Havlík, V. The 2013 Parliamentary Election in the Czech Republic
43
The 2013 Parliamentary Election in the Czech Republic
Vlastimil Havlík ∗ ([email protected])
Abstract
The article describes the context and the results of the 2013 early general election in the Czech Republic. The
election were called a er the dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies following an alleged corruption scandal that
involved the Prime Minister Nečas. The elections did not produce a clear winner, and—from a systemic point of
view more importantly—were part of the continuing destabilization of Czech party politics that began with the
2010 elections. The support the once two major poles—Czech Social Democratic Party and the Civic Democratic
Party—were the worst since the mid of the 1990s. Wit a total of seven parties representend in the Chamber of
Deputies, the election brought the most fragmented parliament since 1996. Moreover, two new anti-establishment
parties won almost one third of the seats in the parliament undelining the continusous transformation of the Czech
party politics. An ideologically heteregenous majority government was assembled consisting of the Czech Social
Democratic Party, anti-establishment ANO 2011, and the Christian Democrats.
Keywords
Czech Republic, election, anti-establishment parties, political crisis
Note
This paper was elaborated in the framework of the grant project Contemporary Challenges of Democracy in EastCentral Europe (GAP408/11/0709) sponsored by the Czech Science Foundation.
∗ Katedra politologie Fakulty sociálních studií Masarykovy univerzity, Joštova 10, 602 00 Brno, Česká republika/Czech
Republic.
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European Electoral Studies, Vol. 9 (2014), No. 1, pp. 43–49
Introduction
Legislative elections in the Czech Republic held on 25–26 October 2013 were called a er the early dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies (Poslanecká sněmovna); the political crisis was brought on by a corruption scandal said to involve Premier Petr Nečas. The elections failed to produce a clear winner, and
were part of the continuing destabilization of Czech party politics that began with the 2010 elections.
The 2013 elections supplied a number of firsts in the electoral history of the independent Czech Republic. Electoral results for the Czech Social Democratic Party (Česká strana sociálně demokratická, ČSSD) were
the worst for a winning party since 1990. A total of seven parties won seats in parliament, the most since
1996. In second place just behind the Social Democrats was a new party, ANO 2011. Another new political formation, Tomio Okamura’s Dawn of Direct Democracy (Úsvit přímé demokracie Tomia Okamury),
also managed to get over the mandate threshold. The Civic Democratic Party (Občanská demokratická
strana, ODS) suffered a historic defeat, while the Christian Democratic Union—Czechoslovak People’s
Party (Křesťanská a demokratická unie—Československá strana lidová, KDU-ČSL) was the first political party
to get back into parliament a er having dropped below the mandate threshold in previous elections.
A er the 2013 elections a majority government was assembled consisting of the ČSSD, ANO 2011, and
KDU-ČSL. However, the ideological heterogeneity of the parties, internal tensions among the Social
Democrats (see below), and ANO 2011’s uncertain ideological profile hint at less-than-ideal long-term
prospects for the government led by Bohuslav Sobotka.
Background
The party system in the Czech Republic is usually classified (along with Hungary and partly Slovenia)
as one of the most stable in the post-communist region of Central and Eastern Europe. This was based
mainly on the stability of the actors (during 1996–2006 the lower house of parliament was mostly
filled by representatives of the same four political parties, along with one or two smaller parties), and
relatively low volatility. This began to change a er the parliamentary elections of 2010, when support for
the two long-time top parties dropped sharply, while the KDU-ČSL and the Green Party (Strana zelených,
SZ) failed to defend any of their seats. Instead seats were won in parliament by two new parties, TOP
09 and Public Affairs (Věci veřejné, VV). A er the 2010 elections a center-right coalition government was
formed under premier Petr Nečas of the ODS, the liberal-conservative TOP 09, and the centrist populist
VV. The government had a majority of 118 seats out of 200, the largest of any Czech government since
1992 (see Haughton et al., 2011; Hloušek, Kaniok, 2010; Stegmaier, Vlachová, 2011).
The Nečas government suffered the effects of the economic crisis, and responded by introducing
austerity measures, repeatedly raising indirect taxes (especially the VAT), and introducing progressive
taxation. The government faced repeated no-confidence votes in the Chamber of Deputies: it is relatively
easy in the Czech Republic to bring up a no-confidence vote, with only fi y deputies needed. But
the government’s stability and position in parliament were even more affected by conflicts among the
coalition parties, and tensions within them. Major media a ention was given to the discovery that the
VV was mainly an instrument for advancing the business activities of the party’s facto leader, Vít Bárta,
and the security agency owned by him. Bárta was also accused of a empting to bribe the deputies of
his own party; he was first convicted, but then freed on appeal. Repeated conflicts within the governing
coalition finally led to the VV leaving the government in April 2012. The party then split, part of it
forming the platform LIDEM (Liberal Democrats, or “To the People”), which remained a part of the
Nečas government, allowing it to retain its parliamentary majority.
The government’s position was also affected by ideological and policy disputes within the ODS, in
particular mounting criticism that the government’s policies had diverged from the party’s proclaimed
program. Several deputies le the party’s parliamentary caucus and, mainly as a result of the rebellion
within the ODS, the government failed to pass an important package of tax legislation in the fall of
2012. It succeeded in doing so a few weeks later when, in a surprise move, a trio of the rebellious
deputies gave up their seats before a repeat vote on the tax package; this allowed them to be replaced
by deputies loyal to the party leadership. It came out later that the resigning deputies were promised
Havlík, V. The 2013 Parliamentary Election in the Czech Republic
45
seats on the boards of directors of state-owned companies. This became one of the causes of the
Nečas cabinet’s fall. On 13 June 2013 police arrested the premier’s chief of staff and mistress, who was
accused of misusing the military intelligence service to spy on the premier’s wife. Also arrested was
the trio of deputies who had given up their mandates before the vote on tax legislation; they were
accused of accepting bribes, and the police submi ed a request to the Chamber of Deputies to revoke
the premier’s immunity from prosecution. Three days later President Miloš Zeman accepted Nečas’s
resignation, causing the entire government to fall. The coalition parties expressed their willingness to
continue working together, declared the existence of a parliamentary majority, and proposed ODS vicechairman Miroslava Němcová as premier. The president, who according to the constitution names the
government, rejected the former coalition’s proposal and named as premier Jiří Rusnok, former minister
of industry and trade in the 1998–2002 government that Zeman had headed. In early September the
Rusnok government failed to win its vote of confidence in the Chamber of Deputies (it was supported
only by the ČSSD, the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia—KSČM, VV, and a few independent
deputies). However, the vote also showed the disunity of the former governing coalition. The absence
of a clear majority for forming a new government, and the president’s refusal to name a new premier,
finally led to agreement across the political spectrum to dissolve the Chamber of Deputies and hold
early elections. These were set by the president for 25 and 26 October. The Rusnok cabinet remained in
office until the new government was installed, meanwhile making a number of important decisions
and drawing up the 2014 budget. The Rusnok cabinet-in-resignation (according to the constitution
a government must resign a er a losing a vote of confidence) continued until 29 January 2014, when
a new government was named.
Electoral System
A closed list proportional representation system is used in elections to the Chamber of Deputies of the
Czech Parliament, with a 5% threshold: an additional 10%, 15% and 20% threshold is applied to electoral
alliances of two, three, or four and more political parties respectively. The country is divided into 14
multi-member districts, which correspond to the boundaries of the country’s regions. The number of
seats in the individual districts is derived from the level of voter turnout (Hare’s quota is used]. In 2013
the smallest district was the Karlový Vary region with 5 seats, the largest the Central Bohemia region
with 25 seats. The d’Hondt divisor is then used in distributing the mandates among the various parties
(Čaloud et al. 2009).
Campaigning
A er the Chamber of Deputies was dissolved and new elections called, political parties had much less
time than in the past to roll out their election campaigns and come up with an election program. Up
to now the Czech Republic has been a country where the socio-economic cleavage has determined
the shape of party competition. This was true to a significant extent of the 2013 election campaign
as well, but with the addition this time of new anti-establishment political parties that campaigned
against the alleged incompetence and corruption of the older political parties. The new parties refused to
identify themselves along the traditional right-le axis, instead calling for a “common sense” approach
to problems, or by significantly expanding the role of direct democracy.
Probably the most high-profile campaign was that of the movement ANO 2011 (Action of Dissatisfied Citizens 2011, or Yes in Czech). ANO was originally founded as a civic initiative in November 2011
by Andrej Babiš, a billionaire of Slovak origin and owner of chemical and food-processing holding company Agrofert. In the initiative’s founding declaration Babiš accused the current political establishment
including then-president Václav Klaus of corruption and looting the state of its property. ANO declared
as its goals “a more just society, and a functioning state of laws” (ANO 2011). The instrument for achieving this would be a broad citizens’ movement; and managing the state more like a business. Dawn of
Direct Democracy chairman Tomio Okamura ran an anti-establishment campaign calling for a major
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European Electoral Studies, Vol. 9 (2014), No. 1, pp. 43–49
strengthening of direct democracy (including “general referenda with nothing excepted”). Okamura,
a businessman and senator of Czech-Japanese origin, had founded the movement just a few months
before the elections. The group also ran on strong anti-immigrant and anti-Gypsy rhetoric.
In its campaign the ČSSD campaigned against the previous center-right government of Petr Nečas;
its main slogan was “We Will Establish a Functioning State”. ČSSD emphasized its traditional themes,
including progressive taxation, raising the minimum wage, requiring property declaration above a certain level of wealth, and raising corporate taxes on certain branches of industry such as banking and
energy. The ODS, a er the resignation of Petr Nečas, had to deal with the problem of finding a new
chairman. The result was a somewhat schizophrenic situation, where Miroslava Němcová became the
campaign leader, but Martin Kuba, minister of industry and trade in the Nečas government, was elected
as party chairman. The ODS sought to present itself as the only authentic right-wing party (the party’s
main slogan was “I Vote Right”, which was featured in a number of somewhat inept rhymes on the
party’s billboards, web pages, and Twi er. However, it failed to find a theme that would give its campaign a clear direction. The party’s professed conservatism seemed less than fully believable given the
ODS’s policies at the head of the previous government. A few days before the elections the party came
out with the slogan “Middle Class, Defend Yourself!”, but this, too, received li le positive response.
For the first time in its history the KDU-ČSL went into elections not holding any seats in the Chamber
of Deputies; this allowed the party to present itself as an alternative to the existing parliamentary parties
under the campaign slogan “We’ll Put the Country Right”. The party also ran on its traditional themes
of a social-market economy and defense of families through tax breaks for parents, as well as two
recently controversial topics in the Czech Republic concerning debt repossessions and food quality.
It made frequent reference to Germany and the recent electoral success of the CDU-CSU there (with
the slogan “Want to Live Like in Germany? Then Vote Like in Germany!”). TOP 09 tried to capitalize
on the popularity of its chairman Karel Schwarzenberg, who in January 2013 made it to the second
round of presidential elections. During the presidential campaign Schwarzenberg was depicted with
a punk mohawk in an a empt to woo young voters. The TOP 09 chairman was also likened to “Agent
009” saving Czech democracy. The party also focused on touting its accomplishments as part of the
Nečas government, and presented itself in contrast with the le -wing parties as a responsible political
actor. KSČM relied on its disciplined voters; its campaign was among the least expensive, but also the
least visible. The Communists focused on criticizing the previous center-right government, promising
a number of measures to strengthen the social state (increased minimum wage, minimum retirement
benefits), progressive taxation, and a “public commercial bank with guaranteed payback on deposits
and an affordable interest rate for borrowing” (for more details on the campaign see Gregor, Macková
2014).
Results
A voter turnout of 59.5% was the second lowest in the history of the independent Czech Republic, and
three percent lower than in 2010. Seven political parties and movements made it over the five percent
threshold (see table 1 and 2), the most in the history of elections to the Chamber of Deputies (eight
political groups won seats in the 1992 elections to the Czech National Council, which was transformed
into the Chamber of Deputies a er the breakup of Czechoslovakia).
The winner of the elections was ČSSD; nevertheless its 20.5% and 50 seats was far below expectations. As recently as April 2013 its poll numbers hovered around 40%, and were still around 30% in September 2013 (Kunštát 2013a, Kunštát 2013b). The KSČM had its best result since 2002, winning 14.8%
and 33 seats to become the third strongest political party. Despite expectations, however, the elections
did not produce a le -wing majority in the Chamber of Deputies.
The election results were a defeat for the political parties that had formed the 2010 governing
coalition. While in 2010 they earned a total of 47.8% of the vote, in 2013 they got only 19.8%. The
ODS suffered the biggest drop (receiving 7.7% and 16 seats). Once the main right-wing element in the
Czech party system (in 2006 they won 35.4% and 81 seats), the ODS was damaged by the scandal that
led to the fall of the Nečas government, and was criticized for supposedly insufficiently conservative
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Havlík, V. The 2013 Parliamentary Election in the Czech Republic
government policies (raising taxes, for example); moreover, the ODS had become the media symbol for
corrupt connections between politicians and business. A drop of 5 percentage points compared to 2010
was also suffered by TOP 09, with 12% of the vote and 26 seats.
Table 1:
The results of the 2013 legislative election in the Czech Republic (Czech Statistical Office 2013)
Party
Votes (N)
Votes (%)
Change (2010)
Seats
Change (2010)
ČSSD
−1.60
50.00
18.70
47.00
−6.00
1,016,929
20.50
ANO 2011
927,240
18.70
KSČM
741,044
14.80
3.50
33.00
7.00
TOP 09
596,357
12.00
384,174
7.70
Tomio Okamura’s Dawn of Direct Democracy
342,339
6.90
−4.70
−12.50
26.00
ODS
6.90
14.00
−15.00
−37.00
KDU-ČSL
336,970
6.80
2.41
14.00
N/A
N/A
N/A
Other parties
628,663
11.86
−10.88
Invalid votes
37,228
0.74
5,010,944
100.00
VV
Total
Table 2:
47.00
16.00
14.00
−10.00
−24.00
6.31
0.00
−0.11
0.00
0.00
200.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
The results of the 2013 legislative election in the Czech Republic in electoral districts
(Czech Statistical Office 2013)
ČSSD
ANO
KSČM
TOP 09
ODS
Úsvit
KDU-ČSL
Praha
14.09
16.46
8.52
23.03
11.99
3.19
5.46
Středočeský
18.44
20.07
14.41
14.64
8.85
6.32
4.05
Jihočeský
20.73
16.97
16.45
12.77
8.08
7.07
6.66
Plzeňský
21.65
18.52
15.76
11.27
10.64
5.57
4.85
Karlovarský
21.34
21.32
16.72
10.08
6.72
8.33
3.36
Ústecký
20.77
21.29
20.33
8.50
6.24
7.64
2.22
Liberecký
16.89
21.59
14.38
15.24
6.95
7.97
3.01
Královéhradecký
18.57
20.28
14.08
12.91
7.27
8.08
6.79
Pardubický
20.53
19.82
14.62
10.81
7.10
6.85
7.70
Vysočina
23.01
15.89
16.86
9.07
6.83
6.84
10.54
Jihomoravský
22.94
17.34
14.36
9.79
7.01
6.49
10.26
Olomoucký
22.22
19.61
17.03
7.74
6.03
8.86
7.94
Zlínský
19.39
18.31
12.90
9.21
5.66
10.17
13.22
Moravskoslezský
26.38
18.07
17.53
6.16
5.45
7.78
7.24
Total
20.45
18.65
14.91
11.99
7.72
6.88
6.78
The biggest change compared to previous elections was the appearance of two new political movements that capitalized on their anti-establishment campaign rhetoric. Together ANO 2011 and Tomio
Okamura’s Dawn of Direct Democracy won more than a quarter of the vote. While ANO 2011 with
18.7% and 47 seats became the second-strongest party, Okamura’s movement won 6.9% and 14 seats to
become the second smallest party in parliament.
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European Electoral Studies, Vol. 9 (2014), No. 1, pp. 43–49
The success of these two parties indicates a significant change in pa erns of voter behavior, and
a dri away from the former right/le cleavage. Instead, the main line of conflict was now between
new party/old party. The KDU-ČSL’s return to parliament (6.78% and 14 seats) was also a significant
event, as it became the first party to regain seats in the Chamber of Deputies a er previously dropping
out of parliament altogether. The KDU-ČSL was helped in this by its above-average membership
base compared to other Czech parties, an established organizational structure, and stable voter base.
However, the Party of Citizens’ Rights—Zemanites, closely connected with President Miloš Zeman,
failed to make it over the mandate threshold despite promising poll numbers.
Forming the government
The election results failed to produce a clear majority for any ideologically-defined party camp. The
electoral drubbing received by the ODS and TOP 09 made it impossible to reform the center-right
coalition. The 83 seats shared by the ČSSD and KSČM were not enough to form a minority social
democratic government supported by the Communists, which had been the scenario most preferred
by the Social Democrats prior to the elections. Some of the coalition variants combining the right-wing
parties (ODS and TOP 09) and the Social Democrats were blocked by ideological differences, and by
the lack of a majority for such a scenario. A er the election results were released it soon became clear
that any new government must be based on some form of cooperation between ČSSD and ANO, even
though the Social Democrats were reluctant before the elections to talk about cooperation with Babiš’s
movement given the movement’s unreadability and unpredictability.
The start of discussions over forming a government was complicated by events within the social
democratic party, which has long been divided between a pragmatic wing close to President Zeman,
represented mainly by then-vice chairman Michal Hašek and Zdeněk Škromach, and a wing farther to
the le led by party chairman Bohuslav Sobotka and vice-chairman Lubomír Zaorálek. On the day the
electoral results were posted the media reported on a secret meeting between several Social Democratic
politicians led by Hašek, and President Miloš Zeman. A day later the party leadership called on Sobotka
to resign as ČSSD chairman. Sobotka refused, and a few days later he was supported by the inner party
leadership and the party’s Executive Central Commi ee. A er the unsuccessful a empt to sideline
Sobotka, the “coup” plo ers resigned from their positions in the social democratic leadership.
Shortly a erward, coalition talks began among the ČSSD, ANO and KDU-ČSL. Given the distribution of forces in the Chamber of Deputies, this configuration was one of the few possibilities for
forming an ideologically somewhat compatible governing coalition. During the negotiations disputes
arose over policy, and over the division of ministerial posts among the individual political parties. In
respect to program one point of conflict was the possible revocation of restitution to the church, which
had been approved under the previous center-right coalition. Before the election the ČSSD had promised to “revise” church restitution, but the KDU-ČSL vehemently opposed any such revision (the issue
of restitution was eventually le out of the final coalition agreement). Also disputed was the issue of
tax reform (the ČSSD advocated steep progressivity and increased corporate taxes, while ANO opposed
any tax increases), as well as medical co-payments by patients. The point on which talks almost collapsed was the division of ministerial posts. According to the original proposal by the ČSSD and ANO,
KDU-ČSL was to get two ministries, the social democrats 8, and ANO 7. The Christian Democrats were
not satisfied with two ministries, and threatened to leave the talks. The final compromise was 8 seats
(ČSSD) : 6 (ANO) : 3 (KDU-ČSL), with the Christian Democrats being given the ministry of agriculture,
which had also been argued over during the coalition talks.
President Miloš Zeman tried to take a hand of his own in the talks by repeatedly commenting on
various aspects of the nascent government, but this only prolonged the process. Bohuslav Sobotka
was finally charged with assembling the government on 21 November 2013, and Zeman officially
named him premier on 17 January 2014, a record 83 days a er the elections. During the coalition
talks, the role of the president in the process of assembling governments was repeatedly an issue.
There is an article in the Czech constitution that says the president names members of the government
upon recommendation by the premier: the argument was whether the president can actually refuse to
49
Havlík, V. The 2013 Parliamentary Election in the Czech Republic
name ministers. Zeman’s interpretation—contrary to that of most legal experts—tended towards the
affirmative; he questioned the professional qualifications of some of the ministerial candidates, such as
their education (M. Chovanec, ČSSD), lack of publications (L. Zaorálek, ČSSD), or lack of knowledge
about the ministry’s area of activity (M. Stropnický, ANO). Another point was the absence of a negative
lustration certificate for ANO chairman A. Babiš, which according to some lawyers is required in order
to hold a ministerial post. Zeman made naming Babiš conditional on approval of a new government
service law that would in practice supersede the lustration law, on the first reading and before the
naming of the new government. The coalition accepted this condition, and passed the amendment
before the new government was named. The president named the ministers to the new government
on 29 January 2014. The cabinet passed the vote of confidence in February 2014.
Conclusion
The 2013 elections were exceptional not just because they were called early, but mainly due to their
results. The historically second-lowest voter turnout was accompanied by a record drop in votes for
the established parties, and the unforeseen rise of new parties basing their identities on protest-type
appeals. The results of the election thus called into question the heretofore dominant socio-economic
cleavage as the main feature of party competition in the Czech Republic. The government produced
by these elections is remarkable for its unprecedented ideological diversity, which may significantly
complicate things for the coalition in the future. For it to remain viable it will require party discipline:
within the ANO movement, which is represented by a set of very ideologically-diverse individuals; and
within the ČSSD as well, which has been divided between at least two clear and competing factions for
quite some time. The way in which the government was constructed show us that the new institution
of direct presidential elections, combined with the strong personalities occupying the office of the
president, may end up transforming the balance of institutions within the political system of the Czech
Republic, and tilting the playing field in favor of the head of state.
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