Political Psychology, Vol. 22, No. 4, 2001
Are Nativists a Different Kind of Democrat?
Democratic Values and “Outsiders” in Japan
Meredith W. Watts
University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee
Ofer Feldman
Naruto University of Education
This paper combines three elements: a discussion of democratic values and the status of
outsiders in Japanese political culture, the development of new measures to examine
sensitive issues of nativism and foreigner perception in Japan, and an empirical exploration
of the relationship between democratic values and antipathy toward outsiders. Two forms
of democratic orientation were investigated in a sample of about 1,000 university students
in Japan: a defensive version, which adheres to the formalistic requirements of democracy
but is exclusionary and illiberal, and a universalist version that is liberal and tolerant. A
defensive orientation is associated with greater chauvinism, a greater sense of threat
emanating from foreigners, and a heightened anxiety about economic competition. A
universalist orientation is associated with low perceived threat and low chauvinism, a lack
of fear of economic competition, and a positive view of the cultural contributions of outsiders.
Nativism may indeed be compatible with democratic values, but only with the defensive,
exclusionary form. In short, the defensive form is democracy for xenophobes. Such an
orientation is not unique to Japan, but is likely to be found in developing democracies as
well as in advanced democracies that feel threatened.
KEY WORDS: Japan, youth, democratic values, nativism, xenophobia
Writing in the context of German unification, Klingemann and Hofferbert
(1994) suggested that the extension of democracy could proceed side by side with
a resurgence of nationalism tinged by an element of xenophobia: “One can be a
nativist and still be a democrat” (p. 36). But what sort of democrat might that be?
Klingemann and Hofferbert were not explicit in defining what they meant by
nativism, but their statement is provocative and deserves a closer look.
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Published by Blackwell Publishers, 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA, and 108 Cowley Road, Oxford, OX4 1JF, UK.
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In the United States the term has historically implied nationalism, ethnic
exclusionism, and even explicit political hostility to outgroups (Bennett, 1995;
Higham, 1963). It is entirely possible for a formal democracy to be created, and to
continue to exist, in a political culture that is xenophobic and exclusionary; recent
research on formerly socialist nations has shown this to be more the rule than the
exception (Gibson, 1996, 1998; Gibson, Duch, & Tedin, 1992). When this occurs,
the formal institutions will apply to those who are in the system, but the political
culture will actively define many groups as being outsiders. This raises two central
questions: (1) Is there a form of democratic orientation that incorporates this
exclusionary sentiment, and, if so, (2) what are its correlates in the political culture?
We chose to explore these questions in Japan because we believe it has an
ambivalent relationship to its political institutions, displaying both liberal and
illiberal forms of commitment to its formal democratic structures (Feldman, 1997).
It also has a deep historical bias against the acceptance of foreigners and outsiders.
It is the connection between these aspects of Japanese political culture that we
examine here.
Liberal and Illiberal Democracy
Observers in the United States often believe the notion of illiberal democracy
to be an oxymoron, but in the broader scheme of world systems it is not. It is not
even an oxymoron in the United States if we look closely at the darker periods of
its political history. There is a common condition under which intolerance is often
thought to be compatible with “democratic” orientations—namely, where it is
believed that the democratic system itself is threatened. The customary political
logic of repression is that the liberal spirit of democracy must be sacrificed in the
short run to save the system in the long run. This argument rarely convinces liberal
democrats, but there is a fetching “psychologic” for those who affirm the basic
institutions of a democratic order, yet wish it to be illiberal and repressive toward
certain feared groups.
The problematic coexistence of democratic institutions and a nativist political
culture is not as uncommon as we might sometimes believe. Gibson and others
have documented strains in the political culture of post-socialist Russia, finding
growing adherence to many theoretical principles of democracy but shallow and
wavering commitment to the core value of political tolerance (Gibson, 1996, 1998;
Gibson et al., 1992). In postwar Germany the dominant concept of the newly
constructed constitutional government was that of a defensive or militant democracy (wehrhafte Demokratie); that term conveyed the new system’s intention to
aggressively oppose the resurgence of political extremes. In the United States
nativism has shown ebbs and flows over the history of the nation, often erupting
in exclusionary movements and discriminatory acts. We do not have to reach as
far back as the Alien and Sedition Acts of the late 18th century to make the case;
we need only mention the Palmer raids and the Red Scare of the 1920s, the trial of
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civilians by military courts during the Civil War, the internment of Japanese
Americans during the Second World War, the McCarthy era, or the investigation
of student activists by military intelligence during the Vietnam war. All of these
events occurred within a formal democracy under stress, and all were essentially
contrary to the system’s normal operating rules.
The signifying characteristic of these conflicts between democratic processes
and intolerance is that they are not resolved by attacking the idea of democratic
institutions; instead, they are made consistent by delegitimizing and excluding
those who have been defined as threatening outsiders. Those individuals and
groups may or may not be citizens (in the U.S. examples above, most were
citizens). The important step is that their claim to the protection of democratic
institutions is delegitimized because they are perceived to constitute a threat.
The issue then is shifted from that of “democracy” to that of the cultural definition
of the outsider—who is legitimately “in,” and who is beyond the protections of the
system. This perspective of the symbolic outsider helps bring together a variety of
questions that are often treated as separate research issues. For example: What is
the status of African Americans, or of Mexican migrant workers in the United
States? Of Roma in Eastern Europe? Of Jews in Russia? Of political extremists in
modern industrial societies? These groups are often treated as if the mechanisms
of political intolerance, xenophobia, and domestic racism were substantially different. In some ways they are, but there is a common thread that connects all these
phenomena.
Research in a variety of areas converges on explanation of one essential
element common to these many forms of exclusion and discrimination. The
research comes from a number of areas that are often not formally linked, but there
are important similarities in research done on political tolerance, social dominance
theory, group position theory, and xenophobia. In the area of political tolerance,
Marcus and associates have found that groups are least tolerated where they are
perceived to be threatening and untrustworthy (Marcus, Sullivan, Theiss-Morse, &
Wood, 1995). Sidanius has documented the existence of a social dominance
orientation that is based on hierarchy and exclusion; it functions as an individual
attitude, but it has powerful effects among certain cultural and racial groups,
national cultures, and even occupations and academic specialties (for an overview,
see Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). In the related area of domestic racial attitudes, Bobo
(1999) has effectively argued that racism in the United States is no longer the result
of outmoded biological or racial thinking, but is based on a fear that contender
groups constitute a threat to one’s own group. Defending the position of one’s group
is the motivation to exclude, dominate, and delegitimize. Last, research on xenophobia (Watts, 1996a, 1997) has found that outsiders are feared and rejected to the
extent that they are perceived to be a threat (e.g., as criminal or sexual predators)
or are perceived as competitors (e.g., for jobs, housing, or cultural hegemony).
The theoretical element common to all these approaches is the proposition that
exclusion, rejection, repression, or expulsion are motivated by the desire to defend
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against those perceived as outsiders or competitors—against those who constitute
a threat to the status, welfare, and privileges of the group with which one identifies.
Unfortunately, these approaches often limit themselves by implicitly assuming that
the threatening groups are endogenous to the system (e.g., citizens), but phrasing
the question more broadly in terms of real and symbolic outsiders shows the link
among these various approaches to dominance, racism, tolerance, and xenophobia.
Hence, we should expect that nativism will be high (1) where the values of tolerance
are relatively new in the political culture, or the system is believed to be under
attack; (2) where certain groups are perceived as threatening or can be placed in
the role of scapegoats; and (3) where outgroups are perceived to be illegitimate,
different, and “other.”
There is one additional step that links our discussion of nativism to democratic
values. To deny legitimacy to outsiders is one mechanism, but it must be matched
with a second justification—one that justifies exclusion and repression not in spite
of, but in terms of democratic institutions. This is the orientation to what we have
termed “defensive democracy.” It is explicitly formulated in some nations (such as
wehrhafte Demokratie in Germany), but it is implicitly present in all democratic
systems. Measuring it is another issue, however.
Most scales of democratic values developed by researchers in the United States
are strongly based in the universalist tolerance as embodied in the privileged
position of the First Amendment to the American Constitution. Within that tradition, the defensive component is usually seen as a temporary aberration from true,
liberal tolerance. We generally agree with this viewpoint as an ideological matter,
but this position bundles together the notion of formal democratic institutions with
a specific culture of tolerance. There is good reason for this position, but our work
with non-U.S. democratic systems leads us to ask whether it is not better to measure
the defensive component separately. At the very least, such a test makes sense in
systems where the commitment to democracy is more ambivalent and acceptance
of diversity insecure. To pursue this question in Japan obliges us to develop and
test a new set of measures that are appropriate to our concern for the Japanese
situation as well as to our theoretical concerns for alternative conceptions of
democracy.
The goals of this paper are therefore (1) to test, in the Japanese context, several
attitude scales related to democratic orientations, patriotism, and sensitivity toward
foreigners; (2) to develop and test a distinction between the universalist definition
of democratic tolerance and a more exclusionary notion of defensive democracy;
and (3) to use these measures to examine the nature of nativism and democracy in
Japan.
Japanese Attitudes Toward Democracy
Since the end of the Second World War, Japan has been constitutionally and
electorally democratic. Although elements of the hierarchical Confucian tradition
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remain (Feldman & Watts, 1999), Japan is largely egalitarian in its economic,
educational, and media systems. Its Constitution guarantees citizens the rights of
freedom of conscience, religion, residence, occupation, and an equal right to
education. There are numerous pressure groups in politics concerned with protecting the interests of their supporters and of various social sectors. There are
competitive and widely available news media, and, like other advanced industrial
societies, Japan also has democratic and electoral processes that support the
existence of diverse political parties and candidates (see Ishida & Krauss, 1989).
Nonetheless, Japanese conceptions of democracy often seem to differ from
those of citizens in other advanced industrial democracies. A major reason may be
that the Constitution was not won by the Japanese themselves but given from above,
under the tutelage of American military forces who occupied Japan after its
surrender in 1945. Because the reconstruction of the political system was forced
on Japan by the allied occupation forces rather than shaped by the Japanese
themselves, some Japanese tend to view democracy less seriously than do citizens
in other nations. Many still view it suspiciously as an imported Western system—
one whose processes and traditions may not fit their own conception of nonWestern, traditional society (Van Wolferen, 1989; Woronoff, 1997).
Japanese tend habitually to be cynical about the benefits of democracy. When
asked in surveys whether democracy is good or bad, the majority of Japanese during
the last 40 years have been likely to answer that “it depends on the circumstances,”
or “it depends on the person.” Indeed, since 1953 between 34% and 52% of the
citizens have answered in this way (Sakamoto, 1995, pp. 14–15). By contrast, in a
Honolulu survey that included a high proportion of respondents of Asian heritage,
a majority of 80% answered that democracy was “good” (Research Committee on
the Study of Honolulu Residents, 1986, pp. 173–174). As rough as these measures
are, they suggest that democracy for the Japanese is a markedly less attractive
concept than it is to American citizens, and that the Japanese are considerably more
ambivalent about democratic government.
There are other signs of cynicism: Public opinion polls have frequently shown
that the majority of the public feel their views and expectations are rarely mirrored
in national politics. Over the last two decades, a minority ranging from 18% to 36%
responded that views held by the public were reflected “very much” or “to a certain
extent” in national politics (Sorifa, 1997, pp. 13–14). Furthermore, like many other
modern democracies, the Japanese interest in voting has been on the wane (Hayashi
& Hayashi, 1995; Nishihara, 1995; Sakamoto, 1995, pp. 6–12). Thus, although the
level of cynicism about democracy and government in Japan may not exceed that
in older democracies (it is difficult to measure exactly), the negative trend is
perhaps of more concern because the historical roots of democracy are less deeply
anchored.
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Japanese Nativism: “Uniqueness” and Attitudes Toward Outsiders
In Japan there is a widespread belief that one must be part of the native ethnic
group, and not just a legal member of the political community (Dale, 1986). Nation
in this regard is almost equivalent to race (Kohno, 1988, p. 8). According to this
exclusionary tendency, however well a non-native is adjusted to the society, speaks
the language, and understands the culture, he or she can never be fully assimilated
into the Japanese people. A case in point is the status of hundreds of thousands of
Koreans and Chinese who were brought to Japan to serve in the labor force during
the Second World War. Many were later naturalized or obtained permanent
residency, as did many of their offspring who were born in Japan. However, they
continue to be viewed by the Japanese as foreigners (see, e.g., Fujisake, 1991 and
Minzoku Sabetsu, 1989).
A look at the psychological and psychoanalytic literature on Japanese history
and culture suggests that there is a powerful sense of cultural uniqueness (embodied
in the intellectual movement known as Nihonjinron), combined with a xenophobia
rooted in a historical sense of having been invaded and dominated by outsiders
(Johnson, 1993, pp. 95–101; Mouer & Sugimoto, 1986). One manifestation of these
attitudes is related to the rapid economic progress and international status Japan
enjoyed during the decades of the 1960s and 1970s. Inspired by their success, the
Japanese were confident in their national power and grew anxious to find what
makes them so remarkable (the spate of books about Japanese management
published in the United States and elsewhere during the 1980s testifies to the
international currency of this cultural legend). Many Japanese ascribed their
national prosperity to the uniqueness of Japanese national character, to their
tradition of self-sacrifice, and to their group-orientation and teamwork, which
allegedly derived from the homogeneity of the society (Stronach, 1995; Yoshino,
1995). These sentiments can represent a healthy pride in national culture and
achievements, but they can also take the form of xenophobic paranoia when the
nation perceives itself to be under threat.
Some of the evidence is not very rigorous, but there are signs in Japan that the
perception of threat is indeed related to defensive intolerance. In the 1980s there
were several occasions for the activation of ethnocentric and xenophobic responses
on the part of the Japanese; these included what appeared to outsiders as a
seemingly inexplicable wave of anti-Semitism. Economic conditions began to
worsen and Japan entered the worst recession of the postwar period. The trade
imbalance between Japan and the United States, the difficulties faced by the
export-oriented Japanese industries, and the rising value of the yen against the
American dollar all contributed to a general sense of anxiety. There was an ensuing
“search for the guilty,” one aspect of which was the flourishing of anti-Semitic
literature. Books denouncing the existence of a world Jewish conspiracy sold to
millions of Japanese readers. Some books even suggested the involvement of Jews
in several political scandals that took place in Japan, and others blamed the rising
Democratic Values and “Outsiders”
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value of the Japanese yen on an international Jewish plot to control Japan. The
emergence of such a body of literature is surprising because Japan has had limited
direct contact with Jews; in fact, most Japanese images of Jews derived not from
direct experience but from translated literature such as Shakespeare’s The Merchant of Venice and from such dubious sources as the scurrilous anti-Semitic classic
The Protocols of the Elders of Zion.
The Japanese tend not to make fine distinctions among Westerners. Thus,
blaming Jews can direct one’s anger against all Westerners and foreigners. Indeed,
it has been suggested that these books can be viewed as a statement of anxiety about
foreigners in general (Goodman & Miyazawa, 1994). Kohno (1988, p. 6) also noted
that Japanese are generally hospitable to visitors but are considerably less warm to
those who become residents. This transition from visitor to resident triggers
nativistic sentiment and raises the question of whether the new arrivals are
legitimately part of the system.
Even though the physical presence of outsiders is quite modest by international
standards, the Japanese are acutely aware of recent increases in the number of
foreigners. The legal foreign population in Japan was scarcely over 1% in 1993,
but that represented an increase of more than 80% over the prior two decades and
35% during the previous 5 years. The absolute number remains low compared to
most industrial nations, but the rate of increase has focused concern on the
receptivity of the Japanese to foreigners (Tanaka, 1991). The call for tolerance has
particularly concerned equal treatment under the law, including labor standards.
To illustrate: Foreigners are not entitled to tenure in Japanese universities. NonJapanese nationals could not be hired by national or public universities, because
the staffs of these universities were by definition public employees, a status denied
to non-citizens. This policy was amended on the grounds that public employees in
the university system rarely participate in the formulation of public or national
policy. However, only a handful of national universities have taken this change in
the law seriously, and non-Japanese are still hired predominantly in their traditional
role as language instructors. The majority of public, municipal, prefectural, and
national institutions hire no foreigners at all, or hire only limited-term or part-time
employees (Hall, 1998, chapter 5).
Historically, this distinction between Japanese (the “Yamato race”) and nonJapanese has in legal terms meant that all non-Japanese are treated equally, and
that what applies to one group applies to any other group (regardless of the
conditions of their being in Japan). This situation has been particularly troublesome
for permanent residents of non-Japanese origin. None are affected more than those
who hold Korean citizenship (the zainichi kankokujin or chosenjin). Most firstgeneration Korean residents were brought to Japan as forced labor before 1945.
Second-, third-, and fourth-generation Korean residents speak, read, and write the
Japanese language fluently and are increasingly indistinguishable from native
Japanese. A rapidly increasing rate of intermarriage has accelerated this process,
but the traditional distinction remains.
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To be sure, there is no institutionalized racial discrimination in Japan: According to Article 14 of the Constitution, “all of the people are equal under the law and
there shall be no discrimination in political, economic, or social relations because
of race, creed, sex, social status or family origin.” This constitutional provision is
supported by the prohibition of racial discrimination in voting and running for
elective office (Article 44 of the Constitution), in employment by the national
government [the National Government Worker Law (Kokka Komuin Ho), Article 27], in employment by local governments [the Local Government Workers Law
(Chio Komuin Ho), Article 13], in educational opportunity [the Fundamentals of
Education Law (Kyoiku Kihon Ho), Article 3], in membership in a labor union [the
Labor Union Law (Rodo Kumiai Ho), Article 5], and in access to the employment
referral service [the Employment Security Law (Shokugyo Antei Ho), Article 3].
Despite these legal protections, the Korean minority in Japan has been barred
from employment in national or local public service, including positions as regular
teachers in public schools. Large corporations and the news media are not yet
inclined to employ college graduates of Korean parentage. Professional positions
in such schools as medicine, law, and engineering are kept specifically for Japanese
(meaning the resident Koreans are not allowed entrance even though they may have
pre-professional degrees from Japanese universities). Koreans are also singled out
for discriminatory treatment in various issues related to human rights, including a
fingerprinting requirement (Minzoku Sabetsu, 1989; Zainichi Daikan Kirisuto
Kyokai, 1989). It is also noteworthy that since 1952 the Japanese government
provided more than 37 trillion yen have been provided to Japanese families in
compensation for death and injury during military service in the Second World
War, but of the Koreans and Taiwanese who fought for Japan, none of their families
has so far been compensated. (It is estimated that the potential claimants among
those groups include 22,000 and 30,000 deaths, respectively, with many more of
course being wounded.)
This brief review of Japanese cultural and political history since the war shows
a conflict between formal democratization and xenophobic tendencies. In the next
section we present some data designed to examine this ambivalence in a more
systematic form. Although our sample and the empirical nature of the survey cannot
match the richness and cultural complexities of the issues just discussed, we hope
to provide a starting point for developing measures and examining some of the
Japanese ambivalence about democracy.
Data and Methods
The Empirical Analysis: Attitudes Toward Democracy and Foreigners
Our vehicle for this empirical analysis is a survey of students conducted in the
fall of 1996 in a variety of universities throughout Japan. The study was intended
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647
to focus on the general phenomenon of perceived outsider threat, rather than beliefs
about any particular group of outsiders.
Data were collected through questionnaires distributed during October and
November 1996 to students at four universities in Japan (see Appendix A and
Table I). The sample included more than 1,000 students living in Tokyo, in
Hiroshima (a city of about 1 million residents), and at two universities in
Tokushima Prefecture (on the island of Shikoku in western Japan) in cities with
populations of 60,000 and 250,000, respectively. Of course, the site of a university
may not reflect the urban versus rural nature of its students’ origins, but this
sampling procedure did achieve the desired regional differentiation: 36% came
from urban areas of more than 300,000 population (predominantly Tokyo), 29%
from urban areas with fewer than 300,000 population, and 35% from non-urban
areas. The average age of the respondents was slightly less than 20 years; the modal
age was 19, with fewer than 1% older than 24 years of age. Reflecting the nature
of the universities to which we had access, the sample somewhat overrepresented
women, who constituted nearly 59% of the sample.
Table I. Exploratory Factor Analysis of Democratic Orientations
Item
Our government must take active steps to control leftist groups,
even if that means they have fewer rights than other groups (B05)
Our government must take active steps to control rightist groups,
even if that means they have fewer rights than other groups (B06)
Any democracy has the right to protect itself, even if that means
repressing certain groups that do not believe in it (B02)
“Defensive”
“Universalist”
.83
–.21
.82
–.21
.54
–.24
For democracy to work, it first must be protected from those who
want to harm it (B01)
.51
.15
Democracy is a very tender plant; it must be sheltered from the
dangers of radicalism (B09)
.46
.12
No matter what people believe, they are entitled to the same legal
rights and protections as anyone else (F02)
It is important to ensure that everyone enjoys freedom of speech,
even those who abuse it to attack our system of government (B04)
–.13
.63
The best way to show our support for democracy is to allow even
its enemies full rights as citizens (B10)
.20
.60
.67
Democracy is for everyone equally, even for those who work
against it (B03)
Free speech ought to be allowed for all political groups even if some
of the things these groups believe in are highly insulting and
threatening to particular segments of society (F01)
.59
–.10
.53
Note. N = 1,040 Japanese students. Factor loadings based on principal components analysis and varimax
rotation limited to two factors. For clarity, loadings smaller than ±.10 are not displayed. The two factors
account for 24% and 18% of the original covariance, respectively, among the 10 items.
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Our data were not drawn from a representative sample of Japanese youth, but
this is not unusual for empirical studies of Japan. Problems of access and financial
support have made representative samples of Japanese populations relatively rare.
Massey’s well-known socialization study (1976), for example, used a procedure
similar to ours (a large sample drawn from Japanese classrooms) where access and
funding for a national youth sample were problematic. Our ability to use available
national polls is also limited: The most accessible national polls are usually not
available for secondary analysis and generally do not contain sensitive questions
of the sort we wished to pose. Nonetheless, we believe our sample is adequate for
developing and testing the survey measures of our key concepts, and for testing the
theoretical relationships among them.
The logic of our approach requires the first step in the analysis to be an
examination of the conceptual distinction between defensive and universalist
democracy. We then present the measure developed for the study—which includes
a new scale of perceived foreigner threat—and use it to examine which groups
our Japanese sample found to be the most threatening. The remaining scales are
newly adapted, have well-known origins, and are generally unproblematic. In
the final analytic steps, we examine the antecedents of threat and develop a
multivariate model that summarizes the relationship between nativism and
democratic orientation.
The Structure of Democratic Orientations: One Dimension or Two?
Following from our earlier historical and theoretical argument, we suggest that
developing democracies and democracies under stress may vacillate between two
types of democratic orientation. The first is a liberal, universalist form that is highly
tolerant. The second is a defensive form that affirms democratic institutions but
excludes threatening groups from their protection. However, these two possible
conceptual forms are only one way to approach democratic orientations. There is
a wide range of specific features to which the term democracy might apply (e.g.,
principles, attitudes, institutions, processes), so it is no surprise that scales of
democratic orientation vary considerably depending on the particular research
goal.
Marcus and associates have measured a “standing commitment” to democratic
principles, which focuses on the normative commitment to political tolerance
(Marcus et al., 1995). Our notion of liberal, universalist democratic orientations is
very close to their idea of a standing commitment, but some elements of their scale
seemed likely to be confusing in a non-American context (for example, one item
asks whether someone suspected of “treason” should be “released on bail”; others
include implied or explicit references to “political groups” or concern the advisability of making people testify against themselves). We wanted a scale that would
measure the same commitment to abstract, universalist principles of free speech
but was less specifically tied to American legal procedures. Otherwise, our concept
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649
of universalist democratic orientation is quite similar in spirit to the scale developed
by Marcus and associates.
There is also a strong resemblance between our scales and Gibson’s recent
work (Gibson, 1996, 1998). Indeed, two of his scales touch very closely on the
universalist/defensive distinction. His scale of Valuation of Individual Liberty
(Gibson, 1998, p. 61) contains two items related to tolerance for “extremist political
views” and for those who have views “fundamentally different from the views of
the majority.” This scale might have served our definition of defensive democracy
if it had not included an item on the approval of specific political tactics (demonstrations). Another of Gibson’s scales that touches on our concerns is that of Rights
Consciousness, which contains an item on the “right of foreigners to settle in . . .
[Russia]” (Gibson, 1998, p. 62). This item, however, is part of a longer catalog of
possible rights and does not isolate acceptance of foreigners or outsiders in a way
that suits our purposes here. Thus, our notion of defensive democracy draws
strongly on elements that have been examined by Gibson and others, but we have
developed our measures somewhat differently for use in the Japanese context.
Our approach differs in another way from those of Gibson and Marcus. Many
of their items tend to stress tolerance of political groups. This implies that the target
groups are members of the legal community and that they have the formal right to
participate in political activity. We wanted to make the measures more applicable
to the study of “foreigners” by minimizing the implicit assumption of legal
citizenship. We realize that we have not fully accomplished this goal with our own
items, but we hoped to minimize the semantic implication that the target groups
were necessarily citizens. This links our research more closely to prior work on
tolerance and xenophobia (e.g., Watts, 1997). The related themes of dominance,
cultural hegemony, and threat to group position (Bobo, 1999; Sidanius & Pratto,
1999) are implicit in some of the items, but these elements are represented more
directly in other measures described below (Patriotism, Threat, Economic and
Cultural Competition, and Distance).
Measures and Results
The central question now is whether this conceptual distinction between
defensive and universalist democracy has any empirical validity. The tentative
answer is positive, but more detailed analysis shows that the matter of dimensions
is not as clear as we had hoped.
Exploratory factor analysis of the democratic orientation items found that the
first two major factors corresponded to our distinction between defensive and
universalist orientations to democracy (reported in more detail in Watts & Feldman,
1997). Factor 1 corresponded to a conception of democracy that gives priority to
protecting itself from extreme ideas and groups. We have called this dimension
Defensive Democracy. Factor 2 was recognizable as a classic form of universalist
democratic tolerance. Two items taken from Marcus’ “Democratic Principles
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Standing Decision” (designated as F01 and F02 in Table I) show the affinity of this
dimension to his approach, but additional items were developed to make even more
clear the normative universalism of the scale. This scale measures our concept of
Universalist Democracy.
The exploratory factor analysis is encouraging, but the factoring procedure
(principal components analysis with varimax rotation) shows signs of forcing
bidimensionality where a more complex structure may exist. There are two pieces
of evidence pointing to the need for further clarification: First, the pattern of factor
coefficients (Table I) shows secondary loadings that indicate a complex overlap
between the dimensions. Some of the cross-factor loadings are in the same
direction, others are not, and none is greater than ±.30; however, the overall pattern
suggests that a two-dimensional solution might not be entirely satisfactory. But a
second bit of evidence suggests that a unidimensional solution is not a better
alternative: Reliabilities of the two scales produced Cronbach’s α coefficients of
.66 and .59, respectively. This is encouraging, but in principle we would prefer
stronger reliabilities. This usually can be accomplished with a larger item set if the
scale is homogeneous. Yet applying this test to the entire 10-item set produced an
α coefficient that was lower (at .46) than those obtained for either of the five-item
scales. The single dimension had inferior psychometric properties, and attempts to
improve it through item deletions were unsuccessful. Progressive deletions would
produce a shorter scale that resembled either the universalist or the defensive
component, but never a simple combination of the two. This is a sign of the
conceptual duality we expected, but there are other tests that can be conducted.
Confirmatory factor analysis offers a more precise way to examine in more
detail the apparent distinctiveness of these two scales. Using the LISREL method
(Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1997), we can test the unidimensional and bidimensional
models under similar constraints and compare their efficiency. Before we proceed
to that, however, we should examine whether our data are also bedeviled by another
problem that is alleged to be common in multifactor solutions of items.
Green and Citrin (1994) have argued that sets of questionnaire items may
erroneously produce multiple dimensions in factor analysis due to a methods
artifact. Specifically, they found that positively stated items may cluster together
on one factor, and negatively stated items on another factor, because of similarities
in wording and response biases of respondents. They showed that removing this
form of methods error often can eliminate the spurious multidimensionality of an
item set, revealing a true unidimensionality. This is a useful caution, although its
central question is moot in this analysis. Green and Citrin’s caveat applies specifically to spurious factors that are produced by items that cluster because they share
a common positive or negative response format. In our analysis, all the items are
in a positive direction. This may produce response-set problems (although we
attempted to minimize that problem by dispersing the items throughout the questionnaire), but it does not produce the “positive-negative” problem. In fact, the form
of methods error most likely to be present in our data should bias the factor structure
Democratic Values and “Outsiders”
651
toward unidimensionality, and not toward the sort of bidimensionality that
Green and Citrin described. Their logic, however, helps us focus on the main
issue—namely, whether the items are better represented with a one-scale or a
two-scale model.
The confirmatory factor analysis differs in two major respects from the
previous analysis. First, it is possible within LISREL to produce polychoric
correlations that are a better fit to the ordinal measurement level of the data than
are the product-moment coefficients in the exploratory factor analysis. This in turn
allows the use of the asymptotic distribution-free procedure and the weighted
least-squares model for estimating the factor structure. The objective was to arrive
at two comparable models of univariate and bivariate description that used identical
constraints, except for the one distinguishing feature of dimensionality. Successive
testing produced models that we believe are essentially comparable.
The findings are easily summarized (for details of the analysis, see Appendix B). The orthogonal factor solution reported in Table I supported the probable
existence of two scales corresponding to our major concepts. Subsequent replication with oblique solutions (not reported here) pointed to overlap between the
scales, but never produced dimensions that correlated more than about –.25. The
LISREL procedure used different correlation coefficients and weighted leastsquares factoring procedures, and allowed the dimensions to correlate freely. In
this solution, there were separate factors corresponding to our major concepts, but
they were correlated at –.49.
Regardless of which factoring procedure was used, the content of the dimensions was essentially the same. Defensive Democracy is best defined by the
sentiment that “any democracy has the right to protect itself, even if that means
repressing certain groups that do not believe in it”; Universalist Democracy is best
represented by the sentiment that “it is important to ensure that everyone enjoys
freedom of speech, even those who abuse it to attack our system of government”
and “the best way to show our support for democracy is to allow even its enemies
full rights as citizens.” This item, however, also overlaps with the “defensive” scale,
although at a lower level. Universalist Democracy also includes an overlap with
the belief that “for democracy to work, it first must be protected from those who
want to harm it.”
Although the technical overlap of the two scales exceeded what we had
expected, this overlapping bidimensionality seems consistent with the Japanese
ambivalence over democratic values. Whether this is unique to the Japanese we
cannot be certain, but we think not. A comparative analysis would require that
similar LISREL models be tested on various populations, both in Japan and in other
cultures. The immediate task for this analysis, however, is to examine the relationship of these overlapping conceptions of democracy with the level of concern about
threatening outsiders. We will proceed on the assumption of bidimensionality, but
because of the overlap in scales we will also include for comparison a scale that
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Watts and Feldman
combines both sets of items. As discussed below, the substantive interpretation of
the analysis remains intact regardless of the scaling procedure.
A New Measure: Who Is Threatening?
The next step is to construct a measure of orientations toward outgroups. For
this we drew on two previous models, one based on a study of anti-foreigner
sentiment in Germany, the other based on studies by Marcus and associates on
political tolerance. In essence, we have combined the two approaches.
In studies of xenophobia in Germany, Watts (1996b, 1997) made use of a
simple 11-point scale in which respondents registered their “sympathy” (scored
as 1) and “antipathy” (scored as 11) to each of a series of potential outgroups. Factor
analysis of the ratings showed that there were two underlying dimensions representing affective evaluation (positive versus negative emotional valence) and
cognitive beliefs about threat. The latter finding supported the measurement approach used by Marcus and associates in their Predisposition Threat Scale (Marcus
et al., 1995, p. 250). As a result of this obvious convergence, we decided to make
explicit the threat component by combining our use of foreign groups with the
Marcus format. We asked respondents to rank specific target groups on an 11-point
scale ranging from “very threatening to the country” (11) to “not at all threatening
to the country” (1), with the middle position defined as “somewhat threatening to
the country” (6).
The groups presented to our sample of Japanese students were chosen by a
four-person team that consisted of three researchers from Japan and one from the
United States. Table II presents the list of groups, ranked by the average threat score
computed for the entire sample. The items were selected with two purposes in mind.
The first was to present an assortment of target groups so that we could estimate
Table II. What Groups Are “Threatening to the Country as a Whole”?
Mean
SD
Group rated
9.39
8.65
8.51
8.18
5.76
4.83
4.23
3.87
3.00
2.96
2.94
2.65
2.17
2.89
2.78
2.78
2.88
2.50
2.76
2.69
2.19
2.41
2.42
2.29
Radical religious sects
Corrupt politicians
Those who would like to see Japan build a strong army again
Tough youth groups, for example, who bully others in school
Nationalists
Communists
Refugees from other countries
Those who criticize the Emperor
Guest workers
Russians
Arabs
Jews
Note. N = 1,040 Japanese students. Responses ranged from 1 (“not at all threatening”) to 11 (“very
threatening”). Groups in italics were included in the Foreigner Threat scale (see Appendix A).
Democratic Values and “Outsiders”
653
how threatening the foreign groups were in comparison to others. The second was
to use multiple target groups to partially mask the study’s focus on foreigners.
How threatening, then, are foreigners in the eyes of the Japanese students who
responded to our questionnaire? Interestingly, foreign outgroups are not perceived
as highly threatening in comparison with many others in the Japanese political
environment—foreigners ranked far below corrupt politicians, radical religious
sects, and even school bullies and nationalists. Those who followed the politics of
Japan in the late 1990s will recognize in this list a reflection of several topical
issues—the perennial issue of political corruption, reactions to the arrest of members of a radical religious sect that set off nerve gas devices in the Tokyo subway,
and several highly publicized suicides among Japanese pupils who were bullying
victims (for more on bullying in Japan, see Feldman, 1998; Sugimori, 1998). If
further evidence were needed that foreigners are not the most salient issue, consider
the fact that even nationalists, communists, and people who criticize the Emperor
were rated as more threatening to Japan.
Thus, among the students in our sample, concern for the threat emanating from
foreigners ranked far below a host of other potential threats. This need not reflect
the level of concerns in the broader population, but it does suggest that foreign
outgroups were not a dominant theme at the time of the survey. (In similar surveys
of Germans shortly after unification, by contrast, the “foreigner problem” was
usually ranked among the top two or three concerns of the public; see Watts, 1997,
chapter 2.) For the groups that are identifiably foreign, the highest threat rating is
for refugees, followed by guest workers. Both groups represent a potential economic and cultural challenge to Japan, and perhaps they will eventually demand
citizenship or permanent residence. Guest workers in particular are not foreign
visitors who can be depended upon to leave; they are threatening because they are
outsiders who may wish to stay. These groups therefore raise basic questions of
tolerance, inclusion, and legitimacy that are at the heart of xenophobia.
Although the specific rankings of the outsider groups are of interest in their
own right, the real purpose of these items on the rating instrument was to allow
construction of a scale of outsider threat. A principal components factor analysis
of the ratings showed a tightly knit cluster of items representing refugees, guest
workers, Russians, Arabs, and Jews. One might quibble a bit about including
Russians in the scale, because they are not so much an internal as an external threat.
In the end we retained the Russian item in the scale on statistical grounds; it was
an integral part of the cluster, which, when scaled, had a high degree of reliability
(α = .86).
But what does the scale actually measure? We know that the groups included
were not perceived as the most threatening of the target groups presented to the
respondents. However, those respondents who found foreigners to be threatening
tended to rate all these groups as problematic. Arabs and Jews are similar in being
non-Japanese and clearly foreign; the same can be said of refugees and guest
workers. Russians would seem to call up a different sort of reaction because there
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Watts and Feldman
is a long history of conflict with that nation—a conflict that remains salient to
Japanese because of the disputed Russian occupation of the Kurile islands. What
holds the scale together is the common belief that these groups are outsiders;
regardless of the different historical or cultural meanings attached to the groups,
reactions to them correlate because they are threatening. The common underlying
factor is therefore the generalized fear and antipathy that lies at the heart of
xenophobia. We refer to this new scale as a measure of Foreigner Threat.
Remaining Measures
We believe that perceived threat is the most important single factor in
nativism, and that threat is based on a number of different beliefs about what
dangers might be expected. Paramount is anxiety that the dominant group’s status
is under attack (Bobo, 1999). We do not have a single measure of this sense of
threat, but elements of these beliefs are directly and indirectly measured by the
following scales:
Patriotism. Here we use McFarland and Adelson’s (1996) version of the scale
with appropriate modifications for a Japanese population (see Appendix A). At the
chauvinistic end, the scale is anchored by such sentiments as “I am for my country,
right or wrong” and “Despite its faults, Japan is closer to being an ideal country
than any other nation.” The opposite pole is represented by such items as “I do not
feel any special pride in being a Japanese citizen.” A measurement alternative to
this scale might have been the procedures suggested by Schatz, Staub, and Levine
(1999; see also Feshbach, 1991; Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989) who proposed a
two-dimensional scale of “blind” versus “constructive” patriotism. Although their
measures were not available at the time this study was conducted, their basic
distinctions are clearly relevant to our own. It seems likely that their measure of
blind patriotism would correlate highly with our notion of defensive democracy,
whereas their scale of constructive patriotism should correlate with our scale of
liberal, universalist democracy. The Patriotism scale used here corresponds
roughly to the unquestioning chauvinism of their blind patriotism scale.
Economic Competition measures the belief that foreigners “cost us more
money than they produce in the Japanese economy,” “make the job situation worse
for Japanese workers,” and the like. An earlier version of this scale was used to
study Germans’ resentment of foreign guest workers and immigrants (Watts, 1997).
The Cultural Competition scale was also developed to measure German sentiment
toward foreigners (Watts, 1997). Adapted to the Japanese sample, it includes such
beliefs as “Having too many foreigners is harmful to Japanese culture and our way
of life.”
Theoretically we expect xenophobia and exclusion to be motivated chiefly by
perceived threat and fear of competition. But this “threat” model is often contrasted
with a “prejudice model” where antipathy toward the outgroup is thought to be the
chief motivator. In practice it is difficult to separate the two, but for comparison
Democratic Values and “Outsiders”
655
we included one classic prejudice-based measure—a variation on the classic
Bogardus social distance scale (Distance), which measures whether the respondent
would drink with a foreigner, invite foreigners to one’s house, or consider marrying
a foreigner.
Why Are Outsiders Threatening?
Before formally testing the antecedents of democratic values, it makes sense
to examine briefly the underlying motivational components of threat. According
to our theoretical approach, threat is the central factor in xenophobia and exclusionary attitudes. Therefore, we predict that foreigner threat will be associated with
perceptions of material and symbolic competition from outsiders, and only to a
much lesser extent with prejudice.
A first confirmation of this relationship appeared in the simple correlations
(not tabulated) of Threat with the other independent variables representing Economic Competition (.39) and Cultural Competition (.31). Desired Distance was
less correlated with sense of threat (.21), but still played a role. Patriotism also
seemed to be a sensitizing factor, with the more chauvinistic respondents also being
likely to perceive outsider threat (.15). These zero-order correlations show the
simple relationships among the independent and dependent variables, but of course
they do not estimate the independent variance of each of the explanatory variables.
A multivariate analysis (not tabulated) confirmed that greater explanatory
weight falls to the scales that indicate the material and symbolic background of
threat perceptions. A standardized regression equation using Threat as the dependent variable produced ß coefficients of .31 for Economic Competition, .14 for
Cultural Competition, .12 for Distance, and .05 for Patriotism (the R2 was .44,
accounting for .19 of the variance). All but the last coefficient were significant at
or beyond the .01 level. Substantively, the analysis indicates that competition is the
most significant factor in the perception of threat from outsiders. Antipathy (as
measured by distance) plays a lesser but still statistically significant role. Patriotism
is not significantly related to sense of threat.
Although we are interested in the motivation antecedents of threat itself, this
analysis is a preliminary stop in our examination of our real interest, which is in
democratic values. We now test the central proposition that it is possible to be both
a nativist and a democrat.
Testing the Full Model of Democratic Orientations, Nativism, and Xenophobia
Do the two types of democratic orientation show substantively meaningful
differences in their association with our measures of threat, competition, patriotism,
and distance? If they do not, we have proposed a distinction without a difference
and it should be abandoned; if there is a difference, it makes sense to retain separate
scales in comparative research. This test involves identical multivariate equations
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Watts and Feldman
that predict the two democratic orientations. As an additional reference point, a
summed scale containing both dimensions is also tested.
The simple correlations (Table 3, values in parentheses) show that Defensive
Democracy is most strongly related to perceived outsider threat, patriotism, and
the belief that foreigners are economic competitors. The affective factor of distance
is positively associated, as we might expect, but of lesser importance. Universalist
Democracy is associated with the belief that foreigners are not a threat, and that
they are not economic and cultural competitors (indeed, there is a positive association with cultural competition, indicating that foreigners are seen as a culturally
enriching presence). Patriotism is negatively associated, but at a lower level than
was the case with Defensive Democracy. Last, universalist democrats are somewhat more likely to feel comfortable around outsiders (lower distance), although
the association is small.
Multiple regression provides an even clearer picture of the differences between
the two measures of democracy. The standardized ß weights in Table III reflect the
independent contributions of each variable. The simplified picture shows that
Defensive Democracy is best predicted by Threat (high) and Patriotism (high), with
perceived Economic Competition (high) remaining significant as well. Universalist
Democracy is best predicted by Threat (low) and Cultural Competition (low). On
the basis of these findings, we propose the following interpretations of Defensive
and Universalist Democracy: (1) Both are associated with a sense of threat, but in
opposite directions. (2) Defensive democrats are more likely to be nationalist
patriots. (3) Universalist democrats share a perception of foreigners as contributing
positively to the culture (or at least, not negatively). (4) For defensive democrats,
the remaining elements of distance and competition combine to intensify the sense
of threat.
The question remains whether we could have gotten to this point without the
extra step of constructing two separate measures of democratic orientation. Most
U.S. researchers tend to use a unidimensional scale in which the exclusionary
component is defined more or less as “anti-democratic.” We do not object to this
Table III. Comparison of Regression Models for Defensive Democracy
and Universalist Democracy Scales
R
Defensive Democracy
Universalist Democracy
Combined scale
.24***
.28***
.32***
Threat
.16***
–.16***
–.21***
Patriotism
.10**
–.03
–.09**
Economic Cultural
competition competition
.07*
–.01
–.05
.03
–.15***
–.07*
Distance
.04
–.05
–.07*
Note. N = 1,040 Japanese students. Values are standardized β coefficients. Identical ordinary leastsquares regression models were used; constants not shown. See Appendix A for description of measures.
Distance is coded so that low score = desire for distance. The combined scale is coded so that high score
= most democratic orientation.
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.
Democratic Values and “Outsiders”
657
generalized usage and find it appropriate against the background of the strict
prescriptions of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. However, the notion
of a defensive democracy is widely held in other nations, including younger
democracies and those finding themselves under challenge. Having made this
distinction with respondents in Japan, a nation that is ambivalent about its democratic traditions, we find that there is an identifiable defensive component.
Because the two scales are correlated, what happens when they are combined?
In Table III, the combined scale is scored in the same direction as the Universalist
Democracy scale for ease of comparison. It is negatively associated with threat and
patriotism, but shows relatively small associations with economic and cultural
competition and with distance. Compared to the two-scale approach, there is little
loss of information, except that the strong influence of cultural openness (the
opposite of cultural competition) on universalist democracy is masked in the
combined scale. Also masked is the fact that universalist democracy is associated
for the most part with positive factors (absence of perceived threat, the embrace of
cultural pluralism), whereas defensive democracy is largely associated with negative beliefs and motives (perceived threat, chauvinism, and fear of economic
competition).
Discussion
We began with the suggestion by Klingemann and Hofferbert (1994) that
“distrust of foreigners . . . is not closely associated with antidemocratic attitudes”
in Germany and that “one can be a nativist and still be a democrat” (p. 36). The
proposition is a provocative one when applied to Germany, and we thought it worth
examining in Japan, where the democratic system is as young as that in Germany.
Although a specific definition of nativism is probably not possible independent of
the political culture in which it occurs, we assumed that important aspects would
be represented by our scales measuring patriotism, perceived threat, a sense of
foreigners as competitors, and a desire to distance oneself from outsiders.
The focal point of the analysis is represented by our Defensive Democracy and
Universalist Democracy scales. Both are closely related to other scales currently
in use, but are adapted here for use with Japanese subjects and to eliminate
references to specific political tactics or practices. We see each scale as a “yes, but”
alternative to the other: Defensive democrats say that, yes, democracy is important,
but must be protected from outsiders; universalist democrats say that, yes, it must
be protected, but without jeopardizing the fundamental principle of free speech.
This logic was generally confirmed in this study and allowed us to point to the
positive cultural universalism of one scale and the negative, anxious xenophobic
tendencies of the other. The performance of the combined scale was close enough
to that interpretation for us to conclude that a unidimensional scale may be more
efficient in other studies.
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Watts and Feldman
Methodological issues aside, what can we say about democratic attitudes and
nativism in Japan? In the first place, foreigners and outsiders do not rank among
the groups seen as most threatening to Japan. No doubt the respondents’ ranking
of groups reflected the more liberal student environment in which they found
themselves, but their perceptions of threat are no doubt widely shared. The high
rankings for radical religious sects and for corrupt politicians reflect persistent
themes in the Japanese news at the time of the study. Also salient in the media are
the militarists and school bullies who occupied third and fourth place. Nationalists
and communists also ranked ahead of the first foreign group (refugees) in the list.
The topical concerns of these Japanese students do not focus on xenophobic issues
but on internal Japanese political problems. By comparison, the German public
rated problems with foreigners consistently among the top threats to the nation
during the early 1990s (Watts, 1997, chapter 2). Concern for foreigners may be an
issue in Japan, but its salience among students was far outweighed by other
potential threats to the nation’s public life. It is worth remembering, however, that
in Germany young non-students were primary carriers of anxiety about and
hostility toward foreigners. Education is an important resource for coping with
economic uncertainty and threat, and we would expect that less well educated
Japanese youth might, like their German counterparts, feel far more threatened than
those (like our sample) whose educational status provides some insurance against
potential foreign competitors on the job market. Unfortunately, we could not test
that possibility with the current sample.
Where anxiety about foreigners appears, it is associated with fear of economic
(and to a lesser extent cultural) competition, with chauvinism, and with a desire to
avoid contact with outsiders. It is also associated with a view of democracy that is
illiberal and exclusionary—that is, democratic in form but illiberal in spirit. By
contrast, openness to foreigners is associated with an absence of fear about their
status as competitors, a positive view about their cultural contribution, and an
openness to closer contact.
It is perhaps worth recalling that the measurement and theoretical background
for this analysis came from several research areas that are often developed separately. The competition measures came from the study of xenophobia, the distance
measure was adapted from the classic analysis of prejudice, and the threat measure
was developed from two related approaches in xenophobia and in political tolerance. This represents a convergence of several approaches on the proposition that
illiberal exclusionism is powerfully motivated by a sense of threat, competition,
and challenge to the position of one’s group.
Political intolerance is associated with fear and antipathy (Marcus et al., 1995),
and so is xenophobia (Watts, 1996a, 1996b, 1997). It is fear that appears to be the
stronger motivation—fear of economic competition and, to a lesser extent, fear of
cultural competition seem to be significant factors. Both seem to be part of a broader
concern for maintaining dominance in the society (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) and
for protecting the position of one’s group from competitors (Bobo, 1999). Our
Democratic Values and “Outsiders”
659
analysis also suggests that the impulse to dominate and exclude is supported by a
defensive view of democracy and reduced by a liberal, universalist democratic
orientation.
APPENDIX A: Constructed Scales and Indices
Full text for the Defensive Democracy and Universalist Democracy scales is given
in Table I.
Foreigner Threat (Cronbach’s α = .86):
Summed ratings of foreigners/outgroups for Jews, Arabs, guest workers, refugees,
and Russians, each rated on a scale from 1 (“not at all threatening to the country”)
to 11 (“very threatening to the country”)
Patriotism (based on McFarland & Adelson, 1996; Cronbach’s α = .59):
“I am for my country, right or wrong”
“Despite its faults, Japan is closer to being an ideal country than any other nation”
“I do not feel any special pride in being a Japanese citizen” (reverse-scored)
“Japanese who think this nation is the best are either conceited or badly misinformed” (reverse-scored)
“Those who are constantly finding fault with Japan should leave it”
“Patriotism toward Japan is more important than one’s individual beliefs and
should have precedence over them"
Economic Competition From Foreigners (developed from Watts, 1997;
Cronbach’s α = .72):
“Foreigner workers cost us more money than they produce in the Japanese
economy”
“Foreigners simply make the job situation worse for Japanese workers”
“Foreign workers make it harder for many Japanese to find a suitable place to live”
“Foreign residents are a burden on our system of social benefits”
Cultural Competition From Foreigners (adapted from Watts, 1997; Cronbach’s
α = .58):
“Making citizens of foreigners enriches the cultural diversity of our everyday life
of Japan” (reverse-scored)
“Having too many foreigners is harmful to Japanese culture and our way of life”
“There is nothing wrong with a Japanese marrying a foreigner and raising a family
in Japan” (reverse-scored)
Distance (from Watts, 1997; Cronbach’s α = .69):
“I would be willing to have a drink with a foreigner”
“I would be willing to invite a foreigner to my house”
“I would be willing to marry a foreigner” (1 = yes, 2 = no)
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APPENDIX B: Details of the Confirmatory Factor Analysis
The results were as follows: The univariate solution produced a plausible
model with χ2 = 125.2, df = 31. The goodness-of-fit index (GFI) was .98, with a
root mean square of approximation (RMSEA) of .054. The χ2 value was significant
beyond the .000 level, which indicates a weakness in the model fit, as did the χ2/df
ratio of 4.03 (a ratio between 1 and 2 is considered acceptable). The bivariate
solution produced a model with χ2 = 88.2, df = 31. The GFI was .98 with an RMSEA
of .042. The χ2 value was significant beyond the .000 level. This, along with the
χ2/df of 2.85, indicates room for improvement of the bidimensional model as well
(for more on these various tests of model fit, see Bollen, 1989; Jöreskog & Sörbom,
1997, pp. 120–126). Between the two models, the bidimensional form is a somewhat better fit. The GFIs of .98 are comparable, but the lower χ2/df ratio (2.85
versus 4.03) and the more favorable RMSEA (.042 versus .054) favor the twodimensional solution. The raw χ2 coefficients of both models show need for
improvement, but statistically there were no further meaningful changes to be made
in the unidimensional model. We therefore turned to improvement of the bidimensional model.
The confirmatory factor analysis indicated that improvements were to be
sought in retaining two identifiable dimensions while loosening the restrictions of
the bidimensional model in the direction of the unidimensional model. A first
modification allowed a cross-factor correlation between “tender plant” (B09 in
Table 1) and “enemies” (B10), resulting in χ2 = 72.5, df = 30, GFI = .99, RMSEA =
.037. All were improvements, as was the reduction of the χ2/df ratio to 2.41.
Relaxing the model restrictions to include two cross-factor loadings improved the
model fit to χ2 = 34, df = 28, p = .17. The GFI remained at .99, but there were
improvements to the RMSEA (.016) and the χ2/df ratio, which achieved an
acceptable value of 1.21. We therefore concluded that the best overall model
solution is the “loosened” bidimensional model, which included two paths across
the bipolar structure and one cross-factor correlation. In the model, the dimensions
are identifiably separate, but they overlap substantially with a correlation of –.49.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We thank Shinkichi Sugimori and Hideya Kitamura for their participation in
the early phases of this project. An earlier version of this paper was presented at
the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington,
DC, 28 August–1 September 1997 (Watts & Feldman, 1997). Some of our findings
have appeared in Japanese (Feldman & Watts, 1998) and in a related study on
perceived social sanctions against xenophobia (Watts & Feldman, 1998). Correspondence concerning this article should be sent to Meredith W. Watts, Department
of Political Science, University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee, Milwaukee, WI 53201,
Democratic Values and “Outsiders”
661
or Ofer Feldman, Social Science Education, Naruto University of Education,
Takashima, Naruto-shi, Tokushima 772, Japan. E-mail: [email protected],
[email protected]
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