Supreme Court Update
by Evy M. Jarrett and Tammy G. Lavalette
In re D.S., Slip Opinion No. 2016-Ohio-7369
(Oct. 19, 2016)
Antoon v. Cleveland Clinic Found., Slip Opinion No. 2016-Ohio-7432 (October 25, 2016)
A juvenile is entitled to credit against
a term of confinement imposed by
juvenile court for days spent in confinement while waiting for disposition of the
charges. Although the case against D.S.
was transferred from juvenile court to
adult court before a plea was reached,
and the plea involved a transfer back to
juvenile to a different charge than that
indicted, the confinement was “in connection with” the charge as the phrase
was used in R.C. 2152.18(B). Although
“[a] judge enjoys a great deal of discretion in sentencing, particularly a juvenile
court judge in fashioning a rehabilitative
disposition,” the “decision whether to
credit pretrial confinement days is simply
not part of the sentence.”
R.C. 2305.113(C), the four-year statute
of repose relative to medical malpractice
actions, “is a true statute of repose that
applies to both vested and non-vested
claims.” The Court found that applying
the statute to vested medical malpractice
claims did not violate the “right-toremedy clause of the Ohio Constitution. In so holding, the Court rejected
arguments that filing, then dismissing, a
claim will suspend the statute of repose
by “commencing” the suit as of the date
of the original filing. The Court further
rejected the ruling of the Eighth District
that, because the claim was vested
(inasmuch as the alleged damage had
been discovered), the timeliness of the
filing depended only on the “statute of
limitations and any tolling provisions.”
In rejecting the Eighth District’s ruling,
the Court clarified Ruther v. Kaiser.1 The
Court expressly did not decide whether
Ohio’s saving statute or the federal tolling statute might allow actions to survive
beyond the expiration of the statute of
repose.
State ex rel. Allen Cty. Children Servs. Bd. v.
Mercer Cty. Common Pleas Court, Probate
Div., Slip Opinion No. 2016-Ohio-7382 (Oct.
20, 2016)
A juvenile court’s exclusive original
jurisdiction over abused, neglected or
dependent children converts to “continuing” jurisdiction after the issuance
of a dispositional order pursuant to R.C.
2151.353(A). The “dispositional order”
terminating exclusive jurisdiction and
allowing continuing jurisdiction may be
a temporary custody order. Ohio vests
“original and exclusive jurisdiction over
adoption proceedings” in the probate
court. Further, nothing in Ohio’s statutes precludes a probate court from exercising jurisdiction in adoption proceedings regarding a child who is the subject
of custody proceedings in juvenile court.
Thus, the Court held a probate court
may exercise its original jurisdiction
regarding adoption proceedings over a
child who is the subject of a temporary
custody order issued by a juvenile court.
10 – December 2016
Foley v. Univ. of Dayton, Slip Opinion No.
2016-Ohio-7591 (November 3, 2016)
The Southern District of Ohio certified
questions of law to the Court regarding
the applicable statute of limitations and
standards of privilege and immunity
relative to the tort of “negligent misidentification.” The plaintiffs in the district
court case were charged with burglary
after they knocked on the door of a
townhouse owned by the University of
Dayton, “angering the occupant.” The
charges were eventually dropped, and the
plaintiffs subsequently asserted claims
1
134 Ohio St.3d 408 (2012)
against the occupant and his roommate
for negligence.
The Court found that Ohio does not
recognize the tort of negligent misidentification, and thus the certified questions
were moot. In so finding, the Court
advised that the Sixth District’s contrary
1995 decision in Wigfall v. Soc. Natl.
Bank2 was erroneous. The Court found
that decisions of other districts acknowledging the tort were similarly misguided.
The Court stated that public policy “encourages all citizens to report crime and
to come forward…during the investigation of those crimes…” and “the tort of
negligent misidentification would have a
chilling effect on that public policy.”
State v. Williams, Slip Opinion No. 2016Ohio-7658 (Nov. 10, 2016)
Williams involves two thorny problems
in criminal law: the distinction between
void and voidable judgments, and the
question of when two offenses must
merge for purposes of sentencing. Williams holds that res judicata will not bar
a request for resentencing some five years
after a direct appeal was decided, when
the trial court found that the offenses
should have merged but nevertheless
imposed sentences for each offense. Williams distinguishes the case from those
in which the trial court finds that the
offenses should not merge, or where the
court makes no finding, both of which
present potentially voidable errors.
When the court finds the offenses to
merge, the imposition of multiple sentences (even to be served concurrently)
is contrary to law so that the sentence is
void.
2
107 Ohio App. 667 (6th Dist. 1995)