WWW.IPPR.ORG
ExploringtheRootsof
BNPSupport
Anipprbriefingpaper
April2010
©ippr2010
InstituteforPublicPolicyResearch
Challengingideas– Changingpolicy
2
ippr|ExploringtheRootsofBNPSupport
Summary
TheBritishNationalParty(BNP)frequentlysuggeststhatitattractssupportbecauseit
istheonlypartytotakeintoaccountcommunities’‘real’experiencesofimmigration.
ipprhasexploredwhetherornotthisisthecasebylookingattherootsofBNPsupport
across149localauthorities.Weconductedregression-basedanalysistoseewhetheror
nothighlevelsofimmigrationdoraisecommunities’supportfortheBNP,orifother
variables–suchaspoliticaldisengagement–areimportant.
Ourfindingssuggestthatareasthathavehigherlevelsofrecentimmigrationthan
othersarenotmorelikelytovotefortheBNP.Infact,themoreimmigrationanareahas
experienced,theloweritssupportforthefarright.Itseemsthatdirectcontactwith
migrantsdissuadespeoplefromsupportingtheBNP.Forexample,ofthe10local
authoritiesinwhichtheBNPgainedmostsupportinthe2009Europeanelections,nine
hadlowerthanaverageimmigration(withBarkingandDagenhamtheonlyanomaly).
Rather,theevidencepointstopoliticalandsocio-economicexclusionasdriversofBNP
support.Inparticular,areaswithlowaveragelevelsofqualifications(whichcanmean
peoplestruggleintoday’sflexible,knowledge-basedeconomy),lowlevelsofsocial
cohesion,andlowlevelsofvoterturnout(indicatingpoliticaldisenchantment)arethe
onesthatshowmoreBNPsupport.
Wethereforeurgemainstreampoliticianstostronglyresistthenotionthatpeoplehave
beendrivenintothearmsoftheBNPbytheharmimmigrationiscausingtotheir
communities.Instead,theymustfocusonbuildingstrongcommunitiesandstrong
educationsystems,andonrebuildingtrustandconfidenceindemocraticpolitics,so
thatmarginalisedpeopledonotfeelingsodisconnected.Thisshouldenablethemto
bothbetterservetheinterestsofthesecommunities,andundercutsupportfortheBNP.
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Introduction
The2010generalandlocalelectionslooklikelytobememorableforawholehostof
reasons,including–dismally–thepossibilitythattheBritishNationalPartyBNPwillgainits
firsteverMemberofParliament.Thoughthisremainsadistant1 possibility,itdoesseem
feasiblethattheBNPcouldtakeBarkingandDagenhamCouncil,whereitisalreadythe
secondlargestparty,holding12seats.Nationally,too,itcontinuestogaininstrength.This
yearwillseethemfieldtheirlargestevernumberofcandidates.
ThisprospectisdamagingforBritishpoliticsandsociety;whiletheBNP’sleaderNickGriffin
hasdonewhathecantotrytomakethepartylookrespectable,aquickreviewofitspolicies
showitremainsnothingofthesort.Aflagshippolicyoncrime?Everyhouseholdtohavea
gun2.Itsapproachtointernationaldevelopment?Letthemsortitoutforthemselves,it’sgot
nothingtodowithus3.
Whilethesepoliciesmayattractcontemptandridiculeinmanyquarters,thisdoesnotmean
thatthoseopposedtotheBNP’sviewscanbecomplacent.Tostopthepartyfromgaining
strongerfootholdsinourpoliticalinstitutionsitisvitaltoexplorewhytheyaregaining
support.Wecan’tcountertheparty,orproposewhatcouldbedonetomeettheneedsof
thisgroupofvoters,withoutunderstandingwhatitisabouttheBNPthatleadspeopleto
voteforit.Thesevotersevidentlyfeelthat,atpresent,themajorpoliticalpartiesdonot
representthem.
AsktheBNPwhypeoplesupportthemandtheywillpointtooneissueinparticular–
immigration.‘Opposingmassimmigration’isthepolicytheygivemostprominenceto4,and
‘ahalttotheimmigrationinvasion’isoneoftheirthreemainmanifestocommitments
(alongsidegettingoutofAfghanistanand‘endingtheglobalwarmingconspiracy’).Indeed,
intheBNP’sview,‘unrestricted,uncontrolledimmigrationisleadingtohighercrimerates,
demandformorehousing,severeextrastrainontheenvironment,trafficcongestion,longer
hospitalwaitinglists,lowereducationalstandards,higherincometaxes,lowerwages,higher
unemployment,lossofBritishidentity,abreakdownincommunityspirit,morerestrictive
policing,highercounciltaxes,ashortageofcouncilhomes,higherlevelsofstressand
unhappinessandamoreatomisedsociety’5.
Sowhy,ifimmigration’seffectsareasproblematicasallthis,dopoliciesnotalreadyreflect
thegreatharmitcauses?Whatpossiblereasoncouldtherebefornotclampingdownhard?
Accordingtotheparty,theanswerliesinthedisconnectbetweenthe‘liberalelite’,whohave
imposedthesepoliciesonthecountryand‘ordinary’Britishcommunities6 withlived
experienceofimmigration.NickGriffinarguesthatinmanyworkingandlowermiddleclass
areas,immigration‘bringsinsomanydifferentpeoples…thattheytotallyswampthe
existingpeople...destroyingcommunities’7.Asaresult,hesays,the‘native’populationvote
fortheBNP.Hesuggeststhe‘politicalelite’continuetoturnablindeyebecauseitdoesn’t
affecttheirownlivesandsocialcircles8.
Butisheright?IsgrowingsupportfortheBNPlinkedtoincreasedimmigrationandthe
impactsthishasonthecommunitiesimmigrantsmoveto?Isimmigrationdrivingpeopleinto
1.Forexample,Labouriscurrently1:8towinBarking(accordingtoLadbrokes),withtheBNPtrailingat5:1.See
http://sports.ladbrokes.com/en-gb/Politics/2010-UK-General-ElectionPolitics/2010-UK-General-Electiont110000405?dispSortId=205
2.http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/BNP_uk_manifesto.pdf
3.http://bnp.org.uk/policies/foreign-affairs/
4.Forexample,thefirststoryontheirwebsite(correctwhencheckedonApril8)isheaded‘Immigration–BNPistheonlyparty
voterscantrust.’
5.http://bnp.org.uk/policies/immigration/
6.www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2009/jun/07/european-elections-manchester-liverpool
7.www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/transcript-of-ithe-iosi-interview-with-nick-griffin-1704933.html
8.www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/transcript-of-ithe-iosi-interview-with-nick-griffin-1704933.html
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thearmsoftheBNP?Oraretherealternativeexplanations–particularlysocio-economicand
politicalexclusion?
Someleadingpoliticiansstronglybackthisalternativeexplanation.Forexample,John
Denham,SecretaryofStateforCommunitiesandLocalGovernment,hasstressedhisbelief
thatmostofthepeoplewhovotedfortheBNPinthe2009EUelectionsdidsonotbecause
ofimmigrationorrace,butbecausetheyfeltignoredandexcluded.Denhamsaidmainstream
politicianshave‘gottomakeitveryclearthatwewanttohearwhatthosevotersare
saying’9.NickClegg,leaderoftheLiberalDemocrats,hasmadesimilarpoints:‘Weshould
notdismissthereasonswhypeoplehavevotedfortheBNP–theanger,thefrustration,the
senseofalienation,thesenseofpowerlessness.Wemustlistentothatandmustreactto
that10.’
Wherepeopleseefewprospectsforthemselvesandtheirchildrenandwhentheybelieve
thattheycannotchangethingsthroughmainstreampolitics,thentheymayvoteBNPasan
actofprotest.Inthisviewfailuresofthe‘politicalelite’alsohavearole,butitisnottheir
failureinanyparticularpolicyarea(suchastheirapproachtoimmigration)thatisthe
problem,buttheirdetachmentfromthelivesandinterestsofthisgroupofvoters.
BelowwegoontoinvestigatethecompetingclaimsabouttheBNP’ssupportusing
econometricanalysis.
Resilience
Thispaperbuildsoninnovativeresearchthatipprhasbeenconductingonresilience.
Resilienceisusuallythoughtofintermsofsecurity(forexample,responsetoterrorattacks)
ortheenvironment(forexample,inrelationtoclimatechange).Butitisclearthatother
kindsofshocksalsoaffectBritishsociety,shockssuchasthefinancialcrisis,rising
unemploymentandtheMPs’expensesscandal.ipprhasbeenexamininghowoursociety,
economyandpoliticalsystemscancopewiththeseshocks,andwhetherornottheyareable
torespond,recoverandadapt.
Specifically,wehaveexploredwhetheritispossibletodefineandmeasuresocialresilience
(seeforexampleMaguireandHagan2007forbackgrounddiscussionsofthisconcept).We
definesocialresilienceastheabilityofcommunitiestowithstandandadaptinresponseto
shocks.Ourresearchsuggeststhattherearefour‘domains’tosocialresilience:(i)economic,
(ii)political,(iii)community,and(iv)individual.Strengthineachoftheseareasmeansthata
communityhasaccesstotheresourcesitneedstohelprespondtodisruptionandstress.
Wehavebeenabletoconstructanindexthatmeasuresvariablesineachofthesedomainsin
English‘top-tier’localauthorities(countycouncils,metropolitanboroughcouncilsand
unitaryauthorities)11.Thisspatialscalewaschosenbecauseabroadrangeofdataon
economic,socialandpoliticalwell-beingisavailableatthis‘level’–thoughnotallindicators
are,meaningthattheoneschosenfortheindexwereselectedbothfortheoreticaland
practicaldataavailabilityreasons12.Combiningthesevariablesallowsustocompareresilience
acrosslocalauthoritiesintheUK.Table1belowsetsoutthevariablesusedintheindex.
9.http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/8088381.stm
10.http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/8088381.stm
11.Atpresentthereare152toptierlocalauthoritiesinEngland.TheCityofLondonandtheIslesofScillyhavebeenexcluded
fromouranalysisduetosmallsamplesizes(bothhavesmallresidentpopulations).
12.Whileusinglocalauthoritiesasourunitofanalysisstrengthenstheworkbecauseoftherelativelystrongdataavailabilityat
thislevel,thedownsideisthatlocalauthoritiescoverrelativelylargeareas,meaningthatthereisverysignificantvariationwithin
them.Differentpatternsmaybecomeevidentthereforeifwelookatsmallerareas,likeneighbourhoodsorwards,anditwouldbe
usefultoconductfollow-upanalysisatthismorelocallevel.
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Table1.Resiliencemeasures
Resiliencedomain
Indicator13
Rationale
Economic
Unemployment
Peoplewhoareemployedhave–onaverage–
accesstomoreresourcesthanthosewhoare
unemployed.Evidencesuggeststhattheyare
wealthier,happierandmoreselfconfident,andhave
moresocialcontactsandnetworksthanthe
unemployed.Theseareallresourcesthatpeoplecan
drawoninatimeofshockorcrisis.
Thecollapseofthefinancialsectorandresulting
recessionhasplacedseverestressonbusinesses.
Thoseareaswithhighlevelsofbusinesssurvival
showresiliencetotheshockofrecession.
Highvoterturnoutdemonstratesthatpeopleare
willingtoparticipateinsocietyanduseofficial
channelstosolveproblems.Lowvoterturnout
suggestspeoplearedisenchantedwiththepolitical
systemandmayfeelalienated.
Ifpeoplefeelthattheyareempoweredtochange
thingsatthelocallevel,theyaremorelikelytobe
abletocometogethertorespondtoacrisis.They
arealsomorelikelytouseestablishedprocessesand
institutionstoeffectchangeintheirlocality,rather
thanmoredivisivemeans.
Cohesionisthe‘glue’thatbindssocietytogether.In
thefaceofexternalshocks(suchasrecessionand
highunemployment)areaswithlowlevelsof
cohesionaremorelikelytoexperiencesocialunrest.
Tolerance,respectandpositiveinteractionsmean
communitiescanadaptandsupportchange,rather
thanbreakingupunderpressure.
Areaswithhighlevelsofcrimedemonstratesocial
breakdowninresponsetotoughcircumstances.
Crimecanalsoleadtofearanddistrust,whichin
turndamageacommunity’sabilitytoworktogether
andadapttootherexternalshocks.
Goodhealthformsthebasisofindividualwellbeing.
Whenpeoplefeelhealthyand‘well’theywillbe
morecapableofconfrontingchallenges.Goodhealth
isalsothebuildingblockofpeople’sabilitytowork
withandrelatetoothers,bothofwhicharekeyto
resilience.
Highqualificationsandskillsmeananindividualis
betterabletoadapttochangingeconomic
circumstances.Thisisparticularlyimportantina
globalised,knowledgeeconomywhichfavoursthose
withflexibleskills.Qualificationsandskillsarealso
associatedwiththepersonalabilitytorespondto
socialchallenges.
(InternationalLaborOrganisation
[ILO]measure)
Economic
BusinessSurvivalRate
(Survivalratesforbusinessesfive
yearsafterstart-up)
Political
Voterturn-outatnational
elections
(Turnoutin2005generalelections)
Political
Feelingabletoinfluencelocal
decisionmaking
(%ofpeoplewhofeelableto
influencelocaldecisionmaking)
Community
Socialcohesion
(%ofpeoplewhoagreethattheir
areaisonewherepeoplefrom
differentbackgroundsgetalong)
Community
Crime
(Crimesper1000ofthepopulation)
Individual
Health
(%ofpeoplereportingtheirhealth
asgoodorverygood)
Individual
Qualifications
13.Forfurtherdetailsontheindicatorspleaseseetheannex,p.10.
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IsimmigrationdrivingpeopleintothearmsoftheBNP?
Figure1:
Resilience
scoreand
BNPsupport
BNP share of vote in 2009 European Elections
Theapproachwehavetaken,asdetailedabove,givesusawaytotestthecompetingtheses
astowhetherornotimmigrationand/orelementsofsocio-economicandpoliticalexclusion
explainBNPsupport.Plottingresilience14 againstBNPsupportinthe2009European
election15 suggeststhatthemoreresilientacommunityis,thelesslikelyitistovoteBNP:see
Figure1.ExamplesofthemostresilientcommunitiesincludeRichmond-upon-Thames(ranked
firstnationally),Wokingham(2)andNorthYorkshire(8)–allofwhichhadbelowaverage
votesfortheBNPin2009.Infact,allthetop10mostresilientcommunitiesintheUKcast
fewervotesfortheBNPthantheaverageUKlocalauthorityatthe2009European elections.
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
Resilience score
Figure2showstherelationshipbetweenimmigration(measuredusingnewNational
InsuranceregistrationsbypeoplewhoarenotBritishresidentsin2008/916)andsupportfor
theBNP.Theresultshowsthatimmigrationtoanareaappearstobenegativelyrelatedto
supportfortheBNP–or,inotherwords,themoreimmigrationanareahadin2008/9,the
lesslikelyitspeopleweretovoteBNP.
25%
BNP share of vote in 2009 European
Elections
Figure2:
Migrationin
2008/9and
BNPsupport
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%
0
20
40
60
80
100
NI registrations by non-British adults 2008/09
14.Whentheresilienceindicatorshavebeenusedinanalysis(hereandintheeconometricworkbelow)theyhavebeenstandardised,
sothateachvariableismeasuredonascaleof0–1.Scoresforcrimeandunemploymenthavebeeninverted(subtractedfromone)so
thatalowscoreforbothindicatorsindicatesproblematicoutcomes(ahighlevelofcrimeandunemployment).
15.ThefactthatweareusingdatafortheEuropeanelectionshouldbenoted,asitseemslikelythattherewillbesomedifferences
betweentheseresultsandvotingpatternsintheGeneralElection.TheEuropeanelectionisconductedusingproportional
representation,whichtendstoincreasevotesforsmallerparties,andthelastelectiontookplaceatatimewhendisillusionmentwith
mainstreampoliticsseemedparticularlyhigh(withtherecessionatitsworstandjustaftertheexpensescrisis).
16.Thisdataisusedasitistheonlydataonimmigrationavailableatalocalauthoritylevel.NoUKdatasourceprovidesacompletely
accurateandtimelymeasureofmigration,andassuchthisdatahassomeflaws.However,itisofgoodenoughqualitytobelistedby
theAuditCommissionasoneofthebestmigrationdatasourcesavailable.Seewww.audit-commission.gov.uk/nationalstudies/
localgov/crossingborders/data/pages/nationaldata.aspx
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Thisresultisverystriking,anditappearstostanduptocloserscrutiny.Whilethelocal
authoritythatcastthemostvotesfortheBNP–BarkingandDagenham–hadsignificantly
higherlevelsofimmigrationthanthenationalaverage,thisisananomaly.Everyotherlocal
authorityinthetop10forBNPvoteshadlowerthanaverageimmigration.Thisincludes,for
example,Stoke-on-Trent,ThurrockandBarnsley(ranked2,3and4respectively).Incontrast,
thethreelocalareaswiththelowestlevelsofresilienceinthecountry(Sandwell,Barkingand
DagenhamandStoke-on-Trent)areallfoundinthetop10forBNPvotes.
Toexaminethisinamorerigorouswayweconductedaregression-basedanalysis.Linear
regressionmodellingenablesustolookattherelativeimportanceofdifferencefactorsin
explainingsupportfortheBNP,holdingallotherfactorsconstant.Themodelencompasses
alltheelementsoftheresilienceindexdescribedearlier,plusseveralmeasuresofmigration,
ameasureofthenon-whitepopulationinanarea(withraceanotheraspectoftheBNP’s
policiesthatshouldbeconsidered,distinctfromimmigration),andregionalindicators,which
allowustoseewhetherparticularregionsoftheUKarewitnessingspecifictrends.The
resultsofthismodelaresetoutinTable2.
Thetableconfirmsthatimmigration(eithermeasuredinthepreviousfullyear,i.e.2008/9,
orexaminingthechangeinimmigrationflowstoanareabetween2002/3and2008/9)has
anegativerelationshipwithBNPvotes.Inotherwords,evenwhentheinfluenceofother
factorsiscontrolledfor,thehigherthelevelofimmigrationistoanarea,thelowertheBNP
vote.Thisfindingisfairlyconclusivetoo,notonlybeingshownusingtwodifferentindictors
ofmigration,butalsobeinghighlystatisticallysignificant,andholdingsteadyinthree
slightlydifferentiterationsofthemodel(forexample,someiterationsincludedregional
variablesandothersdidnot)17.
Table2:OLS[1] regressionresultsforBNPvote
Intercept
Health
Qualifications
Crime
Localinfluence
2005voterturnout
Businesssurvival
Employment
Socialcohesion
Percentagenon-white
Migrationchange2002/3to2008/9
In-migration2008/9
Region(SouthEastasreferencecategory)
EastMidlands
EastofEngland
London
NorthEast
NorthWest
SouthWest
WestMidlands
YorkshireandtheHumber
AdjustedR2
N
*p<0.10**p<0.05***p<0.01
[1]OLS=OrdinaryLeastSquares
Coefficient(β)
0.182***
-0.007
-0.042***
-0.011
-0.003
-0.022*
0.003
0.006
-0.099***
-0.095***
-0.044***
-0.058***
Standarderror
0.012
0.014
0.013
0.010
0.012
0.012
0.011
0.014
0.012
0.026
0.017
0.020
0.020***
0.010*
0.029***
0.013*
0.005
-0.007
0.028***
0.022***
0.826
149
0.006
0.006
0.006
0.007
0.006
0.006
0.006
0.006
17.Alternativeversionsofthemodelcanbeobtainedbycontactingtheauthors.
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Thisfinding,thatimmigrationhasanegativerelationshipwithBNPvotes,isimportant,asit
appearstocontradicttheargumentthatimmigrationisto‘blame’fordrivingvotersintothe
armsoftheBNP.Itsuggeststheopposite,infact:thatwherepeoplehaveexperienceof
livingwithmigrantstheyarelesslikelytovotefortheBNP.Thisfitswiththefindingof
previousresearch(forexample,Caplan2006,Lewis2005)whichsuggeststhat,onthe
whole,themoreinteractionpeoplehavewithmigrantgroupsthelessconcernedabout
migrationtheyare.Importantly,italsoundercutstheBNP’sownargumentthatitis
attractingsupportbecauseofthenegativeimpactsthatmigrationishavinginlocal
communities.
ItisevidentfrompollingthatimmigrationisoneofthetopissuesformanypeopleintheUK
(itremainsamongthetopthreeissuesofconcernforpeoplepolled18 –apositionheldfor
severalyearsnow).ItisalsoclearlyoneofthemostlyhotlydebatedquestionsinthisGeneral
Electioncampaign.Thereisalsoevidencethatinsomeplacesimmigrationdoeshavesome
negativeeffects.However,wherepeoplehavesignificantlivedexperiencesofimmigration,
thoseexperiencesarenotofakindthatdrivethemtovotefortheBNP.Infact,living
alongsidemigrantsmakespeoplelessattractedtotheBNP.
Lookingattheeffectoftheothervariables,andexaminingfirstthe‘non-resilience’aspects
ofthemodel,weseethatthepercentageofnon-whitepeopleinanareaalsohasanegative
relationshipwiththeBNPvote,meaningthatareaswithlargernumbersofnon-whitepeople
arelesslikelytovotefortheBNP.Tosomeextentthismaybeexplainedbysomeofthe
sameforcesasthefindingabove–thatwherepeopleliveinmixedracecommunitiesthey
tend,onthewhole,tobelessagreeabletoBNPargumentsabouttheconsequencesof
mixedcommunities.However,itmayalsobeexplainedbythefactthatrelativelyfewethnic
minoritypeoplearelikelytovoteBNP,giventheparty’shostilitytowardsthem,reducingthe
BNP’spotentialvotepoolinthoseareasaccordingly19.
Manyoftheregionalindicatorsalsoappearsignificant.Thismeansthatevenwhenallthe
othervariablesareheldconstant–therebydiscountingtheeffectsofresilience,raceand
immigration–someregionsstillhavesignificantlyhigherlevelsofBNPsupportthanothers.
ThisisparticularlystrikingbecausethetwospecificregionsthathadthestrongestBNP
supportin2009(holdingallotherfactorsconstant)wereLondonandtheWestMidlands,
whicharethosethattheBNPistargetingthemostheavily20.Insomewaysthisresultis
unsurprising.Politicalpartiesknowthatpouringresourcesintoanareacanboosttheirvote.
However,itremainsnoteworthy,asitisareminderthatsupportfortheBNPisn’tsimply
spontaneous,butthattheparty’scampaigningmayalsobeplayingarole.
Turningtotheresilienceindicators,itisclearthatsomemattermuchmorethanothers.
Some,suchascrime,andunemployment,appeartohavelittleeffectonBNPvotesoneway
ortheother.Thismayseemsurprisingandwarrantfurtherinvestigation,thoughitalso
shouldbenotedthatpreviousworkhasproducedsimilarresults(forexample,Kesslerand
Freeman2004,whofindthatunemploymentdoesnotraiseindividuals’tendenciestovote
forthefarright).Threeresilienceindicators,however,dostandoutasplayingarole.
Firstly,qualifications.Areaswherepeoplehavehigherqualifications,onaverage,areless
likelytovotefortheBNP.Thiseffectmayworkinseveralways,butperhapsmostimportant
isthefactthatpeoplewithhigherqualificationshavemoreoptionsintheincreasinglyopen,
flexibleandknowledge-basedeconomythatwelivein(Leitch2006).Whilefinding
employmentpersemaynotbecentral(asindicatedbythefindingthatemploymentlevels
18.Seewww.ipsos-mori.com/Assets/Docs/Polls/poll-March10-issues-topline.pdf
19.Thesameargumentdoesnotapplytotheimmigrationvariablesdiscussedaboveasmanynewmigrantsdonothavetheright
tovote.
20.Seehttp://conservativehome.blogs.com/goldlist/2009/06/bnp-plan-general-election-campaign-in-labour-heartlandseats.htmlforalistofBNPtargetseats.TherearetwoeachinLondonandtheWestMidlandsrespectively,morethaninany
otherregion.
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donotaffectvotesfortheBNP),thequalityofworkpeoplecanaccessmaybecritical.
Wherepeoplehavelowerlevelsofqualificationstheyseemincreasinglylikelytostruggleto
findgoodqualityworkthatpaysalivingwage,whichcouldmakethemfeelexcludedand
vulnerable.Thisfitswiththefindingsofpreviouswork(forexample,Johnetal2006)which
suggeststhatitisnotthepoorestsocialclasseswhotendtovotefortheBNP,butthelower
middleclass,whoaremostaffectedbysocialchangessuchaschanginglabourmarket
structures.
Secondly,socialcohesionappearstomatter.Wherepeoplebelievethatthepopulationof
theirareatendtogetalong,eveniftheycomefromdifferentbackgrounds,theyareless
likelytovotefortheBNP.Thoughinsomewaysthisvergesonbeingtautological(itseems
unlikelythatmanypeoplewhovotefortheBNPwillreporthighlevelsofsocialcohesionin
theirareas,andviceversa),itdoesindicateapotentialpolicylever.IftheGovernmentcan
findwaystobuildstronger,moresociallycohesivecommunities,theseincreasesinsocial
cohesionshouldsapsupportfromtheBNP.
Thirdly,voterturnoutinthe2005generalelectionisalsonegativelyassociatedwithvoting
fortheBNP.Inotherwords,thefewerpeoplewhoturnouttovote,thehigherthe
proportionofthepopulationvotingfortheBNP.Itseemslikelythatthisistheresultoftwo
trends.First,whennon-BNPvotersfailtoturnout,thismakesiteasierfortheBNPtogaina
higherproportionofthevotes21.Mainstreampartiesgettingthevoteoutisperhapsthe
simplestwayinwhichtheBNP’schancesofelectoralsuccesscanbeminimised(andisa
majortacticbeingusedforexamplebytheanti-BNPorganisationHopenotHate22).
However,alowvoterturnoutdoesnotjustaffecttheproportionofvotesgoingtotheBNP
inasimplemathematicalway,itisalsoindicativeofawidertrendwhichlikelygivessuccour
totheparty–disengagementwithpolitics.Wherepeopleinanareahavelostfaithinpolitics
somewilldisengagefromtheelectoralprocessaltogether,butotherswillturntoradical
alternatives,suchastheBNP23.
Conclusions
Ouranalysisprovidessomestrongevidencethatrecentimmigrationisnotdrivingpeopleto
votefortheBNP.Rather,immigrationtoanareaappears,onthewhole,tomakepeopleless
likelytovoteforthefarright.
ThisisnottodenythatimmigrationisanissueofconcerntotheBritishpopulation,orthat
ithassomenegativeeffectsonthecountry;boththesethingsareclearlytruetosome
extent.However,inplaceswherepeoplehavehadsignificantdirectcontactwithmigrants,
mostarenotconcernedenoughbyimmigrationtovotefortheBNP.Thisisindirect
contradictiontothestorybeingtoldbythepartyitself.
SowhatisbehindtheBNP’sincreasingvoteshare?Thisresearchsuggeststhatsocioeconomicandpoliticalexclusionarethemajorfactorsatwork.Specifically,peoplefeel
dejectedandalienatedinthefollowingsituations:inareaswherethereisalowaveragelevel
ofqualifications,andwheremanyarelikelytobestrugglingtofindgoodqualitywork;where
thereisalackofsocialcohesionandresidentsfeelthatpeoplefromdifferentbackgrounds
don’tgetalong;andwherecommitmenttothemainstreampoliticalprocessislow.Peoplein
thesecommunitiesarelookingforalternativestothemainstreampoliticalparties.
21.Itshouldbenotedthatthevoterturnoutstatisticspresentedinthemodelareforthe2005generalelectionandtheBNP
supportstatisticsarefromthe2009Europeanelection.Webelieve,however,thatifanareahasalowturnoutatageneral
electionitprobablyalsohasalowturnoutataEuropeanelection,makingthiscomparisonvalid.
22.Seehttp://action.hopenothate.org.uk/page/invite/youcanstopthis
23.Itmayseemsurprisinginlightofthisfindingthatthe‘localinfluence’factordoesnothaveaneffect,butthebasicdatahere
showspeopleacrossthecountrytendtorespondverysimilarlytothisquestion,makingitarelativelypoorindicatorofpolitical
engagement.Asaresultwearenotsurprisedtofindthatithasarelativelynegligibleimpactontheresults.
10
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TheBNP,accordingtoourevidence,targetsthesecommunities,anditappearsthatthe
resultingcombinationoflocalpeople’sexclusionandtheBNP’salternativenarrativedriveup
supportfortheparty.TheBNP’sdiscussionsofimmigrationmayappealtosomeofthese
voters,butthisdoesnotseemtobe(onthewhole)becauseoftheirownlivedexperiences.
Rather,immigrationmaybeactingasavisiblesymbolofrapideconomicandsocialchange
whichleavessomepeoplefeelingthreatenedandinsecure.
Sowhatdoesthismeanforpolitics?Mostpoliticiansandcommentatorshaveusedthe
narrativethatexclusion,notimmigration,seemstobeattherootofwhytheBNPis
attractingsupport;ourresearchbacksthisup,withtwoprimaryimplications.
Firstly,itshouldgivemainstreampoliticiansandcommentatorstheconfidencetoresisteven
morestronglythenotionthatpeoplehavebeendrivenintothearmsoftheBNPbythe
actualharmimmigrationiscausingtotheircommunities.NickGriffin’ssuggestionthatthe
mainstreamisoutoftouchwithon-the-groundrealitiesofimmigrationandmustintroduce
eventoughercontrolsonimmigrationinordertoregainpublicsupportistendentious
(thoughtheremayofcoursebeotherrationalesforchangingimmigrationpolicy).
Secondly,ourresearchmakesclearthatmainstreampoliticiansneedtoworkhardertobuild
strongcommunitiesandstrongeducationsystems,andtorebuildtrustandconfidencein
democraticpolitics,somarginalisedandvulnerablepeopledonotfeelingsodisconnected.
Doingsoshouldallowthemtoservetheinterestsofthesecommunitiesmoreeffectively,
and,intheprocess,undercutsupportfortheBritishNationalParty.
Furtherreferences
CaplanB(2006)Immigration:SeeingisUnderstanding.Availableat:
http://econlog.econlib.org/archives/2006/05/immigration_see.html
JohnP,MargettsH,RowlandDandWeirS(2006)TheBNP:Therootsofitsappeal.Essex:
DemocraticAudit
KesslerAandFreemanG(2004)PoliticalOpportunism,SocialExclusionandSupportfor
RightWingExtremistPartiesinWesternEurope.Availableat:
www.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/0/5/9/7/8/pages59781/p
59781-1.php
LeitchS(2006)ProsperityforAllintheGlobalEconomy:Worldclassskills.Availableat
www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/leitch_review_index.htm
LewisM(2005)Asylum:UnderstandingPublicAttitudes.London:ippr.
www.ippr.org/publicationsandreports/publication.asp?id=294
MaguireandHagan(2007)‘Disastersandcommunities:Understandingsocialresilience’The
AustralianJournalofEmergencyManagement,22(2):16-20
Annex:Datadefinitionsandsources
Definitionsinthecontextofthisresearch,anddatasourcesforeachindicator,areasfollows:
Unemployment:thisindicatormeasuresILO(InternationalLaborOrganisation)
unemployment.Apersonisdefinedasunemployedunderthismeasureiftheyarenotin
paidworkbutareavailableforandseekingpaidwork.Noteveryonecoveredbythis
measurewillbeclaiminganout-of-workbenefit.DataisfromtheLabourForceSurvey
andcoverstheperiodJuly2008toJune2009.AvailablefromNomis
https://www.nomisweb.co.uk/Default.asp.
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Businesssurvivalrate: measurestheproportionofbusinesseswhichwereoperatingin
2003andwhichwerestilloperatingin2008.TakenfromtheONSBusinessDemography
2008release,whichisbasedontheInter-DepartmentalBusinessRegisteroperatedby
theDepartmentforBusiness,InnovationandSkills.
Turnout: theproportionofindividualsnamedontheelectoralregisterwhovotedinthe
2005GeneralElection.DataisfromtheBritishParliamentaryConstituencyDatabase
1992-2005,createdbyPippaNorrisatHarvardUniversityandavailableat
www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/pnorris/Data/Data.htm.Notethatdatawasprovidedat
constituencylevelandtransformedintolocalauthoritydatabyaveragingturnoutforall
constituencieswithinalocalauthorityboundary.
Feelingabletoinfluencelocaldecision-making: proportionofrespondentswhoagree
thattheycaninfluencedecisionsintheirlocalarea.TakenfromthePlaceSurvey2008,a
surveyofperceptionsandattitudesinlocalareassponsoredbytheDepartmentfor
CommunitiesandLocalGovernment.Availableat
www.communities.gov.uk/publications/corporate/statistics/placesurvey2008update
Socialcohesion: proportionofrespondentswhoagreethattheirlocalareaisaplacewhere
peoplefromdifferentbackgroundsgetonwelltogether.FromthePlaceSurvey2008,as
above.
Crime:recordedcrime(sevenkeyincidenttypes)per1,000population,2008/9.Available
fromtheHomeOfficeatwww.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/index.html.
Health: proportionofrespondentswhosaytheirhealthis‘good’or‘verygood’,fromthe
PlaceSurvey2008.
Qualifications: thefollowingmethodwasusedtodevelopasinglescoreforqualifications:
(proportionofadultswithnoqualificationsx0)+(proportionofadultswithlevel1
qualificationsx1)+(proportionofadultswithlevel2qualificationsx2)+(proportionof
adultswithlevel3qualificationsx3)+(proportionofadultswithlevel4orabove
qualificationsx4).
DatawastakenfromtheLabourForceSurvey/AnnualPopulationSurvey2008,available
fromNomis,https://www.nomisweb.co.uk/Default.asp.
BNPshareofvote:proportionofindividualsontheelectoralregisterwhovotedforthe
BNPintheEuropeanElections2009.TakenfromHouseofCommonsLibraryResearch
Paper09/53,availableatwww.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/rp2009/rp09053.pdf
Migration:numberofnewNIregistrationsbynon-Britishresidents,per1,000populationin
2008/9;andpercentagechangebetween2002/3and2008/9.
Region:GovernmentOfficeRegion,ofwhichtherearenineinEngland.
Non-whitepopulation: takenfromONSPopulationEstimatesbyEthnicGroup
(experimental),mid-2007.Availableat
www.statistics.gov.uk/statbase/product.asp?vlnk=14238
Inallcasesthelocalauthorityistheunitofanalysis,soforeachoftheindicatorsabovean
averageacrossthelocalauthorityiscalculated.Forexample,thequalificationsvariablefora
localauthoritywouldrelatetotheaveragelevelofqualificationsobtainedbyindividualsin
thatarea.
Allmeasureswerestandardisedonascaleof0to1,andemploymentandcrimescoreswere
subtractedfrom1sothatallindicatorscanbeinterpretedas1=‘best’and0=‘worst’.
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Aboutippr
TheInstituteforPublicPolicyResearch(ippr)istheUK’sleadingprogressivethinktank,
producingcutting-edgeresearchandinnovativepolicyideasforajust,democraticand
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Since1988,wehavebeenattheforefrontofprogressivedebateandpolicymakinginthe
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ThispaperwasfirstpublishedinApril2010.©ippr2010
Authors
ThisipprbriefingwaswrittenbyLauraChappell,JonathanClifton,GlennGottfriedandKayte
Lawton.