Southern Political Science Association
Presidential Support in Congress: Conflict and Consensus on Foreign and Defense Policy
Author(s): James Meernik
Reviewed work(s):
Source: The Journal of Politics, Vol. 55, No. 3 (Aug., 1993), pp. 569-587
Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Southern Political Science Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2131989 .
Accessed: 22/11/2011 00:54
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].
Cambridge University Press and Southern Political Science Association are collaborating with JSTOR to
digitize, preserve and extend access to The Journal of Politics.
http://www.jstor.org
PresidentialSupportin Congress:
on Foreign
Conflictand Consensus
andDefensePolicy
JamesMeernik
Universityof North Texas
In a recent articleappearingin TheJournalof Politics,McCormickand Wittkopf(1990) arguethat
the VietnamWar did not exercise a significantimpact on bipartisanpresidentialsupport in the U.S.
Congressand that a bipartisanCold War consensuson foreignpolicy and defense issues in the House
and Senate was not as prominentas manyhad assumed.I developa comprehensivemodel of bipartisan
congressionalsupportof presidentsfrom 1947-1988 on foreignpolicy and defenseroll-callvotes in the
House and Senate that test the impact of many factors,such as presidentialinfluenceand legislative
processesnot accountedfor in McCormickand Wittkopf'sanalysis.Using probitanalysisof individual
roll-call votes, I show that before the VietnamWar, substantialconsensus existed in both the House
and Senate and after this conflict, such consensus has become much more infrequent.In addition, I
find that forces originatingin Congressexercisemuch more influenceover the incidenceof bipartisan
supportthanpresidentialresources.
The security of free peoples and the growth of freedom both demand a restorationof
bipartisanconsensusin Americanforeignpolicy.
Henry Kissingerand Cyrus Vance
ForeignPolicy, 1988, 899
INTRODUCTION
11 lith such profoundconsequencesas these potentiallyin the balance,the quest
for bipartisanshipin Americanforeign policy, accordingto the two formersecretariesof state, is as importantnow as it ever was. Consensusof this naturein government, however, requires that the president and Congress overcome political
institutionalrivalriesto establishcommonforeignpolicy goalsand an agreedupon
frameworkfor reconcilingtheir differences.It is a commonlyheld assumptionthat
such a situationexisted in this countrybeginningin the aftermathof WorldWarII
and endingin the Americaninvolvementin Vietnam(Destler,Gelb, and Lake 1984;
Peppers 1975).Accordingto Wittkopf(1990):
The author would like to thank the following for their invaluableassistance:James McCormick,
David Rohde, and Mary Alice Nye. Much of the datawere madeavailablethroughthe Interuniversity
Consortiumfor Politicaland Social Research.David Rohde also providedadditionaldata.
Vol. 55, No. 3, August 1993,Pp. 569-587
C 1993by the Universityof Texas Press
THE JOURNAL OF POLITICS,
570
JamesMeernik
The experienceof the United States in the protractedand tragicwarin SoutheastAsia causeda
fundamentalreorientationof the thinkingof politicalleadersand the mass public about the appropriaterole of the United Statesin worldaffairs.Beforethe VietnamWar,a fundamentalconsensus about that role existed. Vietnamled to its demise, and in its wakeAmericanforeignpolicy has become the subjectof an unprecedentedlevel of partisanand ideologicaldispute. (xvii)
One of the primarymanifestationsof both bipartisanshipand its replacementby a
partisanVietnamsyndromeought to be found in congressionalsupportof presidents' positions on foreign policy and defense issues. For example, during the
heyday of Cold War consensus Republicansand Democrats provided President
Truman with near-unanimoussupportfor many of the nation'smost far-reaching
foreignpolicy initiativessuch as the MarshallPlan and the North AtlanticTreaty
Organization.Yet in 1973, afterthe breakdownof consensus,the two partiescombined to hand PresidentNixon a profoundforeignpolicy defeat with the passage
of the War Powers Resolution. Recently, however, McCormick and Wittkopf
(1990) have questionedmuch of the common wisdom concerningbipartisanship
and its demise after Vietnam. They find that partisanpolitical differenceswere
also salientduringthe peakof Cold War consensusand that the effects of the war
in Vietnamon the breakdownof bipartisanpresidentialsupportin Congresscannot be distinguishedfrom other concurrentpolitical developments.Given these
findings, it is importantfor researchersto explore more systematicallyalternative
explanationsof the rise and decline of bipartisanship.If this phenomenonnever
reallycharacterizedAmericanforeign policy, the possibilityof its return as envisionedby Kissingerand Vanceis dubiousat best.
My primarygoal is to develop a comprehensivemodel of bipartisancongressional support of presidents from 1947 through 1988 on foreign policy and defense roll-callvotes to determinewhat factorslead Republicansand Democratsto
overcometheir political differenceson these issues. Such a model will serve two
purposes.First, I seek to bring togetherthe researchfindingsnot only on bipartisanship in foreign policy but also on presidentialinfluence in Congressand legislativeprocessesto develop a more fully integratedframeworkfor explainingand
predictingexecutive-congressionalrelations.The statisticaltest of this model via
probit analysisought to provide us with a more rigorousexaminationof the impact of the diverse universe of explanatoryfactorsthan is often obtainedin this
type of research.Probit allows me to focus on the individualroll-call vote as the
unit of analysisin order to gain a clearerappreciationof specificexplanatoryfactors than is normallypossible with more aggregateddata. Second, the model will
give us a means by which to analyzemore systematicallythe impactof the war in
Vietnamon bipartisanshipin Americanforeignpolicy. Did a Cold War consensus
ever exist; was it laterdestroyedor damagedby Vietnam;and if Vietnamis not responsible for its demise, what is? If this article should serve these purposes, this
researchought to help us better understandexecutive-congressionalrelationsand
better forecastfuture developmentsin Americanforeign policy in the post-Cold
Warera.
PresidentialSupportin Congress
571
WHERE Do POLITICS STOP?
McCormickand Wittkopf examine House and Senate bipartisanpresidential
supporton foreignpolicy issues from 1947 through 1988. They definebipartisanship as the percentageof foreign policy votes on which a majorityof Democrats
and a majorityof Republicansagree with the president'sposition in a given year
(1082). The authors find bipartisanshipon foreign policy issues in the first two
decadesof the postwarera, but argue that a political,partisanperspectiveapplies
equally well to the periods both before and after the VietnamWar. Partisanand
ideological differencesbetween the president and Congress have always been a
part of the Americanpolitical landscape,althoughduring the height of the Cold
War they may not have been as noticeable.McCormickand Wittkopf conclude
that, "While some substantivedifferencesin the levels of bipartisanshipbetween
the pre- and post-Vietnam periods are evident in our data, they are not large
enough to support the contention that Vietnam was primarilyresponsible for
them"(1097). Instead,they arguethat Watergate,the 1979 takeoverof the American embassy in Teheran, and other forces have created a more divisive foreign
policy climateand relationshipbetweenthe presidentand Congress.
When examining all foreign policy and defense presidentialsupport roll-call
votes in the House of Representativesand Senate from 1947 through 1988, however, there appearsto be at least a primafacie case for the existenceof some sort of
Vietnam syndrome affecting congressional-executiverelations. Before 1973 in
both the House and Senate, presidentswere supportedwith bipartisanmajorities
61.3% of the time, while after this date such coalitions appearedonly 38.7% of
the time-a drop of 22.6%. In addition,as table 1 and table2 show, foreignpolicy
issues have become even more divisive. Majoritiesof Republicansand Democrats
supported RonaldReaganand Jimmy Carterless than any other presidentssince
WorldWarII. If other factorsare contributingto the demise of bipartisanshipin
foreign policy, they appearto be obscured in this data. Furthermore,in view of
the substantialbody of evidenceof such a syndromeexistingin othersources(Holsti and Rosenau 1979a, 1979b, 1984, 1990;Pepper 1975;Destler, Gelb, and Lake
1984),a more comprehensiveapproachthat incorporatesconcurrentpolitical developments is necessary to validate and expand on McCormick and Wittkopf's
findings.
This research effort examines bipartisansupport of presidents in the U.S.
House of Representativesand Senate on foreign policy and defense roll-callvotes
from 1947 through 1988 on which the president had taken a position as determined by Congressional
Quarterly.When Congressional
Quarterlydid not provide
directevidenceof the president'sposition, the yearlyalmanacwas used as the primarydatasource.The dependentvariables,H-BIPARTand S-BIPART,aredefined
as occurringwhen a majorityof Republicansand a majorityof Democratssupport
the president'sposition in the House of Representativesand Senate, respectively.
The foreignpolicy and defenseissues includeall roll-callvotes pertainingto issues
TABLE 1
BIPARTISANPRESIDENTIALSUPPORT IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
1947-1988 ON FOREIGN POLICYAND DEFENSE ROLL-CALL VOTES
Administration
Percentageof Bipartisan
Supporton ForeignPolicy
and Defense Issues
Percentageof Nonbipartisan
Supporton ForeignPolicy
and Defense Issues
55.8%
(24)
68.3%
(56)
48.9%
(22)
43.5%
(37)
44.6%
(37)
33.3%
(14)
26.7%
(40)
24.7%
(62)
44.2%
(19)
31.7%
(26)
51.1%
(23)
56.5%
(48)
55.4%
(46)
66.7%
(28)
73.3%
(110)
75.3%
(189)
Truman
Eisenhower
Kennedy
Johnson
Nixon
Ford
Carter
Reagan
Number of votes in parentheses.
TABLE 2
BIPARTISANPRESIDENTIALSUPPORT IN THE SENATE 1947-1988
ON FOREIGN POLICYAND DEFENSE ROLL-CALL VOTES
Administration
Percentageof Bipartisan
Supporton ForeignPolicy
and Defense Issues
Truman
Eisenhower
Kennedy
Johnson
Nixon
Ford
Carter
Reagan
Number of votes in parentheses.
53.9%
(41)
72.2%
(135)
61.3%
(57)
72.0%
(167)
57.9%
(62)
57.9%
(62)
40.9%
(81)
42.1%
(62)
Percentageof Nonbipartisan
Supporton ForeignPolicy
and Defense Issues
46.1%
(35)
27.8%
(52)
38.7%
(36)
28.0%
(65)
42.1%
(45)
42.1%
(45)
59.1%
(117)
57.9%
(189)
PresidentialSupportin Congress
573
such as relationswith other nations,economicand militaryaid, the use of military
force, appropriationand authorizationvotes for the State and Defense departments, and foreigneconomicpolicy. All foreignpolicy and defense votes were individuallycoded for their specificissue, the type of vote being taken(e.g., passage
of bill, amendment,motion to recommit),and the president'sposition. One feature of this data set warrantsfurtherexplanation.Because all individualroll-call
votes in both chambersare analyzed,unanimousand nearly unanimousvotes on
foreign policy and defense issues are included.' Some researchers(Bond and
Fleisher 1984;Sigelman 1979) have arguedthat the inclusionof many trivialnonpartisanissues does not provide us with a truly accuratepicture of the depth of
presidentialsupportin Congress.A more realisticapproachwould involve examining congressionalacquiescenceto presidentson more controversialand divisive
issues. Nonetheless, I include all roll-callvotes in my analysisbecausemanyof the
most importantvotes during the Cold War found Republicansand Democratsin
near-unanimousagreement, such as the Formosa Resolution in 1955 and the
Tonkin Gulf Resolutionin 1964. To exclude such votes would seriouslyunderrepresentthe solid consensusthat existed between the presidentand Congresson
manykey foreignpolicy issues.
To explain and predict bipartisanshipin congressional-executiverelations,the
term must be definedand the theoreticalperspectivethat guides this researchoutlined. While my operationaldefinitionof bipartisanshipin foreignpolicy does not
differ from that offered by McCormickand Wittkopf(except that I use the individual roll-callvote as the unit of analysis),a more amplifiedconceptualizationof
the term is necessaryto establish the validity of its possible causal antecedents.
First, bipartisanshipin foreignpolicy is ultimatelya responseto domesticand/or
internationalpressuresthat bring the two politicalpartiesand the two branchesof
governmenttogether.Absent any compellinginterestin muting partisanviews on
this subject, we might expect these actorsto develop a foreignpolicy agendathat
mirrorstheirdifferenceson domesticissues.Bipartisanshipought to be most prevalent when political developmentsoutside Washingtoncreate for Republicansand
Democrats,and Congressand the White House, a sharedperceptionof common
political goals. Second, the existence of bipartisanshipin congressional-executive
branchrelationsimplies agreementbetween the two brancheson both the policy
itself and the frameworkfor developingconsensuson foreignpolicy issues (Crabb
1957). The existence of bipartisanshipthus requiresthat Congressproducelegislationthe presidentagreesor acquiescesto, and that the presidentretaina capacity
to bring about a favorablecompromise if and when political differences arise.
Thus, the practices,strategies,and resourcesof eachbranchought to play a crucial
role in determiningthe likelihoodof consensus.The congressionalenvironmentin
which legislationtakes shape and the role and influence of the president in this
processprovidethe institutionalpoliticalcontext within which bipartisanshipmay
'I have excluded votes pertainingto immigrationpolicy, veteransissues, and domesticmilitaryconstructionprojects.
574
JamesMeernik
emerge. Thus, I take the view that "legislativebehaviorand legislativeoutputs
are a result of various combinationsof external and internal variables"(Brady,
Cooper,and Hurley 1979, 235).
A MODEL OF BIPARTISANCONGRESSIONALSUPPORT OF PRESIDENTS
ON FOREIGN POLICYAND DEFENSE ROLL-CALL VOTES
TheExternalEnvironment
Consensuson foreign policy issues is often createdby perceivedthreatsto the
nation's security. For example, many researchers(Hinckley 1988; Lee 1977;
Russett 1990) have described the existence of a "rally-round-the-flag"effect
wherein large numbers of the public and Congress flock to the president'sside
afterhighly visible internationalevents (e.g., Sputnik,the Cubanmissile crisis, the
U.S. bombing of Libya). It is reasonableto suppose that during times of heightened tension the likelihood of bipartisanconsensus on the foreign policy issues
facing the country should increase.Whether congressmensimply pay lip service
to the notion of a united front or they legitimatelybelieve in it, the idea that politics ought to stop at the water's edge has been a constant refrainin executivelegislativerelationsin times of peril. Thus, even if members'personalpreferences
would lead them to disagreewith the president,their operativepreferences(Rohde
1991)arelikelyto be shapedby publicsupportfor the White House duringperiods
of internationaltension. I describebelow when such conditionsare likely to arise.
TheCold WarConsensus.
As was mentionedpreviously,one of the primarypurposes of this researchis to evaluatethe degreeto which Congressunited in bipartisan supportof presidentsbefore the VietnamWar and the extent to which their
relationshipdeterioratedafter that conflict. Many have argued persuasivelythat
a Cold War consensus oriented around containment of the communist threat
through an active Americanmilitarypresenceabroadexisted before the Vietnam
War, but that in the war's wake many inside and outside Washingtoncalled into
question the need for constant vigilance againstthe Soviets and their allies, and
the desirabilityof placing so much control over foreign policy in the executive
branch(Destler, Gelb, and Lake 1984). BeforeAmericaninvolvementin Vietnam
there was widespreadsupport in Congressfor the NATO alliance,the Marshall
Plan, initialAmericaninvolvementin Korea,and for PresidentEisenhower'shandling of the various Berlin and Formosa crises. There was presidentialacquiescence to congressionalparticipationin the foundingof the United Nations and in
the MarshallPlan, and congressionaldisapprovalover Americaninvolvementin
Vietnamin 1954 duringthe siege at Dienbienphu.AfterVietnam,the WarPowers
Resolution, the PanamaCanal Treaty, arms control negotiations,Americaninvolvementin CentralAmerica,and a host of other issues either createdor publicly
demonstratedthe division in presidential-congressional
relations.Peppers argues
PresidentialSupportin Congress
575
that "implicitpremises,most of them restingon assumptionsaboutthe exigencies
of the Cold Warand a basicallytrustingpublic, now have been drasticallyaffected
by subsequentevents" (1975, 462). The weight of this evidence and similardata
on public opinion (Holsti and Rosenau 1979a, 1979b, 1984, 1990;Wittkopf 1990)
suggest the presenceof strongbipartisanshipbefore Vietnamand increasedpartisanship after. Therefore, rather than assuming, on the basis of largely bivariate
correlations,that the VietnamWar did not bringaboutsuch changes(Fleisherand
Bond 1988;McCormickand Wittkopf 1990), I seek to show througha more comprehensivemodel that the Vietnam War did exercise a significanteffect on the
likelihoodof bipartisanpresidentialsupportin Congress.2I code all roll-callvotes
beforethe end of the warin 1973as fallingin the era of cold warconsensusand all
subsequentvotes as partof the Vietnamsyndromeera. This leads to the following
hypothesis:
HI: The probabilityof bipartisanpresidentialsupport should be greaterbefore the end of U.S. involvementin the VietnamWar.
VariableName = Cold War Consensus
Koreaand Vietnam.Most researchersagreethat there was strongpublic support
for initial Americaninvolvementin Korea and Vietnam(Hinckley 1988;Mueller
1973). Yet despite these wars' many similarities,the impact of the Korean and
Vietnam wars on Americandomestic politics was often quite different. In their
study, McCormickand Wittkopf (1990) find that the Korean War createdmore
problemsfor HarryTruman than did the VietnamWar for Lyndon Johnson and
RichardNixon. They write that "the Korean War appearsto have produced a
more pronouncedshort-runerosion of bipartisanshipthan did the VietnamWar"
(1098). The unforeseenChinese involvementin that warand the firingof General
MacArthur may have crystallized dissatisfaction with and opposition to the
Truman administrationin a way that the slow buildup of antiwarsentiment during the late 1960s and early 1970s never did for Johnson and Nixon. Mueller
(1973) also arguesthat during the 1960s the Johnson administration"assiduously
cultivatedbipartisansupportfor the war"(228). Likewise,Nixon's policy of gradual withdrawalfrom Vietnamconceivablymuted congressionaloppositionto that
administration'sconduct of the war. Finally, there were relatively few roll-call
votes in Congress on U.S. policy in Vietnam until the 1970s perhaps due to
sharplypolarizedpublic opinion. So while Truman'sconduct of the latterpart of
the Korean War appearsto have resulted in a short-rundrop in bipartisanship,
only after the Vietnam War was over did a long-term breakdownin consensus
result.Therefore,we shouldexpectinitialpublicsupportforboth wars,but a gradual
'It should be noted that McCormickand Wittkopf(1990) find slightly more evidence of a Vietnam
syndromeeffect on voting patternsin the House than in the Senate in their differencein means test
(1087).
JamesMeernik
576
erosion of bipartisanshipduring the KoreanWar and relativelyconstant or possibly increasinglevels of bipartisanpresidentialsupportduringthe VietnamWar.
Unfortunately, there is no completely satisfactorymethod of accounting for a
gradualchange in bipartisanshipthat does not entail arbitrarystatisticalassumptions about the rate of decay of such support.I simply count the numberof years
that elapseas each warcontinuesuntil it ends. All observationsbeforeand aftereither wararecoded as zeros. Therefore:
H2: As the numberof yearsthe United States is involved in the KoreanWar
increases,the probabilityof bipartisanpresidentialsupport should decrease.
VariableName = KoreanWar
H3:As the numberof yearsthe United States is involvedin the VietnamWar
increases, the probabilityof bipartisanpresidentialsupport should remain
the sameor increase.
VariableName = VietnamWar
InstitutionalContext
TheInternalEnvironment TheCongressional
By the congressionalinstitutionalcontext I mean those norms (predictability,
courtesy,reciprocity,etc., Polsby 1968)and procedures(measures"employedto define, restrict,or expandthe policyoptionsavailableto membersduringfloordebate,"
Oleszek1989, 10) thatshapethe incentivestructureof membersof Congressand determinethe likelihoodof consensuson foreignpolicy issues. Since Congressframes
and decideson policy in such a mannerthatpolicyis often shapedby the processitself (Shepsle 1979;Smith 1989;Oleszek1989),presidentswill frequentlytakepositions on congressionalbills ratherthan their own institutionallycraftedlegislation.
We mayexpectthe existenceof thesecongressionalnormsand procedures(or conditions as they are henceforthdesignated)to increaseor decreasethe likelihoodthat a
majorityof Republicansand a majorityof Democratswill adopta foreignpolicythat
is congruentwith the president'swishes. Below I outline those conditionsI expect
will influencethe voting alignmentsof roll-callvotes in such a way as to makethe
probabilityof bipartisansupportof presidentssignificantlymoreor less likely.
Salient Issues.In his analysisof bipartisanship,Hughes (1978) finds that Congressis most likelyto becomeinvolvedin the policy-makingprocesswhenthereis an
economiccomponentto a foreignpolicy issue. Congressionalcontrolof the purse
stringsand interestin internationaleconomicissuesthataffectimportantconstituencies give Congressmoreof an incentiveto followits own particularpreferencesthan
a morenationallymindedpresident.Hughesdemonstratesthatvoteson economicissues such as tariffrates and foreignaid engendersignificantlevels of partisanship
acrosstime. In addition,Peppers(1975)arguesthat the increasingsalienceof nonsecurityissuesin the 1970sconstrainspresidentiallatitudein foreignpolicy.He writes
that"theseamlessnessof the distinctionbetweeninternationaleconomicand domestic economicpolicymaysimplyextendthe president'sweaknessin domesticpolicyto
foreignpolicy as well" (469). Therefore,we ought to expect that the likelihoodof
PresidentialSupportin Congress
577
bipartisanpresidentialsupporton roll-callvoteson thesepolicieswillbe low.Whileit is
not possibleto measurethe domesticeconomicimportof all foreignpolicyanddefense
votes,it is possibleto isolatethreeparticular
issueareaswheresuchconcernsarelikelyto
arise:(1) appropriations,
(2) foreignaid, and (3) international
economicpolicybroadly
defined.Separatevariableswerecreatedfor votes on eachof these issue types.Thus:
H4: The probabilityof bipartisanpresidentialsupporton foreignpolicy and
defenseappropriationsvotes should decrease.
VariableName = Appropriations
H5: The probabilityof bipartisanpresidentialsupport on foreign aid votes
should decrease.
VariableName = ForeignAid
H6: The probabilityof bipartisanpresidentialsupport on internationaleconomic policy votes should decrease.
VariableName = InternationalEconomicPolicy
A RepublicanMinorityParty Strategy.In their analysisof the two presidencies
thesis, Fleisherand Bond (1988) discussthe voting strategiesemployedby majority
andminoritypartiesin Congress.They arguethat "whenthereis dividedpartycontrol, the responsibilityto sharein governancemay constrainmembersof a majority
oppositionto cooperatewith the presidentmoreon foreignand defensepolicy,in orderto maintainthe nation'ssecurity"(765).A minorityoppositionparty,on the other
hand,is often freeto pursueits own politicalpreferencesand electoralgoalsthrough
the legislativeprocess without the added responsibilitiesof governance.Interestingly, Fleisherand Bond find that this principleappearsonly to affect Republican
minorityoppositionpartieswhen the Democratscontrol Congressand the White
House. When the Democratsare the minorityoppositionparty,they are still quite
likelyto offer significantsupportto Republicanpresidentson foreignpolicy issues.
If DemocraticpresidentsconfrontRepublicanminoritiesin the Congress,however,
they areunlikelyto enjoybipartisanendorsementof theirviews. The strategyof Republicanminoritiesin Congresswhen confrontedwith Democraticpresidentshas
been orientedmore towardestablishinga uniqueagendaand emphasizingtheir differenceswith the partycontrollingboth branchesof governmentthan settingaside
politicaldifferencesto createa bipartisanforeignpolicy. Partof this may be due to
what Jones terms a "minorityparty mentality"wherein an entrenchedminority
partybecomesaccustomedto obstruction,criticism,and oppositions(1970, 18). Or,
as Bond and Fleisher (1990) argue,Republicanratherthan Democraticpresidents
havebeen moresuccessfulat attractingthe votes of influentialoppositioncommittee
and party leaders. Thus, during these periods (1949-1952, 1961-1968, 19771980)we ought to find the incidenceof bipartisanshipin Congressdeclining.
H7:When the Republicansare the minorityoppositionpartyin Congressand
the Democratscontrol the White House, the probabilityof bipartisanpresidentialsupportshould decrease.
VariableName = RepublicanMinority/DemocraticPresident
578
JamesMeernik
PoliticalStrategieson the Floor. In his work on the legislativeprocesseson the
House and Senate floors, Smith (1989) demonstrateshow the congressionalreformsof the 1970salong with increasedconstituentdemands,the growthof interest groups, and the increasedscrutiny of congressionalactivity have encouraged
more representativesto become involvedin creatingand amendinglegislation(see
also Edwards1989 and Rohde 1991).The adventof electronicrecordedteller voting in the House and in the Committeeof the Whole createdfurtherincentivesfor
legislatorsto go on recordmore often with their views. In addition,the Democratic caucusdid awaywith manyrestrictionson the abilityof representativesto offer
amendmentsto bills on the House floorand providedmoretime for debate,thereby
makingit easier for those offering amendmentsto win adherentsto their cause.
Thus, ratherthanallowingpartybaronsandcommitteechairmento dominatepolicy,
these rule changes,coupledwith the electoralincentivesof becominga more active
participantin the legislativeprocess, caused a dramaticsurge in the number of
amendmentsoffered on the floor of the House and Senate. Smith points out that
between 1961and 1966only seven flooramendmentswere presentedin the House
on the Defense Authorizationbill, while in 1988 alone, 240 amendmentswere offered (1989, 2). Often this amendingprocesswas characterizedby increasedpartisanship as well. Republicansbegan to utilize their parliamentaryoptions more
readilyand exhaustivelyto express their displeasurewith Democraticlegislation
and their minority party status (61). Additionally,Smith finds that bills coming
out of the ForeignAffairsand ArmedServicescommitteeswere subjectedto some
of the most divisiveamendmentsand counteramendments(176-79).
Given the partisannatureof many amendments,presidentswho weigh into this
legislativewranglingto expresspositionson such votes ought to find their chances
of success considerablydiminished.Given the increasingnumberof Republicans
and Democratsalikewho use the amendingprocessto score politicalwith interest
groups and constituentsback home, we should find the probabilityof bipartisan
supporton amendmentsseverelyconstrainedby the very natureof the vote itself.
It is possible that the expansionof such votes during the 1970s and 1980s helped
in part to create the perceptionof the Vietnam syndrome because many of the
congressionalreformsoccurredin close proximityto the end of the VietnamWar.
Ultimately, however, the use of amendmentshas often been a means by which
minoritypartiesand disgruntledmembersof the majorityhave attemptedto challenge the work of committees.As such, we ought to expect that wheneverpresidents take a position on such votes, the probabilityof bipartisansupportought to
decrease.Thus:
H8: The probabilityof bipartisanpresidentialsupport on amendmentsin
Congressshould decrease.
VariableName = Amendment
3Regularamendments,amendmentsto amendments,reservationsto treatiesin the Senate and substitute amendmentsareall included.
PresidentialSupportin Congress
579
Senate TreatyVotes
One unique featureof the Senate that might exert a significantinfluenceon the
incidenceof bipartisanpresidentialsupportis the Senate'srole in ratifyingtreaties
the executive branch has concluded with foreign nations. As others have indicated, treatiesare routinelypassed by overwhelmingmajorities(Sigelman 1979).
Only the most contentious foreign policy issues tend to result in anything less
than Senate unanimity.Therefore,I createa separatevariablefor all treatyratificationvotes to controlfor its possiblyconfoundingeffects. Thus:
Hg: The probabilityof bipartisanpresidentialsupport should increase on
treatyratificationvotes in the Senate.
VariableName = Treaties
Influencein Congress
TheInternalEnvironment-Presidential
Presidents'abilities to gain support in Congresson foreign policy issues have
been undergoingan extensive revision in the literature(Peppers 1975; LeLoup
and Shull 1979;Sigelman1979;Fleisherand Bond 1988;McCormickand Wittkopf
1990).Yet, while many have shown that presidentialsupporton foreignpolicy issues has been declining,few have attemptedto develop a comprehensivemodel to
test alternativeexplanationsof this phenomenon.Further still, little researchhas
been devoted to determiningif the locus of responsibilityfor this trend lies in
presidentialrelations with the Congress or legislative developmentsover which
presidentshave little control. I attemptedearlierto outline those factorsoriginating in Congressthat we might expect to contributeto the decline in presidential
support. Now I discuss presidentialresourcesand strategiesthat ought to affect
the formationof bipartisancoalitions. I explain later why we might expect congressmen to be more or less responsiveto particularpresidentialstrategiesand
sourcesof influence.
ThePresident'sPositionon Legislation.When attemptingto analyzepresidential
influencein Congress,it is importantto know if presidentsare workingto pass or
block final passage of legislation. Given the dominant tendency of Congress to
pass the bills, resolutions,and conferencereportsthat make it to the floor, presidents wishing to prevent legislationfrom becoming law will be at odds with the
preferenceand goals of a majoritypartythat dominatesthe legislativeprocess.Although there are numerous points during this process where the president may
derail legislation, once bills make it to a roll-call vote, they are almost always
passed (Rohde 1991, 209). Therefore,when the presidenttakes a position against
passageof legislationby disapprovingof a bill, resolution,etc. (this does not include amendments),opposingpassageof the rule governingdebateon the bill, or
approvingof motionsto recommitor tablethat would kill bills, conferencereports,
etc., he is coded as opposinglegislation.This leads to the followinghypothesis:
JamesMeernik
580
H1o:When presidentsare opposedto passageof legislation,the probabilityof
bipartisanpresidentialsupportshould decrease.
VariableName = PresidentialOpposition
PresidentialPopularity.The impactof public approvalas a presidentialresource
in influencingCongresshas been extensively debatedin the literature.Although
severalresearchersfind evidenceof such a link (Riversand Rose 1985;Rohde and
Simon 1985), many conclude that its impactis marginal(Bond and Fleisher 1984;
Edwards1989).Bond and Fleisher (1990, 194) assertthat "the findingsare consistent and clear: the effects of the president'spublic approvalon success in Congress are limited." Still, even those who downplay its potential for influencing
congressmen argue that it is an important tool in executive-congressionalrelations. Edwards claims that "Without question, public support is a primary
resourcefor presidentialleadershipof Congress"(1989, 101). Ratherthan attempting rhetoricallyto resolve these differences,I simply propose yet anothertest of
presidentialinfluencein Congress.Those who believe it affects the voting behavior of congressmenand Congress argue that as the president's approvalrating
amongthe public increases,congressmenfeel increasedpressureeither directlyor
indirectlyfrom their constituentsto supportthe president.The percentageof the
public as polled by the Gallup organizationapprovingthe president'sjob performancein closest proximitypriorto presidentialsupportvotes was employedin the
model. Therefore:
H1l: The greaterthe president'spublic approvalrating,the greaterthe probabilityof bipartisanpresidentialsupport.
VariableName = PresidentialPopularity
METHOD OF ANALYSIS
As defined for each case, the dependentvariablesH-BIPART, (House bipartisanship) and S-BIPART, (Senate bipartisanship)are dichotomousand assume a
value of one when a majorityof Republicansand a majorityof Democratsvote in
favorof a president'spositionon a foreignpolicy or defense roll-callvote and zero
otherwise.I arguethat the probabilityof bipartisansupportincreasesas a function
of (1) externalevents, (2) the congressionalinstitutionalcontext, and (3) presidential influenceand strategies.Becauseof the unsuitabilityof ordinaryleast-squares
regressionin modeling the probabilityof binary outcomes (Aldrich and Nelson
1984), a maximumlikelihoodtechnique,probit, is used. Estimatesof the parameters of the independentvariablesare generatedin probitby a maximumlikelihood
procedurethat also calculatesstandarderrorsof the estimatesand generatespredictions of the endogenousvariableto test the accuracyof the theoreticalmodel
(Aldrichand Nelson 1984;Greene 1990). The significanceof the individualvariablesis assessedas it is in ordinaryregressionby comparingcoefficientswith their
standard errors to calculate T-statistics. To generate predictions, the probit
PresidentialSupportin Congress
581
techniquesets the threshold(h) of bipartisanpresidentialsupportat zero and any
predictedvalue (H-BIPART*,or S-BIPART*i) that fallsbelow it is predictedas a
nonbipartisanvote, while a predictedvalue greaterthan zero generatesa prediction of bipartisanship.The resultsof this procedureare discussedbelow.
MODEL RESULTS
The results for the models are displayedin table 3 and table 4 and demonstrate
substantialsupport for the hypotheses outlined above. Most of the variablesare
statisticallysignificantand in the expected direction for both equations and the
overallfit of the models is quite good. The Cold War consensusvariableis highly
significantin both equationsas demonstratedby its T-statistic,and appearsto exercise a substantialeffect on the likelihoodof bipartisanship.The most important
determinantsof such support, however, turn out to be the mannerin which the
issue was brought to a vote, the president'sposition on the legislation,the issue
type and whether the vote was on a treaty in the Senate. Before proceedingto
explore the impact of the independentvariables;however, it is instructiveto examine severalof the goodness-of-fitmeasuresthe probit proceduregenerates.In
orderto test the significanceof the model as a whole, twice the log likelihoodratio
is computed (Aldrich and Nelson 1984). This measure is analogous to the Fstatistic in regressionand is distributedas a chi-squarevariable.It is 213.0 and
598.0 for the House and Senatemodels respectively,and both are significantat the
.0001 level, which allows us to reject the null hypothesis that all coefficients,except the constant, are equal to zero. The probit technique also producespredictions of the actualvaluesof the dependentvariable.We find that the House model
specifiedearlieris correct74.1% of the time in predictingbipartisanpresidential
support and the absenceof such endorsement.There is a 32% proportionatereduction in errorover the null model that predicts the model value of the dependent variablein every case. No bipartisanpresidentialsupportoccurs in 62.5% of
the cases and is the predictiveaccuracyof the null model. The Senate model performs slightly better. It is correctin 76.1% of the cases, a 54% proportionatereduction in errorover the null model that predictsbipartisanshipto occur in every
case. In the Senate,bipartisanshipoccurs 56.4% of the time. The theoreticalmodels were also tested againstanotheralternativethat employed only dummy variables for all presidents.The predictivecapacityof this model was only 67.1% for
the House and 62.4% for the Senate.
Becauseof the difficultyin interpretingprobitcoefficients(Aldrichand Nelson
1984), I use the derivativeat mean statisticto gauge the impact of the individual
variables.The derivativesat mean gives the estimatedincreasein probabilityof a
bipartisancoalitionassociatedwith a one-unit increasein an independentvariable
holding all other variablesconstantat their mean value. For example,the derivative at mean for the appropriationsvariableis -.129 in the House model, indicating that, on votes concerningthis issue, the probabilityof a bipartisanpresidential
JamesMeernik
582
TABLE 3
BIPARTISANPRESIDENTIALSUPPORT MODEL-HOUSE
Coefficient
IndependentVariable
0.373
0.029
0.028
-0.396
-0.600
-0.602
-0.971
-0.345
-2.261
0.007
0.127
ColdWarConsensus
KoreanWar
VietnamWar
Appropriations
ForeignAid
InternationalEconomicPolicy
Amendment
President
Minority/Democratic
Republican
PresidentialOpposition
PresidentialPopularity
Constant
OF REPRESENTATIVES
T
Statistic
2.33
0.13
0.86
-2.80
-4.60
-3.82
-7.18
-3.09
-7.05
1.67
Derivative
at Mean
.122
.006
.009
-.129
-.196
-.197
-.318
-.112
-.740
.002
Percentcorrectlypredicted:74.1%.
Twice log likelihoodratio:213.0,p <.0001.
N = 777.
TABLE 4
BIPARTISANPRESIDENTIALSUPPORT MODEL-SENATE
IndependentVariable
ColdWarConsensus
KoreanWar
VietnamWar
Appropriations
ForeignAid
InternationalEconomicPolicy
Amendment
President
Minority/Democratic
Republican
PresidentialOpposition
PresidentialPopularity
Treaties
Constant
Coefficient
1.051
-0.535
-0.069
0.150
-0.257
-0.186
-0.363
-0.049
-2.206
0.000
2.370
-0.280
T
Statistic
8.23
-2.79
-2.96
1.38
-2.58
-1.42
-4.17
-0.50
-4.61
0.00
11.23
Derivative
at Mean
.690
-.352
-.045
.098
-.169
-.122
-.238
-.028
-1.447
.000
1.559
Percentcorrectlypredicted:76.1%.
Twice log likelihoodratio:598.0,p <0001.
N= 1,406.
support coalition in the House of Representativesdecreasesby 12.9% when the
valuesof all other variablesare held constantat their mean value.
The estimatedincreasein probabilityof a bipartisanpresidentialsupportcoalition for the Cold War Consensusvariableis 12.2% for the House and 69.0% for
PresidentialSupportin Congress
583
the Senate, holding all other factorsat their mean value.4There is strongevidence
that Congresswas willing to grant presidentsan extra margin of support during
the Cold War and that this assistanceevaporatedafter Vietnam.It is possible that
the lackof such a findingin previousresearchis due to the use of aggregateddata,
which may have obscuredthe relationshipbetween the Cold War consensus and
bipartisanship.Whether these findings indicate congressionaldeferenceto presidentialpolicies or a coincidenceof interestsbetweenthe two branchesdoes not diminish the fact that the foreignpolicy conflictwas much less visiblebeforethe end
of the war in Vietnam.Interestingly,consensusappearsto have been much more
prevalentin the Senate during the Cold War. The enhancedrole of the Senate in
foreign policy and the noteworthyexample of bipartisanshipset early during the
Cold War by Senator Vandenbergmay have promoted greatercooperationbetween the two partiesand the chief executive in the upper chamberof Congress,
althoughmore researchin this areawould seem to be needed.
Interestingly,when controllingfor other factors,the effect of the Korean and
Vietnam wars on bipartisanshipis quite different in the House and the Senate.5
During both the Vietnamand Koreanwars,the probabilityof bipartisanpresidential support in the House increasedby a very slim marginevery year controlling
for other factors, while in the Senate the probabilityof such support decreased
every year by an estimated35.2% for the KoreanWar and 4.5% duringthe Vietnam War. Both variablesare quite insignificantin the House model and statistically significantin the Senate version. These differencesmay in part be explained
by the greaterelectoralinsulationand influenceover foreignpolicy senatorsenjoy
that allowed them to criticize more freely the executive branch'shandlingof the
wars. Yet both sets of results seem to indicate that bipartisanshipdid not suffer
greatlyin Congressover the courseof the warin Vietnam.While oppositionto the
warmay have been buildingthroughoutthe late 1960s and early 1970s, the political fallout of this debate does not appearto have registereduntil Congressfelt it
was safe to attackthe presidentand U.S. foreignpolicy after the Americanwithdrawalfrom Vietnam.While the resultsfor the KoreanWarvariablein the House
equationare inconclusive,the strengthof this variablein the Senate model would
seem to indicatethat PresidentJohnson and PresidentNixon were more adept at
workingwith Congress than was President Truman during the Korean War. In
order to understandmore fully these results, however, future researchneeds to
focus on differentpresidentialstrategiesfor dealingwith Congressand the nature
of the legislativeagendaduringwartime.
Votes on issues concerningappropriations,foreign aid, and internationaleconomic issues were all negativelyrelatedto the incidence of bipartisanshipin the
4Evenusing different years as the end points of the Cold War consensus (e.g., 1964, 1965, 1968)
generallyresultedin similarfindings.
'Dummy variablesfor each war were also employed in the statisticalmodel with almost identical
results.
584
JamesMeernik
House, while only the foreignaid variablewas statisticallysignificantin the Senate
model. The impactof each of these variablescontrollingfor other factorsis to decreasethe estimatedprobabilityof bipartisanshipin the House by 12.9%, 19.6%,
and 19.7%respectively.In the Senate, the probabilityof bipartisanshipon foreign
aid votes decreasesby an estimated 16.9%. The House at least does not appear
willing to afford presidentsgeneral support on those issues most likely to affect
their constituents.Perhapsbecauseof the electoralcycle of the House, representatives feel they must be moreattentiveto their constituents'demandsthan senators.
Yet as the distinction between domestic and foreign policy becomes ever more
disblurredand securityissueslose theirformersalience,presidential-congressional
putes over these areasof legislationmost probablywill increasein both chambers.
As expected, Democraticpresidentsconfrontedwith Republicancongressional
minoritiesface an uphill battle in gainingbipartisanendorsementof their views.
Yet this variableis statisticallysignificantonly in the House. Here, the probability
of such endorsementdeclines by 11.2% holding other variablesconstantat their
mean value. As Fleisher and Bond (1988) argue,there are many incentivesfor minority parties,and the Republicanpartyin particular,to express their differences
with the party controllingboth branchesof government.Given the increasingly
conservativenatureof the Republicanpartyit seems unlikelythat such tacticswill
be droppedin the future. The absenceof such an effect in the Senate may be due
to the informallegislativeproceduresthat smallerbody is permittedthat allowminoritypartymembersmore opportunityto expresstheir views.
Votes on amendments substantiallyreduce the possibility of bipartisanship.
When controllingfor other factors,the estimatedprobabilityof bipartisanpresidentialsupporton amendmentsdeclinesby 31.8% in the House and 23.8% in the
Senate. Often amendmentshave been used to introduceissues and viewpointsat
variancewith the majoritypartyand as such are unlikelyto gatherwidespreadbipartisanbacking.Although it is generallythe case that wheneverpresidentstake
positionson such votes they are unlikelyto be favoredwith the supportof majorities in both parties,during the 1970s and 1980s the increaseduse of amendments
very likely expandedthe scope of political conflict on the floor. Future research
should investigatethe substantivecontent of votes on amendmentsto study the
changingnatureof the legislativeagendaand its effect on presidentialsupport.In
the Senate, votes on treatiesresult in bipartisanshipon nearlyevery occasion.The
probabilityof such supportincreasesby an estimated237.0%, holding other variables constantat their mean value. This unrealisticestimateof the effect of treaty
votes on bipartisanshipis due largelyto a skeweddistributionof the variable.Only
1.2% of these votes (4 out of 338) were not bipartisan.The insignificanceof many
of these treatiesappearsto makebipartisanunanimityonly a formality.
Presidentsin generalappearto have only limited influenceover roll-call votes
in Congress.The presidentialpopularityvariableis significantand in the expected
directionin the House, althoughits impactis ratherweak.The estimatedincrease
in probabilityof bipartisancoalitionsoccurringwith every additionalincrementin
public approvalis only .2%, holding other variablesconstantat their mean value.
PresidentialSupportin Congress
585
For example,on averagea presidentwith a 60% approvalratingis only 4% more
likely to be supportedby a bipartisancoalition than a president with a 40% approvalrating.In the Senate, the variableis statisticallyinsignificantand exerts no
measurableinfluenceon the incidenceof bipartisanship.This findingwould seem
to supportEdwards'and Bond and Fleisher'scontentionthat popularityoperates
largelyon the marginsin influencinga congressman'svotes. Perhapsmost importantly,the resultsdemonstratethat when presidentsare opposed to legislation,the
probabilityof bipartisanshipdeclines by nearly74% in the House and 144.7% in
the Senate with the usual caveats.Again, the unrealisticderivativeat mean statistic for the presidentialoppositionvariablelargelyresults from its skeweddistribution. For example, only on two occasionswhen presidentswere opposed to passage of a bill, resolution, or conferencereport was their position endorsed by a
bipartisanmajorityin the House. The majorityparties in Congressappearcommitted to implementingtheir agendasoften regardlessof the wishes of the president. Clearly,there is little a president can do to derail a determinedlegislative
juggernaut.Such findings demonstratethe need for more of an emphasison the
legislativeprocess and congressionalpreferencesin the literatureon presidential
influence. Because presidents may often be reacting to a proactive legislative
agenda,the possibilitiesfor influencemay not alwaysbe great.I now turn to possible improvementsin the model and the implicationsof these findings.
CONCLUSIONS
Obviouslythere was a strong degree of bipartisanshipin congressionalsupport
of presidentson foreignpolicy and defenseissues beforeAmerica'sinvolvementin
Vietnam.After this conflict, consensus broke down and was replacedwith much
more conflictualvoting behavior.While I agree with McCormickand Wittkopf
(1990) and others who find evidence of partisanshipduring earlier years, such
conflict was not nearlyas visible, frequent,and deep as it has been in later times.
Havingmade these claims,however,it is also extremelyimportantto call attention
to the findingsin this paperconcerningthe significanceof the congressionalinstitutional context, and the ineffectivenessof presidentialresources.The most significantand powerfulexplanatoryfactorswere relatedto the mannerin which issues were broughtup for a vote, the issue type, and the president'sposition on a
vote. These factors,coupled with the limited influenceof presidentialpopularity,
illustrate the problems of both pre- and post-Vietnam syndrome presidents in
obtaining bipartisansupport for their views. Presidential support in Congress
seems to be predominantlyaffectedby congressionalproceduresand norms rather
than by presidentialactions. Future researchin this area, however, should focus
on the evidence of bipartisanpresidentialsupport on major legislationto determine whether these findings are generalizable.Given that all roll-call votes were
analyzedin this study, it is conceivablethat presidentialinfluenceand support is
greateron more importantvotes and/or that a large number of roll-call votes on
narrowand previouslyinsignificantlegislationare makingthe post-Vietnamyears
586
JamesMeernik
appearmuch more divisive than they reallyare. This possibilityand the changing
natureand expansionof the legislativeagendawill be exploredin laterresearch.
Finally, in the absence of any compelling threat to the nation's security, the
prospectsfor the return of a more solid consensus on foreign policy and defense
issues appear negligible. Congressionalincentives to appeal to important constituents with contentiouslegislation,to criticizeweakchief executives,and evermountingdomesticproblemsmakeall but the most short-runbipartisanshipseem
a thing of the past. And while the PersianGulf warwitnesseda largelysubservient
and supportiveCongress,both the prewarbuildup and postwarproblemsin Iraq
and the Middle East were the subjectof considerablepartisandebate.In addition,
in this era of divided partycontrolof government,ratherthan forminglong-term
alliances with Congress to confront national security problems, presidents may
have to focus their attentionon developingspecificissue-basedcoalitionsto obtain
congressionalsupport.Ultimately,withoutany strongincentivesfor stoppingpolitics at the water's edge, the president and Congress will in all probabilitycontinue to shapeforeignpolicy accordingto their own politicalneeds.
Manuscriptsubmitted20 February1992
Final manuscript
received18July 1992
REFERENCES
Aldrich,John, and Forrest Nelson. 1984. LinearProbability,Logit and ProbitModels.Beverly Hills:
Sage.
Bond, Jon R., and RichardFleisher. 1984. "PresidentialPopularityand CongressionalVoting: A Reexaminationof Public Opinion as a Source of Influencein Congress." WesternPoliticalQuarterly
37:291-306.
Bond, John R., and RichardFleisher. 1990. ThePresidentin the LegislativeArena.Chicago:University
of ChicagoPress.
Brady,David, Joseph Cooper,and PatriciaA. Hurley. 1979. "The Decline of Partyin the U.S. House
of Representatives,1887-1968." LegislativeStudiesQuarterly4(3): 381-408.
Crabb,Cecil V. Jr. 1957. BipartisanForeignPolicy:Myth or Reality.Evanston,IL: Row, Peterson.
Destler, I. M., Leslie H. Gelb, and Anthony Lake. 1984. OurOwn WorstEnemy.New York:Simon &
Schuster.
Dodd, LawrenceC., and Bruce I. Oppenheimer.1989. "ConsolidatingPower in the House: The Rise
of a New Oligarchy."In CongressReconsidered,
ed. LawrenceC. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer.
4th ed. Washington,DC: CongressionalQuarterlyPress.
Edwards,GeorgeC. 1989.At theMargins.New Haven:Yale UniversityPress.
Fleisher, Richard,andJon R. Bond. 1988. "AreThere Two Presidencies?Yes, But Only for Republicans." TheJournalof Politics50:747-67.
Greene,William. 1990. Econometric
Analysis.New York:Macmillan.
Hinckley, RonaldH. 1988. "PublicAttitudes towardKey Foreign Policy Events."Journalof Con,flict
Resolution32:295-318.
Holsti, Ole R., and James N. Rosenau. 1979a."America'sForeign Policy Agenda:The Post-Vietnam
Beliefs of AmericanLeaders."In Challengesto America:UnitedStates ForeignPolicy in the 1980s,
ed. CharlesW. Kegley and PatrickJ. McGowan.BeverlyHills, CA: Sage.
PresidentialSupportin Congress
587
Holsti, Ole R., andJames N. Rosenau.1979b. "Vietnam,Consensusand the Belief Systems of American Leaders."WorldPolitics32:1-56.
Holsti, Ole R., andJames N. Rosenau. 1984. AmericanLeadershipin WorldAffairs.Boston: Allen and
Unwin.
Holsti, Ole, and James N. Rosenau. 1990. "The Structureof Foreign Policy Attitudes among American Leaders."TheJournalof Politics52:94-125.
Hughes, BarryB. 1978. TheDomesticContextofAmericanForeignPolicy. San Francisco:Freeman.
Jones, Charles0. 1970. TheMinorityParty in Congress.
Boston:Little, Brown.
Kingdon,John W. 1981. Congressmen's
VotingDecisions.2d ed. New York:Harper& Row.
Kissinger,Henry, and Cyrus Vance. 1988. "BipartisanObjectivesfor Foreign Policy." ForeignAffairs
66(5):899-921.
Lee, Jong R. 1977. "Rallyingaround the Flag: Foreign Policy Events and PresidentialPopularity."
PresidentialStudiesQuarterly7:252-56.
LeLoup, Lance T., and Steven A. Shull. 1979. "Congressversus the Executive:The 'Two Presidencies' Reconsidered."Social ScienceQuarterly59:704-19.
Matthews,Donald, andJames Stimson. 1975. YeasandNays. New York:Wiley.
McCormick,James M., and Eugene R. Wittkopf. 1990. "Bipartisanship,Partisanship,and Ideologyin
Congressional-Executive
ForeignPolicyRelations,1947-1988."Thejournalof Politics52(4):1077-1100.
Mueller,John E. 1973. War,PresidentsandPublicOpinion.New York:Wiley.
Oleszek,WalterJ. 1989. Congressional
Procedures
and the PolicyProcess.3d ed. Washington,DC: CongressionalQuarterlyPress.
Peppers, Donald A. 1975. "The Two Presidencies:Eight Years Later." In Perspectiveson the Presidency,ed. AaronWildavsky.Boston:Little, Brown.
Polsby, Nelson W. 1968. "The Institutionalizationof the U.S. House of Representatives."American
PoliticalScienceReview62(2): 144-68.
Rivers, Douglas, and Nancy L. Rose. 1985. "Passingthe President's Program:Public Opinion and
PresidentialInfluencein Congress."AmericanJournalof PoliticalScience29: 183-96.
Rohde, David W. 1991. Partiesand Leadersin the PostreformHouse. Chicago:University of Chicago
Press.
Rohde, David W., and Dennis M. Simon. 1985. "PresidentialVetoes and CongressionalResponses:A
Study of InstitutionalConflict."AmericanJournal
of PoliticalScience29:397-427.
Russett,BruceM. 1990. ControllingtheSword.Cambridge:HarvardUniversityPress.
Shepsle, Kenneth A. 1979. "InstitutionalArrangementsand Equilibriumin MultidimensionalVoting
Models."AmericanJournalof PoliticalScience23:1.
Sigelman, Lee. 1979. "A Reassessmentof the Two Presidencies Thesis." The Journal of Politics
41:1195-1205.
Smith, Steven S. 1989. Call to Order.Washington,DC: The BrookingsInstitution.
in Congress.Washington,DC: ConSmith, Steven S., and ChristopherJ. Deering. 1984. Committees
gressionalQuarterlyPress.
Wittkopf,EugeneR. 1990. Facesof Internationalism.
Durham:Duke UniversityPress.
James Meernik is assistantprofessorof political science, University of North
Texas, Denton, TX 76203-5338.