Bridging the Gap
Understanding current day nationalism in China.
Radboud Reijn
Studentnummer 0248533
Begeleider Leo Douw
Culturele Antropologie
"There can be no society which does not feel the need of upholding and reaffirming at
regular intervals the collective sentiments and the collective ideas which make its unity
and its personality "(Durkheim 1965: 474-475).
Introduction
In the past 25 years the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) has undergone rapid economic
change. It has also become an increasingly active member of the international community.
The PRC has aimed to build a legal system and a rule of law that promotes economic
reform, within a framework that upholds the supremacy of the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP). This rule of law is also used to maintain political control. These economic,
national and international developments have simultaneously coincided with a growing
self-confidence and a resurgence of nationalism. There is a need for examining the
characteristics of the resurgence to better understand China's present day nationalism.
Today it is widely acknowledged that that the state plays an important role in
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shaping nationalism in practice. This structuralist approach however leaves little room for
agency. In this article I will prove how both structure and agency play an important role
in shaping nationalism in China, within the nationalist discourse. I will prove that the
citizens of China play an active role, just as does the state, in shaping current day
nationalism. This will be proven by providing examples of popular nationalist
expressions in China since the Tiananmen incident.
The explanation of Nationalism in China is mainly done through a structuralist
approach, were the Chinese state is held responsible for the resurgence of nationalism in
China. This view is not incorrect in as far there is a large State guided program present,
that aims to reinforce the States own popularity through a nationalist discourse. However
throughout China's history from ancient times forward there has always been a big role
for the people, which through agency are capable of changing, altering, and even
completely overthrowing State policy and its leaders.
The unique aim of this paper is to shed light on the importance of popular protest
as a second shaping force of nationalism in current day China. I will begin by presenting
the main theoretical debate on nationalism, this will also include my position on the
debate. In the second section I will provide an overview of the development of
nationalism in China. The third section will describe the influence of popular protest on
nationalism. The final section, my conclusion, will put together a framework to analyze
nationalism in China.
Nationalism
When people think of the nation they live in they see it as a given: a country that has been
there for a long time; a community of destiny, which through struggle came into being.
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Contrary to this naturalized belief nationalism is a constructed enterprise influenced by
various actors. I will return to these basic concepts about nationalism as I refer to the
various theoretical approaches. Although from within all the nationalist theories we can
find similarities. From these theories a definition of nationalism can be distilled. Scholars
agree that nationalism means the following:
[A]n ideology which holds that cultural boundaries should correspond to political
boundaries; that is to say, that the state ought to contain
only people ‘of the same kind’ (Eriksen 2001 [1995]: 275 & Gellner 1983).
Despite this generalized definition there are many different theories on nationalism,
I have distinguished three different types. The first approach, modernist, views
nationalism as a phenomenon that came into being at the change from an agrarian society
into a modern industrialized society. Secondly we have the primordialist theory which
views nationalism as an old (pre-industrial) phenomenon. Finally there is the instrumental
approach to nationalism which is more flexible than the former two. With flexible I mean
that people are not the victims of nationalism, but they consciously choose their national
identity. These approaches differ mainly in the way they perceive the genesis of
nationalism. The next section will discuss this theories in greater detail.
When considering modernist theories of nationalism we will look at the work of
one of the foremost authors in developing theories relating to nationalism, Ernest Gellner.
He explains his vision of nationalism in his book Nations and Nationalism (1983).
Gellner stresses that nationalism came into being as a response to industrialization, and
consequently peoples became disconnected from their former kin ties, religion and local
communities. This led to a greater geographical mobility, and made people part and
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participate in a social systems of a much larger scale then they were formerly used to.
This time was also recognized by a fragmentation of society, as Anthony Smith states:
Industrial capitalism, the bureaucratic state, total warfare, mass social mobilization,
science and rationalism,…, the breakdown of traditional family values…have altered the
lives of every individual on the planet and thrown them out of their habitual practices and
daily routine…. This made it necessary for another form of social organization to emerge
to prevent chaos to emerge. This demand for a cohesive ideology was met by nationalism
(Smith 1996 [1995]:4).
As Smith states cohesion is of main importance to uphold social stability, this can be
provided by nationalism. Cohesion and standardization in society is achieved by
education and a nationalist discourse. Gellner’s theory states that during pre-industrialist
society self-sustainable communities were isolated from each other. These communities
all had a high-culture which helped to shape their local identities. As industrialism grew
the demand for a skilled, literate and mobile work force increased. These self-sustaining
forms of communities can no longer produce individual skilled laborers who are
interchangeable as needed for industrialization. Therefore the state’s influence increases,
as there is a need for training specialized labor. To sustain economic growth they are
dependent on innovation, a “changing occupational structure” and “a mobile division of
labour”. Furthermore an industrial society is dependent on citizens capable of “sustained,
frequent and precise communication”. This communication is the method in which which
“meaning [is] transmitted in a standard idiom and in writing when required”. Thus it is
necessary to have a society of a wide exchange of thought and ideas between members.
This requires memebers of society “to be properly employable and enjoy full and
effective moral citizenship.” By having these attributes they must poses “ a common
conceptual currency. This can only be achieved by a modern national standardized
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education system, and cannot be provided by kin or local units”. (Gellner [1983] 2003:
32-34 & 1996: 107).
Industrialization is simultaneous to reproduction and in turn a catalyst for shifts
towards national consciousness. Following this development and a loss of older forms of
social organization, the state creates a new form of identification, which no longer relates
to single communities, but to the nation-state as the producer of a specific national
culture (Gellner [1983] 2003). Thus, industrial society emerges as the new and single
producer of a consciousness of a homogenous culture; an idea of the nation is crafted in
this culture. Gellner sees nationalism as a functional replacement of former forms of
social organization and it provides stability in a chaotic society.
This clear distinction between kinship ideology and nationalism is that society
develops into an abstract community. It is in this way that Benedict Anderson ([1983]
1991) has refered to the nation as an ‘imagined community’. Andersons points states
three factors that occur during the movement from pre-industrial to industrial: the
breakdown of sacred scripts, divine kingship and the merging of history with cosmology.
These three together produce an unconscious unifying force within society that
previously bounded pre-industrialist society. Eventually the break down of these three
combined with the rapid spread of print media - fueled by the capitalist market, lead to
the change in society. Print media allowed for an ability to imagine simultaneously one’s
countrymen and ‘the other’ on an unprecedented scale. Furthermore he argues that
because an immense group of people are capable of acquiring the same knowledge the
dynamics of nationalism changed. This encouraged a standardization of the language and
world views were made possible. Of utter importance in nation-states was the educational
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system, for it sustained the standardization of language and the spread of a single unified
history. Together with the increased movement of people, fusion of religion with territory,
and the decline of traditional powers sovereignty returned to the community, the larger
community the present day nation. Anderson states that nationalism has a unique force to
create a type of self-consciousness of the people imagining themselves as one (Anderson
1991 [1983] & Duara 1995:50-53).
Primordialists as opposed to the theories discussed above, believe that nations and
nationalism have “an unbroken continuity from pre-modern communities to national
ones” (Eriksen [1996] 2001: 279). According to primordialists nationalism is rooted in
pre-modern ethnic communities or “ethnies’’ (Smith 1986). They believe that nations and
nationalisms have a long history and therefore the nation-state is the natural result of their
particular history. However primordial notions of nationality have come under great
attack. Critique came mainly from anthropologists as having an ethnocentric and racist
viewpoint on nationality. Nonetheless it is still a popular view for nationalist themselves,
because of the assumption it makes in relation to a direct connection of bloodlines and
the physical body of the nation.
Soft primordialists such as Anthony D. Smith and Robin Cohen distance
themselves from the idea of national bloodlines, and even to a certain degree the
existence of nationalism being constructed. Those two theorists state that nationalism
exists within the social connections of society. Smith argues that nations constructors
have a hard time building without first having a préexisting “ethnic core” (Smith 1987
[1986]: 262). As Smith states in his article State-Making and Nation-Building: “the
history-less are destiny-less, and this becomes the central dilemma of state-making and
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nation-building today” (Smith 1987 [1986]: 244). Cohen, moreover, suggests that
primordial identity have such grave practical concerns that to deconstruct and dismiss
such identity is problematic (Cohen 1999: 10). Soft primordalist view nationalism as a
natural oucome.
The instrumental theory is often opposed to the primordialist
theory. Instrumentalists suggest that people create nations and promote nationalism to
further their own ends. According to Darden, instrumentalists are often ordinary citizens
that adopt certain national viewpoints in order to achieve their goals (Darden 2002: 6).
National identity is a natural historical fact and for instrumentalist this national identity is
flexible and short lived. For instrumentalists identity is in constant flux, and therefore
differs from person to person. Furthermore according to the instrumentalist an identity is
chosen as opposed to the primordialists who see a identity as a given (Jenkins 1997: 4548). Of main importance in the discussion of nationalism is the definition of identity
trough ethnicity. Does nationalism have a connection with ethnicity or are they to be
viewed as separate, This will be discussed in the next, as I explain ethnicity and compare
it to the three nationalist theories mentioned above.
Just as nationalism ethnicity is a very problematic term and has been studied by
many scholars. Ethnicity is fairly recent term, as it only appeared in the Oxford English
Dictionary for the first time in 1972 (Glazer & Daniel 1975:1). The meaning of this new
term is not clear but there is agreement that it can only be shaped when confronted with
‘others’. As Anthony P. Cohen puts it “…people become aware of their culture when
they stand at its boundaries: when they encounter other cultures, or when they become
aware of other ways of doing things, or merely of contradictions to their own culture”
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(Cohen 1985: 69). Furthermore all the different approaches within anthropology agree
that it has to do with “ the classification of people and group relationships” (Eriksen
[1993] 2002: 4 italics in original quote).
In an attempt to frame ethnicity Anthony Smith has identified six criteria for the
formation of an ethnic group;
1. Ethnic group must have a name in order to developed collective identity.
2. The people in the ethnic group must believe in a common ancestry.
3. Members of the ethnic group must share myths (common historical memories).
4. Ethnic group must feel an attachment to a specific territory.
5. Ethnic group must share same culture that based on language, religion, traditions,
customs, laws, architecture, institutions etc.
6. Ethnic group must be aware of their ethnicity. (Smith. 1991:94).
In other words, they must have a sense of their common ‘ethnies’. Following these
criteria Smith defines an ethnic community as: “A named human population with a myth
of common ancestry, shared memories and cultural elements, a link with an historic
territory or homeland and a measure of solidarity” (ibid.1991:94). This definition asserts
that there is a link between ethnicity and nationalism.
Contrary to this believe in a reified ethnicity we find scholars who see ethnicity as
a social construct. One of these scholars is Gerd Baumann, in his book The MultiCultural Riddle (1999) he explains his argument. According to Baumann people
themselves shape their identity. Therefore his disagrees with the idea that nationalism has
a natural ethnic base. The history and language of a nation are historical constructs
through which education, rituals and national holidays play an important role in unifying
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the nation. Ethnicity is fluid it has no fixed boundaries. Baumann compares ethnicity with
wine as it is also based on natural ‘ingredients’. However nature itself would never be
able to make the wine. Normally people are not even aware that they have a specific
ethnicity, as it only becomes apparent in comparison with other cultures. (Baumann
1999:57-68). Now we see what role these two perspectives on ethnicity play in relation to
the three perspectives on nationalism mentioned above?
According to the modernist view on nationalism ethnicity does not play an
important role. Modernist see no direct connection between nationalism and ethnicity.
Although ethnicity can be used as a mobilizing and claim making force. It is not a
necessary condition for the existence of nationalism, it is mainly a political functionalistic
ideology. They view nationalism as a modern phenomenon as opposed to ethnicity,
which is part of a pre-modern agrarian society. Still nationalism is a force to create unity
among a population however this is not based on ethnic bonds from small agrarian
societies (Jenkins 1997:144).
In contrast, the primordialists view “ethnicity a fundamental, primordial aspect of
human existence” (ibid. 44). Therefore ethnicity plays a key role in the development of
nationalism. According to this view ethnicity becomes reified, which makes it static and
unchangeable. And is the product of human personal and social ties. It is placed therefore
at the center of the theory.
The instumentalist theory is opposing this reification of ethnicity and views it as a
phenomenon that is in constant flux and changes through time. Therefore it is viewed as
a construction and places it diametrically opposed to the primordialist view of ethnicity.
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Now that I have presented the theoretical discussion of nationalism it is necessary
to position myself in this debate. Gellner's theory on nationalism is the best applicable to
nationalism in current day China. However, he leaves little room for agency and focuses
on structural causes for the development of nationalism. In current day China it is
important to incorporate popular expressions of nationalism as it have has a strong
influence on Chinese power holders through out history. Currently these popular
expressions have a strong influence on China's foreign policy. The shift from an agrarian
society to an industrialized society and its consequential changes in bureaucracy and
technological developments is a development has been clearly going on in China since
the 1980s facilitated by wide-ranging, although often unorthodox, economic reforms.
This is a process that China is still going through, and will continue to go through for the
next decades. These developments made homoginization of the national culture possible
through education and the State controlled media. Furthermore China leaders depend on
perpetual economic growth to legitimize there leadership and stay in power.
Furthermore as Gellner states in his theory education has an important role in
shaping an national culture and standardization. Education now defines the status of the
individual, whereas in agro-literate societies kinship status was the defining factor. The
Chinese state takes this need for education, and fuses state and culture together. There is
a need to compete for overlapping cultural attachment areas, and nationalism is the only
way of competing effectively for these areas. In industrial societies, "a high culture
pervades the whole of society, defines it, and needs to be sustained by the polity"
(Gellner [1983] 2003:18). In industrial society, the changing nature of work demands
cultural homogeneity. There is a need for impersonal, context-free communication. This
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high culture shaping nationalism was delivered by the Chinese state in the form of the
victor narrative and the victimizaton narrative. Gellner defines nationalism as "a political
principle which holds that that political and the national unit should be congruent"
(ibid.:1). It is a fundamentally new feature of modern life since states in previous times
were not organized on nationalist lines.
However some critique can also be made in regards to his theory exclusively
focuses on developments in Europe, and his emphasis on a short period of history. This
does however not falsify his general theory on nationalism; since it still enables you to
ask more accurate questions about the empirical arena your looking at. Looking at China
Gellner’s structural approach to studying nationalism could be complemented when more
attention is given to popular expressions of nationalism. The sentiments that popular
nationalism expresses are of great importance of the development of nationalism in
current day China. Ever since imperial days onward popular protest had a great influence
on the rise and collapse of power holders in China.
Having identified conceptualized and compared nationalism we are now in a
position to focus specifically on nationalism in China. I will now use Gellner’s theory to
analyze nationalism in China. This section of the paper will deal with the structural
dimension of nationalism.
Nationalism in China
To understand the developments in China today it is necessary to understand the
developments that led up to the Tiananmen incident in 1989. The Tiananmen incident,
together with rapid economic growth, was a turning point in China because it is when
nationalism resurfaced as the main source of State legitimized power replacing
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communist ideology. Furthermore it is necessary to understand that current day Chinese
nationalism did not develop in isolation but is also based upon the struggle to manage
present day Sino-American and Sino-Japanese relations. By creating unity the State and
their elites used specific narratives, to achieve stability. I will discuss the various ways
nationalism has come about in China in a chronological order, in accordance with their
entrance into the nationalism discourse, these are: ethnic nationalism, liberal nationalism,
and pragmatic nationalism. Important to the role in shaping these forms of nationalism
are the state produced narratives of the victor and the vitimization narrative. These
concepts will all be discussed more in the next section.
At the time when China was still an Empire there was no form of nationalism, as
we think of it today. Nationalist ideology only became of influence after the defeat by the
British in the first Opium War (1839-1842) (Fairbank & Goldman 1998 [1992]: 198-200).
This war was also the prelude to the disintegration of Chinese power and a loss of
sovereignty. It is since this time that Chinese nationalists have attempted to keep a united
political community. The “Century of Humiliation” (bainian guochi), spanning from the
the mid- nineteenth to the mid-twentieth century, plays a central role in Chinese
nationalism today (Gries 2004: 44-46). Tales of the “Century of Humiliation” still prove
to be a powerful tool today in shaping peoples opinion in China (Gries 2001: 26). This
“Century of Humiliation” is still felt today by China political leaders and has
strengthened beliefs to restore China’s pride and glory.
Nationalism in China, in one of its earlier forms, was not pragmatically as it is
today, but rather existed as an ethnic state-making movement. Ethnic nationalism is a
form of nationalism in which the "nation" is defined in terms of ethnicity. It emphasizes
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the differences of an internally well integrated group distinguishing itself from the
surrounding groups on the basis of a set of cultural or physical characteristics (Smith
1988 [1986]: 21-22). This changed however when the Chinese were confronted by
imperialist forces. Then it became necessary to unite the whole of China, including
minorities, to keep its territorial integrity intact.
Central to the development of a Chinese nationalism was Sun Yat-sen. After the
collapse of the Qing Empire he was installed as the first president of the Republic in 1912
(Fairbank & Goldman 1998 [1992]:279-281). Sun wanted to end Manchu rule as well as
end foreign occupation of parts of China. Sun devised a form of nationalism that was
based on a Japanese model of nationalism which he had become acquainted with during
his time in exile in Japan. He proposed that the majority of people living in China belong
to the Han-minzu (ethnic group/ nationality). Sun derived the word minzu from the
Japanese word minzoku which means nation or people. By using han-minzu as an all
including ethnic group he was able to eventually overcome the opposition that existed
between the Mandarin speaking north and the Cantonese speaking south. (Gladney
1991:85).
By redefining, re-educating and regenerating the …[minzu] …
and its members, ethnic nationalists politicize its culture and are
drawn into purifying the community of 'alien' elements, which in
turn may lead to the expulsion and even the extermination of
minorities, the 'outsider within'. Only by some attenuation of
ethnic nationalism, can minorities be protected. (Smith 1994:186-198).
The ethnic nationalist movement was led by a Han majority which aimed to overthrow
the Manchu led Qing-Empire. In order to strengthen its support base, to mobilize its
followers, and promote a sense of political and ideological inclusive categorization of
unity among themselves. the nationalist government created a new nationalistic ideology.
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This ideology argued for a cohesive, unified Chinese people and culture under a unified
country known as China. Its corner stone claim is that all people living in China share an
ethnic identity as Han, which is distinct from that of the peoples living at and within its
borders.
What makes ethnic nationalism distinct from other forms of nationalism is its
emphasis on descent which also includes ideas of a culture shared between members of
the group, and with their ancestors, and usually a shared language. As Sun stated it
himself:
The Chinese race totals four hundred million people; for most part,
the Chinese people are of the Han or Chinese race with common blood,
common language, common religion, and customs- a single, pure race’
(Sun Yat-Sen, translated by Price 1960:5).
Ethnic nationalism of this form answered both to the need to unify themselves against
foreign imperialist invasion and an ever-growing internal chaos and impoverishment of
China at the beginning of the twentieth century. This ideology had greatest support in the
littoral urban east of the country, were a new elite was forming (Fairbank & Goldman
1998 [1992]: 244-263).
The nationalist invention of such a Han ethnic identity, which transforms a
‘community of interest into a ‘community of destiny’ (Scarduelli 2005:138) feeds mainly
on racism, xenophobia and demagogy in constructing a new Han identity. In his book
Imagined Communities Benedict Anderson clarifies the phenomenon of modern
nationalism and pointed out that states mobilize history to produce a linear, teleological
narrative he calls the “biography of the nation.” Shared participation in this narrative then
provides a sense of identity and community (Anderson 1991 [1983]: 204-206). China
had no unilinear history as a nation state. It was in the process of inventing one and
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claiming its spot in the world system. According to Hegel only European nations through
the Enlightenment had “moved beyond the stage where mind and nature were unity”.
Hegel contrasted the European Nations with the Orient that stayed constrained by
“nature/ primitiveness’’ (Chow 2001: 51). The Europeans studied their own history
through the study of primitive societies, and were therefore capable to discover their own
history. Through translated books brought into China, the intellectuals read about the
fundamental principle that constituted a nation. “Chinese intellectuals looked to language,
custom, history, and religion for the common bond of a nation’’ (ibid.: 51). The Chinese
intellectuals could not find any common bonds, which led to the construction of their
own narrative. As Chow stated;
The majority of China’s four hundred million people spoke dialects
that were mutually incomprehensible. Only a fraction of the
population knew the official language and the writing system.
When they looked into the past, they found the rise an d fall of dynasties.
There was no state that belonged to all members of the same political regime.
The belief in he Mandate of heaven lost ground with the rejection of the tianxia
by Europeans (ibid.:51-2).
The history of China was thus made up of over twenty-four independent histories with
little connection. There was no unified national history within the geographical space of
present day China. This also meant that there “were no national heroes, national martyrs
and no abstract subjects with which the entire population could identify”, which
according to various theorist are essential to create nationalism (ibid.: 52). These various
elements did not exist in China due to various cultural influences, the most influential
being Confucianism. From a Confucian viewpoint it was not necessary to have a
unilinear development of history, “[i]t was a belief in moral cosmos that granted and
withdrew its mandate to and from human leaders that really provided the continuity”
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(ibid.: 52). To create such a unilinear history intellectuals created a primogenitor ancestor
although as mentioned above there was little that could formally connect all the empires.
They found their ancestor in Huangdi (Yellow Emperor). Huangdi is considered to be the
founder of Chinese civilization as well as its first ancestor. He lived approximately 4,000
thousand years ago, during the time of patriarchal clan community, and was the mythical
chief of one of the strongest tribes in the middle valley of the Yellow River. So “to be
Han Chinese was to be a member of the mammoth Han lineage, a descendant of Huangdi,
the Yellow Emperor of the Han race” (ibid.: 58). This ancestor was also important
because it wasn’t the ancestor of the Manchus
Secondly, Han nationalism was shaped in racial terms inspired by social
Darwinism. The influx of these Western ideas challenged Confucian universalism, where
before cultural relativism could turn barbarians into civilized “Chinese”. For example in
the case of the Manchu perceived as barbarians yet they became the leaders of the
Empire. Now racial theory was used to make the Manchu’s into alien barbarians who had
only taken on Chinese culture superficially. Now race was permanent; nothing could
make Manchu’s into Han. This promotion of racial definitions of identity became popular
after the fall of the Qing Empire. (Chow 1997: 34-52). Struggling to unite the country as
well as maintaining China’s territorial integrity, Sun had to change this Han-centric
principle to include all people living within China. Besides the recognition of the Han
and Manchu minzu he also formally recognized three other minzu namely Mongols,
Tibetans and Muslims, which are symbolized in the five color flag of the first republic.
According to Sun it would be possible to classify the whole population of China
according to these five ethnic groups. These changes introduced after the fall of the Qing
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Empire in 1911, by the Kuomintang, were also used by the CCP in when they came to
power in 1949. The CCP did not keep to only five minzu but expanded them eventually to
56 official nationalities. The significance of these nationalities have increased since the
1990s due to the ethnic nationalist states formed on China’s borders, after the collapse of
the Soviet Union (Gladney 1998: 11). Today ethnic nationalism remains alive among
Chinas ethnic minorities, such as the Uyghur, Mongols, and Tibetans, who are denied
founding their own state. It is in these regions that some form of ethnic separatism
remains alive. From the view of the Chinese government these groups pose a serious
threat to the unity of the multiethnic state. This has led to a virulent suppression of any
form of ethnic nationalist in those regions.
Two state constructed narratives have been used throughout China’s modern
history interchangeably by the State to bolster unity and increase their popularity. These
narratives are the victimization narrative and the victor narratives (Gries 2004: 4850). The victimization narrative, although in a simple form, was first used by the
Nationalist government. This meant that the West and Japan are to be blamed for China’s
suffering. The image of China as a raped woman was used to unify the Chinese against
the foreign invaders. Surprisingly this narrative, which proved successful for the
republicans in the 20th century, was used again in the 1990s by the Chinese government
as a means to bolster support as communist ideology could no longer legitimize their
position after the rapid economic developments in the 1980s (ibid. 48-52)
This victimization narrative slowly lost strength, because of the CCP victory over
the Japanese; a victor narrative took the forefront. This victor narrative stressed the heroic
Chinese victories over western and Japanese imperialism. When the CCP achieved
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victory they were perceived as the saviors of the State. Used it to mobilize popular
support among the population and later it was also used for nation building purposes and
legitimization of their power. In contrast you find the victor used by the Communist party
as a way to win popular support and furthermore served their nation-building goals.
Nationalism, which stressed China’s role as a victim of modern history, was based on
frustration over china’s inability to overcome political and economic barriers set up by
Western countries. The victimization narrative slowly superseded the victor narrative
during the 1990s. In the Maoist era the image of China as a raped woman replaced by and
‘victors’ narrative. The CCP came to power on the basis of anti-Japanese peasant
nationalism, and has used it ever since to legitimize its power position. The two
narratives are platforms for nationalism used in China throughout its modern history.
When China, at the beginning of the 1980s, began to open up to the outside world
the disasters that occurred by its leaders became apparent. Due to these travesties
“national pride suffered a heavy blow from self-condemnation of their recent past and
awareness of China's economic backwardness (Zhao 2000:9). The economic
underdevelopment was blamed on traditional Chinese culture. So an change from an
agricultural society to an industrialized society was initiated on a broader scale then ever
before, cleary in support of Gellners theory on nationalism.
The anti-traditionalist lost ground which allowed the popularity of liberal
nationalism to rise. The Chinese people developed a negative view of traditional Chinese
culture and promoted the adoptation of western culture. This sentiment was further
popularized by the appearance of a six part television documentary series Heshang
[Yellow River Elegy] in 1988 on the Central Television station in Beijing. It critically
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examined Chinese history, and condemned traditional Chinese values, culture, and
political system which contributed to stagnation of Chinese society. It also indirectly
blamed the Chinese Communist Party for this backwardness (Xu 2001: 152). Liberal
nationalism argues for political, social and economical reform. The nation according
liberal nationalism is then defined as “a group of citizens who have a duty to support and
defend the rights of their state in the world of nation-states, but also to pursue individual
freedoms” (Zhao 2005:133). The post-Mao reforms in the 1980s together with Deng
Xiaoping’s call for liberation created new maneuvering space for the citizens of China
and an increased influence of liberal nationalism in society. Thus, “liberal nationalism
identified with the state, when it came to battling foreign imperialism, at the same time
demanded more say in the political process and authoritarian rule” (Zhao 2005:33). This
movement called for a liberal democratic model to revive China, after the catastrophic
years of the Cultural Revolution. These developments made the communist ideology
loose its credibility and reform was made necessary for the CCP to regain absolute power.
Deng Xiaoping launched a new era of political liberalization and economic reform,
resulting in economical growth and more freedoms for the population (Leng 1994: ixxvii). This development changed Chinese society radically, since it started to
economically develop on an unprecedented scale. As communist ideology lost its
credibility after the reforms the CCP used slogans like “getting rich is glorious” (zifu
guangrong) to gain support. Ideas of Capitalism were introduced in society, however
these reforms resulted in high inflation soaring corruption and high unemployment. In
earlier days people were willing to endure these hardships if an “effective ideology or
long-term vision” inspired them for the sake of a better future (Zhao 2005: 134). As
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Communism was no longer serving as a tool to legitimize capitalist developments the
people demanded more democracy and freedom. This eventually culminated in to
massive anti-government demonstrations at Tiananmen Square and the consequential
crack down of the students and workers protest. The demonstrations were a test to the
government’s integrity and credibility.
These developments put the Chinese Communist Party in a crisis situation
searching for legitimization as their powerbase waned. They had to develop a new
overarching nationalist culture that would legitimize their power hold. They therefore had
to promote their own form of nationalism that could supersede both liberal and ethnic
nationalism, and of which the state could remain control. The answer was found in
pragmatic nationalism. In this view, nationalism is considered “as a territorial political
unit giv[ing] the communist state the responsibility to speak in the name of the nation and
demands that citizens subordinate their individual interests to china’s nation ones” (Zhao
2005:134).
Pragmatic nationalism identifies closely with the Communist State, and asserts its
claims not in name of the people but in name of the state. This in turn meant that the
people are subordinate to the State. The leaders found that they had no alternative but to
cultivate national pride and patriotism to stabilize the country together. This reflects
Gellner’s view that nationalism is "a political principle which holds that that political and
the national unit should be congruent" (Gellner [1983] 1998:1). Pragmatic nationalism
was furthermore targeted to counter regional decentralization. They did this by deviating
attention away from internal inequalities and instead focusing on china’s foreign relations
20
(Xu 2001: 155-157). In this ‘new’ narrative the party had three core issues: economic
modernization, political stability, and national unification (Zheng 1999).
Pragmatic nationalism today is also officially expressed as aiguo, meaning
‘loving the state’ (Zhao 2000:20). “By professing aiguo, one could express loyalty and
desire to serve the state’’, whether they supported the present conditions or idealist future
State (Hunt 1994:63). This intertwinement of State and nationalism has also led to a
passionate production of an ideology for the defense of the state and is used as an
emotive trigger to unify disparate people within the state and mobilize them to support
policies. This was further intensified by the patriotic education campaign in the early
1990s. Its aim was to make clear that the existence of strong government control over
society was capable of preventing the “Century of Humiliation” to reoccur (Xu
2001:155). This campaign was called “The Outline of the Implementation of the
Education of Patriotism” drawn up by the Department of Propaganda. (Zheng 1999:104).
The Campaign was also used as a guide for teaching nationalism. (Zhao 2005: 135). It
was mainly aimed at student and workers, reasserting China’s old grievances and
resisting current and former intrusions while gaining more political influence on the
world stage. Furthermore it stressed China’s unique national conditions, which made it,
unfit for the adoptation of Western style liberal democracy. The Party would be the only
ruler where rapid economic growth could be made possible. Pragmatic leaders claim that
foreign powers who were bullying China should also be considered as a main cause of
China’s slow economic development (Zhao 2005: 135). To incite Chinese nationalist
sentiment as expressed in aiguo, it was and continuous necessary to have enemies. The
Chinese State proved to be very aware of that fact as asserted by them ten years after the
21
Tiananmen incident. In 1990 the Chinese government furthermore incited anti-western
nationalism through the two commemorations; the 150th anniversary of the Opium War
and the May 4th movement. It was not in the commemorations itself, but what was said at
the commemorations that indicated nationalism. The May 4th movement was an antiimperialist, cultural, and political movement in early modern China (Xu 2001). China’s
political elites, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, “are increasingly constructing a victimization
narrative….This has created strong and widespread desire to “erase” (xixue) the national
humiliation….(Gries 2005:106). For example, during the Opium War commemorations
Jiang Zemin spoke to 3,000 students in the People’s Great Hall stressing that China’s
humiliation started when the Opium War was ignited by Western countries. (Xu
2001:156). Furthermore publications swiftly followed up each other in national
newspapers and magazines expressing anti-Western sentiments. Considering that the
press is heavily controlled by the State, it is to be concluded that they represent official
State opinion. Six months after these events the “Renmin Ribao on the 24th of April 1991
openly stated that the United States was China’s biggest enemy” (ibid.:156). This was a
resurfacing of a victimization narrative. This narrative was to become very important for
the formation of pragmatic nationalism in China from the 1990s.
Thus, past humiliations and current weaknesses were used as a driving force for
China’s modernizations. Nationalism has become the most effective instrument for
strengthening the CCP legitimacy as the sole ruler in China, on the claim that they only
can provide political stability that will lead to economic prosperity. Nationalism has
proved to be a very useful tool for the Chinese government to regaining popularity. At the
same time China pragmatist have been cautious to prevent Chinese people’s nationalist
22
sentiment to turn against the State; which could have the intention to demand a leadership
change. (Zhao 2005:139). These developments since the 1980s are in accordance with
Gellner’s theory and point out the structural dimension of nationalism in China as well as
the role the state plays in shaping it. His structural approach however, does not cover
popular expressions of nationalism which also plays an important role in the formation of
nationalism. This second dimension of nationalism, popular nationalism, will be
discussed next.
Popular nationalism
The formation of nationalism in China is just as much a “bottom-up” as a “top-down”
phenomenon. Popular nationalists both support and challenge the state’s claims to
legitimacy, issuing their own rival nationalist claims. In turn, the Party either suppresses
or accommodates expressions of nationalism (Gries 2004:120-122).
Popular nationalism, for the purpose of this paper, is nationalism that is expressed
by the citizens of the PRC as opposed to State controlled forms of nationalism. This
section will focus on these expressions from the 1990s to present day. I will prove that
nationalism in China is built upon the structural aspects as discussed in the previous
section but also popular expressions. Nationalism and the State. The importance of
studying nationalism in China is that the bottom-up dialogue between the state and the
people is often neglected. It is presumed that nationalism is a top-down movement, as
does Gellner. According to this view the state influences their citizens and fires them into
action playing their sentiment (Anderson 1991 [1983] and Gellner 2003 [1983]). In China
there is a dialogue occurring where citizens have significant influence on State behavior.
23
Citizens power in protest is influential to foreign policy for example, several Chinese
nationalist publications, the demonstrations after the 1999 Belgrade bombing, as well as
the anti-Japanese demonstrations in 2005. These nationalist sentiments prove that
Chinese citizens are capable of influencing the State. The government sees many of these
nationalist expressions as a threat to their role in the national and international arena, as
well as harming its economic growth. Economic growth is one of the main pillars on
which the CCP bases its legitimacy. In turn the government attempts purposely to alter
these expressions for their own gain. I will explain these developments in popular
nationalism according to the previous examples. But first it is important to understand the
historical developments of popular protest in China.
From the imperial days onward popular protest had a great influence on the rise
and collapse of power holders in China. China’s history full of rebellions and revolutions
is due to an element in its culture that has encouraged popular protest, Mandate of
Heaven. The Confucian concept of the Mandate of Heaven legitimized instantly those
able to overthrow power holders. “This pragmatic precept differed markedly from
European notions of a “divine right of kings”…one who managed to wrest the throne by
force thereby gained Confucian sanction” (Perry 2001:164). Political challengers were
able to rise to power through popular rebellion.
Although anti-traditionalist movements in the beginning of the 20th and in the end
of the 21st century disprove the idea of Confucianist traditionalism, a link continued to
exist between “mass protest and political legitimacy” (ibid.:164). Prime examples of the
survival of this connection are Sun-Yat Sen’s Three Principles of the People which
eventually led to the collapse of the Qing Dynasty, and Mao’s anti-Japanese peasant
24
nationalism leading to the communist victory in 1949. The Three Principles of the People
were a plan for a radical modernization of China. (Fairbank & Goldman 1998 [1992]
182). Mao used popular protest as a means to gain popularity among the people.
The
use of popular protest changed during the Deng Xiaoping era. After the death of Mao and
at the end of the Cold War Deng Xiaoping initiated numerous reforms. Many believed
that it would be the end of popular protest in China as Deng Xiaoping stated soon after
his rise. However popular protest, with or without state support, have continued to play
an important role in the PRC. (Perry 2001: 163-164).
The main constructors of popular expression of nationalism in present China are a
“fourth generation” of Chinese nationalists. In contrast to the generations before them
they have never themselves lived through hardship, but grew up in a relatively peaceful
time with growing wealth (Gries 2004:4). This group is mainly in their thirties and seeks
to distance themselves from the liberal ’80s. They were also influenced by the patriot
education campaign that was aimed “to recover support for the party among young
people” (Des Forges & Xu 2001: 483-485). It is this generation that is the main producer
of this renewed nationalist sentiment as expressed in publications in mainland China
since the 1990’s in television shows, movies, posters, cartoons, books and magazines
(Gries 2004:4).
One of the first important expressions of popular nationalism is the book China
Can Say No (Zhongguo keyi shuo bu), published in 1996, which sold more then two
million copies. 1 The book attacked Western cultural, political, and economic
imperialism (Xu 2001: 153). It made a clear use of the victimization narrative and used
the US as their main ‘other’, who is responsible for China’s degraded position in the
1
. For more books published in that time see, Xu 2001
25
world. They also used the victimization narrative into a force for the modernization of
China. Since the CCP believed that China economical backwardness was the main cause
of the past humiliations as expressed in the narrative. They thus called on the Chinese
people to improve its economical position on the world stage so that past humiliations
would not return (Li 1997:158). Furthermore it supported and confronted the Chinese
State with its citizen’s nationalist sentiments. At first the substance of the book helped the
State’s interest, both as a way to redirect attention from domestic discontent and as a way
to advance their foreign policy. The attention that the State media gave the book made it
possible for the authors to dominate popular nationalist discourse, challenging the States
hegemony. The authors furthermore argued that they, not the CCP represented popular
opinion (Gries 2005: 126-127). The State’s reaction to the “naysayers” was met with
“suppression and persuasion” (Xu 2001:132). The State found that China’s foreign policy
could not be criticized. Furthermore the sequel to the book, China Can Still Say No,
which received negative attention in the international media, was banned by the State.
The CCP’s response was a way to moderate extreme views and to regain control of the
nationalist discourse. Thus, a clear development is seen whereby society and the State are
in constant dialogue. The State is forced to facilitate part of the popular discourse to
maintain their legitimacy. Society and the State are in a position of mutual exploitation. A
year after the CCP, on the surface regained ideological control of the nationalist discourse
another incident occurred that once again enraged nationalist in China.
The year 1999 was potentially a problematic one for the Chinese leadership. Not
only was it the fiftieth anniversary of the Peoples Republic, but it also marked the
anniversary of other popular protests in China’s history: “the eightieth anniversary of the
26
May Fourth Movement of 1919, the fortieth anniversary of the Tibetan Revolt of 1959,
the thirtieth anniversary of the Democracy Wall movement of 1979, the tenth anniversary
of the Tiananmen uprising and its bloody June 4 suppression in 1989” (Perry 2001:166167). The Chinese government was wary of the potential of that these commemorations
held to erupt in popular protest. The most unexpected event sparked protest across China.
On the 8th of May 1999 in the skies of Belgrade an American bomber dropped
guided missiles with the intention of blowing up a Serbian arms depot. It turned out to be
the Chinese embassy, three Chinese nationals lost their lives and twenty-three others
were injured. Large-scale protests erupted after the Belgrade bombing. Chinese across the
globe spontaneously gathered to protest; at university campuses, city halls, and embassies.
Protestors carried pictures of the three “martyrs” and signs stating “Punish the war
criminals!” and “Justice must be done!” (Gries 2005: 14). In China proper
demonstrations turned violent, as protest spread throughout the country. The U.S.
Consul’s residency in Chengdu was firebombed. In Guangzhou people were
demonstrating in front of the Mc Donald’s, yelling the slogan “Kick American
Hamburgers out of China!”. (ibid. 14). In Beijing students took to the U.S. embassy in
protest. These developments resulted in the incarceration of the U.S. ambassador to
China in the Embassy compound for days (ibid.:14, 128). The citizens made demands on
the government trough these protests.
In emails and in open letter send to newspapers, people pleaded with the
government to take a tougher stand on the issues. One letter from a university student to
Premier Zhu stated; “The [Americans] know that our government’s weak stance has
created a distance between itself and the people….You are so capable…and we need
27
you….But without the ’people’s confidence [minxia],’ how can you lead China’s
economic construction” (Gries 2005:129). The Guangming Daily, received 281
condolence letters, poems emails and faxes, from people from 26 of the 31 provinces of
China. Like the letter above, they all, according to Peter Hays Gries, the wanted
“government to take a tougher stand on the bombing” and prevent China from being
insulted again. Furthermore these writings made clear that the citizens are willing to
support the government if they fulfilled the “ nationalist obligation to restore justice for
the Chinese people” (ibid.: 131). The response to the protests by the government
acknowledged that a bottom-up movement existed within the nation and was a force to be
recognized. Jiang Zemin, the president at that time, soon after the bombing also
responded to citizens’ calls. There was a need for the government to respond quickly as
to not be perceived weak in protecting Chinese sovereignty. Within hours off the
bombing Jiang Zemin radically altered the policies regarding forms of demonstrations.
Protests that were once banned were now encouraged. This change in policy attempted to
harness the State’s control of the nationalist discourse. As Perry states this was a great
opportunity for the government “to reclaim the glorious mantle of nationalism…” (Perry
2001:169).
The citizens’ responded positively to this change in policy. The CCP overtly
began to facilitate student protests. Even on national television the CCP supported protest.
They also supplied physical help: provided busses to transport students to the embassies
and consulates, and supplied official slogans to be expressed during the demonstrations.
This move by the government made it possible to keep control of popular consent.
28
Patriotic student movements have played an important role in modern Chinese
history ever since the Opium War, when the State was accused of being too soft on
imperialism. The May Fourth Movement of 1919, was an anti-imperialist political
movement, which resulted from unequal treaties signed after the end of the First World
War. The movement was started by students from various Beijing universities and
resulted in the toppling of the three officials who signed the Versailles treaty. More
importantly it gave rise to the Communist party. Students played an important role in
who would be the next leaders of China, the Nationalist Party or the Communist Party.
When the Nationalist Party urged students to go back to study for the sake of the nation,
the Communist party urged them to take the streets. Students were decisive in the
Communist win as the CCP was more successful in facilitating the students’ nationalist
sentiments.
These historical events involving popular protest made it clear to the government
that popular nationalistic student movements had the possibility to overthrow the
government. Students were also facilitators of engaging other social groups in society as
they did at the time of the Tiananmen incident (Perry 2001 168-169). These historical
notions continue to influence the Chinese States’ response to popular protest throughout
the 1990s to present day. There is a constant struggle to find a balance between
facilitating and suppressing these protests. This balance is the double-edged sword the
CCP continues to bear. The Chinese government managed these delicate situations with
extreme care. Resulting in very different responses for incidents. In regards to the
Belgrade bombing the Chinese government did not publicize Western leaders apologies
until May 11th, four days after the incident. This was and attempt of the Chinese
29
government to strengthen their popularity within its own borders. For example an article
in the People’s Daily declared the bombing “barbaric’” and intentional ‘’criminal act’’;
the article called “This is not 1899 China”:
This is 1999, not 1899. This is not…the age when people can barge
about in the world just by sending a few gunboats….It is not the age
when the Western powers plundered the Imperial Palace at will.
Destroyed the old Summer Palace, and seized Hong Kong and Macao….
China is a China that has stood up; it is a China that defeated the Japanese
fascists; it is a China that had a trail of strength and won victory over the United
States on the Korean battleground. The Chinese people are not to be bullied,
and China’s sovereignty and dignity are not to be violated. The hot blood of
people of ideas and integrity who opposed imperialism for over 150 years flows
in the veins of the people. U.S.-led NATO had better remember this (Gries
2004:17).
As this quote shows, the Chinese people viewed the bombing as one of the last forms of
aggression that has been acted out against China since the Opium War. Protest continued
across China alerting the government to instability. It was necessary to make an appeal to
citizens to end the protests. This was done by then vice-president Hu Jintao on national
television. He pleaded for a return to a calm society and, for everyone to return to daily
work. (Perry 2001). By the end of 1999 relations began to slowly improve. In October
1999, the U.S. and China reached an agreement on humanitarian payments for families of
those who died and were injured, as well as payments for damages to respective
diplomatic properties in Belgrade and China (Gries 2004).
Six years later another incident revived popular nationalist sentiment throughout
China. This time Japan was the focus of protest. Sino-Japanese relations have been
stained ever since the Japanese invasion of China in the 1920s. Anti-Japanese popular
protest seem to spark up every so often throughout Chinese history. The three main
causes of this are; visits to the Yasukuni Shrine by Japans political leaders, the printing of
30
Japanese history textbooks, and the atrocities committed at Nanking during the Second
World War. The Yasukuni Shrine is a Second World War memorial shrine, which also
commemorates convicted war criminals who executed atrocities in China. Thus, official
Japanese visits to the site are seen, by the Chinese, as honoring these horrible crimes.
Japanese history textbooks have continuously been criticized by the Chinese and even the
Japanese due to the omission of war crimes in the text. In April 2005 thousands of
Chinese protested against the publication of new Japanese history textbooks which
“protesters claim whitewashed Japan’s war time atrocities”(Zhao 2005:131). On the 2nd
of April the first popular protests started in Chengdu. Protests eventually spread to major
cities across the country. These were the largest protests to take place since the Belgrade
Bombing (Economist 2005). These protests were largely organized through email, which
was new to the CCP, and was perceived as a new threat to their position 2 . Furthermore
Internet based petitions calling for a large-scale boycott of Japanese products were
circulating on the internet. These first actions happened without the states consent, once
the state realized that mobilization was occurring over the internet and in media they
blocked various anti-Japanese websites in a bid to regain control over the public
discourse. A notice on the Website of Tsinghua University in Beijing warned students “to
refrain from protesting and spreading or believing rumors” (Kahn 2005b).
The government initially supported these protests, like the ones in 1999, as they to
were infuriated by the history books. These protest turned violent destroying Japanese
shops and restaurants leading to the pelting of the Japanese Embassy in Beijing to
protesters “breaking windows and chanting, “Kill the Japanese!” and “Come out,
Japanese pigs!” (Liu 2005:32). Even as they turned violent the CCP supported them, as
2
See Appendix A
31
the PLA took no action when the protesters began besieging the Embassy. The
demonstrations continued for three successive weekends, becoming China's most
sustained street protests since the pro-democracy uprising of 1989 (Kahn 2005c). “There
[was] a state concern, even panic, about whether this could get out of control,” (Kahn 15th
april 2005). Eventually on the 18th of April the State issued their first message, by
China’s foreign minister Li Zhaoxing that the people should stay off the streets (Kahn
2005c). Li's comments, carried on national television, amounted to the first direct call by
a top official to wind down the protests by tens of thousands of urban residents. The
official comment attempted to sway people away from independent protest: "Cadres and
the masses must believe in the party and the government's ability to properly handle all
issues linked to Sino-Japanese relations," Li was quoted as saying. "Calmly, rationally,
and legally express your own views. Do not attend marches that have not been approved.
Do not do anything that might upset social stability. In public appearances, Li refrained
from criticizing protesters and accused Japan of instigating the protests by provoking
China on issues including territorial disputes, distorted history textbooks, and visits to
Tokyo's war shrine. (Kahn 2005c). Eventually a formal meeting of the Communist Party's
propaganda department was organized. This meeting was attended by 3,500 people that
government, military, and party officials. (Kahn april 16th 2005b). This meeting was
important because it was the first public announcement made by the government
demanding a stop to the demonstrations and violence. Here again not the top leaders of
the CCP made an appeal to stop to the unrest, s they are afraid that they might be
perceived as week. As the protests became more organized it became more difficult for
32
the Chinese government “ to reach diplomatic compromise with Japan without sacrificing
its own authority.” (Yardley 2005).
Current day nationalism is shaped simultaneously by a top-down movement, state
influencing the people, and a bottom-up movement in which the citizens of China having
a strong influence on the State. This nationalistic dialogue between the state and its
citizens must be understood in its historical context. There are several key issues that
shape and remodel it throughout history. Currently the use of the victimization narrative
has a major impact on the formation of nationalism in China. This victimization narrative
is used both by the State and its citizens in the events that I described: the Belgrade
Bombing, the book China Can Say No, and the Anti-Japanese protests. These incidents
were influential in altering the States official discourse on Nationalism within China and
radicalizing its tone in international relations. In facilitating the consent the Chinese
Communist Party tried to channel their citizens anger and frustrations. However through
popular protest and writings their expressions of nationalism went beyond the State’s
intentions and goals of using nationalism as a popularity booster. During this process the
State lost absolute control of the nationalistic discourse. In an effort to regain control
again the CCP had to alter its way of expressing nationalist sentiments to still be seen as
the legitimate representatives of the people. In turn, the growing strength of popular
nationalism proves that a bottom-up movement exists in China. This is in opposition to
western forms of nationalism were there is only a bottom-up movement occurring. This
bottom-up movement is nothing new and has been part of Chinese society since the
imperial days, were leaders were capable of loosing the Mandate of Heaven. The
Mandate of Heaven would agree to the authority to a good ruler, but Heaven is also able
33
of to take away this authority and give the Mandate to someone else. Without
understanding this context and Chinese history it is impossible to understand China’s
specific form of nationalism.
It is therefore necessary to return to the theoretical discussion, which I started at
the beginning of this paper, and to reevaluate these theories with the developments just
presented in mind.
Conclusion
This article sought to explore the characteristics of nationalism in China. I thereby used
Gellner’s theory on nationalism to explain the structural influences. This theory has
proved that in the discussion of nationalism we cannot forget the role of agency. It is
necessary to study the two dimensions, structure and agency, of nationalism in China to
get a full image of the current picture of nationalism. This analysis has proved structure
and agency are highly inter-related, and they are in a constant dialogue with each other.
As my lead quote from Durkheim stated it necessary at regular intervals that
collective sentiments and collective ideas reaffirm the ideals of society. This paper has
shown that we can clearly observe two dimensions alive in China, often competing, but
also mutual influencing forces working to create unity. In China, both the state and the
population – collectively - produce nationalist sentiments and movements which “make
its unity and its personality” (Durkheim 1965: 474 - 475).
34
These actors and nationalist movements are displayed through various narratives;
ethnic nationalism, victimization narrative, victor narrative, liberal nationalism and,
pragmatic nationalism. I have shown these two forces at work in my examples of the
book China Can Say No, the Belgrade bombing, and the anti-Japanese protests of 2005.
There is also a clear distinction that exists between pragmatic nationalism, instituted from
the State and popular nationalism, inspired by citizens. A delicate balance exists for the
CCP to ensure stability; the management of nationalist narratives is a double-edged
sword. Pragmatic nationalism is then both a weapon and a shield: a tool used against
citizens in a top-down manner to protect itself. As seen in this paper of even more
influence in Chinese society is the bottom-up movements that exist in popular nationalist
sentiments. The interaction that occurs between the two are powerful indicators of change.
The change that is revealed in this interaction is the idea that a new form of nationalism
has metamorphosed into a powerful force for both the State and its citizens.
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Identity, and International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Chinese Nationalism and its International Orientations.
Political Science Quarterly 115(1): 1-33
China’s Pragmatic Nationalism: Is it Manageable? The
Washington Quarterly 29(1): 131-144.
Appendix A
Source:
http://www.shanghaidiaries.com/archives/2005/04/15/a_detailed_instruction_on_the_prot
est_against_right_wing_japanese/ (visited 25-07-2007).
‘A detailed instruction on the Protest Against Right Wing Japanese’
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And other notes about ‘warm patriotic sentiments’
The following is a translation of an email making the
rounds in Shanghai regarding the fun-filled weekend the
city has in store. The instructions include some tips that I
think we can all apply to our everyday lives, like “If you
are spotted throwing stuff at the consulate, smile at the
policeman” and “Be careful when burning the Japanese
flag and the Prime Minister’s portrait! Don’t end up
burning yourself!” That’s just common sense.
Not sure if you were planning on checking out the protests
in person or not — a little too early in the day for me —
but the organizers promise it will be “quite a view.”
Here, comrades, is everything you need to know:
“《上海地区抗议日本右翼活动的详细说明书》
A detailed instruction on the Protest Against Right Wing Japanese
时间：2005 年 4 月 16 日 9 点整（本周六）
Time: 2005-4-16 9:00am (Sat.)
地点：1 路－外滩人民英雄纪念碑集中、2 路－人民广场集中
Venue: Route 1:Monument of People’s Heroes; Route 2: the People’s Square
路线：外滩人民英雄纪念碑—> 南京路—> 人民广场—> 日本大使馆
Route: Monument of People’s Heroes→Nanjing Rd. → the People’s Square → Japanese
Consulate
（考虑到有行动不便的爱国者，我们建议在人民广场坐 925B 到虹桥开发区。）
(In consideration of those physically challenged, we suggest you to take bus 925B from
the People’s Square to Hong Qiao)
人物：有消息上海各大高校学生都会自发参与，目前各校都进入了紧张状态，领导
普遍
取消了一切出差会议活动，以防局面发生不可控制。不要试图去各个论坛查证，相
关该
天活动的帖子都被要求立即删除。如果有兴趣请自行转发周围的人获知此事并邀请
参加
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，如果不愿直接参与届时去看看热闹也好的，会是难得的景观！^_^
Participants: Some sources say that college students in Shanghai will participate
voluntarily. All schools in Shanghai are in a state of tension. School leaders canceled all
their activities to see to it that nothing goes out of control. Don’t try to find proof from
school bbs, all related posts are deleted right away. If you are interested, forward this
message to people around you and invited them to join. If you dont want to get directly
involved, just go and take a look. It will be quite a view!
活动注意事项：
Instructions:
1、记得自带干粮和饮水，不要选择日本的品牌；
1. Bring food and drinking water, don’t choose Japanese brands;
2、尽量不要带贵重物品，尽量穿运动鞋，便于跑动；
2. Don’t bring valuables, wear sports shoes in case you need move fast
3、不要携带日产相机、摄像机、手机、录音机等电子产品，以防不测；
3. Don’t bring Japanese made cameras, video cameras, cell phones, recorders, etc, just in
case
4、带好记号笔，届时签名用；
4. Bring markers for signature
5、到了使馆门口不要投掷石块、金属等硬物，建议携带番茄和鸡蛋、小泉头像、
打火
机、日本国旗等；
5. Don’t throw stones, metal or any hard stuff to the Japanese consulate. We suggest you
to bring tomatoes and eggs, lighters, Japanese national flags, and portrait of the Japanese
Prime Minister.
6、参考口号和标语：“抵制日货、抗议日本篡改历史教科书！”、“抵制日货、支持
国货”、“反对日本进入常任理事国”、“反对日本进入联合国常任理事国！拒绝日货
！还我钓鱼岛！抗议日本篡改历史教科书！”等。
Reference slogans and banners: “Boycotting Japanese products! No whitewashing the
school history textbook!”; “Boycotting Japanese products! Support domestic products!”;
“No permanent UN Security Council seat for Japan! No Japanese products! Give us back
Diaoyu Island! No glossing over school history text books!”
活动目的：
Purpose:
对日本政府长期拒不承认二战期间所犯下的滔天罪行、篡改历史教科书、强占钓鱼
岛、
妄想加入常任理事国的卑鄙行径表示最最强烈的抗议！！！
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To protest against the Japanese government for not admitting the war crimes they
commited in the 2nd World War, whitewashing school history textbooks, illegal
occupation of Diaoyu Island, and attempts to obtain permanent seat in the UN Security
Council!
最重要提示：
Important:
1、此次活动不针对任何在华日本友人、仅仅针对日本右翼势力和其支持者，所以
在活
动中请不要过激地针对友人；
1.The protest is not aimed at friendly Japanese, but again Japanese right wings.
2、警察是人民的公仆，在游行过程中，他们和我们一样也是爱国的，只是因为他
们有
他们的任务——保证活动的安全性，所以大家配合警察叔叔，特别是在使馆门口，
如果
警察叔叔看着你，就不要乱丢东西，如果没有人看着你，就丢一个鸡蛋或者一个番
茄，
万一丢完了被警察叔叔发现，就朝他笑笑；
2. The police are public servants, they are just as patriotic as us, but they have their duties
— to ensure security during the protest. Therefore, please cooperate with them, especially
in front of the Japanese consulate. If a policeman looks at you, don’t throw anything, if
not, throw an egg or a tomato. If you are spotted throwing stuff at the consulate, smile at
the policeman.
3、沿途经过日本人投资的商店、公司等，不要给予破坏性打击，因为破坏了以
后，日
本人会向中国政府索要赔偿的，所以大家届时理智一点；
3. Don’t attack Japanese shops, companies en route the protest, for the Japanese
government will claim losses with the Chinese government. Please stay calm!
4、在焚烧日本国旗和小泉头像的时候，请注意安全，不要烧到衣服变成自焚了！
4. Be careful when burning the Japanese flag and the Prime Minister’s portrait! Don’t end
up burning yourself!
5、控制好整个活动的度是最关键的，所以请各部分（学校、公司、社会团体）负
责人掌控好，上海是国际性大都市，是国家的经济命脉，请大家在整个活动中理性
参与！！！
5. It’s very important to control the degree of the protest. People in charge of the protest
from all companies schools and social groups need to control your own group. Shanghai
is an international city, and the economic heart of China, so, please participate with
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caution!!!
6、以上几点是我们能想到的，也希望大家补充，并提醒到时候参加活动的朋友
们。
6. The above mentioned are things we can think of, you can add to it and bring it up to
friends who join our protest.
如果你爱国，如果你周六有空，那就请参与到这个活动中来！
If you are patriotic and you are free on Saturday, please join the protest!
也许你的力量是渺小的，但是千万个我们就能汇聚成强大的力量！！！希望上海的
活动
能象广州和北京一样成功！也希望我们简单的活动能让日本政府认清目前的形势！
Perhaps you think you are nothing, but thousands of us can be a tremendous force!!! We
hope the protest in Shanghai will be as successful as the ones in Beijing and Guangzhou!
We also hope that the Japanese government will recognize the situation because of our
protest!
抗日的道路很漫长，但是只要我们齐心协力，胜利一定属于我们中国人！！！
The road of fighting the Japanese right wing is long. But if we bear ourselves to our
duties, victory definitely belongs to us Chinese!”
And one of the many, many SMS messages making the rounds:
“4 月 16 日，本周六，九点上海人民广场抗日游行。同志们，无论你是否参加，请
大量转发，让爱国的同胞们不错过这次游行！
April 16, this Saturday, 9:00 am, Shanghai People’s Square, Anti-Japanese protest.
Comrades, no matter if you join the protest or not, please forward this message to as
many people as possible. Don’t let those patriotic countrymen miss this protest!”
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