Refighting the Battle of Okinawa :
The Controversy over History Textbook
Revisions of 2007
D. L. OLSON
西南学院大学学術研究所
英 語 英 文 学 論 集
第 56 巻 第 2 ・ 3 号 抜 刷
2 0 1 6 （ 平 成 28 ）年 3 月
Refighting the Battle of Okinawa :
The Controversy over History Textbook Revisions of 2007（　）－ 87 －
Refighting the Battle of Okinawa :
The Controversy over History Textbook
Revisions of 2007
D. L. OLSON
For history is the raw material for nationalist or other
fundamentalist ideologies, as poppies are the raw
material for heroin addiction. If there is no suitable past,
it can always be invented. 1
On March 30th, 2007, the Japanese ministry in charge of education（文部
科学省 hereafter the Monkasho）issued a textbook revision for history
textbooks. The changes were small, but concerned the descriptions the mass
suicides that occurred during the Battle of Okinawa. Though apparently
minor changes, the shift they caused in the interpretation of those events
would reverberate for the remainder of the year, leading ultimately to some
further revisions to the texts.
A great deal has been written on this subject already, 2 and the actual
content of the textbooks is at the center of the debate. More importantly
however, the debate over history or what is called the “historical
consciousness problem”（歴史認識問題）reflects different but often times
overlapping aspects of the need or desire of different players to come to
terms satisfactorily with the “past” and how it is remembered. From the
Japanese Government’s perspective “at stake is the legitimacy of regulating
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2
D. L. OLSON
national history to cultivate ‘desirable’ national identity and solidarity....” 3
Taken from a larger perspective, the debate is not “only about war
responsibility but also about national belonging, the relation between the
individual and the state, and relations between the living and the dead.” 4
Thus, as mentioned above, the specific changes that were made need to
be examined, but of more importance is the way they were made, in
particular the reason（or lack there of）given for making them, and the
reaction this drew from, but not limited to, the people of Okinawa.
The issue of Japanese junior high and high school textbooks have arisen
many times in the past and has often received a lot of coverage in the foreign
press because in the past the issues involved were often related to the
“comfort women”（慰安婦）,the Nanking massacre or other related issues that
had international diplomatic repercussions, particularly Japan’s relations with
China and South Korea. This instance is unusual in that it represents what
could be seen as largely domestic history（not ignoring of course that many
foreigners, mainly from the Korean peninsula, also perished in the battle）.
Though different in that respect, this case also received a fair amount of
attention, if only because of past cases which have created the impression
（unfairly I think—but, as in this case, seems partly the result of conservative
attempts to rewrite or delete history）in foreign media that Japan still refuses
to deal with its past.
To better put this into perspective, the first section will offer a brief
review of the Battle of Okinawa, in particular the mass suicides ; this will
include testimony from survivors and that taken from survivors as well as
academic conclusions that have been drawn. The events that unfolded did so
in what is seen as the most ferocious battle in the Pacific theatre of World
War II—which is not to say that conclusions cannot be drawn, only that
evidence must be weighed carefully. This is presented not as a definitive
statement or conclusion of what happened. But it is important for
Refighting the Battle of Okinawa :
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understanding how Okinawans understand and remember the past.
A second section discusses the revisions, the announcement of the
revisions, and most importantly the reasons（excuses?）given for the
revisions. Because the process of reviewing textbooks is closed and no
records are made available to the public this will necessarily be brief.
A final section deals with the reaction to the revisions, centering
primarily on Okinawans, but drawing on other sources as well, as they
illustrate this issue is not just an Okinawan issue.
The Battle of Okinawa 5
General Gerald Astor considered Okinawa to “the equivalent of England
for the Normandy invasion.” 6 The fighting started on March 26 th 1945 with the
attack on the Kerama island chain（Kerama, Tokashiki, and Zamami）. The
battle would reach the main islands on April 1 st and continue until June 23 rd.
It is considered the bloodiest battle of the Pacific War with estimates of
casualties being about 110,000 Japanese combat deaths and an additional
150,000 civilian deaths.（Estimates for civilian deaths are more varied, the
number here is from Hanson’s. But an easier way so grasp is to understand it
was about 1/4 of the civilian population.）Most of these civilian deaths
happened in the last few weeks of the battle. They were not the result of
mass suicides but of getting caught in the crossfire, hit by artillery, starvation,
and disease. Most of the mass suicides that have been documented occurred
on the Kerama Island chain. The following is a description of what Captain
Frank Barron saw on his second day on Zamami :
[Our] advancing company came upon a group of civilians huddled at
the edge of a step precipice. One woman had a baby in her arms and
another had a two- or three-year-old clinging to her side. “They were
about thirty to forty feet from me,” Barron recalled, “all staring at us
like little frightened animals.” Seconds later, the entire group
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D. L. OLSON
disappeared over the cliff. Barron and his men rushed forward in
time to see bodies bouncing off the wall of the precipice as they
plunged to their deaths.
What Barron and his comrades couldn’t have known at the time was
that all the natives of Zawami had been ordered by the Japanese to
kill themselves when the U.S. forces landed on the island. 7
The exact numbers of those who committed mass suicide is still
uncertain, but records from various municipalities dating from 1945 puts it
somewhere between six and seven hundred. 8 In areas where the main
fighting took place undoubtedly it would have been difficult to ascertain in
many cases.
Sloan records the testimony of other soldiers who came upon families
who had committed suicide by slitting their throats or blowing themselves up,
and Japanese survivors also testify about their own experiences. A man
named Yoshikawa Yoshikatsu, who was seven years old at the time, testified
to his experiences on Takashiki Island on March 28 1945. He and his family
had evacuated from a cave（壕）during the night of the 27th to escape the upcoming attack. They headed to the northern part of the island to an area
called Nishiyama（北山）The families had formed circles and were huddling
together. He recalls hearing the village head shout “Tenno Heika Banzai” and
then hearing grenades exploding all around him. His elder brother had also
thrown one into their group, but it didn’t explode. His father then told them
“Thrown it in the fire!” At that moment, his mother said “Throw it away! You
can die any time. You should live while you can.” Upon which the family ran
away. 9
The elder brother in the story above was working at the town hall at the
time, and people who worked for municipalities were responsible for making
sure military instructions were followed. Stories of being given grenades and
asked to blow themselves up are quite common. Oshiro Mitsuko recalls being
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given a grenade for such a purpose, but recalls “I wanted to die, but I couldn’t
do it. We fled into the hills when the Americans invaded, but they didn’t harm
us—they just let us go.” 10 Another survivor, Toyama Majun, who was chief of
military affairs in the village of Takashiki, testified “On March 28 at Fijiga...in
the upper reaches of the On’na river, the collective death（集団死）incident of
residents occurred. At that time, defense unit members brought hand
grenades and urged members to commit suicide.” 11 He goes on to explain that
when they received orders from the military they were considered orders
from the Emperor himself.
These few examples are not intended to tell the whole story nor to offer
definitive proof of exactly what happened. But they do point to some of the
dynamics involved as events unfolded. There were of course orders/
instructions given through local governments and passed on to villagers. But
another important dynamic was the propaganda the army had used to
convince the local population that should they be captured by the Americans
they would see their wives and daughters brutally raped and killed in front of
them before they too were brutally killed. The fear on the faces of the victims
Captain Barron saw attests to this as does the testimony countless others.
“We all wanted to kill ourselves because we believed the imperial army.” 12
Corporal Dan Lawler’s experience on meeting some young children who had
come out of a cave tells a similar story. When he offered them candy they
refused, thinking it poisoned. They only relented after he ate some himself,
but he had to continue to do so for each and every child in the group of
eight. 13 As Dower has noted, “It can be plausibly argued that no nation in
World War II launched a more sophisticated propaganda blitz domestically
than the Japanese.” 14
From all this, and, most importantly for understanding the events of
2007, it is clear the imperial army was deeply involved in the events of those
spring and summer months of 1945. As further evidence of this, the mass
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D. L. OLSON
suicides only occurred where Japanese soldiers were present. Perhaps only
circumstantial, but, as noted earlier, several dynamics were at work. Hayashi
sums this up : “There is abundant testimony that the Japanese military gave
strict orders（厳令）‘Never allow yourself to be captured,’ and also that they
passed out grenades saying, ‘If you have no choice, commit suicide.’ It matters
little if on the day the military commander gave the order to commit suicide
or not. If we look at the overall picture, there is no question that the mass
suicides were coerced（強制）by the military, and there is not a shred of
research to refute this.” 15
While this research focuses on the mass suicide issue, it is worth
recalling that one fourth of the civilian population lost their lives during those
85 days. So it is not surprising that polls show Okinawans consider the Battle
of Okinawa to be the most significant event in contemporary Okinawan
history. 16 The Battle of Okinawa “not only physically destroyed Okinawa, but
also left deep scars in the minds of its people.” 17 It is small wonder then, that
the Monkasho announcement in the spring of 2007 would spark the reaction
that it did.
Textbook Revision
On the evening of March 30, the Monkasho announced revision to the
high school history textbooks to be used from the following year. The
changes in wording were subtle, but had the effect of eliminating military
responsibility or any role in the mass suicides during the Battle of Okinawa.
The small changes made big news. The headlines were quite similar : The
Tokyo Shinbun “Mass Suicide ‘Military Coercion’ erased” ; Okinawa Times :
“’Mass suicides’ Military connection denied” ; Ryukyu Shinbun : “”’Mass Suicide
Coercion’ erased” 18 and the previously cited Asahi Shinbun : “Ignoring the
truth.” 19 The foreign media also picked up the story, the New York Times :
“Japan’s Textbooks Reflect Revised History.” 20
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Before looking at the justification for the changes here are two examples :
Yamakawa Publishing : Japanese History A Text
Pre-revision : “The Japanese Army forced people out of the caves（壕）
and some were cornered into committing mass suicide.”
Revised : “Among them the Japanese army forced some out of the caves,
some committed mass suicide.”
Tokyo Shoseki Publishing Japanese History A Text
Pre-revised : “Among them, the Japanese army massacred some members
of the general public as spies and others were forced to commit mass
suicide.”
Revised : Among them, some were cornered into committing mass suicide,
the Japanese army massacred some members of the public as spies.” 21
In both revised and pre-revised the passive voice is used but in the
revised versions it in not clear who or what is the cause of cornering people
into committing mass suicides. The way they are written in the revised
version the people could be making the decision of their own volition.
So what was the reason for the revisions? Very little was explained in
depth, but the comment from the review board（検定委員会）said of the
former passages “these passages could generate misunderstanding that all
these actions were carried out under orders from the military.” 22 As means of
further explanation, the Monkasho explained that 1）there are no documents
proving there were orders ; 2）the two commanders（one by his descendants）
on Kerama Island who were said to have given the orders are in the middle
of suing for defamation of character ; 3）Research in recent years has focused
less on whether or not there were orders and more on the mental states of
the people at the time. 23 Number 2 refers to the law suit that was brought
against Oe Kenzaburo and Iwanami Shoten（publishing）for Okinawa no-to, a
book in which he records the testimony and experiences of the people on the
islands. He won the case in 2008, with Judge Fukami Tochimasa concluding :
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D. L. OLSON
“The military was deeply involved in the mass suicides. 24 In either case, at the
time the revisions were announced, the case, still being agued hardly seems a
justification for anything. Yet, when the Monkasho Textbook Division was
queried as to whether or not they took that into consideration they
responded : “Even though at the moment the case is not settled, the plaintiffs
have publicly testified [that there were no orders] so we can’t just completely
ignore it.” 25 The reasons thus given do not develop a coherent argument. As
the headlines introduced earlier suggested, the response would be fast and
vocal.
The View from Okinawa
As might be expected, many people in Okinawa were quite upset.
Politicians and other activists soon started organizing, meetings were held
and the issue would carry through the summer climaxing in a large
demonstration on the 29 th of September. The demonstration was clearly the
climax in the campaign to get the revisions reversed. However, the discourses
that arose in the interim also provide insight into how the issue was and is
viewed by people in Okinawa.
Many articles were written, people interviewed and a lot of people wrote
letters to newspapers. A sample will give an idea of the tone. In an interview,
Ryukyu University Professor Hiyane Teruo stated : “For the people here the
Battle of Okinawa is a problem directly tied to our dignity of life ; even now
with the memories of this battle are still fresh, there is no room for inserting
politics or political ideology into it.” 26 It is clear here that 1）this should not be
a political issue and Tokyo appears to be making it one, and 2）for Okinawans
this is a very personal issue. A letter writer comments : “As someone who
escaped death numerous times during the rampage of war, to see this
distortion makes me apprehensive.” 27 Another letter writer, Uchihori Takshi,
noted, “The Granpas and Gramas（おじい・おばあ）must be lamenting ‘we’ve
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been duped by Yamato again.’” 28 In the case of the apprehensive writer he
explains in his letter that his mother had been given cyanide with which to
kill herself and her family, but they kept wandering until they finally made to
safety. Such a childhood experience would no doubt stay with one for one’s
whole life, with fear at the thought of anyone being put in that situation again.
The second comment somewhat wryly alludes to the fact that many Okinawa
people do not identify with Tokyo（i.e. the central government）and see
themselves as set apart, and at the same time, feel that what happened in the
past was deceptive.
Somewhat broader perspectives were offered from both at home and
abroad. Urashima Etsuko, an author and reporter, noted “To the people here,
the textbook revisions are a flat denial of what Okinawans elders went
through and what they have been telling younger generations. Young people
are retorting, ‘Is the government saying our grandparents are lying’?” 29 Of
course, young people are going to believe their grandparents over the
government in Tokyo, so one wonders how this might affect them in their
thinking about the central government. This sort of negative backlash was
noted elsewhere as well. Denial of military responsibility is likely to “deepen
suspicions...that Tokyo is trying to whitewash its militaristic past even as it
tries to raise the profile of its current forces.” 30 Considering the seemingly
more important issues concerning the US bases and forces based in Okinawa,
the government’s moves to revises the textbooks was not timed particularly
well.
A writer from Aichiken, Utsunomiya Takufumi, ties the issue to broader
issues of education. “If you can’t accept the truth as truth you cannot call it
education. And likewise, with moral education you can only start from the
truth.” 31 This comment points to one of the major issues in education that is
one of the primary sources of textbook controversies : what is the purpose of
education. Asashi Shinbun raises the same issue in an editorial : “Eliminating
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D. L. OLSON
the military’s involvement also eliminates the extreme militarism that would
not even brook civilians becoming prisoners of war. This is a distortion of
history.” 32
Clearly, with respect to the history of the Battle of Okinawa, the people
of Okinawa want their children and the rest of the world to understand what
happened. A visit to the Okinawa Prefectural Peace Memorial Museum will
leave anyone with the impression that passing on the experiences of the past
is highly valued in Okinawa, no doubt in part because of the intensity of those
experiences. And, as the comments above suggest, a lot of other Japanese
agree with them. As a writer quoted earlier ended his letter : “By denying
military coercion in the mass suicides, you are in effect killing them again.” 33
As noted above, people in Okinawa began organizing immediately. Doing
petition drives, politicians putting together resolutions, and people organizing
demonstrations. On June 9 th 63 various organizations held a Okinawan
Prefectural Citizens Meeting（県民大会）attended by about 3500 people. 34 This
meeting and the ones that would follow were focused on getting the revisions
reversed, something which rarely happens. Takashima Nobuyoshi, Professor
at Ryukyu University, however was passionate in his determination and
optimism that they could : “‘A corruption（改悪）[referring to the revision]
which has distorted the historical truth:’ it is still possible to make them take
it back ; in this energy filled context I want to take courage and band
together.” 35 While this meeting was not as large as the one that would follow,
the lack of any sign of compromise from Tokyo, seems to have fed the flames.
On June 22 nd, the Prefectural Assembly passed a unanimous statement
（意見書）“voicing our anger and demanding a retraction of the revisions.” 36
The same report also note that by the 28 th all 41 municipalities in Okinawa
had passed similar resolutions, and, further, that several civic groups had also
implored the Ministry to reverse its decision. The report also notes that
survivors have also come forward to personally relate their experiences
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which testify to the military involvement in the mass suicides. To this out
pouring of anger, the Monkasho has merely replied “This was a matter
decided by the review council.” 37 In essence they are saying that as this is a
matter for the review council（審議会）and so it is out of our hands. The
question arises however, if, as was noted above, nothing had changed
substantially in the scholarship relating to the events, what over the course of
two years had changed. There is no definitive answer as the review process
is closed and only the results are made public. 38
Without
any
satisfactory
response
from
the
Monkasho
another
demonstration was planned for September 29 . The lack of any substantive
th
response from Tokyo perhaps served to galvanize the people of Okinawa.
This next demonstration at Ginowan would turn out to be the largest since
the islands reverted to Japanese control in 1972. 39 While they were hoping to
gather about 50 thousand 40 they ended up with around 110,000 people
attending. 41 The main purpose of the rally was to make two demands : 1）that
the Monkasho retract the examination opinion（検定意見）and 2）that they
put the original wording back in. Other events during the day included a
special dance performance for peace, a song for memorializing the victims,
and a 34 kilometer peace torch relay. If the numbers of attendees are
accurate, this would be equivalent to about 8% of the Okinawa population.
（There may have been people in from the mainland as well, but there were
also rallies held the Kerama Islands which also had a few thousand
participants.）
It had been almost exactly six months since the announcement of the
revisions, and the opposition was clearly getting stronger, not weaker, and
difficult to ignore. Yet, at noted above, in this case, as in previous cases
（usually complaints from South Korea or China）the general reply is that the
Monkasho cannot interfere. To do so this time would set a precedent. In the
end, they announced that if the publishers wished to apply for permission to
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D. L. OLSON
amend their texts, those applications would be considered. This was,
according to the Heiwa Forum, “an unforgivable shirking of responsibility.” 42
Ultimately, some changes were made. The Heiwa Form and others had
called for a clear expression of what had taken place. “But the ministry
rejected this clear description of the military’s role, effectively opting for the
softer and vaguer reference to the military’s ‘involvement’.” 43 For those who
would seek to completely exonerate the Japanese military this was a
disappointing result. And for Okinawans “textbooks should belong to the
people. The essence of the problem here is how do we understand what the
Japanese military did during the battle of Okinawa, and how do we pass that
on to our children?” 44 It seems from this case that not only do we see two（or
more）ways of viewing and understanding the past, but two very different
visions for the future.
Different Ways of Remembering
In the case of the mass suicides and the textbooks, the struggle over
slight changes in wording（albeit with significant impact on meaning）offers a
glimpse at the larger on-going struggle over history and memory that on been
going since the end of the war. This struggle became more pronounced in the
1980s and 1990s, focusing especially on textbook issues. 45 Ienaga Saburo’s 32
year court battle to allow a more straight-forward treatment of the war also
helped keep the issue in the public realm. 46 Since the turn of the century,
however, those opposed to such treatment have been fighting back, and the
mass suicide textual revisions were another site of that struggle.
Superficially at least, as the above analysis indicated, the arguments seem
to be about what happened, who did what and the like. At a deeper level
however, it is about not just what happened（or what we choose to remember
as happening）,but about who we are and who we want to be.
The struggle for control over memory is rooted in the conflict and
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interplay between social, political, and cultural interests and values in
particular
present
conditions.
Memories
of
wars,
massacres,
atrocities, invasions and other instances of mass violence and death
become significant referents for subsequent collective life when
people choose to make them especially relevant to who they are and
what it means to be a member of that society. 47
Thinking about the mass suicides（and of course the mass suicides were
part of the larger tragedy that was the Battle of Okinawa）in this light, it isn’t
really an argument about whether or not it happened. From the Okinawan
perspective, it is a question about who we are. Further, in terms of continuity,
and passing on the knowledge of the experiences to future generations, who
we will be in the future.
Hashimoto
identifies
three
conflicting
narratives
that
help
give
perspective to the differing ways in which the past is thought about in
Japan. 48 These are not wholly exclusive, and can and do overlap, as can be
seen in the case of Okinawa. The first narrative emphasizes the stories of
fallen national heroes, “which justifies the war and national sacrifices in
hindsight by claiming that the peace and prosperity of today are built on the
sacrifices of the past.” Such narratives aim to cultivate pride in national
belonging.
A second narrative focuses on victims and on empathy. The vision is of
war as a catastrophe or terrible tragedy. These types of narrative will focus
on suffering, anti-militarism, and pacifism. The narratives in Hiroshima and
Nagasaki are good examples of this type of narrative. The third type of
narrative presents Japan as perpetrator, emphasizing imperialism and
exploitation—a narrative of a “dark descent into hell.” 49
In the case of the mass suicides the emphasis tends toward both the
second—victim focus and the third, Japan as perpetrator. With the mass
suicides clearly the emphasis is on being victimized. But at the same time,
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D. L. OLSON
that victimhood would be inauthentic without the Japanese military there as
perpetrator. The Monkasho and the government of Abe Shinzo at the time
clearly favored something along the lines of the fallen heroes type narrative.
His oft spoken desire to visit Yasukuni and his wish to see Japanese people
filled with pride are clear indications of this. Thus, ultimately this dispute was
not about history, but about the kind of narrative, the kind of identity（maybe
not consciously）one creates for oneself and constructs together in society as
a whole.
This is not likely to be easily resolved. One underlying reason is the
intensity of the experience of the war. Such intense experiences can cause
what Alexander calls “cultural trauma.” Cultural trauma occurs “when
members of a collective feel they have been subjected to a horrendous event
that leaves indelible marks on upon their group consciousness, marking their
memories forever and changing their future identity in fundamental and
irrevocable ways. 50 Though 70 years has passed since the end of the war, this
‘trauma’ helps to understand the passionate out-pouring of opposition to the
revisions that came from Okinawa.
Conclusion
The focus has been on the dispute between Tokyo and Okinawa due to
the textbook revisions made by the Monkasho. The emphasis has intentionally
been on the discourse emanating from Okinawa, to better understand their
view of the past. Having written on this topic before, it might also be worth
thinking about this issue from a larger historiographical perspective. History
writing always involves choice. “Remembering or reconstructing the past, as
we would say these days—inevitably involves neglecting and forgetting.” 51
When studying or thinking about history, sometimes it’s worth thinking about
what is missing.
Refighting the Battle of Okinawa :
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3
4
5
Hobswam 5.
See for example Hashimoto ; Iwasaki et.al ; Nozaki and Seldon ; and Seaton.
Hashimoto 89.
Hashimoto 25.
Except where otherwise quoted this review is drawn from Sloan’s The Ultimate
Battle and Maj Hanson’s “The Battle of Okinawa.”
6
Hanson 47.
7
297-8.
8
Data reproduced in「実態無視」.
9
Retold in「撤回求める著名」.　His recorded testimony can also be seen on you tube
at 吉川嘉勝。
10
“Okinawa war time wounds reopened.”
11
Aniya.
12
Nakamura Takejiro, quoted in “Okinawa war time wounds reopened.”
13
Sloan 304-305.
14
Ways 65.
15
2.
16
Nakazato 95. Also “Okinawans Protest” 16.
17
Nakazato 95.
18
These are listed in Hayashi 1.
19
「
事実無視」。
20
Onishi.
21
「
事実無視」.
22
“Mass Suicides.”
23
「
集団自決『軍強制』」1.
24
Onishi, “Japanese Court Rejects,” 30.
25
大江健三郎 20.
26
「
沖縄県議会」.
27
堀江祐一郎 .「集団自決、青酸カリ携え、死線くぐった」. 声 . 朝死新聞 . 4 May 2007,
13.
28
「
歴史の汚染をまた隠すか」.
29
Kambayashi.
30
Onishi, “Japan’s Textbooks.”
31
「
沖縄の人々」
32
「
集団自決」.
33
宇都宮 .
34
平和フォーラム .「文部科学省」.「歴史歪曲・沖縄『ノー』」県民大会に人の波 .」朝日
新聞（西日本版）.10 June 2007, 38. Web. 2 Mar 2015.
35
「
歴史歪曲」.
1
2
－102－（　）
16
D. L. OLSON
「文部科学省」.
36
「文部科学省」.
“A Political Decision.” This is also discussed in depth in Nozaki and Seldon.
39
Aniya.
40
「文部科学省」.
41
Onishi “Japan Court Rejects,” 6 ; “Okinawa Protests,” 15.
42
福山 .
43
Onishi “Japan Amends.”
44
福山 .
45
Seaton ; Nozaki andSeldon.
46
Hashimoto 13-14.
47
Hashimoto 2.
48
Hashimoto 8-14.
49
Hashimoto 8.
50
1.
51
Dower 3.
37
38
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