject’s own attention and action for the
imaging (fMRI) monitors changes of oxygen level in the
reorganization.
brain, providing millimeter-scale spatial accuracy for the
sites of active areas.
• Evidence for the importance of emotions for cogMagnetoencephalography (MEG) picks up with milnition, including decisions, which renders the old
lisecond precision weak magnetic fields associated with
division between cognition and emotion inapproneuronal currents. The last-comer, diffusion tensor
priate.
imaging (DTI), provides information about white matter
• Evidence for context-dependence and automaticconnectivity between different cortical areas.
ity of brain activation even during behavior typiThe views whether this brain-mapping enterprise
cally considered to be under conscious control.
with increasing spatiotemporal accuracy has changed
our understanding of human cognitive functions vary
Brain imaging links the human behavior to physiolfrom extreme enthusiasm to nihilism. After discussing
ogy,
thereby also opening connections to the vast pool
some technical and conceptual problems in brain imagof
animal
data. In the brain-imaging field, previously
ing, I will list findings that I consider highly relevant to
separate
research
lines, such as e.g. social psychology
cognitive neuroscience:
and neuroscience, are now smoothly interacting. At• Evidence for overlapping neuronal circuitries for tempts to bring real-life like experimental setups into
thinking and doing, implying a tight action — the laboratory offer great challenges to future hardware
perception link and pointing to the importance of and data analysis, as well as to the conceptual framemotor function for cognition.
work of human brain imaging.
LEVEL OF READING AND SPELLING AT AGE 6 IN CHILDREN AT
RISK OF DEVELOPING DYSLEXIA CORRESPONDS WITH THEIR
LANGUAGE COMPREHENSION SKILLS AT AGE 5
THE SPEAK UP! PROJECT.
A LONGITUDINAL STUDY OF CHILDREN AT RISK OF DEVELOPING READING /
WRITING / MATHEMATICS IMPAIRMENT
Turid Helland1 , Sonja Helgesen Ofte2 ,
Kenneth Hugdahl1
1
2
University of Bergen (Norway)
Eikelund Resource Centre (Bergen, Norway)
Aim. The question asked in this project was if language
comprehension in a group of 5-year olds at risk for developing dyslexia, predict their reading / spelling skills at
age 6. It was hypothesised that at-risk children at age
5 with impaired language comprehension would show
low scores on reading / spelling tasks as well as cognitive tasks targeting dyslexia at age 6. At this age (6)
the children had received no formal training in reading
and writing.
for sub-grouping the subjects into an m-group (median
or above) and a bm-group (below median). WPPSIscores at age 5 showed no subgroup differences. At age
6 the subjects were tested with multiple tasks within
four domains: reading / spelling (R/S), working memory (WM), visuo-spatial skills (VS) and language (La).
Scores within each domain were standardised and averaged into a single score. One-way ANOVAs with
a Group (4: at-risk/m, at-risk/bm, control/m, control/bm) and Tasks (R/S, WM, VS, La) design was
used, with Tukey HSD post hoc tests, all with an alpha
level of p<.05.
Results. Lower scores were seen in the at-risk/bm
Method. Subjects were 25 Norwegian at-risk chil- subgroup vs. controls in all four domains, reaching sigdren and 25 matched controls. Language comprehen- nificance for the R/S, WM, La, and close to significance
sion scores at age 5 in the control group were used for the VS domain. This is shown in Figure 1.
69
Conclusions. Language comprehension skills at age training. Their impaired scores on the cognitive tests
5 in children at risk of developing dyslexia seem to pre- targeted for dyslexia underline this assumption, pointdict their reading / spelling skills at 6, ahead of formal ing to pre-literacy identification of dyslexia.
Fig. 1. TOM-scores (adjusted) in the different groups. Below 5 indicates impairment.
TOM: Therapy outcome measure for speech and language therapists, (Broomfield &
Dodd, 2004; Enderby & John, 1997). m ≥ median, bm < median on TROG (Bishop,
1989) when the children were 5 years old.
References:
Bishop, D. V. M. (1989). Test for reception of grammar (2nd ed.). Manchester: University of Manchester: The Author, Age and Cognitive Research Centre. Norwegian edition.
Broomfield, J., & Dodd, B. (2004). Children with
speech and language disability: caseload characteristics. International Journal of Language and Communication Disorders, 39(3), 303–324.
Enderby, P., & John, A. (1997). Therapy Outcome
Measures for Speech and Language Therapists. San
Diego: Singular.
SPECIFIC SENSORY INTEGRATION OF SPEECH PROSODY:
AN ASSET IN FOREIGN LANGUAGE LEARNING AND NATIVE
SPEECH REHABILITATION
Isabelle Hesling
Université Bordeaux2 (France)
Whatever language is considered, speech is characterized by an Expression dimension, which is made up
of grammatical and syntactic rules and lexical choices,
and an Expressivity dimension which is made up of
the kinesthetic and prosodic aspects of speech, speech
significance being the result of the combined association
of these two different -but complementary- dimensions.
The Expressivity dimension is actually the real basis of any articulated speech: considering the genesis of
speech acquisition, it can be assumed that young children first perceive and then communicate by means of
expressivity. The Expression dimension, which is imposed by the linguistic rules of language, is shared by
all speakers pertaining to the same language commu-
nity, whereas the Expressivity dimension, which depends on each speaker, reflects his/her emotional state
during his/her expression by means of speech. In other
words, the emotional relevance of a spoken message is
both conveyed by its semantic content (what is said)
and by the affective / emotional prosody used by the
speaker (how it is said), the affective content being
over-imposed on the semantic one.
We first addressed the question of the neural networks involved by each of these dimensions in speech
integration and secondly that of the neural networks involved in the specificity of the Expressivity dimension
in speech (using functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging studies). The results were as follows:
(1) The combination of the two dimensions (Expressity + Expression dimensions vs. Expression dimension) induced a specific neural network encompassing
70
not only the primary and secondary auditory areas, but
also projections in left prefrontal and temporo-parietal
areas (Hesling et al, 2005a). These results are in accordance with the dorsal-ventral model of speech processing (Binder et al, 2000; Scott & Johnsrude, 2003).
(2) Based on the functional asymmetry of the secondary auditory areas (Belin et al, 2000; Poeppel,
2003), we showed that a specific sensory integration of
prosody (Expressivity dimension) obtained by dissociating acoustical frequencies addressed to each ear, revealed a network inducing a supplementary recruitment
of cortical areas involved in speech perception such as
right prefrontal areas (Hesling et al, 2005b).
Taken together, these results strongly suggest that
prosodic information, i.e., the Expressivity dimension
is actually the real basis of any articulated speech upon
which the Expression dimension is then overimposed.
It can thus be hypothesized that a specific sensory integration of prosody, based on the different functionalities
of each auditory area, would facilitate the integration of
the Expression dimension. This facilitation would
appear to be relevant not only (1) in the field of foreign
language learning but also (2) in the field of the rehabilitation of clinical aspects of speech disturbances such
as aphasia.
(1) Foreign language learning
All foreign language teachers are aware that foreign language learners run into varied difficulties ranging from
the acquisition of pronunciation, prosodic factors, grammar, lexis, or idiomatic expressions. These difficulties
may be sorted into two categories: (1) problems connected to the Expression dimension, which can be
resolved by resorting to their intellect, i.e., for instance
by the explanation of the rules of the foreign language
and (2) problems connected to the Expressivity dimension which cannot be solved by intellectual explanations. Foreign language learners must be helped in
both fields; we posit that the specific sensory integration of prosody (Hesling et al, 2005b) would influence
their perceptive, and thus productive, abilities, by facilitating the integration of the Expression dimension.
To answer this key question, results from a behavioural
study associated with an fMRI study will be discussed.
(2) Rehabilitation of speech disturbances: aphasia
It can also be hypothesized that the specific sensory integration of prosody could act as a compensatory phenomenon of lesional and perilesional areas. A cross over
behavioural study, alternating between classical speech
therapy and prosodic therapy associated with the
comparison of the evolution of the dynamic cerebral network before and after the two therapies will be proposed.
Results from these two experiments lend credence
to the essential importance of the prosodic dimension
in speech.
References:
Belin, P., Zatorre, R. J., Lafaille, P., Ahad, P.,
Pike, B., 2000. Voice-selective areas in human auditory cortex. Nature 403, 309–312.
Binder, J. R., Frost, J. A., Hammeke, T. A., Bellgowan, P. S. F., Springer, J. A., Kaufman, J. N., Possing, E. T., 2000. Human temporal lobe activation
by speech and non-speech sounds. Cerebral Cortex
10, 512–528.
Hesling I., Clément S., Bordessoules, M., Allard, M.
2005a. Cerebral mechanisms of prosodic integration: evidence from connected speech. NeuroImage,
24, 937–947.
Hesling I., Dilharreguy B., Clément S., Bordessoules, M., Allard, M. 2005b. Cerebral mechanisms of prosodic integration using low-pass filtered
bands of speech, Human Brain Mapping, 26(3):157–
169.
Poeppel, D., 2003. The analysis of speech in different temporal integration windows: cerebral lateralization as asymmetric sampling in time. Speech
Communication 41, 245–255.
Scott, S. K., Johnsrude, I. S., 2003. The neuroanatomical and functional organization of speech
perception. Trends in Neurosciences 26, 100–107.
ON SYMBOLIZING CONSTRUAL OPERATIONS IN ANALYTICAL
MORPHOLOGY: A CASE STUDY OF ENGLISH
Katherine Hrisonopulo
— two varieties of the passive form in English: the beand the get-passive respectively.
There is sufficient linguistic evidence revealing that
Herzen State Pedagogical University of Russia,
be- and get-passives provide alternative, or contrastive,
Vyborg Branch (Vyborg, Russia)
ways of morphological structuring one and the same
The present paper aims to explore the content of mental passive situation, i.e. a state of affairs in which the
construal operations as well as the way they are sym- subject is conceived of as an entity acted upon rather
bolized by grammatical auxiliaries as parts of analytical than performing the predicated action. From the permorphological forms. The focus of the study is the func- spective of cognitive linguistics (Langacker 1987; 2000a;
tioning of the auxiliaries be and get that constitute — Croft & Wood 2000) such alternative uses of linguistic
in combination with the past participle of the main verb forms present a case of symbolizing mental construal
71
operations. In the case under study the symbolization
of mental construal is supposed to be predetermined by
two factors. First, the verbs be and get are not entirely
devoid of their prototypical lexical meanings (those of location and obtaining respectively) even when they function as grammatical auxiliaries, which implies, in turn,
that part of the construal associated with the verbs’
functioning as lexical items does contribute to the total meaning of grammatical passive forms in which they
are used. Second, since, as suggested and substantiated in Langacker (2000b: 27), any linguistic item —
both lexical and grammatical — incorporates conceptual content alongside construal in its meaning, these
two aspects of the overall conceptualization get tightly
blended to form a more or less unified conceptual structure. With these two factors of construal symbolization
in view, the subsequent analysis of linguistic data provides a separate treatment of each element of mental
construal as symbolized by the verbs be and get within
analytical passive forms.
As lexical items, with their meanings not totally
bleached out, both be and get evoke schematic
propositional structures. Thus be typically evokes a
locative schema, in which the subject participant (X)
is linked to a given place (Y): X IS prep Y. The schema
evoked by get is that of possession in which the subject participant (X) enters a possessive relationship with
the object to be possessed (Y): X GETS Y. The only element which is comparable in these two schemas and
thus lends itself to construal is the subject’s (X’s) active
zone incorporated in the meaning of the verbs and construed along the parameter force dynamics. Whereas
be construes the state of affairs as having little forcedynamic value and selects a passive subject as its active
zone, the verb get endows the predicated event with a
high degree of force dynamics and the respective active
zone of the verb is represented by an active subject.
This contrast of the verbs’ active zones symbolizes —
in a number of cases — the contrast of dynamic (get)
vs. static (be) construals of the denoted events: He
got vs. was involved in that business; He got vs. was
inspired by the suggestion.
In agreement with the mentioned contrastive construals evoked by be and get as lexical items the verbs
are contrasted in their grammatical function along the
attentional parameter salience. Thus, though both
verbs represent the same part of speech (or syntactic
class), which, in turn, equally entails evoking the operation of sequential scanning as part of their grammatical
meaning (Langacker 1987), the degree of salience of this
operation is greater with get and lesser with be. This,
again, accounts for the contrast of dynamic vs. static
construals of events, such as the following: Quite a lot
of business gets vs. is done there; It often happens that
these two different ideas nevertheless get vs. are associated. Another aspect of the grammatical meaning of be
and get which lends itself to construal stems from their
combinability with the past participle within the passive form. The past participle which imposes a profile
on the end result of the denoted action agrees with the
same profile in the construal associated with the verb
get whose meaning has evolved from the functioning
in causative-resultative constructions. By contrast, the
meaning of be is neutral to profiling / non-profiling a
resultative construal in its immediate grammatical context. As a consequence of this, alternations of be and
get often symbolize the contrast of non-emphatic vs.
emphatic representations of events involving particular
results (especially negatively evaluated ones): He was
vs. got hurt (arrested, accused, convicted, etc.).
On the other hand, the operation of profiling incorporated in the meaning of the past participle implicitly
relates to the instance of focused attention. This entails, hypothetically, the possibility for the auxiliaries be
and get to be used as morphological classifiers subcategorizing attention in two alternative ways. The hypothesis is substantiated with reference to the relevant
data revealing that be imposes the construal of attention as based on what the viewer / conceptualizer sees
in the instance of perception / mental comprehension.
In contrast to this, the use of get links to the viewer’s /
conceptualizer’s attending to the denoted event because
of his/her personal (including emotional) involvement in
this event. In consequence, the alternative uses of be
and get come to symbolize in a number of cases the
differentiation between a neutral viewer and personally
involved experiencer of the denoted event: The bank
got vs. was robbed (concern vs. emotional neutrality); The whole city got vs. was washed away (alarm
vs. neutrality); Has the book got vs. been published?
(interest, impatience vs. neutrality).
The results of the proposed study give some insights
on the nature of mental construal operations incorporated in the meanings of, and thus symbolized by, analytical morphological elements. Further research in the
suggested direction may help to reveal the content of
construal operations and their (causal) interconnections
typically associated with grammatical (in contrast to
lexical) meanings of a particular language and generally predetermining its typologically relevant grammatical structure.
References:
Croft, W. & E. J. Wood (2000). Construal operations in linguistics and artificial intelligence. In:
Meaning and cognition: a multidisciplinary approach,
L. Albertazzi (ed.), 51–78. Amsterdam / Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
Langacker, R. W. (1987). Foundations of cognitive
grammar, vol. 1: theoretical prerequisites. Stanford /
California: Stanford University Press.
Langacker, R. W. (2000a). Grammar and conceptualization. Berlin; New York: Mouton de Gruyter.
Langacker, R. W. (2000b). Why a mind is necessary: Conceptualization, grammar and linguistic semantics. In: Meaning and cognition: a multidisciplinary approach, L. Albertazzi (ed.), 25–38. Amsterdam / Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
72
AUDITORY LATERALITY AND SPEECH PERCEPTION
Kenneth Hugdahl
University of Bergen (Norway)
The concept of hemispheric asymmetry, or brain laterality, has gained increased interest in light of new findings
using functional brain imaging techniques, like PET and
fMRI. Functional neuroimaging has shown lateralization
of speech sound perception to the left peri-sylvian region. The more precise localization of neuronal activation in the left peri-sylvian region involves the superior
temporal gyrus (planum temporale), superior temporal
sulcus, and middle temporal gyrus. The activations are
also spreading out anteriorly and ventrally in the temporal lobe. These results cause some concern with regard
to the classic models of lateralization of speech sound
perception, to be exclusively localized to Werrnicke’s
area and the upper posterior part of the left planum temporale. In my talk I will present an overview of our research at the University of Bergen using dichotic listening to consonant-vowel syllables and fMRI to reveal both
the functional specificity and anatomical localization of
lateralization of auditory stimuli. I will also review more
recent studies where we have shown lateralization to the
same areas in the left temporal lobe to sub-syllabic stimuli, like isolated consonants. In the last part of my talk I
will apply these findings in an attempt to understand the
neuronal origin of auditory hallucinations in schizophrenia. A patient with schizophrenia hearing voices is
conceptually like an ordinary speech sound perception
with the important exception that there is no external
acoustic input in a hallucination. The phenomenological
experience for the patient is however indistinguishable
from an ordinary speech percept with an external acoustic input. Recent findings in our laboratory point to an
understanding of auditory hallucinations as having their
neuronal origin in the same areas in the left temporal
lobe as perception of an external speech source. MRI
data have also shown that patients with schizophrenia
have significant reduction in grey matter brain tissue
in these areas, pointing towards an abnormality at the
neuronal level.
COMPARING PERCEPTUAL EFFECTS OF LEARNING CHINESE
WRITTEN CHARACTERS AND LEARNING PINYIN
(AN ALPHABETIC) SYSTEM
Lumei Hui
Humboldt State University (California, USA)
East Asians (Chinese, Japanese, and Koreans), whether
in America or Asia, typically score higher in nonverbal
intelligence than White Americans (Neisser et al, 1996,
Herrnstein & Murray, 1994). Several existing theories /
hypotheses to account for this difference have yielded
interesting but inconclusive results. The present researcher, with the assistance of a vice principal and two
teachers of a Kindergarten School in China, investigated
whether learning pictographic, as opposed to alphabetic,
written symbols is a key factor to understand this important intelligence issue.
We had eighty kindergarten children from two
classes learn a writing system that was novel to them.
They were taught either Chinese words (pictographic
characters) or Chinese Pinyin (an alphabet system) for
69 school days, a half hour per school day, for total
of 34.5 hours during the fall semester of 2004. One
teacher had 42 children in her class and the other had
38. Children in each class were randomly divided into
two groups, one group were taught Chinese words and
the other group were taught Chinese Pinyin by the same
teacher but at different times during the school day. The
Vice Principal of the Kindergarten School gave each
child the Motor-Free Visual Perception Test (MVPT)
before and after the learning period.
The final analysis was based on the data from
seventy-one children aged from four years ten months
to six years three months because the other nine children did not provide complete data. The results indicated that both of groups showed a significant increase
in their MVPT scores between the pre- and post-tests.
For the group learning Chinese Pinyin, t (32) = 2.83,
p < .01 (two-tailed). For the group learning Chinese
words, t (37) = 3.05, p < .01 (two-tailed). And, there
was no significant difference between the two groups either for the pre-test, F (1,69) = .14, p = .72; and for
the post-test, F (1,69) = .88, p = .35. The results do
not support the hypothesis that learning a pictographic
writing system may increase children’s visual processing
ability more than learning an alphabetic writing system.
However, by carefully examining the teaching notes
from the two teachers’ daily records, the present researcher realized that children in the Chinese word learning group learned about 103 words, one word per day
for the first 45 days and two words per day for the last
24 days. Children in the Pinyin learning group learned
6 vowels, 14 consonants, and 32 combinations of one
vowel with one or two consonants. Each day, children
in the Pinyin learning group also had to learn 4 different
tones associated with each vowel, or vowel and consonant. Those 4 tones were pictorially presented in the
writing.
Therefore, the actual learning process for the Pinyin
73
group was far more demanding in perceptual perspective than what the present researcher anticipated. In
other words, the present researcher did not anticipate
the pictographic nature of learning the Chinese Pinyin
system for a beginner. Although Chinese Pinyin system
is an alphabetic system its basic elements were created
for matching the tones of Chinese words. So, each element of the Chinese Pinyin actually contains two parts,
one part is an alphabetic component, the other part is a
tone component. For a beginning learner, to learn those
elements of the Chinese Pinyin, children practically have
to remember them just like those children who have to
remember those Chinese words as such. That might be
why both of the two groups showed similar and positive
perceptual effect. In conclusion, the present researcher
predicts that if children were given the opportunity to
learn hundreds of pinyin words in a much longer of learning period, they would treat them as true alphabetic
words. Only then could we see whether learning Chinese Pinyin and Chinese characters generated different
perceptual competencies.
References:
Herrnstein, R., & Murray, C. (1994). The bell curve:
Intelligence and class structure in American life. New York:
The Free Press.
Neisser, U., Boodoo, G., Bouchard, T. J., Boykin, A. W.,
Brody, N., Ceci, S. J., et al. (1996). Intelligence: Knowns
and unknowns. American Psychologist, 51, 77–101.
THE IMPORTANCE OF CONNOTATION IN TRADEMARK
NAMING
Carlos Inchaurralde
Universidad de Zaragoza (Spain)
In this paper I want to highlight certain important ideas
about the relevance of denotation and connotation for
applied linguistic activities involving naming and choosing words. More concretely, I will focus on branding and
trademark naming. In the trademark naming process it
is important to choose a name that can be evocative.
A name can evoke by means of its denotative meaning,
but also, in a subtler way, by means of its connotative
meaning.
Both denotation and connotation are acquired in a
learning process. The more exposure one has to different manifestations of the denotative meaning of a word
(together with the actual use of that word), the more
clearly established the semantic content of that word
will be in the end. We could call this acquisition mode
‘cognitive extension’, suggesting that our knowledge of
the world is created through sensory interaction with our
environment. Knowledge structures and the individual
concepts that are associated with them are dynamically
constructed. On the other hand, when we learn new
concepts at school, we often only receive concise explanations of the meaning of words. We may well call
this type of meaning acquisition ‘cognitive intension’.
For decades, there was a perception that, if we want to
study meaning, or even talk about it, it has to be made
manageable (presumably because it was not thought to
be). As a result, meaning was usually shrunk to presumably manageable proportions. Approaches to meaning
were traditionally ‘intensional,’ i.e. based on the dictionary entry model. Denotative meaning was usually
discussed in terms of (discrete) features or similar categories, articulated in different ways. However, after all
the criticism that came from psycholinguistic empirical
evidence (cf. Rosch 1973a, 1973b, 1975) it became
clear that meaning does not consist of discrete features
which are sufficient and necessary. Rather, denotative
meaning has an internal structure that relies on the distinction between prototypical and peripheral categories
as well as between different levels of schematicity and
specificity.
In addition, we must acknowledge that in the centre of any lexical meaning configuration there is always
one (or, in some cases several) sense(s) to which all the
others relate. In cognitive linguistics, the concept of a
‘core meaning’ from which different meaning extensions
originate has clarified the issue. The theme of this approach is that conceptual categories have a radial structure (Lakoff 1987: 436). All members of a category are
networked around a single core member. Radial structures have not been universally accepted, though. Cruse
(1986) pointed out that certain meaning structures do
pose problems when conceived of as networks. When
there is a connection between meanings along a continuum, normally developed in the course of time by means
of metaphorical or metonymical processes, the idea of
a ‘sense-spectrum’ may be more accurate. However,
the established view remains that different but related
meanings do not need to be graded along a continuum.
On the contrary, the most common arrangement is a radial network in which the different extensions surround
the main meaning. This configuration is geometrically
similar to the family resemblance relations observed in
prototype theory (stemming from Rosch 1973a, 1973b,
1975). For each category, there is a central example,
and several peripheral instances that share only some
characteristics (not necessarily the same throughout).
This is the standard view. The ‘extended’ version of
prototype theory (on the difference, cf. Kleiber 1991)
acknowledges the possibility of configurations similar to
Cruse’s sense-spectra.
Additionally, there is also the other kind of meaning, the connotation of lexical items, which has to do
with a subjective dimension that has to be considered as
well, and which, more importantly, can influence ‘objective’ denotative meaning. The pioneering work in this
74
area, and still one of the most salient references, is Osgood’s research into what he called ‘semantic space’.
Osgood (1976) presented a large number of subjects
with a vocabulary sample, to which they had to assign
different values on several bipolar scales consisting of
qualifying adjectives. A factorial analysis of the data revealed three main dimensions (evaluation, potency and
activity ), which reflected the connotative configurations
of the lexical items involved in the sample. In addition, other types of meaning have been identified from
a psycholinguistic perspective. For instance, we have
norms about features like ‘familiarity,’ ‘concreteness’ or
‘imagery,’ obtained through extensive sampling among
speakers (Gilhooly & Logie 1980; Paivio et al. 1968;
Toglia & Battig 1978; cf. Quinlan 1992).
Another kind of connotation has to do with the way
in which words sound (Magnus 1997). This author mentions three types of sound meaning, according to Von
Humboldt’s old classification: Onomatopoeia, clustering and true iconism.
Onomatopoeia is the imitation of a certain sound
by means of a combination of consonants and vowels in
a word. Clustering, or semantic association, is when a
certain speech sound that is used very often in a given
context can be used productively for new words within
that context. True iconism is when a certain sound
tends to have a certain meaning, independent from the
reference of the word within which it appears. An example of this can be initial ‘s’ before a consonant, which
tends to be linked to meanings expressing smoothness
and gliding (slip, slide, slick) or constriction (squeeze,
smash, etc.). In all cases the differences between the
meanings have to do with connotation, and as this kind
of meaning normally has a subtler nature, it can be
masked by denotative meaning if it collides with it.
Clustering can be assumed to be languagedependent, although the tendency to cluster is universal.
However, true iconism is universal (i.e. the initial / f /
sound is normally linked to the expression of directness).
According to Magnus’ argument, each sound, each
vowel and consonant has an inherent feel to it which
informs the meaning of every word containing it. Accordingly, the sequence of consonants and vowels found
within a word can have an influence on meaning. In this
respect, whether a given consonant precedes or follows
a vowel also determines subtle differences in meaning.
This inherent meaning is implicit in form and is therefore universal, with only small differences to conform the
different sound oppositions that diverge from language
to language.
Magnus uses the notion of archetypes to refer to
a characteristic sound space with a certain meaning
linked to it. For instance, the English/s/is linked to an
archetype that has to do with serpents and snakes and
also other notions connected with the ‘Garden of Eden’
story, concerning knowledge, slyness, betrayal, sex, expulsion.
All these considerations have important implications
for the choice of new trademark names. Descriptive
names can evoke through denotation and learned connotation, but invented names rely strongly on connotation created through true iconism. This is the main
point of the paper, which will stress the importance of
this type of connotation in trademark naming and will
provide many examples to illustrate these ideas.
GENOMICS, PROTEOMICS AND CONSCIOUSNESS
S. G. Inge-Vechtomov, O. N. Tikhodeyev
St. Petersburg State University (Russia)
Several molecular biology classics such as Nobel Prize
Winners: S. Benzer, S. Brenner, F. Crick and others after their success in this field shifted to neuroscience.
Generally they followed to the Crick’s role Structure
defines Function and utilized powerful methodology
of genetics. Usually this approach is based upon development of particular genetics of some model objects
and identification of cellular and molecular structures
responsible for elementary functions in neurological processes.
Here we would like to consider prospects and limitations of this approach. The success of any genetic analysis usually depends on a possibility to divide a complex
trait for so called elementary ones, which are inherited
according to the Mendel’s low. The very possibility to
do that is an indirect witness that we can identify some
discrete molecules, encoded in the genome, which are
involved in the process under investigation. It is difficult to use this approach toward humans and that is
why model objects, such as Drosophila, Nematode, mice
and even primates should be investigated. Sometimes
microbes may be useful.
Recently development of the new field of genomics
opened a possibility to deciphering primary structure of
DNA molecules and to identify nucleotide sequences encoding all the traits (molecules and functions) of the
object studied. Complete DNA sequence of the human
genome is available now the same way as genomes of
several animals.
The fast progress of genetics and genomics produced
a naı̈ve belief that now we can easily understand everything what is written in our DNA. Leaving aside the
very problem of interpretation of genetic (nucleotide)
texts it is necessary to point that some artifacts may be
obtained by this approach.
It is evident that sometimes we encounter only indirect effects of some general molecular defects upon fine
neurological and cognitive processes.
There is a new promising field which became popular
recently — the field of epigenetics. It deals with some
traits which are encoded not in nucleotide sequences
75
but rather in specific reproducible chemical modification of some nucleotide sequences or even with some
reproducible modifications of the protein secondary and
tertiary structure of proteins. The last example links
genomics to the other experimental area — the area of
proteomics, which study a full set of cellular and of organism proteins and specific interactions among them.
It is evident that genomics cannot describe protein
interactions within a proteome. At the same time returning back to the methods of classical genetics we
can find those interactions. There are several examples of the human (and animal) protein diseases linked
to the neuro-degeneration in the later age: Alzheimer,
Huntington, Creuzfeld-Jacobe disease and others. All
these sicknesses are believed to be defined by amiloid
formation through aggregation of some normal cellular
proteins, different in each case. Some of them are even
infectious (Creuzfeld-Jacobe syndrome) through transfer of amiloid aggregates — prions. Study of prions led
to discovery of a new phenomenon of protein inheritance
in lower eukaryotes at the end of XX century and even
stimulated a hypothesis of involvement of the mechanism of protein prionization as an explanation of a long
term memory phenomenon in one mollusk — Applisia
californica.
The data presented show that the powerful methods
of analytical biology may be useful only as a complex
approach to the problem of consciousness.
TAUTOLOGIES IN RUSSIAN
Alina Israeli
American University (Washington, USA)
A nominal tautology (NT) is a construction of the type
[N copula N], which in English takes the form of [N is
N]. Russian NT are complicated by the fact that in Russian there are various copulas: est’, ∅, and èto. While
both [N est’ N] and [N èto N] with both N’s in the
nominative case exist, *[N ∅ N] does not. However,
[Nnon ∅ Ninstr ] does exist. The examples of these four
Russian types are slon est’ slon, slon èto slon, *slon
slon, and slon slonom. The total inventory of Russian
NT’s comprises 18 types altogether. Six types among
them (complicated by additional eight subtypes) form
Nominative types of NT.
There are various misconceptions regarding Russian
tautologies.
Wierzbicka’s original (1987) claim that Russian has
no nominal tautologies was later modified in her expanded version on English tautologies (1991). Other
works on tautologies (Tulina 1970, Nikolina 1984, Islamova 1985, Bulygina & Šmelev 1997) do explore some
data, but there is one common problem: various types of
tautologies are considered to be formal subtypes, variants with no semantic or pragmatic distinctions from
the main type.
Tautologies represent fertile ground for semantic
analysis. It is customary to defend tautologies as meaningful entities (as recently as Dell 1999). According
to Wierzbicka, English NT have four distinct meanings.
Thus A mother is a mother denotes either what is
expected of a mother or what the obligation is towards
one; A steak is a steak denotes either immutable qualities of a steak or its expected high value (Wierzbicka
1987). Dell carefully analyzed three English examples
and showed exactly what constitutes the semantic and
the pragmatic components in each case. Her data is,
however, very limited.
The problem of tautologies is also a problem of reference. The sentential statement [N is N] is actually
[N(1) is N(2) ] and is said in the context of a real situation or discourse, where N(1) refers to some object /
person of the discourse, while N(2) is the prototypical meaning of N together with the extra-lexical feature
that is highlighted by the specific [N is N] in the specific
discourse. Since not every noun can form every type of
tautology, it is possible theoretically to identify all the
extra-linguistic features associated with a given lexeme
based on the number and the types of tautologies it
enters.
In addition, tautologies may be used as a tool in
cross-linguistic analysis. While in the 90’s the two contending schools of thought on tautologies were radical
pragmatics vs. radical semantics, viz. whether tautologies are language independent or language specific,
recently Bulhof & Gimbel (2001 and 2004) have put
forth a concept of d e e p t a u t o l o g i e s (DT). In
their view, tautologies are eminently translatable as tautologies precisely because they are tautologies. While
there are some valuable points in their theory, Russian
tautologies, which have never been fully explored, challenge their theory.
While Russian clearly has a larger inventory of NT
than English, there is no total overlap with English
meanings; for example, immutability as in Math is
math (that is ‘math is always the same’) is not found
in [N est’ N] nor especially in [N èto N] in Russian, but
rather in the form of [N i Loc N] or [N i v Afrike N],
which challenges the Deep Tautology assumption that
tautologies are imminently translatable as (basic) tautologies.
76
SELF-CONSTRUAL IN RUSSIAN-ENGLISH BILINGUALS:
COGNITION, LANGUAGE, AND CULTURE
Ludmila Isurin
Ohio State University (Columbus, USA)
The study addresses a cognitive shift in bilinguals’ selfconstrual as it is reflected in their narratives. Russian /
English bilinguals represent an interesting case of two
cultural and linguistic schemas that may collide and produce a shift in the bilinguals’ cognition. Russian culture
as a collectivist culture may be influenced by the American culture as an individualistic culture. This may further be reflected in the way the speakers narrate in their
first language, which remains a collectivist language,
while residing in the second language environment governed by the individualistic culture / language. In this
paper, I argue with Trafimow (1997) that the language,
collectivist or individualistic, is the prime for eliciting the
culturally specific narrative patterns. On the contrary,
I adopt Hong (2000) approach of frame switching,
that bilinguals shift between interpretive frames rooted
in different cultures. Thus the current social environment, rather than the nature of the language per se,
may result in the collectivist language becoming the
means of conveying individualistic memories.
20 Russian-English bilinguals (US), 20 monolingual
Russian living (St. Petersburg, Russia) and 20 monolingual English speakers (US) participated in the study.
The bilinguals were interviewed in Russian. The participants were individually interviewed on a few selected
topics that elicited description and narration samples.
The qualitative analysis of the data revealed that bilinguals tend to recall personal events and describe the
environment in a manner much closer to English rather
than Russian monolinguals. Russian monolingual participants tend to focus their recollections around a social group and reflect on their memories as members of
the group while bilingual participants tend to shift the
focus on their individual experience. For example, Russian monolingual participants tend to recall how they
felt about the event that they were celebrating, who
was celebrating it with them, whether they had a good
time, etc. It is interesting to notice that the opening
sentence in the monolingual’s discourse is almost always
on the social environment in which the occasion was celebrated (husband, friends, etc.) and the memory of the
occasion is reflected through that environment. The
bilingual participants, on the contrary, tend to shift the
focus on their individual experience: the exact date of
their birthday, location where they went to, and what
material things they received / purchased on that day.
The paper gives the detailed analysis of the linguistic
correlates of individualism and collectivism, e.g., a content measure such as main agent in the narrative, or a
linguistic measure such as the use of pronouns, including
the pro-drop cases. The latter was found to be a measure of collectivist cultures (Kasima & Kashima, 1998).
The analysis of the discourse structure contributes to
the findings in this study and suggests that bilinguals
do shift between the cultural frames regardless of the
language in which they narrate. The paper links the
present study with the prior studies on bilingual’s selfconstrual, bilinguals’ memories and language interaction
in narratives. I will refer to a few other studies addressing similar issues in the same group of population, i.e.
Russian-English bilinguals living in the US.
References:
Marian, V. & Kaushanskaya, M. (2004) Self-construal
and emotion in bicultural bilinguals. Journal of Memory and Language, 51, 190–201.
Ross, M., Xun, W. Q. E. & A. Wilson (2002) Language
and the bicultural self. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 28, 8, 1040–1050.
Trafimow, D., Silverman, E., Fan, R. M.-T. &
J.S. F. Law (1997). The effects of language and priming on the relative accessibility of the private self and
the collective self. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 28, 107–123.
Hong, Y. Y., Morris, M. W., Chiu, C. Y., BenetMartinez, V. (2000). Multicultural Minds: A Dynamic Constructivist Approach to Culture and Cognition. American Psychologist 55: 709–720.
Kemmelmeier, M., Yan-Ming Chen, B. (2004). Language and Self-Construal Priming: a Replication and
Extension in a Hong Kong Sample. Journal of CrossCultural Psychology 35(6): 705–712.
Marian, V. & Kaushanskaya, M. (2005), Language
Interaction in Bilingual Narratives, paper presented
at the 5th International Symposium on Bilingualism,
Barcelona, Spain.
Kashima, E. & Kashima, Y. (1998), Culture and Language: The case of cultural dimensions in personal
pronoun use. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology,
29, 461–486
77
LANGUAGE LEARNING, UNIVERSITY COURSE AND
MINDREADING — ARE THEY RELATED?
Rozalia Ivady
Budapest Technological University (Hungary)
According to the theory of Simon Baron-Cohen (2005)
there are two important factors that characterize human
cognition, one of them being empathy and the other one
systemizing. He makes certain predictions about the
preferences and cognitive architecture of people belonging to one group or another and provides a test (Reading
the Mind in The Eyes Test) and three questionnaires
(Empathy, Systemizing and Autism Questionnaire) to
measure these abilities (Baron-Cohen, 2001). I used
RMET and the Empathy Questionnaire as well as the
Systemizing Questionnaire. The question in my study
was whether a., there is a difference in the empathizingsystemizing points of undergraduate students of different courses (for example physicists and psychologists)
and b., to see if this is related to the ability (or preference) of second language acquisition and subject evaluation.
We know there is a reliable correlation between infant verbal development and theory of mind as measured
with these tests and others (Baron-Cohen, 2003). Yet
its role in second language acquisition is not quite clear
yet.
We also know — actually it is a cliché — that probably students of psychology are more empathic than engineers, whichever way the causation goes. The importance in my view lies in finding these same effects
a., not only in self-reported questionnaires but also in
tests measuring a presupposed ability and b., finding
less obvious differences, for example between biology
and literature students, whose results may not so easily
be explained by differences int he input (i.e. psychology students are more interested in people as it shall be
their job: they attend more to faces, hence the better
ability).
According to the results RMET seems to be the best
indicator of a., the course someone is likely to take at
university (enigineers and physicists do seem to score
low on these points) and b., self-reported language efficiency.
There is no relyable correlation between university
course or language acquisition and the questionnaires,
though there are slightly significant relationships between the questionnaires and RMET.
Our hypothetical point is that maybe — if RMET in
fact does reflect mind-reading — students with greater
mind-reading capabilities can infer more quickly what
the teacher is trying to tell them from non-verbal communication and thus they get a larger input, being able
to map sounds to meanings, owing to the fact of course
that they can find the meanings and assign it correctly
to sound patterns.
Nowing these facts in our later studies we try to focus on other cognitive capabilities and several aspects
of language learning, trying to show how each interacts
with the other. (i.e.: finding out the meaning of words
might be easier for high empathy persons, but acquiring
syntax might be more related to systemizing).
Practical aims: firstly I would like to clarify if the
RMET test might be used as a career advice test — in
other words whether people who chose careers in accordance with their empathizing and systemizing scores are
happier in their work than those who show a discrepany.
Secondly I would like to find out if these two dimensions would be a help in certain areas of second
language acquisition (i.e.: whether the two cognitive
styles — empathyzing and systemizing — require different teaching styles — one more communicative, the
other more rule and language oriented).
Refernces:
S. Baron-Cohen (2005) The Empathizing System: a
revision of the 1994 model of the Mindreading System, In: Origins of the Social Mind, B. a. B. Ellis, D,
eds. Guildford
S. Baron-Cohen, S. Wheelwright, J. Hill, Y. Raste and
I. Plumb, (2001) The ‘Reading the Mind in the eyes’
test revised version: A study with normal adults, and
adults with Asperger Syndrome or High-Functioning
autism. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry
42:241–252
S. Baron-Cohen (2003) The essential difference.
Perseus Books.
78
HOW DRIVING EXPERIENCE AFFECTS DETECTING CHANGES IN
TRAFFIC SCENE?
Osman Iyilikci, Sonia Amado, Mehmet
Koyuncu
Ege University (Izmir, Turkey)
Difficulty in detecting meaningful changes in visual
scene is named as change blindness. Change blindness
is a remarkable phenomenon, as it reveals limited attention capacity and emphasizes the inconsistency between
what people see and what people think they see. Although incapacity to detect changes has been studied
for years, recent work has brought change blindness out
of the laboratory. Today change blindness is known as
more typical perceptual experience. Therefore, in addition to its theoretical background, change blindness has
practical consequences. Recent studies indicated that
individual characteristics of the observer affect the ability to detect changes in visual scene. For example if an
observer is experienced in a domain, he or she would
detect changes faster in scenes from that domain. Al-
though due to this effect it may be expected that experienced drivers would be better in detecting changes
in traffic scenes there is another factor to be considered: Practice and increased exposure to the diversity
of traffic situations predictably result in improved skills
but also increased subjective control of driving, less concern for safety and habitually driving with narrow safety
margins (Näätänen & Summala, 1976). In the frame
of these claims, in this current study it is hypothesized
that inexperienced drivers would detect changes to objects that are potentially dangerous in traffic situations
faster than experienced drivers. In the experiment, 30
images (15 original — 15 modified) from traffic scene
were used. An original and modified image alternated
repeatedly, separated by grey blank interval, until subjects detected the change or until 60s. elapsed (flicker
paradigm, Rensink et all., 1997). In each trial images
were presented for 240 ms. and blank grey screen was
presented for 80 ms. Analysis of the data continues.
COGNITION OF CULTURE, SOCIETY, AND VALUES
Ray Jackendoff
Tufts University (Medford, USA)
It is a commonplace nowadays to speak of social categories and cultural institutions as being socially constructed. I will explore the question of what it takes
for an individual to participate in such socially constructed entities — what kind of mind one has to have
in order to live in a human society. The question has
strong parallels with contemporary linguistics, which
investigates the cognitive structure required to be a
speaker of a human language (another socially constructed entity). As in the case of language, the study
of social cognition is consistent both with acknowledging cultural diversity and with a substantive universal
cognitive framework that underlies the ability to learn
and function in one’s culture. The inquiry leads quite directly to connections with issues in anthropology, primatology, evolutionary psychology, legal and moral philosophy, economics, and religion, as well as more traditional
cognitive sciences such as linguistics and developmental
psychology.
Among the basic issues in social knowledge are the
concepts of person and relationships among persons
such as kinship and group membership. Social behavior
is carried out in the context of cooperation and competition between and within groups, and it is governed by
normative principles such as obligations and rights, legal
codes, moral / ethical codes, and religious codes that
together constitute a system of values. Participation in
a culture depends on having learned the groups to which
one belongs and the system of values that regulate one’s
behavior within these groups.
79
BEYOND THE PAIR: INTEGRATING ASPECT AND ACTIONALITY
IN A MODEL OF RUSSIAN VERBAL DERIVATION
Laura A. Janda
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
(Chapel Hill, North Carolina, USA)
The purpose of this presentation is to provide a new
model to capture the aspectual relationships that exist
among Russian verbs. The traditional pair model of
Russian aspect asserts that aspectual relationships are
best described as the pairing of one Perfective and one
Imperfective verb. This traditional model fails to distinguish among various types of Perfectives and ignores
the fact that most verbs exist in larger clusters of three
or more aspectually related forms. I will propose semantic parameters to account for the interaction of aspect
and actionality (Aktionsart) in the formation of Russian verbs. These parameters serve as the basis for a
semantic map of Russian aspectual relationships, which
in turn disambiguates the types of verbs that constitute
aspectual clusters. I will show, using a multiply stratified
sample of 283 verb clusters (including over 2000 verbs),
that the composition of clusters conforms to a strict
implicational hierarchy. A single implicational hierarchy
predicts all and only the cluster types that are actually attested in Russian. Furthermore, I can show that
verbs with atypical relationships between morphological
form and aspectual marking (suppletive verbs, biaspectual verbs, and the verbs of motion) likewise conform to
the implicational hierarchy. The proposed model makes
it possible to replace the traditional model of aspectual
pairs with a model that is no less constrained, yet
captures the more complex reality of aspectual relationships among Russian verbs. It also provides a hypothesis
for cross-linguistic comparison.
I will propose three semantic parameters, one for aspect and two for actionality, distilled from the various
options in the scholarly literature: closed vs. open
(corresponding to Perfective vs. Imperfective), com-
closed
durative
pletable vs. non-completable (similar to telic vs.
atelic), and durative vs. instantaneous. These
parameters interact in a multi-dimensional space (Figure 1). They contribute to the following distinctions
among Perfective verbs in Russian that could be related to a single lexical stem, such as the Imperfective
shchipat’ ‘pinch/pluck’ (see Figure 2): 1) the Natural Perfective o(b)shchipat’ ‘pinch/pluck’ which is both
closed and completable and does not form a derived Imperfective; 2) several Specialized Perfectives
such as vyshchipat’ ‘pluck out’ which are also closed
and completable, but do form derived Imperfectives;
3) Complex Acts such as poshchipat’ ‘pluck for a while’,
which are closed, non-completable and durative, including delimitatives, ingressives, etc.; 4) and
Single Acts such as shchipnut’ ‘pluck once’ which are
closed, non-completable and instantaneous.
The composition of clusters conforms to a strict implicational hierarchy. The four types of Perfectives plus
the Imperfective Activity comprise the five possible elements in a verb cluster. Theoretically, five elements can
be combined in 31 ways, but an empirical study reveals
that most (19) of the possible cluster structures are not
attested, a quarter of the possible types account for
over 90% of verbs, and three similar cluster types (with
an Activity and a Specialized Perfective, plus a Natural Perfective and/or a Complex Act) account for over
half of the verbs sampled. The data suggest an implicational hierarchy to which all attested verb cluster
types conform: Activity>(Specialized Perfective / Natural Perfective)>Complex Act>Single Act. Given this
hierarchy it is possible to classify all Russian verbs according to the structure of aspectual clusters and thus
include variation in both aspect and actionality. This
yields a model that more accurately accounts for the
real complexity of the aspectual derivation of Russian
verbs.
completable
Natural & Specialized
open
Complex Acts
closed
closed
instantaneous
Single Acts
non-completable
closed
Figure 1. Russian Perfectives in a semantic map of aspect and actionality.
80
vyshchipat’
otshchipat’
o(b)shchipat’ p
p
Natural
Perfective
Specialized
Perfectives
Activities
shchipat’i
vyshchupyvat’ s
otshchipyvat’ s
poshchipyvat’ s
povyshchipyvat’ p
shchipnut’ p
pootshchipyvat’ p
Complex Acts
poshchipat’ p
Single Act
Figure 2. The verb cluster headed by shchipat’i [pinch/pluck] ‘pinch,
plucki ’.
Note: This figure gives only a representative sample
of the verbs of this cluster, which contains several more
Specialized Perfectives, along with the Activities derived
therefrom via Imperfectivization, and the Complex Acts
subsequently derived from those Activities.
FREQUENCY VERSUS AMOUNT IN THE IOWA GAMBLING TASK:
IMPLICATIONS FOR A DIFFERENCE IN DECISION-MAKING
STRATEGY
Ali Jannati1, 2 , Hamed Ekhtiari1 ,
Arian Behzadi1 , Majid Tavajohi1 ,
Azarakhsh Mokri1, 3
1
Iranian National Center for Addiction Studies
(Tehran, Iran)
2
SISSA (Trieste, Italy)
3
Tehran University of Medical Sciences
(Tehran, Iran)
Background: Riskful decision making is a cognitive
process based on which individuals select from different
choices available. These choices have different values
of probable reward or punishment, at present time or in
the future. The amount of reward or punishment, times
of gain or loss, degree of delay and the probability of
reward or punishment are measures important to cognitive scientists in recent years to evaluate their effects
on cognitive function of the individual. Iowa Gambling
Task (IGT) is an appropriate tool to speculate this descriptive process.
Materials and Methods: In this study, 117 male,
first-grade high school students 15–16 years of age underwent the Persian version of Gambling Task in the
first phase. In the second phase which was performed
a month later, the subjects were again investigated by
two simplified Persian versions of the test (BD version
only were composed of two card decks B and D and CD
version constituted card decks C and D) in two separate
study groups.
Results: Analysis of the results from the two phases
of the study indicates a propensity of individuals to
card decks B and D (Fewer times of loss with great
amount)(with average selection of 30.10 and 31.90 in
the main test from 100 choices of each individual) in
comparison with card decks A and C (More times of
loss with little amount) (with average selection of 18.14
and 19.86) so that the major score of the test which
indicates the propensity to good decks (C and D) in
comparison with bad decks (A and B), is diminished
by 3.5%.
This concept is also true with average selection time
from card decks; that is, individuals select more rapidly
from card decks B and D compared to decks A and C.
Discussion: The results of this study show a higher
importance of times of loss compared to the amount of
loss. Therefore, individuals in our study do not discriminate significantly between the cards with the same times
but different amounts of loss. However, among cards
that have the same amount but different times of loss,
a significant propensity is obvious towards fewer times
81
of loss. Our results are different from other previous under the section of amount versus frequency in this
studies showing a different strategy in riskful decision article.
making. Different aspects of this concept is discussed
EXPERTISE AND AGE EFFECTS ON CHECK AND THREAT
DETECTION IN CHESS
Tiffany Jastrzembski1 , Neil Charness1 ,
Catherine Vasyukova2
1
2
Florida State University (Tallahassee, USA)
Moscow State University (Moscow, Russia)
Higher-level cognitive abilities requiring attention and
memory have consistently shown a decrease with age in
late adulthood (e.g. Schaie, 1996). A potential counterweight to age-related decline is skill-related improvement. The critical question to resolve is how age and
skill trade off.
Figure 1. Check detection task.
Theory asserts that experts process large amounts of
information in the form of chunks, patterns, and templates, that are stored in long-term memory but can be
rapidly indexed and activated by domain-specific cues
held in working memory (Ericsson & Kintsch, 1995).
We examined whether skilled chess players could use sophisticated pattern recognition to recognize near threats
(threat detection: can the King be placed in check in
one move?, see Figure 1) as efficiently as they could recognize immediate threats (check detection: is the King
in check?, see Figure 2).
Figure 2. Threat detection task.
The anticipation advantage argues that experts develop optimal visual-search strategies through experience. In this study, two processes could be invoked to
assess the check and threat relations. A fast pattern
recognition process (chunk and/or template matching)
could allow a player to see that a King is in check
(or threatened) much as skilled readers can recognize a
word with a single fixation ( 200–250 ms/word). If the
specific array of pieces is not within a player’s vocabulary, a more likely situation for threat detection, the
player would have to imagine a change in the position
of a piece and use pattern matching on the updated
internal representation to verify a check relation. As
pattern vocabularies grow with skill level (Gobet & Simon, 1996), expert players might have chunks or templates that directly represent the threat relation, making
threat detection as rapid as check detection. Thus, we
hypothesize a perceptual advantage for experts, such
that response times for the threat task should not differ
significantly from response times for the check task.
Further, as the literature is mixed over whether there
is differential age-related decline as a function of skill,
we chose to investigate the interplay of age and skill
in these primarily recognition-based tasks. Support for
mitigation of age effects might be expected from Ericsson and Kintsch’s theory (1995) of long-term working
memory, such that.older experts may be able to circumvent age-related decline on domain-relevant tasks
by drawing on acquired knowledge even when measures
of speeded response are gathered (e.g. for typing digraphs: Bosman, 1993). If acquired skill does indeed
mitigate age-related decline in cognitive efficiency, then
this study should reveal an interaction of age and skill,
such that response time differences between the performance of younger and older experts will not be as
great as response time differences between the performance of younger and older intermediates or younger
and older novices.
The Digit Symbol Substitution Test (DSST, Wechsler, 1981) and a modified number version of the n-back
lag task were also administered to assess speed of information processing and an index of working memory
capacity, respectively. These individual difference measures were collected to determine if task differences were
due to domain-specific knowledge and expertise, versus
general cognitive slowing.
Novice (N=20, estimated to have lower ELO
ratings 1200 or below), intermediate (N=19, Elo
M=1816, SD=128.2), and expert (N=20, Elo M=2377,
SD=112.6) chess players, varying in age (young N=19,
M=32.1, SD=8.19; older N=20, M=61.5, SD=11.7),
performed 4 blocks of the check detection task (16 trials per block), alternating with 4 blocks of the threat
detection task (16 trials per block). Main effects of
task and rating for accuracy were revealed. An interaction of task by skill revealed the expected differential
perceptual advantage, such that experts performed the
threat detection task as quickly as the check detection
task (see Figure 3). Response time results indicated
that skill did not fully mitigate age-related decline in
knowledge activation processes, however, in contrast to
the old to young slowing ratio of 1.5 on the DSST,
82
Brinley (1965) ratio analyses were significantly lower on
skill-related activities (1.12 to 1.23), suggesting some
mitigation for skill-related processing (see Figure 4).
Figure 3. Mean median response time by task type by still (with standart error bars).
Figure 4. Mean slowing ratios for chess tasks and DSST by age and skill.
References:
Bosman, E. A. (1993). Age-related differences in motoric aspects of transcription typing skill. Psychology and
Aging, 8, 87–102.
Brinley, J. F. (1965). Cognitive sets, speed and accuracy
of performance in the elderly. In a. T. Welford & J. E. Birren
(Eds.), Behavior, aging and the nervous system (pp. 114–
149). Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas.
Ericsson, K. A., & Kintsch. W. (1995). Long-term working memory. Psychological Review, 105, 211–245.
Gobet, F., & Simon, H. A. (1996). Templates in chess
memory: a mechanism for recalling several boards. Cognitive Psychology, 3 1, 1–40.
Schaie, K. W. (1996). Intellectual development in adulthood. In J. E. Birren & K. W. Schaie (Eds.), Handbook of
the psychology of aging (4th ed., pp. 266–286). San Diego,
CA: Academic Press.
Wechsler, D. (1981). Manual for the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale — Revised. New York: Psychological Corporation.
REALIS: A DISCOURSE REPRESENTATION THEORY OF VERBAL
AND NON-VERBAL INFORMATION
Gyöngyi Kántor, Gábor Alberti
University of Pécs (Hungary)
A new dynamic discourse theory, called ReALIS (Alberti, 2000; 2004), is introduced in the talk. One of the
most important key words of cognitive sciences, representation, is interpreted for discourses, as we are linguists. This theory tries to combine the formal (logicalmathematical based) semantics’ descriptive exact feature with human (verbal and non-verbal) communica-
tion generating a new approach, the combinate pragmaticosemantics one.
The basic definition of ReALIS
ReALIS (Reciprocal and Lifelong Interpretation System)
can be defined as a quadruple R = WΩ o , WΛ , Dyn∆ ,
TruΘ where Wo = U, T, I, M, Ω is a tensed human world, or the oracle’s / external / real world (U:
universe of entities, T⊂U: temporal entities, I⊂U: inter-
83
preters, M: impulses, Ω: external relations); W is a partial function where W(i, t) = Wi t = Ui t , Coni t , Idei t ,
AccΛi t , κi t , αi t is interpreter i’s information state =
internal world at moment t (components: universe of
referents / internal entities, relation of condition rows,
identity relation, labeled accessibility relation, cursor,
anchor ; Λ: labels of reality status); Dyn: M×W →
W is the partial function of dynamic interpretation; and
Tru(m) = W[m(0), Θ] is a set of propositions concerning a linguistic impulse m, called its generalized truth
evaluation / static interpretation.
ReALIS can be regarded as a theory in which the
representational apparatus of DRT is embedded, on the
one hand, in an interpreter-centered ‘lifelong’ framework
and in a multi-agent system of information exchange,
on the other hand. In this latter respect it should be
compared with Anton Benz’s (2000) DRT-based multiagent system (see also Dekker 1997, Fagin et al. 1995).
Reciprocity in ReALIS
Comments on the ‘psychological’ extension of DRT
Because of ‘the conviction that linguistics should stay
clear from assumptions about what goes on in the
heads of speakers or hearers, DRT, Kamp’s representational dynamic discourse-semantics, is cautious about
regarding DRSs (‘discourse representation structures’)
as structures which the interpreter forms in his mind
(Kamp et al. 2004: 5.1). Their conclusion is that a
non-psychological ‘core DRT’ should be separated explicitly from an extension of DRT, in which DRSs are
used to identify mental representations of content.
This theory captures and formally represents the
real process of communication, as we mentioned above,
(Belief — Desire — Intention ‘wordlets’ building by
anaphoric cohesion) in its natural temporal and interpersonal dimension. It can handle all kinds of messages / information in discourses in a uniform way. The
verbal side of the information content can be treated
and represented in the same way as the non-verbal
side, whose crucial importance in human interaction has
been recognised by psychologists for long (Duncan 1975;
Mehrabrian-Weiner 1967).
This article is devoted to representing sentences and
discourses about beliefs and proposing solutions to stubborn linguistic / philosophical puzzles concerning beliefs
— e.g. intensional identity (in ‘Hob-Nob sentences’)
(Roberts 1996:237, Lewis 1986), and the puzzle of a singular definite expression raised by Benz (2000) — in a
new DRT-based (decidedly representational(ist)) framework called ReALIS (Alberti 2004, 2005a-c, Kleiber
2005), a ‘Reciprocal’ And ‘Lifelong’ Interpretation System, whose stance practically coincides with that of this
‘extended’ / ‘psychological’ DRT.
Benz’s (2000:181) central problems are to ‘provide a description of how the iterated specific use of an indefinite
NP [and then coreferential definite ones] can lead to the
establishment of referential chains across dialogues and
dialogue participants. . . , . . . how they introduce discourse referents, how they are related to the common
ground, and how this common ground can be represented by the dialogue participants.’ We argue that
Benz’s above mentioned representation of the common
ground, at least as it is described in his short 2000 GötaLog paper, is too ‘symmetrical’, which implies empirical
problems. The alternative proposed in the framework of
ReALIS is based on an ‘asymmetrical’ approach to participants of a conversation, which is also ‘constructive’:
they (may) have ‘reciprocal’ knowledge on each other
References:
(and the external world, and their knowledge / beliefs
Alberti, G. 2000: Lifelong Discourse Representation
on the external world, and their knowledge / beliefs on
Structures, Gothenburg Papers in Computational Linguistics
each others’ hypothesized knowledge on the external
00–5, 13–20.
world and each other. . . ).
‘Lifelongness’ in ReALIS
The lifelong (Alberti 2000) character of ReALIS means
nothing else but that interpreters’ information states are
represented (mentally) from birth to death in a DRTstyle, so discourses are to be assigned DRSs ‘inside interpreters’, and not in the usual abstract way (ReALIS
is ‘real’ in this sense). The essence is that in the tensed
model applied in ReALIS, an interpreter’s information
state at a certain moment can be regarded, later, as an
‘internal world’ which can serve as the context / model
of interpretation together with the external world1 (see
also Alberti 2005c).
Alberti, G. 2004: ReAL Interpretation System, in
L. Hunyadi — Gy. Rákosi — E. Tóth eds.: Preliminary Papers of the Eighth Symposium on Logic and Language, Univ.
of Debrecen, 1–12.
Alberti, G. 2005a: The Proportion Problem and the
Problem of Indistinguishable Participants, Szklarska Poreba
Workshop 6, Poland, 28 February 2005, 1700 –1740 .
Alberti, G. 2005b: Generalized Truth-Conditional Interpretation in ReAL Interpretation System, talk at the 9th International Pragmatics Conference, Riva del Garda, 10–15
July 2005.
Alberti, G. 2005c: ReALIS, doct. diss. subm. to
Hung.AS, ms. RIL HAS/U.Pécs; http://lingua.btk.
pte.hu/gelexi.
Benz, A. 2000: Chains and the Common Ground, in
Gothenburg Papers in Comp. Ling. 00–5, 181–184.
1 The model of information state offered by ReALIS can be regarded as a realization of what Zeevat (2005) writes about in his
article whose purpose is coming up with ‘a problem inherent in the work of Kamp and Heim . . . : to give a non-technical account
of accessibility that generalises to belief contexts, counterfactuals, negations and corrections’ (p550): ‘information states may have
a [recursive (see p544)] foreground-background division’ in connection with the fact that secondary contexts conflicting with the
primary context can be brought in by negations, modal statements, belief reports, plans and others’ (p539).
84
Dekker, P. 1997: On First Order Information Exchange,
MunDial’97, CIS LN 106, München, 21–39.
Duncan, S. D. 1975: Language, Paralanguage and
Body Motion in the Structure of Conversations.
In:
Williams, T. R. (eds.): Socialization and Communication in
Primary Groups. Mouton, The Hague. p. 283–311.
Fagin, R. — J. Y. Halpern — Y. Moses — M. Y. Vardi
1995: Reasoning about Knowledge, Cambridge: MIT.
Kamp, H. — J. van Genabith — U. Reyle 2004: Discourse Representation Theory, ms. to appear in Handbook of Philosophical Logic, source: http://www.ims.
uni-stuttgart.de/~hans.
Kleiber, J. 2005: Across World(let)s in a Representationist Interpretation System, StuS. ESSLLI 05.
Lewis, D. 1986: On the Plurality of Worlds, Oxford:
Blackwell.
Mehrabrian, A. — Weiner, M. 1967: Dedocing inconsistent communications. In: Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology. 6. p. 109–114.
Roberts, C. 1996: Anaphora in Intensional Contexts, in
Hb. Cont. Semantic Th., Oxford: Blackwell, 215–246.
Zeevat, H. 2005: Overlaying Contexts of Interpretation,
in Maier, Bary, Huitink eds.: Proc. of SuB9.
NOT ALL HAND-WRITING IS EQUAL: ONLY WELL-PRACTICED
HANDWRITING CAN INTERFERE WITH THE CONSOLIDATION
PHASE GAINS ACCRUED IN THE FINGER-OPPOSITION
SEQUENCE LEARNING TASK
Avi Karni1 , Meirav Balas1, 2 , Nir Giladi2
1
University of Haifa (Haifa, Israel)
Tel-Aviv Sourasky Medical Center
(Tel-Aviv, Israel)
2
We and others have recently shown, that as in several
paradigms of perceptual learning, practice on a novel
sequence of movements leads not only to immediate
performance gains (fast learning; within-session gains)
but also to robust delayed gains in performance evolving
hours after the termination of training (slow learning;
between-sessions gains) (Karni & Sagi, Nature 1993;
Karni et al, Science, 1994; Karni et al, PNAS, 1998;
Korman et al, PNAS, 2003). It was proposed that
these delayed gains in performance reflect neuronal processes, within the processing stream involved in task
performance, that are triggered by the training experience but require time (and perhaps sleep) to reach
completion. Because the resultant gains can be maintained for weeks and months it was conjectured that
the underlying process is one of (procedural) memory
consolidation. However, during the first few hours following the training, these delayed gains are susceptible
to interference: training on a different motor task during
this time-window can interfere with the memory of the
initial one. It is assumed that interference occurs only
if there is critical overlap between the representations
of the two tasks. Recently, it was suggested that extensively practiced, complex movement sequences come to
be represented as simpler ones in motor memory (Karni
et al, PNAS, 1998; Sosnik et al, Cog. Brain Res, 2004).
Here, our aim was to examine whether the learning of
a simple movement sequence will be more prone to interference by well-practiced complex sequences, namely
the participants’ handwriting in their native language
script.
Method: Forty-three participants were trained on
the finger-opposition sequence (FOS) learning task (Korman et al, PNAS, 2003). Pre-training performance,
early gains, and delayed gains in speed (number of correctly completed sequences) and accuracy (number of
incorrect sequences) were measured. Each participant
underwent a Baseline (no interference) and an Interference training condition, one week apart. In the Interference condition, after practicing the FOS half the participants were required to write 32 common words in using
the Hebrew alphabet (Heb int) and the other half, using
the Latin alphabet (Heblatin int). Results: Significant
early and delayed gains were found in all conditions in
both speed and accuracy. However, compared to the
Baseline and Heblatin int conditions, Heb int resulted
in significantly reduced delayed gains in speed. Indicating that well practiced handwriting can interfere with
the learning of a simple FOS. Conclusions: The results
support the notion that the representation of complex
but well practiced sequences overlap with the representation of simpler ones.
85
THE INFLUENCE OF CROSS-LINGUISTIC AND CROSS-CULTURAL
EXPERIENCE ON BILINGUALS’ COGNITIVE ABILITIES
Anatoliy Vladimirovich Kharkhurin
American University of Sharjah (Sharjah, UAE)
This project explores the hypothesis that bilingualism
encourages divergent thinking and cognitive flexibility,
which together facilitate creative thought. The study,
based on Ward, Smith and Finke’s (1999) creative
cognition approach, is part of a larger research program designed to examine the factors in bilingual development that contribute to potential advantages for
cognitive and creative abilities. Whereas most of the
explorations of this issue have directly compared monolinguals with bilinguals, in this study I also use a withinbilingual design in which each bilingual individual is assessed in terms of language proficiency in each language
and cross-cultural experience.
The purpose was to incorporate the various procedures that have been traditionally used to assess
bilingualism in bilingual research along with the sociocultural aspects of bilingualism, which have typically
been neglected. The hypothesis was that, in addition
to the virtue of speaking two languages, bilinguals who
experience and participate in two cultures may benefit from the meta- and paralinguistic advantages of biculturalism leading to an increase in divergent thinking
abilities. This cultural element has been virtually completely ignored in the study of the possible cognitive
impacts of bilingualism. It is entirely possible that the
inconsistency in the findings in this area of research can
be traced to a failure to have controlled for this factor.
In the cross-regional study, 98 Russian-English bilingual Brooklyn college student immigrants living in
the United States and 130 Russian-English bilingual
Moscow State University students living in Russia were
compared with 47 monolingual English native speakers.
Bilinguals were classified by their exposure to American
and Russian cultures and their proficiency in English
and Russian. Self-report questionnaires were used to
assess participants’ cultural and linguistic background.
Language proficiency was assessed using a modified version of the Picture Naming task, in which participants’
knowledge of English and Russian was evaluated by scoring the number of correct responses to the pictures
presented. Divergent thinking abilities were assessed
with the Abbreviated Torrance Test for Adults (ATTA,
Goff & Torrance, 2002), which measures verbal and
non-verbal fluency (total number of relevant responses),
flexibility (number of different categories of relevant responses), originality (the statistical rarity of responses),
and elaboration (amount of detail in the responses).
A MANCOVA showed that when the effect of crosscultural experience was partialed out, bilinguals who
were highly proficient in at least one language outperformed monolinguals and bilinguals who were moderately proficient in both languages on the parts of the
ATTA that tested ability to simultaneously activate multiple unrelated concepts (fluency) and keep them active
during the though process (elaboration), but not on that
part that tested originality in thinking. This finding suggests that although bilingualism may lay foundation for
creative thinking it does not necessary imply being creative; that is, other factors in individuals’ development
(e.g., intelligence, motivation, etc.) might influence
their creative abilities.
Further, a partial correlational analysis showed that
when the effect of language proficiency was controlled
for, culturally balanced individuals tended to obtain
lower fluency and originality scores than their culturally unbalanced and monocultural counterparts. This
finding suggests that the cross-cultural (or may be subcultural) experience had a negative effect on divergent
thinking. These results are discussed in terms of the
possible effects of the conceptual changes (Pavlenko,
2002) on bilinguals’ cognitive flexibility and divergent
thinking abilities.
All together, the findings of the study lend support
to the appealing argument in the literature that bilingualism should be studied not only in context of individuals’ linguistic abilities, but also in sociocultural context. Finally, a spreading activation process is proposed
as a cognitive mechanism underlying basic processing in
divergent thinking. A specific architecture of bilingual
memory (similar to Kroll & De Groot, 1997) in which
two lexicons are mutually linked to the conceptual system is speculated to facilitate the functioning of the
spreading activation mechanism.
References:
Goff, K., & Torrance, E. P. (2002). Abbreviated Torrance Test for Adults. Bensenville, IL: Scholastic Testing
Service.
Kroll, J. F., & de Groot, A. M. B. (1997). Lexical and
conceptual memory in the bilingual: Mapping form to meaning in two languages. In A. M. B. de Groot & J. F. Kroll
(Eds.), Tutorials in bilingualism: Psycholinguistic perspectives. (pp. 169–199). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Pavlenko, A. (2002b). Conceptual change in bilingual
memory: A neo-Whorfian approach. In: F. Fabbro (Ed.),
Advances in the neurolinguistics of bilingualism. Udine,
Italy: Forum, pp. 69–94.
Ward, T. B., Smith, S. M., & Finke, R. A. (1999). Creative cognition. In R. J. Sternberg (Ed.), Handbook of creativity. (pp. 189–212). New York: Cambridge University
Press.
86
MULTI-FACTORIAL CHOICES IN SPEAKING*
Andrej A. Kibrik
Institute of Linguistics, Russian Academy of
Sciences (Moskow, Russia)
As people speak, they constantly make choices. There
are several (partially overlapping) types of choices involved. The first type can tentatively be named unique
choice. Imagine a situation of a military commander
giving orders to his subordinates. In order to prescribe
an action to be done, the speaker must pick an appropriate verb from the lexicon. There is some degree
of freedom in such situations, but basically the speaker
chooses a near-unique formal device for the given function or meaning.
The second type is prompted choice. Different languages prompt speakers to focus on certain aspects of
meaning that must be expressed in this or that way. For
instance, if a language has the category of number, each
noun in discourse must be specified for number, even if
it is not particularly relevant. This is what Jakobson’s
notion of grammatical category and Slobin’s Thinking
for speaking framework have addressed.
Still another kind of choice can be called forced
choice. Some linguistic elements require other linguistic elements. For example, verb V in language L requires
a direct object, and even there is no semantic need to
use an object NP the speaker inserts a dummy element
there.
Now, there is a kind of choice that differs from any
of the listed types, and is much less acknowledged in
linguistics. Such choice perhaps can be dubbed multifactorial. It can be characterized by the following properties:
• the choice is made between two or more options
from a fixed repertoire
• the choice cannot be reduced to one factor governing it but depends on multiple factors
• various factors interact in a certain way and give
rise to a cumilative resultant decision
• the choice is probabilistic; there always exist some
borderline situations in which more than one option can be used
• the choice is cognitively motivated: it can be
linked to a higher-order cognitive function
There is a whole gamut of linguistic choices that are
multi-factorial. I am going to examine three such phenomena belonging to the realms of lexicon, morphosyntax and prosody.
1. Referential choice. Referential choice in a language like English is the choice between a full noun
phrase and an anaphoric pronoun for a given referent at
* This
study has been supported by grant
a given point in discourse. This choice is complex; it
is based on multiple linguistic factors. Factors involved
include inherent properties of the referent itself (animacy, protagonisthood) and properties of the context
(e.g. distance to the antecedent along the hierarchical
discourse structure, or syntactic role of the antecedent).
All these factors interact and in each individual instance
give rise to the cumulative characteristic of the referent:
its current level of activation in the speaker’s working
memory, which is responsible for the actual choice made.
2. Finite vs. non-finite clause form. Many
languages have a distinction between finite verb forms
(those that are inflected for tense and person) and nonfinite verb forms, such as gerunds or converbs (lacking
marking for tense, person, and other grammatical features). Some languages interchangeably use finite and
non-finite verb forms to report events of the mainline of
discourse. For example, in Balkar (Northern Caucasus,
Turkic) narrative clauses in a story can be either finite
or non-finite. My claim is that the speaker choosese
between those each time when formulating a narrative
clause, and the major factors are the following: whether
the clause is sentence-final and what kind of semantic
link connects the event in question to the next event.
Events connected by a ‘strong’ semantic link involving
a cause-effect nuance are coded by means of non-finite
clauses, while events connected by a mere temporal link
are coded by finite clauses.
3. Direction of pitch in accent. The flow of
spoken discourse is organized as a sequence of prosodic
units, or elementary discourse units (EDUs). Each EDU
has a primary accent on a word or constituent, and such
primary accent marks the informational center of the
discourse unit. Accents are established by high intensity of pronunciation, perceived as loudness, but they
are also characterized by the direction of pitch, or tone:
rising or falling. In a language such as Russian, each
time the speaker produces an EDU with a particular nuclear accent, s/he must decide what direction of pitch
is going to be used on the accent. This twofold choice
depends on at least the following factors: whether the
EDU in question is sentence-final or non-final; what is
the illocutionary function of the sentence (statement,
question, etc.); what pitch direction is projected for the
nuclear accent of the following EDU; whether the current EDU is in the mainline of discourse or is a postpositional addendum (elaboration) to the previous EDU.
Only an interplay of all these factors can explain the
choice of pitch direction made by the speaker. The factors involved can be generalized with the help of the
notion of ‘phase’, or ‘continuity’ addressing the role of
the current EDU in the continuous flow of discourse.
Generally, grammar can be viewed as a system that
guides the speaker’s choices. Note that all of the examples of choices discussed above are ‘material’ henom-
05–04–04240 from the Russian Foundation for the Humanities.
87
ena: they are implemented in certain material (noun
phrases, verb morphology, prosodic patterns) used by
the speaker. However, the same types of choices can be
manifested through the second major type of grammatical coding, namely linear ordering, such as word order.
Such examples will be provided in the presentation as
well.
I would like to discuss the theoretical notion of
choice in a more general way. Is it a suitable notion
to describe the linguistic phenomena in question? Are
choices important to other cognitive domains beyond
language? Is the notion of choice useful for the general enterprise of cognitive science? Can choices fit into
some familiar types of cognitive processes, such as decision making? There is extensive psychological literature on how people make, so to speak, macro-choices,
which involves reasoning, such as decisions on vote or
investment. But what about quick and near-automatic
choices, such as braking or accelerating in driving, using right or left hand when reaching an object, etc.?
This would be behavioral analogs of choices made while
speaking that have beed discussed above. Occasionally
psychologists use the choice and decision-making terminology to account for such phenomena, cf.:
For example, a boxer facing an opponent who can
attack with the left or right fist must make a fast decision about what to do. In situations like this, the
‘choice’ reaction time is substantially longer, mainly reflecting the increased processing demands associated
with selecting and programming the appropriate action. (Jos J. Adam and Martinus J. Bueckers. Action.
In: Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. London: Nature
Publishing Group. 2003. Vol. 1, pp. 14–20).
It seems, however, that such usage of terms ‘decision’ and ‘choice’ is informal and generally this kind of
phenomena are subsumed under different psychological
notions, such as ‘action’, as in the case of the quoted article. I believe that acknowledging the omnirelevance of
the notion of choice in behavior, including speech, and
attempting to understand the typology of choices and
properties of various kinds of choices is important for
the agenda of cognitive studies. Particularly interesting
are multi-factorial choices as they present a big challenge to our explanatory models. In order to account
for all relevant factors one needs to develop a theory of
how they interact and how their differential weights give
rise to a certain net effect.
BASIC ONTOLOGICAL CATEGORIES AS REPRESENTED BY
SEMANTIC UNIVERSALS (BACK TO THE QUESTION OF HOW
MUCH TIME AND SPACE GET INTO LANGUAGE)
Inna Klioutchnikova
Minsk State Linguistic University (Minsk, Belarus)
The assumption that the lexicon is just as rulegoverned as syntax is by no means new (KHARITONCHIK 2005). The attempt to formalize the structure of word meaning and to present it as a limited set of
semantic primitives undertaken by recognized linguists
(KATZ 1972, MEL’CHUK 1999, WIERZBICKA 1985,
PUSTEJOVSKY 1995), provided a solid basis for the
study of word meaning from a new angle. That is, from
the point of view of information stored by its semantic components. This approach may help us to bridge
the gap between word meaning and world knowledge,
as it aims to answer one of the challenging questions
of cognitive semantics: what information about objects
is fixed in the lexical meaning of words denoting those
objects and why?
There is strong evidence (IVASHKEVICH 2000,
OLEJNIK 2001) that only a fraction of the properties
of everyday phenomena are registered as semantic components in the lexical meanings of related words.
For example, although everything in the world exists in time and space, not all lexical items convey
temporal and spatial information. M. Bierwisch singles out 4 main groups of concepts according to the
degree of spatial and temporal relations they demon-
strate: 1) those which demonstrate no spatial (hour,
duration) or temporal (water, lion) relations, 2) those
which exhibit extrinsically spatial (animal, instrument) or temporal (fear, trip) relations 3) those that
have intrinsically spatial (horse, violin) or temporal
(death) characteristics and 4) those that are strictly
spatial (square, height) or temporal (hour, duration)
concepts (BIERWISH 1996). Thus, in English, apart
from temporal and spatial words (nouns, verbs, adverbs,
etc.), which denote spatial and temporal relationships
of objects directly; there are certain groups of nouns
belonging to different lexico-semantic categories (artifacts, names of persons, animals, plants, abstract notions, etc.) that contain intrinsic spatial or temporal
information. Observing the definitions of such English
nouns as hat ‘a piece of clothing that you wear on your
head’; miner ‘someone who works under the ground in
a mine taking out coal, gold etc’; bat ‘a small animal
like a mouse that flies around at night’ and many others we may notice that time and space get rather
deep into the language structure being fixed as semantic components in the structure of the lexical meaning
of some words.
Our research proves, though, that there is no hardwired mapping from spatial and temporal properties
of objects to their semantic representation in lexical
meanings. The groups of non-spatial and non-temporal
88
English nouns with spatial and temporal components
in their meaning constitute respectively only 4,7% and
2,6% of all nouns in Longman Active Study Dictionary
of English. This presumably accounts for the fact that
temporal and spatial characteristics (as well as all others) are fixed in lexicographic descriptions only when
they are necessary either for differentiating between two
objects (kitten — cat, foal — horse, attic — cellar,
ceiling — roof ) or for identifying objects making their
descriptions sufficient and the meaning itself comprehensible (triplet ‘one of the three children born at the
same time to the same mother’, amphibian ‘an animal
that can live on both land and water ’, etc.). The analysis of a diverse number of definitions of one and the
same lexical item in several dictionaries also proves this
claim. Although they are rather subjective in nature and
thus somewhat variable, lexicographic descriptions registered in different dictionaries exhibit a certain systematicity and regularity as regards the components under
consideration.
Thus, my main conclusion may be that a close semantic correlation between the language categories of
time and space on the one hand, and temporal and spatial semantic features in the lexical meanings of English
nouns on the other, indicates the existence of a highly
diverse set of semantic universals, that underlie all lan-
guage expressions of time and space in English.
References:
N-I- N P GH h- - 3 2 05 G 3 -3 /.H 66 i- 3 g. ,
g40 I3 1 - - L3
- L3
+++)
g" N j GH k1. -2
30 3.L g l/. ".
k g N GH 3 103.2 3
G 3 -3 /.H g
g#m$
Bierwisch M. How much Space Gets into Language //
Language and Space. — MIT Press, 1996. — P. 31–76.
Katz, Jerrold J. (1972). Semantic Theory. Harper &
Row, New York.
Kharitonchik, Z. A. (2005). Semantic Patterns within
the Lexicon. (To appear).
Pustejovsky J. (1995) The Generative Lexicon. Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England, The MIT Press.
Rosch E. (1978) Principles of Categorization. (in:)
E. Rosch and B. Lloyd, eds. Cognition and Categorization.
— Hillsdale, N. J.; Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 27–48
Wierzbicka A. (1985) Lexicography and Conceptual
Analysis. — Ann Arbor; Karoma
Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English. — Longman Group Ltd, 1995. — 1668 p.
THE NEURO-COGNITIVE BASIS OF SOCIAL COOPERATION
IN HUMANS
Markus Knauff1 , Thomas Fangmeier1 ,
Markus Raabe2 , & Mark W. Greenlee2
1
University of Freiburg (Freiburg, Germany)
Universität Regensburg, Institut für
Experimentelle Psychologie (Regensburg,
Germany)
2
of cooperative-social choices, if he or she pressed a key
associated with a defective decision the corresponding
functional image was assigned to the defective-social
choices group. The third group, the non-social choices,
consisted of all images that were sampled during the
non-social problems.
Introduction and Motivation
Results
Some of the most essential questions concerning our
social relations revolve around the issues of cooperation
and selfishness. We present a functional brain imaging
study in which volunteers could choose between two social decisions, either to cooperate with another person or to defect. As probes a set of social problems was used and contrasted to non-social problems.
The social problems resembled the Prisoner’s Dilemma
game, which is the most widely used paradigm of behavioral sciences to study the roots of cooperation and
conflicts between individuals and social groups.
FMRI scans were acquired while the participants
contemplated over the episodes. The active brain areas
were identified by a random effects group analysis over
the entire set of participants. The responses of the participants during scanning were used to compare cooperative and defective social choices. If he or she pressed
a key associated with a cooperative decision the corresponding functional image was assigned to the group
Figure 1 shows the cortical and Figure 2 the sub-cortical
brain areas differing in activity related to problems associated with cooperative-social choices, problems associated with defective-social choices, and the non-social
decisions.
The comparison between social and non-social problems revealed that a region in the right orbito-frontal
cortex (OFC), corresponding to BA 11, was more activated during social-problem processing than during the
processing of non-social problems. As shown in panels
B and C of Figure 1, a more detailed analysis revealed
that this increase of activation in OFC occurred solely
during the cooperative but not during the defective social choices. Recent studies provide evidence that these
portions of the OFC are involved in what psychologists
call the theory of mind: the ability to infer other’s
mental states. Other cortical activations were found in
parts of the posterior parietal cortex (PPC) corresponding to the right precuneus, the superior parietal lobule
89
bilaterally (BA 7) and the right dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex (DLPFC, BA 46). These areas were significantly
more activated by the social than by the non-social
problems, irrespective of the defective or cooperative
choices. Activity in PPC and DLPFC is usually associated with working memory, executive functions and the
control of attention. Other studies also indicate that
the DLPFC is involved in consciousness, volition and
willed actions.
The comparison between social and non-social problems revealed that a significant portion of the dorsal
amygdala was less activated bilaterally by the social
than by the non-social problems. In general, the amygdala plays an essential role in emotional processing, in
particular in negative emotions such as fear and anxiety.
The comparisons within the social problems revealed a
second focus of activation in the amygdala. This region
was located in the ventral portions of the amygdaloid
complex and showed elevated activity during defective,
but not during cooperative-social choices (Fig. 2). This
elevation of activity was statistically significant in the
right dorsal amygdala. In the corresponding left portion
it was visible with a more liberal threshold, but did not
reach our predefined level of statistical significance.
Figure 1. Activated cortical areas. Panel A) illustrates the activated brain clusters in the comparison
between social choices and non-social choices. Panel B) shows brain areas related to defective social
choices, and Panel C) the activity related to cooperative social-choices. The comparison between B) and
C) shows that cooperative social-choices are accompanied by additional activity in regions in the OFC
and DLPFC, whereas the defective choices in Panel B) did not reveal such an increase of activation in
comparison to the non-social problems. The histograms depict the beta means for the non-social choices
(dark shade), the cooperative-social choices (light shade), and the defective social choices (no shade).
The standard error are indicted by the error bars.
90
Figure 2. Activated sub-cortical areas. The activated clusters in the ventral and dorsal right amygdala (The activity in the left amygdala from the comparison between social and non-social problems
is presented in the bar graphs only). The dorsal activation was obtained from the comparison between
non-social and social choices and the ventral activation from the comparison between defective-social and
cooperative-social choices. The dorsal activations indicate that the non-social choices were accompanied
by stronger negative emotions than the social choices (depicted by stars in the two leftmost histograms).
The ventral activation, however, shows that within the social choices the defective decisions were accompanied by stronger negative emotion than the cooperative decisions (illustrated by star in rightmost
histogram).
Discussion
level, selfish and cooperative social decisions seem to
be guided by inversely working higher cognitive arIn the past, human cooperation has mainly been ex- eas and lower emotional areas. The thinking arplained in terms of kin selection and reciprocity. These eas are located in the OFC and DLPFC. The regions
theories focus on the evolutionary mechanisms result- in OFC enable humans (and probably some great apes)
ing in cooperation and altruism. The present study, to have metarepresentations of other people’s mindhowever, is part of recent developments in the cog- sets, their motives, and emotional states. We can innitive neuroscience of social behavior. On the brain fer, for instance, that another person could be hurt by
91
one’s own action. These cognitive processes are complemented by emotional processing in the amygdala. Here
enhanced activity was found during defective choices.
This provides a new view on the problem of cooperation and egoistic behavior: Defective decisions are linked
to negative emotions and the punishment effects of
the experienced social world and one’s peers. On the
neural level, the thought of cheating another person
is associated with the threat of being punished. The
avoidance of punishment thus might be the key motive
for cooperation. Since the amygdala is a vital part of
the automatic processing of negative emotions these
processes might work almost unconsciously-but nevertheless effectively.
DOES HUMAN MEMORY KEEP OUR PAST OR DOES IT
CONSTRUCT IT AND HOW?
Boicho Kokinov
New Bulgarian University (Sofia, Bulgaria)
Human memory has been conceived as a storehouse
from ancient Greeks till the early psychology work of
Ebbinghaus (1885) and up till nowadays (Tulving, 1987)
when the number of various storages has increased considerably (short-term vs. long term, declarative vs. procedural, semantic vs. episodic, explicit vs. implicit).
Even though this is the dominating tradition in the
field of memory, there is an alternative — the constructivist approach. It started with Bartlett (1932) who
focused on how memory (wrongly) reconstructs stories
and pictures using more general schemas, then Neisser
(1967, 1998) introduced the memory as paleontologist
metaphor and demonstrated that it could be quite incorrect, then Loftus (1979/1996, 1995) demonstrated
how unreliable eyewitness testimony could be, and finally Schacter (1995, 1997, 1998, 1999) and Moscowitz
(1995) explored the brain mechanisms of memory distortions.
There are two main problems with the constructivist
approach to memory. Firstly, the memory distortions
that are typically demonstrated are not that large scale
and thus they could potentially be explained by classing interference-type theories of memory, especially if
there is a replacement of a single feature of an episode.
Secondly, there are very few computational models that
try to demonstrate what could the actual mechanisms
of such a reconstruction be (Hintzman, 1988, Metcalfe,
1990, McClelland, 1995) and they all are based on feature overlap and thus predict only blending of highly
similar episodes.
This paper is presenting a detailed model of constructive memory based on a general cognitive architecture DUAL (Kokinov, 1994) that demonstrates a possible mechanism of episode construction in spontaneous
recall and cued-recall conditions. The model is implemented and a number of simulation experiments have
been performed. These experiments demonstrate that
the proposed mechanisms could actually produce both
faithful and distorted memories depending on the experimental conditions.
The model made a strange prediction that people
could blend very different from each other episodes under certain condition — when these two episodes are
analogically mapped onto a third episode (we call it a
double analogy). Such blending of dissimilar episodes
has never been demonstrated before and thus the prediction seems nontrivial, strange and questionable. If
true blending of dissimilar episodes will be a very strong
case in support of the constructive nature of human
memory since these results could not be explained by
interference and other classic versions of storehouse approaches to memory.
A series of five experiments are presented in the paper that test this prediction with verbal and non-verbal
material, with double analogies and with single analogies, immediately after the analogy and after a week.
All experiments confirm the predictions of the model
and thus support it.
In summary this paper presents a novel model that
can explain how past episodes can be constructed and
new experimental results that show that people do blend
dissimilar episodes. The proposed model and experiments present a case of integrated study of human
memory and human thinking, they are not considered
in isolation, but rather their interactions are explored.
Out of this interaction it turned out that the structural
properties of the episodes are important not merely their
simple features which require more complicated representations than most models of memory offer.
References:
Bartlett, F. (1932). Remembering. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ebbinghaus, H. (1885/1964). Memory. NY: Dover.
Hintzman, D. (1988). Judgements of frequency and
recognition memory in a multiple-trace model. Psychological Review, 95, 528–551.
Kokinov, B. (1994). The context-sensitive cognitive architecture DUAL. Proceedings of the Sixteenth Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Hillsdale, NJ:
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Kokinov, B. & Petrov, A. (2001). Integration of Memory
and Reasoning in Analogy-Making: The AMBR Model. In:
Gentner, D., Holyoak, K., Kokinov, B. (eds.) The Analogical Mind: Perspectives from Cognitive Science, Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press.
Loftus, E. (1979/1996). Eyewitness testimony. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press
Loftus, E., Feldman, J., & Dashiell, R. (1995). The
reality of illusory memories. In D. Schacter (ed.), Memory
distortions: How minds, brains, and societies reconstruct the
92
past. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
McClelland, J. (1995). Constructive memory and memory distortions: A parallel distributed processing approach.
In D. Schacter (Ed.), Memory distortions: How minds,
brains, and societies reconstruct the past. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press.
Metcalfe, J. (1990). Composite holographic associative
recall model (CHARM) and blended memories in eyewitness
testimony. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General,
119, 145–160.
Moscovitch, M. (1995). Confabulation. In D. Schacter
(Ed.), Memory distortions: How minds, brains, and societies
reconstruct the past. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press.
Neisser, U. (1967).
Cognitive Psychology.
NY:
Appleton-Century-Crofts.
Neisser, U. (1998). Stories, selves, and schemata: A re-
view of ecological findings. In M. Conway, S. Gathercole, &
C. Cornoldi (Eds.), Theories of memory (Vol. 2). Hove, UK:
Psychology Press.
Schacter, D., Ed. (1995). Memory distortions: How
minds, brains, and societies reconstruct the past. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Schacter, D. (1999). The Seven Sins of Memory. American Psychologist, 54: 182–203.
Schacter, D., Koutstaal, W., Norman, K. (1997). False
Memory and Aging. Trends in Cognitive Science, 1: 229–
236.
Schacter, D., Norman, K., Koutstaal, W. (1998). The
Cognitive Neuroscience of Constructive Memory. Annual Review of Psychology, 49: 289–318.
Tulving, E. (1987). Multiple Memory Systems and Consciousness. Human Neurobiology, 6: 67–80
UNDERSTANDING FIGURES IN CONCEPTUALISING MOTION
Anetta Kopecka1 & Stéphanie Pourcel2
1
Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics
(Nijmegen, The Netherlands)
2
University of Sussex (Brighton, UK)
This study addresses the issue of motion conceptualisation and seeks to assess the role of figure type (moving entity) in the non-linguistic categorisation of motion
events.
The conceptual domain of motion has received considerable attention in recent studies in both linguistic
and psycholinguistic areas of research. Linguistically,
the domain is interesting as manner of motion appears to receive central emphasis in ‘satellite-framing’
languages, such as Germanic and Slavic, whereas it is
seldom mentioned in ‘verb-framed’ languages, such as
Romance (Talmy 1985, Slobin 2004).
This fundamental difference has been used in psycholinguistic studies to address the issue of whether
cross-linguistic differences in motion expression affect cognitive processes and mental representations of
events, i.e. the linguistic relativity hypothesis (e.g. Gennari et al. 2002, Papafragou et al. 2002, Finkbeiner et
al. 2002, Bohnemeyer et al. 2003). A striking aspect
of these studies is their lack of consistent agreement in
the findings and conclusions they report concerning the
cognitive salience of path and manner of motion.
This lack of concordance is very likely to come from
the great intrinsic complexity of the domain of motion,
which involves not only spatial factors (configuration of
spatial settings), but also aspectual and temporal factors (e.g. accomplished vs. non-accomplished events).
However, and indeed more importantly, the disagreement across experimental findings seems also to reflect methodological divergences and empirical limitations related to the internal dimensions of motion stimuli, such as types of path (e.g. vertical vs. non-vertical,
boundary-crossing vs. non-boundary-crossing), types of
manner (e.g. propulsive vs. non-propulsive) and types
of figure (e.g. human vs. non-human). A central aim
of our study is to demonstrate how fundamental these
basic variables are to the dynamics of motion conceptualisation, and hence to investigations of more elaborate parameters in motion conceptualisation, such as
language-specific patterns.
In this study, we explore the variability of motion
conceptualisation by manipulating the figure dimension internal to the event. Our aim is to assess the impact of figure type on the relative cognitive salience of
the path and manner dimensions in the non-linguistic
categorisation of motion events. Based on a number of
pilot studies, we hypothesise that animate figures trigger path salience, whereas inanimate figures trigger
manner salience. Furthermore, previous results show
that, beyond the animacy of the figure, path salience
is triggered by (a) telicity of path and (b) default force
dynamics of manner.
In order to assess the effect of figure type on motion conceptualisation, the study uses visual digitised
event triads consisting of one target event and two alternate events which vary from the target either in manner or in path. These stimuli display telic paths (e.g.
in vs. out, up vs. down) and default manners (e.g.
walk vs. run for human figures, roll vs. bounce for
ball types of figures). Crucially, the stimuli vary in
the types of figures being displayed, including (a) [animate, +human], i.e. a man, (b) [-animate, -human],
i.e. a ball, and (c) [+animate, -human], i.e. a virtual tomato. Subjects are native speakers of English,
French and Polish (N=12 in each group) — three languages presenting cross-linguistic differences in the expression of path and manner of motion. At this early
stage, we expect cross-group responses to converge independently of language-specific patterns, so that path
salience should decrease across (a) to (c). Preliminary
results confirm these predictions.
These cross-language-group data first help explain
the divergences in findings across research teams — as
93
mentioned above. More importantly, these data provide
insights into factors internal to motion events impacting on motion conceptualisation and, therefore, into the
basic schematic level of conceptualisation of motion dimensions that is independent of language-specific patterns. This study will therefore offer a greater understanding of the conceptual reality of the domain of motion, and in doing so, will enable for increased control
over future experimental procedures as well as for the
development of guidelines for further psycholinguistic
investigations of language-particular and universal constraints on event representation.
References:
Bohnemeyer, J., Eisenbeiss, S. & B. Narasimhan (2003).
Manner and path in non-linguistic cognition. International
Conference on Language, Culture and Mind. University of
Portsmouth, July 2004.
Finkbeiner, M., Nicol, J., Greth, D. & K. Nakamura
(2002).The role of language in memory for actions. Journal
of Psycholinguistics Research 31(5): 447–457.
Gennari, S. P., S. A. Sloman, B. C. Malt & W. Tecumseh
Fitch (2002). Motion event in language and cognition. Cogniton 83: 49–79.
Papafragou, A., Massey C. & L. Gleitman (2002).
Shake, rattle, ‘n’roll: the representation of motion in language and cognition. Cognition 84: 189–219.
Slobin, D. I. (2004). The many ways to search for a
frog: linguistic typology & the expression of motion events.
In S. Strömqvist & L. Verhoeven (eds.) Relating Events in
Narrative: Typological & Contextual Perspectives. Volume
2: 219–57. Mahwah, NJ: LEA Publishers.
Talmy, L. (1985). Lexicalisation patterns: semantic
structure in lexical forms. In T. Shopen (ed.) Language Typology & Syntactic Description. Volume 3: 57–149. Cambridge: University Press.
FUNCTIONS OF GENDER STEREOTYPES IN NEWS COVERAGE
OF POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS
Natalia Kovalyova
University of Texas at Austin (Austin, USA)
Women running for office continuously voice complains
of being portrayed in a more negative way than male
politicians that reinforces the existing stereotypes about
femininity and masculinity. Perseverance of stereotypes — networks of beliefs that highlights selected
characteristics in a description of certain concepts suggests some important cognitive and social functions that
these structures play in human communication and interaction.
Previous research on stereotyping in political discourse and political psychology has found that stereotypes are largely used to enable voters to make inferences about the behavior of politics. Although several
factors serve as a basis for voters’ decision, candidate’s
gender can and often is used as a cue for prospective
behavior and issue position of a candidate and a strong
pullover factor in voter decision-making. Due to stereotyping, women are found to be systematically perceived
(and described) in a way that reduces their chance of
being elected.
Using a combination of content analysis and case
study methodology, the paper examines the newspaper coverage of two campaigns of female candidates
in the US: 1984 vice-presidential campaign of Geraldine Ferarro and 2000 Senate campaign of Hillary Rodham Clinton. The analysis looks into several features
that were previously reported as engaged in transmitting
stereotypes: abstractness of linguistic expressions used
in candidate description, types of attributes, diversity /
homogeneity of expressions, inclusiveness / exclusiveness of language, and opposition terms (‘us’ vs ‘them’
language).
Building on the notion of gendered mediation, the
paper argues that conventional news reports on the
political campaigns frame the events in stereotypically
masculine terms, use more negative and aggressive language to describe female candidate, which convey the
message of them belonging to the political outgroup.
Furthermore, the paper addresses two major functions
that stereotyping performs in news paper coverage of female cnadiate campaigns: cognitive economy (that aims
at filtering and fencing off certain information) and impression management (that underlies that strategy for
denying or masking stereotypes).
References:
Gidengil, E. & Everitt, J. (2003). Talking tough: Gender
and reported speech in campaign news coverage. Political
Communication, 20, 209–232.
Herrson, P., Lay, J., & Stokes, A. (2003). Women running ‘as women’: Candidate gender, campaign issues, and
voter-targeting strategies. Journal of Politics, 65(1), 244–
255.
Huddy, L. & Terkildsen, N. (1993). Gender stereotypes
and the perception of male and female candidates. American
Journal of Political Science, 37 (10), 119–147.
Kawakami, K. & Dovidio, J. (2001). The reliability
of implicit stereotyping. Personality and Social Psychology
Bulletin, 27 (2), 212–225.
Ruscher, J. (2001). Prejudiced Communication. New
York & London.
Shogan, C. (2001). Speaking out: An analysis of Democratic and Republican women-invoked rhetoric in the 105th
Congress. Women and Politics, 23 (1–2), 129–146.
Thompson, M., Judd, C., & Park, B. (2000). The consequences of communicating social stereotypes. Journal of
Experimental Social Psychology, 36, 567–599.
94
MEMORY AND REFERENCE IN FOREIGN LANGUAGE
PERFORMANCE
Inna Kozlova
Universitat Autónoma de Barcelona (Spain)
The memory theory we build upon is the connectionism,
which considers memory content as a set of connection strengths which, when activated, have implicitly
in them the ability to generate states that correspond
to instantiated schemata (Rumelhart 1986: 21). The
connections (synapsis) get established between nodes
which are more basic than concepts, namely, their properties. Paradis (2000: 24) claims lexical representations
and their corresponding conceptual representations are
stored independently and the concepts are fractionable
(ibid.: 22). In the foreign language context we find
it useful to distinguish between external properties, or
form of the lexical unit, and internal properties responsible for its conceptual content. The same distinction
can be traced in any source of reference in both of the
two aspects that intervene: the access and the content.
According to McArthur (1986: 158), the access can
be either alphabetic or thematic and the content either
linguistic (wordbook) or encyclopaedic. The dictionary, as an example, has alphabetic access and linguistic
content. Although recently we find electronic dictionaries which offer possibility to combine various types of
search, the distinction stays there, explicit or implicit.1
The process of reference forms part of other processes taking place in memory. Consequently, to follow
this process we have to study the processes which may
require, at some point, use of external sources of reference. In this paper we present the models of comprehension and production processes of foreign language texts
based on the above mentioned properties theory2 . Our
special interest resides in those parts of these processes
that are perceived by the subject as problematic. Situating both comprehension and production in problem
solving context, we have identified two major problems
in each of them.
Comprehension:
• the input is not recognised;
• some internal properties of the input violate the
established text coherence
Production:
• no candidates with necessary properties are found;
1 The
• the candidates already generated are rejected due
to some incompatibility of their properties to the
task norms3
Despite of the fact there are strategies helping to
solve the above mentioned problems with memory as
the only resource, the comprehension being partial or
delayed and the production based on recycling of the
existing knowledge, these cannot be generally recommended to foreign language students because they limit
their need to expand their vocabulary (Rundell 1999:
38). Moreover, these strategies rarely result successful.
As our study revealed, beyond the subjects threshold of
knowledge which covered 5 out of 10 mistakes corrected
successfully, only external help (from reference materials in our case) allowed students to get better results,
up to 9 out of 10 successfully corrected mistakes.4
The solutions we propose for the problems have to
do with retrieval of required properties from reference
sources, the process which is additional to lexical retrieval from memory. Finally, we present our model of
lexical retrieval from reference sources, general for any
process of reference, which we hope to be useful both in
language teaching and translation5 . There are 6 stages
in this model though some of these happen to be implicit
depending on the type of activity (comprehension or
production) and the subject’s competence. This model
was tested in the observational study where we recorded
the students’ problem solving processes. Our subjects
worked in groups trying to correct lexical mistakes in
summaries and communicated with each other by Messenger program. The recorded group conversations were
analyzed and the markers of the corresponding problem
solving stages were found.
References:
McArthur (1986): Thematic Lexicography. In: Hartmann R. R.K. (ed.) The History of Lexicography. John Benjamins Publishing Company. Pp. 157–166.
Mel’chuk, I. (1999 [1974]) Opyt teorii lingvisticheskih
modelei smisl-text semantika, sintaksis. Moscow.
PACTE (A. Beeby, M. Fernández, O. Fox, I. Kozlova,
W. Neunzig, M. Presas, P. Rodrı́guez, L. Romero. Principal investigator: A. Hurtado Albir) (2005): Investigating
Translation Competence: Conceptual and methodological
Issues. Meta, 50 (2). Pp. 609–619.
Paradis, M. (2000): Cerebral representation of bilingual concepts. Bilingualism: Language and Cognition, 3
(1). Pp. 22–24.
Presas, M. (2005): Contributions de la psychologie
lexical database WordNet (Miller et al. 1990: 236) developed at Princeton University was conceived to provide an aid to
search dictionaries conceptually, rather than merely alphabetically.
2 These models form part of my unpublished PhD dissertation.
3 Mel’chuk’s filters theory (1999 [1974]: 198).
4 The study was realized with 50 subjects studying English for Social Sciences at Universitat Autónoma de Barcelona (2nd year
Political Science students with Spanish and Catalan as their mother tongue).
5 PACTE Research Group refers to it as Instrumental Subcompetence as part of overall Translation Competence (PACTE 2005:
610) and Presas 2005 situates it in the cognitive context.
95
cognitive à l’explication de la compétence de traduction.
In: Peeters, J. (ed.) On the Relationships between Translation Theory and Translation Practice. Frankfurt / M: Peter
Lang. Pp. 177–187.
Rumelhart, D. E. (1986): Parallel Distributed Processing. (Computational models of cognition and perception).
Volume 2: McClelland, J. L.; Rumelhart, D. E. and research
group PDP. The Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Rundell, M. (1999): Dictionary Use in Production.
International Journal of Lexicography, 12 (1). Oxford University Press. Pp. 35–53.
MYTHS LINGUISTICS LIVES BY: CONCEPTUAL FALLACIES IN
UNDERSTANDING LANGUAGE AND COMMUNICATION
Alexander V. Kravchenko
Baikal National University of Economics and Law
(Irkutsk, Russia)
Mainstream linguistic science regardless of its fleeting infatuations with one methodological trend or another over the past hundred years has shown remarkable tenacity in sustaining the two assumptions about
language and communication as its cornerstones: (1)
Language is a code and its function is that of representation, (2) Communication is telementation.
The code model of language has been so deeply
ingrained in the metalanguage of linguistics that the
ubiquitous code model has become part and parcel of
any theoretical construal pertaining to language — from
linguistic semiotics to discourse analysis. In fact, this
model underlies almost all theorizing in cognitive science / linguistics as well. However, there have always been voices (F. de Saussure no exception) warning
linguists against confusing language as a natural phenomenon (a kind of patterned behavior) which should be
the true object of linguistic study with language as a system of written signs designed to represent (very often in
a quite arbitrary fashion) short-lived acoustic phenomena that accompany communicative behavior. Although
written language is in fact a system based on the use of
a limited set of characters (letters in alphabetic systems
of writing) and, because of this, resembling (at least,
superficially) a code, it does not represent language as
a specific kind of cognitive interactions with the environment. The written language bias in linguistics (Linell
2005) is responsible for the grave fallacy in conceiving
of language as a kind of code (Love 2004; Kravchenko
2005) based on one-to-one correspondence between the
sign (e.g., the word) and what it stands for. Yet it is a
well known fact that no such correspondence is observed
in natural spoken language (communication) characterized by a large number of situational (contextual) variables affecting the actual outcome of communication as
a kind of joint activity. The ‘circumstantial’ parameter of human communication. . . has been scandalously
neglected in the history of Western linguistics (Harris
2004: 735).
The ‘conduit’ metaphor exploited in discourse and
communication studies reflects another basic fallacy
stemming from the code model and pertaining to the
definition of communication as exchange of (coded)
information (meanings, thoughts, etc.), that is, tele-
mentation. Such view on communication suggests that
meanings are ‘out there’, they are dissociated from
signs, yet every time the subject of linguistic meaning is broached the starting point is always the sign
through which we become aware of particular meanings. This stark contradiction has been one of the main
reasons why the core problem of linguistics, the problem
of meaning, has not been resolved.
Today, the conceptual framework of mainstream linguistics is still based on the assumption that linguistic signs represent (denote) different aspects of reality,
thus denotation is seen as the basis for understanding in
human communication. However, the representational
theory of mind built largely on this notion and implying
a kind of non-arbitrary (i. e., computationally definable)
relationship between the sign and what it stands for has
been unable to facilitate radical advances in areas where
application of the coded equivalence principle should do
the job, such as machine translation or AI. But if a theory fails to do the job it has been devised for, something
must be wrong with the theory itself or at least with its
grounding principle (see Gross 2005).
As an alternative, an account of language as a specific kind of cognitive activity integrated in human interactions with the environment, known as the distributed
view of language and cognition, is based on the assumption that far from ‘representing’ cognitive processes, language transforms the causal links between brain, body
and world (see Clark 1997). This view is consistent
with the main tenets of biological theory of cognition
(Maturana 1970; Maturana & Varela 1980; Järvilehto
1998), biosemiotics (Sebeok & Umiker-Sebeok 1992),
integrational linguistics (Harris 1996) and biocognitive
philosophy of language (Kravchenko 2003). There has
been a growth of converging evidence from different areas of research in humanistic sciences highlighting the
ineptitude of mainstream linguistics to deal with the
problems it has been called upon to resolve because of
its initial conceptual fallacies.
References:
Clark, A. (1997). Being There: Putting Brain, Body and
World Together Again. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Gross, A. (2005). Is evidence based linguistics the solution? Is voodoo linguistics the problem? Paper presented
at the LACUS Conference, August 2005, Dartmouth.
Harris, R. (1996). Signs, Language and Communication: Integrational and Segregational Approaches. London
and New York: Routledge.
96
Harris, R. (2004). Integrationism, language, mind and
world. Language Sciences 26. 727–739
Järvilehto, T. (1998). The theory of the organismenvironment system: I. Description of the theory. Integrative Physiological and Behavioral Science, 33. 317–330.
Kravchenko, A. V. (2003). Sign, Meaning, Knowledge:
An essay in the cognitive philosophy of language. Frankfurt / Main: Peter Lang.
Kravchenko, A. V. (2005). Essential properties of language, or why language is not a (digital) code. Paper
presented at the Cognitive Dynamics and the Language Sciences Conference, 9–11 September, 2005. Cambridge, UK
Linell. P. (2005). The Written Language Bias in Linguistics. Routledge.
Love, N. (2004). Cognition and the language myth.
Language Sciences 26–6. 525–544
Maturana, H. R. (1970). Biology of Cognition. BCL
Report R 9.0. University of Illinois, Urbana.
Maturana, H. & F. Varela (1980). Autopoiesis and Cognition: The Realization of the Living. Boston: D. Reidel.
Sebeok, T. A. & J. Umiker-Sebeok (eds.)
(1992).
Biosemiotics: The Semiotic Web 1991. New York: Mouton de Gruyter.
NONVERBAL SEMIOTICS AND COGNITION
Grigory E. Kreidlin
Russian State University for the Humanities
(Moskow)
In one of the Letters To My Son Sir Earl Chesterfield
writes: Do not think that the knowledge that I greatly
advise you to acquire is all contained in books, no matter
how pleasant, useful and necessary it is: what I mean
is the real knowledge of people, which is more necessary than the knowledge acquired from books <. . . >
It is acquired only among people, not within the quiet
of the study <. . . >. Do not hope that you can acquire this knowledge in empty and idle chatter. No, you
have to not just look at people, but to closely observe
them (the letter dated 4th of October, 1746.) To observe closely means not only to try to distinguish all the
details by taking a good look, but also to understand
people. The knowledge of people which the great English essayist and philosopher talks about is the comprehension of people’s actions, and thoughts, and feelings.
It is the condition sine qua non for individual’s functioning in society and for the communication between
different social and cultural groups. Understanding by
itself presumes correct interpretation of information in
a communicative act.
Human face-to-face interplay in a communication
process is both a highly interesting topic for research
and a challenge to a cognitive scholar. Anyone who
intends to explore the process as a whole or to study
some aspects of it must first realize that people engaged in oral conversation use not one but many sign
systems, simultaneously. Of course, spoken utterances
are given a sort of a privileged status in the hierarchy
of explorative attention and communication participants
tend to treat the verbal texts as if they are deliberately
meant. However, various aspects of individual’s appear-
ance, nonverbal behavior and manners play also a crucial
role in a human interaction and take an active part in
its cognitive and semantic interpretation.
The main sign system that parallels natural language
in oral communication is human body language (BL).
In spite of their wide distribution, BL-s have not so far
received the attention they might have been expected
to attract, though cognitively, semiotically and linguistically they are extremely interesting. BL-s are much
more than mere codes or conventional systems of signals; they function in many respect the similar way as
human speech, being in fact realizations of cognitive
attitudes and meanings that sometimes are badly expressed or not inexpressible at all in the verbal languages. It is shown that under certain circumstances
BL has inarguable advantage over a spoken language in
conveying required meanings and essential ideas
The phenomena of intercultural commonality and
some cognitive peculiarities that characterize nonverbal
communicative behavior are discussed. The main attention is paid to male and female BL interaction in
human dyads. Among kinetic features that determine
the actual dialog, gender and gender communication
roles play a crucially important role. By gender I mean
socially and culturally loaded representation of sex, and
gender communication roles are gender-based social expectancies and modes of their realizations in verbal and
nonverbal semiotic interaction. The nonverbal gender
symbolic strategies of cognition as well as nonverbal
practices that are based on cognitive units and models
usually neglect the Slavic tradition. As to the Russian
culture and the Russian BL, it did not come in view to a
large extent of scholars. The presentation aims to single
out and propose the cognitive account for some universal and culturally specific (Russian) gender nonverbal
stereotypes and their integral components.
97
APPLIED COGNITIVE LINGUISTICS: LANGUAGE ACQUISITION
AND LECTAL VARIETIES. AN EMPIRICAL STUDY
Gitte Kristiansen
Universidad Complutense de Madrid (Madrid,
Spain)
One of the basic claims in Cognitive Linguistics is the relationship between a usage-based model of language and
language acquisition (Langacker 1999). It is assumed
that input to language acquisition is an encounter with
actual linguistic expressions and that generalizations are
made over usage-based events. Language acquisition is
thus a bottom-up process, guided by linguistic experience (Taylor 2002). However, the rich theoretical
framework developed over the last few decades in Cognitive Linguistics has not yet been sufficiently applied to
structured paradigmatic oral variation, more traditionally studied by the discipline of Sociolinguistics. Lectal
variation and the categorization of lectal varieties and
their relationship with social categories thus constitute
a new field of application (cf. the theme session on this
topic at ICLC9, Seoul, 2005).
Briefly stated, in previous publications and presentations on lectal variation and cognitive phonology (Kristiansen 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005a, 2005b, to appear), I ascribed an active role to hearer and speaker
and argued that social groups exploit the possibility of
establishing minor (subphonemic) or major (transphonemic) salient acoustic-perceptual contrasts in order to
effectively convey social differentiation by means of linguistic cues. Linguistics stereotypes (a complex cluster
of distinctive features) thus come into existence as effective reference point constructions in social cognition,
on the one hand allowing hearer to categorize and characterize (cf. Lambert 1960) an unknown speaker on the
basis of his speech style, and on the other hand allowing
speaker to position himself in more active ways.
It is within this general framework that we now
present the outline and first results of an empirical study
on the acquisition of receptive and productive competence in children. So far empirical research on speech
perception and accent-based speaker identification has
concentrated on adults (Purnell et al. 1999; van Bezooijen & Gooskens 1999; studies on speech identification in relation to AI). We adopt a usage-based approach to language acquisition and assume that the
acquisition of competence of speech styles is experientially grounded and that phonetic detail is stored as
such (Bybee 2001) and put to constructive uses. The
study implements tests, interviews and psycholinguistic
experimental methods to investigate, amongst others,
the following factors:
1. the degree to which children acquire receptive
competence of accents and speech styles at different ages.
2. the relative precision with which accents are identified at different ages.
3. the relative degree of awareness regarding the features which allow hearer to proceed to lectal and
social identification.
4. The degree to which hearer’s own repertoire of
speech styles influcences the nature of features
which are perceived as salient in a languageinternal or foreign accent.
5. the relative capacity of children to imitate accents
(productive competence of lectal varieties) at different ages.
6. the relative degree of awareness of children regarding the ways in which linguistic stereotypes
relate to social stereotypes.
References:
Bybee, Joan 2001 Phonology and Language Use. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kristiansen, Gitte 2001 Social and linguistic stereotyping: A cognitive approach to accents. Estudios Ingleses de
la Universidad Complutense 9: 129–145.
====== 2002 On the Role and Functions of Phonetic Markers as a Linguistic Variable in Social Categorizations. LAUD Series A: General & Theoretical Papers. Paper
No. 538. Essen: LAUD 2002.
====== 2003 How to do things with allophones:
Linguistic stereotypes as cognitive reference points in social
cognition. In: Dirven, René, Martin Pütz & Roslyn Frank
(eds.) Cognitive Models in Language and Thought. CLR
24, 69–120. Berlin / New York: Mouton de Gruyter.
====== 2005a Codes, Styles and Shifts from a Cognitive Linguistics Perspective. Paper presented at the Theme
Session Lectal Varieties and the Conceptualization of Lectal Variation in Cognitive Linguistics (ICLC9, Seoul, 2005).
====== 2005b Towards a Usage-Based Cognitive
Phonology: On Phonemic Description and Speech Styles
as Experientially Grounded Construals. Paper presented at
the Theme Session Phonology in the Cognitive Grammar
Worldview (ICLC9, Seoul, 2005).
====== to appear Style-shifting and shifting styles:
a Socio-cognitive Approach to Lectal variation. In: Kristiansen, Gitte & René Dirven (eds.) Cognitive Sociolinguistics: Language variation, cultural models, social systems.
Berlin, New York: Mouton de Gruyter.
Lambert, Wallace E., Richard Hodgson, Robert
C. Gardner and Samuel Fillenbaum 1960 Evaluational reactions to spoken languages. Journal of Abnormal and Social
Psychology 60: 44–51.
Langacker, Ronald W. 1999 Grammar and Conceptualization. Berlin and New York: Mouton de Gruyter.
Purnell, Thomas, William J. Idsardi and John Baugh
1999 Perceptual and phonetic experiments on American English dialect identification. Journal of Language and Social
Psychology 18: 10–30.
Taylor, John R. 1995 Linguistic Categorization. Prototypes in Linguistic Theory. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
====== 2002 Cognitive Grammar. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
98
van Bezooijen, Renée and Charlotte Gooskens 1999 Identification of language varieties. The contribution of different
linguistic levels. Journal of Language and Social Psychology
18–1:31–48.
ATTITUDES AND STRATEGIES OF GROUP REPRESENTATION
AND IDEOLOGICAL CONFRONTATION: A SOCIO-COGNITIVE
STUDY OF SOCIAL ACTORS IN A CONFLICT OF URBAN
PLANNING*
Marı́a Labarta Postigo
Universitat de Valencia (Valencia, Spain)
Introduction
The present research* addresses issues related to power
abuse, domination and social inequality within a context of controversial urban planning. My interest lies
in the study of ideologically biased discourse, and the
way this polarizes the representation of the groups involved. In the present study, the research centres on the
transformation of a residential area in Valencia (Spain)
into a leisure area. The plan means throwing around
200 people out of the district through expropriation or
purchase of the affected properties, and does not consider re-housing the affected neighbours. This urban
project translates into a discursive polarization of two
group representations: an ingroup representation, that
is those who agree with the proposed project, versus
an outgroup representation of those who oppose to the
project. Furthermore, this polarization translates as well
into forms of ideology (see e.g. van Dijk 1998).
Research aim
retical ground based on the discourse-cognition-society
triangle. For the study of the representation of social
actors that adhere to a specific ideological group and
hence participate in a discourse practice of inclusion vs.
exclusion of social representations, I have specifically
resorted to Fairclough’s (2003) multi-functional categorisation of textual variables, and to van Leeuwen’s
(1996) sociosemantic categories for the representation
of social actors. Van Leeuwen’s (1996) study of the representation of social actors provides an interesting characterisation of the principal ways in which social actors
are construed to implement strategic representational
choices. Fairclough’s categorisation of grammatical categories such as personalisation versus impersonalisation,
naming or classification practices link the societal practice to the cognitive aspects of context models.
Corpus
The corpus of this paper comprises three different but
related textual inputs: on the one hand the urban
project outlined by the technical specialists, on the other
hand opinion articles published in press, linked to the
restoring of the Arabic wall of the Carmen quarter in Valencia, all of which date from 2000 to 2005. A representative corpus of recordings of round tables has also been
included, where architects, urban planners, archeologists and neighbours discuss the project. I have chosen
a comprehensive corpus in terms of data and sources,
and at the same time we wanted it to be balanced with
what regards the opposed groups’ ideological tendencies
and their corresponding chosen texts.
The study of ideology, of the specific group confrontation we are dealing with here, is approached as both a
cognitive and a social phenomenon when studied under
a Critical Discourse Analytical lens. Various forms of
social cognition are shared by the members of each of
the ideologically confronted groups, forms which revolve
around issues of knowledge, attitudes, ideologies, norms
and values. These are mental representations which are
References:
in either case embedded in specific ideological context
Davies, B. & Harré, R. (1990). Positioning: the discurmodels. Our interest lies in textually tracing the underlying mental structures, and in unveiling how these sive production of selves, Journal of the Theory of Social
control the production and comprehension of text and, Behaviour 20: 43–65.
Fairclough, N. (1989). Language and Power. London:
hence, the social representations.
Methodological framework
I have based my research on the multidisciplinary field of
Critical Discourse Analysis, since it is a problem-oriented
discourse analytical approach which allows as a methodological framework to unravel sources of dominance and
power, and hence reveals itself as an interesting perspective for the research of ideology that starts from a theo-
Longman.
Fairclough, N. (1992) Discourse and Social Change,
Cambridge: Polity Press
Fairclough, N. (2003) Analysing Discourse. Textual
Analysis for Social Research, London and New York: Routledge
Fairclough, N. (1995). Critical Discourse Analysis. The
Critical Study of Language. London: Longman.
Fowler, R., Hodge, B., Kress, G. and Trew, T. (1979).
Language and Control. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
* This paper is part of a project on the discursive construction of identities, financed by the Generalitat Valenciana: Gestió de
Investigació, 2005–2006.
99
Gergen, K. J. (1994).
Realities and Relationships:
Soundings in Social Construction. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Langacker, R. W. (1987). Foundations of Cognitive
Grammar, vol.1, Theoretical Prerequisites. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Langacker, R. W. (1993). Grammatical traces of some
invisible semantic constructs. Language Sciences 15,
323–355.
Langacker, R. W. (1999). Grammar and Conceptualisation. Berlin, New York: Mouton de Gruyter.
Van Dijk, T. A. (1995). Discourse Analysis as Ideology
Analysis. En: Schaffner, C. & A. Wenden (eds.) Language
and Peace. Dartmouth: Aldershot: 17–33.
Van Dijk, T. A. (1989). Ideology. London: Sage.
Van Dijk, T. A. (2002). Political discourse and political
cognition. In: Chilton, P. & Schäffner, C. (eds.) Politics
as Text and Talk-Analytic Approaches to Political Discourse.
Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
Van Leeuwen, T. (1996). The representation of social
actors. En: Caldas-Coulthard, C. R. & Coulthard, M. Texts
and Practices. London: Routledge: 32–70.
Minds, selves and senseWetherell, M. (2001).
making. En: Wetherell, M., S. Taylor & S. Yates (eds.)
Discourse Theory and Practice. A Reader. London: Sage
Publications: 186–197.
Wodak, R. & Ludwig, Ch. (eds.). (1999). Challenges
in a Changing World: Issues in Critical Discourse Analysis.Vienna: Passagenverlag.
THE ANATOMY OF LANGUAGE
Sydney Lamb
throughout the associative areas of the posterior cortex.
This uniformity of structure suggests uniformity of proRice University (Houston, USA)
cessing and supports evidence from cognitive linguistics
This three-hour workshop will be presented in three pointing to the conclusion that there is no specialized
cortical module for linguistic functions.
parts.
Part II of will describe the form and organization of
Part I will describe of some of the basic features of
the
cortical information system as a network, as revealed
neuroanatomy and the structure of the human cerebral
by
four
kinds of evidence:
cortex:
• The hemispheres, lobes, and major subdivisions of
the lobes;
• Fiber bundles connecting parts of the cortex to
one another;
• Layers of the cortex;
• Neurons and cortical columns;
• Types of neural interconnections.
Of particular importance is the organization of neurons in cortical columns. The structure and function
of cortical columns has been investigated intensively in
recent decades by Mountcastle (1998), Tanaka (1996),
and others. It is necessary to recognize both microcolumns and macrocolumns. The microcolumn contains
about 70–110 neurons, while the macrocolumn is a contiguous bundle of about 100 microcolumns. Probably
also important, even more important, is the functional
column, a contiguous group of microcolumns within a
macrocolumn. Many studies have shown that the microcolumn is a unit in that all of its neurons become
activated together. The same may said of the functional column, and the difference between microcolumn
and functional column is that the functional column allows for learning by its capability of being subdivided
into smaller functional columns representing finer distinctions.
The cortical information system is a network. Although the network is ultimately composed of neurons,
its operation is best understood and modeled as a network whose nodes are functional columns.
Of great importance is the relative uniformity of cortical structure in different areas of the cortex, especially
• Linguistic evidence,
• Neuroanatomical evidence,
• Evidence from microelectrode probes of cortical
tissue engaged in perception,
• Evidence from brain imaging, especially from
magnetoencephalography (MEG).
Among other things, the evidence allows us to reject certain network models that have been proposed
in cognitive science as unrealistic, since their properties
are at odds with what is known from neuroscience about
the real networks of the cortex. Some of them also are
inadequate when faced with certain kinds of linguistic
evidence.
Various findings and hypotheses relating to the
structure of the neurocognitive network will be discussed, including
• Local and distributed representation of information,
• Functional representation,
• Coarse coding and fine coding,
• Bidirectional processing,
Quantitative comparison of information requirements and capacity.
Part III will describe various features of what can be
called the language cortex. The language cortex consists
of the areas of the cortex that are devoted to linguistic
processing. It consists of several interconnected modules, and these modules are evidently not devoted exclusively to linguistic functions. Their functions and locations will be described, along with supporting evidence
100
and consideration of seemingly conflicting evidence that
has been brought forward. Of great importance in the
study of localization is the proximity principle, which is
explainable in part by the evolution of cortical structure
and in part by language development in the child.
Some related topics to be treated briefly include
Finally, some features of linguistic processing as performed in the network model will be described, along
with some supporting evidence from MEG imaging,
which allows us to observe the time-course of activation in the cortical network.
• The roles of the right hemisphere in language proReferences:
cessing,
Mountcastle, V. B. 1998. Perceptual Neuroscience: The
• Language development and learning,
Cerebral Cortex. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
• Plasticity in the cortex,
Tanaka, K. 1996. Inferotemporal cortex and object vi• The role of motor cortex in perception.
sion. Annual Review of Neuroscience 19:109–39.
CONJUNCTION AND/OR DISJUNCTION: THE CONCEPTUAL
BASIS OF COORDINATION
Ronald W. Langacker
University of California, San Diego
Abstract
In Cognitive Linguistics, meaning resides in conceptualization and grammar is seen as being meaningful. Cognitive semantics provides an array of well-motivated descriptive constructs allowing a revealing description of
semantic and grammatical structure. The linguist evidence sheds light on human conceptual abilities that
need to be accommodated in models of cognitive processing.
Crucial in a conceptualist semantics is our capacity
to conceive and portray the same situation in alternate
ways, in terms of factors such as prominence, perspec-
tive, and the sequence of mental access. Also essential
and pervasive are various imaginative abilities, including metaphor, blending, fictivity, and mental space configurations. These prove especially important for the
characterization of logical elements.
In this presentation, cognitive semantic notions are
applied to coordinate structures with AND and OR.
Prominence, fictivity, mental spaces, and sequence of
mental access are among the notions essential to their
conceptual characterization. This provides the basis for
the grammatical description of coordination. Topics to
be discussed include variation in verb agreement, the
effect of using multiple conjunctions, cases where AND
and OR seem interchangeable, and the relation between
coordination and subordination. Broader theoretical implications will also be considered.
GESTURE AND CONCEPTUALIZATION
Jean-Rémi Lapaire
Université Michel de Montaigne-Bordeaux 3
(France)
Grammatical objectivism is the belief that grammar is
a purely technical, ideologically neutral subject, which
uses the conceptual apparatus of a body-free reason.
Grammatical concepts thus represent objective and disembodied features of language. The ultimate purpose
of formal descriptions is to establish the hard facts
of syntax. Cognitive grammar offers an unprecedented
opportunity to challenge this view. The knowledge systems used to conceptualize language are viewed as fundamentally embodied and imaginative. Thus grams,
constructions and grammatical concepts can be understood via perception, movement and narrative. New
accounts of syntax may thus be given that assume
overt kinetic and narrative structure.
In this presentation we explain how short iconic and
metaphoric gesture performances — or KineGrams —
can be used to conceptualize abstract grammatical functioning. Examples are taken from Grammar in Motion,
a DVD made by the author and soon to be released
by Hachette Education (01.2006), the largest publishing house in the French-speaking world. KineGrams
are ceptual and integrative: they blend perception with
conception, imagination with reason. KineGram are
metonymic: they select a handful of salient features
to refer to rich interpretive structures. The accessibility
of abstract grammatical phenomena through narration,
perception, gesture and motion confirms the richness
and interconnectedness of semiotic systems and their
link to conceptual structure.
References:
Arnheim, Rudolf. 1969. Visual Thinking. Berkeley: The
University of California Press.
Birdwhistell, Ray. 1970. Kinesics and Context. Essays on Body Communication. Philadelphia: University of
Philadelphia Press.
Donald, Merlin. 2001. A Mind so Rare. The Evolution of Human Consciousness. New York: W. W. Norton &
Company.
Fauconnier, Gilles & Eve Sweetser. 1996. Spaces,
Worlds and Grammar. Chicago: The Universtiy of Chicago
101
Press.
Fauconner, Gilles and Mark Turner. 2002. The Way
We Think. New York: Basic Books.
Goldin-Meadow, Susan. 2003. Hearing Gesture. How
Our Hands Help Us Think. Cambridge Mass.: The Belknap
Press of Harvard University Press.
Johnson, Mark. 1987. The Body in the Mind. The Bodily Basis of Meaning, Imagination, and Reason. Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press.
Lakoff, George & Mark Johnson. 1999. Philosophy in
the Flesh. New York: Basic Books.
Langacker, Ronald. 2000. Grammar and Conceptualization. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
Lapaire, Jean-Rémi. 2002. Imaginative grammar. In
Cognitive Linguistics Today : 623–642. Edited by Barbara
Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk and Kamila Turewicz. Frankfurt / M: Peter Lang.
Lapaire, Jean-Rémi. 2006. Grammar in Motion. DVD.
Paris: Hachette Education.
Liddell, Scott K. 2003. Grammar, Gesture, and Meaning
in American Sign Language. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
McNeill, David. 1992. Hand and Mind. What Gestures
reveal about Thought. Chicago: The University of Chicago
Press.
Talmy, Leonard. 2000. Towards a Cognitive Semantics.
Volume 1. Concept structuring systems. Cambridge, Mass:
The M. I. T. Press.
SECONDARY HOMOGENIZATIONS IN RUSSIAN:
A SECOND LOOK
Nicholas LeBlanc
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (USA)
This paper analyzes Russian delimitative verbs formed
in light of Hans Robert Mehlig’s (2001) model
with
of secondary homogenization and in light of Xenia Kisseleva and Sergei Tatevosov’s (2004) model of delimitative formation. Delimitative verbs in Russian, formed
, impose temporal boundaries on a
with the prefix
situation encoded by the verb, as in the case of
‘sit for a while’:
is added to the base verb
‘sit’, bounding the action sit in time and perfectivizing the verb. The only verbs that permit prefixaare those expressing what Vendler (1957)
tion with
calls activities-situations that have no inherent beginning, middle, or end, such as the situations expressed
by the verbs running, sitting, and standing. Since all
the sub-segments of each action are identical to all the
others (every sub-phase of sitting is identical to all other
sub-segments, for instance), activities are said to be homogeneous; they are likewise without an inherent endpoint (that is, they are atelic).
Another type of verbal predicate, the accomplishment (Vendler 1957), is similar to activity predicates in
that they are homogeneous. Unlike activities, however,
they do have inherent endpoints (that is, they are telic).
Write a book is a good example of an accomplishment
predicate: Although the sub-segments of writing the
book may be construed as identical, there is still a definite endpoint (the moment the book has been written).
Accomplishment predicates do not permit the formation
in Russian.
of the delimitative with
Despite this stricture, it appears that a certain subset of accomplishment predicates in Russian do admit delimitative formation, such as
‘shatter (some) windows (for a while)’. The verbs
in delimited accomplishment predicates are usually imperfectives derived from specialized (prefixed) perfecsuffix. Mehlig (2001) proposes
tives with the
D
D
D
D
D
D
DR a hierarchical system of conditions that enable delimitative formation in these predicates. He calls each
condition a secondary homogenization, and there are
three of these: distributivity, iterativity, and frequentativity. These secondary homogenizations depend on
the speaker’s conceptualization of a predicate as involving unbounded actors (distributivity), unbounded repetitions of the action (iterativity), or unbounded repetitions of internally-quantified actions (frequentativity).
Kisseleva and Tatevosov (2004) call into question the
necessity of these three secondary homogenizations, and
instead they posit a logical criterion, iterativity, as the
single motivator for delimitative formation in accomplishment predicates. Unlike Mehlig’s version of iteravitiy, they define iterativity as the relationship by which
every part of the given event is related to the whole
patient-a system based on the action’s real-world characteristics, not on the speaker’s construal of the action.
This paper attempts to resolve the discrepancy
between Mehlig’s (2001) and Kissleva & Tatevosov’s
(2004) restrictions on delimitative formation. In so doing I refine Kisseleva & Tatevosov’s concept of iterativity
(which I now term iterativity), and I assert that iterativity is the one quality that underlies all three of
Mehlig’s secondary homogenizations. In essence iterativity refers to the speaker’s re-construal of a situation as occurring in discrete, conceptually identical (or
nearly identical) sub-segments, which may occur simultaneously or serially-thus I posit a cognitive motivation
for the formation of delimitative predicates. I analyze
a data set of 100 secondarily homogenized Russian verbal predicates taken from the internet to lend empirical
support to the notion that the presence or absence of
iterativity predicts whether or not delimitative formation is permitted in these predicates. Iterativity
provides a concise explanation of the linguistic data I
have reviewed and it gives a psycholinguistically plausible means for explaining delimitative use in unexpected
places.
102
TALKING AND LISTENING WITH AN ACCENT: SPEECH
PERCEPTION IN A SECOND LANGUAGE BY LATE BILINGUALS
Mark Leikin1 , Zohar Eviatar1 ,
Rafiq Ibrahim1, 2 , and Shimon Sapir1
1
2
Haifa University (Israel)
Rambam Medical Center (Haifa, Israel)
We report two experiments that examined the functioning of late bilinguals in their second language. The first
examines how native and non-native Hebrew speaking
listeners perceive accented and native-accented Hebrew
speech, and the second tested a hypothesis that the
degree of accent in L2 is related to a measure of ego
permeability. The first experiment was a gating study
that explored the ability of healthy late fluent bilinguals
to recognize words in L2 when they were spoken in an
accent like their own, a native accent, or another foreign accent. The data revealed that for Hebrew speakers, there was no effect of accent, whereas for the two
bilingual groups (Russian and Arabic native speakers),
stimuli with an accent like their own and the native Hebrew accent, required significantly less phonological information than the other foreign accents. In the second
experiment we looked at the correlations between the
‘heaviness’ of the accent of L2 speakers and a measure
of empathy. These revealed strong correlations between
degree of accent and empathy scores in the Russianspeaking group, but not in the Arabic-speaking group.
The psycholinguistic and sociolinguistic implications of
these findings are discussed.
DEFINING NEW BOUNDARIES AND FEELING GOOD
Ludmila M. Leshchova
ian, fruter, fruterer; organic fruit, tropical fruit, run
out of fruit, etc.), getting to know different connotaAcademy of Public Administration
tions and emotive charge that correlated foreign words
of the President of the Republic of Belarus
may have (bath-house), etc.
(Minsk, Belarus)
Neglecting these conceptual and word meaning differences leads a bilingual to lexical-semantic mistakes
Bilingualism is treated here in its broadest sense as abil- similar to those made by a child acquiring his/her
ity of a person to communicate in one of his two lan- mother tongue, they are:
guages, even if it is learned in artificial environment as
foreign language.
• overextension of a category (it is revealed in a
There are certain beliefs about learning a foreign
wider use of a foreign word than it is accepted
language that adult learners usually have. One of them
in the target language community). Overexis that learning a foreign word is just learning a new
tension is especially obvious in foreign language
sound and written word form, the concept these labels
speech production. The cases of overextension
refer to is believed to be the same. Thus, a foreign
that a Russian native speaker learning English
name is felt to be a perfect synonym to the label in the
usually makes are mainly due to interference of
native tongue. Conceptual and word meaning differthe mother tongue (e.g., *a place for ‘a berth’
ences in correlated words in different languages are usuor for ‘a piece of luggage’, *a salted cucumally overshadowed, and at the initial stage overshadowber for ‘a pickle’, a *back leg for ‘a hind leg’; I
ing promotes foreign language learning. Thus, apples,
feel (hear) the smell for I smell). Sometimes a
bananas, and plums are prototypes for the conceptual
learner extends a foreign word category to comcategory named both by the Russian word fg and
pensate the lack of knowledge of a certain foreign
the English word fruit, and this makes communication
name, and in this way creates a new name as a
in a foreign language possible.
child usually does acquiring his/her language;
Yet learning foreign language lexicon is a far more
complicated process than just learning forms of isolated
• overnarrowing of a category (it is revealed in a
words. It presupposes construction of a new concepnon-application of a foreign word to its proper
tual system the previous, however, is not forgotten as
conceptual category). Overnarrowing is obvious
it is captured and operated by a different language)
in speech comprehension in the form of misunderand memorizing a differently structured foreign lexicalstanding of an otherwise familiar word due to narsemantic system. It is a long and tedious job of learnrower boundaries or absence of the relative sense
ing new concepts (caboose), new semantic features
in the correlated word of his mother tongue (the
(cereal), defining new prototypes and boundaries for
fruit of an oak-tree is difficult for comprehenfamiliar conceptual categories (e.g. for house) as well
sion because in Russian the meaning of f
is narrower: ‘plant growth that could be served
as learning one-word names for concepts non-lexicalized
for desert’ or The soldiers hid in a depression —
in one’s mother tongue (my job is challenging, dethe meaning ‘hollow, sunk place’ is absent in the
manding and rewarding), establishing a different set
correlated borrowed word).
of word (and category!) associations (fruit — frutar-
103
Overextension and overnarrowing may also occur
due to differences in emotion charge and connotations
of correlated words. Thus, Russian speakers try to narrow the use of the word sex according to the Russian
language etiquette and would hardly produce without
special learning such collocations as sex antagonism or,
on the contrary, they may overextend the category old,
or invalid as the correlated Russian words do not have
any political correctness restrictions.
Learning foreign language vocabulary itself is a complex cognitive and emotional process of construction
new knowledge. The interrelation and interdependence
of cognition and emotion in bilingualism is displayed
on different levels: on the level of language processing
where both hemispheres take place, on the level of types
of knowledge that is to be learned (different types of
word meaning — denotational and connotational), and
also on the level cognitive mechanism of learning accompanied by positive emotions aroused by the process
of academic learning itself. We get new knowledge of
and about a foreign language (which is mainly a cognitive process), and experience positive emotions learning
new information while reading and listening to authentic English texts, finding useful information in dictionaries, and even making mistakes while speaking and being
tactfully corrected.
The connection of cognition and emotions in the
process of foreign language learning is especially obvious when the results of cognition are quick and positive,
for example, when we learn an ‘inner form’ of a foreign
word by reading its etymology and/or by establishing
its motivating feature (e.g. < is were-wolf
[O.E. wer ‘man’], *## is humming-bird [hum —
‘a prolonged sound like that of a bee’]). This information helps us to catch the prototype and to predict
to a big extent boundaries of the category named by a
foreign word, and its connotations and possible associations with other categories.
The carried out experiment shows that learning (predominantly cognitive process) is more effective and the
learner’s positive emotions are stronger when a motivated foreign word correlates with a Russian nonmotivated word ($7
h CIN^ h
CPCCL^ 7*< h NCi CI). It may be accounted for ‘visualizing’ the concept by means of its
prototype and simultaneous better understanding correlated words in both the languages.
Similarly effective and emotional is learning foreign words that differ from native ones in a motivating feature (/#* h ICN?ACR^ $ % 7 h CNGFCN UU?). However, the process
of primary recollection of such foreign words is a bit
slower, especially if they are non-assimilated borrowings
(' g, / h CGU Hj?) or are
native but partially demotivated words (
< —
were-wolf).
So, cognition is closely related to emotions in foreign language leaning in many aspects but mechanisms
of this relation still need investigation.
A COGNITIVE CORPUS STUDY OF FEAR EXPRESSIONS
IN POLISH AND ENGLISH
Barbara Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk1 ,
Katarzyna Dziwirek2
University of L
ódź (Poland) University of
Washington (Seattle, USA)
This paper has initially been inspired by Wierzbicka’s
(1995, 1999) observation that Slavic languages prefer
to express feeling emotions with intransitive, often
reflexive, verbs while English tends to use far more copular constructions with adjectives and participles. This,
according to Wierzbicka reflects both a semantic and a
cultural difference between Slavic and English. The semantic difference is that adjectives . . . designate passive states, not active emotions to which people give
themselves more or less voluntarily, while emotions
expressed by reflexive verbs such as bojat’sja to be
afraid . . . are treated not as arising by themselves but
by the speaker’s conscious thoughts about the event.
(Wierzbicka’s 1995: 226/229). Thus, in a sense, by using reflexive verbs the Slavic speakers are manufacturing
the emotion within themselves. The cultural difference
is stated by Wierzbicka as follows: I believe that this
[use of adjectives in English] is not accidental, but
reflects an important feature of Anglo-Saxon culture —
a culture which tends to view behavior described disapprovingly as emotional with suspicion and embarrassment. . . . Their culture encourages them to be glad
rather than rejoice, to be sad rather than to pine, to
be angry rather than to fume or rage, and so on.
(Wierzbicka’s 1995: 226–7) By contrast, Slavic speakers value emotional expression and do it with verbs.
We were intrigued by these observations and set out
to see if they were true and along the way discovered
(cf. Dziwirek and Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk in press)
a number of striking hitherto unnoticed patterns and
generalizations.
The paper presents an analysis of FEAR constructions expressing emotions in Polish and English. Our
data comes from the British National Corpus and PELCRA (Polish and English Language Corpora for Research
and Applications), which includes the Polish National
Corpus. We also look at the data from the Polish Learners of English and American Learners of Polish corpora
to see possible transfer patterns.
The corpora reveal a number of striking hitherto unnoticed patterns and generalizations. There are two
104
main components to the paper. In the syntactic part
we focus on complex sentences with emotion verbs as
main predicates. The Polish verb bać siȩ allows a number of constructions as its complements. In English the
range of such constructions is more limited. These fields
are also the only ones where we find infinitival (subject
control) complements in both languages, though much
more frequently in English. English also allows for-to infinitive complements (I Verb for him to), absent in Polish. The semantic analysis of emotion nouns (strach /
lȩk / przerażenie) reveals a profound insight into how
speakers conceptualize these emotions. There are two
almost mutually exclusive sets of emotion words in Polish and English: some emotions are seen as present inside individuals and thus part of human nature (albeit
possibly in a dormant state), while others are perceived
as external. You can awaken (wzbudzić / obudzić) or
call forth (wywolać) the former and fall into (wpaść w )
the latter. Our analysis of these patterns shows that
strach ‘fear’ and lȩk ‘anxiety’ are part of the former
while their stronger counterpart przerażenie ‘terror /
horror’ act as an interface between the two. This analysis offers insights into Polish and English cultural values
and national psyche.
The FEAR constructions are polysemous in English
and Polish and, in Polish, they can be construed as
mental verbs as well as emotion verbs, possibly also
as verbs expressing volition. Our analysis contradicts
Wierzbicka’s claim that all reflexive emotion verbs have
a thinking component (that adjectives lack). Our findings (cf. also Dziwirek & Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk in
press) suggest that only some senses of some reflexive
emotion verbs involve thinking, while other polysemic
variants express prototypical emotions and/or volition.
References:
Dziwirek,
Katarzyna & Barbara LewandowskaTomaszczyk (in press) Corpus-based analysis of emotion
predicates FEAR, WORRY, and JOY in Polish and English
PALC 2005 Proceedings — Cognitive Corpus Linguistics
Workshop. Frankfurt a. Main: Peter Lang.
Lakoff, George (1987). Women, Fire, and Dangerous
Things: What Categories Reveal about the Mind. Chicago /
London: The University of Chicago Press.
Lakoff, George and Mark Johnson (1980). Metaphors
We Live by. Chicago: University Press.
Landsberg, M. ed. 1995. Syntactic Iconicity and Linguistic Freezes. Berlin: de Gruyter
Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk, Barbara and Katarzyna Dziwirek (2003). A Class of Adverb / Adjective Controlled
Infinitival constructions in Polish and English — A CorpusBased Study. Research in Language 1. 117–142
Wierzbicka, Anna. 1995. Adjectives vs. verbs: the
iconicity of part-of-speech membership. In M. Landsberg,
223–245.
Wierzbicka, Anna. (1999). Emotions Across Languages
and Cultures: Diversity and Universals. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Language Corpora: BNC, Longman Corpus, PELCRA.
ITEM-SPECIFICITY IN CONSTRUCTIONS: GERMAN AND
RUSSIAN CHILD DIRECTED SPEECH
Elena Lieven, Sabine Stoll
Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary
Anthropology (Leipzig, Germany)
It has been proposed that one mechanism children use
to learn word order regularities is by extracting schemas
based around high frequency markers, such as familiar
verbs and/or case-marked pronouns (e.g. Pine, Lieven
& Rowland, 1998; Santelmann & Jusczyk, 1998). Recently, Cameron-Faulkner, Lieven and Tomasello (2003)
have provided evidence of a high degree of repetition of
lexically based strings in English child directed speech
(CDS). However, this strategy might be language specific since English has an unusually rigid word order,
and child directed speech in other languages might not
lend itself so easily to utterance-initial lexically based
patterns.
To test this, we carried out the same analysis for two
languages which show more variability in word order,
namely German and Russian. German has more wordorder variations than English and Russian word order
is less rigid than German and quite free. We analyzed
1400 codeable utterances per mother in the child directed speech of six German mothers from the Szagun
corpus (Szagun, 2001) and four Russian mothers from
the Stoll corpus.
In a first analysis, utterances were categorized
into general construction types such as copulas, whquestions and imperatives. Significant differences were
found between the three languages for all constructions,
with, for instance, English CDS having more questions
and Russian CDS having more imperatives.
Subsequently utterances in each of these constructions were analyzed in terms of their initial one to three
words. If a specific lexical pattern was used four or more
times by a particular mother, this was called a ‘frame’.
There was considerable lexical specificity at the beginnings of utterances in both Russian and German but
the general direction of the results was for English to
have more frames accounting for more of the data, with
German lying somewhere between English and Russian
which had fewer frames that, in turn, counted for less
of the data.
In the third analysis, we analysed for frames across
the corpus of each mother. We found the same pattern
as we had found within constructions, but of great interest was the fact that English had a relatively equal number of one, two and three-word frames, while German
105
had a balance of one- and two-word frames and rather
few three-word frames. Russian frames were largely oneword with virtually no three-word frames at all.
These results are discussed in terms of the typological characteristics of the languages and the relationship between particular constructions and the functions
they perform. They suggest that CDS in languages with
more word order variations than English still shows considerable predictability and systematicity since both in
German and in Russian there is a high degree of lexicalspecificity at the beginning of constructions. However,
the number of frames and the amount of data accounted
for by these patterns is higher in German than in Russian. Since Russian has a freer word order than German,
is prodrop and has zero copula in the present tense,
frames tend to be shorter and lexical items can and do
occur in a greater variation of positions in an utterance.
SLA AND COGNITIVE SCIENCE
Michael H. Long
University of Maryland (College Park, USA)
Second language acquisition (SLA) is a young science,
to the extent it deserves the name at all, struggling to
emerge and differentiate itself from such fields as education and applied linguistics. While diary studies and longitudinal case studies of child and adult second language
acquisition have appeared in scientific journals for over
a century, modern SLA research, most of it now crosssectional and experimental, dates from the mid-1960s,
and the vast majority of work since the 1980s. The field
shows its youth in a number of ways, disagreements as
to the proper scope of inquiry and, not unrelated, an
intemperate rush to theory being just two of them. The
American philosopher of science Larry Laudan’s concept
of ‘research tradition’ offers a way of seeing the wood
from the trees with respect to multiple theories in any
field, and his ‘problem-solving’ notion is a useful yardstick when it comes to the comparative evaluation of
theories.
SLA is an internal, individual, in part, innately specified, cognitive process. As such, its natural home lies
within cognitive science. There, it can make substantial contributions over and above understanding how
second, including foreign, languages are learned, why
adults often fail when children are so successful, the
role of metalinguistic knowledge and of explicit and implicit learning, the role of the linguistic environment,
and more. The fact that not only natural experiments,
but also real ones, are possible (and legal) with adults
means that SLA research can throw light on such matters as the dissociation of language and cognition, maturational constraints on learning, relationships among
affective and cognitive variables, and other factors typically confounded in simultaneous language and cognitive development in children. The potential SLA contribution is well illustrated by work on the so-called Critical
Period Hypothesis.
SURPRISE-DRIVEN COGNITIVE BELIEF REVISION
Emiliano Lorini, Cristiano Castelfranchi
Institute of Sciences and Technologies of
Cognition (Rome, Italy)
Some symbolic AI models for example BDI (belief, desire, intention) models ([3, 13]) are conceived as explicit
and operational models of the intentional pursuit and
belief dynamics. The main concern of these models is
to provide a clear understanding of the functional roles
of different kinds of epistemic and motivational states
(beliefs, acceptances, expectations, intentions, goals,
desires etc.), of the relational properties among them.
The role of mental configurations of appraisal (involving different kinds of motivational and epistemic states)
for the definition of particular cognitive emotions such
as disappointment, fear, relief, shame etc. . . has been
stressed by several authors close to the BDI theoretical
tradition (see for example [4, 10]) The main objective
of this work is a conceptual and theoretical clarification
of the functional role of Surprise in a BDI-like cognitive
architecture with respect to resource bounded belief re-
vision. The first necessary step is to enrich the BDI
vocabulary by including anticipatory mental states
such as expectations and beliefs ([5, 12]).
The introductory part of the work is devoted to introduce the fundamental aspects of our model of Surprise presented in [6] where each type of surprise is associated with a particular phase of the cognitive processing
which involves a particular kind of epistemic state (expectation under scrutiny, presupposed belief and so on).
As in [6, 15] we assume that perception in cognitive
agents is based on an abductive procedure for selecting the best interpretation of input data and we define
Mismatch-based Surprise as the reaction of alert due
to a mismatch between an expectation under scrutiny
(a belief about the future, that the cognitive system is
willing to verify) and the selected interpretation of input data and the degree of Mismatch-based Surprise is
associated to the quantitative discrepancy between the
selected interpretation of input data and the invalidated
expectation under scrutiny. Moreover, we argue that the
revision of beliefs and expectations in the background
106
of the agent’s knowledge structure is associated to a lief revision in resource bounded rational agents.
qualitatively different form of surprise. We give speReferences:
cial emphasis to the revision of presupposed assumptions and beliefs given the current expectation under
1. Alchourron, C, Gardenfors, P., Makinson, D. (1985).
scrutiny invalidated by the explanation of input data.
On the Logic of Theory Change: Partial Meet ConSimilarly to Speech Act theory [14] Presupposed beliefs
traction and Revision Functions. The Journal of Symgiven a current expectation under scrutiny are defined
bolic Logic, 50, pp. 510–530.
as beliefs whose contents are implied by the content of
2. Baldi, P. (2004). Surprise: A Shortcut for Attention?
the expectation under scrutiny and which are in backIn L. Itti, G. Rees, & J. Tsotsos (Eds.), Neurobiology
ground during the phase of interpretation of input data.
of Attention, Academic Press.
The degree of Revision-based of surprise is associated
3. Bratman, M. E. (1987). Intentions, plans, and practito the degree of revision of a belief presupposed by the
cal reason. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
expectation under scrutiny given the (interpreted) in4. Castelfranchi, C. (2000). Affective Appraisal versus
put data which invalidate both the expectation under
Cognitive Evaluation in Social Emotions and Interscrutiny and the presupposed belief. Finally, we analyze
actions. In A. Paiva (Eds.), Affective Interactions:
the surprise generated by the deeper mismatch between
Towards a New Generation of Computer Interfaces,
the selected explanation of input data and the (logical)
Springer-Verlag, Berlin, pp. 76–106.
supports of the expectation under scrutiny. A support
5. Castelfranchi, C, Lorini, E. (2003).
Cognitive
of an expectation under scrutiny is defined as the backAnatomy and Functions of Expectations. In Proceedground belief whose content implies the content of the
ings of IJCAI 03 Workshop on Cognitive modeling of
expectation under scrutiny.
agents and multi-agent interaction, Acapulco, Mexico.
The core part of the work is devoted to discuss the
relevance of the present approach for the theory of belief
6. Castelfranchi, C, Lorini, E. (under review). Computrevision. We move towards a procedural perspective on
ing Novelty: for a Cognitive Model of Surprise. Submitted for International Journal of Pattern Recognithe problem of Surprise where deeper mismatch-based
tion and Artificial Intelligence.
surprises are conceived as later emotional responses
which are coupled with the revision of deeper beliefs
7. Hansson, S. O., Wassermann, R. (2002).
Local
Change. Studia Logica, 70(1), pp. 49–76.
in a belief base.
We defend the following thesis concerning the func8. Harman, G. (1986). Change in View. MIT Press,
tional role of surprise in belief revision of rationally
Cambridge, MA.
bounded cognitive agents: since realistic cognitive
9. Macedo, L., Cardoso, A. (2001). Modelling Forms
agents are non-omniscient and have not direct and inof Surprise in an Artificial Agent. In Proceedings of
stantaneous access to all their knowledge both in phase
the 23rd Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science
of perception and in phase of revision, some mechanism
Society, pp. 588–593.
which is responsible: 1) for signaling the global inade10. Meyer, J. J. (2004). Reasoning about emotional
quacy of the belief base with respect to the incoming
agents. In Proceedings of 16th European Conference
input data, 2) for making explicit deeper layers, 3) for
on Artificial Intelligence, IOS Press, pp. 129–133.
the revision of broader parts of the belief base, is needed.
11. Meyer, W. U., Reisenzein, R., Schiitzwohl, A. (1997).
One of the functional role of surprise is exactly this.
Towards a process analysis of emotions: The case of
With respect to area of cognitive modelling the
surprise. Motivation and Emotion, 21, pp. 251–274.
present work provides a conceptual and formal clarifica12. Miceli, M., Castelfranchi. The Mind and the Future.
tion of the notion of Surprise thanks to the elaboration
The (Negative) Power of Expectations. Theory &
of a typology of Surprise where each type of surprise
Psychology, 12(3), pp. 335–366, 2002.
is associated with a particular phase of the cognitive
13. Rao, A. S., Georgeff, M. P. (1992). An abstract archiprocessing which involves a particular kind of epistemic
tecture for rational agents, in Proceedings of the Third
state (expectation under scrutiny, presupposed belief
International Conference on Principles of Knowledge
and so on). Indeed the authors believe that current
Representation and Reasoning, pp. 439–449, Morgan
Kaufmann Publishers, San Mateo, CA.
formal and psychological models of surprise (see for example [2, 9, 11]), which are merely focused on the ini14. Searle, J. (1969). Speech Acts: An Essay in the Phitial phase of mismatch between input data and active
losophy of Language. Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge.
schemas and expectation, are incomplete.
With respect to the area of belief revision the present
15. Shanahan, M. (2002). A logical account of percepwork is aimed at discussing the theoretical foundations
tion incorporating feedback and expectation. In Profor a model of Surprise-driven progressively structured
ceedings of 8th international conference on principles
of knowledge representation and reasoning, Morgan
belief revision in resource bounded cognitive agents.
Kaufmann Publishers, pp. 3–13.
With respect to this scientific area the present work is
very close to works done under the philosophically in16. Wasserman, R. (1999). Resource-bounded Belief Revision. PhD thesis, University of Amsterdam, The
spired ([8]) local revision framework ([7, 16]) which has
Netherlands.
been proposed as an advancement of standard AGMbased belief revision ([1]) approaches to understand be-
107
IMPLICIT LEARNING OF SEQUENCES
AND LANGUAGE IMPAIRMENT
Ágnes Lukács1, 2 , Attila Krajcsi3 , Dezső
Németh3 , Bence Kas1, 4 , Csaba Pléh1
1
Budapest University of Technology
(Budapest, Hungary)
2
Research Institute of Linguistics, Hungarian
Academy of Sciences (Budapest, Hungary)
3
University of Szeged (Szeged, Hungary)
4
Eötvös Loránd University of Sciences
(Budapest, Hungary)
The series of studies to be presented aimed at examining the relationship between implicit learning abilities,
their underlying mechanisms and memory systems and
language acquisition by testing typically developing children and children with language impairment. The process of language acquisition is itself a form of implicit
learning, since it takes place incidentally, without conscious intent to learn, and without explicit knowledge of
the acquired grammatical rules. Our question is whether
the implicit learning ability driving language acquisition
is an instance of a general learning mechanism, or there
are several mechanisms specialized for processing different types of inputs, which are organized by different principles, show different paths of development and
can be selectively impaired. Results from adult artificial
grammar learning show that constraints of the learning
mechanism are not specific to acquiring linguistic material (Saffran, 2002). There are, however, no systematic
typical developmental and developmental neuropsychological studies on the background mechanisms of different implicit learning paradigms in different modalities.
Since sequential organization is of central importance in language, we chose the SRT (serial reaction
time) task, a classical implicit sequence learning task as
our experimental paradigm (Nissen and Bullemer, 1987)
to examine modality specificity and development of im-
plicit sequence learning. The original SRT task was simplified for children: we reduced the number of elements
to 2 and the length of the sequence to 6. There were
four experimental conditions, differing in the modality
and nature of the sequentially organized information:
i) location ii) colours iii) nonsense syllables iv) nonverbal sounds. If typically developing children show different patterns of performance in the four conditions, it
suggests that sequence learning uses different systems
in different domains. This conclusion would be supported by observing greater deficit in learning sequences
of linguistic stimuli in SLI than learning nonlinguistic sequences. Uniform performance profiles in both groups
in all conditions would suggest that the same general
implicit memory system is responsible for implicit learning of different kinds of stimuli.
With this experiment we can also test the Procedural Deficit Hypothesis of Specific Language Impairment (SLI) (PDH, Ullman and Pierpont, 2005). On
this view, language impairment is a result of abnormal
development of brain structures underlying the procedural memory system responsible for learning cognitive
and motor skills, and, among them, grammar. Developmental disorder of such a system should result in deficit
of skills based on procedural learning, such as implicit
learning of sequences within both the linguistic and nonlinguistic domains.
References:
Saffran, J. R. (2002). Constraints on statistical language
learning. Journal of Memory and Language, 47, 172–196.
Ullman, M. T. and E. Pierpont (2005) Specific language
impairment is not specific to language: the procedural deficit
hypothesis. Cortex, 41(3):399–433.
Nissen, M. J. and Bullemer, P. T. (1987) Attentional requirements for learning: Evidence from performance measures. Cognitive Psychology, 19, 1–32.
NEURAL CORRELATES OF LOCOMOTOR IMAGERY WITHIN
AN EMBODIED COGNITION PERSPECTIVE
Davide Mate1 , Franco Cauda1 , Leonardo
Cerliani1 , Katiuscia Sacco1, 2 , Sergio
Duca2 , Giuliano Geminiani1
1
2
University of Turin (Turin, Italy),
Ospedale Koelliker (Turin, Italy)
Introduction
Motor imagery consists in simulating movements without their overt execution. Jeannerod (1994) advanced
the hypothesis that motor images are endowed with
the same properties as those of the corresponding motor representations, and therefore have the same functional relationship to the imagined or represented move-
ment and the same causal role in the generation of this
movement. Various methodological approaches demonstrated the existence of psychophysical, physiological
and neural similarities between imagined and physically executed movements (for some reviews see Decety,
1996a; 1996b; Decety and Grèzes, 1999; Jeannerod and
Frak, 1999). However, while motor imagery involving
the upper limbs has been investigated in many works
(for a summary of the results in healthy subjects see
Lafleur et al., 2002), little is known about brain functioning during locomotor imagery (for some pioneeristic
works see Jahn et al., 2004; Malouin et al., 2003). The
present study examined the neural correlates of locomotor imagery, through the use of functional magnetic
108
resonance imaging (fMRI), and how they support an
embodied cognition perspective.
Methods
Eight right-handed and right-footed healthy volunteers
(four women and four men; mean age= 27) took part in
the experiment. The fMRI locomotor imagery paradigm
was block designed and consisted in two conditions: in
the active condition, subjects imagined to walk along
two parallel lines at a normal speed; in the rest condition, they imagined to be laying down. Stimuli were
auditory and consists in an audio-recorded voice saying
‘Laying down’ in the rest condition and ‘Walk’ in the
active condition. Data acquisition was performed on
a 1.5 Tesla Philips Intera; imaging data were analyzed
using Brain Voyager QX (Brain Innovation, Maastricht,
Holland).
Results and discussion
Activations were found bilaterally in primary motor
area (leg/foot), premotor area, supplementary and presupplementary motor areas, prefrontal cortex (medial
frontal cortex BA 8; dorsolateral inferior frontal cortex
BA 9), cingulate gyrus, insula, primary somatosensory
areas, paracentral lobule (BA 5/31), inferior parietal
lobule (BA 40), precuneus and cerebellum. Besides,
in the right hemisphere, activations were in cuneus and
lingual gyrus; while, in the left hemisphere, activations
were found in inferior frontal gyrus (BA 44), superior
parietal lobule and hippocampus.
All activated regions are part of a well documented network associated with the mental representation of motor actions: (1) supplementary and presupplementary motor areas are linked with the intention and anticipation of action (e.g., Lau et al., 2004a;
2004b); (2) the ventral and the dorsal parts of the prefrontal cortex has been found in many imagining experiments; in particular, the dorsolateral inferior frontal
cortex BA 9 is responsible for response inhibition (Aron
et al., 2004), which is essential during a motor imagery task; (3) the premotor area contributes to the
preparation of sequential movements (Leonardo et al.,
1995) and it is involved in dynamic visuospatial imagery
(Lamm et al., 2001); (4) the primary motor cortex is involved in the sensory processing for the purpose of upcoming movement generation, as well as in mental operations of sensorimotor representations (Hanakawa et
al, 2003); (5) the anterior cingulate cortex provides an
interface for motor control, drive and cognition (Paus,
2001); (6) as far as the anterior parietal lobe is concerned, Porro and his collaborators (1996) stressed the
role of the primary somatosensory cortex in motor imagery, especially in tasks involving the recall of sensations of proprioceptive nature; besides, area 5 is mostly
devoted to analyzing proprioceptive information such as
location of body parts (Hanakawa et al, 2003); (7) the
precuneus is involved in the retrieval of visuo-motor se-
quences (Fletcher et al., 1995) and in the imagination
of motor actions in space (Ruby & Decety, 2001); the
cuneus and the lingual gyrus seem are related to the
perception of walking biological motion (Servos et al.,
2002).
Conclusions
The neural similarities between motor and motor imagery have been confirmed also for a highly automated
movement such as walking. Interestingly, even when
one has to purely imagine a certain movement, proprioceptive and environmental aspects are mentally simulated, suggesting that action motor schemes are not
only abstract representations. In particular, according
to our data, the sensory-motor scheme of walking involves the intention and the anticipation of action (1),
a response inhibition (2) and a preparation of sequential
movements (3), integrated with the processes of upcoming (4), control (5) and coordination (6) of movements;
and all these mechanisms are grounded in proprioceptive and environmental mentally simulated information
(6–7). It seems that, in such a sensory-motor scheme,
the cognitive level of action representation is strictly
linked to the experience of one’s own body moving in a
specifically featured context.
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RATIONALITY IN ACTION — FROM PHILOSOPHY TO
COGNITIVE SCIENCES
Carlos Eduardo Evangelisti Mauro
Porto University (Porto, Portugal)
The paper will be proposing a new model of explanation
of the rationality in action. The belief-and-desire model
from the Analytic Philosophy will be the conceptual and
the theoretical basis. In the section 1 will be demonstrated the criteria for an answer for the question: Is
irrationality in action in fact possible? In the section
2 I will try answer to the following questions: a) What
does make the agent to act at the first time?; b) How
is possible explain that a human agent initiates his life
of rational agent (independently of the time localization
of this initial border)?; c) What permits the first rational action? In the section 3 I will argue on behalf of
the bankruptcy of the preferences system concept. It
the section 4 I will argue that inevitably the creation /
acquisition of a belief presumes, in the essence of the
own belief, the corresponding attribution of a bigger or
smaller desirability to the cognitive content of that
belief. Of the same form, the existence / creation of
a desire presumes, in the centre of the own desire, the
attribution of a minimum cognitive representation
(formally, or in terms of content) in which the desire
is revealed. In the section 5 I will describe the referred
model of explanation of the rationality in action.
References:
Anscombe, G. E. M. Intention. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000.
Cherniak, C. Minimal Rationality. Cambridge: MIT
Press, 1986.
Cohen, J. L. Can Human Irrationality Be Experimentally Demonstrated? Behavior and Brain Sciences, 4: 317–
370, 1981.
Davidson, D. Essays on Actions and Events. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2002.
Davidson, D. Problems of Rationality. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2004.
Elster, J. Ulysses and the sirens: studies in rationality
and irrationality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1979.
Gigerenzer, G. Bounded Rationality: The Adaptive Toolbox. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2002.
Hume, D. Tratado da Natureza Humana. Tradução
de Serafim da Silva Fontes, prefácio e revisão técnica da
tradução de João Paulo Monteiro. Lisboa: Fundação Galouste Gulbenkian, 2001.
Kahneman, D., Slovic, P., Tversky, A. (eds). Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1982.
Miguens, Sofia. Racionalidade, Porto: Campo das Letras, 2004.
Nozik, R. The Nature of Rationality. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993.
Searle, Jon. Rationality in Action. Cambridge: MIT
Press, 2001.
Simon, H. A. Models of Bounded Rationality vol. I, II.
Cambridge: MIT Press, 1982.
Stich, Stephen. The Fragmentation of Reason: preface
to a pragmatic theory of cognitive evaluation. Cambridge:
MIT Press, 1993.
THE QUESTION OF ADDUCTION AND ABDUCTION IN
LANGUAGE
Nazaire Mbame
UBP Clermont-Ferrand (France)
tion everywhere in its system, in the contrast between
affirmation / negation, attributive / privative sense, assertive / oppositive sense, etc. In English for example,
some prefixes introduce both abduction and adduction:
There’s no scientific literature on the principles of adduction and abduction which play great role in lexical
• The prefix a- wears adductive sense in: agglucategorization. Undoubtedly, because semantics have
tinate, approach, association agglomerate, add,
always been kept away from the points of view of pheadverts, etc; and abductive sense in: asocial, abnomenology on its own concerns. But fortunately, the
sence, amoral. . .
situation is in the way of being reversed thanks to the
job of Cadiot and Visetti in their theory of semantics
• The prefix in wears adductive sense in: inside,
forms. It is a design materialist conception of language
interfere, interact, induction, information. . . ; and
according to Cassirer’s theory of symbolic forms, and
abduction sense in: impossible, independent. . .
deeply anchored on Phenomenology and Gestalt as supThe preposition in which is adductive, has its
posed by Husserl, Gurwitsch, Merleau-Ponty, R. Thom
abductive counterpart out. The prefixes di-, dis-,
...
Language exhibits the duality adduction / abduc- un- that appear in divide, difference. . . ; disruption,
110
disperse, distance. . . ; unbelievable, uncommon . . . are
strongly adductive. Many antithetic paradigms reflect
the dual spirit of adduction and abduction as: to/from,
in/out, inside / outside, unite / disunite, union / disunion, approach / move away; put / remove. . . In English, we have a special use of the word abduction (rapt,
ablation . . . : child abduction) which reflects the spirit
of that concept.
When transposed into the intentionality, adduction
and abduction bears affirmation and /negation. Every
word and expression used to affirm (yes, certainly, ok,
absolutely,. . . ) are adductive. In the other hand, any
word used to express negation (no, nobody, don’t, never,
ever. . . ) is abductive.
Phase 1
Otherwise, adduction and abduction are so linked
that, some words can be semantically salient on abduction, but very close to adduction. For example, we have
the words unexpected, unbelievable, incredible. . . that
are abductive (cause of the prefix un-, in-) but create
an effect of adduction in their interpretation. Adduction and abduction are universal principles that structure
any sort of natural language. In French, many affixes,
morphemes and words express these principles in many
ways, and certainly in Russia, German, Spanish, Japan
. . . we can find that.
In the phenomenological point of view, adduction
and abduction are facets of an on-going spatial movement, as the figure below shows it.
A
B
subject
B
A
subject
Phase 2
Adductif phase
Abductif phase
The on-going spatial movement of the subject
Figure 1.
Adduction is the on-going spatial movement viewed
in its phase of approaching the target B; and abduction
is that movement perceived in its facet of leaving the
point A. Leaving one place implies approaching another
place, and approaching a place supposes having leaved
a place in the space before. This is the nature of adduction and abduction that call each other in the frame of
the spatial movement. By many ways, language transposes the two faces of that movement in its system. For
example, every word that is adductive profiles in some
way, the movement of approaching something. This
movement can be seized in its dynamic phase (run,
march, unite, to go, to see . . . ) or in its result (to
stay, to seat, to feel. . . ). Also, any kind of word that
is abductive expresses in some ways, the movement of
leaving, or the state of being distant, far from something. This is the aim of my communication: explain
in more details, the principles of adduction and abduction within the spatial movement, and explore how they
manifest themselves in language especially in English
and French, for a new perception of lexical semantics
researches.
References:
E. Cassirer, La philosophie des formes symboliques, tome
1, le Langage.
Guillaume, Gustave, Leçons de linguistique de Gustave
Guillaume 1948–1949, séries A, B, C Québec et Paris,
Presses de l’Université Laval et Klincksieck. [Publiées par
R. Valin.]
Gurwitsch, A., Théorie du champ de la conscience, Paris,
Desclée de Brouwer, 1957.
Husserl, E. Idées directrices pour une Phénoménologie,
Paris, Gallimard (1950–1913), (Edition originale: Ideen
zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und pänomenologischen
Philosophie, 1913, Husserliana, III–IV).
J. Damourette, Edouard Pichon, Des mots à la pensée;
essai de grammaire de la langue française, 1930.
J. Petitot, Morphogenèse du sens, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1985.
Martinet, André, Eléments de linguistique générale,
1967.
Mbame Nazaire, Psychosystématique de la négation
en français, mémoire de maı̂trise, université Blaise-Pascal,
Clermont-Ferrand, 2000.
Merleau-Ponty, La phénoménologie de la perception.
Paris, Gallimard, 1945.
Pierre Cadiot, Yves-Marie Visetti, Pour une théorie des
Formes sémantiques, Motifs, profils, thèmes, puf, 2001.
111
A COMPUTATIONAL MODEL OF THE CAPGRAS DELUSION
Ryan McKay1 , Fabio Paglieri2
1
Tufts University (Medford, USA)
Institute for Cognitive Sciences and
Technologies-CNR (Roma, Italy)
2
Delusions are false beliefs that are held with strong
conviction despite the efforts of others to dissuade
the deluded individual. They are first-rank symptoms
of schizophrenia and feature prominently in numerous
other psychiatric and neurological conditions. Thematically speaking, delusions range from the bizarre and exotic (e.g. I am the left foot of God) to the relatively
humdrum (e.g. My neighbours are persecuting me).
Few delusions, however, have captured both the professional and public imaginations like the Capgras delusion,
which involves the belief that a spouse or close relative
has been replaced by a physically identical impostor.
Theories of the Capgras delusion tend to take the
form of either motivational or deficit accounts (McKay
et al., 2005a, b). Motivational formulations explain the
delusion in terms of some putative psychological benefits it provides. For example, Enoch and Trethowan
(1991) claim that the delusion resolves ambivalent feelings of love and hatred towards a loved one. In coming
to believe that the loved one is in fact an impostor, the
deluded individual can feel or express their unacceptable
feelings without guilt or tension.
Deficit accounts, on the other hand, view the Capgras delusion as the consequence of a breakdown in the
normal functioning of belief mechanisms, underpinned
by neuroanatomical or neurophysiological abnormalities.
For example, Langdon and Coltheart (2000) explain
cases of Capgras delusion as resulting from the conjunction of two cognitive deficits. The first deficit involves
damage to neural pathways underpinning the emotional
component of face recognition (see Ellis et al., 1997).
The ensuing discordance between experiences of the way
someone looks and the way they feel is thought to
be what provides the content of the impostor delusion.
The second deficit is some kind of defect in the machinery of belief evaluation, and accounts for why the
impostor hypothesis, once generated, is then adopted
and maintained in the absence of appropriate evidence
for that hypothesis.
A recent model of the Capgras delusion integrates
both motivational and deficit perspectives (McKay et
al., 2005b; see also Raschka, 1981). This model posits
that the Capgras delusion may result when cognitive
or perceptual deficits interact with salient motivational
forces. For example, imagine a man who loves his wife
deeply, and is thus motivated to believe that they have
a happy and successful relationship. If such a man suffers a neurological disruption to pathways subserving
the emotional component of face recognition, he may
be confronted with a combination of doxastic inputs (1.
This looks like my wife; 2. This doesn’t feel like my
wife) that, given his motivational state, is intensely disturbing. In the face of these inputs, the inference that
there is something amiss in his relationship with his wife
may be the logical one to make. However, if he is sufficiently motivated to avoid making this inference, he
may be attracted to an alternative that is less logical
yet in some sense still fits the facts (perhaps this
is not my wife after all, but rather a physically identical
impostor).
A possible means of testing this integrated explanation of Capgras delusion, and of contrasting it with competing accounts (i.e., purely motivational and deficit
theories), involves building a computational model of
the doxastic context in which Capgras delusions arise.
Such a model should abstract the clinical features of
typical Capgras cases, preserving only those factors considered relevant in delusion formation — namely, the
available perceptual information, the patient’s motives,
and the cognitive machinery underpinning belief dynamics. By running computer simulations of this simplified
model, it should be possible to assess the relative impact
of each of these factors in the generation and maintenance of the Capgras delusion.
A major difficulty in such research concerns the
choice of an appropriate formal architecture for representing belief dynamics. Most current approaches either ignore (Gardenfors, 1988) or marginalize (Boutilier,
1998) the influence of motives in belief formation and
change, and hence are inadequate for critically assessing
the role of motivational factors in the formation of the
Capgras delusion (for a survey, see Paglieri, 2005). To
overcome this limitation, we make use of an alternative
approach to belief dynamics, Data-oriented Belief Revision (DBR). DBR was recently proposed by Paglieri and
Castelfranchi, and has been successfully used to model
motivational influences on belief formation and change
(Paglieri, 2005; Paglieri, Castelfranchi, 2005). DBR is
based on the ideas that (i) perceived information is believed or disbelieved on the basis of several specific properties, i.e. factual credibility, epistemic importance, motivational likeability and pragmatic relevance; moreover,
(ii) belief change should be understood as an emergent
effect of information dynamics, rather than being represented as an independent phenomenon as is customary
in standard approaches.
In framing Capgras delusion within the DBR model,
we will focus on two informational features: credibility
(the amount of supporting evidence) and likeability (the
motivational pressure exerted by the subject’s goals).
The relevant cognitive architecture will include 8 candidate data: 2 doxastic inputs (Dl: This agent looks like
my husband; D2: I feel uncomfortable with this agent),
3 potential conclusions (Cl: There is something wrong
with me; C2: There is something wrong with our relationship; C3: There is something wrong with the world,
i.e. my husband has been replaced by a physically identical impostor), and 3 inferential rules (II: [Dl & D2] →
112
Cl; 12: [Dl & D2] → C2; 13: [Dl & D2] → C3). In
addition, we consider three motivational factors potentially influencing the subject’s belief dynamics: Ml: I
want to be sane (= not Cl); M2: I want to have a good
relationship with my husband (= not C2); M3:1 want
the world to remain as it should be (= not C3).
This computational setting allows us to manipulate
several different variables, in order to assess their relevance for the development of the Capgras delusion: (i)
the amount of perceptual evidence regarding the physical appearance of the other person, i.e. the credibility
of node Dl; (ii) the strength of the feeling of uneasiness, i.e. the credibility of node D2; (iii) the credibility
of the different inferential rules available to the agent,
i.e. nodes II, 12, and 13; (iv) the strength of the motivational influence exerted over different conclusions,
i.e. the likeability of nodes Cl, C2, and C3; and (v) the
weight assigned to different factors (i.e., credibility and
likeability) in the process of belief selection.
In this paper, we present the results of a series of
computer simulations of this model, to reproduce the
behaviour of both Capgras patients and ‘normal’ subjects. More specifically, we wanted to test three competing hypotheses regarding the cognitive genesis of the
Capgras delusion: whereas motivational theories assign
to factor (iv) the main role in the formation of the
delusion, deficit models emphasise the other variables.
In partial contrast with both, the theoretical synthesis
championed by McKay and colleagues (2005b) locates
the genesis of this syndrome in the interaction of all of
the variables.
Other authors (e.g. Sahdra, Thagard, 2003) have
used computational modelling techniques to successfully
simulate the effects of motivational factors on belief formation in garden variety cases of self-deception. This is
the first reported effort, however, to model motivational
influences in the genesis of delusions. In future work,
we plan to extend this computational treatment to other
belief pathologies, e.g. the Reverse Othello Syndrome
(Butler, 2000), and cases of persecutory delusions in
hearing-impaired subjects (McKay et al., 2005a).
References:
Boutilier, C. (1998). A unified model of qualitative belief
change: A dynamical systems perspective. Artificial Intelligence, 98, 281–316;
Butler, P. V. (2000). Reverse Othello syndrome subsequent to traumatic brain injury. Psychiatry: Interpersonal
and Biological Processes, 63, 85–92;
Ellis, H. D., Young, A. W., Quayle, A. H., & de
Pauw, K. W. (1997). Reduced autonomic responses to faces
in Capgras delusion. Proceeding of the Royal Society of
London: Biological Sciences, B264,1085–1092;
Enoch, M. D., & Trethowan, W. (1991). Uncommon
psychiatric syndromes (3rd ed.). Oxford: ButterworthHeinemann;
Gardenfors, P. (1988). Knowledge in flux: Modeling the
dynamics of epistemic states. Cambridge: MIT Press;
Langdon, R., & Coltheart, M. (2000). The cognitive
neuropsychology of delusions. Mind & Language, 15(1),
183–216;
McKay, R., Langdon, R. & Coltheart, M. (2005a). Models of misbelief: Integrating motivational and deficit theories
of delusions. Proceedings of the MSB 2005 symposium on
Agents that want and like: Motivational and emotional
roots of cognition and action, 76–83;
McKay, R., Langdon, R. & Coltheart, M. (2005b).
Sleights of mind: Delusions, defences and self-deception.
Cognitive Neuropsychiatry, 10(4), 305–326;
Paglieri, F. (2005). See what you want, believe what you
like: Relevance and likeability in belief formation. Proceedings of the AISB 2005 symposium on Agents that want
and like: Motivational and emotional roots of cognition and
action, 90–97;
Paglieri, F., Castelfranchi, C. (2005). Influence of social
motivation over belief dynamics: A game-theoretical analysis. Advances in Cognitive Economics. Sofia: NBU Press,
202–213;
Raschka, L. B. (1981). The Capgras syndrome. Canadian Journal of Psychiatry, 26(3), 207–208;
Sahdra, B. & Thagard, P. (2003). Self-deception and
emotional coherence. Minds and Machines, 13,213–231.
THE RELATION BETWEEN INDIVIDUALS’ PRIMARY LANGUAGE
AND THE NATURE OF THEIR SHORT-TERM MEMORY CODING
OF WRITTEN WORDS
Paul Miller
ond objective was to reexamine the validity of the primary language coding hypothesis initially proposed by
A first objective of the present study was to determine Shand (1979) with reference to the obtained findings.
the nature and efficiency of the strategy/ies used by Data was gathered based upon a research paradigm askprelingually deafened, native signers and a hearing con- ing the participants to remember series of six written,
trol for the temporal retention of written words. A sec- consecutively presented words and to recognize them
University of Haifa (Israel)
113
within word matrices (4×4) that comprised distracter
words that were either visually, phonologically, or cherologically (sign) similar to the target words, or were not
similar to the target words on any of these dimensions. Participants were native signers who were deaf
(n=11, age=14.18) and a hearing control group (n=25,
age=15.00). The analysis of errors resulting from the
confusion of target words with distracter words showed
convincingly that the two participant groups used different memory codes for the retention of the written
target words. Findings actually suggest that for their
retention hearing individuals recode written words into
phonological code whereas signing individuals seem to
use for this purpose a code reflecting the basic components of sign language (hand shape, movement, place
of articulation). Although the use of a nonphonological memory strategy was not found to be detrimental
for STM capacity, evidence suggests that it may be less
efficient in retaining word order. Finally, in line with a
primary language coding hypothesis, findings from the
present study suggest that for its retention individuals
tend to recode information into a code derived from
their mother tongue.
COGNITIVE AND LINGUISTIC ASPECTS OF PERCEPTUAL SPACE
Marzenna Mioduszewska
operations are not clearly distinguishable (Talmy 1996).
This paper represents work in progress and it aims at
Universidad Rey Juan Carlos (Madrid, Spain)
indicating a possible way of analysing the field of spatial
Spatial representation and reasoning is an issue of inter- reasoning. Dealing with language as an open system,
est to many different disciplines. Studies in these areas connected to a variety of spatial representations, one
exploit several sources: cognition, language, perception should bear in mind the restrictions that spatial cognias well as world knowledge. The inherent complexity tion puts on the relations that language can express.
Some of the problems to be addressed are:
and multidimensionality of space explain the difficulty
1. How are dynamic aspects of spatial / perceptual
of reducing it all to a small number of primitive spatial
information conveyed and how are they processed
concepts.
in mental images or scenes?
This paper proposes the analysis of spatial language
used in the descriptions of perceptual impressions or
2. In what way are spatial linguistic categories
perceptual events, on the one hand, and, the interface
grounded or rooted in perception?
between language and spatial cognition, on the other.
3. Which spatial representations can language acMy strategy here is to collect a large amount of data
cess?
in a number of different experiments investigating spa4. How do spatial representations assist mental
tial relations in language and cognition. It will draw
model building (if any) by novices in the wine
upon the results of analyses in the field of vision, touch,
tasting experiment as compared to the wine tastsmell and kinaesthesia during the wine tasting procedure
ing descriptions elaborated by experts?
conducted in Spanish.
5. How to integrate several different perceptual repIt is known that a large number of knowledge sources
resentations taking into account that we code difsuch as vision, hearing, touch, smell and kinaesthesia
ferently in different sensory systems?
contribute to the establishment of mental representa6. Is it possible to translate information from one
tions of space (Levinson 2003, Jackendoff 1992, 1997,
spatial representation to the other? If so, are we
Herskovits 1986, 1997, Vieu 1997).
speaking of a different kind of spatial reasoning?
It is also to be noted that human minds have the
ability to establish systematic relationships between linReferences:
guistic forms and perceptually based knowledge. This
Albertazzi, L. (ed.) (2000) Meaning and Cognition. Amgrounding of linguistic symbols in perceptual represen- sterdam: John Benjamins
tations (Harnad 1990, Regier 1996, Regier and Carlson
Albertazzi, L. (ed.) (2002) Unfolding Perceptual Con2001) is essential to understanding linguistic abilities tinua. Amsterdam: John Benjamins
Eilan, N., McCarthy, R. and Brewer, B. (eds.) (1993)
and linguistic structure. In a similar way, Thom (1980b)
deals with the ontological conception of perception and Spatial Representation. Oxford: Blackwell
Harnad, S. (1990) The symbol-grounding problem.
language. According to Thom, language is, at its most
Physica
D 42: 335–46
basic levels, rooted in perception.
Herskovits,
A. (1986) Language and Spatial Cognition.
But it is also to be observed that non-linguistic cogCambridge: Cambridge University Press
nition, even perception, involves conceptualisation in
Herskovits, A. (1997) Language, Spatial Cognition and
the same way as linguistic cognition does. Slobin (1996)
Vision. In Spatial and Temporal Reasoning. O. Stock (ed.)
gives evidence of thinking for speaking. We certainly 155–202. Dordrecht: Kluwer
need more evidence for perceiving for speaking (HerJackendoff, R. (1992) Languages of the Mind: Essays
skovits 1997) as using language involves, for instance, on Mental Representation. Cambridge. Mass.: MIT Press
some kind of visual cognition beyond basic processes
Jackendoff, R. (1997) The Architecture of the Language
of vision. In those cases, perceptual and conceptual Faculty. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press
114
Langacker, R. (1991) Concept, Image, and Symbol.
Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter
Levinson, S. C. (2003) Space in Language and Cognition.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Port, R. F. and van Gelder, T: (eds.) (1995) Mind as
Motion. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press
Regier, T. (1996) The Human Semantic Potential: Spatial Language and Constrained Connectionism. Cambridge,
Mass.: MIT Press
Regier, T. and L. A. Carlson (2001) Grounding Spatial
Language in Perception: An Empirical and Computational
Investigation. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General,
130(2), 273–98.
Slobin, D. (1996) From thought and language to
speaking. In Rethinking Linguistic Relativity. J. Gumperz and S. Levinson (eds.) 70–96. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Talmy, L. (1996) Fictive Motion in Language and ception. In Language and Space. P. Bloom, M. Peterson,
L. Nadel and M. Garrett (eds.) 211–276.Cambridge, Mass.:
MIT Press.
Thom, R. (1980b) Prédication et grammaire universelle.
Fundamenta Scientiae, 1, 23–34.
Vieu, L. (1997) Spatial Representation and Reasoning in
Artificial Intelligence. In Spatial and Temporal Reasoning.
O. Stock (ed.) 5–41. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
thinking for
AN ANALYSIS OF WRITTEN JARGON IN A HINDI-ENGLISH
BILINGUAL FLUENT APHASIC
Ramesh Kumar Mishra
National Brain research center
(Manesar, Haryana, India)
that phonotactic features of both languages being different will impose constraints on the phonological organization of the produced written jargon.
Background:
Tools used:
The classic symptoms of Wernicke’s aphasia include
moderate to severe comprehension deficits in spoken
and written language, fluent but paraphasic speech and
neologistic jargon. Production of jargon may be in
the spoken and the written modalities with observable
dissociation (Marshall, Chiat, Robson & Pring 1995).
Rochford (1974) suggested that a pathological arousal
mechanism and lack of control were crucial to jargon
seen in fluent aphasia. However in spite of reports of
various bilingual fluent aphasic symptoms in English,
there are few case studies on the nature of written jargon
in L1 and L2, in other non-European languages. This
paper attempts to understand the phonological nature
of jargon in written language performance of a bilingual fluent aphasic patient with Hindi and English as
languages of use.
The patient was administered a test of letter fluency in
written mode in both Hindi and English separately and
on different occasions. From each language 26 vowels
and consonants were used. He was instructed not to
mix both the languages as far as possible during the
testing. He was given a sheet of paper where all the
alphabets of English and Hindi were written in separate
pages in bold letters and he was given the instructions
to write as many words as he can against each letter in
each language in a given time of 30 minutes. He had
to complete the test in both languages.
Case description:
The patient is was a 47 years old successful businessman
who had suffered a severe left CVA. One-month onset of
the stroke he was admitted with the complain of speech
language difficulties at the therapy clinic of All India
Institute of Speech and Hearing, Mysore, India. Administration of an Indian version of WAB (Kertesz 1982)
and other speech language evaluations confirmed fluent
aphasia with severe word finding difficulties along with
noticeable deficits in reading and writing. The patient
produced jargon in both written and spoken modalities
and had agraphia.
Results:
The patient produced 85 words in total in English, where
33 were correct words and 52 were jargon. In Hindi he
produced 107 words where 53 were correct words and 54
were jargon. These jargon produced in both languages
were analyzed to see if they obey the phonotactics of the
respective languages. Results indicate that a majority
of jargons produced in English (more then 50%) were
not following any phonotactic rules. The rest followed
partially. In the case of Hindi only 11% of words did not
follow the phonotactic patterns of the language.
Conclusions:
From the results obtained it was tentatively hypothesized that jargon produced in written modality in bilingual fluent aphasia, the phonotactic preservations are
qualitatively and quantitatively different in both the
languages. There may be less distortions in the first
Research question:
language compared to the second language. Based on
We wanted to investigate the phonological nature (more this initial finding hypotheses are proposed regarding
precisely the phonotactics) of his written language pro- the phonological nature of written language output in
duction in both Hindi and English. It was hypothesized bilingual fluent aphasia and the L1L2 interaction.
115
CONSIDERATIONS ON MEASUREMENT OF THE BIPOLARITY OF
PSYCHOSEMANTIC SCALES*
Olga V. Mitina, Eugene N. Osin
Moscow State University (Moscow, Russia)
Most studies in the field of psychosemantics (see Petrenko, 1997) conducted in the past have been using
sets of bipolar scales introduced by Osgood (Osgood,
Suci & Tannenbaum, 1957), constructs in terms of Kelly
(1955). However, the question arises whether the bipolar scales consisting of two antonymic adjectives are
truly bipolar, that is, whether a subject is able to recognize and rate an object unambiguously as related more
strongly to one of the opposites given and less to the
other. For instance, if a person rates some object on the
good vs. evil scale as medium, it is usually interpreted by the researcher as neither (very) good, nor
(very) evil. It seems possible though that in the case
of two unipolar scales (good and evil) presented
separately the subject might rate the same object either
high or low on both scales at once.
The case when the same object is highly rated on
two separate antonymic unipolar scales is generally referred to as ambivalence. This concept originally appeared in the field of attitude research and several different formulae to measure ambivalence have been suggested since (Scott, 1966; Kaplan, 1972), but the advantages and limitations of particular measures are still
being studied (Riketta, 2000). Attitude studies often
rely upon different variations of the simple positive vs.
negative evaluation scale, whereas pscyhosemantic research usually uses a much wider set of scales of different nature (evaluation as well as sensory qualities),
hence more advanced indices are required in order to
mathematically measure and assess the way these scales
behave upon different sets of objects.
The results of psychosemantic research are usually
represented by a data cube with scales, objects and subjects as dimensions. Suppose (X+ (s, o, i); X- (s, o, i))
is the pair of grades the subject i has given to the same
object o on two antonymic unipolar scales which constitute a bipolar scale s. These grades are integer values in
the range from 0 to N, where N expresses the quality
is present to the maximum degree opinion and 0 expresses the quality is not present at all opinion, the
in-between grades corresponding to the different degrees
of the quality’s presence in the object.
If the extremes of the scales are truly antonymous
for the subject i when applied to the object o, the grades
should lie upon the line defined by the equation X+ (s,
o, i) = N — X-(s, o, i). Two reservations should be
made: 1) in the case the grades’ regression curve is not
linear, we propose a correction for linearity to be applied,
and 2) the bias caused by peculiarities of the subjective
evaluation strategy can be eliminated by normalizing
the subjective distribution of grades to the mean and
standard deviation of the scale.
If the grades are close to the line defined above, this
is the case of bipolarity. If both grades are above average, the point (X+ (s, o, i); X- (s, o, i)) lying above
the line mentioned, this is the case of ambivalence. If
both grades are below average, the point (X+ (s, o, i);
X- (s, o, i)) lying below the line mentioned, this is the
case of irrelevance. The terms bipolarity, ambivalence
and irrelevance are defined for any pair of grades, but
can be generalized as properties of the scale, the object
or the subject. Measures relevant to each of the three
states would allow a researcher to assess, for instance:
1) the relevance (bipolarity) of the scale to a given set
of objects; 2) the ambivalence of an object as rated by
subjects in general; 3) the ambivalence (as defined in
attitude research) of a subject towards certain objects
or scales.
The easiest and most practical way to assess bipolarity is by correlating positive and negative ratings. The
drawbacks of this method are 1) it can only be applied
to two-dimensional data, hence the need for averaging
over the third dimension in the data cube; 2) it does not
allow to discern between ambivalence and irrelevance.
The measures we suggest below 1) can be applied to
any pair of values (averages or individual grades) and
generalized for any needed (scale, object or subject) dimension of the cube by adding or averaging them, and
2) allow to discern between ambivalence and irrelevance.
The first index we suggest is a measure of ambivalence / irrelevance vs. bipolarity. It uses normalized
grades (=0, =1) and is defined by the equation:
X+
X−
) ∗
) ∗
Amb1 (s, o, i) = sin(2 ∗ arccos( |X
2
2
−|
X+ + X−
Ambivalence / irrelevance is calculated simply as a
function of the angle tangent of the line section which
goes from (0; 0) to (X+ (s, o, i); X (s, o, i)) (which
equals −1 in case of extreme bipolarity and 1 in case of
ambivalence / irrelevance) and the length of this sec* The
2 + X2 .
X+
−
tion (which corresponds to the magnitude of the ambivalence observed). Normalization allows to compare
the magnitude of the ambivalence observed between the
studies using different scales.
research is supported by the Russian Foundation of Basic Research. GRant 02–06–80247.
116
The second index we suggest measures ambivalence
vs. irrelevance / bipolarity. It uses raw grades and is
defined as follows:
X−
2 + X2 .
)) X+
Amb2 (s, o, i) = sin(2 arcsin( −
2
2
X+ + X−
The behavior of the two measures is summarized in same data, a researcher can discern between ambivathe table below. By applying the two together to the lence, irrelevance and bipolarity:
Grades
X1 > X, X2
X1 > X, X2
X1 > X, X2
X1 > X, X2
X1 > X, X2
X1 > X, X2
>X
>X
>X
>X
>X
>X
Interpretation
ambivalence
indefinite
irrelevance
indefinite
indefinite
bipolarity
In order to assess the validity of our measures, we
applied them to the data obtained by Klauer & Musch
(1999), who studied the evaluation of 92 German nouns
on positive and negative scales. Both Amb1 and Amb2
demonstrated high and significant correlations (r = .71
to r = .94, p < .001) with measures proposed by Kaplan
and Griffin, as well as with reaction time (r = .66 and
r = .51, respectively, p < .001) which was used by the
authors of the original research as an external criterion
of ambivalence.
The measures were then applied to the data gather
in our own psychosemantic research of the values conducted in 2004–2005, in which the subjects (psychology
and physics students, N=159) were asked to evaluate
the values suggested by Rokeach (1973) on a number
of unipolar scales (5-point). The most bipolar scales
turned out to be those we supposed would be most
relevant to values (e.g., unimportant vs. important,
socially favoured vs. socially disapproved); most ambivalent were scales we interpreted like truly unipolar
(e.g., masculine vs. feminine and personal vs. social), and the most irrelevant to values were scales of
more sensory nature (e.g., slow vs. fast, smooth vs.
abrupt). The data processing is still underway, but the
results already obtained indicate that the measures we
proposed are valid and practical for any researcher who
wants to find out which of the scales they chose are the
most appropriate for their set of objects.
The measures described above are not final and
Amb1 is. . .
> >0
∼0
> >0
∼0
∼0
< <0
Amb2 is. . .
> >0
∼0
< <0
>0
<0
< <0
definitive; they can be elaborated by any researcher in
order to accommodate better the needs of his own research. The statistical criteria similar to normality tests
may be developed in order to test hypotheses about
bipolarity of the scales, which would allow to compare
and combine the data provided by different studies.
References:
Kaplan K. J. (1972). On the ambivalence-indifference
problem in attitude theory and measurement: A suggested
modification of the semantic differential technique. Psychological Bulletin, 77, 361–372.
Kelly G. A. (1955) The psychology of Personal Constructs. N. Y.
Klauer K. C. & Musch J. (1999) Eine Normierung unterschiedlicher Aspekte der evaluativen Bewertung von 92
Substantiven // Zeitschrift für Sozialpscyhologie, 1999, 30,
pp. 1–11.
Osgood C. E., Suci G. J. & Tannenbaum P. H. (1957)
The Measurement of Meaning. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1957.
Petrenko V. F. (1997) Osnovy psihosemantiki: Uchebnoye posobiye. Smolensk: Izd-vo SGU. (In Russian).
Riketta M. (2000) Discriminative validation of numerical
indices of attitude ambivalence. Current Research in Social
Psychology, Vol. 5 No. 5.
Rokeach M. (1973). The nature of human values. New
York: Free Press.
Scott, W. A. (1966) Measures of Cognitive Structure.
Multivariate Behavioral Research, 1, 391–395.
117
NEUROPHYSIOLOGIC BASES FOR VISUAL SELECTIVE
ATTENTION AND MEMORY ENCODING STUDIED WITH
HIGH-DENSITY EEG/ERP RECORDINGS IN HUMANS: MULTIPLE
DIPOLE SOURCE MODELING
Elena V. Mnatsakanian1 , Ina M. Tarkka2
1
Institute of Higher Nervous Activity and
Neurophysiology RAS (Moscow, Russia)
2
Brain Research and Rehabilitation Center
Neuron (Kuopio, Finland)
The neurophysiologic mechanisms for visual object processing are of theoretical and practical interest. Attentional mechanisms are required to select relevant objects
from several visual objects competing for brain processing resources. The perceived stimuli are encoded into
(visual) working memory for immediate use and/or for
further storage into long-term memory. The networks
underlying these processes include different brain structures that may be detected in metabolic studies or recovered from scalp-recorded EEG or MEG. In our study,
selective attention and visual working memory processes
were studied in humans using dipole source modeling
approach. Our aim was to detect the possible sources
of event-related brain potentials related to attention and
memory processes that provide selective encoding for information combined in a complex image.
The general design of the experiments was that the
participants had to compare pairs of consecutive targets
displayed together with the ignored stimuli on a computer screen. The choice of the target type to compare
in each trial was dependent on the preceding cue. For all
experimental series (total of 6 series), the analysis was
done for the event-related potentials (ERPs) recorded
after the first stimulus onset, where the selection of relevant target and its encoding into working memory take
place. The spatio-temporal multiple dipole models were
developed in BESA2000 for 128-channel ERPs. Previously we have reported a model including eight dipole
sources for ERPs recorded during familiar-face recognition and comparison. The model (here base model)
was developed using 128-channel ERPs recorded after
the second picture in a pair when the task was to compare two consecutive picture stimuli (Mnatsakanian and
Tarkka, 2004). In this series we had 2 tasks: Face comparison (targets were personally familiar faces) and Pattern comparison (targets were abstract dot patterns).
We applied the base model developed for the second target in a pair to the data recorded after the first
target in the same experiments. The processes of selective attention are present in both data segments, since
all stimuli contained faces and patterns superimposed.
The familiarity of the faces likely influences similarly the
ERPs recorded after first and second targets in a pair.
The priming effects are not present in the ERPs elicited
by the first target, however, the encoding into working memory of the selected target is assumed to occur
within this segment. Thus, the comparison of active
sources for ERPs elicited by first and second targets
in a pair may elucidate the functional roles of specific
brain areas associated with memory and attention. To
dissociate the processes related to active task performance (attention directed to specific target, voluntary
memorization), we have designed new experimental series in which one of two tasks from our previous design
was replaced by a passive viewing condition with no voluntary memorization of any target. To investigate the
face-specificity (face vs. non-face objects) and facefamiliarity effects, additional series were developed in
which familiar faces were replaced by unfamiliar faces
or animal figures. The abstract patterns were the same
for all series, which allowed the comparison of conditions
where the real objects were attended or unattended.
Also, another series was done where the complex
stimuli included verbal and non-verbal components: all
pictures were photos of personally familiar people (new
set) with written first names. The cues were switching
participant’s attention between comparison of faces or
names (Face and Name conditions). The first picture
in a pair always contained a face and a name belonging
to the same person.
The application of the base model to the ERPs
recorded after the first stimulus in a pair and comparison of the source activities with those obtained for the
ERPs elicited by the second target was very informative. The observed differences allowed us to presume
that the sources in the anterior brain areas, near midline, may reflect nonspecific processes of memory and
attentional control. The activity, related to encoding of
relevant target into the visual working memory is probably explained by sources in the inferotemporal brain
areas, especially in the left hemisphere. This was also
supported by the data from our last experimental series,
where the encoding of verbal and non-verbal stimuli resulted in obvious differences in the activity of left inferotemporal dipole after 200 ms. As was reported in fMRI
studies, the processes of encoding and maintenance of
visual information take place in the inferotemporal areas
(Postle et al., 2003; Ranganath et al., 2004).
The search for non-verbal object-specificity in our
studies showed that in general, the components between
120 ms and 180 ms were reduced when comparing ERPs
for mammals to ERPs for faces. After 240 ms, the ERP
differences between series were complex; they were also
dependent on whether the items were attended or not.
For certain occipital locations, the differences between
unfamiliar faces and the other 2 categories were larger
than between faces and mammals; this was clearly observed in unattended conditions. Dipole source model-
118
ing showed multiple differences between series, among
them was occipital source activity reduction for mammals.
As for the verbal vs. non-verbal stimuli encoding,
the largest inter-hemispheric differences were observed
in parietal and posterior temporal regions. Significant
differences between conditions (Face — Name) were observed for major ERP components (170 ms, 250 ms, and
330–360 ms): a reduction of their amplitudes for Name
condition and peak latency delays. The amplitude reduction for Name condition in 200–400 ms range was
stronger in the left posterior areas (dipoles in inferotemporal and midtemporal areas).
In our research we demonstrated that a dipole model
can be a powerful instrument to explore the timing and
approximate locations for brain sources related to visual memory and attention. The application of a source
model to the data from experiments with similar design
or to the different segment of the same data may be informative. The alterations in dipole source activity may
be interpreted as a reflection of how the brain activity
in the modeled areas changes when the task conditions
are different.
References:
Mnatsakanian, E. V., Tarkka, I. M., 2004. Familiarface recognition and comparison: source analysis of scalprecorded event-related potentials. Clinical Neurophysiol.
115, 880–886.
Postle, B. R., Druzgal, T. J., D’Esposito, M., 2003.
Seeking the neural substrates of visual working memory storage. Cortex 39, 927–946.
Ranganath, C., DeGutis, J., D’Esposito, M., 2004.
Category-specific modulation of inferior temporal activity
during working memory encoding and maintenance. Cognitive Brain Res. 20, 37–45.
PROSODY AND THE BRAIN
Inger Moen
University of Oslo (Norway)
The auditory correlates of prosody are variations in
pitch, loudness, tempo, and rhythm. The presentation will review studies, including lesion, dichoticlistening, and functional imaging studies, investigating hemispheric specialization of prosodic features, with
particular emphasis on variations in pitch.
Pitch variation is a property of all natural languages.
No language is spoken on a monotone. But pitch differences function differently in different languages. One
taxonomy of this type has two categories: (1) intonation languages, languages where differences in pitch are
associated with phrases or sentences, like English; (2)
tone languages, languages which use differences in pitch
for lexical purposes, like Thai, Chinese, and Norwegian.
Tone languages also have sentence intonation, but with
fewer possibilities in pitch variation than intonation languages.
Several hypotheses have been put forward with regard to hemispheric specialization of prosody. One of
these hypotheses (Van Lancker 1980, 1988) proposes
a scale of pitch contrasts from the most linguistically
structured pitch contrasts (e.g. Chinese and Norwegian word tones) associated with left-hemisphere specialization to least linguistically structured pitch contrasts (e.g. emotional tone, voice quality) associated
with right hemisphere specialization. A similar hypothesis (Packard 1986) assumes that the important factor
is not whether the pitch contrasts are included in the
linguistic system or not, but which part of the system
they are included in.
Another view is that prosody is a multifaceted phenomenon consisting of a set of features some of which
are processed by the right hemisphere and some by the
left. Fundamental frequency is assumed to be processed
by the right hemisphere, whereas the other prosodic features, like timing and intensity, are produced by the left
(e.g. Van Lancker & Sidtis 1992). It has also been
suggested (Gandour 1987) that hemispheric specialization depends on the relationship between the control of
fundamental frequency and timing.
The presentation will discuss to what extent present
research supports any of these hypotheses.
References:
Baum, S. R. and Pell, M. D. (1999): The neural bases
of prosody: Insights from lesion studies and neuroimaging,
Aphasiology, 13, 8, 581–608.
Gandour, J (1987). Tone production in aphasia. In
J. Ryalls (Ed.) Phonetic approaches to speech production
in aphasia and related disorders (pp. 45–57). Boston: College Hill Press.
Moen, I. (submitted). Production and perception of
word tones in patients with brain damage
Moen, I. (2004): Dysprosody in Broca’s Aphasia:
A Study of Norwegian Brain Damaged Patients.
In
Teoreticeskie problemy jazykoznanija Teoreticeskie problemy jazykoznanija: sbornik statej k 140-letiju kafedry
obscego jazykoznanija Filologiceskogo fakul’teta SanktPeterburgskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta. St. Petersburg: Filologiceskij fakul’tet Sankt-Peterburgskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta, 341–356.
Moen, I. (1993): Functional lateralization of the perception of Norwegian word tones — Evidence from a dichotic
listening experiment. Brain and Language, 44, 400–413.
Moen, I. and Sundet, K. (1996): Production and perception of word tones (pitch accents) in patients with left
and right hemisphere damage. Brain and Language, 53,
267–281.
Moen, I. and Sundet, K. (1999): An Acoustic Investigation of Pitch Accent Contrasts in the Speech of a Norwegian
Patient with a Left-Hemisphere Lesion (Broca’s Aphasia). In
Maassen, B. and Groenen, P. (Eds.) Pathologies of Speech
and Language. Advances in Clinical Phonetics and Linguistics, London: Whurr Publishers, 221–228.
119
Packard, J. L. (1986). Tone production deficits in nonfluent aphasic Chinese Speech. Brain and Language, 29,
212–223.
Van Lancker, D. (1980). Cerebral lateralization of pitch
cues in the linguistic signal. Papers in Linguistics, 13 (2),
201–277.
Van Lancker, D. (1988) Nonpropositional speech. Neurolinguistic studies. In A. Ellis (Ed.), Progress in the psychology of language (Vol. 3, pp. 49–118). Hillsdale, NJ:
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Van Lancker, D. & Sidtis, J. (1992). The identification
of afffective-prosodic stimuli by left- and right-hemispheredamaged subjects. All errors are not created equal. Journal
of Speech and Hearing Research, 35, 963–970.
Wong, P. C. M. (2002): Hemispheric specialization of
linguistic pitch patterns, Brain Research Bulletin, 59, 2, 83–
95.
THE PRODUCTION OF VERBAL MORPHOLOGY
IN PATIENTS WITH FOCAL AND NON-FOCAL BRAIN DAMAGE
— EVIDENCE FROM NORWEGIAN APHASIC SPEAKERS
AND SPEAKERS WITH DEMENTIA OF THE ALZHEIMER TYPE
Inger Moen1 , Hanne Gram Simonsen1 ,
Marianne Lind2
1
2
University of Oslo (Norway)
Bredtvet Resource Centre (Oslo, Norway)
Two groups of patients, 18 aphasic speakers and 10 patients with dementia of the Alzheimer type, have been
tested with a test on verbal morphology, examining the
ability to access and produce past tense forms in an
experimental context.
The test was originally developed to study the acquisition of past tense in normally developing children
(Ragnarsdóttir, Simonsen & Plunkett 1999, Simonsen
2001). It is constructed as a picture elicitation task in
which infinitive and/or present tense forms of the relevant verb is provided (orally and in writing). The test
consists of 60 verbs, chosen to represent the main verb
classes of Norwegian: strong verbs (27 verbs), the large
class of weak verbs (16 verbs) and the small class of
weak verbs (17 verbs) (cf. Endresen & Simonsen 2001).
The verbs are matched for token frequency, with approximately the same number of high and low frequency
verbs in each verb class.
The test has also been used with other population groups: SLI-children (Bjerkan 2000), adults under
time pressure (Simonsen & Bjerkan 1998), Alzheimerpatients (Simonsen, Moen, Øksengård & Engedal
2004), and Russian learners of Norwegian as a second
language (Tkachenko & Simonsen 2005). The test has
been applied in a single case study of an aphasic speaker
(Simonsen & Lind 2002).
In the present study the following research questions
are addressed:
• How do the aphasic speakers and the Alzheimer
patients respectively respond to the past tense
test as a group? How do the responses of the
two clinical groups compare to those of a group
of normal controls (N=30)?
• What types of errors are found in the responses
of the three groups, the aphasic patients, the
Alzheimer patients, and the normal controls?
• Can the error types be associated with the primary location of the neurological damage in the
two clinical groups?
A preliminary analysis shows a mean of 74 % correct
responses in the group of aphasic speakers, compared to
a mean of 94 % correct responses among normal controls, and 95 % in the Alzheimer-group. In addition,
there is great variation inter-individually in the aphasia
group, with a range of correct responses from 18 % to
98 %. The inter-individual variation is extensive also in
the Alzheimer-group. As a group, the responses of the
aphasic speakers do not differ to any substantial degree
when distributed across the verb classes (strong verbs:
71 % correct, large weak class: 75 % correct, and small
weak class: 78 % correct). However, again there is great
inter-individual variation.
The errors of the informants are classified as overgeneralisation errors (responding with a non-existing
form of the verb, based on an inflectional pattern from
another verb class), inflectional errors (responding with
a wrong, but existing, form of the verb), lexical errors
(responding with a wrong verb) and other (responding with a noun, failing to respond etc.). The aphasic
speakers have a mean of 15.7 errors; the normal control
group has a mean of 3.6 errors, and the Alzheimergroup has a mean of 3 errors. The most common error
type in the aphasia group is inflectional errors (56 %
of all errors), which make up only 11 % of the errors
in the normal control group. Overgeneralisation errors
are the most common type of error in the group of normal controls (74 % of all errors), whereas this error
type accounts for only 24 % of the errors in the aphasia group. In the Alzheimer-group, the pattern is less
clear, although there is a tendency for lexical errors and
irrelevant comments / verbal detours.
Quantitatively, processing of verbal morphology is
most difficult for the aphasia group in this study. However, analysis of the error patterns shows an important
qualitative difference between the responses of the apha-
120
sic speakers and the healthy adults on the one hand and
the Alzheimer patients on the other, indicating different
underlying sources of the difficulties. From a linguistic
point of view the aphasic patients seem to have a morphological problem and the Alzheimer patients a semantic problem. From a cognitive point of view the aphasic
patients seem to suffer from a procedural memory deficit
and the Alzheimer patients from a declarative memory
deficit (Ullman 2001). Furthermore, the Alzheimer patients’ inappropriate verbal behaviour in the test situation, irrelevant comments and circumlocutions, may be
seen as a deterioration of pragmatic abilities (Perkins
2002). Further theoretical implications of the study will
be discussed in the presentation.
References:
Bjerkan, K. M. 2000: Verbal morphology in specifically
language impaired children: Evidence from Norwegian. Acta
Humaniora, 73. Oslo: Unipub.
Endresen, R. T. & H. G. Simonsen 2001: The Norwegian
verb. H. G. Simonsen & R. T. Endresen (eds.): A Cognitive
Approach to the Verb: Morphological and Constructional
Perspectives. New York & Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 73–
94.
Perkins, M. 2002: An Emergentist Approach to Clinical
Pragmatics. F. Windsor, M. L. Kelly & N. Hewlett (eds.): Investigations in Clinical Phonetics and Linguistics. Mahwah
& London: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1–14.
Ragnarsdóttir, H., H. G. Simonsen & K. Plunkett 1999:
The acquisition of past tense morphology in Icelandic and
Norwegian children: An experimental study. Journal of Child
Language, 26, 577–618.
Simonsen, H. G. 2001: Past tense acquisition in
Norwegian: Experimental evidence.
H. G. Simonsen &
R. T. Endresen (eds.): A Cognitive Approach to the Verb:
Morphological and Constructional Perspectives. New York
& Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 129–152.
Simonsen, H. G. & K. M. Bjerkan 1998: Testing past
tense inflection in Norwegian: A diagnostic tool for identifying SLI children? International Journal of Applied Linguistics, 8, 251–270.
Simonsen, H. G. & M. Lind 2002: Past tense expression in a Norwegian man with Broca’s aphasia. In Windsor, F., M. L. Kelly & N. Hewlett (eds.): Investigations in
clinical phonetics and linguistics. Mahwah, N. J. & London:
Lawrence Erlbaum, 45–56.
Simonsen, H. G., I. Moen, A. R. Øksengård & K. Engedal
2004: Processing of Verbal Morphology in Norwegian Speakers with Alzheimer’s Disease (AD). Proceedings of the 2004
IALP Congress.
Tkachenko, E.& H. G. Simonsen 2005. Past tense morphology in L1 and L2 acquisition: Evidence from Norwegian.
Proceedings of the CML (Cognitive Modeling in Linguistics)
2005 Conference, Varna, Bulgaria, September 4–11, 2005.
Ullman, M. T. 2001: The Declarative / Procedural
Model of Lexicon and Grammar. Journal of Psycholinguistic
Research, Vol. 30, No. 1, 37–69.
GENERIC SIMULATION IN NATURAL LANGUAGE SEMANTICS
Friederike Moltmann
Institut d’Histoire et de Philosophie des Sciences
et des Techniques (Paris, France)
Simulation Theory (cf. Goldman 1989, 1995, Gordon
1986, 1995a, 1995b) provides an important alternative
to the traditional view about the ascription of attitudes
and the explanation / prediction of actions of others, the
socalled Theory Theory. Whereas on the latter view,
the attribution of propositional attitudes and future actions to others is based on a tacit theory about other
people’s behaviour (in particular on observations about
them), for Simulation Theory, third person ascriptions
of attitudes and explanations and predications of actions
are based on first-person ascriptions: by putting oneself
in the other person’s shoes, pretending to be the other
person or taking the other person’s point of view, that
is, by simulating her. Simulation has become a central
notion in contemporary cognitive science and philosophy of mind, generally being recognized as providing
at least one strategy for the ascription of attitudes and
the explanation / prediction of actions of others. In this
talk, I will argue that this notion also plays an important
role in the semantics of a number of natural language
expressions and constructions. More precisely, I will argue that a form of generic simulation is central to the
understanding and correct formal analyses of a range
of natural language sentences with generic or epistemic
content. Whereas the literature on simulation theory
has concerned itself so far only with the attribution of
properties to a specific person in whose situation the
agent puts himself, the notion of generic simulation I
will make use of involves an agent generalizing from his
own situation by abstracting from features of his situation that are particular to himself.
Generic simulation, I will argue is a strategy underlying the semantics of generic one, in uses as in (1)
(as well as generic uses of you), but also, arguably, the
various expressions and constructions that in recent philosophy of language and linguistic semantics (MacFarlane 2003, 2005, Koelbel 2003, Lasersohn 2004) have
given rise to analyses in terms of relative truth, such
as predicates of taste as in (1b) (and other evaluative
predicates) and epistemic modals as in (1c):
(1) a. One can see the picture from the entrance.
b. Chocolate tastes good.
c. It might rain.
All these linguistic phenomena share three distinctive characteristics:
[1] faultless disagreement: A sentence and its
negation may both be appropriately, and it seems truthfully, be uttered by different speakers. Thus, one person might be justified in asserting (2a), whereas another
person, used to a greater degree level of comfort, may
be justified in asserting (2b):
121
(2) a. One cannot sleep on this sofa.
b. One can sleep on this sofa.
(6) a. People can see the picture from the entrance.
b. People like chocolate.
Another way is that for establishing the generalizaYet the two clearly disagree. Similarly, if B has
tion,
a single experience on the part of the agent (given
knowledge that excludes rain, but A does not, A and
he
takes
himself to be normal) suffices, as in (7a, 8b),
B may both be right:
in contrast to other generic sentences (7b, 8b):
(3) A: It might rain B: It might not rain.
(7) a. John found out that one can see the picture
from the entrance.
[2] retraction of previously asserted propositions:
b. John found out that people can see the picture
the content of an utterance of (1a) might later be withfrom the entrance.
drawn, namely when the picture’s location has changed.
Similarly, (2a) and (3a), once appropriately and truth(8) a. John just found out that chocolate tastes good.
fully asserted, might be withdrawn later, in view of
b. John just found out that people like chocolate.
changes in taste or further knowledge.
[3] sharing of propositional contents of different
The generalization in (7a, 8b) is based on a sinagents involved in different contexts. Thus inferences
gle
first-person
experience, projected subsequently onto
such as the following are always valid:
others by generic simulation.
Formally, generic one-sentences can be analysed as
(4) A found out that one can see the picture from the
follows.
First, I take generic one to introduce a varientrance.
able to be bound by a generic operator Gn. This variB found out that one can see the picture from the able is supplemented by a ‘mode of presentation’, the
entrance.
speaker’s ‘self-mode of presentation’ (or whoever the
A and B found out the same thing (i.e. that one relevant agent may be). This means that the predicate is applied to a given value of the variable as if the
can see the picture from the entrance).
speaker were to apply the predicate to himself. I will
Relative truth theorist about predicates of taste ad follow Lewis’ (1979), by taking attitudes de se to conepistemic modals take [1]–[3] to require an enrichment stitute a self-application of a property, and Chierchia
of the context of assessment by additional parameters of (1990) in taking the contents of sentences involving de
taste or of epistemic situations, so that the proposition se interpreted expressions to express properties, repreexpressed will be evaluated as true or false not just with sented by a lambda expression. The ‘self-mode of prerespect to the actual world, but with respect to these sentation’ is then identified with the property λx[x =
additional parameters as well. I consider such an ap- y], where ‘y’ is the variable later to be bound by the
proach fundamentally flawed: it does not really explain lambda operator defining the meaning of the sentence
the intuition of disagreement, it does not explain why as a property (to be self-ascribed in an act of assertion
evaluative predicates and epistemic modal give rise to or belief). Thus, the meaning of (1a) will be represented
a relativization of truth rather than context-dependency as in (9a), and the one of (7a) as in (9b):
in the traditional sense, and it posits cognitively inacces(9) a. λy[Gn z see from the entrance(<z, λx[x =
sible entities such as standards of taste and knowledge.
y]>, the picture)]
I will propose a unified analysis of generic one, predicates of taste and epistemic modals that is based on
b. found out (John, λz[Gn y see from the enthe recognition that these phenomena involve the first
trance(<y, λx[x = z]>, the picture)])
person in some fundamental way and thus give rise to
Faultless disagreement is well explained on this acself-locating (de se) assertions and beliefs (Castaneda
1966, 1979, Perry 1979, Lewis 1979). In addition it count: it is ‘faultless’ because the generalization is
based on first-person experience about which one can
makes use of the notion of generic simulation.
The first-person nature of the phenomena shows up generally not be in error. It is ‘disagreement’ because
in different ways. One way is that the relevant sentences a generalization is made with, generally, at least overgenerally allow for an inference to the first person, as lapping domains of application, and moreover because
in (5), in contrast to other generic sentences, as in (6), an interlocutor can accept the content of a generic onewhich do not permit such an inference (the speaker may sentence only if he self-applies the content it expresses.
Sharing of contents of generic one-sentence by different
easily be an exception)
agents is possible for just the same reasons as sharing of
contents of sentences involving de se pronouns is pos(5) a. One can see the picture from the entrance.
sible for different agents, on Lewis’ (1979) account.
b. Chocolate tastes good.
I take predicates of taste to express two-place reI can see the picture from the entrance. Chocolate lations. Thus, tastes good expresses the relation that
tastes good to me.
holds between an object o and an agent a if o tastes
122
Gordon, R. M. (1986): ‘Folkpsychology as Simulation’.
good to a. Then with an occurrence of tastes good as
in (10a), the second argument position will be bound Mind and Language 1, 158–71.
====== (1995a): ‘Simulation Theory: Objections
by a generic operator and the argument position filled
and
Misconceptions’. In M. Davies / T. Stone (eds.).
by a complex variable, as in (10b):
(10) a. Chocolate tastes good.
b. λy[ Gn z tastes good(c, (<z, λx[x = y]>,]
A similar analysis can be given for epistemic modals,
and the explanation of faultless disagreement and of
sharing of propositional contents will then of course be
the same.
References:
Chierchia, G. (1990): ‘Anaphora and Attitudes De Se’.
In R. Bartsch et al. (eds.): Language in Action. Foris Publications, Dordrecht.
Goldman, A. I. (1989): ‘Interpretation Psychologized’.
Mind and Language 4.
====== (1995): ‘In Defense of Simulation Theory’.
In Davies and Stone (eds.).
====== (1995b): ‘Simulation without Introspection or Inference from me to you’. In M. Davies / T. Stone
(eds.).
Lasersohn, Peter (2004): ‘Context Dependence, Disagreement, and Predicates of Personal Taste’. ms. University of Illinois.
Lewis, David (1979): ‘Attitudes De Dicto and De Se’.
The Philosophical Review 88.
Koelbel, Max (2003): ‘Faultless Disagreement’. Aristotelian Society 104, pp. 53–73.
MacFarlane, John (2005): ‘Making Sense of Relative
Truth’. Aristotelian Society 105, 321–39.
====== (2003): Epistemic Modals and Relative
Truth’. Ms, University of Berkeley.
Perry, J. (1979): ‘The Problem of the Essential Indexical’. Nous 13, 3–21.
CAPTURING THE CONCEPT LIE: A USAGE-BASED APPROACH
Elena I. Morozova
Kharkov National University (Kharkov, Ukraine)
0. Introduction. A significant effect of the paradigmatic change in linguistic studies has been the concern
with the exploration of natural communication as it really exists, rather than involvement with some ideal
of what it should be. Cognitive linguists have not really
contributed to the study of how non-canonical communication is conceptualized, though in recent years there
has been some improvement on this situation. Yet the
balance still has to be adjusted. It is the purpose of
this contribution to present the results of our work on
the ways the concept LIE is instantiated in discourse.
We will first deal with the theoretical background to
the problem, then present a model of the unit of discourse and continue with discussing some practical and
substantial details using the English language data.
1. Theoretical prerequisites. The concept LIE
captures a certain fragment of ideal reality — that of
natural communication deviating from the canon by
the parameters of the falsity of the underpinning proposition and the insincerity of the speaker. Thus, its specificity is accounted for by two major factors: for the first
thing, it is a culturally constructed entity, which sets it
apart from mental representations for objects (images),
which exist whether or not they are linguistically labeled;
for the second thing, its referent belongs to the sphere
of language, and as such is also subject to linguistic
analysis. The latter circumstance makes it possible to
speak of the two realization planes of the concept LIE
as laid down in the English language — the nominative
and the discursive ones.
In order to analyze the latter, it is necessary, first
of all, to adopt an adequate theoretical framework. In-
stantiations of lying raise an embarrassing problem for
speech act theory, which currently provides the most
widespread metalanguage for describing linguistic action, since they cannot apparently be described in this
framework in a non paradoxical way: lies are perlocutionary acts, the success of which is both necessarily
linked to the success of the related illocutionary act and
necessarily implies the failure of the related illocutionary
act.
We believe that a usage-based [3, 4, 7], or discourse
approach [1] would provide a more satisfactory framework here. Its main assumption is that the speaker’s
linguistic system is fundamentally grounded in the instances of his producing and understanding language.
Thus, lexicalizations of the concept LIE are tightly
linked to its discourse instantiations in the following way.
First, such instances are the experience from which the
system itself is abstracted. Second, instantiations are
necessarily specific in nature. The corresponding lexemes fixate more general of their features, which are
recurrent in a number of similar instances of use, such
as the falsity of the proposition, the insincerity of the
speaker, his intent to deceive the hearer. These general
mental representations are activated in concert with the
specific ones in concrete instances of those patterns.
The third way in which lexicalizations of the concept
LIE relate to its discourse instantiations is that the former are crucial to defining this or that utterance as a
lie. Thus, instantiations play a double role in the relationship: they both result from, and also shape, the
lexical system in a kind of feedback loop.
2. The discourseme. In the general framework of
the usage-based approach we adopt one specific level
of abstraction for the analysis of instantiations of lying, and that is one to which we will refer as the dis-
123
courseme of lying. In contrast to a sentence, an utterance, or a speech act, the discourseme is a unit with
a multiple system of coordinates. It is roughly identical to R. Langacker’s notion of a ‘usage event’ defined
as ‘an actual instance of language use’ [5: 144] with
one significant constraint: the discourseme can only be
an utterance in actual discourse context, not just any
language unit. We define the discourseme of lying as a
product of the speech / mental activity of the subjects
of communication which is characterized by the following features: (1) the factual falsity of the underpinning proposition; (2) the belief of the speaker that the
proposition is false; (3) the speaker’s intent to deceive
the hearer by his utterance The discourseme of lying is
analyzed in accordance with the functions of the language sign [6]: the ideational function — the structure
of the information on the object-matter of communication (the propositional structure); the communicative
function — the specificity of the act performed (overtly
communicative, covertly strategic; a way for the speaker
to accommodate a number of conflicting goals, bondbinding vs. redistribution of power, etc.); the textual
function — the way this information is ‘packaged’ (assertion / presupposition; fabrication, falsification, concealment, evasion, ambiguity, etc.).
In the content of the discourseme of lying we distinguish the following ‘layers’:
1. the referential situation, the content of which is
modeled as a frame;
2. the communicative situation (ground), which includes the object situation, the speaker and
hearer, their interaction, and the immediate circumstances of speech;
3. the social and cultural context, in the center of
which is the ground,
3. Discussion. The content of the discourseme is
well captured by the ‘onion’ metaphor (Cf.. [2: 100]),
in the heart of which is the referential situation, while
the ground, the context and the shared knowledge are
the ‘layers’ enveloping it. The metaphor is necessarily
schematic and maps the basic principle of the structural
organization of a discourseme. Each particular instance
of lying demonstrates a rather intricate configuration
of parameters which belong to different ‘layers’. In detecting a lie the hearer may activate the information
belonging to any of the layers but, as a rule, only certain elements turn out to be relevant for the hearer (get
into the focus of his attention), others remaining latent.
References:
i
- n l/. / P 1 1
/ /. o - / O" /. - 1/ 3 g l/.
- ". +
2. Dirven R., Verspoor M. Cognitive exploration of language and linguistics. — Amsterdam, Philadelphia:
John Benjamins, 1998.
3. Langacker R. W. Foundations of cognitive grammar:
In 2 Vol. — Stanford: Stanford University Press,
1987. — Vol. I: Theoretical Prerequisites.
4. Langacker R. W. A usage-based model // Topics in
cognitive linguistics / Ed. by B. Rudzka-Ostyn. —
Amsterdam: Benjamins, 1988. — P. 127–161.
5. Langacker R. W. Discourse in cognitive grammar //
Cognitive Linguistics. — 2001. — Vol. 12, R 2.P. 143–188.
6. Morris C. Foundations of the theory of signs. —
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1938.
7. Usage-Based Models of Language / Ed. by M. Barlow
and S. Kemmer. — Stanford, CA: CSLI Publications,
2000.
4. a body of knowledge shared by the participant.
DOES THE PRESENT HAVE A FUTURE?
ENGLISH, GERMAN AND DUTCH COMPARED
Tanja Mortelmans
University of Antwerp (Antwerpen, Belgium)
In my presentation, I would like to report on an ongoing corpus-based study on the expression of future
time in three related languages — English, German and
Dutch — from a Cognitive Grammar point of view. I will
draw on previous analyses of future tense predications
in English (e.g. Brisard 1997, 1999, 2001) and German
(e.g. Mortelmans 2004), and on Langacker’s work on
grounding predications, including his characterization of
the present tense in English (Present tense: A full instantiation of the profiled process occurs and precisely
coincides with the time of speaking Langacker 1987:
82, see also Langacker 2003).
In order to be able to compare and contrast the use
of future expressions, a corpus consisting of about 300
English, Dutch and German sentences either referring to
the future or containing an explicit future tense marker
was set up. The original sentences were taken from English, Dutch and German fictional prose texts and were
then contrasted with their translation equivalents in the
respective languages (resulting in a database of more
than 900 tokens).
The three languages under investigation dispose of
auxiliaries to present future states of affairs (e.g. English
will, Dutch zullen, German werden), but can also make
use of the present tense, albeit to a different extent.
English, for instance, uses the present tense mainly for
scheduled future SoA’s (as in ‘The train leaves at six’),
whereas German and Dutch are much more tolerant re-
124
garding the use of present tense for future events. Put
differently, English will has acquired a much higher degree of grammaticalization (mirrored by a high degree of
obligatoriness, see Lehmann 1985) than its German and
Dutch ‘equivalents’. This observation has its repercussions on the ‘meaning’ of the present tense in German
and Dutch. Given that the present tense exhibits a far
greater number of future (and modal) uses than in English (it can easily accommodate intentions (1a), future
time predictions (1b) or statements concerning future
events or situations (1c), we cannot simply assume that
the German or Dutch present tense codes the occurrence
of the profiled process that precisely coincides with the
time of speaking.
(1)
a. Christine, I’ll come with you after all.
Chrstine, ich komme (come PRES) jetzt
doch mit. [German original]
Christine, ik ga (go PRES) toch mee.
b. He’ll be finished in an hour or so.
Over een uurtje is (be PRES) hij klaar
[Dutch original]
In einer Stunde ist (be PRES) er fertig.
c. Dad and my brother and his lot aren’t here
yet, but, by the time they arrive, I count that
there’ll be twenty-four guests. [English
original]
Dad und mein Bruder samt Familie sind
noch nicht hier, aber mit ihnen sind (be
PRES) wir vierundzwanzig.
Pa en mijn broer en zijn gezinnetje zijn er
nog niet, maar als die eenmaal komen, tel
(count PRES) ik vierentwintig gasten.
The following questions therefore arise: Which aspects govern the use of either present tense or future
auxiliary in Dutch and German? Are there any differences between the two languages? What do these differences tell us about the semantics of werden (for German), zullen (for Dutch) and the present tense? Does
Aktionsart (aspect) come into play? (Note that for English, the difference between perfective and imperfective
verbs is crucial to the extent that perfective verbs cannot
normally be used in the simple present, but need the progressive for present time reference). And of course, what
does the present tense ‘mean’ in German and Dutch?
A preliminary answer to these questions includes referring to the role of the Ground (i.e. the speech event,
its participants and its accompanying circumstances),
the construal of which seems to affect the use of either auxiliary of present tense in German and Dutch.
When the present tense is used with future reference,
the Ground is much more subjectively construed (in the
sense of Langacker i.e. much more off-stage) than with
the auxiliaries zullen and werden. Another part of the
answer lies in the general vagueness of the semantics of
tense categories in both German and Dutch: speakers
and hearers relie on contextual clues to establish temporal reference to a much higher extent than it is the
case in English.
References:
Brisard, Frank (1997): The English Tense-System as
an Epistemic Category: The Case of Futurity. Verspoor,
Marjolijn, Kee Dong Lee & Eve Sweetser (eds.). Lexical and
Syntactical Constructions and the Construction of Meaning.
Amsterdam / Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 271–285.
Brisard, Frank (1999): A critique of localism in and
about tense theory. Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Germanic Linguistics and Literature, University of Antwerp.
Brisard, Frank (2001): Be going to: an exercise in
grounding. Journal of Linguistics 37.251–285.
Langacker, Ronald W. (1987). Foundations of Cognitive
Grammar, Vol. 1. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Langacker, Ronald W. (2003). Extreme subjectification:
English tense and modals. In Hubert Cuyckens, Thomas
Berg, René Dirven & Klaus-Uwe Panther (Hrsg.), Motivation in Language, 3–26. Amsterdam / Philadelphia: John
Benjamins.
Lehmann, Christian. (1985). Grammaticalization:
Synchronic Variation and diachronic change. Lingua e Stile
20. 303–318.
Grammatikalisierung
Mortelmans Tanja (2004).
und Subjektivierung:
Traugott und Langacker revisitedZeitschrift für germanistische Linguistik 32. 188–209.
INTERDISCIPLINARITY ON THE BENCHTOP: MODEL-SYSTEMS
IN BIOMEDICAL ENGINEERING RESEARCH LABS
Nancy J. Nersessian
Georgia Institute of Technology (Atlanta, USA)
This paper examines cognitive and learning practices in
the context of two biomedical engineering (BME) laboratories, where problem solving involves constructing,
manipulating, and revising physical models. BME is an
interdiscipline in that problem solving requires figuring
out and learning how to integrate concepts, methods, knowledge, and practices from more than one field
in ways specific to the kinds of problems under investigation. The researchers call those physical models that lie at the interface of biology and engineering
model-systems. Experimentation with model-systems
requires designing technological devices that either simulate well-understood mechanisms, such as the forces
on arterial vessels from the flow of blood through them,
or mechanisms under investigation, such as how learning
takes place among neurons. In the innovative, creative
settings of the university research laboratory artifacts
and understandings are created and undergo change and
125
development over time. They are also significant sites of
learning, since they are populated mainly by student researchers (undergraduate, graduate, and postdoctoral)
and since, given the cutting-edge, interdisciplinary nature of the research, the laboratory directors are also
learners. I will develop an analysis of the laboratories
as evolving cognitive-cultural systems and focus on the
model-systems as a means to developing an account
of problem solving as situated in local interactions and
distributed across researchers and artifacts. My analysis
couples ethnographic methods with cognitive-historical
analysis to examine in a unified manner the evolution of
technologies, models, and learning and the enactment
of these in the daily problem solving practices of the
community.
PROTOTYPE INTERACTION AND PARADIGM STRUCTURE:
THE /A/ → /AJ/ SHIFT IN RUSSIAN VERBS AND COGNITIVE
LINGUISTICS
Tore Nesset
University of Tromsö (Norway)
A key issue that has not received due attention in cognitive linguistics recently is the mechanism of language
change. In what ways do constructs like prototypes,
radial categories (Lakoff 1987) and entrenchment (Langacker 1987–91) bear on language change? The purpose of this presentation is to shed light on this fundamental question by means of a case study from Russian
verb morphology.
It is well known that some Russian verbs with the
suffix /a/ shift to the productive group of verbs with the
suffix /aj/. For instance, verbs like kapat’ and murlykat’
have developed secondary present tense forms like kapaet and murlykaet in addition to kaplet and murlyčet.
This /a/ → /aj/ shift is mentioned in major grammars,
and has been studied from various perspectives such as
historical linguistics, language acquisition, dialectology
and sociolinguistics (cf. Andersen 1980, Gagarina 2002,
Krysin 1974 and references therein). However, with the
advent of large electronic corpora the cognitive linguist
has received a new and powerful tool for the analysis of
(ongoing) language change. This presentation offers a
detailed statistical analysis on the basis of the Russian
National Corpus (www.ruscorpora.ru), an electronic
corpus consisting of more than 65 million words (as of
August 2005).
The two main hypotheses entertained in the present
study can be summarized as follows:
a) Verbs with the /a/ suffix constitute a radial category, where peripheral members are more prone to regularization than prototypical members.
b) The paradigm of each verb constitutes a radial category, where peripheral inflected forms are more
prone to regularization than central members of the
paradigm.
In order to test hypothesis (a), which regards the
lexical level, the relevant verb roots were classified with
regard to two parameters, viz. the quality of the root
vowel and the final consonant. This is illustrated in
Figure 1, where roots with a non-alternating vowel followed by a dental consonant occupy the central position
in a radial category. Preliminary results give partial con-
firmation of the hypothesis insofar as verbs with roots
in dentals, e.g. pisat’, do not in general change from
/a/ to /aj/. However, verbs with roots with alternating
vowel (e.g. tesat’) or no root vowel (e.g. ždat’) also
tend to resist regularization, a result that is not predicted from the hypothesis. An alternative explanation
is based on the fact that such verbs are not compatible
with the prototype for the /aj/ verb category, since alternating or no root vowel is not characteristic of verbs
with the /aj/ suffix. In other words, language change
depends on the interplay between two radial categories.
Even if a lexeme is peripheral in its source category (/a/
verbs), it may resist regularization as long as it is incompatible with the prototype of the target category (/aj/
verbs).
In order to test hypothesis (b), which concerns the
sublexical level, the relevant forms of the inflectional
paradigm were classified as finite vs. non-finite and
present / future tense vs. imperative. The finite present
tense was considered the central, prototypical subcategory showing the highest degree of entrenchment. Once
more, preliminary results lend partial support to the hypothesis, in that gerunds and imperatives in general tend
to be more prone to regularization to /aj/ than present /
future tense forms. However, contrary to what the hypothesis might lead us to expect, participles are not at
the leading edge of regularization. In the case of the
present passive participle with the ending /om/, the explanation may be trivial. In many cases, participles of
this sort are not available for verbs with the /a/ suffix, and speakers are therefore forced to resort to the
variant with the /aj/ suffix. For the active participle,
an alternative hypothesis is based on the close formal
relationship between the 3 plural present / future tense
and the active participle. In Russian, the present active participle has the same stem and also the same
vowel in the ending as the 3 plural present / future tense
(cf. delajut — delajuščij and govorjat — govorjaščij).
Since the formation of the participle is parasitic on
the 3 plural present / future tense, one would predict
that regularization to /aj/ in the former would not take
place without previous regularization in the latter. This
prediction is borne out by the results gathered so far.
In summary, the preliminary results of this study indi-
126
cate that the /a/ → /aj/ shift in Russian depend on the
interaction of the prototypes of the source and target
radial categories, but that this interaction is constrained
by conditions on paradigm structure. While more data is
needed in order to provide a more solid basis for conclu-
sions, the proposed analysis strongly suggest that cognitive linguistics not only sheds light on the intriguing
/a/ → /aj/ shift in Russian verbs, but also contributes
to our understanding of the mechanisms of language
change in general.
NO VOWEL
(?dat’)
1111111
0000000
0000000
1111111
LABIAL
0000000
1111111
(kapat’)
0000000
1111111
0000000
1111111
1111111
0000000
DENTAL
STABLE VOWEL
(pisat’)
1111111
0000000
0000000
1111111
VELAR
0000000
1111111
(murlykat’)
0000000
1111111
0000000
1111111
1111111
0000000
ALTERN. /e/∼/o/
(tesat’)
Figure 1. Radial category for /a/ verbs. Regularization most common
in shaded cells.
References:
Andersen, H. (1980): Russian Conjugation: Acquisition
and Evolutive Change, E. C. Traugott et al.: Papers from
the 4th intrnational conference on historical linguistics, Benjamins.
Gagarina, N. (2002): Productivity of the verbal inflectional classes, K. Dziubalka-Kolaczyk et al.: Future Chal-
lenges for Natural Linguistics, Lincom Europa.
Krysin, L. P. (ed.) (1974): Russkij jazyk po dannym
massovogo obsledovanija, Nauka.
Lakoff, G. (1987): Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things,
Chicago University Press.
Langacker, R. W. (1987–91): Foundations of Cognitive
Grammar 1–2, Stanford University Press.
HISTORICAL CONCEPTUALIZATION OF
IN CHINESE
Priscilla Ngan Yuk Han
Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales
(Paris, France)
In Jiaguwen1 , the morpheme xia, under is represented graphically as 2 . This graphic is formed
with an arc line as the datum line and a short line under it to indicate the position of an object. The symbol
thus formed is purely indicative and it maps exactly onto
what the Chinese people observed in the physical world
more than three thousand years ago.
From 1027 to 221 BC, the old meaning of xia
persists alongside the five new ones which mean
a.
after in time and order;
b. to descend, to rain;
c. to eliminate;
d. to take hold of (a country, a city etc.);
e. to decline modestly.
During the Han Dynasty (206 BC — 220 AD), a new
meaning of xia appears: issue an order. Besides this,
1 Inscriptions
2 Duan
XIA, UNDER
xia also functions as a classifier which represents the
number of times of an action, for example, da san xia,
hit three times.
From 220 AD to present days, the morpheme xia
continues its semantic and functional evolution. In this
paper, we will limit our study of the conceptualization
of xia from the very beginning (16th century BC) to
220 AD.
According to what we have seen above, we observe
the following stages of semantic and functional evolution of the morpheme xia:
a. originally, xia is a locative that indicates a
lower position;
b. about five hundred years later, five new meanings
derive from the original one. Among these new
meanings, one represents order and four describe
five different actions.
c. During the Han period, another new meaning
which describes the action of issuing an order derives from the original meaning under. Besides, xia plays the role of a classifier.
on tortoise shells and ox bones (16th -11th centuries BC).
Zhenmei (1999 p. 29).
127
After examining all the points mentioned above, we
observe that most of the new meanings of xia imply a direction downwards. For the first one after,
time and order are expressed by a vertical axe. As for
the meanings of to descend, to rain and to decline
modestly, the implication of the downward direction
is obvious. Concerning the meaning of to take hold
of, Chinese people consider that a conqueror is in a
superior position and the defeated in an inferior one.
For issuing an order, the explanation is the same:
the direction from an emperor / an official (superior) to
people (inferior). As regard the meaning of the number of times of an action, the above example da san
xia, hit three times shows that the classifier xia implies the number of times of the action da, hit from
up to down. When we hit somebody, we have to raise
our hand first. Then we lower it until it comes into contact with the body of person we hit. As for the last one
to eliminate, apparently it has nothing to do directly
with under.
These are our observations. How can we account for
them? In order to solve this problem, we will examine
the followings:
a. the process of conceptualization, including conceptual blending, undergone in the brain of the
Chinese ancients more than three thousand years
ago;
b. the linguistic environments, i.e., the contextual
backgrounds in which the morpheme xia is
used;
References:
Cognitive Linguistics (2000). Conceptual Blending.
Edited by Seana Coulson and Todd Oakley. Special issue
11: 3–4.
Collected Essays of SHEN Xiaolong on Chinese Cultural Linguistics (1997). Translated by GAO Yihong et al.,
Changchun: Northeast Normal University Press.
Duan Zhenmei (1999). Yin xu wenhua. Beijing: Dongfang chubanshe.
Goldstein, E. B. (2005). Cognitive Psychology: Connecting Mind, Research, and Everyday Experience. Belmont,
CA: Thomson Wadsworth.
Journal of Pragmatics (2005). Conceptual Blending
Theory. Edited by S. Coulson and T. Oakley. Volume 37,
issue 10, pages 1507–1742.
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c. the cultural model of the Chinese ancients.
RIGHT-LEFT DISCRIMINATION IN 5 AND 6 YEAR OLDS
The Speak up! Project. A Longitudinal Study Of Children At Risk
Of Developing Reading / Writing / Mathematics Impairment
Sonja Helgesen Ofte1 , Turid Helland2 ,
Kenneth Hugdahl2
1
2
Eikelund Resource Centre (Bergen, Norway)
University of Bergen (Norway)
Objective. The objective of this study was to assess the
right-left discrimination ability in 5 and 6 year olds at
risk of developing reading, writing, or mathematics impairment, comparing them to a matched control group.
Subjects and methods. Forty-nine children were
included, 26 males; 13 in the at-risk for reading, writing, and mathematics impairment, and 13 in the control group, and 23 females; 11 in the at-risk and 12 in
the control group. The children were allocated to the
groups based on questionnaires administered to their
parents and the kindergarten personnel. Results on the
WPPSI-R showed no differences in the mean IQ scores
in either of the groups. The Aston Index items on right-
left discrimination (5) and Benton’s (1959) right-left
discrimination test (6) were used. Benton’s test consisted of 36 items, including items on Own and Other
Persons Body. The mean percent correct scores and
error scores were subjected to an ANOVA. This was a
split plot, factorial design, sex and group as independent
measures and repeated measures on the dependent variable; Own Body and Other Person’s Body items. Design: 2 (Sex) x 2 (At-risk and control group) x 2 (Own
and Other Person’s Body), split for correct and error
scores. Furthermore, the scores on the Aston index (5)
were compared to the number of correct scores, and
whether or not the Benton test (6) was completed.
Results. At five 38 children knew their right hand
as compared to 14 who did not know this (p < .001).
An equal number (27) of children knew another persons
right hand. Also, 30 children could not point to their
right ear as compared to 22 who could (p .001). The
128
ANOVA on the Benton test (6), did not show any significant differences on neither main nor interaction effects
for any of the groups on either measurement. Most children did not finish the Benton test, however, there was
a linear increase in number of subjects who finished the
Benton test at six as compared to the number of correct
scores on the Aston Index at five. There was also an
increasing number of corrects scores on Own and Other
Person’s Body items (6) on the Benton test as compared to number of correct scores on the Aston Index
(5), except for the children who had no correct scores
on Aston Index. These children performed the best on
Own Body items as compared to Other Person’s Body
items.
Discussion. The findings confirm that most children at five discriminate between right and left from
their own perspective as opposed to taking another per-
son’s perspective. However, also at both five and six,
most children are confused about right and left. However, even at this early age one can detect a development in the ability. The lack of difference between the
at-risk and control groups may be a result of an inability
to predict who belongs to which group in the initial allocating of the children to the at-risk and control groups.
However, comparative data seems to refute this assumption. Alternatively, Benton’s theory that children with
language impairment are poor at right-left discriminating might be discarded. Furthermore, the test might not
be designed to detect group differences in an experimental design, but may still be useful in a clinical setting.
The Aston Index has some capacity to discriminate between different aspects of the right-left discrimination
ability, and to predict future performance on more complex right-left discrimination tasks.
EPISTEMIC PERSPECTIVE AND THE WAY ADULTS EVALUATE
THE TURNING POINTS IN THEIR LIFE STORIES
sufficient condition for viewing the turning points in
narratives in terms of redemption and contamination
Jagiellonian University (Cracow, Poland)
sequences (McAdams, 1985, 2001). The results of the
Mature narratives do not appear before adolescence. It study suggest there is an interrelation between relativisis since then that people are able to construe their life tic thinking and redemption sequences but no strong
stories that exhibit sufficient level of causal, thematic evidence on necessary but not sufficient condition
and temporal coherence (Habermas, Bluck, 2002). This was found.
ability can be linked with attainment of formal operaReferences:
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Habermas, T., Bluck, S. (2000), Getting a life: The
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D. P. (1985), Power, intimacy, and life story:
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Marian Olejnik
ACOUSTIC PURE TONE RECOGNITION AND ITS METAPHORS
IN MORAL PERCEPTION AS A MODEL FOR COGNITIVE SCIENCE
DECISION-MAKING
Brenda Orser
Gapping grammars pose constraints on such knowledge;
speech recognition models may be linked or compleTrinity College (Toronto, Canada)
ment such constraints, for example, temporal partitionOne of the problems in decision-making as it is in ar- ing of the knowledge constraint. I have observed, intificial intelligence is the use of logic grammars to de- stead, certain underlying characteristics of both speech
rive surface expressions of deeply embedded knowledge. and its recognition. While doing so although I have
129
drawn from moral theology, the actual motivation for
this paper is the discovery of a linguistic characteristic of speech recognition — in general, proprioception.
The paper is based on research into Pure Tone in bioacoustics and theoretical linguistics, phonology specifically. Also, in Music pure tone is perfect pitch, a
problem of both perception and composition. I will first
review logic grammars, then show how reconstruction
based on pure tone works in theory, how it can work
in an AI model applied to decision-making: Inherent or,
arguably, innate conceptual categories of reality are constructed, destroyed and reconstructed; cognitively these
are reconstructed from either the actual physical tone or
images of that. While there may be cognitive digressions
from the pure tone, it provides a significant restorative
basis for a principled surface expression of successful
decision-making. Such a derivation closed the gap in
revealing the theoretical physics
nature of the embedded knowledge.
(One should note that the intent of this paper
may be appreciated, quite critically by some, as being the incorporation of moral reasoning, i.e., the incorporation of moral theology into cognitive science.
(In ethics, moral reasoning is posed as the problem of
creative imagination including interpretive imagination [Gula (2004)].) Nonetheless, the motivation
in the paper is the linguistic characteristic inherent in
deeply embedded knowledge. Moreover, this paper is
not about depth psychology, i.e., Jungian Archetypes
as used in psychotherapy. It is about the presence of
pure tone and such imagery in the cognitive reconstruction of remnant features).
gapping grammars
C!#, LANGUAGE OR DİL: A MINIMALISTIC APPROACH TO
RUSSIAN-ENGLISH-TURKISH MULTILINGUALISM
Oya Ozagac
Bogazici University (Bebek, Istanbul, Turkey)
The empirical question which is the focus of present
research is: How may the lexicons from different languages interact in the course of one syntactical derivation, resulting in code switching phenomena? We develop the following hypothesis concerning code switching: The units of intrasentential code switching are either heads or functional maximal projections. Code
switching in this study, refers to a speech style in which
fluent bilinguals move in and out of two (or conceivably
more) languages. To get support for this hypothesis,
intrasentential code switching instances from RussianEnglish-Turkish and Dutch-Turkish spoken data are
analyzed within the minimalist framework (Chomsky,
1995). In the data analysed, it has been observed that
the data gathered support this hypothesis and that the
Minimalist Program has an explanatory force for bilingual language processing.
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NEUROFUNCTIONAL COMPONENTS OF BILINGUAL VERBAL
COMMUNICATION ARE IDENTICAL TO UNILINGUALS’
Michel Paradis
McGill University (Montreal, Canada), Université
du Québec à Montréal (Montreal, Canada)
The cognitive architecture of bilingual speakers contains
at least four systems involved in verbal communication (i.e., implicit linguistic competence, explicit metalinguistic knowledge, pragmatic abilities and affect /
motivation). As proposed in a neurolinguistic theory
of bilingualism (Paradis, 2004), the implicit linguistic
competence system contains as many subsystems as languages acquired by the speaker. Each subsystem contains its phonology, morphology, syntax, and lexicon.
These language subsystems are differentially connected
to a single conceptual system that groups together con-
ceptual features in accordance with the specific lexical
semantic constraints of words in each language and the
relevant pragmatic circumstances at the time of their
use. This implies a distinction between concept and
lexical item, and multiple redundancy of representation
in bi/multilingual verbal communication system.
The conceptual base of L2 differs only quantitatively from that of L1: What is represented may differ
from L2 native speakers’ representations but the principles of conceptual organization and processing are the
same as those of L1. The bilingual’s common uderlying conceptual base is larger than a unilingual’s conceptual base, but does not differ in its structure or modus
operandi. Differences in what is represented are derived from quantitative differences in phonology, lexical
131
semantics and conceptual representations, and from different parameters of linguistic principles in morphosyntax. But at no level of language or conceptual functioning is there anything in bilinguals that would involve an entity that is not available to unilinguals. For
every function available to bilinguals (switching, mixing, translating) there is a unilingual functional analog
(switching and mixing registers, paraphrasing). There
is therefore no need to postulate the existence of any
kind of cerebral function or mechanism that would be
specific to bilingual individuals.
Some concepts are acquired (or are allowed to be instantiated) through experience and keep being modified
by experience, i.e., increasing or pruning the meaningful
domain covered by each concept. Some concepts will
be developed through linguistic delimitation (languagedriven concepts). These may modify some of the concepts acquired through experience by adding or subtracting meaningful features to constitute a new meaningful representational unit (a new concept). Modifications of this sort through exposure to two languages
and/or two cultures are of the very same kind as the
ones occurring in unilinguals just described. Hence here,
as for all other aspects of unidirectional (in either direction) or bidirectional interference, the difference is of
the same kind, and is quantitative (i.e., more or fewer
conceptual features enter into the constitution of a concept to match the corresponding lexical semantic constraints).
The underlying mechanisms that sustain the various representations and their processing are the same
in all individuals, whichever language or languages they
speak. The only difference, for speakers with imperfect
competence in a second, third or fourth language, is the
degree of reliance on other systems within the verbal
communicative system (i.e., metalinguistic knowledge
and pragmatics) in order to compensate for an incomplete implicit linguistic competence system.
Reference:
Paradis, M. (2004). A Neurolinguistic theory of bilingualism. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
NON-LINEAR DYNAMIC SYSTEM THEORY PUT TO TEST IN
VARIOUS INSTANCES OF LANGUAGE DEVELOPMENT
Annemarie Peltzer-Karpf
10 years) and (4) bilingual language development in immigrant children (6–11 years). The common grounds of
Graz University (Graz, Austria)
these ontogenetic activities shall be discussed along a
dynamic trajectory moving from more diffuse to more
The non-linear approach proposed here unites devel- refined constructions in the various subsystems. What
opmental cognitive neuroscience and dynamic systems matters are the internally and externally driven motors
theory. Our argumentation hinges upon the assump- of change becoming apparent on the micro- and macrotion that natural systems share common underlying pro- level. In order to trace the metamorphoses of individual
cesses and principles. Thus, incipient language devel- systems it shall be illustrated
opment viewed against the background of current in(i) how (sub)systems emerge along the arrow of
terdisciplinary research is a constantly shifting dynamic
time (input selection, extraction of early patterns,
system in which patterns are organized and reorganized.
ontogenesis of morphosyntax and semanticsDynamic systems theory can do wonders to large data
lexicon),
pools but is — in return — also extremely data-hungry.
The problems of a sufficient empirical foundation are
(ii) how/when phase shifts / major reorganizational
discussed by Lightfoot (1991) and Smith and Thelen
processes occur triggering systemic changes on
(1993: 166): Techniques for analysing chaos are ‘datathe macro-level,
hungry’, and it is hard to determine whether fractal attractors exist for some body and data unless there are
(iii) how the unfolding of language skills is influenced
enormous quantities of data. (Lightfoot 1991: 165).
by sensory deficits.
The wealth of data collected and theories developed
over the past decades suggests kindred spirits worldWe set the scene by bringing in a discipline which
wide. Over the past 15 years we have invested considover the past years has become an attractive partner for
erable efforts into satisfying just that hunger. Four of
our dynamic enterprise: developmental cognitive neuthe long-term studies presented were carried out on our
roscience. This new way of data analysis is clearly
own initiative1 , two long-term studies answered official
process-based and gives insight into the inter- and ininterests2 : (1) early monolingual and bilingual developtrarelated development of (sub)systems along the evoment (1;5 to 3;1 years), (2) language development in
lutionary path.
children with congenital visual or auditory deficits (age
range 4–11), (3) early second language development (6–
References:
1 funded by the Austrian National Bank (Jubiläumsfondsprojekte 4244, 6179, 7729) and the Austrian Research Fund, FWF (P
10250-SPR).
2 funded by the Austrian Ministry of Education, Research and Culture (in the years 1993–1997 and 1999–2003).
132
Lightfoot, David. W. (1991). How to Set Parameters.
Arguments from Language Change. Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press.
Smith, Linda & Thelen, Esther, eds. (1993). A Dynamic
Systems Approach to Development. Applications. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Peltzer-Karpf, Annemarie & Zangl, Renate (2001).
Figure-ground segregation in visual and linguistic development: a dynamic systems account. In Keith Nelson,
Aksu-Koc, Ayhan and Johnson, Carolyn (eds.). Children’s
language. Interactional contributions to language development. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. 197–226.
Peltzer-Karpf, Annemarie (2005). The self-organization of dynamic systems: modularity under scrutiny. In
Nathalie Gonthier, van Bendegem, Jean Paul and Aerts, Diderik (eds.). Evolutionary Epistemology, Language and Culture. Berlin et al.: Springer, series Theory and Decision
Library A, vol. 39 (forthcoming in November).
ANTHROPOMORPHISM IN METAPHOR IN THE MONA
LANGUAGE (WEST AFRICA)*
Elena Perekhvalskaya
St. Petersburg State University (Russia)
Any language is anthropocentric, and in any language
there are metaphors which perceive objects, animate or
inanimate, as persons. G. Lakoff and M. Johnson speak
about personification metaphors as of a major metaphor
type. These metaphors present objects as persons
mostly, on the basis of our own motivations, goals, actions, and characteristics (Lakoff, Johnson 1981, 34).
G. Lakoff and M. Johnson also mention that there is
another type of personification metaphors which they
consider marginal for the European culture, namely,
metaphors which regard objects as human bodies:
There are well known expressions like the foot of the
mountain, a head of cabbage, the leg of a table, etc.
These expressions are isolated instances of metaphorical
concepts, where there is only one instance of a used part
(or may be two or three). Thus the foot of the mountain
is the only used part of the metaphor A MOUNTAIN IS
A PERSON. In normal discourse we do not speak of the
head, shoulders, or trunk of a mountain, though in special contexts it is possible to construct novel metaphorical expressions based on these unused parts. In fact,
there is an aspect of the metaphor A MOUNTAIN IS
A PERSON in which mountain climbers will speak of
the shoulder of a mountain (namely, a ridge near the
top) and of conquering, fighting, and even being killed
by a mountain. <. . . > The point here is that there are
metaphors, like A MOUNTAIN IS A PERSON, that are
marginal in our culture and our language; their used part
may consist of only one conventionally fixed expression
of the language, and they do not systematically interact
with other metaphorical concepts because so little of
them is used. This makes them relatively uninteresting
for our purposes but not completely so, since they can
be extended to their unused part (pp. 54–55).
It seems not correct to formulate the basic
metaphoric concept represented in the foot of the
mountain as A MOUNTAIN IS A PERSON. A moun-
tain is not personified; it is pictured not as a person
with motivations, goals and actions but as an object
whose body consists of the same parts as the human
body, as having the same physical constitution. Expressions of this type are rare both in English and in Russian.
It is not characteristic for European languages to present
objects as having human bodies. However, it is a common thing in the languages of the West Africa. Expressions of this type represent basic metaphoric concept of
animals, plants and inanimate things as having the same
physical structure as people. At the same time they are
not personified as in European languages. While Europeans tend to ascribe human thoughts, feelings and
emotions to objects and abstract notions, Africans view
everything as having the human body. Thus, it is necessary to distinguish metaphors of personification and
anthropomorphous metaphors.
As an example I present the data of the Mona (or
Mwan) language which belongs to the South Mande
language group (the Niger-Congo macro-family). The
conceptual basis of this language is typical for languages
of the area.
The Mona language regards persons and animals (including birds, reptiles, insects and so on) as having the
same parts of body Limbs of both animals and humans are divided into hands+arms and feet+legs.
Speaking of insects, spiders or centipedes, which have
more than two pairs of limbs, the Mona speakers call
the first pair of limbs gbE1 ‘hands+arms’ and the rest
pairs are called gaan ‘feet+legs’.
Names for the extremities of the human body are
applied not only to limbs of animals but also to parts of
inanimate objects:
gbE has the following meanings 1. hand+arm of a
person; 2. foreleg or forepaw of an animal; 3. wing of
a bird; 4. branch of a tree; 5. side of an object (e.g. of
a house).
gaan 1. leg+foot of a person; 2. hind leg or hind
paw of an animal; 3. leg of a bird; 4. leg of an object
(e.g. of a chair).
* The study was carried out within the framework of the project financed by the Swiss National Foundation for Scientific Research
(SUBJ 062156.00).
1 Capital letters are used here to denote open vowels: E for [E] and O for [O]. The sigh of apostrophe denotes a high tone, the
hyphen sign denotes the low tone, and the sigh of equality marks the falling tone. The lack of marking means the middle tone.
133
Head (ngblo), neck (bhlO), belly (’kpee), face
(wlE), eye (-yrE), ear (’trOn) may be applied both to
persons and animals (mammals, birds, reptiles and so
on).
There are certain exceptions: -srO denotes nails of
humans or claws of all animals except for birds which
have -fela ‘claws of a bird of prey’.
Mona distinguishes hair on the head (win) and body
hair (’cı́E-).
win 1. ‘hair on the head of a person’ and also denotes: 2. roof of a house; 3. top of any object that has
a head
’cı́E 1.
body hair, beard and moustache,
(eye)lashes; 2. hair and fur of animals; 3. feathers
of birds.
Fish scale enters another category together with
bark of tree, skin of snake or crocodile and shell of turtle
or egg (kro).
Terms designating parts of the human body are extended to the inanimate objects:
ngblo (lit. ‘head’) denotes a bunch or a cluster (a
cluster of palm tree grains), a head of a mountain;
-lE (lit. ‘lip’) denotes antenna (of insects); edge
(of a cutting instrument).
Some terms for body parts underwent grammaticalization and function as locative postpositions:
’lii (lit. ‘mouth’) has the following meanings:
2.door, entrance; 3. in, inside (a part is seen outside),
on (only a part of the object is on smth.), e.g. zi ‘E ‘lii
‘on the road’ (lit. mouth of the road);
’lEE (lit. ‘forehead’) — means 2. front side of
something, 3. in front of, 4. before (in time);
-zanta (lit. ‘back’) — means 2. behind, e.g. ’fE
‘E -zanta ‘behind the house’;
zi (lit. ‘buttocks’) — backside of something, in
the back;
’kOO (lit. ‘palm of hand’) — means 2. with, at;
3. indicates the possessor in a possessive construction
(e.g. ’fE do -o ‘ng ‘kOO ‘I have a house’, cf. Rus. u
menia est’ dom); 4. marks the role of agent in a passive
construction.
Metaphors of this type are not totally unknown in
both English or Russian (e.g. Eng. the back of the
house, Rus. nos korablia ‘prow’ (lit. nose of the
ship); szadi ‘in the back’(lit. at the back side).
As G. Lakoff and M. Johnson pointed out, in European
languages these expressions use only few parts of the
corresponding metaphor. In Mona, on the opposite,
all parts of the metaphor A THING IS THE HUMAN
BODY are used. Thus, in the metaphor A HOUSE IS
THE HUMAN BODY there are many used parts: a
house in the Mona language has hair (roof), mouth
(door), belly (inside part), forehead (front part), buttocks (back side).
Some designation of persons can also be applied to
inanimate objects. The word -nE (lit. child’) denotes
not only a young animal but also any object of the size
smaller than usual and is used in fact as a diminutive
suffix. The physical peculiarity is underlined again.
Physical (bodily) metaphors expressing mental activity, feelings and emotions are also very
frequent in Mona. ‘Kpee (belly) is regarded as
a container for thoughts (the place of mental activity). C.f. the following expressions: -jan ‘E ‘nia‘ng ‘kpee ‘I forgot this story (lit. the story left my
belly). Feelings and emotions are located in zru (liver):
zru ma le ‘beloved woman’ (lit. liver-at-woman).
The parallelism in the physical construction of persons, animals and inanimate objects is expressed in the
usage of certain verbs which in European languages can
be applied only to persons or animate objects. Thus,
the verb dE ‘to kill’ is used in the following expressions:
kaa dE (to kill fish) — to fish
yi dE (to kill the sleep) — to sleep
plin dE (to kill a drum) — to play a drum
’sOn dE (to kill tooth) — to blacken teeth
These metaphoric expressions are not just set
phrases but the only way to express the corresponding
meanings.
The data presented show that conceptual
metaphoric basis of the languages of the West Africa
(of which Mona is a typical example) include the anthropomorphous view of objects of reality.
References:
G. Lakoff, M. Johnson, Metaphors we live by. Univ. of
Chicago Press, 1981.
INTEGRATING LANGUAGE AND COGNITION: NEW RESULTS IN
COMPUTATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
Leonid Perlovsky
Air Force Research Lab. (Hanscom, USA)
During the last decades computational intelligence
methods have being developed taking advantage of
the known mechanisms of the mind and brain. Much is
known; still the knowledge is far from complete. Among
the big unknown are relationships between cognition
and language: do we think with words? Or are words
just labels used at the end of the thinking process?
The talk reviews the known mechanisms of cognition
and suggests a new computational mechanism, dynamic
134
logic, which the mind might use for integrating cognition and language. Mathematics is related to results of
other sciences studying the mind and brain: psychology,
philosophy, psycholinguistics, evolution, and neurobiology. Mathematical descriptions of conscious and unconscious, imagination, symbols, concepts and emotions,
including aesthetic emotion and beautiful will be briefly
discussed. The talk will review recent results in origin
and evolution of language, emotional contents of languages and cultures. Applications to recognition, data
mining, Internet search engines based on language understanding, and evolving ontologies will be discussed.
The presentation focuses on the current understanding of the fundamental principles of working of the
mind in the areas of cognition and language, their computational implementations, and practical applications.
Mathematical difficulties encountered for over fifty years
will be summarized and related to Gödel’s proof of the
inconsistency of logic. The mind overcomes these difficulties using mechanisms of the knowledge instinct,
related mathematically to dynamic logic. This includes
mechanisms of concepts, emotions, behavior, language,
cognition, understanding, thinking, intuitions, conscious
and unconscious, abilities for formation of symbols, and
aesthetic feelings. Computational techniques are given
for these mechanisms and abilities. Future research
directions will be outlined: language emotionality vs.
grammar; its relations to cultural evolution; mechanisms
of differentiation and synthesis determining evolution of
consciousness and cultures; role of music in evolution of
consciousness.
HIPPOCAMPAL-SENSITIVE MEMORY PERFORMANCE IN
CHILDREN WITH AUTISM AND DOWN SYNDROME:
AN ANALYSIS OF COGNITIVE AND NEUROCOMPUTATIONAL
PROCESSES
Laura Petra, Oana Benga, Ioana Ţincaş
Babes-Bolyai University (Cluj Napoca, Romania)
Several studies have underlined the essential role played
by the hippocampus (as a central structure of the medial temporal lobe memory system — Gabrieli, 1998) in
the functioning of different memory subsystems such as
declarative memory, working memory, relational memory and episodic memory, or in memory functions such
as binding of items into a cohesive memory, encoding a novel scene, consolidating memory in other brain
regions, although its differential involvement in these
processes remains controversial (Davidson & Jarrard,
2004). The study of atypical developmental trajectories that have a documented deficit in the structural
aspects of the hippocampus can help elucidate some of
the conjectures that can be established regarding the
functional role of this structure in different aspects of
memory development.
Both Down Syndrome (DS) and Autistic Spectrum
Disorder (ASD) represent unique challenges to cognitive developmental neuroscience, representing probably
the most prevalent neurodevelopmental disorders that
present different patterns of associated neurocognitive
impairment. In the case of DS, and in terms of brain
development, some studies have identified a pattern of
microencephaly and relatively smaller volumes of frontal
cortex, hippocampus and cerebellum (Jernigan et al.,
1993). There seems to be a decrease in the dendritic
spines and overall volume in the hippocampal region
(Ferrer & Gullotta, 1990), and also extensive cell loss
in the locus coeruleus (Mann et al., 1990). Some tests
sensitive to hippocampal lobe functioning have been applied to children with DS, identifying deficits in spatial
learning (Uecker et al, 1994), explicit but not implicit
memory (Carlesimo, Marotta, & Vicari, 1997; Pennington et al., 2003) and long-term memory (Caltagirone,
Nocentini, & Vicari, 1990).
The picture of ASD memory functioning is far from
being clarified, and most studies conducted up to this
point fail to offer a clear image. While early research
and theorizing seemed to suggest explicit memory impairments (Boucher, 1981), more recent studies indicate
unimpaired performance on tasks of recognition memory
(Bennetto, Pennington & Rogers, 1996; Renner, Klinger
& Klinger, 2000) and verbal paired-associate learning
(Bowler et al., 1997; Mottron et al., 2001), but deficits
in the way ASD persons organize information in memory
(Minshew & Goldstein, 1993) and impaired performance
in tasks such as delayed matching- or non-matching to
sample (DMS, DNMS) (Dawson et al., 2002), thought
to tap medial temporal lobe (MTL) functioning; still
the neural impairments associated with ASD are more
extended than that (e.g. Bauman & Kemper, 2005).
Some authors (Dawson et al., 2002) suggest that hippocampal / MTL impairment might account for autistic persons’ inability in forming coherent representations
(Frith, 1989), deficits in generalization or face processing.
There have been relatively few studies that comparatively addressed the relationship between memory systems associated with the hippocampal formation both
in ASD and DS (Dawson et al., 2002), and in most
cases DS was used as a control group for autistic children (for details regarding atypical profiles matching see
Petra & Benga, 2004). Our study aims to investigate
and compare the performance of DS and ASD children
(matched for mental age) aged 5 to 10, in five tasks
135
of hippocampally-related associative memory (see description of tasks below), as compared to the performance of mental age-matched typically developing children.We expect a more fractionated performance in children with autism (with peaks of performance in visualspatial learning (VSL), visual paired-associate learning
(VPAL) and VPR and lower performance in delayed
non-matching to sample task (DNMS) and a closer-totypical performance in children with Down syndrome,
except for the tasks that also tap verbal short-term
memory. The second aim of the study is to explore the
some possible neurocomputational mechanisms underlying task performance, using a neural network model of
hippocampal memory encoding (O’Reilly & Munakata,
2000).
Neuropsychological tasks. The children will be
evaluated using five tasks that are assumed to assess:
(1) the ability to encode and recall the spatial location of
objects in a long-term memory task (visual spatial learning; VSL); (2) the ability to form associations between a
visual stimulus and its location (visual paired-associate
learning; VPAL); (3) the ability to learn the rule of an
association between familiarity and reward (DMS); (4)
the ability to learn the rule of an association between
novelty and reward (DNMS) and (5) the ability to recognize and select the familiar stimulus from a pair (visual
pattern recognition; VPR). The tasks will be presented
either in a computerized (using CANTAB — Cambridge
Automated Testing Battery) or a more ecological, noncomputerized form (e.g. Dawson, 2002).
Neurocomputational model. The model used
here assumes that hippocampally-based learning is characterized by fast learning (the ability to rapidly encode
and bind together the details of a novel experience),
and by the capacity to store separately representations
of events that did not occur together (thus minimizing the risk for catastrophic interference) (Munakata &
O’Reilly, 2000). Previous simulations using a simpler
model (Tincas, 2004) have shown relations between an
altered learning rate and rule learning in autism. The
present simulations will attempt to find the model parameters (i.e., in terms of learning rates, inhibitory competition and activation thresholds) that best fit the behavioral data for each group, and to analyze their implications for the neural underpinnings of the two developmental disorders discussed here.
Implications. The tasks we employed are relevant
because they assess relatively basic associative memory
processes (i.e., the ability to associate no more than
two stimuli characteristics). Through the computerized
assessment provided by CANTAB, cognitive capacities
can be dissociated into their most basic elements, still
A more critical view is that this level of purity reduces cognition to a level that is rarely demanded in
real-life settings (Luciana, 2003). We developed some
more ecological versions of some tasks to facilitate the
interaction with the children. It should be noted that
both the tasks used, and the two disorders investigated
involve complex neural networks linking different brain
regions. Thus, by focusing on the hippocampus, we are
not implying that this is the only neural site of interest
in autism and Down Syndrome, nor the only one that
the employed tasks measure, but only one of the potential contributors to a complex pattern of symptoms that
characterize these disorders.
References:
Bauman, M. L., & Kemper, T. L. (2005).
Neuroanatomic observations of the brain in autism: A review
and future directions. International Journal of Developmental Neuroscience, 23, 183–187.
Bennetto, L., Pennington, B. F., & Rogers, S. J. (1996).
Intact and impaired memory fnctions in autism. Child Development, 67, 1816–1835.
Boucher, J. (1981). Immediate free recall in early childhood autism: Another point of behavioral similarity with
the amnesic syndrome. British Journal of Psychology, 72,
211–215.
Bowler D. M., Matthews N. J., Gardiner J. M. (1997).
Asperger’s syndrome and memory: Similarity to autism but
not amnesia. Neuropsychologia, 35, 65–70.
Caltagirone, C., Nocentini, U., & Vicari, S. (1990). Cognitive functions in adult Down’s syndrome. International
Journal of Neuroscience, 54, 221–230.
Carlesimo, G. A., Marotta, L., & Vicari, S. (1997). Longterm memory in mental retardation: Evidence for a specific
impairment in subjects with Down syndrome. Neuropsychologia, 35, 71–79.
Davidson, T. L., & Jarrard, L. E. (2004). The hippocampus and inhibitory learning: A ‘Gray’ area? Neuroscience and
Biobehavioral Reviews, 28, 261–271.
Dawson, G., Webb, S., Schellenberg, G., Aylward., E.,
Richards, T., Dager, S., & Friedman, S. (2002). Defining the
broader phenotype of autism: Genetic, brain, and behavioral
perspectives. In D. Cicchetti & G. Dawson (Eds.), Special
Issue of Development and Psychopathology on Multiple
Levels of Analysis 14, 581–611.
Ferrer, I., Gullotta, F. (1990): Down’s Syndrome and
Alzheimer’s Disease: dendritic spine counts in the hippocampus. Acta Neuropathol, 79, 680–685.
Frith, U. (1989). Autism: Explaining the enigma. Oxford, UK: Blackwell.
Gabrieli, J. D. E. (1998). Cognitive neuroscience of human memory. Annual Review of Psychology, 49, 87–115.
Jernigan, T. L., Bellugi, U., Sowell, E., Doherty, S., &
Hesselink, J. R. (1993). Cerebral morphologic distinctions
between Williams and Down syndromes. Arch Neurol, 50,
186–191.
Luciana, M. (2003). Practitioner Review: Computerized
assessment of neuropsychological function in children: Clinical and research applications of the Cambridge Neuropsychological Testing Automated Battery (CANTAB). Journal
of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 44, 649–663.
Mann, D. M., Royston, M. C., & Ravindra, C. R. (1990).
Some morphometric observations on the brains of patients
with Down’s syndrome: their relationship to age and dementia. Neurol Sci. 1990 Nov;99(2–3):153–64. Related
Articles, Links
Minshew, N. J. & Goldstein, G. (1993). Is autism an amnesic disorder? Evidence from the California Verbal Learning
Test. Neuropsychology, 7, 209–216.
136
Mottron, L., Morasse, K. & Belleville, S. (2001). A study
of memory functioning in individuals with autism. Journal
of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 42, 253–260.
O’Reilly, R. C. & Munakata, Y. (2000). Computational
explorations in cognitive neuroscience: Understanding the
mind by simulating the brain. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Pennington, B. F., Moon, J., Edgin, J., Stedron, J., &
Nadel, L. (2003). The neuropsychology of Down syndrome:
Evidence for hippocampal dysfunction. Child Development,
74, 75–93.
Petra, L., & Benga, O., (2004). Methodological Controversies In The Neuropsycholgical Assessment Of Atypical Development. Implications For The Study Of Autism.
Part I: The Developmental Neuropsychological Assessment
Method: Flaws And Assets, Studia Universitatis BabeşBolyai, 1, 93–107.
Renner, P., Klinger, L. G., & Klinger, M. R. (2000). Implicit and explicit memory in autism: Is autism an amnesic
disorder? Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders,
30, 3–14.
Ţincaş, I. (2004). Autism and regularity detection: Explorations using an artificial neural network. Cognitie, Creier,
Comportament, VIII, 409–432.
Uecker, A., Obrzut, J. E. and Nadel, L. Mental rotation
performance by learning disabled and Down’s syndrome children: A study of imaginal development. Developmental
Neuropsychology, 10: 395–411, 1994.
ANALYSING VISUAL METAPHOR IN POLITICAL CARTOONS
Marı́a Jesús Pinar Sanz
Universidad de Castilla-La Mancha (Ciudad Real,
Spain)
The present article examines humour in political cartooning in Britain during the general elections of 2001
and 2005. The corpus comprises six cartoons published
by Steve Bell in The Guardian in the period devoted
to election campaigns. It will be interesting to explore
whether the main aim of the cartoons is humour or if,
on the other hand, political criticism and debate on the
relevant points in the campaigns are predominant. The
paper aims to explore some of the cognitive mechanisms
involved in the creation and interpretation of cartoons
and to reveal the characterising features of political cartoons.
Theories of humour have attributed the creation and
interpretation of humour to emotional and cognitive factors, involving arousal-relief mechanisms, hostility, and
incongruity-resolution processes (Marı́n Arrese, 2005:1;
Freud, 1905; Koestle [1964]1989; Gruner, 1997). Linguistics theories have centered on the bisociation produced by two frames of reference, triggered by ambiguity
or contradition. An essential ingredient in the humour
process is the intentionality behind the joke, as well as
the intended emotional effects. In the case of political
cartoons, the combination of the emotional power of the
drawing and the critical analysis of social and political
issues creates a highly complex message (Marı́n-Arrese,
2005:2; Ginman&von Ungern-Sterberg, 2003).
The approach taken in this paper is based on the
perspective of mental spaces and conceptual integration
or ‘blending’ (Turner and Fauconnier, 1995). Elements
from different input mental spaces, linked by cross-space
mappings, are projected onto a new blended space.
Emergent structure in the blend is generated through
composition (the creation of new relations drawing on
elements from the input spaces), completion (frames
and meanings are completed by recourse to background
knowledge) and elaboration (setting up imaginative simulations) (Marı́n-Arrese, 2005; Fauconnier and Turner,
2002: 48). The cognitive clash between the two world
representations takes place in the blend, where the interpreter undergoes this cognitive shift by projecting backward to the input spaces (Fauconnier, 1997; Marı́n Arrese, 2003).
Cartoons take place within a frame. According to
Giora (1997 in Marı́n-Arrese, 2005), in cartoons with
no captions, we encounter some form of visually depicted incongruity typically involving some discrepancy
or incoherence regarding expected scenarios, rational
behaviour, etc., and some form of visual interpretative
cue which induces simultaneous access to two juxtaposed discordant scenarios. This is the case in most of
the cartoons chosen for this paper. In cartoons with captions, the interpretative cue is characteristically found in
the caption, or else there is some form of interaction between a verbal prompt in the caption and some visual
interpretative cue, which induces sequential access to
the two conceived contexts.
The following features will be taken into account
(based on Marı́n-Arrese, 2005):
1) Degree of cognitive effort involved in the interpretation of the cartoon. This involves features such
as the opacity or complexity of the cartoon, or the degree of implicitness and the inferential work required
to interpret the cartoon. In this sense, visual analogies, intertextuality and cultural memory will be aspects to be taken into account (Werner, 2004; Walker
and Chaplin, 1997). I will call these metaphors, in
line with Zinken (2003) and El Refaie (2003) visualintertextual metaphors, the product of a specific cultural situatedness of the metaphor producer, motivated
by the speaker’s adapatation to a certain cultural structure which provides specific imaginative resources.
2) Degree of participant distinctness and identifiability of the target depicted in the cartoon: the individual,
group or institution that is being ‘put down’.
3) To what extent the cartoons — or the metaphors
in the cartoons — are likely to be influenced by the social and political circumstances at the time or by our
shared physical experiences as infants (Lakoff, 1987).
137
References:
Fauconnier, G. (1997). Mappings in Thought and Language. Cambridge: Cambride University Press.
Fauconnier, G. and Turner, M. (2002) The Way We
Think. New York: Perseus Books.
Freud, S. (1905) Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.
Ginman, M. and von Ungern-Sternberg, S. (2003) ‘Cartoons as information’, Journal of Information Science 29(1):
69–77.
Giora, R. (1997) ‘Understanding figurative and literal
language: The graded salience Hpothesis’, Cognitive Linguistics 8(3): 183–206.
Gruner, C. R. (1997) The Game of Humour. A Comprehensive Theory of Why We Laugh. New Jersey: Transaction.
Koestler, A. (1964) The Act of Creation. London:
Hutchinson.
Lakoff, G. (1987) Women, Fire and Dangerous Things:
What Categories reveal about the Mind. Chicago: University
of Chicago Press.
Marı́n-Arrese, Juana I. (2005) Humour as Subversion
in Political Cartooning in M. Labarta (ed.) Approaches to
Critical Discourse Analysis. Universidad de Valencia.
Turner, M. and G. Fauconnier (1995) ‘Conceptual integration and formal expression’, Journal of Metaphor and
Symbolic Activity 10(3): 183–204.
Walker, John A and Sarah Chaplin (1997) Visual Culture: An Introduction. Manchester: Manchester University
Press.
Werner, Walt (2004) On political Cartoons and Social Studies Textbooks: Visual Analogies, Intertextuality and
Cultural Memory in Canadian Social Studies, 38, 2. Documento de Internet: www.quasar.ualberta.ca/css. Last
accessed 10 Sep. 05.
LINGUOSYNERGETIC ANALYSIS AND SYSTEMIC REGULATION
OF DISCOURSE
Eugenia V. Ponomarenko
The Finance Academy under the Government of
the Russian Federation (Moscow, Russia)
The integrity of various empiric data in different fields
of science has become one of the characteristic traits
of today’s research process. Some discoveries and innovations in, for instance, psychology, physiology, even in
mathematics and physics, not to mention humanities,
may bring to life certain trends in linguistics that gradually form a new scientific paradigm. In this respect
linguosynergetics ranks among most promising fields of
cognitive linguistics.
In its present state linguistics (and the discourse theory in particular) has reached a new stage of fruitful
interaction with other humanities and natural sciences,
which makes it possible to reveal the inherent mental
and psychic processes resulting in speech production
and speech perception. Cognitive linguistics investigating various facets of thought and feelings verbalization
treats discourse as a specific kind of information processing and cognitive activity.
Specialists in cognitive linguistics view discourse (i.e.
the linguistic representation of the general principles of
the world perception and categorization in man’s consciousness) as a unique system with its specific structure, inside and outside relations, and, most important,
dynamic properties and evolutionary processes. The elements and components interaction within the system
and with the medium being the basis for the system
development, it becomes clear that certain factors regulating such interaction must make an indispensable
mechanism preventing the collapse of the system and
thus deserving special attention. Hence synergetics as
the theory of systems self-organization presents vast opportunities for revealing these factors in language and
speech and working out the models of their efficient us-
age for the sake of positive influence on people’s minds
and emotions.
Synergetics is known to focus on all kinds of coherent processes in complex dynamic non-linear systems,
aimed at the preservation of a system in its striving for
self-regulation. The main idea of synergetics being the
possibility of spontaneous ordering through disorder and
chaos under systems self-organization, the purpose of
linguosynergetics is to study the conditions and mechanisms of self-regulation in discourse as a system, in case
of cognitive linguosynergetics — self-regulation of discourse cognitive properties. Thus, self-organization of
discourse undermines its ability to regulate the evolution of its systemic characteristics by way of coherent
interaction of all elements and components for the sake
of the system preservation.
The general scheme of self-organization processes
as viewed by synergetics may be presented as follows.
Some complex open system is in the state of dynamic
(mobile) equilibrium and exchange with the medium.
This state is defined by its inherent factors — order parameters. The system’s elements, subordinate to the
order parameters, strive for the best regulated area (attractor). The attractor makes the purpose of the system’s existence, the most favourable regime of its functioning. Alongside the development of the system’s initial state, the inner dynamic processes and some signals
from the medium stimulate certain fluctuations inside
the system, which cause such essential functional shifts
that the system’s behaviour approaches the so-called
bifurcation point(s) — the turning-point(s) in the system development. At that point chaotic processes are
activated, and in order to oppose them and to preserve itself, the system has to mobilize all its elements
for common, coordinated actions, and to dissipate extra matter, or information, or energy into the medium.
Some so far stable structures come under destruction
and the least fluctuation can give an impetus to the
138
next stage of evolution in any direction (but within a
certain range of possibilities). The dependence of the
system’s behaviour on its inner processes and fluctuations is defined as non-linearity. So, having overcome a
disordered state of bifurcation, the system climbs a
new, though not necessarily better, organizational level,
at which the analogous scenario starts again. Thus,
the aim of synergetic analysis is to reveal the order parameters and those cooperative processes which lead to
self-organization of the system.
The efficiency of discourse synergetic analysis can
be supported by quite a number of arguments.
First of all, by non-linearity of discourse, which reflects the non-linearity of cognitive and other mental
processes. And though particular discourse fragments
are built up by a succession of utterances, it does not
mean that the discourse functional plane is developed
in the same linear succession; on the contrary, discourse
of any type reveals inevitable many-sided cognitive, semantic, structural, modal and other links, rendering the
thought and sense formation, which is non-linear itself.
Therefore, the adequate realization of the speaker’s intention in discourse occurs not only through perceiving
the principal purport line of communication, but also
due to some parallel, crossing or attendant cognitive,
pragmatic and, consequently, formal speech structures.
No doubt, their diversity needs to be somehow organized so as not to cause excessive chaotic deregulation
in discourse and mental systems of the communicants.
Besides, such property as the system’s openness
supposes not only dissipation (mentioned above) but
also indraught of resources, dropping, to put it fig-
uratively, into the system, the resource coming either
from the medium, or from within, which is very significant. Discourse characteristics are conditioned by the
communicants’ conceptual systems in a given communicative situation, which practically delimits the possibilities of new structures’ (both cognitive and linguistic)
formation and thus, of the evolution of discourse and
cognition.
Finally, considering that discourse reflects the fluctuations in the communicants’ conceptual systems and
in the development of the situation, one can’t but admit that the process of self-organization in the system
of discourse is worth serious analysis. Besides purely
scientific interest, the synergetic view of discourse may
be helpful in developing more promising methods of producing the models of the world conceptualization. The
investigation of speech synergetic foundations can be of
great importance for those people who seek to improve
communication and develop argumentation and debate
skills, the ability to build up the optimum structure of
speech and other rhetorical faculties, for treatment of
certain mental disorders, etc.
Natural sciences have been investigating selfregulation synergy of consciousness (cognition included)
for many years, not to say for ages. Time has come for
linguistics to root into this field, as language not only
reflects the processes going on in mind, but also forms
those processes. So, the widely acknowledged concepts
of verbal memory, inner lexicon, cognitive space of a
linguistic person render the phenomena of high importance.
PUTTING LINGUISTIC RELATIVITY TO THE TEST: MOTION
AND INFERENCING PROCESSES
Stéphanie Pourcel
University of Sussex (Brighton, UK)
Motion of objects and animates is a considerable aspect
of life daily conceptualised and referred to in language
by individuals. Motion is composed of four basic conceptual dimensions, (F) a moving figure, (P) a path
trajectory or endpoint, (G) a spatial ground reference,
and (M) a manner of displacement.
Expressing those conceptual dimensions in various
languages is realised differently in semantic forms, however, resulting in those dimensions being selectively codable and highlighted (cf. Talmy 1985, Slobin 2004).
In English, all four dimensions are typically encoded,
e.g.
(1) the dog (F) ran (M) across (P) the road (G).
However, in French, the manner is typically left out,
e.g.
(2) le chien (F) a traversé (P) la rue (G).
the dog crossed the road.
The question I will address is whether differing se-
mantic representations (SRs) entail differing conceptual
representations (CRs) in cognition. This question, also
known as linguistic relativity, has been extensively examined by cognitive linguists with regard to the domain of
motion — in various languages (e.g. Slobin 2003, Gennari et al. 2002, Papafragou et al. 2002, Bohnemeyer
et al. 2004). Most studies have focused on testing the
effects of SRs on the cognitive functions of category
formation (e.g. through triad judgement tasks), and
memory (e.g. through free prose recall and recognition
tasks).
Few — if any — have sought language effects on
inferencing — an equally interesting cognitive ability
wherefrom to contemplate the potential influences of
SRs on CRs, and hence a new direction in relativistic
research. The kind of information that is of an inferential nature is particularly interesting in linguistic relativity, because it offers rich glimpses at habitual ways
of conceptualising a particular scene. According to the
relativity hypothesis, these habitual ways of conceptualising should be influenced by the fashions of speaking
139
in particular languages. We may thus expect English
speakers to infer more manner-related details, that is,
dynamic and processual details, than French speakers;
and vice versa, we may expect French speakers to infer
more path-related details, that is, static and resultative
details.
In this study, inferencing processes were tested using
elicited narratives and questionnaires relating to an animated motion scene (from a 4-minute televised Charlie
Chaplin extract). Elicited inferences and questions for
testing inferences must pertain to events or scenes as
wholes, as inferences constitute constructive CRs following from the processing of elements perceived salient
in the situation. Testing inferences is thus highly interesting to understanding holistic CRs of motion events
as wholes, rather than as complex representations decomposable into discrete dimensions (e.g. path, manner, etc.). Inferencing is of further interest as it relies
heavily on other cognitive processes, e.g. attention and
memory, and as such, inference should be an insightful index of the relativity of conceptualisation via these
other cognitive modes of event processing.
Methodologically, tests were performed with English
and French native speakers (N=22 and N=25, respectively) in order to offer a comparative assessment of
the potential relativity of inferencing motion event CRs,
based on the same objective stimulus.
Results demonstrate significant differences across
the two language groups, such that English speakers reveal more salient CRs relating to active processes than
the French speakers, and such that French speakers reveal more salient CRs relating to resultative states than
the English. The present study thus offers some evidence in support of linguistic relativity in the domain of
motion.
Overall, I will also suggest that investigating and
understanding the potential for language-based relativity of concepts is critical, as its implications entail that
speakers of different languages therefore differ in their
cognitive conceptualisation of otherwise similar events.
References:
Bohnemeyer, J., Eisenbeiss, S. & B. Narasimhan (2003).
Manner and Path in non-linguistic cognition. International
Conference on Language, Culture and Mind. University of
Portsmouth, July 2004.
Gennari, S. P., S. A. Sloman, B. C. Malt & W. Tecumseh
Fitch (2002). Motion event in language and cognition. Cogniton 83: 49–79.
Papafragou, A., Massey C. & L. Gleitman (2002).
Shake, rattle, ‘n’roll: the representation of motion in language and cognition. Cognition 84: 189–219.
Slobin, D. I. (2003). Language & thought online: cognitive consequences of linguistic relativity. In D. Gentner &
S. Goldin-Meadow (eds.) Language in Mind: Advances in
the Investigation of Language & Thought. 157–91. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Slobin, D. I. (2004). The many ways to search for a
frog: linguistic typology & the expression of motion events.
In S. Strömqvist & L. Verhoeven (eds.) Relating Events in
Narrative: Typological & Contextual Perspectives. Volume
2: 219–57. Mahwah, NJ: LEA Publishers.
Talmy, L. (1985). Lexicalisation patterns: semantic
structure in lexical forms. In T. Shopen (ed.) Language Typology & Syntactic Description. Volume 3: 57–149. Cambridge: University Press.
INFLUENCE OF EXCITABILITY OF THE NERVOUS SYSTEM ON
ACTUAL VOLUME OF MEMORY AND ITS ACCURACY
A. N. Radchenko
St.-Petersburg institute of informatics and
automation of RAS
It is recognized neural excitability of two types —
ionotropic and metabotropic. The first one generates
by neurotransmitters binding with clusters of ionotropic
receptors, which are built-in subsynaptic membrane and
invoking PSP. Their sum may start an evoked spike.
The second type of excitability is generated by receptors, which are built-in perisynaptic membranes. Chemical and electrical stimuli applied to such receptors do not
produce significant PSP, but with the help of the second messenger provoke spikes named spontaneous.
Fig. 1 displays similarity and difference of these two
controls of a neuron. Criterion of spontaneous activity is the cooling or narcosis: their applying cuts
off metabolic amplification and spontaneous activity, but the evoked activity is kept. Let us mark, that in
area of artificial intelligence the evoked activity are exalted. Obviously, natural intellectual processes cannot
base on such activity. Otherwise, intellectual processes
would not interrupt by narcosis.
The theory of molecular memory [1] considers
iono- and metabotropic controls for conformations of
metabotropic receptive clusters (MRC) on perisynaptic neuron membranes. The conformational hysteresis
does MRC similar to molecular trigger with two discrete
and continuum of monotonic states. In dependence on
membrane potential, the discrete conformations can be
mono- or bistable (R and W in a fig. 2.). These MRC
properties are ideal for engram creation, consolidation
and retrieving.
The molecular trigger is assembled during the receptor clusterization process by hydrophobic-hydrophilic
forces on BLM surfaces, ionization of terminal chains
of adjacent receptors and their transmembrane electrostatic attraction. The computation of the voltconformation characteristics (VCC) outcomes, that
MRC has hysteretic properties, which can be transformed to monotonic ones (M in a fig. 2). Such transition is due to decrease of conformation motility, which
140
is following in result of adhesion forces that immobilize receptors in one of conformation states of MRC.
This immobilization, being a common cause of the inactivation of ion channels conductivity (ionotropic control) and engram consolidation (metabotropic control),
is proceeded in time. EPSP lengthens the adhesion process, and IPSP breaks it. In the first case, the 1
of engram is consolidated (MRC loses hysteretic prop-
erties and ability to generate spontaneous spikes —
that is written 1). In the second case, MRC returns
in the initial conformation state (is written 0). Such
engram replicates inversely, and the repeated inversion
is necessary for recovery. Such retrieving is executed
by inhibit synapses or looped neuron circuits with even
number of neuron populations.
Fig. 1. Two ways for neuron control.
Fig. 2. Volt-conformation characteristic of MRC.
Relative metabotropic excitability of a neuron population containing M MRC, can be estimated by a part
of simultaneous conformations q = S/M, where S is a
number of MRC participated in creation of one bit of
engram. For economical creation of memory trace, this
part should be small, but nonzero: the multiplicity of
the trace, S=qM, should be sufficient for engram reliablity. It is possible to adjust the S value by change
141
the number of conformed MRC per engram bit, by influencing onto thresholds of conformation transitions.
The initial excitability of neuron population is S0 =qM.
Each next 1 from b spikes diminishes the excitability
of the population:
S0 = M q, S1 = (M − S0 )q, S2 = (M − S0 − S1 )q,
. . . , Sb = M q(1 − q)b , . . .
(1)
For economical creation of the engram containing b
spikes, it needs a part q of conformed clusters appears
being optimal. Derivation of a common term S b = Mq
(1- q)b on q is zero if q = 1/(b+1). Therefore, it is
favorably to assign the initial metabotropic excitability
of nervous tissue as
(2)
S0 = M/(b + 1).
Fig. 3. Dynamics of metabotropic activity during memory
loading at a different excitability of a nervous tissue (A);
dependence of engrams accuracy versus a loading factor
L=b/M (B).
The theory of molecular memory [1] shows that its
accuracy p and trace multiplicity S decrease exponential
during loading process according to (1):
(3)
ln p = −Sexp(−S/S0opt ).
The initial value S0opt is reduced at the end of loading to S0opt /e, where p = p min . The process of memory
loading is shown in a fig. 3A for a potential memory capacity M = 500000 that approximately corresponds to
number of MRCs in one cortical column (100 neurons).
For b = 40000 we have S 0opt = 12.5. The deviation
of excitability from this best value (for example, S0 =
60 and 7) strongly restricts the volume of loaded texts,
namely, at 60 > S opt > 7 we obtain following values of
actual memory capacity: b 60 = 23000, b 12.5 = 40000,
b 7 = 29700. Fig. 3A shows, as the accuracy of engrams
is decreased during loading with the same parameters b
and M. The transition of boundary S opt /e and p min
= 0.01 is marked on the graphs of Fig.3 by shading.
The metaphorical notations of the curves S 60 , (cholerics), S 12.5 (sanguinics) and S 7 (phlegmatics)
in Fig. 3 are convenient for demonstrating the optimal
excitability of sanguinics: they at given accuracy of engrams can store in 1,5–2 times more information, than
cholerics and phlematics (40000 is in contrast to 23000
and 29700).
Reference:
Radchenko A. N. (2005) Hetero- and auto-associative
neural memory owing recognizing access to information.
Neurocomputers: Development, Application, No 8–9,
FREQUENCY EFFECTS IN WORD RECOGNITION
Péter Rebrus1 , Péter Halácsy2 , Péter
Vajda1
and the exact nature of effects operating at different
levels of language processing is a flourishing branch of
psycholinguistics. Even if the exact nature of the effects
1
is a topic of considerable debate, today the hypothesis
Research Institute for Linguistics, Hungarian
that there is a correlation between the frequency of a
Academy of Sciences (Budapest, Hungary)
2
word and the speed of recognition is a starting point
Budapest University of Technology and
and not the aim of research. For this reason, one of
Economics (Budapest, Hungary)
the biggest methodological problems in psycholinguistic
One of the most well-established findings in psycholin- experiments is to control for frequency effects and make
guistics is that frequency affects processing. The field lists with words of the same frequency.
The aims of our study were to specify the exact
of research concentrating on the types of frequencies
142
nature of the relationship between word frequency and
recognition speed on the one hand, and on the other
hand, to find frequency clusters based on reaction times
in which words can be considered to have the same
frequency in terms of processing and thus by selecting
words from the same cluster, frequency effects can be
controlled for.
The first step is to define the form and parameters
of the t(freq(w )) function giving the time required for
recognizing a w word. To define this function, we use
reaction times in a lexical decision task for words differing in frequency along a continuum.
Selection of words is not a trivial matter for two
reasons. One problem is model estimation. Formally,
we are looking for a function that best supports our
measurements, i.e. the function F that maximizes
p(F —experiment). This is the basis of maximum likelihood estimation. At the same time, before running the
experiment, we do not yet know the exact form of the
function, so compiling the experiment properly (in this
case putting together the word list) is problematic.
Another source of difficulty is the concept of word
frequency, which is most often estimated from corpus
data. At the same time, word frequency in the psycholinguistic sense is the number of times a person has
heard a word, which can show considerable amount of
individual variation. As a first approximation, one can
use a measure that specifies the probability of a test subject hearing or uttering a certain word in a given interval. A further approximation can be when this measure
is averaged over people (in our case one of the authors
was not even familiar with half of the infrequent words
in the experiment).
Corpus data can be misleading, too. A corpus can
be taken as a random sample of texts. The bigger
the corpus, the better frequency estimation we have for
words. Infrequent words, though, received very bad estimations. What does it mean if a word only appears
once in a corpus? Adding a single sentence that contains the word could have increased its frequency by a
hundred percent. However Zipf’s law states that few
frequent words occur in a corpus and the majority of
the types will be sparse.
That corpora are not in fact uniform and random
samples may cause bigger problems. For our research we
compared two wide-coverage Hungarian corpora. The
Hungarian Web Corpus has 500 million tokens, while
the Hungarian National Corpus has 80 million. We expected that such big corpora would estimate word frequency well. However we found that for some words one
predicted probabilities up to several orders of magnitude
higher than the other. To eliminate other possible effects when selecting the words for the experiment we
chose (by using a morphological analyzer) unambiguous words that have the same part-of-speech and same
CV-skeleton.
Since lexical decision times are in the 300–900 msec
range and word frequency counts can cover 5–6 orders
of magnitude we hypothesized that the relationship between the two is probably logarithmic. More specifically,
our hypothesis is the following: the ratio of the log frequency of two words in a balanced corpus is the same as
the ratio of lexical decision times for those two words.
EVOLUTION OF LANGUAGE AND FORCES BEHIND IT
Eric Reuland
Utrecht institute of Linguistics OTS (Utrecht,
The Netherlands)
(1) Schematic representation of the ‘language system’
Sensori-motor
system
← CHL →
Interpretation
system (IS)
−dedicated +dedicated −dedicated
A recurrent issue in the discussion of the evolution and
genesis of language is whether the emergence of the
PF-Interface
C-I-Interface
language faculty was instantaneous or gradual. In this
talk I will argue that in this form the question cannot
In terms of this schema, the computational system
be answered. In order to fruitfully address the issue we of human language (CHL ) is what allows the sensorihave to further articulate it. It is crucial to distinguish motor system and the interpretation system to connect.
between:
We can now distinguish between the following issues,
where in particular the question of evolutionary advani. Evolution of man up to the emergence of the
tage comes up (assuming that necessary niche condilanguage faculty
tions are satisfied):
ii. The emergence of the language faculty
i. Crucial for the study of preconditions: Whatever
iii. Emergence of language
guided evolution during i must be independent of laniv. Evolution of man and her language (obviously guage. We have to face the following truism: Whatever
evolutionary advantage language may have, as long as
since the emergence of the language faculty)
it is not yet there, there is no niche in which it could
Each of i–iv raises different questions, and hence re- possibly help. So, the advantage must be in the systems
quires a different window in the sense of Botha (2004). subserving language, specifically the IS system in its poLet’s clarify what is at stake in terms of the schema in tential for reasoning, calculating the outcome of alter(1), adapted from (Chomsky 2001):
native actions, including the ability to imagine states of
143
affairs that are not yet realized and the ability to imagine and plan courses of action that avoid unwanted and
bring about desirable states of affairs.
• Crucial for the next step: The emergence of the
language faculty must be distinguished from the emergence of language. It is possible that the potential for
language to develop is in place without this potential
being realized in an external language So we have two
subquestions:
ii. Genesis: what must minimally have happened at
ii? Answer: PF and C-I become legible to each other.
This allows the reasoning system to manipulate concepts in terms of forms instead of content. There is
a potential evolutionary advantage insofar as reasoning with formal, uninterpreted elements is more efficient
than reasoning in terms of content alone. In order to
properly aid reasoning, recursion must be in place (perhaps borrowed from sensori-motor system as in Hauser,
Chomsky, Fitch 2002?)
iii. Emergence: what must minimally have happened
at iii? Answer: The language system was put to use
for inter-subject communication. Note, that we cannot exclude that this was a discovery, rather than an
evolutionary step.
iv. The question about iv is whether there can
be evolution of language (other than mere language
change), after the faculty of language developed. This is
crucial for assessing whether special forms of language
can serve as windows into the evolution of language
(‘degraded’ language, spontaneous languages (sign),
Jackendoff 2002, etc., motherese Falk 2003 or ‘transitional stages’ or ‘proto-languages’ Arbib 2004). I would
like to suggest that in principle it can, but the only locus
for real evolution of language in this sense can reside in
enhancing systems of working memory that are available
for linguistic computations, including the processing of
dependencies. In order to be able to exploit this window we should have models of the effects of restrictions
on working memory in modern man. This is the type
of issue the study of ‘degraded’ languages may indeed
shed light on.
References:
Arbib, Michael A. 2004. From Monkey-like Action
Recognition to Human Language: An Evolutionary Framework for Neurolinguistics. Behavioral and Brain Sciences.
Botha, Rudolph P. 2004. Constructing Windows on the
Evolution of Language. Ms Department of General Linguistics, Stellenbosch University.
Chomsky, Noam. 2001. Derivation by Phase. In
M. Kenstowicz, ed., Ken Hale: a Life in Language. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Chomsky, Noam. 2004a. Beyond explanatory adequacy.
In Structures and beyond, ed. A. Belletti. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Falk, D., 2003. Prelinguistic evolution in early hominins:
Whence motherese? Behavioral and Brain Science.
Hauser, Mark, Noam Chomsky, and Tecumseh Fitch.
2002. The Faculty of Language: What Is It, Who Has It,
and How Did It Evolve? Science, 298:1569–1579.
Jackendoff, Ray. 1999. Possible stages in the evolution
of the language capacity. Trends in Cognitive Science 3.7:
272–279.
Jackendoff, Ray. 2002. Foundations of Language:
Brain, Meaning, Grammar and Evolution. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
FROM ELEMENTS TO INTELLIGENT SYSTEMS
Helge Ritter, Jörg Ontrup, Gunther
Heidemann and Jochen Steil
Bielefeld University (Bielefeld, Germany)
While physics gives us a picture how simple laws
can drive the self-organization of matter at increasingly complex scales of organization, biological evolution led to systems with processes enabling a rapid selforganization of information. Cognitive systems are the
culminating point of this evolution, exhibiting the ability
to very rapidly integrate and coordinate complex pieces
of information originating in peripheral sensors and vast
memory systems within the brain.
Trying to replicate even remotely similar capabilities
in artificial intelligent systems, such as robots, poses
the challenge to find architectural principles that can
integrate large collections of possibly heterogeneous information elements into a coherent structure. However,
a major problem is the complexity of architectures that
makes it very demanding to explore many architectures
in parallel.
Therefore we have adopted a two-pronged approach:
studying highly idealized architectures in order to explore guiding principles in simplified settings in order to
inform the development of a robot system operating in
a human-robot interaction-scenario.
Focusing on our research at the level of idealized settings, the talk will discuss in more depth three concrete
examples: (i) the self-organized formation of semantic
maps by combining ideas from neural self-organization
and non-euclidean, hyperbolic spaces of uniform negative curvature that facilitate topology-preserving mappings from high-dimensional spaces, (ii) a generic approach for image categorization by information compression motivated from analogies to compression-based
structure formation in physics, demonstrating the possibility of feature-free classification and categorization
of image data using standard compression algorithms
such as Lempel-Ziv, and (iii) a layered competitive network architecture (Competitive Layer Model, CLM) to
decompose complex patterns into simpler constituents,
demonstrating perceptual grouping by a suitable dynamical process.
144
MIRROR NEURON SYSTEM AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR
COGNITIVE FUNCTIONS
Giacomo Rizzolatti
Università di Parma (Parma, Italy)
We live in a world full of objects, sounds and movements. Among all these stimuli, the movements of other
living creatures-especially of our conspecifics-are particularly important for us. How do we understand the actions of others? What are the neurophysiological bases
of this ability? It is possible that the capacity to understand the actions of others is based exclusively on the
visual analysis of the observed action. There is growing
evidence, however, stemming from neurophysiological
experiments in monkeys and brain imaging studies in
humans, that this capacity is based on mapping visual
information of the observed action onto internal motor
representation of the same action. In my presentation I
will discuss evidence for such a system (mirror neuron
system), review its properties, and explore its implication for other cognitive capacities such as action imitation, understanding intentions of others, and language.
ERROR AS A HALLMARK OF NON-DEVIANT SPEECH
PROCESSING
Marina V. Rusakova
Saint-Petersburg State University (Russia)
The present paper is based on the analysis of a corpus
of speech errors registered in Russian oral discourse. I
have been gathering this corpus for at least 15 years.
A thorough analysis of Russian speech errors can add
new important facts and ideas to the theory of speech
processing elaborated on the basis of speech error in English [Fromkin 1990]. The richness of Russian morphology (if compared to that of English) makes it possible
to penetrate into both the mechanisms of morphologic
processing, and into those peculiarities of syntactic processing that manifest themselves through morphological
devices.
It is commonly believed that speech errors can help
to reveal those operations that are used in speech processing. This idea is based on the assumption that realization of every operation must sometimes fail. This
assumption is, however, wrong. For example, there is
not a single mistake in my corpus that was encountered
in the production of finite forms of the verbs belonging to the so-called first inflectional class. It can
be further noticed that this class has the highest type
and token frequency in Russian, and that thus speakers
encounter opportunities to make a mistake in the formation of the corresponding verb forms very often. In
other words, if there were any regularity in the failure
of those mechanisms that are used in the production of
the verbs from the first inflectional class, I would have
surely registered some errors of this kind during more
that 15 years of everyday observation. Thus the mental
operation that provides morphological setting of these
forms is error-free, even though some verbs belonging
to this class are quite infrequent.
The analysis of encountered morphological and mor-
phosyntactic errors shows that their overwhelming majority easily fall into a limited number (not more than
several dozens) of rather homogenous groups of errors
registered under the circumstances that are equally homogenous for each group. Although the exact number
of such groups is a matter of further discussion (it depends on some methodological assumptions and on the
desired level of the comprehensiveness of classification,
first of all) this number is definitely much less than the
number of classes of errors that could be theoretically
computed. It means that in fact errors do indeed occur
only under specific circumstances. Systematic analysis
of each group yields one and the same generalization:
an error can occur if and only if the following two prerequisites are met:
1. The target form can be arrived at in more than
one way. For example, there is no doubt that some
verb forms, e.g. those characterized by unique
conjugation, are stored by rote in the mental lexicon, and that some verb forms, e.g. those that
had never been encountered by the speaker, are
undoubtedly conjugated ad hoc (on-line).
2. Various ways of form processing lead to discrepant
results and only one of these ways securely leads to
the adequate one. For example, only the mechanism of reproduction by rote leads to the adequate
result when producing an irregular verb.
An illustration
On of the groups of errors can be labeled as mistakes
in verb form production induced by the priming effect.
Errors of this kind are regularly encountered in Russian
speech.
145
{— A gde adres? ‘Where is the address?’}
vnizu posmotri, ja
Uže zagružen,
Already load.PTCP.PAST,
beneath look,
I
zagružila
load.PAST (erroneous, instead of zagruzila).
‘(It’s) already loaded, look beneath, I have loaded (it)’ {About the file with the address}.
In the erroneous form (zagružila) the speaker used
the variant of the stem which was already realized in the
prime (zagruž- instead of zagruž-). All errors included
in this group have the same property. The mechanism
used by a speaker is transparent: instead of a new lexicon look-up, the speaker takes the stem that has been
already actualized and adds the necessary inflectional
setting. For sure, it should be faster and easier than
using the begin-from-the-beginning strategy. The
prime-oriented mechanism works perfectly in case of
regular conjugation, it also may work if the adequate
target form contains the same variant of stem as the
source one, but it inevitably leads to a mistake otherwise.
Speculation: from speech error analysis to the mechanisms of processing correct forms
It can be concluded based on the analysis of a subset
of errors in the corpus that speakers regularly use the
prime-oriented mechanism. We are now in a position
to make the next logical step: it would be quite absurd to admit that this prime-oriented mechanism is
used only in those circumstances when there is a high
probability that it would lead to a failure. Such a supposition would be all the more absurd since speakers
would have to first find those potential error-triggering
positions. Evidently, what is true is the reverse claim:
the prime-oriented mechanism (take the actualized
stem, add the necessary morphological setting) is
regularly used by the speakers when two different
forms of the same lexeme are used in a certain context
(although in some — rare — cases it may cause an
error).
However, not all irregular verb forms encountered in
the position after the prime with another variant of the
stem are erroneous. It means that the prime-oriented
mechanism (take the actualized stem, add the necessary morphological setting) was not used when producing these forms. It means in its turn that other operations were realized (e.g. extraction by rote or complex
on-line production). Choosing another available mechanism should have been determined by the fact that it
is faster and easier or — and this is more probable in
the circumstances described — by the fact that two or
more mechanisms were realized simultaneously and the
speaker had enough time to control the erroneous result
1 Cf.
of the fastest strategy and to reject it. In any case, when
processing a primed verb form speakers simultaneously
use more than one mechanism and these mechanisms
compete1 ; thus, the process of morphological setting
is fastened.
Actually, it is the competition of simultaneously implemented mechanisms or strategies that triggers all errors in morphological setting. Examples include errors
in assignment of nominal case (competition of semantic
and structural strategies) and errors in morphological
setting of various agreeing forms (independent vs. dependent morphological processing). An initial study of
the processes of comprehension allows one to conclude
that competition of strategies is responsible for the errors in morphological analysis in perception no less that
in production of morphological forms.
The obtained data are consistent with the main
stream of functionally oriented linguistic theory, especially with the idea of language as an evolutionary product [Givón, 2001; Givón, 2002; MacWhinney, 2005].
Errors inevitably result from the organization of the internal language system, which is mostly aimed at providing the fastest speed of communication. Avoiding
errors takes time and requires extra attention on the
part of communicants, while everyday communication
— evolutionary the first communicative form and the
only available communicative form for many speakers
— is usually not impeded by errors that are most not
even noticed by communicants.
References:
Fromkin, V. 1990. Grammatical aspects of speech errors.
In: Newmeyer, F. J. (ed.) Linguistics: The Cambridge survey. Vol. II. Linguistic theory: Extensions and implications.
Cambridge: CUP. 117–138.
Givón, T. 2002. Bio-Linguistics: The Santa Barbara
Lectures. Amsterdam / Philadelphia: JB.
Givón, T. (ed.). 2001. The Evolution of Language.
Philadelphia: JB.
MacWhinney, B. 2005. Language evolution and human
development. In: Bjorklund, D. & A. Pellegrini (eds.). Origins of the Social Mind: Evolutionary Psychology and Child
Development. New York: Guilford. 383–410.
MacWhinney, B. & E. Bates (eds.). 1989. The Crosslinguistic Study of Sentence Processing. New York: Cambridge
University Press.
Yuang, C. D. 2002. Knowledge and Learning in Natural
Language. Oxford: OUP.
(cue) Competition Model [MacWhinney & Bates, 1989] and Rule Competitiion Model [Yang, 2002].
146
NEUROCOGNITION OF AUDIOVISUAL SPEECH PERCEPTION
Mikko Sams
Helsinki University of Technology (Finland)
In normal conversation we both hear our companion’s
speech and see the corresponding articulatory gestures.
Perceptually, the audiovisual nature of speech is manifested in two ways. First, visual information improves
intelligibility of auditory speech, especially in noisy condition. Second, observing articulatory gestures can
change the auditory percept phonetically, as occurs in
the McGurk effect: when the acoustic syllable /pa/
was dubbed onto the visual presentation of articulatory gestures of /ka/, subjects typically heard /ta/ or
/ka/. During the last 15 years, we have started to understand the brain mechanisms underlying audiovisual
speech perception. Interactions of auditory and visual
speech at posterior superior temporal areas have been
found in numerous studies. Evidence has accumulated
that visual speech modifies activity in the auditory cortex, even in the primary auditory cortex. Visual influences on cortical auditory processing can be quite early,
occurring already about 100 ms from the onset of the
auditory stimulus. Moreover, our recent results suggest
that seeing speech may influence processing in the audi-
tory brainstem at about 10 ms latency form the onset of
the auditory stimulus. When considering such early effects, it is important to remember that in normal speech
the onset of articulatory movements starts often even
100 ms before the onset of acoustic speech stimulus.
Normal readers and dyslexics process audiovisual
speech is different ways. We have evidence that despite
being less accurate in identifying unisensory visual stimuli, dyslexic children are more likely than normal readers
to report hearing only the visual component of conflicting audiovisual stimuli in poor listening conditions. In
our recent fMRI study we compared neural processing of
audiovisual speech in dyslexic and fluent readers. Both
groups showed increased activation during observation
of phonetically conflicting compared to matching vowels
within the classical motor speech regions (Broca’s area
and the left premotor cortex), this activation difference
being more extensive and bilateral in the dyslexic group.
We suggest that these findings reflect dyslexic readers’
greater use of motor-articulatory and visual strategies
during phonetic processing of audiovisual speech, possibly to compensate for their difficulties in auditory speech
perception.
AGE OF ACQUISITION AND PICTURE NAMING IN MONO- AND
BILINGUALS
Jasmin Sadat Schaffai1 , Armina Janyan2 ,
Elena Andonova2
1
2
University of Osnabrueck (Osnabrueck, Germany)
New Bulgarian University (Sofia, Bulgaria)
The study aimed to compare picture naming processing
in mono- and bilinguals and to explore the role of age of
word acquisition in the processing by examining impact
of various pictorial and lexical characteristics on picture naming reaction time (RT) variance. Naming data
for 139 black-and-white drawings (Snodgrass & Vanderwart, 1980) collected from twenty one Bulgarian-French
bilingual university students were compared with picture naming data of 36 French (Bonin et al., 2003) and
50 Bulgarian (Bates et al., 2003) monolinguals. Bilinguals were Bulgarian native speakers who had started
to learn French from a mean age of 12 on throughout formal school and university education. They were
asked to name pictures as fast and as accurate as possible in their second language (L2). Simultaneous multiple regression analyses were carried out on naming
RTs for each group (Bulgarian and French monolinguals and Bulgarian-French bilinguals) with 12 conceptual, semantic and lexical variables (visual complexity,
image agreement, object familiarity, image variability,
word frequency, age of word acquisition, word length
measured in number of phonemes, animacy, concrete-
ness, imageability, name agreement, and number of alternative names) adopted from French and Bulgarian
data bases (Alario & Ferrand, 1999; New et al., 2001;
Andonova & Janyan, unpublished). Thus, multiple regression analyses were run for each subject group with
separate set of French and Bulgarian predictors separately.
Regression on monolingual data showed consistent
pattern within and across languages, namely, both
French and Bulgarian naming RTs were predicted (apart
for uncertainty measures) by conceptual and semantic
factors (image agreement, image variability and animacy) and age of acquisition (AoA). That is, speed
of picture naming in a given language was predicted
by conceptual, semantic and AoA values for both languages. These results suggest that AoA measure is not
just a purely lexical, language-dependent factor (Morrison & Ellis, 1995) but is a semantic one (Brysbaert et
al., 2000).
Regression on bilingual data showed the only unique
contribution of Bulgarian frequency in the analysis of
predictors of L1 and contribution of French frequency,
word length, and AoA in the analysis of L2 predictors.
None of the conceptual and semantic predictors made
a significant contribution to the RT variance. These
results are in agreement with the results of Izura &
Ellis (2002) who found that lexical decision speed in
147
L2 was determined by AoA of L2 and not by the AoA
of L1. Furthermore, the results fit nicely the model
of bilingual language structure (Silverberg & Samuel,
2004) that suggests that late proficient bilinguals incorporate L2 words into the existing lexical level representations for their first language. Finally, the results
of both monolingual and bilingual data are compatible with the mapping hypothesis of AoA (see Ellis &
Lambon Ralph, 2000; Izura & Ellis, 2004) according to
which early learned items play a more important role
than later learned in determining the connection structure between various types of meaning- and form-based
representations. That is, it could be suggested that in
monolinguals AoA is linked with both lexical and semantic representations while in late bilinguals AoA of
L2 is linked mainly with lexical representations of both
languages.
In conclusion, our data suggest that monolingual
picture naming processing relies largely on non-lexical
mechanisms while the bilingual L2 naming — on the
lexical ones and that AoA is structured differently in
monolingual and late bilingual brain.
References:
Alario, F.-X., & Ferrand, L. (1999). A set of 400 pictures standardized for French: Norms for name agreement,
image agreement, familiarity, visual complexity, image variability, and age of acquisition. Behavior Research Methods,
Instruments, & Computers, 31(3), 531–552.
Andonova, E., & Janyan, A. (unpublished). Data base
for 520 pictures and their dominant responses in Bulgarian.
Bates, E., D’Amico, S., Jacobsen, T., Székely, A., Andonova, E., Devescovi, A., Herron, D., Lu, C.-C., Pechmann, T., Pléh, C., Wicha, N., Federmeier, K., Gerdjikova, I., Gutierrez, G., Hung., D., Hsu, J., Iyer, G., Kohnert, K., Mehotcheva, T., Orozco-Figueroa, A., Tzeng, A.,
& Tzeng, O. (2003). Timed picture naming in seven languages. Psychonomic Bulletin and Review, 10(2 ), 344–380.
Bonin, P., Chalard, M., Méot, A., & Fayol, M. (2002).
The determinants of spoken and written picture naming latencies. British Journal of Psychology, 93, 89–114.
Brysbaert, M, Lange, M., & Van Wijnendaele, I.
(2000). The effects of age-of-acquisition and frequencyof-occurrence in visual word recognition: Further evidence
from the Dutch language. European Journal of Cognitive
Psychology, 12(1), 65–85.
Ellis, A. W., & Lambon Ralph, M. A. (2000). Age of
acquisition effect in adult lexical processing reflect loss of
plasticity in maturing systems: Insights form connectionist
networks. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning,
Memory, and Cognition, 26, 1103–1123.
Izura, C., & Ellis, A. W. (2002). Age of acquisition effects in word recognition and production in first and second
languages. Psicológia, 23, 245–281.
Izura, C., & Ellis, A. W. (2004). Age of acquisition effects in translation judgment tasks. Journal of Memory and
Language, 50, 165–181.
Morrison C. M., & Ellis, A. W. (1995). Roles of word
frequency and age of acquisition on word naming and lexical decision. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning,
Memory, and Cognition, 21, 116–133.
New, B., Pallier, C., Ferrand, L., & Matos, R. (2001).
Une base de données lexicales du français contemporain sur
Internet: LEXIQUE. L’Année Psychologique, 101, 447–462.
http://www.lexique.org/
Silverberg, S., & Samuel, A. G. (2004). The effect of
age of second language acquisition on the representation
and processing of second language words. Journal of Memory and Language, 51, 381–398.
Snodgrass, J. G., & Vanderwart, M. (1980). A standardized set of 260 pictures: Norms for name agreement,
image agreement, familiarity, and visual complexity. Journal
of Experimental Psychology: Human Learning & Memory,
6, 174–215.
SPOKEN-WORD RECOGNITION IN RUSSIAN PRESCHOOLERS
Irina A. Sekerina
City University of New York (USA)
According to the Cohort model (Marslen-Wilson &
Welsh, 1978), spoken-word recognition starts with identification of the very first phoneme of the word. Because not all the perceptual information is yet available,
more than one representation will be activated. Thus,
a spoken target noun (e.g., candy ) will be activated together with competitor nouns that begin with the identical phonetic material (e.g., candle). All activated lexical candidates will then compete in a recognition race.
Eye-tracking studies in English found that in a picture
identification task, adults’ fixations of the target noun
were delayed when the beginning of a word was equally
compatible with two different objects due to the cohort
competition (Allopenna et al., 1998). Swingley et al.
(1999) showed that 2-year-old infants exhibited a similar cohort effect with a restricted set of spoken materials
although their word recognition was slower than that of
adults.
However, little is known about developmental progression in spoken-word recognition from 2 year-olds to
adults. The present experiment investigated this process in 5-and 6-year-old preschoolers. Free-viewing eyetracking allowed us to overcome methodological limitations of the Swingley et al.’s study (i.e., the preferential looking task and the materials with only four target
nouns) and employ adult-like experimental design and
materials. In an on-line task, 32 monolingual Russian
children viewed a computer display showing 4 pictures of
familiar objects. In half of the 24 trials (the Cohort condition), the names for the 2 of the pictures started with
an identical three-phoneme onset ( ‘bow’, ‘jar’); in the other half (the NoCohort condition), the
names for all of the pictures were different (bant, vilka
‘fork’). 24 different onsets have been used, 16 of the
CVC form, and 8 CCV ( ‘crocodile’, ‘bed’). The children’s task was to click on the target
noun embedded in a carrier phrase, 148
‘Show where the bow is here’. We analyzed accuracy and latencies of behavioral responses, and eye
movements.
Results. 17 children exhibited 100% accuracy on
the picture identification task, while the remaining 15
children made errors in 1 to 3 out of 24 items (mean
96.5%). Coarse-grain eye movement analysis did not
reveal any significant differences in the percentage of
trials that had a fixation to the Competitor picture (Cohort condition) compared to the Distractor in the same
location (NoCohort condition), 74% vs. 70%. We also
computed a fine-grained eye movement analysis by comparing (1) the latencies of the first look to the Target as
a factor of Condition, and (2) the moment-by-moment
fixations in the 600-ms window during the average duration of the target noun. The children were significantly faster in launching their first eye movement to
the Target in the NoCohort (at 627 ms from the onset
of the Target) than in the Cohort condition (at 823 ms),
F1(1,60) = 6.01, p <.02); F2 (1,22) = 5.83, p < .03.
This disadvantage for the Cohort condition due to com-
References:
Allopenna, P., Magnuson, J., & Tanenhaus, M. (1998).
Tracking the time course of spoken word recognition using
eye movements: Evidence for continuous mapping models.
petition between the Target and Competitor persisted
throughout the trial resulting in 200 ms longer clicking
RTs for the Cohort (4965 ms) compared to the NoCohort condition (4763 ms). Analysis of eye movement
fixations at 33-ms intervals (Fig. 1) revealed the time
course of the Cohort effect: The looks to the Target
diverged from the ones to the Distractor 250 ms faster
on average in the NoCohort condition compared to the
delay in divergence in the Cohort Condition.
Thus, the preschool children showed adult-like continuous interpretation of spoken input that rapidly
changed with availability of acoustic information. This
similarity was especially evident in the temporal characteristics of fixations. In contrast to infants, 5-and
6-year-old children demonstrated the robust Cohort effect even under the serious task demands, and with a
wide variety of Russian onset types and less familiar
words. In contrast to adults, children tended to look
more at all of the pictures in the display irrespective of
presence or absence of the cohort competitor.
Journal of Memory and Language, 48, 419–439.
Swingley, D., Pinto, J., & Fernald, A. (1999). Continuous processing in word recognition at 24 months. Cognition,
71, 73–108.
DYSLEXIA SPEED PROBLEMS IN SPANISH
Francisca Serrano, Sylvia Defior
University of Granada (Spain)
Dyslexia is a persistent problem that involves a serious
difficulty in identifying written words, and that affects
people of otherwise normal intellectual capacity.
Cross-linguistic studies (Öney and Durgunoglu,
1994; Landerl, Wimmer and Frith, 1997; Seymour, Aro
and Erskine, 2003) have highlighted that the conceptualisation of dyslexia may be influenced by the differences between orthographic systems. According to
these studies, the results of the investigations carried
out with English speakers are not totally applicable to
other languages and it has been suggested that the occurrences of dyslexia in the different countries reflect the
differences in the orthographic complexity of their writing system. The indicators of dyslexic difficulties may
even have a different value depending on the written
system under consideration. For example, in opaque
orthographies, the criterion used to compare reading
achievement between children with dyslexia and normal readers is accuracy in reading performance. In more
transparent orthographies, reading accuracy is a less im-
149
portant factor, whereas speed is more determining. Research undertaken in German (Wimmer, 1993; Wimmer
and Mayringer, 2001), Finnish (Holopainen, Ahoen and
Lyytinen, 2001; Müller and Brady, 2001), Italian (Tressoldi, Stella and Faggella, 2001) and Spanish (Jiménez
and Hernández-Valle, 2000) supports these ideas.
This study aimed to make progress in clarifying the
nature of dyslexia in the Spanish language. A sample
of Spanish dyslexic children was compared to two control groups; the age-matched control group (CA) and
the reading-level control group (RL) in three reading
tasks. Two tasks demand individuals to use the phonological procedure (non-word reading and pseudohomophone reading) and another one demands them to use
the orthographic procedure (homophone decision task).
For each task, accuracy and reading time were measured.
All the tests were carried out individually. The nonword reading and the pseudohomophone reading tasks
were presented and registered by computer while the
homophone decision task was registered by using pen
and paper procedure
Non-parametric test (U Mann-Whitney) was used to
analyse the results in each of the tasks. Generally, results showed a low performace in the dyslexic group in
all the tasks used.
Table 1 shows the accuracy results of the reading
tests, measured by percentage of error.
Table 1. Mean percentage of error and (standard desviation) in nonword and
pseudohomophone reading and in homophone decision task, as a function
of Group.
Tasks
Dyslexic group (D)
N=10
Reading-level control
group (RL) N=10
Age-matched control
group (CA) N=10
Nonword reading
25,00 (19,54)
7,92 (10,65)
4,16 (8,09)
9,5 (7,97)
3,5 (3,37)
0,5 (1,58)
26,67 (11,36)
22,78 (11,55)
11,67 (6,11)
Pseudohomophone
reading
Homophone
decision
Comparison
D-CA-RL
D-CA**
D-RL*
D-CA**
CA-RL**
D-CA**
CA-RL**
This deficit is more evident when time is considered command of phonological processing. Table 2 shows
and in nonword reading task, which requires a great the performance time results measured in seconds.
Table 2. Mean time in seconds and (standard desviation) in nonword and
pseudohomophone reading and in homophone decision task, as a function
of Group.
Tasks
Dyslexic group (D)
N=10
Reading-level control
group (RL) N=10
Age-matched control
group (CA) N=10
Nonword reading
152,9 (23,92)
135,6 (12,01)
122,1 (9,14)
Pseudohomophone
reading
151,3 (36,3)
128,1 (10,13)
110,3 (11,32)
Homophone
decision
176,8 (43,24)
169,9 (63,59)
103,4 (33,26)
In conclussion, according to studies with other transparent orthographies such as Italian and German, speed
problems are more evident and relevant than accuracy
problems in the explanation of dyslexic deficits in Spanish. The phonological deficit becomes apparent in the
slow performance of the dyslexic children in the reading
tests and also in the errors they make when the test
requires a great command of the phonological rules,
which is the case of non-word reading. We consider
the fact that the children need more time in the task
performance is an indicator that phonological processing is not automatized, which connects with the idea
Comparison
D-CA-RL
D-CA**
CA-RL**
D-CA**
D-RL*,
CA-RL**
D-CA**
CA-RL*
of an automatization deficit in dyslexia (Nicholson and
Fawcett, 1990; Van der Leij and Van Daal, 1999).
References:
Holopainen, L., Ahonen, T., & Lyytinen, H. (2001). Predicting delay in reading achievement in a highly transparent
language. Journal of Learning Disabilities, 34 (5), 401–413.
Jiménez González, J. E., & Hernández Valle, I. (2000).
Word Identification and Reading disorders in the Spanish
Language. Journal of Learning disabilities, 33 (1), 44–60.
Landerl, K.; Wimmer, H. & Frith, U. (1997) The impact
of orthographic consistency on dyslexia: a German.English
comparison. Cognition, 63, 315–334
150
Müller, K. & Brady, S. (2001). Correlates of early reading performance in a transparent orthography. Reading and
Writing: An Interdisciplinary Journal, 14, 757–799.
Nicholson, R. I., & Fawcett, A. J. (1990) Automaticity:
A new framework for dyslexia research. Cognition, 35, 159–
182.
Öney, B. & Durgunoglu, A. (1997) Beginning to read in
Turkish: A phonologically transparent orthography. Applied
Psycholinguistics, 18 (1), 1–7.
Seymour, P. H. K.; Aro, M. & Erskine, J. M. (2003)
Foundation literacy acquisition in European orthographies.
British Journal of Psycholog, 94, 143–174.
Tressoldi, P. E., Stella, G., & Faggella, M. (2001) The
development of reading speed in Italians with Dyslexia: A
longitudinal study. Journal of learning disabilities, 34 (5),
414–417
Van der Leij, A., & Van Daal, H. P. (1999). Automaticity, automatization and Dyslexia. In I. L. Kundberg,
F. E. Tonnessen, & I. Austad (Eds.), Dyslexia: Advances in
Theory and Practice. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Wimmer, H. (1993). Characteristics of developmental
dyslexia in a regular writing system. Applied Psycholinguistics, 14, 1–33.
Wimmer, H., & Mayringer, H. (2001). Is the ReadingRate problem of German Dyslexic Children Caused by Slow
Visual Processes? In M. Wolf (Ed.), Dyslexia, Fluency and
the Brain. N.Y.: York Press
TAKING THE PRINCIPLED POLYSEMY MODEL OF SPATIAL
PARTICLES BEYOND ENGLISH: THE CASE OF RUSSIAN ZA
Darya Shakhova, Andrea Tyler
Georgetown University (Washington, USA)
Based on the analysis of approximately 1500 naturally
occurring examples of the Russian preposition za, this
paper presents a Cognitive Linguistic analysis of the
many meanings associated with this preposition. In addition, the analysis takes into consideration, the interaction of the semantics of case (Janda, 2005) with the
various meanings associated with za. The results show
that the many meanings form a systematic, motivated
network of senses.
Motivated by the goals of providing a replicable
methodology and theoretically grounded model of the
polysemy networks of English spatial particles, Tyler &
Evans (e.g. 2001; 2003) developed a model of semantic extension, termed the Principled Polysemy model.
Relying primarily on established principles of language
processing such as embodied experience, profiling, and
pragmatic inferencing, the model attempted to offer
both a method for determining the central sense of a
preposition and a more comprehensive accounting of
the meaning extension mechanisms involved in polysemy
networks of spatial particles. In addition to defining the
central sense of a preposition as reflecting a particular
spatial relation between a trajector (TR) and a landmark
(LM), Tyler & Evans argue that a functional element,
which represents the humanly meaningful consequences
of the TR and LM being in a particular spatial configuration, must be recognized as a key part of the central
sense.
The model emphasizes universal properties of human cognition, leading Tyler & Evans to hypothesize
that the model is likely to be applicable to most languages. However, Tyler & Evans’ analyses have been
based almost solely on English prepositions and the hypothesis concerning universal application is yet to be
tested. The purpose of this paper is to begin to test
the universality of the Principled Polysemy model by applying it to one of the most highly polysemous spatial
particles in Russian, za. A second purpose is to investigate how the model might be flexibly augmented when
applied to a language whose system of spatial referencing includes a complex system of case marking, which
is lacking in English.
The Russian preposition za is associated with a
broad range of meanings, e.g. standard Russian-English
dictionaries list such diverse meanings as behind, over,
outside, beyond, after, for, at, by, because. Some
Russian-Russian dictionaries list up to 21 different uses.
To date, no unified analysis has been offered for the
many, seemingly unrelated meanings associated with za.
Moreover, many of the dictionary definitions are misleading in that they often fail to provide subtle, but key
elements of contextualized usage. For instance, a common dictionary definition of za is okolo ‘near’; a typical
illustrative example is sidet za stolom ‘sit ‘near’ the table’(cf. Ozhegov and Shvedova). However, while za
denotes a spatial scene where the TR is positioned in
close proximity to the LM (here the table) and therefore
conforms to the notion ‘near’, in this context za evokes
an additional understanding that the TR is facing towards the table and that part of the tabletop covers the
TR’s knees. Such a fine-grained configuration is not
captured by the preposition ‘near’ or okolo.
The analysis presented here argues that applying
the Principled Polysemy model allows us to account for
the range of meanings exhibited by za, including finegrained interpretations as illustrated above. Key to the
analysis is positing a central scene in which the TR is
positioned behind and proximal to the LM. The functional element arising from this configuration is one of
mutual influence between the TR and LM; one consequence of this functional element is the notion of the
purposefulness of the TR being positioned proximal to
the LM, hence the interpretation that if a person is located za the table, they are positioned such that they
can purposefully interact with the table. In addition,
the analysis demonstrates how the central meaning elements associated with the accusative and instrumental
151
cases interact with the semantic network of za in con- nitivnoe modelirovanie, No. 4, part I, ed. by R. K. Potapova,
V. D. Solov’ev and V. N. Poljakov. Moscow: MISIS
text of use.
References:
Janda, L. (1993) A Geography of Case Semantics: The
Czech Dative and the Russian Instrumental. Berlin: Mouton
de Gruyter.
Janda, L. (2000). A Cognitive Model of the Russian Accusative Case. In Trudy mezhdunarodnoj konferencii. Kog-
Tyler, A. and Evans, V. (2003) The Semantics of English
Prepositions: Spatial Sciences, Embodied Meaning and Cognition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Shakhova, D. (2003). Principled polysemy in the semantics of the Russian preposition ‘za’: a cognitive approach.
Unpublished Master’s thesis, Georgetown University.
FUNCTIONAL PROPERTIES OF NUCLEUS ACCUMBENS
NEURONES IN ZONES RECEIVING HIPPOCAMPAL OR
PREFRONTAL CORTICAL INPUTS: THE SPATIAL AND
BEHAVIORAL CORRELATES*
R. Shibata1 , E. Tabuchi2 , O. Trullier3 ,
S. V. Albertin4 *, A. B. Mulder 5 ,
S. I. Wiener6
1
Ajinomoto Co., Inc. (Japan);
Toyama Medical and Pharmacological University
(Toyama, Japan);
3
MASA Group (Paris, France);
4
Pavlov Institute of Physiology, Russian Academy
of Sciences (St. Petersburg, Russia);
5
Netherlands Institute for Brain Research
(Amsterdam, The Netherlands);
6
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique /
LPPA, College de Prance (Paris, France)
2
In order to better understand the impact of hippocampal
processing on downstream neural structures and cognitive functions, neurons were simultaneously recorded in
the hippocampus and in basal ganglia zones receiving inputs from hippocampus directly (the nucleus accumbens
shell) or indirectly via the prefrontal cortex (nucleus accumbens core and ventromedial caudate nucleus) in rats
performing spatial orientation tasks. In one series of
experiments, the animals alternated be-tween using intramaze and extramaze cues to find water rewards. In
a second series, the rats were required to learn the distribution of different reward quantities provided at the
respective goal boxes in a plus maze. Correct performance in the latter task has been shown to be impaired
by lesions of the accumbens shell receiving subicular projections of hippocampus.
Hippocampal place responses were anchored to the
extramaze cues and were independent of reward values provided near or in the firing fields. While no
hippocampal-like firing fields were round in accumbens neurons, neuronal activity during pre-reward, postreward and reward appro-ach behaviors was more intense at some locations than at others. Moreover our
data revealed the existence of synchrony between hippocampus and Acb neurones which is modulated by spatial position and rewards and the theta rhythm may play
an important role for this synchronization. This is consistent with anatomical and physiological observations
corresponding to the convergence of hippocampal position information with reward related signals from the
amygdala and ventral tegmental area (VTA).
In both experiments, the hippocampus maintained
a stable representation of the environmental context
across the various experimental conditions while, in contrast, the Acb neurons were sensitive to all of the manipulations. While these findings are consistent with the
anatomical data, it remains to be determined how the
highly diverse responses in the accumbens are exploited
by downstream structures. Thus it must be recalled that
the Acb is an important junction tunneling inputs from
limbic cortices (including hippocampus, infralimbic and
prelimbic areas of the pre-frontal cortex) and subcortical
structures (e.g., amygdala) into the basal ganglion loops
that eventu-ally feedback through medial dorsal thalamic nucleus to arrive at prefrontal cortical areas believed
to have ‘executive’ functions. Accordingly experimental lesions to the accumbens spare the capacity to use
beacon cues to find water rewards (a simple taxic response) but impair the use of room cues to locate maze
arms previously associated with larger rewards. Behaviors such as the latter could benefit from information
signaled by individual neurons in the region of the accumbens, neurons that receive converging hippocampal,
prefrontal and amygdalar inputs which in turn encode
multiple types of information including spatial position
and behavioral context.
Further studies employing simultaneous recordings
in these structures will help to further elucidate the dynamics of information transfer in the interactions between these structures.
A scheme presented above illustrates the anatomical
relations of the hippocampus and the nucleus accumbens (adapted with permission from Thierry, Gioanni,
Degenetais, Glowinski (2000). Glutamatergic pathways
are shown in dashed lines, GABA — ergic pathways
in solid lines. Abbreviations: CA1-hippocampal cornu
* This work was supported by GIS, Cogniscience, Human Frontiers Fellowship to ABM, a Canon Foundation grant to RS, RFFI
and French Menrt to SVA, French MAE, the EC HCM and Esprit programs.
152
ammonis region; DA — dopaminergic pathway; Nacc tia nigra pars reticulata; STN — subthalamic nucleus;
— nucleus accumbens; PFC — prefrontal cortex; SNC Thal-mediodorsal thalamic nucleus; VP1 and VPm —
— substantia nigra pars compacta; SNR — substan- ventral pallidum, lateral and medial parts.
CA1
Subiculum
PFC
Thal
PFC
CA1
Subiculum
Thal
NAcc
”core”
NAcc
”shell”
Ventromedial
Caudate n.
VP1
VPm
STN
SNR
VTA/SNC
DA
To pre-motor structures.
THE READING PROCESS: A UNIVERSAL OR
LANGUAGE-SPECIFIC MECHANISM?
Joseph Shimron
University of Haifa (Haifa, Israel)
A central question in the psychology of reading is
what characteristics of the reading process are universal
across languages and writing systems, and in what aspects of the reading process do language-specific and
orthographic factors affect the reading act. In answering these questions, one should take into account
how linguistic elements such as words, morphemes, and
phonemes are represented in print, and how the mechanism that identifies these elements is constrained by
language- and orthographic-specific factors.
One way to explore this issue is to examine reading in a variety of languages and orthographies. Most
research on the psychology of reading so far has been
conducted on Indo-European languages. In this presentation I review the research on reading Hebrew, a
Semitic language that has some unique characteristics
in its writing system and word morphology.
As for the writing system, reading Hebrew differs
from reading most other languages in that the Hebrew
reader is nearly equally proficient in reading two kinds of
alphabets: one that contains diacritical marks (points,
nekudot) that signify each and every phoneme of the
spoken language, and another that omits these marks.
The question here is are these two alphabets read dif-
ferently, and if they are, in what ways? The comparison between the readings of these two alphabets may
indicate the extent to which the reading mechanism relies on phonological information in the process of word
recognition. It may also suggest a compensation mechanism, which is at work when phonological information
is not sufficiently provided.
On the morphological level, the research on IndoEuropean languages in the last three decades has accumulated increasing evidence that in reading complex
words readers decompose the words into their morphemes, and extract the meaning of the morphemes on
the way towards the recognition of the whole word. It
seems logical that this word decomposition process is
facilitated in languages in which morphemes are aligned
in a simple linear fashion. If this is so, readers of Hebrew may encounter difficulties, because quite likely,
in Hebrew, in order to extract the meaning of words,
the reader must identify a consonantal root that is
embedded in a word pattern, in a non-linear (nonconcatenative) fashion. The question here is do Hebrew
readers decompose words into their root and pattern
despite the fact that these are meshed in a nonlinear
manner, and if so, how do they do it?
Empirical results on these two matters support a universal model of reading which is endowed with a high
degree of versatility and flexibility that enables adapta-
153
tion to language-specific factors. For example, it turns
out that consistent with many other languages, Hebrew
reading is facilitated by phonological information-single
words are easier to recognize when more unequivocal
phonological information is provided in the print. However, the advantage of the pointed Hebrew alphabet
over the unpointed alphabet is diminished, perhaps nullified, in reading a text. The reader, so it seems, is
quite agile in recruiting information beyond that which
is given in the text.
In addition, psycholinguistic research suggests that
Hebrew readers do identify the consonantal roots even
though they are intertwined non-linearly within word
patterns. That is, the word-decomposition hypothesis
withstands the non-linearity of Hebrew words’ morphology. Together with research conducted on other (nonEuropean) languages such as Chinese and Japanese, the
empirical evidence provides some ground for a description of a model of reading that has some universal parameters on the one hand, and remarkable means of
adaptability on the other.
References:
Berent, I. and Shimron, J. (1997). The representation of
Hebrew words: Evidence from the obligatory contour principle. Cognition, 64, 39–72.
Berent, I. and Shimron, J. (2003). Co-occurrence restrictions on identical consonants in the Hebrew lexicon: Are
they due to similarity? Journal of Linguistics, 39, 1.
Frost, R., Forster, K. I., & Deutsch, A. (1997). What can
we learn from the morphology of Hebrew? A masked priming investigation of morphological representation. Journal of
Experimental Psychology: Learning Memory, and Cognition,
23, 829–856.
Perfetti, C. A. (2003). The universal grammar of reading. Scientific Studies of Reading. 7, 1, 3–24.
Perfetti, C. A., Zhang, S. and Berent, I. (1992). Reading
in English and Chinese: Evidence for a universal phonological principal. In R. Frost, & L. Katz (Eds.), Orthography,
phonology, morphology, and meaning (pp. 227–248). Amsterdam: North-Holland.
Shimron, J. (1993). The role of vowels in reading: A
review of studies of English and Hebrew. Psychological Bulletin, 114, 1, 52–67.
Shimron, J. (Ed.) (2003). Language processing and
language acquisition in a root-based (Semitic) morphology.
Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
Shimron, J. (2005). Reading and literacy in Hebrew:
The language and the psychology of reading it. Mahwah
NJ: Erlbaum Press.
PROCESSING OF SYNTAX, BASED ON SEMANTIC OPERATIONS
Velina Slavova1 , Alona Soschen2
1
New Bulgarian University (Sofia, Bulgaria)
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
(Cambridge, USA)
2
Introduction. The efficiency of the existing AI systems
for speech recognition is still far below the human capacity to recognize the meaning of what was said.
On their conceptual level, these systems are not based
on a formal representation of processes, which occur in
the human cognitive system. The intention of this work
is to obtain a formal model which takes into consideration the following cognitive principles: 1) Constructing
the meaning is a dynamic process, which results in two
information flows — Bottom-up and Top-down, 2) Information stored in Long Term Memory (LTM) is structured, 3) Information flows are processed using Working
Memory (WM) resources; 4) A control mechanism oversees the overall process of transformation, conduction,
retrieval and use of information. These functions are
performed within a system called further a cognitive
system (CS).
Formal Approach. A formal model, called AGN
(Figure 1), is elaborated using mathematical formalism
of Generalized Nets1 . AGN simulates CS functions during the treatment of language message. A sequence
of sentence-fragments α is processed on transitions Zi
(corresponding to stages of speech perception) and conduced to the Top through parallel pathways, related
1 Generalized
to memory buffers and verification loops. The interaction between Top-down and Bottom-up information
flows assigns new characteristics to the ascending signal. The stored in LTM knowledge is organized in two
discrete structures — γ and σ, corresponding to knowledge spaces — language (as a system of lexical units
and grammatical rules) and semantics (a semantic representation of the world, based on a system of semantic
primitives and operators).
The model incorporates the use of a ‘mental lexicon µ’, containing the correspondences between the elements of the two LTM structures. The elements of γ
and σ are activated (on the right places of fig.1) by the
massage content. The stored activation influences the
Top-down information flow.
The formal description of AGN transitions has required a detailed accurate description of their inputs
and outputs, permitting to analyze the flows, managed
by the system.
The development of AGN obliges to base transitions
Z25 — Z27 on the semantic and language knowledge
simultaneously. Transitions Z25 — Z27 correspond to
the stages of syntactic treatment. General representation of human language requires the inclusion of joint
operations in two knowledge spaces — conceptual and
grammatical.
Representation of LTM Knowledge. Language
is represented as Language Information System (LIS).
According to engineering procedures for conceiving LIS,
Nets can be viewed as a kind of extended Petri Nets.
154
language rules are images of operators in the semantic
space. LIS treatment unit is shaped on the basis of semantic primitives, semantic operators, language rules,
and data. LTM knowledge is modeled by means of a
relational database (DB) with two underlying levels of
data representation — SEMantic primitives and operators, and SYNtactic parameters and rules.
Application of LIS approach. The proposed
database architecture is applied for modeling a specific
grammatical rule — secondary predication (SP) in Russian. Implications of the distinction between INSTR
and NOM Case marking on SP were examined in several linguistics studies, without obtaining uniform results and explanations. The DB, constructed for the
study (fig. 2), contains a semantic level, with units for
the basic semantic categories concept, characteristic, state and event and the semantic operators:
assign characteristic, choose state and chunk
in new concept. The grammatical level is composed
by parameters representing general language categories
and factors, associated with specific linguistics studies
of secondary predication.
Ja
pokupaju banany spelymi (I/-nom
buy bananas/-acc ripe/-instr) and
Don
pišet pis’mo ustalyim (Don/-nom
writes letter /-acc tired/-instr).
The analysis confirms that processing necessitates
between SYN rules and operations in
SEM space applied to corresponding SEM primitives.
Tracking procedure demonstrates that system employs
the structure of SEM space and activation (by message content) of its elements to obtain a solution about
statement’s meaning.
In conclusion, modeling of this particular SYN rule
and the reasoning behind both AGN and LIS models
suggests that grammatical rules are transferable to semantic primitives and operators. The analysis implemented by means of AGN confirms the level of syntactic
and semantic primitives shared by human languages.
translation
Figure 2. LIS architecture in secondary predication DB
References:
Figure 1. AGN — Generalized Net Model
Examples of statements (linguistic data: 53 examples and contra-examples) are stored in DB and connected to both levels. Linguistic assumptions are validated by the queries over the parameters modeled in
DB. Only the proposed canonical SEM scheme provides,
for all statements, a clear-cut and uniform explanation
of the semantics of SP. Conclusions: 1. SEM representation of events must be treated as separate from states
of objects; 2. INSTR marking on SP implies SEM operator choice of state.
Syntax / semantics interface. We tracked on
AGN statements like:
1. Slavova V. (2004) A generalized net for natural language comprehension,. in: Advanced Studies in Contemporary Mathematics, vol. 8, Ku-Duk Press, 131–
153.
2. Slavova, V. and A. Soschen (2005) Information processing in a cognitive model of NLP, in: International Journal Information theories & applications,
in print.
3. Soschen, A. (2003). On Subject and Predicates in
Russian. Ph. d. Dissertation, Univ. Ottawa.
4. Soschen A., and V. Slavova (2005), Information system approach to semantics, in: Text Processing and
Cognitive Technologies, IIX International conference
Cognitive modeling in linguistics, Varna 2005.
Puzzles of crosslinguistic diversity in form-meaning mappings
Dan I. Slobin
University of California, Berkeley (USA)
The basic problem of language acquisition is to arrive
at the mappings between meaning and form in the expo-
sure language. Neither the meanings nor the forms can
be given to the child in advance, because there is great
diversity between languages. It is proposed that the
child is equipped with various procedures for extracting
155
both meanings and forms. The lecture focuses on prob- (bootstrapping) require attention to fine-grained selems of extracting appropriate semantic categories in mantic distinctions, syntactic constructions, and the tyvarious languages. The procedures available to the child pological tendencies of the exposure language.
DYNAMICS OF LEARNING AND INTERFERENCE IN APPROACH
AND WITHDRAWAL CONDITIONS*
Sozinov A. A.1 , Laukka S. J.2 ,
Zaccagnini J. L.3 , Tuominen-Eilola T.2 ,
Siipo A.2 , Nopanen M.2 ,
Alexandrov Yu. I.2
1
Institute of Psychology, Russian Academy of
Sciences, Moscow, Russia
2
LearnLab, University of Oulu, Finland
2
Dept Basic Psychology, University of Málaga,
Spain
Factors of learning and teaching efficacy are considered
in psychology and pedagogics. New learning occurs
in accord with its context (setup, physiological state,
etc.) and the structure of previously formed memory.
The ways of new and previous memories interaction include interference, a decrease in performance after new
learning. Difficulty and similarity of tasks, time interval
between them are factors of interference (Experimental
Psychology, 1966,). Transfer of learning is influenced
by evaluation of shame and guilt emotional experience
(Laukka et al., 2004).
Behavior of organisms can be classified as approach
or withdrawal (Schneirla, 1959). This classification is
used in research of emotions (Davidson et al., 1990;
Schwarz, 1990; Alexandrov & Sams, 2005; etc.). Memory formation and learning is determined by the type of
motivation (Shvyrkova, Shvyrkov, 1975; and many others). On the stage of afferent synthesis prevailing motivation defines the memory used during realization of
definitive behavior (P. K. Anokhin). Withdrawal, including the avoidance of punishment, is emotionally negative situation (NS), and approach, including obtaining of reward, is emotionally positive situation (PS),
and different behaviors are used in these situations.
Hence, different valences of emotional situations are related to actualization of different domains of memory (Alexandrov & Sams, 2005). It was shown that NS
has more cognitive load, is more differentiated, than
PS (Peeters, Czapinski, 1990; Damasio; and many others), and that more systems belong to the negative
domain than to the positive domain (Alexandrov &
Sams, 2005). Hence, we have proposed that the dynamics of learning and interference in PS and NS is
different.
In order to check this proposition we have conducted
a study with 58 pupils of Practice school, Oulu University, Finland (aged 10–11). Each participant was
asked to perform two tasks on defining parameters of
* Supported:
words that were presented on a computer monitor. All
the words (Finnish nouns and adjectives) were known
by the pupils. The first task required distinguishing between two sizes of letters: it could be either big or
small (font size task). The second task was to
define the number of letters in presented words: there
could be either four or five letters (number of letters
task). Thus, the both tasks had two possible answers
(corresponding to the two buttons on computer keyboard) and did not require word reading. The time interval between tasks was 5 min or less. A short training
session was given before each task. Therefore, all participants had to pass four stages of the study: training
and performance for the first and the second tasks.
Participants were asked to look at the screen attentively and to answer as soon as possible by pushing a
specified button after each word disappears. All the buttons were required to be pressed with the forefinger of
dominant hand, and to hold the space button rest of the
time. This way we recorded errors percent and the time
from word disappearance to the button pressing (RT).
Each task was ordered either the first or the second in
two different groups. If the RT in the second task of
one group exceeded the RT in the first (same) task of
the other group, we concluded that there is interference
effect.
PS and NS were given by the instruction: adding
points for the correct answers (with no subtracting
for errors), or subtracting points for errors (without
adding), correspondingly. One half of participants received PS instruction, and the rest received NS instruction. Combination of two independent variables
(PS/NS, and order of tasks) resulted in four groups of
subjects 13–16 participants each. Nonparametric statistics was used for the analysis, and the differences were
considered significant if p<,01.
There were significantly more errors percent in font
size task than in number of letters task. Nevertheless, we found no differences in errors percent between
NS and PS for one or the other task. Hence, the difficulty of the PS and NS, assessed by errors percent, was
similar, but the font size task was more difficult than
the number of letters task. It means that one order
of tasks was from simple to hard, and the other — from
hard to simple.
In the first training session the RT of all subjects
was similar in all four groups. In the later stages RT in
PS appeared to be significantly lower than in NS. This
effect differed in two orders of tasks. The dynamics
RFH 05–06–06055a, RF President’s grant 1989.2003.6.
156
of RT revealed interference effect, when the tasks
were presented from hard to simple (font size
— number of letters), but only in NS. When the
order was from simple to hard, this dynamics revealed
positive transfer effect, more considerable in PS. The
RT was greater in NS than in PS in both orders.
Thus, we have shown that the interference and
transfer effects are related to the situation (PS or NS),
i.e. to the valence of emotion. We found general advantage of PS in RT dynamics that is not seen in the
first stages.
Greater RT in NS is in accordance with the following propositions: approach and withdrawal behaviors
are performed via actualization of different domains of
memory; withdrawal behavior is subserved by the elements of a more differentiated memory domain, than
outwardly similar approach behavior.
References:
1. Alexandrov Yu.I., Sams M. Emotion and consciousness: ends of a continuity, Cogn. Brain Res., 25(2),
2005, pp. 387–405.
2. Davidson R. J., Ekman P., Saron C. D., Senulis J. A.,
Friesen W. V. Approach-Withdrawal and Cerebral
Asymmetry: Emotional Expression and Brain Physiology I, J. Personality and Social Psychology, 58(2),
1990, pp. 330–341.
3. Experimental Psychology. Eds. Woodworth R. S.,
Schlosberg H. S. Methuen & Co., 1966 (1954), Ch.
24, p. 733.
4. Laukka S. J., Heikkilä J., Sozinov A., Alexandrov
Yu.I., Zaccagnini J. L. Relationship between transfer
and shame emotion, Psykologia 2004 — Kongressi,
Turku, Finland, p. 101.
5. Peeters G., Czapinski J. Positive-negative asymmetry
in evaluations: the distinction between affective and
informational negativity effects. In: European Rev.
of Social Psychology, v.1. Eds. Stroebe W., Hewstone M., New York: John Wiley & Sons Ltd, 1990,
pp. 34–60.
6. Schneirla T. C. An Evolutionary and Developmental
Theory of Biphasic Processes Underlying Approach
and Withdrawal. In: Nebraska symposium on motivation, v.7. Ed. M. R. Jones, Univ. of Nebraska
Press, Lincoln, 1959, pp. 1–42.
7. Schwarz N. Feelings as information. Informational
and motivational functions of affective states. In:
The Handbook of motivation and cognition: Foundations of social behavior, v.2. Eds. E. T. Higgins,
Sorrentino R. M., New York: Guilford Press, 1990,
pp. 527–561.
8. Shvyrkova N. A., Shvyrkov V. B. Activity of the visual
cortex neurons during feeding and avoidance behavior, Neurophysiologia, 7(1), 1975, pp. 100–102. (in
Russian)
RECIPROCAL CONJUNCTION OF RELATIONAL NOUNS
Petr D. Staroverov
Moscow State University (Russia)
In this work I examine the behavior of relational nouns
in coordination construction. I use the term relational
nouns to refer to all nominal elements that roughly
speaking have valencies. This means that those
nouns denote an entity that is related to another entity.
For example, if we use the word brother we can’t help
having in mind whose brother it is. This can be shown by
employing simple test first proposed by Panevová (1974
among many others). When you use a word like brother
you can never answer I don’t know if someone asks
you whose brother it is.
By definition, relational nouns denote two-place reunpublished] I will use the
lations. Following [
terms referent and correlate to describe the related
entities (in case of brother the person who actually
is brother corresponds to the referent and the person
whose brother it is corresponds to the correlate).
The constructions in question include examples1 like
(1) where we get what I call reciprocal interpretation.
(1) can be used when we talk about two people who are
in fact brother and sister to each other but not in the
Š
case of talking about, say, brother of Peter and sister of
Mary.
(1)
Brother and sister have been speaking to each other
al night long.
This does not coincide quite well with what we know
about the semantics of coordination and with current
theories of assigning values to implicit arguments. Relational nouns are traditionally treated as two-place predicates connecting the correlate to the referent. However, recent theories of conjunction (Krifka 1990, Winter 2001 among others) suggest that two-place predicates conjunction yields a two place predicate as it is in
case of (3) where the second argument of the verb can
not be dropped. In case of relational nouns sentences
corresponding to (3b) are grammatical (4).
(2)
< D
>1
71 X R
1 51 X
R
1
They attacked and destroyed the enemy. They attacked and destroyed.
1998, Partee 1989)
It has been noticed (
that correlates for relational nouns are established as
speaker, addressee, subject or narrator depending on
the context. Partee (1989) finds that all that variables
can be described by the term Origo (first introduced in
]
1 In this report I use Russian examples. Most of my claims about semantics hold for many other languages as well as for Russian.
However, there may be some complications as, for example, in case of English where you need to describe how these facts interact
with the possibility of employing an article (compare: brother and sister, a brother and a sister, ?? the brother and the sister ).
157
[Bühler 1934]) which roughly corresponds to discourse
prominent referent. So in most cases the correlate of
relational nouns seems to be pragmatically determined.
The reciprocal interpretation provides a completely different way of establishing the correlate.
I will argue that reciprocal components are in
fact central in the semantics of constructions like (1)
and (2). This can be shown firstly by the fact that the
nouns that are not inherently relational such as teacher
and pupil get reciprocal interpretation if conjoined.
(3)
Teacher and pupil have spent this summer in Paris.
Second, predicative uses of relational nouns demonstrate that reciprocality is in fact crucial.
N>
> D
Z 1
OJP = † Q 1
! "#$ %& $# '(&)
OHP 71 = 1 51 Ž 1
! # ($&%) *& # #)
not denote exactly inverse functions.
Of course, for every person it is true that he or she
is a sibling of his or her sibling. But the situation is a bit
more complicated because one can have more than one
sibling. If x belongs to the set picked out by the function
f(g(x)) we will call f and g quasi-inverse functions. We
can formulate the following principle: two nouns can get
reciprocal interpretation in coordination construction if
and only if they denote quasi-inverse functions.
This principle seems to be quite plausible. Indeed
the referents of the words denoting quasi-inverse functions are inherently connected by certain relation that
shows up when these words are combined in a coordinate structure.
References:
pJ- , p p q !
( ' )
( 66 n , O2 r l # L5 G0H L1
Roughly speaking, (5a) means that Vania has children. Speaking more formally, when relational nouns /. 1 M g-
m0 s * (
'
are used in predicative position their correlate gets existentially quantified. Therefore (5b) is pragmatically GTC9U9<E9= Y?_ ?E '?Ct?C? d?CE99aU U9u><?CH
0- n , !
" unacceptable: being a son means having a father, but
everybody has a father so the sentence is not informa- + g- I l/. ".
tive.
Q3- j v * , -
' In (4) however we are not talking about the exis- 66 3 !3 R $O g
tence of Vania’s wife and Masha’s husband. It is crucial -
that they are husband and wife to each other. That’s
Barker, C. 1999 Temporary Accomodation: I am the
why negating the sentence (5) doesn’t mean that either Oldest of My Siblings.Studies in the Linguistic Sciences 29.
Vania or Masha is unmarried.
Borschev, V. and Partee, B. H. 2004. Genitives, types,
O:P = † Q 1
Vania and Masha are not husband and wife.
Furthermore, the example (6) shows that we are
not dealing with presuppositional meaning in case of
conjoined relational nouns. Barker (1999) claims that
meaning shifts in relational nouns may arise to satisfy
presupposition but here it is not the case.
So we deal with semantic restrictions that need to
be explained. In what follows I try to approach this
problem. First of all, it is evident that not all of the
relational nouns can get reciprocal meaning when conjoined. For example in (8) we do not get the reading
where the referent of the word brother is in fact brother
of the person denoted by the word friend.
OuP ‚ DR 1
I am going to invite my brother and my friend to my
birthday.
And of course not all of the nouns that can be relationalized get the reciprocal interpretation or even
become relational occurring in coordination construction.
OIP C
†
[ > >
1
A teacher and a doctor are needed to work at school.
I use the notion of inverse functions to describe the
semantics of conjoined relational nouns. To be more
precise, I will be talking about what can be called quasiinverse functions. Two functions f and g are inverse
when f(g(x))=x. But the words we are describing do
and sorts: the Russian genitive of measure. // Possessives
and Beyond: Semantics and Syntax (UMOP 29), eds. Jiyung Kim, Yury A. Lander and Barbara H. Partee, 29–43.
Amherst, MA: GLSA Publications.
Bühler, Karl. 1934. Sprachtheorie. Jena: Fischer.
Krifka, M. 1990 Boolean and non-boolean and. //
Papers from the second symposiumon Logic and Language,
eds. In Lászlo Kálman and Lászlo Polos, Akadémiai Kiadó,
161–188. Budapest.
Panevová, Jarmila. 1974. On verbal frames in functional
generative description I. // Prague Bulletin of Mathematical
Linguistics 22:3–40.
Panevová, Jarmila. 1975. On verbal frames in functional
generative description II. // Prague Bulletin of Mathematical Linguistics 23:17–52.
Partee, Barbara. 1989. Binding implicit variables
in quantified contexts. // CLS 25: Papers from the
Twenty Fifth Meeting of the Chicago Linguistic Society, eds. C. Wiltshire, B. Music and R. Graczyk, 342–365.
Chicago: Chicago Linguistic Society.
Partee, B. H., and Borschev, V. 2003. Genitives, relational nouns, and argument-modifier ambiguity. // Modifying Adjuncts, eds. E. Lang, C. Maienborn and C. FabriciusHansen, 67–112. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.
Vikner, C. and Jensen, P. A. 2002. A semantic analysis of the English genitive. Interaction of lexical and formal
semantics. Studia Linguistica 56:191–226.
Winter, Y. 2001. Flexibility principles in Boolean Semantics: the Interpretation of Coordination, Plurality and
Scope in Natural Language. Current studies in linguistics,
37, MA: MIT Press.
158
A COGNITIVE-FUNCTIONAL APPROACH TO THE
DEVELOPMENT OF NUMBER AND CASE IN EARLY CHILD
GREEK: LEXICALLY BASED CONSTRUCTIONS VS. ABSTRACT
SYMBOLIC RULES
Ursula Stephany
University of Cologne (Koeln, Germany)
Contrary to what is held in structuralist (including generative) approaches to language acquisition in which
the development of grammar is seen as the acquisition
of abstract, across-the-board algebraic (symbolic)
rules which do not carry meaning themselves, cognitivefunctional (or usage-based) approaches postulate that
the development of grammar proceeds from item-based
to more abstract constructions, both of which are meaningful linguistic symbols remaining closely tied to the
lexical units from which they emerge. The adult target of language acquisition is therefore much less abstract than what it is considered to be in structuralist
approaches (see Bybee 2001, Tomasello 2003).
The main purpose of the paper is to show that the
development of number and case in Greek first language
acquisition is at first item-based demonstrating individual variability and only gradually becomes more general
and abstract. Thus, the acquisition of plural must not
be thought of as the acquisition of a formal, algebraic
rule but rather as the development of lexical schemas of
different degrees of generality (see Bybee 2001).
In a typical inflecting-fusional language such as
Modern Greek, a considerable number of noun stem
types has to be mastered in the acquisition of number and case. These include gender classes as well as
stem classes of different inflectional patterns within genders. The development of the grammatical categories
of number and case in Greek language acquisition is a
very slow process starting in the second year and continuing through the early school years (TheophanopoulouKontou 1973, Stephany 1997: 214).
As predicted by usage-based approaches to language
acquisition, the emergence of case distinctions such as
the (marked) genitive vs. the (unmarked) nominative /
accusative or the (marked) nominative vs. the (unmarked) accusative may considerably vary among children acquiring Greek as their native language. Rather
than being triggered by inherently grammatical factors it
may depend on pragmatic factors such as the children’s
natural gender and their first names belonging to the
masculine or feminine gender. Thus, a girl called Mairi
first expressed the cognitively early and socially important relation of possession with the speaker functioning
as possessor by the genitive of the first person singular clitic pronoun while the genitive of nouns emerged
later. In the speech of a boy named Christos, however,
this possessive relation was first expressed by the genitive form of his first name, a masculine noun (Christos
nom./Christu gen.). A boy named Spiros distinguished
the nominative singular form of a few masculine nouns
ending in -os from the accusative singular ending in -o
earlier than the girl Mairi because of his greater experience with a masculine noun of this subclass, his own
name.
Case distinctions are not only item-based in the beginning but they may also develop at a different pace
for different cases in different parts of speech. Thus,
paradigm formation will not only vary for individual
items but also for different gender classes. Rather than
being characterized by across-the-board, abstract rules
of plural or case formation the resulting developmental picture of the categories of number and case is at
first more adequately described as consisting of piecemeal knowledge of individual constructions. When the
number of constructions of a given number-case combination increases, more systematic and more abstract
patterns of morphological structure result.
References:
Bybee, J. (2001). Phonology and Language Use. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (Cambridge Studies in
Linguistics 94).
Stephany, U. (1997). The Acquisition of Greek. In
D. I. Slobin (ed.), The Crosslinguistic Study of Language
Acquisition. Vol. 4, pp. 183–333. Mahwah, NJ / London:
Lawrence Erlbaum.
Theophanopoulou-Kontou, D. (1973). Acquisition of
Noun Morphology by Children Learning Greek as a Native
Language. Unpubl. master’s thesis, Ohio State University,
Columbus.
Tomasello, M. (2003). Constructing a Language: A
Usage-Based Theory of Language Acquisition. Cambridge,
MA / London, England: Harvard University Press.
159
THE ROLE OF FICTIVE MOTION IN THE EXPRESSION OF
STATIC LOCATION: A CROSS-LINGUISTIC PERSPECTIVE
Dejan Stosic1 , Laure Sarda2
1
2
U.F.R. de Lettres et Arts (France)
Ecole Normale Supérieure (France)
This work examines the role of Fictive Motion verbs in
the expression of static location in English, French and
Serbian. Verbs of Fictive Motion are defined (Talmy
2000) as ‘verbs whose reference is to motion but which
actually describe static situations’ (e.g. The road descends towards the coast). The framework of the
present study is Talmy’s typological distinction between
Verb-framed languages (e.g. French) and Satelliteframed languages (e.g. Serbian, English) (cf. Talmy
2000). As is well known, this typological distinction reflects two ways of encoding a change of location, i.e.
‘the Path of Motion’. In Verb-framed languages, the
path of motion is encoded by the verb (e.g. FR Il est
entré dans la chambre). In Satellite-framed languages,
in contrast, the Path component is encoded by various particles (satellites) associated with the verb (e.g.
ENG He ran into the room). Moreover, it has been
shown (Tamy 2000, Slobin 2004) that this distinction
also reflects a difference in the ways of encoding the
‘Manner of motion’ component. The manner of motion is highly codable in Satellite-framed languages, and
much less so in Verb-framed languages. We particularly
discuss the validity of the distinction between highmanner-salient and low-manner-salient languages
for the domain of static location, seeking more generally to draw a parallel between the motion and location
domains (cf. Lemmens forthcoming).
We first compare the expression of static location
in French, chosen as representative of Verb-framed languages, to English and Serbian, two representatives of
Satellite-framed languages. These languages use three
main types of locative predicates in the expression of
static location:
a) neutral verbs (e.g. FR. être ‘to be’, se trouver ‘to
be located’).
of fictive motion among the other ways of expressing
static location.
In a previous work (S & S forthc.) based on the data
of French and Serbian, we show that Serbian uses the
posture verbs much more extensively by locating both
animate and inanimate Figures (e.g. Marija / njena
torba je stajala u holu. ‘Mary/her bag was standing in
the hall’). In French, only animate Figures (human or
animate) can occur with a posture verb (e.g. Le chien
est assis devant la maison. ‘the dog is sitting in front
of the house’ vs *Le livre est assis / debout sur la table. ‘the book is sitting / standing on the table’). This
pilot study also showed that French uses fictive motion
in some situations describes by posture verbs in Serbian
(1) and that Serbian preferably uses posture verbs to
translate some French fictive motion descriptions (2):
1. SR Nedaleko od Krnojelčeve pekarnice (. . . ) stajala je gazda-Nikolina kuća u kojoj je živeo Mihailo. (Andrić, Anikina vremena, p. 80)
‘. . . his house was standing not far from the bakery . . . ’
FR Pas loin de la boulangerie de Krénoyélats (. . . )
s’élevait la maison du gazda Nicola, où vivait
Mihaı̈lo. (p. 78)
‘. . . his house was standing / rising up not far
from the bakery’
2. FR Parcourant l’ı̂le en tous sens, il finit par
découvrir en effet un quillai dont le tronc
(. . . )
rampait sur le sol dont il s’élevait
médiocrement en se divisant en deux grosses
branches maı̂tresses. (Tournier, p. 120)
‘. . . its trunk slithered on the ground . . . ’
SR Prelazeći ostrvo u svim pravcima, na kraju je
zaista otkrio jedan kilaj čije je stablo (. . . ) ležalo
na tlu iz kojeg se malo izdizalo račvajući se na dve
glavne grane. (p. 82)
b) posture verbs (e.g. ENG. to sit, to lie, to stand),
‘. . . its trunk was lying on the ground . . . ’
which in many languages have become basic location verbs for describing the location of any entity,
The results of this comparison suggest that the limanimate or inanimate (e.g. ENG: The book is sit- ited use of posture verbs in French makes fictive moting on the table.) (cf. Newman 2002; Lemmens tion more salient. In the present work, we test this
2002a, 2002b; Grinevald forthcoming).
hypothesis by extending our analysis to English data.
c) verbs expressing fictive motion, i.e. verbs whose Our preliminary results show that English is more conreference is to motion, but which actually describe cerned with manner of location than Serbian, because of
static situations (e.g. The road descends towards a more extensive use of posture verbs in locating inanimates. These differences in the use of posture verbs
the coast) (Talmy 2000).
within the group of Satellite-framed languages have very
This cross-linguistic study is based on a large con- interesting implications for the salience of fictive motrastive corpus of expressions of static location. It com- tion. Thus, as for manner of motion (Slobin 2004) and
pares the role that these different types of locative pred- manner of location (Lemmens forthc.), a continuum of
icates play in each language, and focuses on the place salience appears to exist in the case of fictive motion
160
Lemmens, M. (forthc). Motion and location: toward a
across languages. Finally, we also show how such crosslinguistic differences in attention to fictive motion can cognitive typology
Newman, J. (ed.) 2002. The Linguistics of Sitting,
affect human spatial cognition.
References:
Grinevald, C. (forthc.)
Vers une typologie de
l’expression de la localisation statique: le cas des prédicats
locatifs. Actes du colloque de typologie TYPO3 de
l’association CERLITYP Presses Universitaires du Septentrion.
Lemmens, M. 2002a. The semantic network of Dutch
posture verbs In: Newman, John. (ed.) The Linguistics of
Sitting, Standing, and Lying. Amsterdam & Philadelphia:
John Benjamins, 103–139.
Lemmens, M. 2002b. Tracing referent location in
oral picture descriptions. In: A. Wilson, P. Rayson, &
T. McEnery, A Rainbow of Corpora — Corpus Linguistics
and the Languages of the World. München: Lincom-Europa.
Standing, and Lying. Amsterdam & Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
Slobin, D. I. 2004. The many ways to search for a frog:
Linguistic typology and the expression of motion events. In
S. Strömqvist & L. Verhoeven (eds.), Relating Events in Narratives: Typological and contextual perspectives. Mahwah,
NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, p. 219–257.
S & S (forthc.), The many ways to be located: the
expression of fictive motion in French and Serbian, Proceedings of International Conference — Space and Time
in Language and Literature, (Rijeka, Croatia, April 22–23
2005). Views and Voices, Rijeka: Zagar Publishing.
Talmy, L. 2000. Toward a Cognitive Semantics. (Volume I & II). Cambridge, Mass.: MIT-press.
SIGHT, SOUND AND TOUCH METAPHORS IN WINE DISCOURSE
Ernesto Suárez-Toste, Rosario Caballero
Universidad Castilla-La Mancha (Ciudad Real,
Spain)
In wine discourse, it is frequent to find a wine described
as being very pure and well-delineated, unfolding its
slate, apple and citrus notes on a wave of bright acidity
or still a bit jarring on the palate, and as finishing
soft, long, chewy, velvety, wide open or
warm -to list but a few of the adjectives used to
evaluate the aftertaste of a wine. Together with being highly metaphorical, these examples show the ability of certain figurative language to convey disparate
sensorial experiences (here those of sound, touch, and
sight). Such language is variously referred to as synaesthetic metaphor (after the cross-modal physical experience known as synaesthesia), cross-modal or intersensory metaphor (Ramachandran & Hubbard 2001)
or intersense metaphors (Ning Yu 2003), and is subsumed in Brooke-Rose’s (1958) sensuous metaphor and
in Friedrich’s (1991) image tropes.
Indeed, although everyday language is full of crosssensorial descriptions (e.g., loud skirt, strident
colour, soft music), wine discourse and, particularly texts devoted to describing and evaluating wine
(referred to as wine reviews or tasting notes), is a case
in point of both the high percentage of occurrence and
the rhetorical potential of synaesthetic metaphor. As it
is, the penchant for this type of metaphor among wine
critics is not the product of whim or verbosity, but arises
from the need to communicate their sensorial experience
of a wine and share it with a vast and multifarious audience -an experience difficult to share otherwise. In
other words, the conspicuous presence of synaesthetic
metaphor in tasting notes does not turn wine critics into
synaesthetes, but points to the difficulties of translating
the sensations produced by a given wine into something
intelligible and, above all, shareable -however obscure
and mystifying their jargon may seem to the profane.
For the present paper, we have used a corpus of
12,000 wine tasting notes retrieved from eight specialized magazines in order to explore the following questions:
1. Which are the source domains / senses mainly
used to describe wine?
2. Are the same metaphor(s) indistinctively used to
describe red and white wines?
3. When the same metaphor is used to describe
both a red and a white wine, does it articulate the same
meaning?
The research data reveal a large amount of
metaphors mapping information from the source domains of sight, sound and touch onto the target domain
of ‘taste’ (the latter, in fact, a combination of touch,
smell and taste proper) all of which appear to be crucial in the conceptualization and verbalization of wine
tasting experiences. Finally, the analysis is theoretically
anchored in cognitive approaches to metaphor as expounded in Lakoff and Johnson (1980, 1999), Lakoff
(1987), Johnson (1987), and Gibbs (1994) among others.
References:
Brooke-Rose, C. 1958. A Grammar of Metaphor. London: Secker & Warburg.
Friedrich, P. 1991. Polytropy. In Fernández, J. (ed.)
Beyond Metaphor: The Theory of Tropes in Anthropology.
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 17–55.
Gibbs, R. W. 1994. The Poetics of Mind: Figurative
Thought, Language, and Understanding. Cambridge & New
York: Cambridge University Press.
Johnson, M. 1987. The Body in the Mind. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
Lakoff, G. & M. Johnson. 1980. Metaphors We Live By.
Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press.
Lakoff, G. & M. Johnson. 1999. Philosophy in the flesh.
The embodied mind and its challenge to Western thought.
New York: Basic Books.
161
Ning Yu. 2003. Synesthetic metaphor: A cognitive perspective. Journal of Literary Semantics 32: 19–34.
Ramachandran, V. S. & E. M. Hubbard.
2001.
Synaesthesia-A window into perception, thought and language. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 8, No. 12, 2001,
pp. 3–34
MODULES OR NETWORKS: ACQUISITION OF RUSSIAN VERBAL
CLASSES BY NATIVE CHILDREN*
Tatiana Svistunova1 ,
Tatiana Chernigovskaya1 ,
Kira Gor2
1
2
St. Petersburg State University (Russia)
University of Maryland (College Park, USA)
Background
a specific conjugational type, and can include consonant
mutations, stress shift, and suffix alternation. We used
the following classes: -aj (non-past-tense form chit-aju ‘I read’ vs. infinitive chit-a-t’ ‘to read’), -a (pish-u
‘I write’ vs. pis-a-t’ ‘to write’), -i (nosh-u ‘I carry’ vs.
nos-i-t’ ‘to carry’) and -ova (ris-uj-u ‘I draw’ vs. risova-t’ ‘to draw’). Respondents were asked to generate
non-past-tense forms of the stimuli presented in the infinitive. In each class there were 5 high-frequency and
5 low-frequency real Russian verbs, and 5 nonce verbs
composed by manipulating the initial segments of the
high-frequency real Russian verbs. The experiment was
conducted orally and individually with each subject, and
recorded.
Two groups of subjects participated in the experiment:
The study explores the acquisition of Russian verbal
morphology by two groups of subjects: children with
normal linguistic development aged 4 and children with
specific language impairment (SLI) aged 5–7. The theoretical framework for the study comes from research on
the structure of the mental lexicon, which focuses predominantly on English regular and irregular past-tense
inflection and on the debates between the advocates of
universal grammar (UG) (e.g. Pinker, 1991; Prasada &
1. Children with normal language development aged
Pinker, 1993; Ullman, 2004) and the network approach
4 (N=21);
(e.g. Plunkett & Marchman, 1993; Bybee, 1995). Very
few studies analyze linguistic processing in languages
2. Children with specific language impairment (SLI)
with complex verbal morphology (e.g. Ragnasdóttir et
aged 5–7 (N=8).
al, 1996; Orsolini & Marslen-Wilson, 1997; Simonsen,
2000; Gor & Chernigovskaya, 2004). According to the Results
dual-system (UG-based) approach, regular and irregular
verbs are processed by two distinct mechanisms, or mod- 1. Children with normal linguistic development
ules: regular verbs are computed in a rule-processing
system and are not governed by frequency factors, while
• Recognize default -aj and -i classes better than
irregular verbs are processed in associative memory. The
-ova and non-productive -a classes.
opposite single-system (network) approach claims that
• The generalization of -uj model (e.g. hohot-a-t’
both regular and irregular verbs are processed by a sin‘to laugh’ vs. hohot-uj-u ‘I luagh’) demonstrates
gle mechanism in associative memory, and frequencies
that they also use the symbolic default rule.
play crucial roles.
It is clear that the properties of English past-tense
• High-frequency verbs were easier for recognition
inflection cannot be generalized to languages with dethan low-frequency ones, and low-frequency verbs
veloped inflectional morphology. Russian is one of them
were easier than nonce-verbs.
and it has numerous verbal classes and more than one
• Children mostly used the j-strategy (i.e. stem +
‘regular’ class. Previous data on Russian verbal processvowel + j + ending ); however, the non-j-strategy
ing cannot be handled by either dual- or single-system
(i.e. stem+ ending ) also occurred in their reacapproach. (Gor & Chernigovskaya, 2001; 2003; 2004).
tions.
The goal of this project is to study the acquisition
of verbal morphology in Russian children with normal
2. Children with specific language impairment
language development and in those with SLI.
This group of subjects can be divided into two subgroups:
Design of the study
The test included 60 Russian verbs of 4 verbal classes
according to the one-stem system developed by Jakobson and his followers (Jakobson, 1998; Davidson et al,
1996) which identifies 11 verbal classes. Each class is of
• The first sub-group of SLI children does not crucially differ from normal children; however, SLI
children were older, so here we can observe a certain developmental lag in language acquisition.
* The research was supported by grant
04–04–00083a from Russian Scientific Foundation for Research in Humanities and by
grant 06–06–80–152a from the Russian Foundation for Basic Research.
162
• The second sub-group of SLI children recognized
only the default -aj class relatively well. In form
generation they preferred to use the default aj model in all cases. The non-j-strategy never
occurred in their responses. The recognition of
low-frequency verbs was better than that of highfrequency and nonce verbs.
These results conflict with both the dual-system and
single-system approaches. On the one hand, children
with normal linguistic development demonstrate that
they are sensitive to verb frequency and it does not depend on the verb class. On the other hand, they use not
only analogy, but symbolic rules as well. Unexpectedly,
SLI children actively used the default -aj pattern, which
conflicts with the results of (Ullman & Gopnik, 1999).
The comparison of these data with the results of a
similar experiment with L2 learners of Russian (Gor &
Chernigovskaya, 2003) demonstrates that children used
the rules derived from the input, whereas L2 learners
paid attention to the morphological keys and used the
explicit rules that were learned in the formal classroom
environment.
References:
Bybee J. L. Regular morphology and the lexicon // Language and Cognitive Processes 10, 1995. Pp. 425–455.
Davidson D. E., Gor K. S., and Lekic, M. D. Russian:
Stage One: Live from Moscow! Kendall / Hunt Publishing Company: Dubuque, Iowa, 1996.
Gor K., Chernigovskaya T. Rules in the Processing
of Russian Verbal Morphology // Current Issues in For-
mal Slavic Linguistics / eds. Zybatow G., Junghanns U.,
Mehlhorn G., and Szucsich L. Frankfurt / Main, 2001.
Pp. 528–536.
Gor K., Chernigovskaya T. Mental Lexicon Structure
in L1 and L2 Acquisition: Russian Evidence // Glossos
http://www.seelrc.org, 2003.
Gor K., Chernigovskaya T. Formal Instruction and the
Acquisition of Verbal Morphology // Investigation in Instructed Second Language Acquisition. Mouton de Gruyter,
Berlin, New York, 2004. Pp.103–139.
Jakobson R. O. Russian conjugation // Word 4, 1948.
Pp. 155–167.
Orsolini M., Marslen-Wilson W. Universals in morphological representation: Evidence from Italian // Language
and Cognitive Processes 12, 1997. Pp. 1–47.
Pinker S. Rules of language // Science 253. 1991.
Pp. 530–535.
Prasada S., Pinker S. Generalization of regular and irregular morphological patterns // Language and Cognitive
Processes 8, 1993. Pp. 1–56.
Ragnasdóttir H., Simonsen H. G., Plunkett K. Acquisition of past tense inflection in Icelandic and Norwegian
Children // Proceedings of the 28th Annual Child Language
Research Forum. Stanford, 1996.
Simonsen H. G. Past tense acquisition and processing in
Norwegian: Experimental evidence // Language and Language Behavior 3/II, 2000. Pp. 86–101.
Ullman M. T. Contributions of memory circuits to language: the declarative / procedural model // Cognition.
92(1–2), 2004. Pp 231–270.
Ullman M. T., and Gopnik M. Inflectional morphology
in a family with inherited specific language impairment //
Applied Psycholinguistics 20, 1999. Pp. 51–117.
UNDERSTANDING METAPHORS IN WILLIAMS SYNDROME:
THEORY OF MIND OR ANALOGICAL STRUCTURE MAPPING?
Vera Zoe Szamarasz
Budapest University of Technology and
Economics (Budapest, Hungary)
The aim of the present study is twofold. First, it assesses
metaphorical abilities in Williams syndrome. Second,
it tests whether -as it has been previously proposedmetaphoric understanding is related to such abilities as
theory of mind, analogical mapping, verbal maturity or
intelligence.
Williams syndrome is a rare genetic disorder, occurring in fewer than 1 in every 20,000 live births. The syndrome is characterised by an average IQ of 56, reflecting serious deficits in general cognitive abilities such as
spatial cognition, reasoning, problem solving and number skills, and unexpectedly good language abilities,
social skills and face processing abilities. Contrary to
previous assumptions claiming theory of mind abilities
to be selectively intact in Williams syndrome, TagerFlusberg and Sullivan (2000) propose, based on empirical evidence, that in Williams syndrome only the socialperceptual components of theory of mind are spared,
while the social-cognitive component is deficient. This
defective component involves conceptual understanding
of the mind as a representational system. For this reason, the syndrome provides a suitable test ground for
assessing whether metaphoric understanding relies on
theory of mind or on some other cognitive ability such
as analogical structure mapping.
Traditionally, metaphor has been treated as both extraordinary in comparison to literal language and largely
ornamental in nature. However, current research suggests precisely the opposite. Rather than being restricted to poetic uses, it is now widely accepted that
metaphor is conceptual in nature and is commonly and
automatically used in everyday thinking, reasoning and
communication (e.g. Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). Despite
the widespread acceptance of viewing metaphor as an
essential mechanism of the mind, there is still much debate as to the precise nature of metaphor understanding
and the underlying mechanisms involved.
There have been several proposals as to the underlying mechanisms of metaphor comprehension, the
present study considers two of these. Firstly, according
to their Theory of Relevance, Sperber and Wilson (1986;
2003) claim that metaphorical understanding requires
163
first-order theory of mind abilities. Secondly, Gentner’s
Structure Mapping Theory of Analogy (1983; 2001)
provides an alternative proposal to this issue. In this
view, metaphor is considered to be a species of analogy,
and as such, most metaphors are said to constitute an
analogical matching of the relational structure of two
distinct representations
The present study tested 15 individuals with
Williams syndrome. Two typically developing control
groups matched on age and IQ also participated in the
research. The experiment consisted of four distinct
parts, each examining a different aspect of cognition
with several tasks. The study comprised
(1) Three tasks assessing metaphorical understanding (understanding metaphoric images, understanding metaphoric stories, and an elicited
repetition task involving literal, metaphoric and
anomalous utterances);
(2) Three First-order Theory of Mind tasks, including a Deceptive box task, a Chocolate task
and a Seeing leads to Knowing task;
(3) an Analogy task;
(4)
Verbal intelligence was measured by the
Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test.
Results show that individuals with Williams syndrome demonstrate a better understanding of metaphor
than would be expected based on their level of mental
retardation. Additionally, it was also found that good
performance in the metaphor tasks did not necessarily
entail high performance in the theory of mind tasks,
rather, it was associated with high performance on the
analogical matching task.
References:
Gentner, D. (1983). Structure-mapping: A theoretical
framework for analogy. Cognitive Science, 7, 155–170.
Gentner, D., Bowdle, B., Wolff, P., & Boronat, C.
(2001).
Metaphor is like analogy.
In D. Gentner,
K. J. Holyoak, & B. N. Kokinov (Eds.), The analogical mind:
Perspectives from cognitive science (pp. 199–253). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press
Lakoff, G. & Johnson, M. (1980) Metaphors We Live
By. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Sperber, D. & Wilson, D. (1986): Relevance. Communication and Cognition. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sperber, D. & Wilson, D. (2003) Relevance Theory. In
Laurence R. Horn, Gregory L. Ward (Eds) The Handbook of
Pragmatics. Oxford: Basil Blackwell
Tager-Flusberg, H., and Sullivan, K. (2000) A componential view of theory of mind: evidence from Williams syndrome. Cognition, 76:59–89.
RECOMBINANCE IN THE EVOLUTION OF LANGUAGE
Leonard Talmy
University at Buffalo, State University of New
York (USA)
In pre-language hominids, the vocal auditory channel,
as it was then constituted, may have been inadequate
as a means of transmission for communication involving
certain levels of thought and interaction. If this circumstance were regarded metaphorically in terms of conflicting evolutionary pressures or forces, it could be seen
as a bottleneck. On the one hand, the capacity within
individuals for thought, i.e., for conceptual content and
its processing, perhaps was already relatively great — or
was developing or had the near potential to develop — in
its range of content, of granularity, and of abstractness,
as well as in complexity and speed. The potential also
existed for the development of the interaction among
individuals, so that it included the communication of
more advanced thought more quickly. Such developments in thought and in its communication would have
had selective advantage. On the other hand, the vocalauditory channel then had limitations that made it unable to represent enough advanced conceptual content
with enough fidelity and speed.
Another means of transmission, the bodily-visual
channel in general or the manual-visual channel in particular, had properties that might have allowed it to
handle the new communicative load. Within modernday sign languages, the so-called classifier subsystem
presents a kind of existence proof for the cognitive feasibility of a manual-visual system conveying advanced
conceptual content with fidelity and speed. It has two
main enabling properties: its extensive parallelness, that
is, its numerous concurrent parameters for representing
different kinds of content at the same time, and its extensive iconicity. But these are minimal in the vocalauditory channel. Nevertheless, for whatever reasons,
the manual-visual channel did not follow an evolutionary path toward becoming the main means of communication for humans, while the vocal-auditory channel
did. For this to happen, though, this channel had to
acquire certain characteristics that could overcome its
limitations. The proposal here is that it shifted from
being a largely analog system to being a mainly digital
system.
As analyzed here, digitalness has a lesser or greater
extent, cumulatively built up from a succession of four
factors: a) discreteness, b) categoriality, c) recombination, and d) emergentness. These can be characterized
as follows. a) Distinctly chunked elements, rather than
gradients, form the basis of some domain in question.
b) The chunked elements function as qualitatively distinct categories rather than, say, merely as steps along
a single dimension. c) These categorial chunks systematically combine with each other in alternative arrangements rather than occurring only at their home
sites. d) These arrangements each have their own new
higher-level identities rather than remaining simply as
164
patterns. The term recombinance is here applied to
any cognitive domain that includes both recombination
and emergentness.
Human language is extensively recombinant. By one
analysis, it has six distinct forms of recombination, of
which three or possibly four also exhibit emergentness.
In particular, there are four formal types of recombination: phonetic features combining into phonemes,
phonemes combining into morphemes, morphemes combining into idioms, and morphemes and idioms combining into expressions — with the first three of these producing new emergent identities. And there are two semantic types of recombination: semantic components
combining into morphemic meanings, and morphemic
meanings combining into expression meanings — with
the first of these perhaps yielding a new emergent identity.
A heuristic survey of various cognitive systems such
as visual perception and motor control suggests that discreteness and categoriality appear in many of them. But
candidates for recombination and emergentness in these
systems seem rarer and more problematic. Language
evolved recently and may have borrowed or tapped into
organizational features of the extant cognitive systems.
The cognitive system of language thus could have readily acquired its discrete and categorial characteristics
from other systems. But language seems to be the cognitive system with the most types and the most extensive use of recombinance. The question thus arises
whether language, as it evolved, adopted a full level of
recombinance already present in another cognitive system, increasing it somewhat; adopted a minor level of
recombinance from another cognitive system, elaborating it greatly; or developed full recombinance newly as
an innovation.
In any case, the evolutionary development of digitalized recombinance in the cognitive system underlying the vocal-auditory channel rendered it capable of
transmitting a greater amount of more complex conceptual content with greater fidelity and speed. Again
in metaphoric terms, this development resolved the bottleneck by loosening the prior constriction — or rather,
by circumventing the built-in limitations of the channel.
Finally, consideration can be given to whether
thought coevolved with language in certain respects,
such as in its degree of digitalness in general and recombinance in particular, in its crispness, and in its
voluntariness.
HYPERBOLIC CURVE AS A PREDICTOR FUNCTION FOR
DIFFERENT TIME PERCEPTION TASKS
Majid Tavajohi1 , Hamed Ekhtiari1 ,
Ali Jannati1, 2 , Amir Hoshang Tavajohi1
1
Iranian National Center for Addiction Studies
(Tehran, Iran)
2
Cognitive Neuroscience Sector, SISSA
(Trieste, Italy)
Introduction: Time Perception is a cognitive process
that involves monitoring and comparing sequences of
different events in the timeline, hence facilitating anticipation of the events occurrence, and also planning and
organizing future behaviors. Objective assessment of
this process has been approached using different methods: 1) Time Estimation (TE): estimating one particular time interval, 2) Time Production (TP): behaviorally
producing a verbally- or nonverbally defined time interval, 3) Time Reproduction (TR): behaviorally producing a time interval based on a duration estimated by
the subject, and 4) Time Discrimination (TD): discriminating and ordering events according to their duration.
Executive factors including attention, working memory,
and cognitive load affect this process, but emotional
aspects are also involved due to impulsive behaviors.
Different impairments in time perception have been
demonstrated in attention deficit / hyperactivity disorder, impulse control disorders, brain injuries, Parkinson’s disease, psychoses, and some types of personality
disorders.
Methods: The authors have redesigned some of
the known TE & TR tasks, plus a novel Delay Estimation (DE) task. A group of male high school students
(n=86) were assessed using these tasks.
Results: In TE task, when the subjects did not
know a priori they had to estimate the interval, they
underestimated an interval of 8 seconds as short as
7.33±0.66 (95% C.I.) seconds, but overestimate it as
long as 9.65±0.43 seconds (95% C.I.), while aware of
the task. The intervals of 5, 8, and 11 seconds were
also overestimated as 6.20, 7.53 and 9.73 seconds respectively. But increasing the duration of the interval
as long as 23 seconds resulted in a 26% underestimation. Similar results were obtained for TR and DE tasks.
Time Perception were fitted with a hyperbolic function
in all of three different tasks.
F(t) = a/ (1+k∗t), t: time interval, k: hyperbolic
constant. Hyperbolic constant was 1167 for TE, 902 for
TR, and 836 for DE with R2 over 0.95.
Discussion: In all TE, TR, and DE tasks, increasing
the time interval caused a decrement in the perceived
value of the interval duration in consistence with a hyperbolic function, and the percentages of time underestimation and underreproduction were increased. Possible mathematical & neuropsychological underpinnings
of these findings, along with potential applications are
discussed.
165
ADAPTATION TO THE NEW CURRENCY: A CASE OF TURKISH
MONETARY REFORM
Mert Teközel1 , Sonia Amado1 ,
Rob Ranyard2 , Yurdal Topsever3 ,
Fabio Del Missier4
1
Ege University (Izmir, Turkey)
University of Bolton (UK)
3
Izmir University of Economics (Turkey)
4
University of Trieste (Italy)
2
In this study, we investigated the psychological effects
of Turkish Monetary Reform, (which depends on the
deletion of 6 zeros from the former currency) a month
before the reform and six months after the reform. In
the first study, 202 university students estimated the
price of an average new middle-size Turkish car in
different currencies: TL, NTL or Euro. Results showed
that price estimations in Euro and NTL were significantly higher than estimations in TL. This may be explained by the money illusion, thinking in nominal terms
more than real terms in economic transactions. In the
second study, which was conducted six moths after the
currency change, we enlarged the product diversity and
replicated the first procedure. This time 240 participants, recruited from the entrance of one of the biggest
supermarkets, estimated the price of 14 products including a bottle of milk, an office scissors, a wardrobe, a kilo
of potatoes, a DVD player, a packet of paprika, a compass, a car etc. Products were divided into three price
(low, middle and high) and two purchasing frequency
categories (low and high). The results of the second
study were fairly different from the first study. There
was no difference between NTL and TL estimations on
any of the products including the estimations of a car
which there was clear difference before the introduction
of the new currency. These results implied that, after
six months period, people were quite well adapted to
the NTL.
MEMORY PERFORMANCE IN THE DEFERRED IMITATION TASK
IN AUTISTIC CHILDREN: IS GENERALIZATION UNIMPAIRED?
Ioana Ţincaş, Oana Benga
Babes-Bolyai University (Cluj-Napoca, Romania)
Autism is a puzzling, chronic developmental disorder
characterized by deficits in social interaction, verbal
and non-verbal communicative behavior and a restricted
range of activities and interests (American Psychiatric
Association, 1994). The present study focuses on generalization deficits in autism and the way they relate to
declarative memory in autistic children. Both of these
aspects represent relatively neglected areas in the study
of autism. Generalization deficits, although frequently
mentioned as one salient characteristic of autistic persons (e.g., Klinger & Dawson, 2001), have seldom represented a specific focus of research. Research on memory
functioning in autism is also relatively scarce. Early research suggested memory deficits similar to those found
in medial temporal lobe amnesia (Boucher, 1981). More
recent studies seem to reject this hypothesis, showing relatively unimpaired recall (Minshew & Goldstein,
1993) and recognition (Bennetto, Pennington & Rogers,
1996; Dawson et al, 2001). Autistic persons are often
mentioned to have good rote memory skills, and they
are known to form extremely context-bound memories
of events (Frith, 1989). In typical development, such
context-boundedness has been extensively investigated
in infants, showing that even minor changes in contextual details tend to impair performance on recognition
or recall (Amabile & Rovee-Collier, 1991). However,
this tendency seems to decrease with age, infants becoming more and more able to form decontextualized
representations of objects (Bauer & Dow, 1994; Learmonth, Lambert & Rovee-Collier, 2004; Klein & Meltzoff, 1999).
One of the tasks classically used in the study of
declarative memory and generalization in typical development is the deferred imitation task (DIT; Meltzoff,
1988). It is considered a nonverbal task of declarative
memory (McDonough et al., 1995). The DIT represents
a good candidate to the investigation of declarative
memory and generalization in autism, since it has generated a considerable amount of data in typical memory development, it is a nonverbal task — thus being
amenable to even non-verbal children with autism, and
it relies on imitation of actions with objects, a relatively
unimpaired ability in autism (Smith & Bryson, 1994).
The present study aims to investigate whether autistic children are impaired in recall, as assessed by the
number of correct actions, and whether they are able
to generalize imitation of actions to a novel context
(represented here by a novel set of objects). Two independent studies were conducted, using two variations
of the DIT: observation + manipulation (experiment 1),
and observation-only (experiment 2).
Method:
Participants.
The participants in the two
experiments were preschool children with autism,
developmentally-delayed, and typically-developing children. Different children participated in the two experiments. The children were matched on control tasks
deemed relevant for the experimental tasks (see Jarrold
& Brock, 2004 for arguments concerning this approach),
166
which assessed children’s ability to imitate actions with
objects and their nonverbal level of cognitive functioning. Stimuli. The stimuli used in both studies were
twelve sets of three objects. Six sets were used during the demonstration phase, and the other six (which
were similar but not identical to the first six) were used
to assess recall and generalization. Procedure. During the training phase the child was given the objects
and allowed to manipulate them (baseline phase), after
which the experimenter demonstrated the actions. Here
the children were either encouraged to imitate immediately (experiment 1), or the objects were removed after
the demonstration (experiment 2). Recall was assessed
one week later. All phases of the procedure were videotaped and two coders assessed the number of correct
actions performed by the children during both baseline
and recall.
Preliminary results
We are reporting here results from experiment 1, for
7 autistic and 7 developmentally-delayed children from
our sample. Results are depicted in figure 1. Comparison between the two groups revealed similar performance during the baseline phase (Mann-Whitney
U=11,00; p>0,1), but better performance for the control group (Mann-Whitney U=7,00; p<0,05). However, both groups showed a significant increase in performance from baseline to recall (Wilcoxon’s Z=-2,20;
p<0,05 for the autistic group; Wilcoxon’s Z=-2,22;
p<0,05 for the comparison group), and comparison of
the amount of performance increase (recall-baseline)
revealed similar increases for the two groups (MannWhitney U=9,00; p>0,05).
Figure 1. Perfomance changes from baseline
to recall for the autistic and the control group.
Discussion
These preliminary results are quite surprising, showing
that, at least under the constraints imposed by this task,
children with autism are able to perform actions learned
on one set of objects on a new one. The results of
experiment 2 will show whether similar results are obtained under more stringent conditions, when children
are not allowed to practice the demonstrated actions before the recall phase. These preliminary results point to
the need for further research on generalization deficits
in autism. While there is no doubt that such deficits
do exist, evidence to help specify the conditions under
which they manifest is lacking. Further studies should
determine the impact of different factors (e.g., developmental level, length of delay between training and recall,
changes in the objects used versus changes in the testing
environment, etc.) on memory and generalization performance in autism. This is relevant to since increased
flexibility in memory across different contexts is thought
to contribute to the development of language and symbolic play (Klein & Meltzoff, 1999), both of which are
known to be severely impaired in autism.
References:
Amabile, T. A., & Rovee-Collier, C. (1991). Contextual
variation and memory retrieval at six months. Child Development, 62, 1155–1166.
American Psychiatric Association (1994). Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 4th edition.
Washington: American Psychiatric Association.
Bauer, P. J. & Dow, G. A. (1994). Episodic memory in
16- and 20-month-old children: Specifics are generalized but
not forgotten. Developmental Psychology, 3, 403–417.
Bennetto, L., Pennington, B. F., & Rogers, S. J. (1996).
Intact and impaired memory fnctions in autism. Child Development, 67, 1816–1835.
Boucher, J. (1981). Immediate free recall in early childhood autism: Another point of behavioral similarity with
the amnesic syndrome. British Journal of Psychology, 72,
211–215.
Dawson, G., Osterling, J., Rinaldi, R., Carver, L., &
McPartland, J. (2001). Recognition memory and stimulusreward associations: Indirect support for the role of the
ventromedial prefrontal dysfunction in autism. Journal of
Autism and Developmental Disorders, 31, 337–341.
Frith, U. (1989). Autism: Explaining the enigma. Oxford, UK: Blackwell.
Jarrold, C., & Brock, J. (2004). To match or not to
match? Methodological issues in autism-related research.
Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 34, 81–86.
Klein, P. J., & Meltzoff, A. N. (1999). Long-term memory, forgetting, and deferred imitation in 12-month-old infants. Developmental Science, 2, 102–113.
Klinger, L. G., & Dawson, G. (2001). Prototype formation in autism. Development and Psychopathology, 13,
111–124.
Learmonth, A. E., Lambert, R., & Rovee-Collier, C.
(2004). Generalization of deferred imitation during the first
year of life. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 88,
297–318.
McDonough, L., Mandler, J. M., McKee, R. D., &
Squire, L. R. (1995). The deferred imitation task as a nonverbal measure of declarative memory. Proc. Natl. Acad.
Sci. USA, 92, 7580–7584.
Meltzoff, A. N. (1988). Infant imitation and memory:
Nine-month-olds in immediate and deferred tests. Child Development, 59, 217–225.
Minshew, N. J. & Goldstein, G. (1993). Is autism an amnesic disorder? Evidence from the California Verbal Learning
Test. Neuropsychology, 7, 209–216.
Rogers, S. J., Bennetto, L., McEvoy, R. & Pennington, B. F. (1996). Imitation and pantomime in high-
167
functioning adolescents with autism spectrum disorders.
Child Development, 67, 2060–2073.
Smith, I. M., & Bryson, S. E. (1994). Imitation and ac-
tion in autism: A critical review. Psychological Bulletin,
116, 259–273.
FOCUS ON FORM IN THE ACQUISITION OF INFLECTIONAL
MORPHOLOGY BY L2 LEARNERS: EVIDENCE FROM
NORWEGIAN AND RUSSIAN*
Elena Tkachenko1, 2 ,
Tatiana Chernigovskaya2
1
2
University of Oslo
St. Petersburg State University (Russia)
One of the key discussion issues among the researchers
on second language (L2) acquisition is to what extent
second language acquisition by adults is similar to first
language (L1) acquisition by children (Krashen 1988,
McLaughlin 1987, Miesel 1991). This issue has been
discussed in the light of different theoretical approaches.
One of the interesting points in this debate touches
upon the issue of whether L2 acquisition is based on
the same processing mechanisms that are involved in
L1 acquisition. Consideration of this issue should be accounted for in the light of the core differences between
L1 and L2 acquisition situations.
From the very beginning, L2 learners find themselves
in a different situation than children acquiring their native language. They are presented with the entire system, while children gradually extract the grammatical
forms from the input. Furthermore, while children learn
grammatical forms, their meaning and usage implicitly,
without explanation of which rules they have to remember and use to produce correct grammatical forms, the
situation of L2 acquisition is quite the opposite: L2
learners are more often than not exposed to formal instruction in their learning of the second language, with
the formulation of explicit rules for regular paradigms
and usually a list of irregular verbs to be learned by
heart. Focus on form in formal instruction is yet another point of difference between L1 and L2 acquisition of morphology: while children acquire morphology
through communication, and their first focus of attention is meaning, L2 learners to a lesser or greater extent
are focused on grammatical forms. And last but not
least, there is a great difference in the input for L1 and
L2 learners. Children receive more input, and this input
is natural, while L2 learners receive very limited input,
mostly in a formal classroom, which also may play a role
in the process of acquisition.
This study focuses on the processing of verbal morphology by second language learners of the two languages — Norwegian and Russian. The choice of languages for the study is not fortuitous. Being a Germanic
language, Norwegian has the verbal morphology similar to that in English, based on a distinction between
regular and irregular paradigms. However, the morphological system in Norwegian is more complex: there are
two weak classes that are different in size and productivity, and several classes of strong verbs (Endresen &
Simonsen 2001). Russian has a much more complex
morphological system, which is not based on a division
between regular or irregular classes. There are a great
number of verb classes in Russia; they are different in
size and in the complexity of conjugation rules that are
used for producing different verb forms (Jakobson 1948,
Townsend 1975).
The theoretical background for this research concerns the mechanisms that rule the acquisition and processing of verbal morphology (Bybee 1995, Marchman
1997, Markus et al. 1992, Plunkett & Marchman 1993,
1996; Rumelhart & McClelland 1986, Chernigovskaya
& Gor 2000, 2004 to mention a few). Two main approaches that have been discussed recently — the Dual
Mechanism Account and the Single Mechanism Account
— have different views on the role of input factors, such
as phonological similarity and salience, type and token
frequency. As this issue remains quite controversial even
with regards to L1 acquisition, we will not try here to
provide any evidence in support of either of the two
models, but rather concentrate on more specific issues:
• What is the role of input factors in the L2 acquisition and processing of Norwegian and Russian
verbal morphology?
• To what extent do formal instruction and focus
on form influence this process?
• Do L2 learners rely on morphological cues in their
verbal processing?
• How does the complexity of the verbal morphology system influence the acquisition of inflectional
forms in general?
The study is based on experimental data from the
experiments conducted with Russian learners of Norwegian and Norwegian learners of Russian and on the comparison of results on verbal morphology tests by these
two groups of L2 learners to the results of the similar
tests by several age groups of Russian and Norwegian
children respectively (Simonsen 2000, Chernigovskaya,
* The research was supported by grant
04–04–00083a from Russian Scientific Foundation for Research in Humanities and by
grant 06–06–80–152a from the Russian Foundation for Basic Research.
168
Gor 2004). The tests were conducted orally and individually with each subject in a dialogue format. Each
test included 60 stimuli verbs.
The Norwegian test included verbs representing all
major classes of the morphological system — Weak
Larger class (which is the most productive), Weak
Smaller class (which is phonologically restricted and
mostly cannot be used productively) and Strong verbs
(represented also by several subclasses which are different in type frequency and in phonological salience).
For these three classes, verbs were balanced for token
frequency. The subjects were provided with the infinitive and the present form of the stimuli verbs and were
expected to answer with a past tense form.
The Russian tests included verbs from 4 morphological classes: -AJ-, -A-, -I- and -OVA- (the classification
according to the one-stem verb system (developed by
Jakobson 1948). Each of these classes was represented
by 5 high-frequency, 5 low-frequency and 5 nonce verbs.
Two tests were conducted with each subject — in one of
them the subjects were presented with the stimuli verbs
in the infinitive form and in the other in the past tense
form. They were then asked to produce the present
forms for 1st person singular and 3rd person plural.
The analysis of the answers was performed in terms
of the rates for correct answers in general, correct answers within different verb classes and rates for stem
recognition (for Russian). Furthermore, the major error
types are analyzed with a more detailed consideration
of generalization errors.
The results show that input factors play an important role in L2 acquisition of both Russian and Norwegian. We found type frequency effect, token frequency
effect, and phonological effect. Morphological cues do
not seem to play an important role in the morphological
processing of the verbal forms. Focus on form and the
influence of formal instruction was reflected in the type
of errors L2 learners made.
The results of the comparison provide some interesting facts about the differences and similarities in learning strategies between L1 and L2 acquisition. The differences we found can be explained by focus on forms
and explicit instruction in grammatical rules, which is
usually the case for L2 acquisition.
Reference:
Bybee, J. L. (1995). Regular morphology and the lexicon. Language and Cognitive Processes 10: 425–455.
Chernigovskaya, T. and Gor, K. (2000) The complexity
of paradigm and input frequencies in native and second language verbal processing: Evidence from Russian. Language
and Language Behavior 3/II, 20–37.
Endresen, R. T. & Simonsen, H. G. (2001) The Norwegian verb. — Eds. Simonsen, H. G & Endresen, R.T A
cognitive approach to the verb: Morphological and constructional perspectives. Mouton de Gruyter, New York Berlin.
2001.
Gor, K., Chernigovskaya, T. (2004). Formal Instruction
and the Mental Lexicon: The Acquisition of Verbal Morphology. In: Housen, A., Pierrard, M. (eds.). Current Issues in
Instructed Second Language Learning. Mouton De Gruyter.
Jakobson, R. O. (1948) Russian conjugation. Word 4,
pp. 155–167.
Krashen, S. D. (1988). Second Language Acquisition
and Second Language Learning. New York: Prentice-Hall
International Inc.
Marchman, V. A. (1997). Children’s productivity in the
English past tense: The role of frequency, phonology, and
neighborhood structure. Cognitive Science 21, 283–304.
Markus, G. F., Pinker, S., Ullman, M., Hollander, M.,
Rosen, T. J., and Xu, F. (1992). Overregularization in language acquisition. Monographs of the Society for Research
in Child Development 57 (4), Serial No. 228. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
McLaughlin (1987). Theories of second language learning. London: Edward Arnold.
Miesel (1991). Principles of Universal Grammar and
strategies of language learning: Some similarities and differences between first and second language acquisition. —
Ed. Eubank. Point counterpoint: Universal Grammar in the
second language, pp. 231–276.
Plunkett, K., & Marchman, V. A. (1996). Learning from
a connectionist model of the English past tense. Cognition,
61, 299–308
Plunkett, K., and Marchman, V. (1993). From rote
learning to system building: Acquiring verb morphology in
children and connectionist nets. Cognition 48, 21–69.
Rumelhart, D. E., and McClelland, J. L. (1986). On
learning the past tenses of English verbs. In: McClelland, J. L., and Rumelhart, D. E. (eds.). Parallel distributed
processing: Explorations in the microstructures of cognition,
vol. 2, 216–271. Cambridge, MA: Bradford / MIT Press.
Simonsen H. G. (2000). Past tense acquisition and processing in Norwegian: Experimental evidence. Language and
Language Behavior Vol. 3, Part II, p. 86–102.
Townsend, C. E. (1975).
Russian Word-Formation.
Slavica Publishers.
169
CONCEPTUAL METAPHORS AND IMAGE METAPHORS AS
DISCURSIVE STRATEGIES IN URBAN PLANNING
Júlia Todolı́1 , Montserrat Ribas2
1
2
Universitat de València (València, Spain)
Universitat Pompeu Fabra (Barcelona, Spain)
Background
In this paper we will focus on the Plan for restoring
the Islamic wall in València (Spain), which affected
200 people (40% of the population of the area) and anticipated the demolition of 16 buildings and the reuse
of 17 construction sites. The project was supposed to
aim at the restoration of the Islamic wall. However, the
real goal of the plan was to redevelop a residential area
into a tertiary one by getting rid of the neighbours.
Aim, data and method
The main aim of this paper is to show how metaphors
are used to form public opinion. It is widely assumed
that metaphor is a salient feature of discourse whose
function is twofold. Firstly, it helps make complex issues understandable to the public, and secondly, it helps
promote and legitimise the ideological viewpoints of particular groups. That is the reason we are particularly
interested in showing how metaphors structure our perception and understanding of reality and help promote
and legitimise the ideological viewpoints of particular
groups. Specifically, we will look into how the authors of the Plan for restoring the Islamic wall use
metaphors to justify a redevelopment initiative and the
discursive resistance that residents, residents’ associations, intellectuals and engaged citizens opposed with
to the project.
The data for this study consists of articles from
newspapers, campaigns organized by the residents’ associations and round tables. These discourses are analysed through the combination of the approach of critical
discourse analyses (i.e. Fairclough 1992, 1995, 2003;
Chouliaraki & Fairclough 1999 and van Dijk 1995) and
conceptual metaphor theory as used in cognitive linguistics (i.e. Lakoff & Johnson 1980, Chilton 1996).
References:
Chilton, Paul (1996): Security metaphors. Cold War
Discourse from Containment to Common House, New York:
Lang.
Chouliaraki, Lilie, and Norman Fairclough (1999): Discourse in Late Modernity: Rethinking Critical Discourse
Analysis. Edinburg: Edinburgh University Press.
Fairclough, Norman (1992): Discourse and Social
Change, Cambridge: Polity Press
Fairclough, Norman (1995): Critical Discourse Analysis:
The Critical Study of Language. London: Longman
Fairclough, Norman (2003): Analysing Discourse: Textual Analysis for Social Research. London: Routledge.
Lakoff, George & Mark Johnson (1980): Metaphors we
live by, Chicago / London: The University of Chicago Press.
Van Dijk, T. A. (1995). Discourse Analysis as Ideology
Analysis. In Schaffner, C. & A. Wenden (eds.) Language
and Peace. Dartmouth: Aldershot: 17–33.
VARIABILITY IN L2 FUNCTIONAL MORPHOLOGY PRODUCTION:
THE EFFECT OF GENERAL COGNITION
Danijela Trenkic
University of York (Heslington, UK)
The paper addresses the debate on the causes of variability in production of L2 functional morphology. It reports a study on article production by L1 Serbian / L2
English learners, and compares their behaviour to that
of a Turkish learner of English, reported in Goad and
White (2004). In particular, it focuses on the tendency
of these learners to omit articles more in adjectivally
pre-modified (Art + Adj + N) than in non-modified
contexts (Art + N). The asymmetry is found in both
spoken and written production.
The paper argues that the pattern of results is not
consistent with models assuming target-like L2 syntax:
the Missing Surface Inflection Hypothesis cannot predict the asymmetry at all, and the Prosodic Transfer
Hypothesis cannot extend its explanatory power to spoken production of L1 Serbian / L2 English learners (Serbian is shown to have requisite prosodic structures), or
to written production in general.
An alternative account, with broader empirical coverage, is proposed, on which L2ers whose L1s do not
grammaticalize definiteness misanalyse English articles
as nominal modifiers (adjectives), and treat them in
production as such. Unlike in native-speaker production, where articles are semantically empty elements,
and their insertion is purely syntactically motivated by
the need to check off the uninterpretable feature [Def],
in learner production articles are meaningful adjectives,
accessed and produced as lexical words. While syntax will regulate where lexical elements occur within
a phrase, w h e t h e r they occur at all will be pragmatically motivated by the perceived need to express
the meaning they encode. The suppliance of articles
misanalysed as adjectives will thus critically depend on
the stage of production that is open to general cognition (conceptualisation), and will be constrained by
the available attentional resources. Whether the need
for expressing the meaning that articles encode in the
170
learner’s system is perceived will depend on whether
enough attentional resources are left after more relevant aspects of meaning have been attended to. When
the resources are exceeded, the form will be omitted in
production. All other things being equal, the resources
will always be exceeded sooner within a phrase encoding one extra element of meaning, thus more omissions
will occur in Art + Adj + N than in simpler Art + N
contexts.
While the paper will focus on one particular asymmetry in L2 article production, the model proposed within
it should bear implications, and testable predictions,
for L2 production of functional morphology in general.
The model goes beyond the representational deficit vs.
processing constraints debate, in that it suggests that
variability in production of L2 functional morphology is
caused by processing limitations, but precisely because
the production of misanalysed elements cannot be (directly) syntactically motivated, and has to rely on general cognition instead.
References:
Goad, H. and White, L. 2004: Ultimate attainment of
L2 inflections: Effects of L1 prosodic structure. In FosterCohen, S., Ota, M., Sharwood Smith, M. A. and Sorace, A.,
editors, EUROSLA Yearbook, Amsterdam: John Benjamins,
119–45.
A COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO COGNITIVE LINGUISTICS:
DOMAIN-GENERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MODELING SEQUENCE
COMPREHENSION AND COGNITIVE TASKS IN A BOTTLENOSED
DOLPHIN
Robert K. Uyeyama & Tatjana Ilic
University of Hawai‘i at Manoa (Honolulu, USA)
The group of research programs under the umbrella label of animal language encompasses the modeling of
human language in a number of animal systems, including primates such as chimpanzees and gorillas, as well as
nonprimates including dolphins, sea lions, and parrots.
Even though some of the early research in this area suffered from methodological problems, such as lack of
experimental controls and the issue of impressionistic
interpretation of the production data, the main reason
why the animal language programs have been largely ignored by the linguistics community in the past 30 years is
the Generativist assumption about the inborn, domainspecific and human species-specific universal principles
of Language. This assumption rendered even later animal results founded in rigorous cognitive protocols to be
excluded from the explanatory discourse of how the phenomena of language arise in humans. Therefore investigative questions of form can an animal demonstrate
ability X or possess the generalized concept Y (e.g.
Herman & Uyeyama, 1999) are, by definition, no longer
of interest to such linguists investigating top-down
processes.
In this study we introduce the application of a Cognitive Linguistics framework to earlier research measuring the cognitive performance by a bottlenosed dolphin (Tursiops truncatus), including comprehension
of stimulus sequences and untrained generalizations to
novel sequences (Herman et al., 1984). In contrast to
generative theory, approaches such as cognitive linguistics and constructionism (Goldberg, 2003) view language acquisition as an input-driven, domain-general,
bottom-up process. We provide evidence that semantic and syntactic phenomena, similar in form to
those conventionally associated with language use, may
be generated in spontaneous responses to novel stimuli
sequences in an animal model (that can only be operating with non-linguistic cognitive mechanisms), and
that these results may be fruitfully approached with the
construal operations of cognitive linguistics. Such an
approach finally provides a logical entry point for comparative cognitive studies with animals.
At the core of cognitive frameworks is the notion of
the conceptualized experience as a basis of all semantic
representations. For example, image schemas (Johnson,
1987; Lakoff & Turner, 1989; Clausner & Croft, 1999)
represent embodied abstractions of sensorimotor experiences. Image schemas are not specific to language and
are intuitively appropriate for use by both humans and
nonhumans because of evolutionary pressures that any
autonomous agent would require to meaningfully process and interact with its environment. In various cognitive tests, dolphins have been demonstrated to possess
generalizable concepts largely overlapping with those of
image schemas, e.g. identity, comparison (sameness
vs. difference), categorization, absence, deixis / perspective, search domain, and containment. (e.g.
Herman, 2002).
The most informative for our understanding of general cognitive mechanisms underlying the languagelearning process are the artificial language studies in
which the dolphins demonstrated two broad classes of
generalizations when presented with wholly untrained
novel sequences of hand-signed stimuli. We propose
that these generalizations are readily explainable in the
theoretical framework of cognitive linguistics.
In the most basic case, of a two-stimulus imperative
sequence glossed here as 1) Object + Action, the animals were trained with exposure to particular pairs of
stimuli, then behaviorally demonstrated generalization
to novel pairs. In addition, two more fixed sequence
patterns were trained: 2) Modifier + Object + Ac-
171
tion; and 3) Object + Object + Relational Action.
In 2), the Modifier was a locative designating either
the left or right of the animal. Form 3) required the animal to transport the second object to the first one, and
based on the third stimulus could be required to additionally place it inside of the destination object. Again,
the dolphins demonstrated input-based generalizations
to novel sequences after training in these two patterns.
The generalization of all three sequence patterns is explained as a gradual formation of abstract constructions
derived from experience via a stage of more formulaic,
frame-and-slot type of constructions. We explain semantic comprehension using basic image schemas such
as transfer, containment, and search domain schema.
However more advanced probes of entirely unfamiliar sequence patterns were performed without any prior
preparatory training, showing evidence of spontaneous
comprehension that transcends finite-state grammars.
For example, existing 3-item patterns were combined to
form novel five and four-item sequences such as: Modifier + Object + Modifier + Object + Relational
Action, as well as the more interesting Object + Modifier + Object + Relational Action. With no previous exposure to sequences longer than 3 items, the
dolphins immediately generalized successfully. These
more sophisticated, non-input-based generalizations to
novel sequence patterns can only be explained as computational derivations from the two previously-formed
abstract constructions corresponding to the sequence
patterns Modifier + Object + Action and Object +
Object + Relational Action. In short, we believe that
the cognitive linguistics can provide adequate analytic
tools that allow us to describe behavioral response that
on the surface appears to indicate the ability to comprehend recursion and similar phenomena.
Another experiment, utilizing a mimicry task,
showed the dolphins’ ability for a context-driven dynamic construal of meaning (reference). One dolphin
was trained to mimic the behavior of its companion
dolphin only if a specific stimulus, labeled here as the
imperative Mimic, was presented. The dolphin’s response was then probed by exposing it without train-
ing to the unfamiliar sequence Object + Mimic, where
the Object was either the stimulus for Dolphin
or Person. Both of these stimuli had previously occurred only in the context of the comprehension trials
above (e.g. Object + Action), in which they had to be
construed as target objects that the dolphin swims to
and acts upon. However, when the stimuli occurred
as part of the Mimic sequence pattern, the dolphin
spontaneously created a new, on-line interpretation of
the stimuli as the animate agents that it identifies in
the tank and uses as a model for its behavioral action. Furthermore, we argue that the previous knowledge of the abstract 2-item construction corresponding
to the sequence pattern Object + Action facilitated
immediate comprehension of the novel sequence pattern
Object + Mimic (in addition to the fact that the conceptualization of mimicry implicitly requires a model).
In conclusion, cognitive linguistics, as a non-nativist
approach, provides a relevant conceptual system for the
analysis of animal language studies, which had not received the attention of, nor integration with, the linguistic community in the past.
References:
Clausner, T. C. & Croft, W. (1999). Domans and imageschemas. Cognitive Linguistics, 10, 1–31.
Goldberg, A. E. (2003). Constructions: a new theoretical approach to language. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 7,
219–223.
Herman, L. M. (2002). Exploring the cognitive world
of the bottlenosed dolphin. In M. Bekoff, C. Allen &
G. Burghardt (Eds.) The cognitive animal: Empirical and
theoretical perspectives on animal cognition. Pp. 275–283.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Herman, L. M., Richards, D. G. & Wolz, J. P. (1984).
Comprehension of sentences by bottlenosed dolphins. Cognition, 16, 129–219.
Herman, L. M. & Uyeyama, R. K. (1999). The dolphin’s
grammatical competency; Comments on Kako (1999). Animal Learning & Behavior, 27, 18–23.
Johnson, M. (1987). The body in the mind. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
Lakoff, G. & Johnson, M. (1980). Metaphors we live by.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
CONVENTIONAL METAPHORS AND COMMUNICATIVE
MEANINGS
Marianna Vallana, Francesca M. Bosco,
Monica Bucciarelli
Università di Torino (Torino, Italy)
This study focuses on children’s ability to comprehend
the communicative meaning of the same conventional
metaphor when proffered in contexts within which the
speaker has reasons either to be sincere, or to deceive,
or to be ironic.
Our theoretical framework is the Cognitive Pragmatics (Airenti, Bara & Colombetti, 1993), a theory
of the cognitive processes underlying human communication. Within this framework, Bucciarelli, Colle and
Bara (2003) distinguish different kinds of communicative phenomena (e.g., irony, deceit) on the basis of
the complexity of the mental representations involved
in their comprehension. In order to introduce these, it
is important to consider some experimental results in the
literature concerning the development of human cognition: the ability to detect inconsistencies between
representations increases with age and it correlates with
172
the ability to reason (Bara, Bucciarelli & Johnson-Laird,
1995; Bara, Bucciarelli & Lombardo, 2001). Bucciarelli
et al. (2003) assume that the complexity of mental representations can be determined by (i) the presence and
the number of inconsistencies between representations
and (ii) the exploitation of shared beliefs.
(i) In standard communication what the speaker
says is in line with his/her private beliefs. Consider, for
example, the utterance [1] John is suffering for a love
pain by which the speaker expresses his/her private belief to the listener, namely that John is really suffering
for a love pain. In terms of mental representations, the
private beliefs of the speaker and the beliefs expressed
through the communicative acts, are not inconsistent.
On the contrary, in non-standard communication (i.e.,
deceit and irony), what the speaker says is inconsistent
with his/her private beliefs.
(ii) In case of comprehension of a deceitful act, the
listener recognizes the inconsistency between the mental
states that are expressed and those the speaker privately
entertains. In our example the speaker may proffer [1]
with a deceitful intention: in this case the speaker expresses to the partner a belief (John is suffering), while
he does not privately entertain such a belief. In addition, an utterance becomes ironic when, along with this
inconsistency, the partner also recognizes the inconsistency between the expressed mental states and the scenario provided by the knowledge the speaker shares with
the listener. Thus, by proffering [1] the actor may intend to share with the listener his/her private belief that
John is not suffering at all. The simultaneous activation
of the representation of the speaker’s utterance and of
the inconsistent shared belief makes an ironic utterance
more difficult to entertain for a child than a deceitful
utterance.
To sum up, the sort of mental representations involved predicts and explains the difference in difficulty
of comprehending an utterance proffered either with sincere, deceitful or ironic intention.
We extend the theoretical assumptions of Bucciarelli
et al. (2003) to account for the difference in difficulty
of comprehending a speaker’s communicative intention
when his/her communicative act consists of a conventional metaphor proffered with different communicative
purposes. Our goal is not to provide a theoretical explanation of the cognitive processes underlying the comprehension of a metaphor per se, rather, we focus our
analysis on the different cognitive processes underlying
the comprehension of the same metaphor proffered by
an actor in order to reach different communicative intentions. Consider for example the metaphor [2] John’s
heart is broken; by proffering the metaphor the speaker
may intend to be sincere (i.e., to share with the listener his/her private belief that John is suffering for a
love pain), or to deceive (i.e., to give as shared a belief
which is in fact inconsistent with his/her real private
belief), or to be ironic (i.e., to express a belief which is
inconsistent with his/her real private belief, but is also
inconsistent with the belief the speaker shares with the
listener). We expect to find that it is easier to comprehend a conventional metaphor proffered with the intention of being sincere than the same metaphor proffered
with the intention to deceive, that, in turn, is easier to
comprehend than the same metaphor proffered with an
ironic intention.
Materials. The experimental material consists of
six metaphors extracted from a dictionary of Italian idioms (Turrini, 1995) assessed as conventional metaphors
for Italian people, each occurring at the end of three
different written stories. In the three stories, each
metaphor acquires one of the following communicative intentions: sincere, deceitful, ironic. By combining the six metaphors with the three stories, we obtained a total of 18 stories, all equally brief and comparable for syntactical and semantical complexity. We
devised three different experimental protocols involving 2 standard metaphors, 2 deceitful metaphors and
2 ironic metaphors. Each metaphor appears only once
per protocol, paired with one of the three communicative intentions.
Procedure. Each story is presented to the child in
double format, in both an audio-recorded and a written
version. We kept the intonation of the voice telling the
story under control. Neither emphasis, nor any variation in the intonation of the voice suggests the actor’s
communicative intentions. At the end of each story the
experimenter asks the child: Why did the speaker say:
[METAPHOR]?. If the child repeats the metaphor the
experimenter asks: What could the speaker have said
instead of: [METAPHOR]?.
Participants. The participants in the experiment
were one hundred eighty children, with sixty children
in each of the following age-groups balanced by gender: 7–7.6, 8.6–9 and 10–10.6 year-olds. The children
attended four primary schools in Piedmont.
Results. Two independent judges, blind with respect to the aim of the experiment, coded each response
as correct or wrong. The results confirm our predictions.
A detailed analysis reveals that standard metaphors are
easier than deceitful metaphors, for the overall group of
participants and for single age groups (Wilcoxon test:
tied z value ranging from 2.84 to 5.06, tied p value ranging from <.0045 to <.0001). Also, standard metaphors
are easier than ironic metaphors, in the overall group
and for single age groups (Wilcoxon test: tied z value
ranging from 3.1 to 5.28, tied p value ranging from
<.002 to <.0001). As regards a detailed comparison between deceitful and ironic metaphors the results reveal
that deceitful metaphors are easier to comprehend than
ironic metaphors when considering the overall group
of participants (Wilcoxon test: tied z= 3.03, tied p
value <.002). The same result holds for the oldest
group of participants, namely 10-year-olds (Wilcoxon
test: tied z= 2.85, tied p<.004), but not for 7-year-olds
(Wilcoxon test: tied z=.58, tied p<.56) and 8-year-olds
(Wilcoxon test: tied z=-1.55, tied p<.12), who per-
173
form poorly with both deceitful and ironic metaphors.
If we consider the youngest and the oldest group of
participants, the increase in correct performance that
we observe with the increase in age, is greater with
ironic metaphors than with deceitful metaphors (MannWhitney test: tied z=3.64, tied p<.0003).
To conclude, our results reveal the existence of an
increasing trend of difficulty in the comprehension of the
same metaphor proffered by an actor with the intention
either of being sincere, or to deceive, or to be ironic.
It is possible to explain our results on the basis of the
complexity of the mental representations involved in the
comprehension process.
References:
Airenti, G., Bara, B. G. & Colombetti, M. (1993). Conversation and behavior games in the pragmatics of dialogue.
Cognitive Science, 17, 197–256.
Bara B. G., Bucciarelli, M. & Johnson-Laird, P. N.
(1995). The development of syllogistic reasoning. The
American Journal of Psychology, 108, 2, 157–193.
Bara B. G., Bucciarelli, M. & Lombardo, V. (2001).
Model Theory of Deduction: A unified computational approach. Cognitive Science, 25, 839–901.
Bucciarelli, M., Colle, L. & Bara, B. G. (2003). How children comprehend speech acts and communicative gestures.
Journal of Pragmatics, 35, 207–241.
Turrini G. (1995). Capire l’antifona: dizionario dei modi
di dire. Bologna: Zanichelli.
REPRESENTATION, SEMIOSIS, ART: THE CASE OF THE SONNET
Barend Pieter van Heusden
University of Groningen (Groningen,
The Netherlands)
In my paper, I will present the results of recent theoretical and historical research on human artistic semiosis
as a specific kind of representation.
Representation is broadly defined as ‘the patterns of
behaviour of an organism that allow this organism to
interact with its environment successfully’. Representation processes, which constitute an organism’s memory,
are determined both by the anatomy of the organism
and by the environment.
Human semiosis is one of the many possible evolutionary developments of this very general representational capacity of living beings. What distinguishes human semiosis from other representation processes seems
to be the fact that in humans the representation process
is doubled: at least a part of the external information
is processed twice: one representation process being in
terms of (the expression ‘in terms of’ is used metaphorically here) more or less stable patterns, the other in
terms of a new (and fuzzy) combination of recognized
elements.
The double processing allows for what can be considered to be the main characteristic feature of human
semiosis, namely its ‘aboutness’. When the stable representation is compared to the less stable, ‘floating’ one,
the stable representation becomes what we call a sign,
and the instable, changing combination of recognized
elements becomes what we call reality. The comparing
of the two representations is what is known as interpretation or semiosis. The semiotic process is the continuous process of matching the stable representations of
memory to the reshuffled, unstable representations of
an ever-changing actuality (cf. Fauconnier and Turner
2001). This ongoing process of semiosis, moreover, always reflexively turns upon itself.
Following the major evolutionary ‘break’ that made
this specific form of representation possible (cf. Mithen
1999), the stable representations — or signs — must
have developed further on the basis of three types of relations: perceptual, conceptual, and structural. These
three types of relations ground the three major types of
signs: the icon, the symbol and the diagram or model.
In my historical research I have tried to discover out how
this logic of the sign, which appears to be cumulative
(diagram presupposes symbol, symbol presupposes icon,
but not the other way round) determines the evolution
of culture.
The intuition that the evolution of culture is determined by an underlying semiotic logic is an old
one. It has been held by thinkers like Vico (1744)
and Ernst Cassirer (1923–1929; 1944), Erwin Panofsky
and François Braudel (1949), and more recently by August Nitschke (1975), Hayden White (1973; 1982) and
Michel Foucault (1966). The work done in evolutionary psychology on the origins of the modern mind and
the stages of episodic, mimetic, mythical and theoretical thought by Merlin Donald, has given new impetus
to this line of thought. In my opinion, semiotics can
contribute in a significant way to this work.
In my presentation I will focus on one particular type
of semiotic representation, which is the iconic reflexive
semiosis. This type of semiosis encompasses all iconic
(reflexive) representations of the semiotic process. It
represents the doubling process which is so characteristic of semiosis in terms of (once again, the expression is
being used metaphorically!) figurative representations,
that is, representations of concrete events (from colours
and sounds to fictional characters). I have been fascinated by the evolution and development of this form of
semiotic reflexivity, as I assume that it grounds what is
known in our modern culture as artistic representation
or art (Zeki 1999; Solso 2003). It is my contention that
the study of this particular kind of semiosis will greatly
help us to gain insight in the nature and development
of human semiosis and culture. Taking as a case-study
the invention of the sonnet in the early 13th century (cf.
Oppenheimer 1989), I will argue that a theory of reflex-
174
ive iconic semiosis can be of great help in unravelling and the Brain. Oxford: Oxford UP.
Van Heusden, B. (2005). ‘Künstlerische Prägnanz’ in:
the semiotic logic of cultural evolution.
References:
Braudel, Fernand (1949 / 1966). La Méditerranée et
le monde méditerranéen à l’époque de Philippe II. Paris:
Armand Collin; The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean
World in the Age of Philip II, trans. Sian Reynolds, 2 vols.
New York: Harper and Row, 1972–1974.
Cassirer, Ernst (1923–1929). The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms. Vol. 1: Language, Vol. 2: Mythical Thought,
Vol. 3: The Phenomenology of Knowledge [translated by
R. Mannheim]. New Haven and London: Yale UP, 1980.
Cassirer, Ernst (1944). An Essay on Man. An Introduction to a Philosophy of Human Culture. New Haven and
London: Yale UP.
Donald, Merlin (1991). Origins of the Modern Mind.
Three Stages in the Evolution of Culture and Cognition.
Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard UP.
Donald, Merlin (1998). ‘Mimesis and the executive
suite: missing links in language evolution’ in: Hurford et
al., eds., Approaches to the Evolution of Language. Social
and Cognitive Bases. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 44–76.
Donald, Merlin (2001). A Mind So Rare: The Evolution
of Human Consciousness. New York: Norton.
Fauconnier, Gilles, and Mark Turner (2001). The Way
we Think. Conceptual Belnding and the Mind’s Hidden
Complexities. New York: Basic Books.
Foucault, Michel (1966). Les Mots et les Choses. Une
Archéologie des Sciences Humaines. Paris: Gallimard.
Mithen, Steven, 1998. Creativity in Human Evolution
and Prehistory. London and New York: Routledge.
Nitschke, August (1975). Kunst und Verhalten. Analoge
Konfigurationen. Stuttgart: Fromann-Holzboog.
Oppenheimer, Paul (1989). The Birth of the Modern
Mind. Self, Consciousness, and the Invention of the Sonnet.
New York and Oxford: Oxford UP.
Solso, Robert L., (2003). The Psychology of Art and
the Evolution of the Conscious Brain. Cambridge, Mass. /
London: The MIT Press.
Vico, Giambattista (1744).
The New Science.
Unabridged revised translation of the third edition (1744)
with the addition of the ‘Practice of the New Science’,
ThG. Bergin and M. H. Fish, eds.. Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell UP,
1984.
White, Hayden (1974). Metahistory. The Historical
Imagination in 19th Century Europe. Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins UP.
White, Hayden (1982). Tropics of Discourse. Baltimore
and London: The Johns Hopkins UP.
Zeki, Semir, (1999). Inner Vision. An Exploration of Art
Martina Plümacher and Wolfgang Wildgen (eds.), ‘Prägnanter Inhalt — prägnante Form’, Special Issue of the Zeitschrift
für Semiotik (forthcoming).
Van Heusden, B. (2004). ‘Torn between two (autonomous) lovers: mimesis and beauty in modern art’,
in: Heusden, B. van en E. Korthals Altes (eds.), Aesthetic
Autonomy: Problems and Perspectives, Leuven: Peeters,
pp. 113–129.
Van Heusden, B. (2004). ‘A bandwidth model of semiotic evolution’, in: Bax, M., B. van Heusden en W. Wildgen
(eds.), Semiotic Evolution and the Dynamics of Culture.
Bern: Peter Lang, pp. 1–28.
Van Heusden, B. (2003). ‘Cassirers Ariadnefaden —
Anthropologie und Semiotik’, in: Sandkühler, H.J., Pätzold,
D. (Hrsg.), Kultur und Symbol. Ein Handbuch zur Philosophie Ernst Cassirers. Stuttgart / Weimar: Verlag J. Metzler,
2003, pp. 111–147.
Van Heusden, B. (2003). ‘Kunst — die vierte symbolische Form?’, in: Sandkühler, H.J., Pätzold, D. (Hrsg.), Kultur und Symbol. Ein Handbuch zur Philosophie Ernst Cassirers. Stuttgart / Weimar: Verlag J. Metzler, 2003, pp. 191–
210.
Van Heusden, B. (2003). ‘Biologie — Fragen der Autonomie’, in: Sandkühler, H.J., Pätzold, D. (Hrsg.), Kultur
und Symbol. Ein Handbuch zur Philosophie Ernst Cassirers.
Stuttgart / Weimar: Verlag J. Metzler, 2003, pp. 248–258.
Van Heusden, B. and R. J. Jorna, (2003). ‘Why representation(s) will not go away: crisis of concept or crisis of
theory?’ in: Semiotica. Special Issue — The Crisis of Representation: Semiotic Foundations in Culture and Media. Eds.
W. Nöth & Christina Ljungberg’, 143–1/4, pp. 113–134.
Van Heusden, B. (2001). ‘Jakob von Uexküll and Ernst
Cassirer’ in: Semiotica 134–1/4, 275–292.
Van Heusden, B. (1999). ‘The emergence of difference:
Some notes on the evolution of human semiosis’ in: Semiotica. Special Issue on Biosemiotics, 127 (1/4), pp. 631–646.
Van Heusden, B., and R. J. Jorna (1998). ‘Semiotics
and information-psychology: a case for semio-psychology’
in: Theory and Psychology, 8 (6), pp. 755–782.
Van Heusden, B. (1997). Why Literature? An Inquiry
into the Nature of Literary Semiosis. Tübingen: Stauffenburg Verlag.
Van Heusden, B. (1996). ‘Aesthetic and artistic semiosis: A Peircean perspective’ in: Colapietro, V. M. &
T. M. Olshewsky, eds. Peirce’s Doctrine of Signs. Theory,
Applications, and Connections. Berlin, etc.: Mouton De
Gruyter, 1996: pp. 239–250.
Van Heusden, B., and R. J. Jorna (1996). ‘Semiotics of
the user interface’ in: Semiotica 109, 3/4: pp. 237–250.
ROMANTIC SCIENCE TODAY: THE LEGACY OF
NATURPHILOSOPHIE IN COGNITIVE RESEARCH
Boris M. Velichkovsky
to remember the very first attempt at building a unified
science of mind, one related to Romantic Movement in
culture and science culminated in the early 19th CenOn the occasion of the Second Conference of the As- tury in the German Naturphilosophie. Though it has
sociation for Cognitive Studies, it may be instructive been overthrown by new analytical methods and by the
Dresden University of Technology Russian
Association for Cognitive Studies
175
tremendous progress of natural sciences (including biology), some of the legacies of this unified approach
persisted during much longer time. In fact, Romantic
ideals in studies of language, mind and brain were twice
called by name during the 20th Century: firstly, by Roman Jakobson (1934) and, secondly, by Alexander Luria
(1975).
In the talk, I wish to start with consideration of reasons for a particularly strong influence of romanticism
in the intellectual history of Russia. My argumentation
will be furthermore that in some cases this influence
permitted a number of insights that anticipated developments in cognitive science over the last several years.
For example, Romantic teleology and doubling-up of the
world into Istwert and Sollwert may explain why notions ‘images’, ‘imagery’ and ‘imagination’ have never
been completely banned from the Russian psychology
and even from neurobiology.
One of the Romantic insights also was the emphasis
on the so-called activity approach as well as organismic
and social metaphors as opposite to mechanistic models (e.g. in the work of physiologist A. A. Ukhtomsky).
The anti-Cartesian attitude has been with time transformed into anti-Chomskian feelings what easily explains
numerous anticipations and a surprisingly broad acceptance of cognitive linguistics within Russian scientific
community. The next inheritance of Romantic science
and medicine is the emphasis on the developmental and
evolutionary explanation with its stratification / levels
metaphor (it was initially borrowed by the romanticists
from geology — see Novalis, 1799). This legacy can
be best of all exemplified by the works of Lev Vygotsky (1935) and Nikolai Bernstein (1947). Still other
heritage of romanticism is a denial of artificial laboratory settings and the quest for more ecological validity.
While this point may be only sparsely represented in the
contemporary Russian research literature, I will take the
liberty to illustrate it in some details by our-own experimental studies of human eye movements, attention,
perception, memory and communication.
Finally, the question arises why Naturphilosophie
failed and how its modern interdisciplinary counterpart
could become more successful. This question will lead
us to the issue of methodology of research. Last but
not least, a closely related issue is whether cognitive
studies will provide a visible impact on the solution of
substantial practical problems in such crucial domains
of application as medicine, technology and education.
SIMULATING AMNESIA FOR A MOCK CRIME EVENT:
MECHANISMS AND CONSEQUENCES FOR LATER RECALL
George Visu1 , Ioan Buş2 ,
Viorel Virgil Andreieş1
an imaginary crime event may have deleterious effects
for later genuine memory performance. They proposed
several explanatory mechanisms: rehearsal effect, re1
Court of Appeal (Cluj Napoca, Romania)
trieval induced forggeting and self-induced missin2
Babes-Bolyai University (Cluj Napoca, Romania) formation effect (see also, Anderson, Bjork & Bjork,
1994; Ciranni & Shimamura, 1999; Shaw, Bjork & HanTheoretical background
dal, 1995; Levy & Anderson, 2002; Roediger, Jacoby &
McDermott, 1996; Van Oorsouw & Merckelbach, 2004).
The investigation presents ongoing research related to
Although simulating memory impairment is a very
the effects of simulating amnesia on later memory per- frequent phenomenon in criminal investigations, relaformance. A frequently encountered situation in the tively few empirical studies have been conducted to inforensic field is when a person who commited a crime, vestigate the consequences of not reporting and/or disor a witness of a crime, doesn’t want to disclose details torting information on later genuine memory accuracy.
of the crime with probative value to the investigators. In two studies we are investigating the effects of simuTo evade or minimize the legal consequences of their ac- lated forgetting on later genuine memory performance
tions, these persons forget some information (or all (study 1) and the mechanisms responsible for these efthe information) connected with the event. This type fects (study 2).
of simulated amnesia appears especially in cases of serious offences, such as murders or sexual offences, and
in forensic literature this situation is labeled crime re- Study 1: The deleterious effects of simulated forlated amnesia (Cima et al., 2002; Hall & Poirier, 2001; getting on later genuine memory performance.
Schacter, 1986). It is estimated that 25% to 45% of
all murderers claim amnesia for their crime (Kopelman, In this study we used a procedure adapted after a design
1995; Cima et al, 2004; Cima et al, 2003). Addition- used by Bylin (2000); although the design is very similar
aly, a number of authors argued that in the legal field (but not identical), the materials used in the experiment
the most common form of amnesia is simulated amnesia were developed by the authors and tested in a pilot study
(Cima et al, 2001; Sadof, 1974; Schacter, 1986), other (Buş & Visu, 2004). There were two testing phases (T1
forms being dissociateive amnesia and organic amnesia. — immediatly after the story reading and T2 — after
Christianson & Bylin (1999) and Bylin & Christian- one week) and two experimental conditions: genuine
son (2002) have suggested that malingering amnesia for (subjects responded truthfully in both testing phases)
176
and simulation (subjects simulated amnesia by omiting and/or distorting informations in order to minimize
their responsability). The answers were tape-recorded
and then transcripted verbatim for analysis. The results
(Visu & Buş, 2005) suggest that feigning memory impairment about an imaginary event can undermine the
genuine memories related to that event. The obtained
data also suggest that retrieval induced forgetting may
be one plausibile explanation for the negative effect of
simulation.
Study2: Simulating amnesia for a mock crime
event: mechanisms and consequences.
The simulation of memory impairment is a relatively
common phenomenon in the forensic field. In this study
we are investigating the effects of simulated forgetting
for a mock crime event on later genuine memory performance. Memory for an imaginary event may be different
from memory for events in which one has actually participated (Engelkamp, 1995); provided this, we wanted to
overcome the drawbacks of the previous studies and we
used a more realistic mock crime paradigm. To distinguish between the proposed mechanisms we designed a
study which combines a mock crime paradigm with the
methodology used by Bylin & Christianson (2002). The
subjects performed a mock crime and they were tested
immediately and after 1 week, according to their distribution in one of the four experimental conditions: genuine 1 (genuine memory for the event is tested only at
the second test occasion T2), genuine 2 (genuine memory for the event is tested at both testing occasions, T1
and T2), sim om (subjects instructed to simulate amnesia by omitting the information they believed it has probative value at T1 and requested to recall genuinely at
T2), sim dis (subjects instructed to simulate amnesia by
distorting the information they believed it has probative
value at T1 and requested to recall genuinely at T2).
Van Oorsouw & Merckelbach (2004) suggested that rehearsal effect may be (the most important mechanism)
responsible for the deleterious effects of simualting amnesia on memory performance; however, other mechanisms may be involved as well: retrieval-induced forgetting and/or self-induced missinformation effect. We
expect that the results will suggest the involvment of
RIF mechanism in the deleterious effects of simulating
memory impairment; we also assess the involvment of
rehearsal mechanism in the same deleterious effects.
References:
Anderson, M. C., Bjork, R. A., & Bjork, E. L. (1994).
Remembering can cause forgetting: Retrieval dynamics in
long-term memory. Journal of Experimental Psychology:
Learning, Memory and Cognition, 20, 1063–1087.
Buş, I. & Visu, G. (2004). Simularea deficitului de memorie ı̂n contexte medicale şi legale: Un studiu pilot. În Studii
şi Cercetări din Domeniul Ştiinţelor Socio-Umane, vol. 12.
Cluj-Napoca: Argonaut.
Bylin S. & Christianson S-Å. (2002). Characteristics of
malingered amnesia: Consequences of withholding vs. dis-
torting information on later memory of a crime event. Legal
and Criminological Psychology, 7(1), 45–61.
Christianson, S.-A. & Bylin, S. (1999). Does simulating amnesia mediate genuine forgetting for a crime event?
Applied Cognitive Psychology, 13, 495–511.
Cima, M., Merckelbach, H., Hollnack, S. & Knauer, E.
(2003). Characteristics of psychiatry prison inmates who
claim amnesia. Personality and Individual Differences, 35,
373–380.
Cima, M., Merckelbach, H., Nijman, H.,. Knauer, R. &
Hollnack, S. (2002). I can’t remember Your Honor: Offenders Who Claim Amnesia. German Journal of Psychiatry, 5,
24–34.
Cima, M., Nijman, H., Merckelbach, H., Kremer, K. &
Hollnack, S. (2004). Claims of crime-related amnesia in
forensic patients. International Journal of Law and Psychiatry, 27, 215–221.
Ciranni, M. A., & Shimamura, A. P. (1999). Retrievalinduced forgetting in episodic memory. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition, 25,
1403–1414.
Engelkamp, J. (1995). Visual imagery and enactment
of actions in memory. British Journal of Psychology, 86,
227–240.
Hall, H. V. & Poirier, J. G. (2001). Detecting malingering and deception. Boca Raton: CRC Press.
Kopelman, M. D. (1995). The assessment of psychogenic amnesia.
In A. Baddeley, B. A. Wilson &
F. N. Watts (Eds.).
Handbook of memory disorders
(pp. 427–448).
Levy, B. J. & Anderson, M. C. (2002). Inhibitory processes and the control of memory retrieval. Trends in Cognitive Science, 6,(7).
Roediger, H. L., Jacoby, D., & McDermott, K. B. (1996).
Missinformation effects in recall:Creating false memories
through repeated retrieval. Journal of Memory and Language, 35, 300–318.
Sadoff, R. L. (1974). Evaluations of amnesia in criminallegal situations. Journal of Forensic Sciences, 19, 98–101
Schacter, D. L. (1986). Amnesia and crime: How much
do we really know? American Psychologist, 4 1, 286–295.
Shaw, J. S., Bjork, R. A. & Handal, A. (1995). Retrieval
induced forgetting in an eyewitnes-memory paradigm. Psychonomic Bulletin Review, 2, 249–253.
Van Oorsouw, K. & Merckelbach, H. (2004). Feigning
Amensia Undermines Memory for a Mock Crime. Applied
Cognitive Psychology, 18, 505–518.
Visu, G. & Buş, I. (2005). The deleterious effects of
simulated forgetting on later genuine memory performance.
In Studii si Cercetari in Domeniul Stiintelor Soscio-Umane,
vol. 13, p. 118–125. Argonaut: Cluj Napoca.
177
PROXIMITY SPACE OF VERBS
Victor L. Vvedensky
Kurchatov Institute (Moscow, Russia)
Startling development and enormous spread of computer technologies imply that the traditional interfaces
should be replaced or supplemented with ordinary human speech. However, it is quite difficult to implement
this commonplace human activity into technical devices.
The probable reason is the lack of understanding of how
the speech system is organised. One should somehow
explain to the computer the properties of language.
The language acts as a coding system converting manifold of notions into an array of words and the properties
of this conversion depend on the structure of linguistic
memory. One can try to disclose this structure through
the analysis of the word-formation process.
One of the main difficulties in the computer processing of language is the fuzziness of relationships between what we call the meaning of a word and it’s
shape manifested as a sequence of phonemes approximated with some sort of alphabetic representation. Synonyms are clearly different words attributed to nearly the
same meaning. Human interpreters feel which synonym
should be used in a given context, though this feeling
is difficult to implement in software. Large dictionaries
provide multiple translations for a given word with a
certain ordering, more or less in accordance with the
frequency of their use. We believe that they contain
sufficient information for the construction of the space,
bearing internal representation of the manifold of basic
notions of human life. This space is a reflection of the
system, which stores these notions in the cortex.
Our previous study of the representation of basic notions through the words of different languages
[1, 2] revealed quite robust regularities, common at
least for Bulgarian, Russian, Czech, Polish, Latvian,
Swedish, German, English, Dutch, French, Italian, Romanian, Greek and Albanian, taken for the study, possibly for other languages as well. Frequency of use of
the phonemes in the construction of the basic roots,
is a universal function with the initial linearly decreasing trend including about 30 symbols. This implies a
common mechanism shaping the basic words in different languages. This mechanism allows only appropriate
borrowings and makes obsolete words, which do not fit
the general dependence.
With such a mathematical background one can address the problem of interrelation between words, assessing their proximity in a certain space. Technically
this can be done with the use of large multi-language
electronic dictionaries. Here we limit ourselves to English verbs.
legare, länka ihop, koppeln, kojarzyć, ı̂nlănţui,
förena, congiungere, bashkoj.
EMTYkBBOcl ,0 / , /+1
- sund’ew %& ##23 4%5&46 47%48
9&% 9$&: 9&; <=4(& l>56 $&%
&&%& #9)
BBOcl /?- //, /01
/?- ? 63#<
@=& @#:<& @#<9:4& ##% 4&
4%5'&%6 4%54%'6 47%@6 47%4&@
4%& 47%97 47%9&4 4;%%& 4&#4%2
4&7#<>% 4&9< ;8# <5 8%& $&$&
(; AB A##%& (&#:$& (=# 9=;; & &(&#;& %& % >#
%%C&&% 44%%& #$9&ß& $&(& ;D>
D; 49<<&)
sun’aptw, kat’asqw, atrof’w, aposp’w
These examples provide numerical values (number of
translations in a group of kindred languages) for both
verbs LINK and ATTACH separately and for their overlap (number of common translations). The choice of
14 languages seems to be nearly minimal, levelling up
variations and providing reasonable accuracy for subsequent procedures. Every pair of verbs is specified with
the number of common translations, like in the pair
LINK/ATTACH. We consider the logarithm of the number of common translations, as an appropriate measure
of proximity between two verbs in a certain space. This
is an approach, which turned out to be successful in the
construction of the proximity space of the European languages [3]. It turns out that the array of links between
verbs is self-consistent and English verbs can be located
in a 3-dimensional space. The portion of this space is
shown in Fig.1.
We observe, that the system of English verbs (and
most probably of other languages as well) can be represented as a continuous object in a 3-dimensional space.
There is reason to believe that just this object bears
internal representation of the multitude of actions perceived by the human being. Every particular language
pins individual points on the body of this object with
the words of this language. We understand that the implementation of such an object in a language-processing
device may solve problems of human-computer interface, providing direct speech contact between computer
and user. Just the verbs are the main sources of ambiguity in the interpretation of speech. On the other
hand, one should look for a system supporting verbs in
the human cortex, which has properties similar to those
manifested by the shape of the object in the proximity
LINK: +,- ./, -0 en’wnw, space. There is no doubt that other words of human
zusammenkommen, wia̧zać, vincolare, verklam- language can be treated using similar approach. This
mern, verketten, verflechten, verbinden, uni, can reveal more complex structure of the internal repschakelen, savienot, saldare, saķēdēt, raccorder, resentation of language.
178
Figure 1. Three-dimensional representation of the proximity space of English
verbs. This is a portion of a larger array. The distances between any two verbs are
proportional to the logarithm of the number of common translations in a group
of 14 foreign languages.
References:
, m ,-0 g3 /3
-
/- - -1 2 /.2
) .//01 " w
Gg- )H
Basic Language Thesaurus. Proc. VII International
Conf. Cognitive Modelling in Linguistics, 308–313,
(Varna 2004).
3. V. L. Vvedensky, Proximity space of the European
Languages. Text Processing and Cognitive Technologies, v.11, 2005, pp.376–378.
2. V. L. Vvedensky, A. V. Korshakov, Visualization of the
A 4T ERFMRI STUDY OF ORTHOGRAPHIC EFFECTS ON
PICTURE NAMING IN CHINESE*
Brendan Stuart Weekes1 , Sam Hutton1 ,
Deming Wang2 , Katie McMahon2 ,
Matt Eastburn2 , Martina Bryant2 ,
Greig de Zubicaray2
English suggest distinct regions of brain activity are involved in phonological priming relative to a baseline control. Phonological priming of picture naming in English
speakers is associated with a BOLD signal decrease in
1
University of Sussex (Brighton, UK)
left Wernicke’s area and signal increases in anterior cin2
University of Queensland (Australia)
gulate, orbitomedial prefrontal, inferior parietal cortices
The presence of a phonological relationship between a and the occipital lobe (de Zubicaray et al., 2002). In alcontext word (cap) and the name of a target picture phabetic languages, orthography and phonology are un(cat) facilitates picture naming in the picture-word in- avoidably confounded. This makes it difficult to estabterference task in alphabetic languages such as English lish the relative contribution of orthographic and phonoand Dutch. Neuroimaging studies of picture naming in logical information to the facilitation effect. Therefore
* This research was supported by a grant from the Australian Research Council and the Research Grants Council of the Hong Kong
government HKU7275/03H.
179
it is not clear whether priming effects on picture naming are purely phonological or reflect additional orthographic processing, since the effect may be due to shared
orthography rather than phonological overlap between
target and foil. In non-alphabetic languages such as
Chinese it is possible to examine the relative contribution of orthographic and phonological information to
the facilitation effect independently as many characters
are heterographic homophones and others are visually
similar characters that are not homophonous (Leck et
al., 1995). This is of interest as most accounts of picture naming assume that phonological processing influences performance whereas at lest some writers (e.g.,
Starreveld & La Heij, 1995) argue that orthographic
information has an impact specifically at the lemma
level. Weekes et al. (2002) reported independent effects on picture naming performance in Chinese when
orthographically related and phonologically related foils
are manipulated factorially and they showed that these
effects do not interact. We know that recognition of
characters is associated with specific patterns of activation in the cortex (Chee et al., 1999; Kuo et al., 2003).
However, no study has reported on the neural bases of
phonological and orthographic priming on picture naming in Chinese.
Subjects and methods. Five normal right-handed
adults were scanned. All were native Putonghua speakers residing in Australia. The task was picture naming
and all participants were trained to criterion prior to
data collection (no errors were made prior to or during scanning). Participants were presented randomly
with trials from orthographically related, phonologically
related, identity or unrelated distractor conditions and
whole-brain volumes that were co-incident with the estimated peak haemodynamic response for each trial were
acquired. Overt naming responses occurred in the absence of scanner noise allowing reaction time data to
be recorded (de Zubicaray et al., 2002). The study
was performed on a 4T Bruker Medspec system located
in Brisbane, Australia. For the functional MRI data a
sparse temporal acquisition was used to acquire 80 T2*weighted GE EPI volumes (36 slices, 3 mm×0.6 mm
gap, and in-plane resolution of 3.6 mm) with TR/TE
of 3000/30 ms. Functional MRI data were preprocessed
and analysed in SPM99. Activation from the group random effects analysis is reported, thresholded at p < .005
(uncorrected) with a cluster size minimum of 5 contiguous activated voxels.
Results and conclusions. Activation in phonological processing (relative to an unrelated distractor word)
was observed in left hemisphere sites including temporal, lingual, insula, post-central, supramarginal frontal,
inferior orbital and supplementary motor areas. Activation during orthographic processing (relative to an unrelated distractor word) was observed in left hemisphere
sites including middle and superior temporal lobe, angular gyrus, thalamus, lingual, and supramarginal gyrus
(see Figure 1). When activation during phonological
processing was compared with activation during orthographic processing (and vice versa) a large number of
brain regions were more involved in one task than the
other. Additional analyses found activation for identity
priming (target presented simultaneously relative to an
unrelated distractor word) was associated with specific
sites in the left and right hemisphere, thus revealing for
the first time evidence of repetition priming in Chinese.
The results reveal a number of findings that shed
light on the neural mechanisms underlying picture naming in Chinese. First, we found phonological processing
modulates brain activity in regions that are similar to
those identified for English speakers. Second, although
there was considerable overlap in the brain regions activated during phonological and orthographic processing,
orthography had an independent facilitatory effect on
picture naming in Chinese that could be seen in specific
brain regions. Phonological effects without a confounding of orthography are therefore genuine and orthography has a unique effect on picture naming. This is
evidence against the hypothesis that phonological and
orthographic priming effects on picture naming rely on
common mechanisms (at least among Chinese speakers). It is therefore legitimate to test the question of
whether there are independent phonological and orthographic priming effects on picture naming in alphabetic
scripts using brain imaging. We assume that facilitatory priming effects with orthographic, phonological and
identity distractors occur at a lexical level that involves
language areas that are typically activated during picture naming. Orthographic priming effects result in activation in the angular gyrus, which has long been known
to be necessary for reading in alphabetic scripts. The
present results converge with studies of character processing suggesting independent orthographic-semantic
processing in a visual word form area located in the angular gyrus (Kuo et al., 2003; Law et al., 1999; see also
Fiebach et al., 2002). Repetition priming in character
recognition has been reported in the behavioural literature (Weekes et al., 1999). The present data also reveal
for the first time evidence of repetition priming in Chinese using brain imaging data. Repetition priming has
been reported in parts of the occipitotemporal cortex
that are particularly responsive to the specific category
of stimuli presented e.g. face recognition in the fusiform
cortex Henson et al. (2000). The present data shows
that lexical activation in Chinese has an impact on brain
activation confirming the status of a mental representation that we will call lexemes in Chinese.
References:
Chee, M. W., Weekes, B., Lee, K. M., Soon, C. S.,
Schreiber, A., Hoon, J. J., Chee, M., (2000). Overlap and
dissociation of semantic processing of Chinese characters,
English words, and pictures: evidence from fMRI. NeuroImage 12, 392–403.
de Zubicaray, G. I., McMahon, K. L., Eastburn, M. M., &
Wilson, S. J. (2002). Orthographic / phonological facilitation of naming responses in the picture-word task: An event
related fMRI study. NeuroImage, 16, 1084–1093
180
Fiebach, C. J., Friederici, A. D., Muller, K., & von Cramon, D. Y., (2002). fMRI evidence for dual routes to the
mental lexicon in visual word recognition. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 14, 11–23.
Henson, R., Shallice, T., & Dolan, R. (2000). Neuroimaging evidence for dissociable forms of repetition priming. Science, 287, 1269–1272.
Kuo, W. J., Yeh, T. C., Lee, C. Y., Wu, Y. T.,
Chou, C. C., Ho, L. T., Hung, D. L., Tzeng, O. J. L.,
Hsieh, J. C., 2003. Frequency effects of Chinese character
processing in the brain: an event-related fMRI study. NeuroImage, 18, 720–730.
Law, I., Kannao, I., Fujita, H. S. M., Lassen, N., Uemura, K. (1991). Left supramarginal / angular gyri activation during of syllabograms in the Japanese language. Journal of Neurolinguists, 6, 243–251.
Leck, K. J., Weekes, B. S., Chen, M. J., (1995). Visual
and phonological pathways to the lexicon: evidence from
Chinese readers. Memory and Cognition. 23, 468–476.
Starreveld, P. A., & La Heij, W. (1995). Semantic interference, orthographic facilitation, and their interaction in
naming tasks. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 21, 686–698.
Weekes, B. S., Chen, M. J., Yu, B.-L. (1997). Repetition priming of Chinese characters and pseudocharacters.
In H-C. Chen (Ed.). Cognitive processing of Chinese and
related Asian languages. Hong Kong; Chinese University
Press. pp. 161–170.
Weekes, B. S., Davies, R. A., & Chen, M.-J. (2002).
Stroop effects on picture naming in Chinese. In H. S. R. Kao,
C. K. Leong, & D-G. Gao (Eds.), Cognitive Neuroscience
Studies of the Chinese language. Hong Kong University of
Press. pp. 101–127.
EFFECTS OF AGE LIMITED LEARNING ON LANGUAGE
PROCESSING IN CHINESE: AN FMRI STUDY*
Brendan Stuart Weekes1 , Zhen Jin2 ,
Alice Chan3 , Jenny S. W. Kwok3 ,
Li Hai Tan3
1
University of Sussex (Brighton, UK)
Beijing 306 Hospital (China)
3
University of Hong Kong
2
Brain imaging studies investigating the effects of word
frequency on lexical processing have helped to characterize the role of inferior frontal brain areas to word
recognition (Fiez et al., 1999; Fiebach et al., 2003; Chee
et al., 2002). Frequency has a demonstrable effect on
brain activation during word recognition tasks in English
and Chinese (Chee et al, 2002). However, cognitive psychologists have observed that words learned early in vocabulary development are processed differently to later
acquired words. Brain imaging studies have found the
age of acquisition of a word (AoA) modulates specific
brain areas and these are not influenced by word frequency (Fiebach et al, 2003). The precuneus is activated by early learned words and additional activity
for the reading of early acquired words is observed in
the auditory cortex. By contrast, late acquired words
result in a selective increase in activation in lateral inferior frontal areas. No study has investigated the neural
bases of AoA in Chinese or attempted to dissociate these
effects from effects of word frequency on Chinese word
recognition. In this study, our aim was to investigate
whether early and late acquired Chinese words are represented differently in the brain and, if so, whether brain
activation effects for word frequency and AoA are mediated by common neural systems. The two questions we
address are: first, are early and late learned words processed differently behaviorally in visual lexical decision
and, if so, is the neuroanatomical dissociation between
early and late acquired words similar or different for low
* This
and high frequency words; and second, if AoA effects
are different from frequency effects, can theoretical explanations of the AoA effect proposed in the behavioral
literature account for these neuroimaging results.
Subjects and methods. 12 right-handed native
Mandarin speakers in Beijing. The behavioural task was
visual lexical decision (half real and half pseudowords
were presented). Half the real words were early-acquired
and half were late acquired words. AoA was assessed
using rating scales given to 100 native Chinese speakers. The frequency of the words was matched across the
two sets of stimuli. Then after holding age of acquisition constant frequency was manipulated. The study
was performed on a 2T GE / Elscint Prestige wholebody MRI scanner. T2*-weighted gradient-echo EPI
sequence was used, with slice thickness = 6 mm, inplane resolution = 2.9 mm×2.9 mm, and TR/TE / flip
angle = 2000 ms/ 45 ms/ 90◦ . Twenty contiguous axial
slices were acquired to cover the whole brain.
Results and conclusions. All responses were
checked by a native Chinese speaker. Early-acquired
words were associated with activations in left superior temporal and middle frontal gyri, while lateacquired words were mediated primarily by bilateral
supramarginal gyrus and anterior cingulated cortex.
When age of acquisition was controlled across high and
low-frequency words, only the bilateral occipital gyrus
showed frequency effects. Typical cortical regions contributing to frequency effects such as left inferior frontal
gyrus and motor cortex were not active (see Figure 1).
AoA effects occur at a lexical level involving typical language areas. Frequency effects without a confounding
of AoA, however, occur at a visual and non-linguistic
level in Chinese. The different pattern of brain activity observed when adults read words acquired at different ages suggests that differences between early and
research was supported by a grant HKU7275/03H from the Research Grants Council of the Hong Kong Government.
181
late learned words in behavioral studies are also significant at the neural level. The results reveal a number
of new findings that shed light on the neural mechanisms underlying Chinese word recognition. First, AoA
modulates brain activity. Second, AoA modulates activity in areas not affected by frequency. This finding is
evidence against the hypothesis that behavioral effects
of word frequency and AoA are due to common underlying mechanisms. Late learned words caused greater
activity in the left inferior frontal lobe. The increase
in inferior frontal activity during processing of words
that are difficult to recognise is compatible with the
suggestion from neuroimaging studies that left inferior
prefrontal cortex (LIPFC) has a critical role in semantic processing of words. LIPFC is necessary for effortful
or strategic activation of information from the semantic
knowledge system (Gabrieli et al., 1998). The present
data suggest this account can be extended to Chinese
word recognition. Early in life, i.e., until 5 or 6 years
of age, language is generally learned exclusively through
spoken words and understanding the meaning of words
is most likely more closely linked to subjective experiences than it is later in life. Ellis and Lambon Ralph
(2000) suggest that due to loss of plasticity during maturation, early and late acquired words are represented
differently during language development. Furthermore,
later learned items are harder to differentiate in computational models. In summary the results show age
of acquisition plays an important role in Chinese word
recognition. The study also reveals AoA modulates ac-
tivity in areas devoted to semantic retrieval. However,
one question remains whether differences are due to a
loss of plasticity during maturation as suggested by Ellis and Lambon Ralph (2000) or differences in the context in which learning took place (Fiebach et al., 2002;
2003).
References:
Chee, M. W. L., Hon, H. H. H., Caplan, D., Lee, H. L., &
Goh, J. (2002). Frequency of concrete words modulates prefrontal activation during semantic judgments. Neuroimage,
16(1), 259–268.
Ellis, A. W., & Lambon Ralph, M. A., (2000). Age of
acquisition effects in adult lexical processing reflect loss of
plasticity in maturing systems: insights from connectionist
networks. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning,
Memory and Cognition, 26, 1103–1123.
Fiebach, C. J., Friederici, A. D., Muller, K., & von Cramon, D. Y., (2002). fMRI evidence for dual routes to the
mental lexicon in visual word recognition. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 14, 11–23.
Fiebach, C. J., Friederici, A. D., Muller, K., von Cramon, D. Y., & Hernandez, A. E. (2003). Distinct brain representations for early and late learned words. Neuroimage,
19(4), 1627–1637.
Fiez, J. A., Balota, D. A., Raichle, M. E., Petersen, S. E.,
1999. Effects of lexicality, frequency, and spelling-to-sound
consistency on the functional anatomy of reading. Neuron,
24, 205–218.
Gabrieli, J. D. E., Poldrack, R. A., Desmond, J. E., 1998.
The role of the left prefrontal cortex in language and memory. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 95,
906–913.
LEARNING SYNESTHESIA FROM REFRIGERATOR MAGNETS
Nathan Witthoft1 , Jonathan Winawer1 ,
Lera Boroditsky2
1
2
MIT (Cambridge, USA)
Stanford University (Stanford, USA)
Synesthesia is a condition in which percepts in one
modality reliably elicit secondary perceptions in the
same or a different modality that are not in the stimulus.
In a common manifestation, synesthetes see colors in response to spoken or written letters, words and numbers.
For example, the letter P might appear to be purple to
a synesthete even if printed in black or grey ink. The
question of how particular letter-color pairings arise in
the mind of a synesthete has provoked much debate and
is still unknown. Many researchers hold that the relation arises from pre-existing mappings between sensory
areas. Another possibility is that learning can influence
the development of particular stimulus-synesthesia pairings. Although a learning account is intuitively plausible, this view has largely fallen out of favor due to
the inability of researchers to find a case where learning
could be traced to a particular environmental source.
In earlier work we demonstrated that the particular colors seen by a letter-color synesthete AED were
learned from a set of refrigerator magnets that she
played with as a child (figure 1). Furthermore, the
synesthesia later transferred to Cyrillic in a systematic
way, with the colors induced by the Cyrillic letters determined by their visual or phonetic similarity to English
letters. Closer examination of the data revealed that letters of either language that are more visually similar to
the English capitals in the magnet set are also more saturated. In order to differentiate AED’s synesthesia from
ordinary memory, we use a novel psychophysical method
to show that AED’s synesthetic colors are subject to
ordinary lightness constancy mechanisms (Witthoft &
Winawer, Cortex, in Press).
Here we present behavioral and functional imaging
experiments with this same subject that provide further
evidence of the perceptual reality of her experience and
suggest that at least in part that her synesthesia arises
early in the visual pathways. First we found that the
vividness of AED’s synesthetic colors varies in a systematic way depending on the real hue of a particular letter
or number. As the hue of the stimulus is shifted around
the color circle away from the hue of AED’s photism,
the vividness declines, and AED’s synesthesia is abolished entirely when the hue of the stimulus is roughly
182
180 degrees from the hue of the synesthetic color (figure
2).
This finding led to two experiments which provide
objective evidence of this phenomena. In the first we
used a variant of the Stroop task to show that as has
been demonstrated for other synesthetes, AED takes
longer to name the hue of a stimulus, when the hue
is inconsistent with the hue evoked by her synesthesia.
However, when we split the inconsistent hues into two
sets, one which evoked synesthesia and one which did
not, we found that the effect of interference was significantly reduced when AED did not experience a synesthetic color This suggests that the interference produced
in the Stroop task is separable into two components, one
cognitive and one perceptual.
In a second experiment, we took advantage of the
variation in AED’s subjective ratings of the vividness
of her synesthesia to examine its neural substrates. In
one part of an fMRI experiment, color responsive areas in visual cortex were located. In the next part of
the experiment AED viewed letter strings which evoked
synesthetic colors of varying vividness. Data collected
from the regions of interest showed that BOLD activity
was positively and linearly related to AED’s subjective
ratings of the vividness of the synesthetic colors, suggesting a tight coupling between activity in this early
visual area and her conscious experience.
These results make a strong case that AED’s synesthesia is available to early visual processes which are
ordinarily considered encapsulated with respect to associative memory and further highlights the fact that a
learning account of synesthesia can be consistent with
an early processing account.
Figure 1. Left: matches generated by AED for her synesthetic colors. Right:
Childhood toy recovered from AED’s parents.
Figure 2. Top left: examples of matches to synesthetic colors. Middle Right:
colors complementary to synesthetic matches. Bottom Left: colors generated by
AED which eliminate experience of synesthetic colors. Right: correlation between
complements to synesthetic matches and colors which eliminate synesthesia. This
effect was the basis for the Stroop and fMRI experiments described in the abstract.
183
NATURAL FORCES: THE REFLECTION OF EXPERIENCE IN
METAPHOR
Karina Yuryevna Yeremetova
Herzen State Pedagogical University of Russia
(Saint Petersburg, Russia)
This work is an attempt to explore how language structures the domain of perception.
Perception is the doorway to cognition, which is
characterized as the two-facet relationship between the
subject and the environment.
The human experience (physical and emotional)
may be expressed by various aids. This study is focused
upon the analysis of metaphorical expressions denoting
the natural force (wind).
Although natural forces are less tangible and less
concretely perceptible than, for example, natural objects, they, nevertheless may function to describe such
experiences.
Let’s consider the following linguistic examples taken
from different literary corpuses that illustrate the sound
as one of the characteristic properties of the wind:
1.
the wind sighed sadly in the pines about them
components of their meanings (moan — pain, suffering, sexual pleasure; sob — tears; rave —
malice) are eliminated with the preservation of components rendering the nature, quality of a sound (see
examples 4, 5, 7).
Thus, the auditive mode of perception of the natural force is correlated with the characteristics of the
internal experience (1.subjective 2. communicative 3.
emotional).
Another integral feature of this natural force is its
varying impact upon the human beings, other objects
and phenomena:
1.
2. The soft wind of the tropics played in the naked
ward (J. Conrad. Lord Jim);
3.
The wind would get hold of his hand and try
A blast of cold wind lifted her hair (A. Huxley.
(J. Steinbeck. Tortilla Flat);
2.
the mutter of the wind drew near apace
(J. Conrad. Typhoon);
4.
3.
Don’t you hear to what soft whispers the wind
has fallen? (Ch. Bronte. Jane Eyre);
5.
There was no sound through the house, but
the moaning wind which shook the windows every now and then. . . (Ch. Bronte. Wuthering
Heights);
6.
4.
The sweet wind from Europe was still whispering in the refreshed leaves. . . (Ch. Bronte.
Jane Eyre); a sweet-scented wind stole along
from the West, very slow as yet (J. Galsworthy.
Patrician);
to shake it off his shoulders (J. Conrad. Typhoon);
After the Fireworks);
At the last moment a tongue of air scurried in
and licked out the flame of the lamp(J. Conrad.
Typhoon);
The
wind kissing the earth! (J. Galsworthy.
The Dark Flower);He removed his hat, let
the breeze stir his hair and kiss his brow
(Ch. Bronte. Jane Eyre).
5. As she went, the wind rose sobbing; the rain
The verbs get hold, shake off, lift, kiss, lick out charpoured wild and cold; the whole night seemed to
acterize the physical contact and contain the following
feel her. (Ch. Bronte. Villette);
components (get hold, shake off, lift — direct con6. . . . the wind sang in the strenuous note which tact with the object, transposition (3), (4); kiss —
under the circumstances would have expressed to a tender touch of lips as a sign of affection (6); lick
me all the joy of life (J. Conrad. Typhoon);
out — a touch with the help of the tongue (5). In
sentences (1) and (2) the symbols of the metaphors are
7. I only once awoke to hear the wind rave in fuassociations fragrant (1) and mild, warm, moderrious gusts (Ch. Bronte. Jane Eyre).
ate, calm (2).
Thus, there is the following correlation between the
8. a muffled silence reigned, broken at times by the
mode
of perception and cognition:
shrieks of the storm (H. Melville. Moby Dick);
The associative metaphorization is based on the similarity of the different sounds of the wind and the sounds
produced by human beings (the words sigh, mutter,
whisper, moan, sob characterize a low sound; sing, rave,
shriek — a loud sound). The peculiarities of the emotional experience can be traced in the connotations of
such words as, for example, moan, sob, rave. As the
result of the metaphorical transfer, the anthropocentric
the tactile mode of perception → internal experience
(1.communicative, 2.emotional, 3.subjective).
The lexical survey has shown that the wind is personified: it is able to express emotions with the aid
of different sounds (sigh, whisper, mutter, sob, shriek,
song, moan etc.) and has the ability to influence other
objects and phenomena (the analogy with the purposeful actions of human beings).
184
In conclusion, let us point out that it would be interesting to investigate the relations between the visual,
auditive, tactile domains and the cognitive domains in
the diachrony and make a comparative study on the
material of other languages.
References:
1. Johnson, M. The body in the mind. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987.
2. Lakoff, G. and M. Johnson. Metaphors we live by.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980.
VARIETY OF KNOWLEDGE AND NATURAL LANGUAGE
ANALYSIS
Richard Zuber
entail its sentential complement. Given this fact we
have another difference between the two clauses: it can
CNRS (Paris, France)
be shown that (1) asserts (2). The reason is that (1)
The fact that there are various types of knowledge is well and its (internal) negation both entail (2).
Sentence in (2) is sometimes considered as a prorecognised by philosophers and cognitive scientists. In
particular the distinction made prominent by G. Ryle be- totypical example of an indirect (yes-no) question. So
tween propositional or factual knowledge expressed by I will discuss some differences between direct and inknow that constructions and practical knowledge as- direct questions as seen in modern linguistic theories,
cribed in know-how constructions has been often stud- Furthermore, the verb to know can also be used to
ied. It is also well-known that natural languages have a form wh-indirect questions, as in (3) and (4) (where P
large variety of complex constructions in which the verb is a property):
to know (or its various forms) occurs. Such construc(3) A knows who/what is P (4) A knows
tions are usually assigned different grammatical catewhy S
gories. The purpose of this talk is to analyse diferent,
As is well-known logical analysis of (direct and infrom the point of view of categorial syntax, construcdirect)
why-questions poses various specific problems,
tions involving knowledge and in particular to establish,
I
will
mention
some additional difficulties for their linwhen possible, semantic relations to which specific conguistic
analysis.
structions give rise and semantic relations which relate
Finally the verb to know can occur in constructions
different constructions between themselves. By doing
taking
a direct (nominal) object, as in (5):
this I hope to show why natural languages try to unify
different types of knowledge philosophers distinguished
(5) A knows B / every logician / most
and in particular to justify the fact that in general the
philosophers.
same basic lexical item is used even if grammatical catIf we consider the fact that to know can freely take
egory may change.
different
complements (nominal, interrogative and senThe syntactic framework to be used is the one of
tential)
as
non-accidental, an explanation is needed.
a simple categorial grammar extended by the Boolean
One
possible
way to explain this fact is to show that
semantics. The semantic notions that will be used are
constructions
with categorially different verb to know
basically those of (generalised) presupposition and (genare
semantically
related. In the case of (5) it can be
eralised) assertion. They are supposed to hold not only
claimed
that
there
is a specific property that direct obbetween sentences but also cross-categorially between
ject
in
(5)
have
and,
in addition A knows this fact. This
sub-sentential categories and even between two expres(6a)
is
related
(possibly
equivalent) to (6b):
sions which belong to different grammatical categories.
Concerning logical apparatus I will use, in a rather infor(6a) A knows B (6b) There is a property P
mal way, a higher order variables and quantifiers binding
such that A knows that B is P.
them.
Various problems concerning this proposal, which is
To illustrate the problems that will be discussed let
not new, will be discussed. In particular I will try do
us start with the difference between that-clauses and
delimitate the exact nature of the property P supposed
if-clauses formed with the verb to know, as in the folto characterise the individual A.
lowing examples (where A stands for a human individual
Finally some related verbs of cognition, such as to
and S for as sentence):
remember, to forget, to see and to ignore will be
discussed. I will show that basically they are derived by
(1) A knows that S (2) A knows whether S
Boolean means, from the verb to know.
In conclusion, categorial polyvalency of many verbs
It is usually assumed (at least in linguistic semanof
cognition
may be considered as not accidental since
tics) that (1) presupposes S, in contradistinction to (2).
this
feature
is
common to many other items, not necesThe reason is that (10 and its internal) negation both
sarily
related
to
cognition.
entail S. This is not the case with (2), which does not
.IH
)*
+)
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. /
/
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