Sentencing Advisory Council –
Statutory Minimum Sentences
for Gross Violence
To: Sentencing Advisory Council
30 June 2011
Queries regarding this submission should be directed to:
Contact person
Brigid Foster
Ph
(03) 9607 974
Email
[email protected]
© Law Institute of Victoria (LIV).
No part of this submission may be reproduced for any purpose without the prior permission of the LIV.
The LIV makes most of its submissions available on its website at www.liv.asn.au
Table of Contents
Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 3
Terms of Reference .................................................................................................................... 3
How the factors making the offence of gross violence to which the minimum sentence is
applicable should best be satisfied: ........................................................................................... 4
LIV recommendations ............................................................................................................... 5
1.
The LIV submits that ―gross violence‖ offence should be framed as a discrete offence ..............5
2. The LIV submits that a new offence of ―gross violence‖ must be defined to preclude
first time offenders .............................................................................................................................................5
3. The LIV strongly submits that mandatory sentencing regimes cannot and should not
apply to juvenile offenders. ...............................................................................................................................6
4.
The LIV submits that the proposal should only apply to serious injury charges where
intention and not recklessness is the requisite state of mind. .............................................................................7
5.
The LIV submits that the offence should contain an element of ―severe injury‖ ..........................7
6. The LIV submits that the offence of gross violence should contain at least two of the
following elements ..............................................................................................................................................8
How the exceptional circumstances in which a court may impose a non-parole period of
less than the statutory minimum should best be specified ....................................................... 8
7. The LIV submits that the offence of ―gross violence‖ should be accompanied by a nonexhaustive ―special circumstances‖ provision. ...............................................................................................9
The likely effects of the recommendations and options put forward by the Council on
sentencing levels for the relevant offences and on the number of persons serving
custodial and non-custodial sentences; ................................................................................... 10
Examples of where the proposal would lead to the imposition of a disproportionate
sentence ................................................................................................................................... 10
Example 1: Mr Brown ..................................................................................................................................... 10
Example 2: Child X ......................................................................................................................................... 11
Example 3: Miss Jones .................................................................................................................................... 11
Example 4: Mr Smith ...................................................................................................................................... 11
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Introduction
The Law Institute of Victoria (LIV) welcomes the opportunity to participate in the consultation on
the introduction of statutory minimum sentences (mandatory sentences) for offences of intentionally
causing serious injury and recklessly causing serious injury, when either offence is committed with
gross violence.
We note that the Terms of Reference do not allow for an assessment or advice on the merits of the
proposal.
Despite this, the LIV must make it clear that we object in the strongest terms to the Governments
proposal (―the proposal‖) to introduce mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment.
Mandatory sentencing does not fulfil its stated aims; mandatory penalties do not provide a significant
marginal deterrent effect, reduce crime rates, nor provide consistency in sentencing1. By their very
nature, mandatory sentencing regimes and the ―one size fits all‖ approach to sentencing leads to
unjust outcomes, as unequal offenders are sentenced to the same minimum sentence of
imprisonment, or more.
We believe that independent, highly qualified, professional and experienced judicial officers are best
placed to impose the most appropriate sentence, taking into account all the circumstances of the
case.
We attach our submission to the Attorney General, outlining in detail our opposition to mandatory
sentencing, of which statutory minimum sentences are a form. That submission is to be read in
conjunction to this one.
Despite our strongest opposition to this proposal, we address the Terms of Reference below.
This submission is in no way to be read as acquiescence to the proposal, or endorsement of
the law, should it be introduced.
Terms of Reference
The Terms of Reference are as follows:
The Government has committed to introduce a statutory minimum sentence for the offences of
intentionally or recklessly causing serious injury when committed with gross violence, in the
following terms:
1

A four year minimum sentence (ie, non-parole period) will apply to adult offenders, and a
two year minimum detention sentence will apply to juvenile offenders aged 16 or 17

The minimum sentence is to apply save in tightly defined exceptional circumstances, such
that the circumstances of the case are so unusual that the court is entitled to assume
Parliament could not have intended those circumstances to be covered

The minimum sentence is to apply where the offence involves gross violence, such as where
the offender:

Plans in advance to engage in an attack intending to cause serious injury;

Engages in a violent attack as part of a gang of three or more persons;
See LIV Submission to the Attorney General Statutory minimum sentences June 2011 (attached)
Page 3

Plans in advance to carry and use a weapon in an attack and then deliberately or recklessly
uses the weapon to inflict serious injury; or

Continues to violently attack the victim after the victim is incapacitated.
The Terms of Reference request the Sentencing Advisory Council‘s (SAC) advice on the following
matters:
(a) How the exceptional circumstances in which a court may impose a non-parole period of
less than the statutory minimum should best be specified;
(b) How the factors making the offence of gross violence to which the minimum sentence is
applicable should best be satisfied;
(c) The likely effects of the recommendations and options put forward by the Council on
sentencing levels for the relevant offences and on the number of persons serving
custodial and non-custodial sentences;
(d) Any other matters the council considers relevant.
How the factors making the offence of gross
violence to which the minimum sentence is
applicable should best be satisfied:
Mandatory sentences lead to harsh and unjust outcomes, where the judicial officer cannot take into
account the individual circumstances of the offender or the offence to mitigate penalty below the
mandatory minimum.
The experience in other jurisdictions with mandatory sentencing regimes shows that, in many cases, a
mandatory sentence can be grossly disproportionate to the gravity of the offence in the particular
case2.
Even if one takes the example of murder, generally considered the most serious offence, it is possible
to conceive of examples of where the offender‘s level of blameworthiness is such that a lengthy term
of imprisonment would be considered an inappropriate sentence.
An elderly, chronically ill person constantly begs her elderly husband of 50 years to take her life, as an act of love,
because she is incapable of doing it herself. Finally, under a great deal of constant pressure and great sympathy,
her partner agrees and administers a fatal overdose of a drug.
This example is unusual, but the offence still constitutes murder, and a very lengthy mandatory term
of imprisonment in these circumstances would normally be considered unjust.
There are several examples where the government‘s proposal would lead to severe injustice. We have
attached some examples to the end of this submission.
Mandatory sentencing has an intuitive appeal as a simple method of dealing with serious crime, but
has serious, unintended and long-term consequences, especially for juvenile offenders. Stigmatisation,
loss of long term employment possibilities, and the severing of pro-social and family ties through
incarceration can all lead to increased recidivism3.
Further, mandatory sentencing is an extremely costly method for reducing crime (which is a small
effect, at best, of mandatory sentencing) as more matters are contested.
A Hoel & K Gelb Sentencing Matters: Mandatory Sentencing, Sentencing Advisory Council August 2008, p 13
K Richards ‗What makes juvenile offenders different from adult offenders?‘ Trends & Issues in crime and criminal justice Australian Institute
of Criminology, Feb 2011
2
3
Page 4
The potential injustices of mandatory sentences can be ameliorated to a small extent when the
legislation pertaining to them is very carefully drafted, and designed to capture only the most culpable
and blameworthy offenders.
The recommendations below are therefore designed to capture only the most serious range of
offending, and the most blameworthy offenders.
LIV recommendations
1.
The LIV submits that “gross violence” offence should be
framed as a discrete offence
The motivation to plead guilty to charges disappears under mandatory sentencing regimes.
Mandatory sentencing therefore leads to more matters being contested; with nothing to lose, it makes
sense for an offender to ―roll the dice‖ and defend a matter in the hope that they are acquitted of the
charges.
The economic and social costs of running a criminal trial are tremendous.
Economic costs include wages for judicial officer and court staff, jury costs and lost productivity,
courtroom and capital costs, Office of Public Prosecution costs for both counsel and instructing
solicitor, police costs for the Informant to prepare a brief of evidence and organise witnesses to
attend court for both a contested committal hearing and the trial itself, witness lost productivity, and
the costs of counsel and instructing solicitor for the defence – in many cases publicly funded through
Victoria Legal Aid.
The social cost of contested trials on victims of crime should also not be understated. Victims of
crime are more likely to undergo the rigours of cross-examination, as alleged offenders contest
charges in an effort to avoid the mandatory sentence.
By framing the offence of ―gross violence‖ as a new and discrete offence, some of these issues can
be ameliorated. Plea-bargaining opportunities are preserved, so the number of contested trials should
not increase to the same extent.
If ―gross violence‖ was framed as a discrete offence, the Office of Public Prosecutions (OPP) could
still proceed with a charge of Intentionally Causing Serious Injury with Gross Violence in the most
serious matters, where the lengthy mandatory sentence would not, ultimately, be a disproportionate
sentence.
2.
The LIV submits that a new offence of “gross violence” must be defined to
preclude first time offenders
Empirical studies have shown that mandatory penalties have little or no deterrent effect4. Imposing
lengthy terms of imprisonment or detention on first time offenders, who may not offend again, is
therefore an extremely unjust and disproportionate response if deterrence is the purpose of such
mandatory sentencing.
Further, if punishment of the offender (in the absence of any deterrent effect) is the purpose of the
proposal, then the LIV submits that the current discretionary sentencing is sufficient, in that it allows
the judicial officer to impose lengthy terms of detention or imprisonment where appropriate
considering the gravity of the offence and the circumstances of the offender. Therefore, any
mandatory sentence over and above what would otherwise be imposed would be disproportionate to
the gravity of the offence.
4
A Hoel & K Gelb Sentencing Matters: Mandatory Sentencing, Sentencing Advisory Council August 2008, p 13
Page 5
If the purpose of mandatory sentencing is to prevent crime through the incapacitation of the
offender, then first time offenders must be precluded. The prediction of risk of future offending is an
extremely inexact science, especially where there are no prior convictions to consider5. Even in
discretionary sentencing regimes, there is a great risk of ―false positives‖ – ie- the incapacitation of
those offenders who would otherwise not have reoffended, where incapacitation is the purpose of
sentencing.
3.
The LIV strongly submits that mandatory sentencing
regimes cannot and should not apply to juvenile offenders.
Juvenile offending differs from adult offending in a number of ways. While juveniles commit crime
disproportionately6, they also mostly ―grow out‖ of offending behaviour and into law-abiding citizens
as they mature7. They are also uniquely capable of being rehabilitated, and this is recognised in
matters to be taken into account sentencing, in s362 Children, Youth and Families Act 2005, reflected in
R v Mills8 where Batt JA accepted the following submissions as correct:
―i. Youth of an offender, particularly a first offender, should be a primary consideration for a sentencing court
where that matter properly arises.
ii. In the case of a youthful offender rehabilitation is usually far more important than general deterrence. This is
because punishment may in fact lead to further offending. Thus, for example, individualised treatment focussing
on rehabilitation is to be preferred. (Rehabilitation benefits the community as well as the offender.)
iii. A youthful offender is not to be sent to an adult prison if such a disposition can be avoided, especially if he is
beginning to appreciate the effect of his past criminality. The benchmark for what is serious as justifying adult
imprisonment may be quite high in the case of a youthful offender; and, where the offender has not previously
9
been incarcerated, a shorter period of imprisonment may be justified .
The mandatory detention of juvenile offenders may ―interrupt‖ the normal offending trajectory and
redirect juveniles away from reintegration and rehabilitation, and back into a life of criminality.
Mandatory sentencing may in fact reinforce criminality, which can lead to greater crime rates in the
long term. Imprisonment and detention have been shown to be criminogenic10.
Mandatory sentencing also contravenes the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CROC), to which
Australia is a party.
The CROC requires that in all actions concerning children (every person under the age of 18, Article
1), courts must have the best interest of the child as a primary consideration (Article 3), and that
sentences imposed must be proportionate to the circumstances of the offence (Article 40(4)), and be
subject to appeal (Article 40(2)(v)). By their very nature, mandatory penalties are not appealable on
the grounds of being manifestly excessive; therefore, mandatory sentences of juvenile detention or
imprisonment contravene the CROC by way of disproportionality and inability to be appealed.
Article 37(b) states:
―No child shall be deprived of his or her liberty unlawfully or arbitrarily. The arrest, detention or imprisonment
of a child shall be in conformity with the law and shall be used only as a measure of last resort for the shortest
appropriate period of time‖
In our view, this article is contravened if a juvenile is detained after a first conviction, unless such
detention is necessary for reasons of public safety. This view is consistent with the views of the UN
Committee on the Rights of the Child11.
Ibid, p 14
K Richards ‗What makes juvenile offenders different from adult offenders?‘ Trends & Issues in crime and criminal justice Australian Institute
of Criminology, Feb 2011
7 Ibid, p 2
8 [1998] 4 VR 235
9 Ibid, at 241.
10 D Ritchie Does Imprisonment Deter? A review of the evidence Sentencing Advisory Council April 2011, p19
11 Para 71, General Comment No 10 (2007) Children’s Rights in Juvenile Justice, CRC/C/GC/10, 25 April 2007
5
6
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4.
The LIV submits that the proposal should only apply to
serious injury charges where intention and not
recklessness is the requisite state of mind.
To avoid the potential injustice (disproportionate sentence) that mandatory sentencing poses, only
the most culpable and blameworthy offenders, and the gravest type of offending, should be captured.
The LIV submits that awareness that the acts committed would probably result in the complainant
being seriously injured (recklessness) is not a sufficient threshold of blameworthiness to justify the
imposition of a mandatory sentence.
The lesser level of blameworthiness constituted by recklessness is reflected in both the lower
maximum penalty for an offence of Recklessly Causing Serious Injury (RCSI) (15 years
imprisonment12) compared to Intentionally Causing Serious Injury (ICSI) (20 years imprisonment13),
and the fact that charges of RCSI can currently be heard summarily in the Magistrates‘ Court14. It is
inconceivable that an offence where an offender intends to cause a serious injury should carry the
same mandatory minimum as an offence with the lesser mental element of recklessness.
Therefore, only charges of gross violence where the offender causes Serious Injury Intentionally
should, if the proposal is introduced, attract a mandatory minimum sentence.
5.
The LIV submits that the offence should contain an
element of “severe injury”
Intention and the offender‘s level of culpability should not be the only factor taken into
consideration when drafting the offence of ―gross violence‖.
In order to capture only the gravest offending and the most culpable offenders, the consequences of
the offender‘s actions should also be taken into account.
For example, if a person intends to seriously harm another person, but only manages to slightly graze
that person (whether through good luck or bad management), then the gravity of the offence is
lessened.
The LIV therefore submits that the offence of ―gross violence‖ should include a consequential
provision, framed in similar terms to s134AB(37) Accident Compensation Act 1985, where ―serious
injury‖ is defined as:
serious injury means—
(a)
permanent serious impairment or loss of a body function; or
(b)
permanent serious disfigurement; or
(c)
permanent severe mental or permanent severe behavioural disturbance or disorder; or
(d)
loss of a foetus.
The LIV further submits that the injury provision should be framed as ―severe injury‖ so as to avoid
confusion with the current common law relating to ―serious injury‖.
s17 Crimes Act 1958
s16 Crimes Act 1958
14 Schedule 2, Criminal Procedure Act 2009
12
13
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6.
The LIV submits that the offence of gross violence should
contain at least two of the following elements
In order to ensure that only the most serious offending is captured by the mandatory sentence, the
LIV submits that the offence of ―gross violence‖ should be framed as an exhaustive list, containing
the factors proposed in the Terms of Reference:
Gross violence means any offence where severe injury is caused, and was committed in circumstances where the
offender:
(a)
Plans in advance to engage in an attack intending to cause serious injury;
(b) Engages in a violent attack as part of a gang of three or more persons;
(c)
Plans in advance to carry and use a weapon in an attack and then deliberately uses the weapon to inflict
serious injury;
(d) Continues to violently attack the victim after the victim is incapacitated.
At least two of the factors above must be included for an offence to constitute ―gross violence‖.
We submit that ―incapacitated‖ should be defined as loss of consciousness, or inability to remove
themselves from the situation.
The LIV further submits that the ―planning‖ must not be immediate or spur of the moment, and the
plan must be to commit the serious injury, not just to commit an offence.
The LIV would also recommend removal of the word ―gang‖, which most commonly pertains to
groups of children or youth. Such a term pre-supposes that this proposal is designed to target
youthful offending.
How the exceptional circumstances in which a
court may impose a non-parole period of less
than the statutory minimum should best be
specified
In the case of Corbiac v Liddy15, Windeyer J said:
―The whole history of criminal justice has shewn that severity of punishment begets the need of a capacity for
mercy. The more strict a rule is made, the more serious become the consequences of breaking it, the less likely it
may be that Parliament would intend to close all avenues of exception. Especially when penalties are made rigid,
not to be reduced or mitigated, it might seem improbable that Parliament would not retain a means of escaping
the imposition of a penalty which must follow upon conviction, that it would abolish it, not directly but by a side
wind. This is not because mercy, in Portia's sense, should season justice. It is that a capacity in special circumstances to
avoid the rigidity of inexorable law is of the very essence of justice.‖
Exceptional circumstances provisions allow a court to take into account those factors, which lessen
the culpability of the offender or the gravity of the offence, thereby allowing the judicial officer to
impose a just sentence in all the circumstances.
In 1999, an exceptional circumstances provision was introduced into the now notorious Northern
Territory, ―three strikes‖ property crime law, after a public outcry about the harshness of the law.
Those laws were ultimately repealed in 200116
(1969) 119 CLR 257 at 269.
Australian Human Rights Commission Commission welcomes repeal of mandatory sentencing laws in NT 19 October 2001
http://www.hreoc.gov.au/about/media/media_releases/2001/01_65.html
15
16
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The common law in relation to the definition of ―exceptional circumstances‖ is prolific and
ambiguous, and for this reason, the LIV submits that the offence of ―gross violence‖ should be
accompanied by a ―special circumstances‖ provision.
The LIV submits that the offence of “gross violence”
should be accompanied by a non-exhaustive “special
circumstances” provision.
7.
It has long been recognised in the common law, that mental illness or impaired mental functioning
(not amounting to mental insanity) can reduce the offenders culpability, reduce the effect of general
or specific deterrence as a sentencing consideration, and make the effect of a sentence of
imprisonment weigh more heavily on an offender.
The Court of Appeal in the case of R v Verdins (2007) 16 VR 269 at 276 restated the principles of R v
Tsiaras17 as follows:
―Impaired mental functioning, whether temporary or permanent ("the condition"), is relevant to sentencing in at least
the following six ways:

The condition may reduce the moral culpability of the offending conduct, as distinct from the offender‘s legal
responsibility. Where that is so, the condition affects the punishment that is just in all the circumstances; and
denunciation is less likely to be a relevant sentencing objective.

The condition may have a bearing on the kind of sentence that is imposed and the conditions in which it should
be served.

Whether general deterrence should be moderated or eliminated as a sentencing consideration depends upon the
nature and severity of the symptoms exhibited by the offender, and the effect of the condition on the mental
capacity of the offender, whether at the time of the offending or at the date of sentence or both.

Whether specific deterrence should be moderated or eliminated as a sentencing consideration likewise depends
upon the nature and severity of the symptoms of the condition as exhibited by the offender, and the effect of the
condition on the mental capacity of the offender, whether at the time of the offending or at the date of the
sentence or both.

The existence of the condition at the date of sentencing (or its foreseeable recurrence) may mean that a given
sentence will weigh more heavily on the offender than it would on a person in normal health.

Where there is a serious risk of imprisonment having a significant adverse effect on the offender‘s mental health,
this will be a factor tending to mitigate punishment.
The LIV forcefully submits that the ―special circumstances‖ provision accompanying the ―gross
violence‖ provision, if introduced, must include mental illness or impairment, as a reflection of the
well understood common law position.
The ―special circumstances‖ provision should also include where an offender has taken an oath of
undertaking to assist the Crown, or has assisted the police in their investigation. The absence of these
―special circumstances‖ provisions would remove the motivation for an offender to assist police.
This would have particular relevance to many complex drug cases, where investigations often rely
upon the co-operation of police informers to secure a conviction.
Likewise, any evidence of substantial rehabilitation since the commission of the offence should also
be taken into account in the ―special circumstances‖ provision, thereby preserving the motivation for
an offender to address the underlying causes of their offending, a factor which is ultimately in the
communities best interests.
17
[1996]1 VR 398
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The LIV submits that the ―special circumstances‖ provision should be non-restrictive, to allow the
court to take into account any other factors, either singly or in combination, that reduce an offender‘s
culpability and make the imposition of a mandatory sentence unjust.
The likely effects of the recommendations and
options put forward by the Council on sentencing
levels for the relevant offences and on the
number of persons serving custodial and noncustodial sentences;
Charges of RCSI are currently capable of being tried summarily18. However, under the government‘s
proposal, the new offence of ―gross violence‖ will be incapable of being heard in the Magistrates‘
Court due to jurisdictional limits19.
This means that all charges of the new offence will need to be tried in the County Court, the court
that suffers most from issues of backlogs and court delay.
The economic and social costs of this proposal are set out clearly in our submission to the Attorney
General Mandatory Minimum Sentences (attached).
Examples of where the proposal would lead to
the imposition of a disproportionate sentence
Example 1: Mr Brown20
Mr Brown is a 69-year-old man with no prior convictions. He is very frail and is in the early stages of
dementia.
He lives in a unit complex in Melbourne, where he spends most of his time attending to the garden
outside his unit. English is not his first language.
The victim in the matter is a 25-year-old man with an extensive criminal history and an addiction to
drugs. His girlfriend lives in a flat near to Mr Brown, and he spends a lot of time around the flats.
According to Mr Brown, he also deals drugs around the area and causes trouble, which the police
concede.
Mr Brown says that he loaned some money to the victim some time prior to the incident, and despite
numerous requests, the victim had refused to pay him back.
On the day in question, Mr Brown was pruning his roses with a box cutter when he saw the victim
sitting in his car. He asked the victim whether he had the money to repay him, and an argument
ensued. During the argument, the victim struck out at the accused with the box-cutter.
The cut was quite deep and bled a lot. During the altercation, the victim knocked Mr Brown to the
ground. Mr Brown suffered injuries to his arms, hands and face, and was transported to hospital by
ambulance.
Mr Brown was been charged with RCSI and ICSI in relation to this incident.
Schedule 2, Criminal Procedure Act 2009
s113 Sentencing Act 1991
20 Not Mr Brown‘s real name, as the case is currently proceeding through the courts.
18
19
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It is likely that Mr Brown will plead to one count of RCSI.
In all the circumstances, it is unlikely that Mr Brown would receive an immediate custodial term
under the current discretionary system. He is elderly and infirm and suffering from the early stages of
dementia, has no prior convictions, and will plead guilty at an early opportunity. English is not his
first language, and prison would be particularly hard on him. However under the government‘s
proposal, and in the absence of a widely drafted ―special circumstances‖ provision, Mr Brown would
face four years imprisonment.
Example 2: Child X
Miss X is 16 years old and attends a school in Melbourne. She has no prior convictions, comes from
a supportive family, and gets good results at school.
Miss X has recently been bullied by Miss Y. That bullying has been particularly vicious and relentless
in nature, and has involved threats, harassment, and the public humiliation of Miss X. It has taken
place at school, at the local shopping centre, and via Facebook. As a result, Miss X has been suffering
from depression.
On the day of the offence, Miss X saw Miss Y in the local park. She picked up a rock and hid behind
a tree to avoid taunts. Miss Y approached her and taunted her and Miss X snapped and threw the
rock at Miss Y, hitting her in the mouth. Miss Y suffered from broken teeth and a cut lip.
Under the government‘s proposal, Miss X would be sentenced to two years detention in a Youth
Justice Centre, regardless of her previous good character, the fact that she suffers from depression,
and the severe provocation of the circumstances of the offending.
Example 3: Miss Jones
Miss Jones is 18 years old. She has no prior convictions. Miss Jones was sexually abused from the age
of eight by her stepfather.
On the day in question, Miss Jones became involved in a domestic argument with her stepfather,
during which he taunted her in relation to the sexual abuse. Despite not being in any immediate
danger from him, nor needing to defend herself in any way, Miss Jones picked up a knife from the
kitchen, walked into the next room and stabbed the victim in the arm, causing a serious but not lifethreatening injury.
Under the government‘s proposal, and notwithstanding the mitigating circumstances and history of
sexual abuse, Miss X would be sentenced to a mandatory minimum of four years imprisonment.
Example 4: Mr Smith
This is an example of a case that resolved upon a sentence indication, some 10 years ago. This case is
included to illustrate that mandatory minimum sentences, if introduced, will exacerbate the issue of
court delay. This case would proceed to trial, under the government‘s proposal.
Mr Smith was a 19-year-old man with prior convictions for drug related offending, stemming from a
horrible background of prolonged sexual abuse, described by his caseworker as ―the worst I have
seen in 15 years‖.
He and a co-accused approached a man in the city and demanded his mobile phone. The co-accused
was carrying a carving knife, and when the man refused to hand over the phone, the co-accused
stabbed him.
Mr Smith offered to plead guilty to a charge of RCSI, put on the basis that the stabbing went beyond
what the prior agreement had involved.
Page 11
The Crown refused to accept the plea, but the case ultimately resolved when the Judge indicated that
Mr Smith would be sent to YTC in the event of a plea.
Mr Smith did so and was sent to YTC for 18 months.
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