Who is (not) afraid
of (cultural) relativism? *∗
N ader N. Ch o k r
Introduction: why a different kind of question?
As the world grows increasingly inter-connected and inter-dependent,
and as we progressively come to recognize and draw the ‘consequences of
cultural complexity’ (Chokr, 2006a, 2007a) that such a world entails and
reveals, one could have expected to see a higher degree of ‘moral convergence’ between members of various cultures, or at least, a more substantial
“overlapping consensus”1. Similarly, one could have expected the “cosmopolitan outlook” (that Kant, and long before him the Stoics talked about)
and its underlying “moral universalisme”, to have gained more ground and
become, if not widely accepted, at least more widely tolerated2. Instead, it
is seen in some circles as the threatening expression of Western hegemony
and cultural imperialism. As a result, we have been witnessing in recent
years repeated affirmations of cultural distinctiveness and national identity,
and vehement celebrations of provincialism, parochialism, particularism,
∗ My deepest gratitude to Li Xiaolin whose “soul-music” enables me to go on, convinced that
life is not a mistake. I would like to thank the editors of Tracés, especially Eric Monnet and
Paul Costey, as well as an anonymous reviewer from the École Normale Supérieure (ENS),
Paris, France for their helpful suggestions and encouraging comments throughout the process
leading up to the completion of this essay in its double (long and short) versions. A shorter and condensed version of this essay in French is already published in the paper edition
of the review Tracés no 12/1 (Chokr, 2007c). This version is slated for publication online at
http://traces.revues.org.
1 I am here using Rawls’ expression (Rawls, 1996) without however endorsing his brand of
‘political liberalism’ and the particular strictures or conditions under which he believes such a
notion makes sense. I do so along the same line as Nussbaum, as we shall see later on.
2 The notion, question and problem of ‘tolerance’ will be, as can be expected, at the center of my
reflection and discussion for a number of reasons. It is often evoked or conjured up as part of
the justification for (normative) cultural relativism, and for the critique of Western hegemony
and cultural imperialism. It is also evoked because it is a cardinal virtue of Western liberalism
and one of the main values of the Enlightenment, whose legacy is precisely in question today
(see Graham, 1996, Harrison, 1976).
T r a cés 1 2 2 0 0 7 /1 pages i-lxxiii
Nader N. Chok r
sectarianism, nationalism, and fundamentalisms of various kinds –religious
and secular. Needless to say, the specter of “cultural relativism” is writ large
in all these affirmations and celebrations3. Cosmopolitanism and cultural
chauvinism (or narrow-minded nationalism) are nowadays no longer opposites, it seems, but instead mutually reinforcing and defining of each other:
as one does increase, so does the other. This is a hypothesis that can be easily confirmed by any well-informed observer of world affairs in the past
decade or two.
Why, one may ask, has the thesis of cultural relativism proven to be so resistant to the cold, rigorous and hard-edged ‘knife’ of logic and rational arguments?
Is it because it seems, despite its apparent problems of consistency and coherence4, to convey some profound insights about the human condition and alert
us to some real and difficult (perhaps even intractable) moral problems? Or is
it because, though it is based on a deeply problematic and controversial way of
thinking, it can nevertheless readily serve the personal, ideological and political
purposes (even conflicting ones) of those who uphold it?
Both sets of considerations must arguably be taken into account in any
fair and meaningful discussion of this thesis. However, because of its highly
objectionable and deeply troublesome consequences, esp., from an ethical
and political point of view, it should be clear to anyone who cares to make
such an assessment that we have good reasons for fearing relativism, and
that such a fear (both as an emotional and intellectual response) is furthermore not only warranted but reasonable. I am mostly interested here in the
fact that cultural relativism precludes in the final analysis any normative,
critical judgment –either intra-culturally or inter-culturally. This is in my
view the most damning implication of such a thesis from an ethical and
political point of view. The voice of dissent and contestation is rarely if ever
taken into account (see Benhabib, 2002, Wellman, 1963, 1975). My answer
to the normative question of whether we should be afraid of relativism follows obviously from that.
3
4
ii
At this point, I am neither reinforcing nor justifying any of the perspectives, views or outlooks
implicated here. I am merely setting up the problem in a provisional only to show further the
possible conceptual links that may be said to obtain (or not) between (some of ) them, e.g.,
between cultural relativism and particularism, or communitarianism.
Putnam writes: “We all know that cultural relativism is inconsistent” (Putnam, 1983, p. 236);
see Brandt, 1984 for a refutation. See however Hales (1997), for a valiant effort to show how
one can make relativism consistent from a logical point of view. See also Harman (1977, 1996,
2000a, 2000b), Wong (1985, 1986, 1991, 1996), Walzer (1994) for other, yet different attempts to
defend moral relativism. See finally Williams (1985) for an attempt to state normative relativism
in a coherent and not self-defeating way.
W ho is ( n o t ) a fra id o f ( c u lt u r a l ) r e l at i vi sm ?
However, I believe that we stand to advance the debate further and
thereby gain in our understanding of the issue by addressing another question, and that is, “Who is (not) afraid of (cultural) relativism?”5 I submit that
by trying to ascertain to whom it appeals or not, and more precisely, why
it appeals to some people and not to others, and by focusing thereby on
what is at stake between opposing camps, we can better understand some
of the uses, or rather abuses of relativism. We might also thereby understand
better the possible conflicts, divisions, and tensions that may subsequently
emerge between them. Besides, by attending not only to the arguments
and ­counter-arguments given by proponents and opponents of relativism,
but also to their respective motivations, background assumptions, as well
as their personal, ideological or political purposes, we can show more effectively why cultural relativism is untenable and unacceptable today, not even
for the reasons for which it is often upheld by its proponents. In turn, we
might be able to show how the challenge it raises can best be met and countered (Rachels, 1999, Renteln, 1985).
5
I am naturally aware that the latter question sounds more like an empirical question, perhaps
better addressed through a socio-historical inquiry, whereas the former is, properly speaking,
to be understood as a normative question, and therefore squarely situated within the realm of
moral philosophy. And I certainly do not intend to commit myself to a defense of “the naturalistic fallacy”, and seek somewhat trivially to derive an ‘ought’ (norms, what we ought to do) from
an ‘is’ (facts, what we are and what we do). Nevertheless, I believe that our normative thinking
is best (more realistic and more convincing) when it is constrained in some way by relevant
kinds of empirical considerations, though not determined by, nor merely derived from them.
This should be taken in the context of a broader concern with a prominent trend in moral and
political philosophy (esp., in the Anglo-American tradition), in which philosophers, despite
claims to the contrary are in fact far too focused on ideal-theoretical considerations and less
or not enough on real-world conditions. They do not always factor in relevant and appropriate
considerations about the world as we know it is, what human beings are and have shown
themselves to be in the course of recorded history. But most importantly, they do not consider
what humans and/in the world can both realistically become –provided they are prodded by a
judiciously calibrated normative and arguably “utopian thinking”. Compare and contrast with
Rawls (1999), or with Rousseau (1997). The latter writes at the opening of his famous work: “My
purpose is to consider if, in political society, there can be any legitimate and sure principle of
government, taking men as they are and laws as they might be. In this inquiry I shall try to bring
together what right permits with what interest requires so that justice and utility are in no way
divided”. Rousseau also said: “The limits of the possible in moral matters are less narrow that
we think. It is our weaknesses, our vices, our prejudices, that shrink them. Base souls do not
believe in great men. Vile slaves smile mockingly at the word freedom” (Rousseau, 1997, II,
12,2). In the Law of Peoples, Rawls claims to follow Rousseau. He writes: “I shall assume that
his phrase ‘men as they are’ refers to persons’ moral and psychological natures and how that
nature works within a framework of political and social institutions; and his phrase ‘laws as
they might be’ refers to laws as they should, or ought, to be” (Rawls, 1999, p. 7, 13). See Chokr,
“On Justice in a Globalizing World” (2008, forthcoming) for a clearer and more substantial
articulation of my concern and my view on “how not to do political philosophy today”.
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In my essay, I propose to discuss the thesis of “cultural relativism” (in both
its descriptive and normative version)6 in an effort to ascertain and impeach
more perspicuously the reasons for the strong appeal it continues to exert
today in a world deep in the throes of the nth wave of ‘globalization’7.
The approach I take is the one recommended by Bernard Williams in
Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy.
Rather than seeking to know whether we should think in a relativistic manner,
for logical or conceptual reasons, or whether this is impossible, we must instead
ask ourselves what place we could reasonably find for a thought of this kind, and in
what sense it responds more adequately to reflection (Williams, 1985, p. 160).
6
7
iv
To keep my discussion within manageable bounds, I will not seek herein to discuss all versions and
variations on the thesis of relativism. However, it will be obvious that much of what I have to say
about (normative) ‘cultural relativism’ has a certain degree of generality and wider applicability
(see Krausz, 1989, Krausz & Meiland, 1982). Relativism is certainly one of the most tenacious
views with a pedigree and a history as old as philosophy itself —in both Western and Eastern
traditions. In the ancient Greek world, both the historian Herodotus and the sophist Protagoras
have presumably endorsed some form of relativism. The latter’s view was famously discussed
by Plato in the Theaetetus. This has, as we know, given rise to philosophical controversies about
what Protagoras really meant by his well-know statement: Man is the measure of all things”, but
also naturally about Plato’s interpretation. In the ancient Chinese world, the Taoist philosopher,
Chuang-Tzu (whose name is nowadays spelled ‘Zhuangzi’) is also said to have put forward a nonobjectivist view which is often interpreted as a kind of relativism (see Westermarck, 1906, 1932 and
Allinson, 1989, p 112-142, on the question of relativism in Chuang Tzu). Nearly as ancient as its
history is the criticism that such a view is untenable and self-refuting. However, despite its ancient
history, it was not until the 20th century that it became a prominent and highly controversial
issue in philosophy as well as in other areas or domains. Since then, it has been submitted to a
continuous barrage of other objections and criticisms. Yet, it seems to have endured –in one form
or another—and continues to exert an appeal, even though is has been shown repeatedly to be
profoundly misguided (see for example Brandt, 1984 for a refutation; see also Putnam, 1983).
Unlike many writers today dealing with this subject, I am here taking a historically more informed,
and therefore more nuanced and qualified position about ‘globalization.’ Thus I assume that we
have witnessed several waves of ‘globalization’ before –starting roughly back in the 6th century BC,
and upward in time through the 15-16th centuries until the 19th and 20th centuries, and in more
recent times (how many depends on when one starts and the ‘periodization’ of history one favors).
However, I contend that the latest wave, which is commonly said to have started in the 80s, is one
that is substantially different (qualitatively and quantitatively) from all previous ones. Its impact
on all spheres of life (economic, political, social, cultural, etc) is of a different kind and far more
extensive. The challenge before us is to figure out how to think through the consequences of
these developments, and in the case that is of interest to us here, we need to figure out what this
means for the commonly accepted conception (or misconception) of ‘culture’ at this juncture
of our history. As I will show in due course the thesis of ‘cultural relativism’ is underwritten
by an inadequate conception of ‘culture,’ one that is committed to dubious and objectionable
assumptions (of essentialism, monism, holism, hermeticism, idealism and determinism), and therefore
inadequate from both an empirical and normative point of view. In short, relativists fail to taken
into account what I call “the consequences of cultural complexity” (Chokr, 2006a, 2007a, 2007b)
and most specifically the fact that ‘globalization’ is invariably accompanied by ‘glocalisation’ –i.e.,
the adaptation and appropriation of global phenomena in terms of local and particular factors
and considerations. See later discussion to that effect.
W ho is ( n o t ) a fra id o f ( c u lt u r a l ) r e l at i vi sm ?
This is precisely the leading question of my inquiry. However, I must
quickly note that, given the character properly philosophical of my inquiry,
I will not be able to dispense completely with a certain amount of preliminary logical and conceptual work.
I believe however that, by heeding Williams’ injunction to the extent
possible, and by situating our efforts within such an approach, we might be
able to ascertain certain real and serious moral problems and difficulties to
which we had not perhaps paid sufficiently attention. We might also come
to better appreciate (the reasons for) the enduring and powerful appeal that
it has exerted for more than two thousand years, and continues to exert
today on individuals and groups of diverse philosophical, political and ideological persuasions, and this, regardless of the strictures placed upon them
by purely logical or conceptual considerations. This appreciation of the
peculiar “resistance” of relativism to logical and conceptual analysis might
in turn give us a uniquely informed vantage-point from which to address
(the question of ) the “fear of relativism” (Scanlon, 1995).
To clarify further my theoretical and methodological commitments, the
following caveat is in order. Though I have taken up Williams’ recommendation and will be appropriating and using a number of his most insightful
concepts and notions for my purposes, I do not intend however to situate
my entire analysis squarely within the conceptual, theoretical and explanatory framework that his work seems to suggest. Williams has unquestionably offered us one of the most insightful, perspicuous, and nuanced discussion of moral relativism. Thus, I am favorably disposed to adopt a number
of his insights and points in these regards as part of the background of my
inquiry. However, I believe along with a number of sympathetic critics that
his contribution is in the final analysis confronted with aporias, serious difficulties and tensions (see Nussbaum, 2003, p. 9-12, Scheffler, 1987, reprinted
in 2002, p. 197-216). For one thing, it is arguably unclear, and thus it is a
matter of philosophical debates, whether Williams (1985) can be viewed as
attempting to see how (if ) we can make relativism coherent or as defending outright some version of moral relativism. For another, it is doubtful
whether this alternative proposal to ethical theory or to “the morality système”, to use his expression, will satisfice (i.e, satisfy and be sufficient) for
the purpose of normative social and political criticism, which he obviously
engages in and deems necessary. I will attempt to show why I entertain
such doubts when I take up later on my critical examination of Williams’
view. I will consider, in particular, his alternative proposal based primarily
on ‘reflection’ and his recommendation that we replace the ‘thin’ concepts
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favored by the “morality system” and its theorists with ‘thick’ concepts –of
the sort that were prevalent in the ethical thought of ancient Greece.
In the end however, I agree with Williams on the following point.
Though cultural relativism conjures up admittedly a general moral problem,
it is in reality either too early or too late (Williams, 1972, 1981, 1985, 2002). In
our case, and at this juncture of history, we must recognize that it is rather
late in the day. In an increasingly globalizing/glocalizing, inter-connected,
and inter-dependent world, we need to heed the consequences of “cultural
complexity” and articulate a more appropriate conception of ‘culture’ than
the one that typically serves to underwrite the relativists’ view (see Chokr,
2006a, 2007a, 2007b for a proposal of an alternative conception)8. If and
when we do so, we would better be able to see the normative, pragmatic
and political requirements imposed upon us all at this juncture to take our
moral responsibilities toward one another more seriously than we have so
far. We might then perhaps be more inclined to break down even further
the walls of our “cultural prisons”, and reject the “comfortably numbing”
yet “dangerous illusions” of a walled-in relativistic existence.
In such a context, I argue, the old debate between ‘cultural relativism’
and the ‘moral universalism’9 of yesteryears –with regards to human rights,
for example– is in my view not only at a dead-end, but outdated, literally
overcome and made irrelevant by the events, so to speak (Chokr, 2002, 2003,
2006a). It seems then that only a movement away from cultural relativism
and towards something like a “pluralistic, historically enlightened, ethical
universalism” can help us. We must address the questions that we all face
together in a world caught up in the nth wave of ‘globalization,’ and in which
we now all form a new moral and conversational community confronted with
urgent questions as well as new and unprecedented problems. But, of course,
8
9
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Among the relativists here in question, I would include all the self-appointed and elitist “guardians of cultural purity and integrity”, comprising, among others, the former Prime Minister of
Singapore, Li Kuan Yew, officials and numerous intellectuals of the People’s Republic of China,
various other Asian, African and Latin American leaders and intellectuals, various religious
and secular leaders and scholars of the Muslim world, a number of Western intellectuals and
philosophers [such as Rorty (1991), Levi-Strauss (1985), and Lyotard (1984) for example, apart
from those already mentioned], and many other protagonists around the world who do not
have the courage of standing clearly and firmly behind their beliefs and positions, and that one
may characterize therefore as “closet or reluctant relativists”.
What I mean to say here obviously is that the traditional formulation of the problem is outdated, not that the stakes are and should no longer be our concern. By the notion of “moral
universalism”, I mean the traditional, Western-centric approach which sought to find its justification in a metaphysical or transcendental way on the basis of some suspiciously ethnocentric,
monolithic notion of human nature, reason, rationality, or even person (see Donnelly, 1984,
Renteln, 1985, Okin, 1998).
W ho is ( n o t ) a fra id o f ( c u lt u r a l ) r e l at i vi sm ?
the philosophical interesting and urgent question is how can we best make a
case for such a perspective –which aims to be sufficiently respectful of cultural
differences, while countenancing at the same time strong normative requirements and constraints for the purpose of social and political criticism.
A number of contemporary philosophers are attempting to articulate precisely such a view from their respective philosophical and political standpoint
(see for example, Nussbaum, 2000, 2006, Pogge, 2002, Benhabib, 2002).
The view I am inclined to uphold and advocate bears obviously some clear
and strong affinities with Nussbaum’s in her effort to articulate and defend
a “partial theory of social and global justice” anchored within “the capabilities approach” for which I also have great sympathies10. However, I seek to
defend such a view without resorting for its ‘justification,’ as Nussbaum does,
to a prior account of the human good based on a Marxian/neo-Aristotelian
form of (internal) essentialism11. We are better off proceeding in a radically
non-foundationalist and non-metaphysical manner, on purely pragmatic and
political grounds. The “justification” for a pluralistic, contextually sensitive,
and historically enlightened ethical universalism should therefore be based on
historically contingent normative considerations which could be the object
of an “overlapping consensus” between members of different cultural traditions around a “free-standing moral and political conception” of social and
cultural justice and human development or flourishing. I contend more specifically that what they could agree upon are some basic and minimalist set of
pragmatic conclusions, provisions, principles, or values upholding a certain
open-ended, defeasible and ‘multiply founded’ basic proposition about what
is right (and therefore also good) for each and all human beings. They could
do so, I believe, even if they may have to resort for their fundamental justifications to their respective and at times conflicting (philosophical, moral or
religious) comprehensive doctrines or conceptions of the good life12.
10 It may be worth noting, ahead of the forthcoming in-depth discussion of Nussbaum’s view,
that the ‘capabilities’ are associated with “the freedom to choose”, and that as such, they serve
to underwrite a partial (thick-vague) conception of the good –comprising at least the freedom
to choose one’s conception and way of life.
11 Nussbaum disagrees in this regard with Rawls who has insisted on the “priority of right” in
relation to “ideas of the good” (Rawls, 1996, p. 174-211). Despite her claims to be proceeding
in this regard in a non-metaphysical way (though in an internal essentialist neo-Aristotelian
way), it is questionable whether she actually succeeds in doing so (see Nussbaum, 1988, 1990,
1992, 1993, 1995, 1999, 2000, 2000b, 2003, 2003b, 2004, 2006). In due course, I will articulate
several other grounds for possible objections to Nussbaum’s approach.
12 Just as they have done already in 1948 with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).
See Jacques Maritain (1951), Charles Taylor (2001, p. 409-423), and Nussbaum (2004, p. 63) for
a similar line of reasoning. See Chokr, 2006a for an extended discussion on this point.
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Cultural relativism:
thesis-arguments and counter-arguments
The thesis-formulation, clarification, preliminary problematization
The thesis of cultural relativism here of interest, and that I intend to
examine critically can be formulated as follows13:
(CR) Different cultures have different moral standards, and the standards by
which the action and conduct of any individual are (can or should be) evaluated
and measured are those of the community to which the individual belongs.
Because such a thesis is easily confused with a number of moral claims, it
might be useful to draw some distinctions for the sake of clarification, and
setting up if only in a preliminary manner the problematic as I see it. It is
one thing to note that (as in the first part of CR) that “different cultures
have different moral standards” and subsequently assert that “there is a plurality of standards associated with different cultures, peoples –and one might
even add, times and places. This may be called “descriptive moral relativism”.
It is another to state that there is no single universally valid moral standard for all cultures, peoples, times and places. In such a view, a plurality of
standards provides the only frames of reference against which the truth (or
justification)14 of moral claims can be evaluated. Such claims, it is said further, cannot be evaluated unless and until a framework is specified. We may
13 At a meta-theoretical level, I make some relatively unproblematic and widely accepted and
reasonable background assumptions –which are also for the most part those included by the
editors of Tracés in their call for contributions. Quite generally, a position is said to be relativistic, if it holds that a determinate thing is relative in some specifiable way to another. In others
words, where there is relativity, there is at least a two-term relation. A relativist scheme functions
on the basis of a dependent variable (A) and an independent variable (B): A is relative to B. This
scheme can be applied obviously to a number of areas or domains, and may thus seem general
enough and innocuous. But the stakes become more serious and clearer when it comes to
choosing the variables and determine the strength of the relation (whether it be one of necessity,
probability, or sufficiency). The debates about relativism, as attested by the exploding literature
in the 20th century, are all the more acrimonious and heated if truth, rationality, knowledge,
language, or morality is chosen as a dependent variable rather than an independent one. They
bear furthermore on following kinds of considerations: the scale (local or global), the domain
of application (moral, epistemological, ontological, semantical, or cultural), the pretensions
and aims (descriptive vs. normative, theoretical vs. empirical, weak vs. strong) or the kinds of
connections or combinations that can be established or assumed between various claims (e.g.,
moral relativism to substantive normative relativism), and which a particular version relativism
can claim (or not) for itself (See Krausz, 1989, Krausz and Meiland, 1982, Munthe, 2005).
14 Because the point is often made with respect to truth or justification (or both), it is useful to
include both aspects in our general characterization (see MacIntyre, 1994).
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W ho is ( n o t ) a fra id o f ( c u lt u r a l ) r e l at i vi sm ?
call this variant, “philosophical moral relativism”. It is also sometimes referred
to as “meta-­ethical relativism” because it asserts in effect that “the truth (or
justification) of a given action, behavior or judgment is indexed or relative
to cultural and historical context of the community in which the action or
behavior is carried out, or the judgment is made”. It is meta-ethical because
it is a thesis about the conditions under which judgments are true or justified. Moral truth is relativized to a moral community. It is yet quite another
to assert that we should be tolerant of those who use moral standards different from our own –because each standard is somehow appropriate for its own
culture. Such a claim that we ought not to pass judgment on those deploying
alternative frameworks is often dubbed “normative moral relativism”(see section 3 for details).
Although these three different relativist doctrines are distinguishable
from one another and can arguably be held consistently in different combinations, all three quite often go together. It must stressed however that only
a view that allows different moral standards in a given area of concern to be
in some sense equally valid is a genuinely relativist view. In order to ascertain whether there is a genuine difference in moral standards, and whether
a given view is truly relativist, it seems that we must hold that there is an
agreement on some facts –unrelated to the area of concern which is the
point of/in contention. A universalist view, holding that there are (true)
substantive universal moral principles, could well allow –as in the parametric universalism of Scanlon (1998)– that these principles yield different
moral requirements when applied to different circumstances. However, it is
not a relativist view, since it allows opposed moral judgments to be generated from a single universal standard due to different circumstances. Diversity of moral judgments in a given area of concern are traceable, according
to a parametric universalist, to the different circumstances in which they are
made, rather than to different moral standards.
Anyone who holds that there are (objective) ethical truths must admit
that the rightness or wrongness of an act is relative to the circumstances
in which it is performed. Because people’s circumstances differ, what is
(objectively) right for one person, might be different from what is (objectively) right for another. Even the most ardent defenders of moral objectivism or universalism must recognize that differing circumstances might well
make some action or behavior right for someone and wrong for another.
However, cases of “this is right for me, and wrong for you” do not and
cannot obviously support in any straightforward way any form of ethical
relativism.
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We could then understand cultural relativism in a similar way, as simply
putting forth a special view about how moral right or wrong varies with the
agent’s circumstances. It holds in effect that (objective) moral rightness and
wrongness depend on the prevailing culture’s beliefs about given action by
members of the culture in question15. In other words, if we want to know
the objectively right answer to the question whether a given act is right or
wrong, all we have to do is find out what the agent’s culture believes on that
question: their beliefs determine what is objectively true or justified. In the
end, it would seem that cultural relativism holds that what a culture believes
about an act determines the truth about its objective rightness or wrongness
in something like the way in which spatio-temporal location determines the
truth about the weather conditions obtaining then and there.
Though it seems obvious that we may or ought to be relativists about
some things (e.g., etiquette, humor, culinary taste, standards of beauty) but
not others (e.g., human dignity, flourishing, well-being, quality of life),
late 20th century philosophical discussions of relativism have spent a fair
amount of time simply trying to state the view coherently.
The ethical relativist most familiar to us combines all three of the theses
sketched out above in a way that best serves to illustrate the problem. Such
a person begins typically with innocent observation of a diversity of moral
practices, proceeds to infer that there is no single universal moral standard,
and then confidently concludes that we should not judge the actions or
behaviors of members of other cultures. Although this crude form of reasoning is obviously self-contradictory (the conclusion asserts a universal
moral requirement the existence of which the premises deny), avoiding this
kind of incoherence has proved surprisingly difficult –as Williams has quite
rightly pointed out (Williams, 1972, 1985).
Philosophers have also been concerned with the extent of defensible tolerance. For any moral outlook, to sincerely hold that outlook seems incompatible with regarding it as merely one among a number of outlooks, each
different, but not better than others. How, for example, could morality
have the “grip on us” that it does if it does not lead us to condemn those
who, however distant from us in time and space, radically violate its deepest tenets? The normative relativist requirement of tolerance apparently can
only be taken seriously by those who have no sincere moral convictions
15 As I will show more explicitly in due course, such a view makes some objectionable assumptions
about culture –as if it is ever monolithic and consensual operating in a deterministic, homogeneous way and equally on all members of a given culture. See later discussions of inadequate
conception of ‘culture’ (section 3.3) and ‘cultural complexity’ (section 5).
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and commitments. Thus, we might say that the basic dilemma confronting a relativist is this: Either the “ought” in the claim that we ought not to
condemn standards radically at odds with our own is relative “ought” from
within our own standards or an “ought” tied to an absolute standard. The
former is incompatible with sincerely embracing and living within a standard; the latter is incompatible with relativism.
Does moral relativism lead then to moral skepticism? The latter holds
that there are no goods grounds for believing anything is really the case
from a moral point of view. Suppose what we morally ought to do is relative to the culture (or era) in which we find ourselves. Is this compatible
with claiming that what we ought to do is what we really ought to do? Some
philosophers, such as J. L. Mackie (1977), have argued that it is not. Moral
beliefs, in his view, are beliefs about absolute moral standards of conduct.
If what exists are multiple standards, each no better than the others for its
context, then it follows that there is really nothing answering to our moral
beliefs. Others, such as David Wong (1991) argue that moral beliefs are not
about absolute standards but about prevailing standards, and therefore, in
his view, there is something answering to these beliefs.
Perhaps the most powerful consideration that has been mobilized in
favor of the claim that there is a plurality of equally correct moral standards
is that it provides the most satisfying explanation of existing differences over
the question of whether something is the case –right or wrong. If relativism explains existing differences –differences that persists even against the
background of agreement about non-contentious facts –then perhaps we
should be relativists about the matter of contention. However, it does not
follow from the fact that there are different moral frameworks for judging
the rightness or wrongness of a given action or conduct that no single correct universal moral standard exist. The different frameworks might themselves be assessable as more or less close to some universal standard. Perhaps
because of its complexity, it is simply difficult to understand or know the
correct universal standard16. It may well be that the existence of different
frameworks could be explained by the absence of a universal standard. But
it does not follow from the fact that there appears to be different frameworks for moral judgment that there are in fact different frameworks. The
parametric universalist in moral standards, for example, holds that diversity
16 This may explain at least in part why so many forms of universalism in the past
have been misconstrued, obtuse, and therefore untenable –as Nussbaum (2000) will
correctly note in section 6.2.
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is a result of the application of a very general but universally shared standard to locally diverse conditions. If this view is right, then the (philosophical, meta-­ethical, or cultural) relativist position that there is no such universal standard lacks its main support, as an explanation of moral diversity.
Arguments and counter-arguments
Over the years, various arguments have been advanced in support of
the thesis of cultural relativism. The main ones include: (1) an argument
based on the observed fact of cultural diversity. (2) An argument based
on the recognized fact of moral disagreements. (3) An argument based on
the presumed functional role of morality in society. Finally, (4) an argument based on the obvious or apparent lack of convergence in ethics as
opposed to the natural sciences. I examine next these arguments in turn
and proceed to put forth some possible (grounds for) counter-arguments
and responses.
Argument from cultural diversity
Much of the appeal of cultural relativism stems, as suggested earlier,
from the observation or affirmation that different cultures have different
moral standards and moral practices from ours, but they nevertheless get
along at least as well, or reasonably well, with their standards and practices
as we do in ours. Other things being equal we have no reason to doubt the
sincerity with which different groups hold their values. Nor, do we need to
deny that truth plays a crucial role in moral discourse, reasoning and judgment within a particular moral community.
Consider in this regard the following view suggested for example by
Harman (1977). According to Harman, a statement S1 ‘x is wrong’ should
always be interpreted as a shorthand for S2 “x is wrong in relation to moral
framework, M.’ By uttering S1, I don’t specify the conditions under which
it is true. Rather, it is the sentence and the context in which I state it that
determine the conditions under which it is true. The context supplies the
moral framework in which the sentence is to be evaluated. So, when I say
for example that “‘fox-hunting is right”, or “widow-burning is wrong”, the
truth of either claim is determined within the relevant moral framework or
context. There is no objectively correct moral framework, but there can be
multiple frameworks. The constraint on whether a statement is really to be
judged true is only one of internal consistency within the particular moral
framework. Given the complexity of the relations between principles and
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situations to which they apply, consistency may be an ideal which could
only be recognized by a thinker with perhaps unlimited time and cognitive powers so that reflection can allow their beliefs, attitudes, and values to
come into a stable equilibrium.
In later works (Harman, 1996, 2000a, 2000b), Harman has elaborated
his view so that it combines four claims: (1) There is a plurality of moral
frameworks, none more correcte than any other. (2) Moral judgments are
elliptical and stand for more complex judgments whose truth-conditions
include one of these frameworks. (3) Morality should not be abandoned.
(4) Even if relative, moral judgments can play a serious role in practical
thought (1996, p. 3-19). The second claim is an important adjustment: relativism is, he argues, not a claim about “what makes sense” in our moral
statements but a claim about their truth-conditions. What we saying for
example when we state that the slaveholder is doing something wrong
makes sense. It is just that we are saying something false because the slaveholder is not party to an agreement giving him the motivation to act
accordingly. But the third claim runs into the relativist dilemma. What
sort of “should” would we be invoking in saying that morality should not
be abandoned? Suppose “morality” refers to some moral framework: we
should have some “morality” or other. Then either there is some absolute
framework that makes this “should” true, or there is no standard at all that
makes this true. From within the point of view of one morality, it is not true
that some other morality should not be abandoned.
Counter-argument: similarities beyond or beneath differences
As suggested earlier, it may be too rushed to conclude from diversity
and variability that there is no single criterion or standard. As Wong (1991),
a proponent of moral relativism, remarks the argument from diversity does
not support relativism in any simple or direct way. One may countenance
and save cultural differences and diversity without resorting to cultural relativism. Does the fact that different communities affirm as true propositions that are contradictory entail that both must be in some way true, and
hence support relativism? I don’t think it follows. Diversity is arguably no
disproof that there are some beliefs it is better to hold than others. It may
be regarded as true in one community that we inhabit a planet revolving
around a star. In another community, the people may sincerely believe that
we inhabit a sphere-like universe attached to the back of a giant tortoise.
Furthermore, these beliefs about the nature of our world may be consistent
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with the other beliefs and attitudes held in their respective communities.
The fact of difference may be better explained by the fact that some beliefs
are wrong. As for the task of explaining why certain beliefs are false, this is
arguably the kind of task characteristic of cases in which there is, and there
should be, both diversity and dialogue.
The very same value may be expressed or realized in a different ways.
Differences in practices may be superficial differences in the sense that it
is the very same fundamental value which finds expression differently. In
this regard, it might be worth pondering an experiment conducted by the
Emperor of Persia, Darius, and reported by the Greek historian Herodotus (presumably one of the first recorded pieces of anthropological investigation). Darius wanted to know how much Greeks would need to be
paid in order to eat the bodies of their (deceased) fathers. No amount of
money could induce them to do such a thing for it was absolutely contrary to the traditional and proper way of treating the dead. Turning to a
group from the east of the Persian Empire, Darius asked how much they
would need to be paid in order to burn their dead fathers. While burning
was acceptable to the Greeks, no amount of money could induce those
from the East to do such a thing for it was absolutely contrary to the traditional and proper way of treating the dead. They could only treat the
dead properly and with respect by eating them. This example, and others like it, in more recent times, of radically conflicting commitments on
what counts as the right thing to do have become a common staple in discussions of moral diversity, disagreement and relativism. But what we can
we safely conclude from such examples? From Darius’ experiment, I don’t
think that we cannot safely conclude that values are relative, but rather
that the value of respecting the dead can be realized in different ways. The
variety of environments and contexts in which societies exist makes it
unsurprising that fundamental or basic moral principles are implemented
and expressed in different forms17.
Argument from the fact of moral disagreements
Another reason for the appeal of cultural relativism stems from “the
fact of moral disagreements” (Wellman, 1975, Miller, 1992, Gowans, 2000).
They seem to be widespread and often appear intractable concerning a
17 Various anthropological studies could be adduced in support of this point. One may focus in
this regard on “honoring and respecting one’s parents” or “the respect for elderly members of
the community” more generally.
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number of past and contemporary issues18. The failure to settle moral disputes supports the view that there is no single moral truth or fact of the
matter, which could force such a settlement. A community in which one
practice is right just cannot agree by its own lights with one in which that
very same practice is wrong. It is then claimed that we can understand why
the dispute is irresolvable by appeal to relativism. The ways in which the
relevant facts and states are assessed are just distinct.
Counter-argument: pluralism and/or universalism
as a better response
Does disagreement really occur if relativism is true? My hunch is that it
does not. The appearance of disagreement may be explained, on a subjectivist understanding of relativism, as a clash of attitudes, as one person trying
to get the other to stand (in relation) to the world as she does. However, if
we assume that the opposing moral claims of different moral communities
can each be true, then if your judgment is true (for you), what could get
you alter it? We are in agreement about the facts or states to which the judgment is directed. By simply stating opposing views, we are of course disagreeing, but then there is nothing further to be said. Arguably the hallmark
of genuine disagreement is an assumption on the part of the interlocutors
that there is a single answer. One (or perhaps both) of us is wrong. If relativism is right, then it looks as if it is only by (somehow) moving into a different framework or moral community that I could come to understand the
rightness or wrongness of a given practice or belief. If this is so, universalism
might then offer a better account of real disagreement.
One could also argue that pluralism explains the fact of disagreement better
than relativism19. Pluralism is here taken to be the thesis that there is not a single dominant moral criterion or value (e.g. individual welfare, or the good of
18 The following issues may be mentioned in this regard: human sacrifice, slavery, pogroms, footbinding, widow-burning, animal cruelty, experimentation on animals vs. humans, IPR and
the poor’s health and medical welfare, GMF, global warming, bio-diversity, abortion, death
penalty, torture, just war, violence against women, marital rape, pornography, female genital
mutilation, women’s rights, free speech and free press, corporate responsibility, dissidence and
political activism, obligations to others (near and dear vs. distant and foreign), conceptions of
human rights, limits of tolerance, etc, etc.
19 Both pluralism and universalism are discussed further and in detail throughout. In the closing
section of this essay, I distinguish at least two variants of each. My purpose is double: making a
case for the view that I wish to advocate in the final analysis, following Nussbaum in this regard,
though with significant differences, as well as making clearer and more acute the fundamental
challenge that we face today. See Chokr (2008) for further details.
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the community), and that there is an irreducible plurality of morally relevant
considerations. There are therefore independent kinds of value, which can
pull moral judgment in different directions depending on the context and the
perspective of the person deliberating or judging. Disagreement reflects apparently ‘incommensurable’ and sometimes conflicting values and goods which
frame deliberation and judgment to which moral communities respond.
Argument from the functional role of morality in society
A third reason for the appeal to cultural relativism has to do with the
functional role of morality. The function of morality is said to be, inter alia,
to foster conditions of stability and cooperation making it possible to negotiate conflicts of interest between and within individuals. Those conditions
can be realized by the adherence to, and application of different models of
morality. Perhaps the most basic function of morality is the regulation and
negotiation of conflict.
A community committed, for example, to the values of dignity, humility, charity, compassion, and justice (including a notion of just retribution,
and probably several others) has one normative framework in which conflicts can presumably be handled, resolved, or dissolved. The point however
is that the very same problem (or set of problems) can be solved in many
different ways. It is interesting to note that these values (as well as others)
can be attributed to, and associated with Christian, Muslim, or Jewish communities, and possibly others –even if they are formulated and ‘cashed out’
in different ways. The fact that a given problem can be addressed in different, yet equally viable ways may lend support to the “overlapping consensus” view that I uphold –along with Nussbaum.
Counter-argument: other, more fundamental, role(s) for morality
The role of morality is not just to keep order or stability so as to facilitate co-operation and help resolve potential conflicts. This is presumably
the role of the law. Morality is (and should be) concerned with the standards
of good and right to which law and individual judgment ought to conform
and aim. Whereas ethics is (and should be) concerned with the question of
“how should we live?” individually and collectively20.
20 With regard to the distinction implied here between morality and ethics, and the proper and
central question of the latter, I follow not only Williams, but the later Foucault as well (see
Chokr, 2006b for a forceful defense of this point of view).
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Argument from the lack of convergence in ethics
Finally, another reason for the appeal of cultural relativism has to do
with the lack of convergence in ethics as opposed to the natural sciences, at
this juncture of our history. We have no reason to impugn people in general
with irrationality when it comes to moral matters. Yet, if there were a set of
moral truths against which all actions should be evaluated and which are
accessible to persons in general, then we should expect some degree of convergence on these moral truths. Convergence will tend to eliminate diversity
and we have no grounds for thinking that this has happened. If we contrast
ethics with the natural sciences, we note that there has been a very high
degree of convergence on belief on the fundamental structure of the physical
universe. This contrast has been cited by some philosophers as good reason
to be skeptical about moral knowledge and progress (Mackie, 1977).
Counter-argument: pessimistic and possibly unjustified conclusion
It would unreasonable not to concede that, unlike scientific enquiry of
the natural world, there is no appearance of a moral convergence or agreement in ethics. How can this observation be explained (away)? Is it because
moral questions are particularly difficult? Is it because of our cognitive and
affective limitations that we have no answer that is accessible to us? Or, is it
because certain moral issues are essentially indeterminate or vague? I don’t
think that it is a cognitive failing or an indication of relativism that we have
not identified or converged on the determinate facts of the matter. While it
would be flagrantly unreasonable to deny the lack of convergence in ­ethics,
it may be arguably unjustifiably pessimistic to conclude that cultural relativism (or even moral skepticism) follows from the above premise. Even
more strongly, I think we might deny that there has been no convergence
on moral standards. It may be difficult for us to accept the idea of ‘moral
progress’ in a world that has been marred by so much moral horror and
tragedy –esp., during the 20th century. However, we can reasonably concede the following point. The widening acceptance worldwide that there
are certain basic standards –e.g., such as most, though perhaps not all, of
those contained in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (see
earlier note 10) which can serve to frame how we ought to act can somehow
be viewed as an empirical ground for the claim that there is moral development. It can also be taken as an explanation for the contention that the
world could be a morally much improved place. This is not the expression
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of a naively optimistic outlook, but rather that of a realistic yet hopeful pessimism calling desperately for a hyper-activist political and ethical stance.
The normative variation and its justification
The observation or affirmation of cultural diversity is often conjoined
with another idea consisting in objecting to (what is perceived as) Western
hegemony and imperialism by upholding that it is wrong for Western culture
to be intolerant of other cultures and impose its ways on them. But this idea
does not imply cultural relativism, as its proponents often claim. It could even
be shown that it is probably even inconsistent with it. The intended connection between ‘cultural relativism’ and ‘tolerance’ is arguably based on an argument for normative (cultural) relativism. Such an argument is concerned with
practice and policy rather than questions of ontology, knowledge or meaning.
It is about first-order moral judgments –the kinds that address directly and
substantively questions of what is good, right, and virtuous.
To be more explicit, such an argument maintains that
(NR1) One ought not to pass judgment on others who hold (substantially)
différents values from one’s own.
(NR2) The actions generally approved in other cultures are objectively right
for no other reason than they are generally approved in those cultures (cultural relativism)
(NR3) One ought not to try to make those others conform to one’s ­values
because their values are as valid as one’s own.
A serious question confronting this normative version of relativism is
whether it can be coherently stated, let alone defended. Let me briefly
explain why.
Consider the following line of reasoning:
(R1) Moral standards are relative to a particular culture or community:
‘right’ means ‘right for a given society’ (meta-ethical claim).
(R2) The rightness or goodness of an action is determined by its functional role for a given society or community (sociological and anthropological claim).
(R3) Therefore, one should not pass judgment on, one should respect, and
not intervene in the life or practices of other cultures or communities (normative claim).
This is clearly an instance of the kind of reasoning mentioned earlier (section 2), which leads, according to Williams (1972), to a relativism in a vulgar
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and unregenerate form. The conclusion makes a non-relativistic claim: it tells
us what is right to do in our dealings with other societies and cultures, and
in doing so it employs ‘right’ in a non-relative and universalist sense, which
is not permitted by R1.
One can further impugn the defensibility of normative relativism by
pointing out that it appears to entail paradoxically self-condemnation. Suppose in our community C1 the normative claim (R3) is accepted. What
should we do when we see another community C2 intervene in the practices of some other community C3? If we criticize C2, then we seem to be
breaching our very own principle, and so we must condemn ourselves. Yet
how can we at once endorse a principle of non-intervention or tolerance
while allowing to pass un-questioned and un-criticized the actions of those
who violate it? The difficulty appears that normative relativism requires a
sincere commitment to (R2) be supplemented with a kind of ‘do-nothing
attitude’ or ‘quietism’ with respect to those who do not share that standard.
Yet a failure to act in the face of a violation of the principle just casts the
sincerity, commitment or seriousness with which it is held into doubt. The
normative claim is here taken to be non-relative, and therefore universally
applicable: this is clearly a self-refuting stance.
Even if one is skeptical about the plausibility of normative relativism,
the meta-ethical claim (R1) may nonetheless be a live option. Indeed, that
would explain why it is true for me to say that C2 has acted wrongly in
intervening in C3 and to criticize them for doing so. For, in our community, it is true that intervention is wrong. Equally, the people in C2 can
insist that for them, by their moral standard or criterion, it is true that intervention is right (see Wong 1985, 1991 for a more positive view on normative
relativism).
Bernard Williams was interested in coming up with some way of stating normative relativism such that it is coherent and not vulnerable to selfcontradiction. Recall that the self-contradictory ethical relativist view is
the claim that, since there are no universal moral standards, no one ever
ought to condemn the practices of other cultures. The main issue is whether
philosophical or meta-ethical relativism can coherently constitute grounds
for normative relativism. Coherent normative relativism requires recognizing the absence of an (external) vantage-point from which one can make
meaningful evaluative comparisons between alternative moral frameworks.
Such a vantage-point would result in what Williams calls a “real confrontation” between belief-systems –as opposed to a “notional” one (Williams,
1981, p. 132-143).
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The basic idea is this: The possibility of normative relativism arises only
when some action or practice is the locus of disagreement between holders of two self-contained and exclusive systems. Two belief-systems, B1 and
B2, are exclusive of one another when they have consequences that disagree
under some description but do not require either to abandon their side of
the disagreement. When groups holding B1 and B2 respectively encounter
each other, this can result in a confrontation between them. A real confrontation between B1 and B2 occurs when B2 is real option for the group
living under B1. In a notional confrontation, in contrast, B2 is not a real
option. B2 would be a real option for a group living under B1 if two conditions are met. First, those holding B1 could “retain their hold on reality”
by living under B2, in the sense that they would not, for example, need
to engage in radical self-deception. Second, they could acknowledge their
transition to B2 in light of a rational comparison to B1. If the conditions for
real confrontation are not met for those holding B1 however, then there is
only a notional confrontation with B2 and there is “no point or substance”
to considerations of whether B2 might be a better or worse belief-system
than B1. If a member of B1 does not regard the confrontation with B2 as
real confrontation, then “the language of appraisal –good, bad, right, wrong
and so on is seen as inappropriate, and no judgments are made” (ibid, 1985,
p. 161). The suspension of such judgments amounts to adopting normative
relativism about B1 and B2.
The language of appraisal is appropriate with regards to B2 only if those
holding B1 could “go over” to B2. The people (hoi polloi) who pursue the
pleasures of so-called “low” culture may judge that there is little of value in
a life crowded with the elites activities of “high” culture. It is a real possibility that they could learn to love and enjoy opera, for example, and lose their
taste for country music, so they may evaluate doing so on their own terms.
Those from the “low” culture could judge “high” culture to be boring, while
those from “high” culture could judge “low” culture to be tacky, tasteless
and lacking depth. However, Williams observes, “the life of a Bronze Age
chief or a medieval samurai are not real options for us: there is no way of
living them” (ibid, 1985, p. 161). They are too alien to permit us to make the
same judgments between culture mavens.
In this respect, however, Williams’ account (like Harman’s) fails to
deliver what it set out to do –a coherent normative relativism. For, it is
not clear in what sense it would not be “appropriate” to appraise these
moralities as less morally enlightened than our own. If appraisals of B2 are
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system B. Can B1, then, forbid the appraisal of other B’s? It is difficult to
see how it could, if, as we assume, a belief-system requires and presupposes that it has a grip on the thinking of those within it that prevents
them from taking an external view of it. Let us suppose that Williams
thinks that “a real option” is an option that would be as good or better
from a point of view external to both B1 and B2 –say, the point of view of
human flourishing and well-being 21. This would be to abandon relativism.
For, according to the relativist, there is no B external to particular beliefsystems such as B1 and B2, i.e, a universal standard from which one could
judge that appraisal is inappropriate. To evaluate B1 and B2 in terms of
“human well-being” would be to hold up such a notion as a universal
standard. Alternatively, suppose that Williams is thinking (like Harman)
that this is somehow “a soberly logical thesis”: it is just nonsensical to
judge medieval samurai morals to be better or worse than our own. Williams himself denies this claim, by saying that the vocabulary of appraisal
in such cases “can no doubt be applied without linguistic impropriety”
(Williams, 1981, p. 141). But if we were to accept that this is a logical or
linguistic impropriety, then he (like Harman) would have to explain how
this could be so, given that it seems intelligible enough to say that their
morals were worse in many respects than our own.
Normative (cultural) relativism versus Western hegemony and imperialism
Some proponents of cultural relativism often charge that among the ethical beliefs of Western culture22 is that of its superiority and rightful supremacy
over all others. They would presumably formulate such a belief as follows:
Western values, ways and practices should be imposed on other cultures, and
members of Western culture should blame, and interfere with, the actions of
people in other cultures whenever these actions violate ­Western values.
Let us assume for the sake of argument that cultural relativists are right
that superiority and supremacy is a belief of Western culture. Then what
they are telling us as members of Western culture is that it is (objectively)
right for us to impose our ways on others and objectively right for us to
blame and interfere with the actions of people in other cultures whenever
21 The pertinence of this point will become clearer when I turn in due course to my critical
discussions of both Williams’ and Nussbaum’s views.
22 As if it has always been consensual, one and indivisible, and otherwise uncontested from
within. This is certainly a questionable and highly problematic assumption not only about
Western culture but also, I would argue, about any other culture, as a proper apprehension
and understanding of ‘cultural complexity’ would confirm (see section 5 on this notion).
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our values condemn them. That means that cultural relativism does not
support (NR3), or (R3) for that matter, but its contradictory.
Besides, what account can a cultural relativist consistently give of the
ethical principle stated in (NR1) above? If the principle is supposed to have
trans-cultural validity, how can this be consistent with cultural relativism?
If the principle is valid merely because it is one of our culture’s ethical
beliefs, then it deserves no priority over the alleged Western superiority and
supremacy. And then it looks as if (NR1) and the alleged Western superiority/supremacy taken together imply the falsity of (NR2), that is, of cultural
relativism. In that case, cultural relativism is self-refuting for us Westerners (and, indeed, for the members of any culture whose ethical beliefs happen to be incompatible with cultural relativism). It follows from this that
cultural relativism is totally incapable of combating any form of culturally
entrenched (justification for) imperialism, racism, sexism, or ethnocentrism. For whenever we find these ugly propensities and phenomena built
into a culture’s beliefs, cultural relativism is committed to endorsing them;
and if cultural relativism is interpreted in such a way as to conflict with
these beliefs, then it becomes self-refuting in that culture.
In practice, cultural relativism is also used sometimes as a pretext for
following whatever ethical beliefs one finds convenient. For instance, a
Western-based multinational corporation operating in other parts of the
world comes from a culture that believes that it is all right to seek and
secure for oneself the highest profit one can within the bounds defined by
the law. Cultural relativism could say they may do that –even if this means
disrupting the traditions of that culture. But cultural relativism could also
say that they need not blame or interfere with practices within that culture
which might be considered wrong in their own culture. These practices
could include violations of fundamental civil and political rights, repression of so-called ‘dissidents,’ censorship of media outlets, police-state terror directed against minorities, religious groups, or migrant workers who
protest brutally low wages, miserable, unsafe, and precarious working conditions through which corporations reap much of their profits. So interpreted, cultural relativism allows these corporations to do whatever they
like and deem expedient, or strictly in their business interests –very narrowly construed.
The above analysis and results suggest that cultural relativism does not do
justice to the actual views of those who really want to promote cross-cultural
tolerance or oppose Western hegemony and imperialism. It looks like those
views really consist in holding to certain (objective, trans-cultural) ethical
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principles about how the members of different cultures should act toward
each other, such as that people should be open-minded and tolerant to all
human beings, always treating them with dignity and respect. But those
who presumably oppose ‘Western hegemony and imperialism’ are often
embarrassed to admit to such principles because they obviously come from
the modern, Western Enlightenment tradition. To do so would immediately expose them to the dreaded charge of ‘brain-washing’ or ‘ethnocentrism’ –the former, if one is a member of a non-Western culture, and the latter, if one is a Westerner. By contrast, cultural relativism’s principled stance
of cross-cultural neutrality seems then to buy immunity from this charge.
But cultural relativism itself is arguably a modern Western idea every bit as
much as Enlightenment moral principles are. The only difference perhaps
is that, as I have suggested, cultural relativism is actually hostile to crosscultural tolerance and mutual respect, whereas certain other principles of
Western Enlightenment do favor them.
We seem to end up in a paradoxical and somewhat perplexing position.
This may be because we start somehow from the correct point that everyone’s standpoint is somehow constrained and perhaps limited by their cultural perspective, and then proceed by directly contradicting this insight in
trying immediately to occupy a non-existent “sublimely neutral standpoint”
above all such constraints and limitations. Wouldn’t it be wiser to align
­ourselves with some standpoint situated within a given culture, or rather
and more accurately within a given “cultural complex” which, despite its
inevitable constraints and limitations, at least makes an effort to be critical of itself and tolerant of other cultural standpoints? We may be reluctant
to take this wiser course because it may be hard to identify and adopt such
a standpoint23. We may realize that the biases and prejudices from which
we start will undoubtedly lead us into misjudgments, mistakes and errors,
probably culpable and morally objectionable ones. We may even be aware
that by taking this path we can never hope altogether to escape the accusation of ethnocentrism, but we may resign ourselves to learn to live with it,
as part of our human condition (Rorty, 1991, Levi-Strauss, 1985)24.
23 As suggested earlier (note 14), and as we shall see when I turn in section 6.2 to my discussion
of Nussbaum’s view.
24 Levi-Strauss (1985) has argued that it may be an illusion that humanity can ever escape completely ethnocentrism, or even that it will care to do so. In his view, it is not only not a bad thing
in itself, but, as long it does not get out of hand, a rather good one. As for Rorty, he claims,
“we have to work from the networks we are, from the communities with which we presently
identify”, and that “we can only hope to produce a better conception of rationality and a better
conception of morality if we operate from within our tradition” (Rorty, 1991, p. 200-202).
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Cultural relativism is found far more appealing because its empty gestures enable its proponents to announce their good intentions and repudiate
their cultural biases and prejudices in the abstract, with a mere wave of the
hand, as it were. It enables them to absolve themselves of cultural constraints
and limitations in general without ever having to overcome any of them in
particular. As we have seen, it even provides an endorsement for them, when
that is needed. Could this be the reason why it has widespread appeal among
the more sophisticated and elite members of both Western and non-Western
cultures?25 In the case of the former, perhaps what proponents of cultural
relativism really want is a justification and a license to behave like brutal and
arrogant imperialists or oppressors while at the same time thinking of themselves as tolerant and humane cosmopolitans who have transcended all their
cultural biases and prejudices. In the case of the latter, it would seem that proponents of relativism are typically the self-appointed and elitists “guardians of
cultural purity and integrity”. They wish to maintain and legitimize their use
and abuse of power within their respective communities, and seek to “justify”
traditional beliefs and practices no matter how oppressive and unjust they
might be. At the same time they claim to ward off the irrepressible incursions
of Western cultural ­imperialism and other cultural influences in the name
of dubiously and suspiciously construed notions of ‘cultural egalitarianism,’
‘diversity,’ and ‘tolerance.’
Problems, paradoxes, and other difficulties
Even if cultural relativism lived up to its advertised claim and image as
promoter of cross-cultural tolerance, it would still be extremely implausible
because it seems to commit us to the objective rightness (in the context of a
given culture) of all the moral beliefs and practices which have ever existed.
Slavery was objectively right in ancient Greece and Rome, and even in the US
not so long ago. Human sacrifices were objectively right for the Aztecs and
other pre-Columbian, meso-american cultures: it was right to cut the heart
out of the still living human sacrificial offering. That practice is wrong to us,
and would have been considered wrong in medieval Europe or Japan, but
not in other parts of the ancient world. The Indian custom of suttee, requiring a widow to burn herself to death on her husband’s funeral pyre, was also
considered right in traditional India. The pogrom, or the periodic indiscriminate slaughter of Jews, which has long been part of the folkways of European
25 Other reasons for its enduring, yet misguided appeal are provided in forthcoming section 4.
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Christian peoples in past centuries was also considered morally acceptable.
Also objectively right is the genital mutilation of women, which is still practiced in a variety of cultures in Africa and elsewhere in Asia. And the list of
examples can go on and on. Proponents of cultural relativism sometimes
refuse to back down even when presented with the most outrageous and
grisly of such cases. This should lead us to wonder if they would not be probably among the first to condemn these practices as strongly as anyone else,
had they not backed themselves into this position by hastily adopting a philosophical stance without due reflection upon its full implications?
Nevertheless, one must admit that the moral problems cultural ­relativism
is trying to address are certainly real and serious ones. In some cases, it is
simply not obvious what we should do or even think when confronted by
practices of another culture that offend our moral sense and contradict our
deepest convictions or intuitions. Some things that people do to one another
in different cultures are, on the one hand, quite evidently the results of ignorance, wretched superstitions, myths, and poisonous ideologies, and the brutally unjust distribution of power and authority that are common and traditional in those societies. On the other hand, we can often see that in other
cultures certain actions or practices have a different meaning, and we are
quite aware that we somehow lack the conceptual resources to understand
and evaluate the practices of alien societies. If we do nothing in the face of
what is evidently (to us) evil or morally wrong, we completely forfeit our
integrity. But if we act on the basis of convictions held from our admittedly
incomplete and ethnocentric perspective, we run the risk of arrogantly setting
ourselves up as infallible moral judges of ­people who may know more than we
do about what is being judged.
However, if traditional cultures in other parts of the world are changing
so that they become more like modern Western culture in ways we approve,
what should be our attitude? Should we applaud and support this process as
the victory of moral progress, or should we deplore, regret and oppose these
changes because they amount to the violent extinction of that culture’s “priceless, unique and distinct heritage?” What is objectionable about cultural relativism is that it pretends to have found a simple, general, tidy and unambiguous answer to questions where any answer fitting this description is almost
certainly wrong.
Inadequate conception of ‘culture’ –a poor man’s anthropology
The general criterion of right and wrong which cultural relativism proposes is not helpful at all because it is inherently unclear and impossible to
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apply in the real world. Cultural relativism tells us that the rightness of an
act depends on what the agent’s culture believes about it. But most societies today are “a complex network of cultures and subcultures”, sometimes
having widely divergent moral beliefs about important and controversial
issues. For a given person in a given situation, how are we supposed to
decide which culture or subculture the person belongs to? How many different cultures are represented in any given country today? Almost all countries are today multi-cultural societies. How many of us can be entirely sure
what culture(s) or “cultural complex” we ourselves belong to? How many
(or few) people does it take to set up a culture?
In most cultures (our own, for instance), many ethical questions are the
subject of endless disagreement and debate. This is arguably what got ethical relativism started in the first place. How are we to determine what the
ethical beliefs of the prevailing culture are? What is the so-called “prevailing
culture?” According to whom or which criteria does one characterize such a
culture? Does this require an overwhelming consensus among the culture’s
members, or is it a matter of simple majority vote? Or does cultural relativism imply that the most old-fashioned and ethnically traditional moral
judgment or opinion is always the right one? It seems that wherever (or
whenever) there is any intra-cultural disagreement at all, the effect of cultural relativism will be to support the so-called “dominant view” within
the culture by de-legitimizing all dissenting views and drowning out all
­contesting voices without giving them so much as a hearing. Cultural relativism implies that on any moral question within a culture an opinion or a
judgment is always necessarily wrong whenever it goes against traditional
beliefs very widely held in the culture in question. This means that those
individuals (or groups) who raise moral questions about entrenched and
accepted practices are always in the wrong. It also means that any movement for moral reform within a culture, even if it eventually succeeds, must
have been in the wrong at the time it got started, and therefore, it must
always be wrong to try to reform any culture’s established and accepted
moral beliefs and practices. This is clearly hard to countenance or accept
from a normative philosophical standpoint.
Cultural relativism seems to give plausible answers to ethical questions
only in a culture (utterly unlike our own) that is homogeneous, unreflective,
unchangeable and free of serious moral disagreements. Ironically, the very
social and cultural complexities, mutabilities and controversies that could
have made cultural relativism attractive render it in fact useless, unclear and
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productive and dangerous from a normative, pragmatic-political point of
view –esp. at this juncture of history.
Some other reasons for its enduring yet misguided appeal
What other reasons could be brought up to explain cultural relativismes enduring (yet misguided) appeal to a diverse range of people, united
only in the potential uses or abuses they can make of such a position for
their respective, dubious and often conflicting, purposes? In this section,
I am particularly interested in ascertaining further some of them. For this
purpose, I examine the connection between such a thesis and four sets
of ­relevant considerations in an effort to heed again Williams’ injunction. These are: (1) dogmatism/ authoritarianism vs. open-mindedness and
­tolerance, (2) traditionalism / conservatism vs. modernism / progressivism,
(3) the quasi-universality of “bullshit”, and (4) ultimate intellectual defense
mechanism and immunization against any criticism.
Dogmatism/authoritarianism versus open-mindedness/tolerance
People are often attracted to cultural relativism because they think it
expresses and supports attitudes of open-mindedness and tolerance, and
that its rejection implies somehow a commitment to arrogant dogmatism
and narrow-mindedness. The terms “relative” and “absolute” are taken to be
opposites. Subsequently the opposite of «relativism» assumed to be ‘absolutism’, a term commonly associated with authoritarian and dogmatic connotations. Besides, dogmatism and intolerance seem to make sense only if the
idea that “I am right and the other is wrong about something” is assumed.
Otherwise, what are we dogmatic or intolerant about? But if everyone’s
belief is equally true (because ‘true for them’), then there never could be
any occasion to think that one is any more (or less) right than anyone else
about anything. Consequently, it seems to follow that there could never be
any possible reason for being morally outraged or for treating anyone with
anger, hostility or disrespect if they hold a belief different from mine. It is
hard to see how this could be squared with our condition and even daily
experiences.
If ‘absolutism’ is bad and ‘relativism’ is its opposite, it does not follow
however, that relativism is necessarily good, or better. From a pragmatic
point of view, one does not always avoid a bad thing by flying to the opposite extreme, since that might turn out to be just as bad or detrimental. In
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any case, it is not clear that relativism really is the opposite of dogmatism,
authoritarianism, closed-mindedness, and intolerance. In fact, it may even
be just another version of the same thing.
Let’s explore this issue further. One can safely say that, by definition,
relativism never declares any belief absolutely true or false. This may incline
us to think that it is open-minded. But what is it to be open-minded? Isn’t
it to be disposed to think that one is fallible, that one could be mistaken
in what one believes, so that what one now think is absolutely true might
upon closer examination or due reflection turn out to be absolutely false.
This is presumably a thought that a relativist can never have, because relativists are convinced that at any time all their beliefs are necessarily true
(for them). Are they not? One shows open-mindedness by leaving open the
possibility of changing one’s beliefs (coming to disagree with and rejecting
what one used to believe) when one is given good reasons to do so. But can
relativists ever have any reason for changing their beliefs, since relativism
says that at every point their beliefs are already true (for them)? To be sure,
relativism does not actually give anyone (individual or group) a reason for
not changing their beliefs. But if anyone Individual or group) just happen
to change their beliefs, then relativism would presumably say that their new
beliefs are just as true (for them) as, but no truer (for them) than, their old
beliefs were. In effect, relativism would seem to imply that that the right
attitude toward one’s beliefs is always one of total self-complacency.
If relativism is anti-authoritarian, it seems to be only in the sense that
it takes away any reason one might have for considering the opinions and
arguments of others in forming one’s beliefs –for instance, the opinion of
someone better informed and more experienced, or simply someone else’s
opinion). Let’s recall again that what relativism says: our beliefs are all true
(for us) no matter what anyone else may say or think. Thus, it effectively
undercuts any reason anyone might have for being critical about their own
beliefs. As noted earlier, relativism implies that one is always infallible in
whatever one believes. This is not only closed-minded but arrogant. To say,
in effect, that everyone else is infallible too does not diminish in any way
the closed-minded arrogance of this view. It merely adds to one’s own dogmatism the provision that it is all right for everyone else to be just as dogmatic as one is.
As I understand it, tolerance is the willingness to let others be different
from us, and especially, to let them disagree with us, even if they are wrong.
If one takes such a line of reasoning, then one must admit that relativism
undermines or even cuts down on the need to be tolerant, since it denies
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that anyone is ever wrong. How does this make the relativist tolerant? Does
successfully fleeing from every danger make one courageous? It is as if relativists cannot even conceive of actually tolerating those they think are in the
wrong, and the closest thing to tolerance they are capable of imagining is
the principled refusal ever to admit that anyone could ever be wrong about
anything.
But relativism does not altogether eliminate the need for tolerance because
people can be intolerant not only of those whose beliefs they think are wrong,
but also of those who differ from them in other ways (in skin color, race,
sexual orientation, gender, customs and folkways, or emotional sensibilities)
even when the difference involves no disagreement in beliefs. When the need
for tolerance in all such cases does arise, relativism provides no reason at all
for being tolerant rather than intolerant. If someone believes that it is wrong
to hate people who differ from us, relativism tells that person that that belief
is true (for her); but equally, if someone believes in persecuting others, then
relativism tells her that this belief is also true (for her). In short, relativism is
just as likely to encourage intolerance as it is to encourage tolerance. And this
is precisely what we should have expected.
By saying that every belief is true for the person who holds it, relativism is absolutely neutral between all pairs of opposed beliefs. But that
entails directly that relativism is absolutely neutral between the belief in
tolerance and the belief in intolerance. What this shows is simply that
tolerance is not the same thing as neutrality. Tolerance, properly understood, requires some positive convictions about why, when and to what
extent we should let people believe and do what we take to be wrong. It
implies that there must always be a threshold of the intolerable, or a limit
to what can be tolerated. Relativism can never support or even admit any
convictions of this kind, because it cannot even admit that anything is
ever wrong.
Traditionalism/conservatism versus modernism/progressivism
Religious and political conservatives or traditionalists often attack ‘relativism’. When they are accused of maintaining their views dogmatically
or intolerantly, their reply typically amounts to saying that all they are
doing is maintaining that there is such a thing as “the truth”, and that it is
right to stand by the truth. Alternatively, when their views are challenged,
they engage in the rhetorical move of asserting that their dogmatically
held opinions are true –as if this is sufficient to justify the dogmatic and
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intolerant manner in which they hold them. Obviously, it is one thing
to believe that there is truth, and quite another thing to believe that one
is in sole and certain possession of it. Even if their beliefs were true, this
does not automatically justify forcing them down other people’s throats.
But their entrenched bad habits and erroneous reasonings do probably
encourage the idea that it is inherently conservative to believe in “truth”,
and that ‘relativism’ is the right name for any view that is open-minded,
tolerant, liberal and progressive.
I would be prepared to contend that what the conservatives and traditionalists oppose is not so much relativism in the sense discussed here, but
some other beliefs, namely the following views: (1) Traditionally accepted
moral principles may not be correct; this is at least something about which
intelligent and reasonable people may disagree. (2) Which moral rules and
principles are correct is subject to change with time and circumstances.
(3) Moral principles apply differently to different circumstances, so that
what is right for one person in one situation can be wrong for another person in a different situation. (4) There are sometimes justified exceptions to
even a moral rule that is correct in general. (5) Even if an accepted moral
principle is correct, we should sometimes be tolerant of people who disagree with it and refuse to follow it.
Each of these views might be described in some sense as “relativist”. It
asserts that moral rules and principles should be considered “relative” to
something [in (1) and (2), they are relative to the grounds or evidence for
them, which may not, or may no longer, be sufficient; in (3), (4) and (5), to
the conditions of their application, which may justify flexibility in applying
them]. These forms of “relativity” do not however imply “relativism” in the
sense discussed in this essay, and are even arguably inconsistent with it. For
all of the views stated [(1)-(5)] presuppose that there is truth in moral matters,
since they challenge traditional ideas about which principles are objectively
correct, how certain we can be about this, whether moral truth can change,
and how flexible we should be in adapting moral principles to different situations. Defenders of such views might want to remain vigilant and not let conservatives and traditionalists get away with the suggestion that they are vulnerable to the charges of incoherence and self-refutation that can be brought
against relativism.
As we have seen earlier, (cultural) relativism is itself a very conservative
position26: it tends to lend uncritical support to dominant cultural views
26 In ancient Greece, Protagoras was well known for advocating very conventional views about
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and practices. Those who want to question or criticize traditional practices,
creeds and values at least have to admit that they might be wrong. But since
relativism holds that everyone’s belief is already true (for them), it implies
that there is never really any need for anyone to change their views about
anything. One does not have to attack the very notion of objective truth in
order to challenge traditional ideas about what it is, where it is to be found,
or whose views have to be taken into account in looking for it –if that is
our interest. On the contrary, it is only by presupposing that there is such a
truth that you can legitimize challenges to mistaken ideas about what it is
and how it should be sought. In fact, since objective or absolute truth is not
truth for anyone in particular, this implies that everyone’s standpoint needs
to be considered and possibly be taken into account in searching for it.
The quasi-universality of “bullshit” and relativism
I examine next what some might consider to be a highly speculative
and ‘unserious’ hypothesis27, namely, whether and in what sense there is a
strong and substantial connection between the pervasive, ubiquitous, and
quasi-universal presence of ‘bullshit’ in virtually all aspects of our lives and
the strong and widespread appeal that (cultural) relativism exerts today. I
believe such a connection is plausible, and I attempt to substantiate such
a claim. In this regard, it is worth noting the suggestion (made by Frankfurt, for example) that a (more than superficial) connection could also be
established between the so-called trendy and dominant movement of ‘postmodernism’ (itself viewed as a fairly advanced form of ‘bullshit’) and the
how to live and what is right and wrong. See also Teson (2001) for a similar point in the context
of a discussion regarding obstacles to the universal acceptance of human rights.
27 Following the republication of an essay by Harry Frankfurt, Emeritus Professor of Philosophy
at Princeton University, on “bullshit” (Frankfurt, 2005), this topic has recently gained some
‘serious’ and ‘focused’ attention in the English-speaking world (in both the academic and nonacademic worlds, in the media and popular culture at large) to the dismay or shock of some,
and the pleasure or satisfaction of others. Previously, the only other notable philosophical work
dealing with this issue was Max Black’s discussion of The Prevalence of Humbug (Black, 1983).
[“Humbug” is basically the English term for the American ‘bullshit”]. In contrast however,
the French-speaking world has been familiar with numerous ‘serious’ discussions of ‘bullshit’
–commonly translated as la connerie ou la betise– going back at least to the 17th-18th centuries,
and of course, in more recent times in the writings of Gilles Deleuze, Clement Rosset, and
Michel Onfray, to mention only a few. A number of hypotheses regarding this observation can
be entertained but this is not properly speaking my concern herein. See for example G.A. Cohen
(2002b) on the prevalence of ‘bullshit’ in French academia. I address such issues and many others
regarding ‘bullshit,’ and most specifically, the views of Frankfurt (2005) and G.A. Cohen (2002;
2002b) in an unpublished critical essay titled “Even Deeper into Bullshit: An Archeological and
Genealogical Analysis –In Response to Harry Frankfurt and G.A. Cohen” (2006c).
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appeal exerted by relativism (itself one of the articles of faith and core tenets
of postmodernism). In this regard, it might be worthwhile entertaining a
general hypothesis: Does relativism as a theoretical position thrive more in
some periods of history than others? What features or characteristics, if any,
distinguish such periods –even if, in the final analysis, what matters from a
philosophical point of view is to determine if such a position can be justified apart from the appeal and attractiveness it may exercise? It should be
­obvious that this kind of hypothesis, entertaining or establishing a direct
connection between “postmodernism”, “bullshit”, and “relativism”, raises
larger philosophical problems, which are clearly beyond the narrow bounds
of my present analysis. Nevertheless, the following questions could be entertained: Isn’t the academic world a producer of a particular kind of ‘bullshit’ that is as nocuous as the one we more readily associate with the media,
­advertising and marketing, politics or politicians? Isn’t ­postmodernism
itself, without too many circumspections, at least in some of its (extreme
and radical) expressions and formulations, a form of advanced and sophisticated relativistic “bullshit?” (Sokal and Bricmont, 1998)28.
Much of what we are exposed to in mass or pop culture today is what
we may call “bullshit”. There are obviously varieties and varying degrees of
“bullshit” –some more substantial and noxious, with more ‘stench’ than
others –relative to various domains, areas or spheres of activity. But generally speaking, one could say the following, in an effort to characterize
different degrees of “bullshit”. There is “bullshit” when I say something
to you that isn’t true, when I know it isn’t true (1st degree), I know you
know it isn’t true (2nd degree), and I know you know I know it isn’t true
(3rd degree), but I know that if you hear it enough, it will probably influence your behavior, typically in my interests, or in some favored direction
(4th degree). [This characterization is, I believe, compatible or in accord
with Frankfurt’s take].
A special kind of bullshit consists in making wildly exaggerated claims
for something: no one believes them, but the “bullshit-artist” foresees that
people will end up acting as though they believed them, if only just a tad.
Another kind of bullshit consists in a transparently self-serving interpreta28 Writing in the Times Literary Supplement (1996) on the Sokal affair, Paul A. Boghossian described
how the hoax and satire revealed for all to see the extent of “the brush-fire spread, within vast
sectors of the humanities and social sciences, of the cluster of simple-minded relativistic views
about truth and evidence that are commonly identified as `postmodernist’. These views license,
and on the most popular versions insist upon, the substitution of political and ideological criteria
for the historically more familiar assessment in terms of truth, evidence and argument”.
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tion of the world, such as the contrasting versions of events narrated by
openly self-advertised representatives of political parties, or by the ostensibly “right-wing” and “left-wing” debaters on those TV shows in which
important contemporary issues are reduced to scripted, half-serious ‘shouting matches’ for the amusement and entertainment of the audience.
Nobody expects the bullshit-artist to be objective or fair or even credible
–indeed, he would not have even have gotten the job if what he is said
could be taken at face value. The ability to produce ‘creative bullshit’ is part
of the job description.
As everyone recognizes, (almost) all political rhetoric, advertising and
marketing today is one sort of bullshit or another –some may call it “spin”
or “hype”. Nobody believes them, or even takes them seriously. Yet the politicians who spend their donors’ money are the ones who get elected, and
the products that are advertised and marketed on TV are the ones that sell.
It is even fair to say that everywhere we look we are invariably subjected to
some Ad or marketing campaign.
To be “bullshitted” is to be exposed to something that seems at first at
least to pretend to be truth, but which you know from the start is less than
truth. You reject it as truth, but then gradually come to accept it as less than
truth, but also as not quite nothing either. Bullshit therefore works partly
by numbing our mind, dulling our desire for truth, and by getting us used
to filling our mind with what we know is less than truth, with what is selfconsciously phony, a showy or glitzy but of course unconvincing imitation
of truth. Bullshit does not function on the level of reality, but on the level
of subjectivity –the perceptions of the recipients (or bullshittees) and the
interests of the bullshit-artists (or bullshitters).
The psychological result of constant and massive bombardment by
“bullshit” (in its various forms and varying degrees) is inescapable. It
may perhaps help us to understand what relativists might mean by “true
for me”. Bullshit is something other than and less than truth, something
designed to dull my desire and appetite for truth. It is something I don’t
believe (yet eventually sort of believe), a substitute or ersatz for truth that
functions effectively not because of its relation to reality, but because of
its relation to our subjective susceptibilities to being deceived and manipulated at least partly with our own knowledge and consent. Bullshit puts
itself forward as a sort of truth, which will affect our behavior as if we
believe it, even though we really do not. Isn’t this one way in which the
confused and self-contradictory notion of “true for me” might acquire a
semblance of intelligibility? Paradoxically, as Jacques Bouveresse once put
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it, what is true does not always appear as such, and this could even be a
detriment to the cause of truth; on the other hand, what only appears to
be true is often more efficacious and somehow convincing, and therefore
more readily accepted.
Couldn’t we then say that relativism expresses somehow the consciousness of someone whose emotional-cognitive environment has been taken
over by “bullshit”, so to speak? It is an environment in which nothing anybody believes is really believed; nothing anybody asserts is meant seriously,
so nobody would be as crude or rude as to say that it was “true”. Nobody
would care about the truth even if it came up and hit them in the face. Such
a person would have come to regard being “bullshitted” as the normal,
default state. Such a person might think that to really believe in something
(and hold it to be true, period) is somehow abnormal, a relic of a more
innocent age in which people did not yet realize that “everything is bullshit”. This also might explain why relativists (and some so-called “postmodernists) often think of themselves as sophisticated compared to people who
have not gotten over the idea of ‘absolute or objective truth’. Relativism
might even seem to be a way of protecting oneself against being taken in
and deceived by bullshit, since it makes it explicit that no assertion is to be
taken at face value and nothing anybody ever says is really to be believed.
Interestingly though, people who bullshit others do however seriously
hold some beliefs, even if they don’t express them: For example, they seriously believe that if the others are bullshitted often enough, they will behave
in ways that serve the bullshitter’s interests at the expense of the bullshittee’s.
It is only because the bullshittees seriously believe this too that they have any
reason to protect themselves against bullshit by not taking it ­seriously. So it
would seem that however prevalent, pervasive and ubiquitous bullshit might
become, it never really abolishes genuine belief or assertion, or renders the
notion of (absolute or objective) truth obsolete. In fact, one might wonder
if it is not a self-defeating strategy to try to protect oneself from bullshit by
not taking it seriously. Isn’t bullshit by its nature something that is not seriously believed, and that manipulates us despite the fact that we do not seriously believe it, and sometimes even because we do not believe it? Therefore,
however prevalent bullshit may become in our emotional-cognitive or sociocultural environments, we cannot ultimately avoid challenging it directly and
in unsophisticated manner by just recognizing it for what it is and declaring
bluntly that it is false. Admittedly, this may not always be the most expedient
or diplomatic. But it is the nature of bullshit that it manipulates those who
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fully than it does those who are not, since such attitudes often mean slouching into the acceptance of the very notions and dispositions that let bullshit
work on you. The only way really to oppose bullshit is by being undiplomatic, by uncompromising chopping logic and rational arguments, and by
insisting rather squarely on the ­obvious if boring fact that there is after all a
distinction between telling the truth and telling lies. Isn’t there? As far as what
we really know, we may concede that we don’t know much with certainty in
the final analysis, but nevertheless we can still insist on a simple distinction
between what is more or less and relatively speaking established or substantiated and what is mere fable, fabulous or fabrication.
Ultimate intellectual defense mechanism and immunization
against criticism
As we have seen above, relativism says that whatever we believe is true for
us irrespective of what anyone else believes. In effect, it marginalizes everyone else’s standpoint except our own. In relation to bullshit, relativism tries
to protect us from being manipulated by urging accommodation, and by
blocking beliefs that others could try to implant in us against our knowledge and will, by cutting us off from any pretense at serious communication
or dialogue with them. In relation to what we do seriously believe, however,
relativism also cuts us off from serious communication or dialogue with others, and serves thereby as a self-protective mechanism in another way.
In the course of opening ourselves up to other ways of thinking (as
when we do philosophy, for example), we may suddenly discover powerful
arguments and theories we never considered before and which challenge
the opinions and judgments we have always taken for granted. Needless
to say, this can be very unsettling and disturbing, and could even make us
feel intimidated and insecure. Relativism comes to the rescue by protecting
our opinions and judgments (by making them all “true for us”). Because
relativism is presumably ‘neutral’ between all particular opinions and judgments, it enables us to remain above the fray, so to speak, by taking the high
ground away from those who, by defending and lobbying for their particular version of the truth, make it all too obvious that they somehow have an
axe to grind. A relativist never has to bother with the frustrating details of
any real dispute (philosophical or otherwise) because his position explains
ahead of time not only why the dispute will never get resolved, but also
why this is perfectly all right. It is as if we can agree that inquiry, reasoning
and argument are fine (if someone happens to feel like paying attention to
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them), but we are assured by the “guardians of cultural purity and integrity”
that they will never seriously threaten our own beliefs, which remain true
for us however the arguments come out. In this way, it seems that relativism encourages one kind of tolerance, namely, tolerance toward one’s own
intellectual cowardice, laziness, ineptitude, and incompetence, for which
some people have arguably a desperate need.
When, furthermore, it purports to protect us against all those whose
powerful arguments might threaten one’s comfortable little world of convictions and deeply held, though objectionable beliefs, relativism also
makes us think we are tolerant toward others. Since it protects us somehow from experiencing their alternative views as a threat to ours [and
prevents us from looking at them as “alternatives for us” or even “alternatives to us” –to appropriate and use freely another of Williams’ distinction
(Williams, 1985). Thus, it releases us from the need to resist their arguments or to argue back: We can just “live and let live” –as the popular
bumper sticker philosophical statement puts it. Both the appeal of relativism and its so-called claim to tolerance are then grounded ultimately
in the way it immunizes our dogmatically held opinions and judgments
against any facts or critical reasonings that might possibly call them into
question.
Consequences of “cultural complexity”:
toward an empirically and normatively adequate approach
to cultural analysis
As we all know by now, ‘culture’ has emerged in recent decades as the
subject of intense and divisive political controversies at both the national
and international (or should I say, global) level. The intensity and divisiveness of these controversies can be felt most acutely in a number of
areas. These include: identity politics or the politics of cultural differences and recognition, multiculturalism, cross-cultural communication
or incommensurability, or more specifically, with the issue of cultural
relativism vs. moral universalism, particularly as it is brought to bear on
the debates and struggles about human rights, democracy, human development, social and global justice –to mention only a few of the most contentious ones.
In the aftermath of the Cold War and the so-called “end of ideologies”,
some authors (on the right side of the political spectrum) have argued that
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the single most important conflict confronting the world today and for the
foreseeable future will be a “clash of civilizations” (Huntington, 1996) –also
characterized as a “clash of cultures” (in the broadest sense of the term)29,
which are irremediably incommensurable and condemned to misunderstand one another30.
Paradoxically enough, this view is further supported and given credence
by so-called “postmodernists” who are typically situated on the left side
of the political spectrum. These thinkers take a strong anti-metanarrative
stance and recommend that we content ourselves and learn to live with
diverging tales and narratives in irreconcilable idioms and languages. They
urge that we forego once and for all any attempt to make comparative
evaluations on the basis of a presumably neutral (external, trans-historical,
trans-cultural, and universal) set of standards, or to enfold them into synoptic or synthetic visions of any kind.
Besides, the phenomenon of “globalization” –apprehended in at least
one of its main dimensions– is commonly viewed as something fundamentally new (see earlier note 6) and interpreted as one threatening cultural
uniformity or homogenization around the world. It is in one sense taken
to represent the new face of “cultural imperialism”. In effect, it is viewed
mainly as “a threat to cultural diversity”.
It is widely believed that the predominance and global expansion of
uniformizing and homogenizing modes of production and reproduction,
consumption and information risks alienating non-Western and Western
people alike from the intellectual and moral resources embedded in their
own ‘distinctive’ cultural traditions. In reaction to what is viewed as the
erosion of traditional cultures and civilizations, we seem to be witnessing the re-emergence of a tendency to “re-ethnicize the minds” through
renewed and more or less systematic “cultural revivals” worldwide
(viz., “induisissions”, “sinofication”, “nipponification”, “islamicization”,
29 Obviously, I am not here making the traditional German distinction between Kultur and Zivilization, which can also be made in French (Culture et Civilisation) –following in this regard
Freud’s principled refusal to the same effect.
30 In a recent book (2006), Amartya Sen takes aim at the logic of conflict underlying the reductionist approach pitting “us-vs.-them” (the West vs. the Rest) found in the work of Huntington,
and in which members of different cultures seem to be locked up in ‘little boxes’ from which
they cannot escape. Interestingly, or rather ironically, Huntington’s outlook is shared by those
‘radical Muslim fundamentalists’ against whom his analysis seems to be aimed. Along similar
lines, Jean-Francois Fayart (2005) argues that the “clash of civilizations” is not unavoidably our
fate. We come to believe otherwise only if we adopt a problematic and objectionable conception
of cultural identity as natural.
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“indianisassions”, “ivoirization”, “russification”, “gallicization”, etc). Scholars of various stripes and persuasions are clamoring to understand and assess
the significance of this phenomenon, as attested by the proliferation of
publications on this subject (Botz-Bornstein and Hengelbrock, 2006).
In the past few years, the unesco convened a forum in order to hammer out a convention on the “protection and promotion” of cultural
diversity. Such a convention was finally approved, I believe, in October
2005. The drafters worried that “the processes of globalization …represent a challenge for cultural diversity, namely in view of risks of imbalances between rich and poor countries”. The fear was that the values and
images of Western mass culture, like some invasive weed, are threatening
to choke out the world’s native flora. Subsequently, alarms are sounded
and concerns raised about the imminent disappearance of “distinctive
cultures”, and calls made to “preserve” all existing cultures –as if they each
and all deserve to be saved, in each and all their respective components
and elements.
Upon closer scrutiny however, the unesco document reveals contradictions and tensions. For example, it affirms both the necessity of protecting cultural diversity and the importance of the free flow of ideas,
freedom of thought and expression, and human rights. However, as we
know, the latter values will become universal only if we all choose to
make them so. And it is manifestly unclear how to best arrive at this
desirable result. In this context, shouldn’t we ask the difficult question:
What is really important –cultures or peoples? Shouldn’t the most pressing question be instead: How can we articulate a viable universalist ethics
of globalization –judiciously and properly understood in its complexity?
A defensible global ethics is arguably going to be one that tempers the
respect for differences with a respect for the freedom of actual human
beings to make their own choices.
It is important to recognize that ‘diversity’ and ‘freedom’ may often be
at odds, and the tensions between them are not always easy to resolve. The
rhetoric of preservation and diversity does not seem of much help in dealing with the contradictions that emerge. Let us consider a couple of provisions included in the unesco convention on cultural diversity (Unesco,
2001). Take for example the principle affirming equal dignity and respect
for all cultures. Does this mean each, any and all cultures, or what? Does
this mean affirming the equal respect for each and all components or
aspects of a given culture? Do the cultures deserving protection for diversity’s sake include the KKK (Ku Klux Klan) and the Taliban, other expresxxxviii
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sions of cultural purity and integrity, or fundamentalisms –whether they
are religious or secular31? I, for one, certainly do not think so.
Take also the principle affirming the importance of culture for social
cohesion, and its potential for the enhancement of the status and role of
women in society. Doesn’t cohesion argue for uniformity or conformity?
Wouldn’t enhancing the status and role of women involve changing, rather
than preserving, some cultures –at least in some important respects32?
31 I mean here to include various “dogmatic, political ideologies”, some of which claiming to be
atheistic, agnostic, or laic, among the forms that fundamentalism can take. This point does not
seem to be appreciated enough in contemporary discussions, and is therefore often overlooked.
32 In a recent article titled “A Secret History” that appeared recently in The New York Times
(February 25, 2007), Carla Power reports about a project of bold and radical re-interpretation
pertaining to Islam and women. Undertaken by Mohammad Akram Nadwi, a 43-year-old
Sunni alim, or religious scholar, at the Oxford Center for Islamic Studies in Britain, such
a project led him to rediscover a long-lost tradition of Muslim women teaching the Koran,
transmitting hadith (deeds and sayings of the Prophet), discussing Islamic law with men and
even making it, not to mention holding official posts, and lecturing in the men’s section at the
mosque. His findings challenge prevalent notions of women’s roles within Islamic societies or
communities. As Power points out, for Muslims and non-Muslims alike, the stock image of
an Islamic scholar is a gray-bearded man. Women tend to be seen as the subjects of Islamic
law rather than its shapers. And while some opportunities for religious education do exist for
women –the prestigious Al-Azhar University in Cairo has a women’s college, for example, and
there are girls’ madrasas and female study groups in mosques and private homes, their options
are very limited and the barriers and obstacles numerous. Eight years ago, Akram Nadwi embarked on what he thought would perhaps amount to a single volume biographical dictionary of
female hadith scholars. He thought initially that he might find 20 or 30 women. To date, while
trawling through dictionaries, classical texts, madrasas chronicles, letters and other citations,
he has found 8 000 of them, dating back 1 400 years and his dictionary now fills 40 volumes.
Admittedly, not all these women were previously unknown. Many Muslims acknowledge that
Islam has its learned women, starting with one of the Prophet’s wives, Aisha. Several Western
academics have written on women’s religious education. About a century ago, a Hungarian
Orientalist Ignaz Goldziher estimated that 15% of medieval hadith scholars were women. But
Akram Nadwi’s biographical dictionary is groundbreaking in its scope and its implications for
Islam and the place of women in Islamic societies could be radical and far-reaching in eliminating the visible and invisible cultural barriers that prevent women in the Islamic world from
pursuing an (advanced) education, functioning as full citizens, and taking leadership positions
in their communities. *In the aftermath of 9/11 and the subsequent “war on terror” and most
specifically against “radical and extremist islamists”, several Muslim scholars (men and women)
have undertaken in good faith with tremendous integrity and courage similarly bold and radical
re-interpretation of the classic and canonical texts of their religion. Their aim is to bring out
the “true” message of “peace, tolerance, and justice” and the universal core ideas and tenets of
Islam as one of three great religions of the Book. Many have done so, it goes without saying,
at great risks to their lives and welfare.* Worth noting here is the recent case of Laleh Bakhtiar,
an Iranian-American Muslim woman, which has received some media attention while I was
completing this essay –only two days ago. For the past two years, she has been working on a
new translation of the Koran when she came upon Charter 4, Verse 34, according to which “a
rebellious woman should first be admonished, then abandoned in bed, and ultimately ‘beaten’
–the most common translation for the Arabic word ‘daraba’ –unless her behavior improves”.
She nearly dropped the project right then, but later decided prodded by her faith that God
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Unquestionably, human variety and cultural diversity matter –not for their
own sake or in themselves, but because they offer people different options
to which they are entitled in order to flourish (see Mill, 1860, 1982 for a
classic argument to that effect). It is not to enable them to adapt merely to
miserable and oppressive conditions (see Nussbaum, 2000, p. 111-166 for an
insightful discussion of “Adaptive Preferences and Women’s Options”). If,
however, we want to preserve a wide range of cultural and human conditions, it must be because it gives free people more live options as opposed to
dead ones. Subsequently, it must be because it gives people the best chances
to make their own lives as they see fit. Can we thereby justify enforcing
diversity by trapping people within differences that they themselves long
to reduce and seek to escape? We should not forget, as I already pointed
out, that cultural differences are often the perfect cover for the continued
imposition of unjust and oppressive traditional practices. We should also
keep in mind, as Seyla Benhabib reminds us, “cultural boundaries circumscribe power in that they legitimize its use within the group or community”
(Benhabib, 2002, p. 7).
“Political correctness” aside, perhaps we should also keep in mind that:
“Cultures are not museum pieces, to be preserved intact at all costs” (Nussbaum, 1999, p. 37). Perhaps we also need to come to grips with the unavoidability and even desirability of “cross-cultural contamination, intermingling and fertilization” (Appiah, 2006b).
According to Appiah (2006a), it may be useful to distinguish between
‘preserving cultural artifacts’ produced by different cultures over time from
‘preserving cultures.’ It is hard to see how one could object to the former
–commensurately of course with one’s means and resources, and morally
justifiable priorities. But it is not clear how much we can or should preserve cultures as such –as if they can be preserved ‘frozen in time’ like ‘pickles in a jar’ if they are unable to survive through changes and adaptations
and endure, even if only as a historical entity. Let’s not forget that cultures
could not be saying such a thing that there must another, more accurate and compelling way to
translate this word. In the 20 or so English translations of the Koran that available, the word in
question was translated variously as: beat, hit, strike, scourge, chastise, flog, make an example
of, spank, pet, tap, send way, or even seduce. She was therefore faced with a serious dilemma
–all the more so that she is not an Islamic scholar with the appropriate credentials and she knew
the opposition and outcry she would face from the Muslim community at large. In Germany
last week, a judge citing the verse caused a public outcry and controversy after she rejected the
request for a fast-track divorce by a Moroccan-German woman because her husband beat her.
The judge, removed from the case, had written that the Koran sanctioned physical abuse (see
the article on the subject by MacFarquhar, The New York Times, March 25, 2007).
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are made of continuities through changes, and the identity of a culture
(as a historical entity) typically survives through these more or less radical
changes. A culture which does not survive through various kinds of changes
is not more authentic, but merely dead. This is true of any particular Western culture as well as any other non-Western culture.
The so-called ‘preservationists’ or ‘guardians of cultural purity and
integrity’ in the non-Western world, for exemple33, often make their case
by invoking the evil of ‘culturale imperialism’. The picture underlying their
position can be depicted, in broad strokes, as follows: There is a global Western system of capitalism34. It has a center and a periphery. At the center –in
the US and Europe– is a set of multinational corporations. Some of these
dominate literally the media business. All however are actively seeking to
sell their ‘products’ around the world by promoting the creation of ‘desires’
and ‘false needs’ that can be fulfilled only by the purchase and use of these
products. They do this explicitly through advertising and marketing, but
more insidiously, they also do so through the messages implicit in videos,
movies and in TV soaps, comedies, and dramas. Leading critics of mediacultural imperialism claim that ‘it is the imagery and cultural perspectives
of ‘the ruling sector’ in the center that shape and structure the consciousness
33 This is not to imply that such protagonists don’t exist in the Western World as well. They
obviously do. The Western world has its share of such individuals who wish to ‘preserve’ cultures,
local, particular, and exotic ones in any part of the world, which are in fact only their constructed
representations thereof. Let us not forget the often romanticized, exotic, and fictive images of
Africa, the Middle East, India and China that many Western intellectuals have often entertained
uncritically for the past hundred years or so. It is also worth noting perhaps that their fictive
images of various parts of the world have often led some to declare that this or that part of the
world would ‘never be ready for democracy and human rights”. Finally, though it would be better
perhaps to be more specific and explicit about the tenets of the so-called “preservationists”, I
believe that the above discussion could make due in an ostensive or performative manner.
34 Capitalism, as we know it, is unquestionably of Western origin and nowadays it is indeed
global –esp., with the emergence of a number of new major players such as India, China,
Brazil, and Russia, not to mention Japan and South Korea, as well as the other so-called “Asian
tiger economies”. However, it is far being homogenous or of the same type everywhere, and it
is no longer bi-polar, but rather multi-polar, more network-like, dynamic and arguably with
several centers and multiple peripheral layers, with even reverse-directionality-and-­subsidiarity,
a phenomenon not yet appreciated or understood well-enough. Besides understanding how
these different models work, or rather don’t work, and in effect, understanding the new global capitalist (dis)order, requires analytical and diagnostic tools that are far more up-to-date
and sophisticated than the ones provided by the usual and dominant so-called “neo-liberal”
perspective, the traditional liberal or Marxist approaches. In this regard, the analysis offered
for example by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri in Empire (2000) is noteworthy. However,
many other, more recent critical and sophisticated studies, from France particularly, abound.
See for example: Aglietta & Berrebi (2007), Chavagneux (2007), Charolles (2006), Artus &
Virard (2005), Cohen (2005), Greau, (2005).
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throughout the system at large.’ From a certain (experiential) point of view,
this claim seems to be borne out at least in part, but it is doubtful whether
a socio-historical and political analysis of evidence (in due form) would
corroborate this picture in an unmitigated and unqualified way. Recent
studies in this area show interestingly enough that people around the world
respond to these cultural imports differently depending on their values,
needs and priorities in their respective and already very complex cultural
contexts. In short, it seems that adaptations, re-­interpretations, transfers
and filterings are taking place in so many different ways. Besides, doesn’t
talk of cultural imperialism ‘structuring the consciousness’ of people living in the so-called periphery treat them like ‘blank slates’ on which global
Western capitalism unfettered writes its subliminal messages, leaving in its
wake only ‘cultural automatons’ or ‘zombies’? Isn’t this deeply condescending, apart from being unsupported by the complexities of cultural interactions and exchanges around the world in this era of both globalization and
glocalisation?
More often than not, a problematic conception of ‘culture’ is at work
implicitly or explicitly in the views of various protagonists involved in these
debates about culture. As noted earlier, they write or talk as if “culture” were
a homogenous, coherent, bounded, tightly woven, un-contested, unified,
or unitary entity with a distinct nature, whose identity-constituting and
deterministic role on individuals and groups of people is uniform, continuous, and stable35. I contend that such a conception of “culture” underlying
or underwriting many of the controversies raging today constitutes in fact
a fundamental misconception, with profound and at times disturbing philosophical as well as political implications (Chokr, 2006a).
Admittedly, the concept of “culture” is “essentially a contested concept
–like democracy, religion, simplicity, or social justice”, which is multiply
defined, multiply employed, ineradicably imprecise (Geertz, 2000, p. 11).
And a history of its evolution over the past couple of hundred years or so
–to take a relatively limited yet arguably sufficient historical perspective–
would attest to the vicissitudes it has undergone, the battles over its meaning, its use, and its explanatory worth36.
35 I am here putting into play the various dubious assumptions or premises, alluded to earlier (in
note 6), and that typically serve to underwrite the relativists’ misconception of ‘culture.’
36 A worthwhile project might consist in sketching out (1) the Modern view, how it evolved
in the past 100-200 years, and gave way in the past 50-60 years to (2) the (anthropological)
Received View. For a brief yet substantial treatment in this regard, see Chokr, 2006a, 2007a,
2007b (forthcoming); see also Geertz, 2000, Benhabib, 2002. In their classic compilation of
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If however we were to draw together some of the main insights and
lessons that we have learned from various such efforts, we would come
to recognize the facts of “cultural complexity”37 and be compelled to draw
its consequences. This would inevitably lead us to articulate and defend
an alternative, more appropriate conception, according to which “culture”
is always already ineradicably plurael, compound, inconstant, and always
already multiply contested both from within and without. Such a conception constitutes, I believe, a direct challenge to the static “cookie-cutter
conception of culture” with its focus on consensus, type, uniformity and
commonality. In the face of the kind and degree of fragmentation, dispersion, intermingling, cross-fertilization and contamination ­characteristic of
the (globalizing and ‘glocalizing’) world today, I submit that the view of culture, a culture, this culture, as a consensus on fundamentals –shared beliefs,
feelings, values and practices– is hardly tenable except for the “guardians
of cultural integrity and ethnic purity” who would like us to believe otherwise. Against such guardians, we must be prepared to countenance instead
the various definitions of “culture” that have appeared in the literature since the 19th century,
Kroeber and Kluckhohn (1963) had found 171 distinct definitions, which could then be sorted
out into 13 categories.
37 In recent years, ideas from ‘complexity theory’ have had a substantial impact on various disciplines outside the “hard” sciences from which they originated, in particular in sociology, organizational sciences, and in anthropology. However, their impact on mainstream philosophy has
not been as significant as one would expect. This is surprising given that the related domains of
cognitive science and evolutionary theory have inspired plenty of philosophical investigations.
In a recent paper, titled “Complexity and Philosophy”, Heylighen, Cilliers and Gershenson
(2006) explore some of the reasons for this. They go on to show how (postmodern) philosophy
could benefit from taking complexity seriously on a number of issues, including the structure of
complex (social) systems or systems of meaning, the distinction between boundaries and limits,
the problem of difference, the idea of the subject in political philosophy, ethics, relativism, life,
mind, consciousness, and in turn how complexity theory could be further enriched by philosophy. They write: “Complexity is perhaps the most essential characteristic of our present society.
As technological and economic advances make production, transport and communication ever
more efficient, we interact with ever more people, organizations, systems and objects. And this
network of interactions grows and spreads around the globe, the different economic, social
technological and ecological systems that we are part of become ever more interdependent. The
result is an ever more complex ‘system of systems’ where a change in any component may affect
virtually any other components and that in a mostly unpredictable manner. The traditional
scientific method, which is based on analysis, isolation, and the gathering of complete information about such a phenomenon, is incapable to deal with such complex interdependencies. The
emerging science of complexity offers the promise of an alternative methodology that would
be able to tackle such problems. However, such an approach needs solid foundations, that is,
a clear understanding and definition of the underlying concepts and principles”. Despite the
fact that concepts from complexity have not yet gone very deeply into philosophy, the process
is already under way. Apart from the works of Derrida (1988) and Deleuze (1987) which are
often mentioned in this regard, it is also worth noting those of Morin (1992), Cilliers (1998,
2004, and 2005), Rescher (1998), and Taylor (2003).
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the composite, dynamic and heterogeneous nature of cultures. I must stress
here that such a view does not aim to deny the significance of cultural
differences, quite to the contrary. We should be willing and prepared to
countenance them in a realistic and normatively justifiable way; however,
we need not reify them because this would deprive us of the necessary
resources to engage in social and political criticism and radical questioning intra and inter-culturally. To be sure, “Culture matters”, but not in an
essentialist and strictly deterministic sense –as in the view articulated by
Huntington & Harrison (2000).
In conclusion, we are well advised in my view to draw the consequences
of “cultural complexity” in a world that is undergoing both ‘globalization’
and ‘glocalisation’ at the same time in an effort to articulate an adequate
conception of culture and cultural analysis –from both an empirical and
normative point of view. I contend that, if, and when we do, we would for
example be able to come up with an account of the complex mechanisms of
identity-formation for individuals and communities that is far more compelling empirically and normatively (Chokr, 2007a)38. We would also be
38 Jean-Francois Fayart has argued along similar lines in his book (2005). He claims that the
concept of ‘cultural identity’ has become for many a convenient explanation from most of the
world’s political problems. He offers a sustained critique of this rationalization by dispelling
the notion that fixed identities do, in fact, exist. In his view, the very idea of cultural identity
prevents us from grasping the cultural dimensions of political action and economic development. Identities, he argues, are fluid, never homogeneous, and more often than not invented.
The conflicts we read about in the news draw their murderous force from the supposition that
a ‘political identity corresponds to each so-called ‘cultural identity,’ which is in reality illusory.
What the facts indicate is that each of these identities is often a recent construction. There is
no ‘natural identity’ which imposes itself to us by the sheer power of things. There are only
‘identity strategies,’ rationally produced by actors easily identifiable, and identity dreams or
nightmares to which we adhere because they either seduce or terrorize us. In any case, Fayart
argues, we are not condemned to remain prisoners of such devious manipulations. The “clash
of civilizations” need not be our fate. Also, worthy of note in this context is the essay by Amin
Maalouf (2001), in which he offers a philosophical exploration of what a culture without
entrenched identities, or tribalistic forms of identities would be like. Writing from a position of
multiple identities, which, he claims, to share with many people around the world, he addresses
such complicated and timely issues as how we judge religious traditions that have embraced
violence and brutality, modern manifestations of ‘otherness,’ how language facilitates and breeds
nationalism, and most importantly, the contradiction between stark identity-based political
conflicts and how the same identity-based cultures can be shared by different groups. In the
end, Maalouf does not naively demand that personal identities be dismissed, but suggests a
number of ways in which identities can remain intact and might form not a “meaningless sham
equality” but “rather the acceptance of a multiplicity of allegiances as all equally legitimate”.
While “the wind of globalization” could lead us to disaster, he writes, it could also lead us to
success. Maalouf envisions a globalized world in which our local identities are subordinated to
a broader “allegiance to the human community itself ”. And in this regard, he may be viewed
as a proponent of what Appiah (2006a) calls “a rooted cosmopolitanism” –which is in effect a
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able to better understand the complex internal dynamics of cultures as well
as the diverse relationships that obtain (or not) between them at this juncture of history. I am also prepared to argue that it would enable us to better address the various issues mentioned above, and in particular, that of
human rights –to mention only one of the issues referred to earlier (Chokr,
2006a). We would then easily come to see that the traditional debate pitting ‘cultural relativism’ against ‘moral universalism’ is in fact a dead-end,
outdated and made irrelevant, so to speak, by the newly emerging historical
conditions confronting us, and in which we find ourselves.
Considering two possibly viable options:
Williams & Nussbaum
I believe that Williams is correct when he notes that, though cultural
relativism conjures up a general moral problem, it is in reality either too
early or too late (Williams 1972, 1981, 1985, 2002). Different cultural communities are either in contact or not. If, on the one hand, two communities and their outlooks have not encountered each other, then it is too early
for any question to arise about their relations to one another and the judgments they form. Relativism is then not a very interesting or substantive
thesis because there is nothing at stake between them. This allows for a sense
in which cultural relativism is true. There can be in other words relativism
at a distance between two historically distinct cultures. But if, on the other
hand, two communities are already in contact with one another, then it is
too late for cultural relativism. By virtue of being in contact, the communities have to some degree become interconnected. It is too late for cultural
relativism in the sense that it can provide no answers to the question of how
individuals and groups with different moral outlooks and judgments are to
treat each other. Together they now form a new moral and ­conversational
­community, which must confront the morally basic questions of how its
members ought live and relate to one another (Benhabib, 2002). This is
obviously the situation in which we are today, and which arguably involves
(almost) the whole world.
form of ethical universalism taking its premises from the core universal ideas contained in each
culture. For further details on the notion of “rooted (moral) cosmopolitanism”, and “pluralism
under rigorous normative constraints”, see Chokr, 2008.
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It seems then that only a departure from cultural relativism towards
something like a “pluralistic, historically enlightened ethical universalism”
can help us address the moral questions that we all face together in a ‘globalized’ world, and in which we now form a new community confronted
with urgent moral questions. Such a universalism must be one that remains
however sufficiently respectful of cultural differences, while at the same
time being constrained normatively by what is right and therefore good for
each and all human beings, regardless of which culture or cultural complex
they (claim to) belong to.
As I pointed out at the outset, such a view is also that of a number
of contemporary philosophers who are eager to clear the ground for such
a perspective and defend it each in their own distinctive way from their
respective philosophical and political standpoint. For this purpose, I intend
in a forthcoming section (6.2) to focus on, and discuss in some detail Nussbaum’s bold, substantial, and timely proposal. First however, I turn next to
Williams’ case against ‘ethical theory,’ and his defense of ‘reflection’ as an
alternative in an effort to ascertain if he offers us a viable option.
Williams’ case against ethical theory/defense of ‘reflection’ as alternative
Though Williams’ writings –subtle, imaginative and insightful as they
are, have for the most part defined themselves over the years in opposition
to one or another of the dominant ethical theories in contemporary moral
theory, they have not however put forward an alternative theory. This is not
of course to say that Williams’ contributions have been primarily negative
or critical, but it means that “his positive contributions have not taken the
form of theory construction” (Scheffler, 2002, p. 197). For Williams, traditional ethical theories have failed to orient themselves convincingly in relation to conspicuous features of ethical phenomena as actually experienced
by situated human beings. They have overlooked or neglected dimensions
of ethical life, the complexity of human life, the non-rational and emotional aspects of human nature, including the fact that people find value, as
he says (1972), in such things as trust, submission, regret, uncertainty, risk,
even despair and suffering”.
This has led him to challenge the dominant agenda of contemporary
moral philosophy; to question and raise serious doubts, not just about the
alternative and rival answers that moral philosophers have traditionally given
to certain standard and traditional questions, but more importantly, about
whether the standard and traditional questions themselves are really the right
ones for moral philosophy to be addressing. He has thus indicted the so-called
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traditional “morality system” and its underlying assumptions. Moreover, he
has recommended that we replace the “thin” concepts (e.g., good, bad, ought,
right, wrong, etc) favored by the “morality system” and which are “general
and abstract” and “do not display world-guidedness” by “thick” concepts
(e.g., courage, shame, treachery, brutality, gratitude, promise, lying/truthfulness, etc) which are “world-guided and action-guiding” (Williams, 1985,
p. 140-134 and 152). And on the basis of a distinction drawn between morality and ethics, he urged that philosophers return to the Greeks’ more inclusive and general starting point “How should one live?”39 In his view, such a
question obviously invites considerations of all salient aspects of human life,
as well as confrontations of life’s tough questions, presumably in a piecemeal
fashion, with close attention being paid to the arts, literature and psychology,
and more generally to the humanities and the social sciences.
In effect, one could say that, for Williams, the fundamental alternative confronting moral philosophers today is between (1) an ethics based
on theoretical, metaphysical criteria and (2) an ethics squarely and firmly
anchored in the thick of human life and existence.
In his famous 1985 work, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, Williams
extended his criticism with increasing vigor to the very idea of an ‘ethical
theory’ itself. To put it briefly, he does not believe that there is any legitimate philosophical question that is best answered by elaborating the kind
of normative structure that philosophers commonly refer to as an ‘ethical
theory’. “There cannot be any very interesting, tidy or self-contained theory of what morality is…nor…can there be an ethical theory, in the sense
of a philosophical structure which, together with some empirical fact, will
yield a decision procedure for moral reasoning” (Williams, 1981, p. ix-x).
It is in this context that we may understand his powerfully articulated and
defended criticisms of Utilitarianism, Kantianism, and Aristotelianism.
However, in their evaluations of Williams’ work, several critics, who
are otherwise sympathetic to a number of his ideas (including myself ) have
expressed doubts and reservations about the wisdom of, or warrant for, his
wholesale repudiation and rejection of the so-called “morality system”.
Thus, while Nussbaum, for example, agrees for the most part with his
objections to Utilitarianism, she finds his critique and rejection of both
Kantianism and Aristotelianism too sweeping and not nuanced or qualified enough. In fact, she believes that “there are many points of agreement
39 As noted earlier (note 18), I have myself vigorously defended such a view as well in another
context (Chokr, 2006b) on the basis of Foucault’s later work.
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between Williams’ approach to ethics and Aristotle” (Williams, 2003, p. 24).
She also believes that “Kant’s idea that we should always treat humanity as
an end and never as a mere means” is also helpful for criticizing many inclinations we have, in both personal and political life (ibid, p. 11). Another
question that she also finds puzzling concerns the relationship between the
ethical and the political in Williams’ work (ibid, p. 10). According to her,
“Williams later maintained that his attack on ethical theory left intact the
aspiration to construct political theories, which might be valuable guides”.
But she then asks, quite pertinently: “where does this leave those among the
great Western political theorists such as Aristotle, Cicero, Rousseau, Kant,
and John Rawls, who put a moral theory at the core of their political theories?” (ibid, p. 10). She goes on to note, also quite pertinently for my later
discussion, that Williams has somehow singled out Rawls as an example
of the criticized class of moral theories, and yet, his later statements to this
effect seem to suggest that he might after all admit the usefulness of Rawls’
theory, given its political nature. In the end however, Nussbaum thinks
quite rightly, I believe, that the source of the distinction between an acceptable aspiration to a theory of political justice and an ­unacceptable aspiration to a theory of individual morality is left obscure. Williams’ general
failure to engage systematically with Rawls’ ideas about social and political justice leaves such important issues unresolved. In her mind, Williams
never adequately confronted the question of a plausible account of the good
in ethical theory (ibid, p. 11).
As for Scheffler, another sympathetic critic of Williams, he argues that
Williams’ distinction between ‘thick’ and ‘thin’ concepts is flawed (see also
Tappolet, 2004, for another argument to that effect), and therefore less
effective against ethical theory than Williams takes it to be (Williams, 2002,
p. 199). A closer examination of the latter distinction leads him to identify
what he regards as “an important instability in that position”. He wonders in
particular if the elimination of ethical theory, given Williams’ own diagnosis
of the urge that produces it, would leave Williams with enough resources to
engage in the kind of social criticism he evidently wants to engage in (viz.
discussions of racism, sexism, and social injustice). According to Scheffler,
“there is in fact a conflict between Williams’ repudiation of ethical theory
and his desire to engage in social criticism of oppressive social institutions”
(ibid.). If Scheffler is right, this raises the question of whether ethical theory
should be retained, or whether ethical criticism should instead be eschewed.
The answer to this question depends in part on the force of Williams’ objections to ethical theorizing, and those objections in turn depend in part on
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his doubts about the objectivity of ethics. In the final analysis, Scheffler suggests, quite rightly in my view, that “the possibilities of ethical objectivity
may be greater than Williams allows” (ibid.). Insofar as that is so, his case
against ethical theorizing is weakened even further.
However, Williams has insisted that viable resources for moral and
social criticism will remain available to us long after ethical theories have
disappeared. He writes: “Nothing has been said should lead us to think
that traditional distinctions are beyond criticism; practices that make distinctions between different groups of people may certainly demand justification, if we are not to be content with unreflective traditions which can
provide paradigms of prejudice” (Williams, 1985, p. 115). Williams calls his
alternative to ethical theory “réfection”, and he states unequivocally that the
latter should go in a direction opposite to that encouraged by the former.
“Respect for freedom and social justice and a critique of oppressive and
deceitful institutions may be no easier to achieve than they have been in
the past, and may well be harder, but we need not suppose that we have no
ideas to give them a basis. We should not concede to abstract ethical theory
its claim to provide the only intellectual surroundings for such ideas” (ibid.,
p. 116 and 198). And he adds: “It is quite wrong to think that the only alternative to ethical theory is to refuse reflection and to remain in unreflective
prejudice. Theory and prejudice are not the only possibilities for an intelligent agent, or for philosophy” (ibid., p. 112).
What does Williams mean by ‘reflection’? Is it really the case, as he
insists, that it enables to criticize moral practice without resorting to moral
theory? I will next consider these questions in some detail in an effort to
ascertain whether Williams’ alternative proposal is satisfactory.
The concept of ‘reflection’ is most at home within Critical Theory and
Williams’ own use of the term owes clear debts to the way in which critical
theorists, such as Habermas employ it40. Although Williams does not offer
a formal definition of what he means by ‘reflection,’ the following passage
serves both to give some sense of what he means and to indicate how, on his
account, reflection differs from ethical theory.
What sorts of reflection on ethical life naturally encourage theory? Not all of
them do. There is reflection that asks for understanding of our motives, psycho40 For evidence of Williams’ debt to Critical Theory, see Williams, 1985, p. 166-7, esp. notes 11
and 12. See also his remarks about “reflective social knowledge” (ibid, p. 199). In his Knowledge
and Human Interests, Habermas announces that his aim is “to recover the forgotten experience
of reflection” (Habermas, 1971, p. vii), and the concept of ‘reflection’ plays a central role –albeit
not always clean– in much of his work. See also Geuss (1981, p. 61-63, 70, 79, 91-94).
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logical or social insight into our ethical practices, and while that may call for
some kinds of theory, ethical theory is not among them. Nor is it merely that
this kind of reflection is explanatory, while that which calls for ethical theory
is critical. Much explanatory reflection is itself critical, simply in revealing that
certain practices or sentiments are not what they are taken to be. This is one of the
most effective kinds of critical reflection. It is a different kind of critical reflection that leads to ethical theory, one that seeks justificatory reasons. (Williams,
1985, p. 112, italics added)
The kind of reflection Williams has in mind occurs when agents are led
to see how they have acquired their normative beliefs and attitudes. This is
by the way reminiscent of the ‘genealogical’ approach advocated by both
Nietzsche and Foucault. Critical theorists often speak of this as “emancipatory self-reflection” –which consists basically in freeing oneself from hidden
forms of domination and repression through a depth explanation and understanding of social processes. Williams intends it however as a more extensive strategy for promoting not only freedom but justice and other ethical
concerns as well. He allows that such reflection “may call for some kinds of
­theory” (e.g., psychoanalysis, or even Marxist social theory) but not ethical
theory, allegedly because ethical theory seeks justificatory reasons, which simply cannot be had. The strong justificatory urge of ethical theory is impossible to fulfill, according to Williams, because it involves a wish to see our
moral life as endorsable from a standpoint external to it; and many aspects of
human moral cannot stand up to such impartial rational scrutiny.
In this regard, he writes:
We may be able to show how a given moral practice hangs together with other practices in a way that makes social and psychological sense. But we may not be able
to find anything that will meet a demand for justification made by someone
standing outside those practices. We may not be able, in any real sense, to justify
it even to ourselves. A practice may be so directly related to our experience that
the reason it provides will simply count as stronger than any other reason that
might be advanced for it. (Williams, 1985, p. 114; italics added)
There seems to be good sense behind Williams’ conviction that many
of our moral practices are alas “human, all too human” (to use Nietzsche’s
expression) and that they lose the only ground they have if we try to view
them from a nonhuman (external) perspective –something like a God’s eye
perspective. But does it follow from this that such practices cannot be critically evaluated, or that they can somehow be criticized effectively without
invoking moral norms and justifications of these norms? Granted, our justifications often turn out to be more meager than we had hoped they would
be, but does this diminish their necessity and importance in our thinking?
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It is worth noting here that Williams uncharacteristically suggests that
‘justice’ may be one moral concept that “transcends the relativism of distance” (Williams, 1985, 166), thus allowing us to appraise societies as just
or unjust that are temporally and spatially quite distant from us. If this is
so, then on Williams’ view we can appraise some aspects of moral practices
from a standpoint external to them. However, it is hard to see what the
force of these “justice appraisals” could be. Since the concept of ‘justice’ is
also a ‘thin’ concept –one that is not “world-guided” in Williams’ account,
it follows then that such appraisals must accordingly and ultimately lack
any objective basis.
Critical reflection only attains its goal when agents are arguably able
to defend or dismiss social practices on the basis of arguments41. For Habermas, for example, the search for justificatory reasons is not an esoteric
practice indulged in only by ethical theorists. It is somehow built into the
structure of everyday communication. In everyday communication we are
constantly making various sorts of claims, and the communication continues only when there is a background consensus that the claims could be
justified. When this background consensus breaks down, then justificatory
reasons must be provided or else the communication itself will break down.
In other words, for Habermas, the capacity to provide justificatory reasons
is also part of the “communicative competence” that defines us as members
of a linguistic community. Contrary to what Williams says, showing that
certain practices “are not what they are taken to be” is merely a first step.
Defending or dismissing a social practice on the basis of arguments always
involves an appeal to moral norms that one believes is rationally justifiable,
and this, in turn, necessitates the resources of moral theory. Theorists will
continue to debate the precise ways in which such norms can and cannot be
rationally justified; but there is no getting around the necessity of normative
justification (and hence, of moral theory) once one decides to venture into
the arena of social and political criticism. This is, I believe, where the single most important challenge confronting moral and ­political ­philosophy
today lies. The character of the arguments we are inevitably forced to use in
the moral sphere need to find their place within a larger theoretical framework in order to show that our criticisms are neither ad hoc nor self-serving
for suspicious ideological purposes.
41 Habermas makes a distinction between “reflexive learning“and “non-reflexive learning”. The
former involves defending or rejecting practical claims “on the basis of arguments” while the
latter takes place when practical claims “are naively taken for granted and accepted or rejected
without discursive consideration” (Habermas, 1973, p. 15).
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Williams’ own use of the concept of “reflection” therefore not only runs
counter to how Habermas intended it to be understood, but is ultimately
self-defeating as well42. Reflective knowledge in the moral sphere requires
the resources of normative theory. Habermas himself, in seeking to “recover
the forgotten experience of reflection” in his early work (Habermas, 1971)
was explicitly trying to re-appropriate a crucial insight of the classical
Greek concept of theoria that most modern theorists unfortunately have
dismissed, and that is, “the insight that the truth of statements is linked in
the last analysis to the intention of the good and true life” (Habermas, 1971,
p. vii and 317)43. In doing so, he was not only expressly acknowledging that
critical reflection requires the resources of normative moral theory but also
drawing attention to the fact that moral norms are embedded in, and presupposed by, all forms of critical thought.
In the final analysis however, it remains that ethical theorizing may have
to be done in a new way, perhaps even in a post-Williams’ way44. I.e, a
historicized way of doing ethics, anchored in the real, one that takes into
account the variegated and complex phenomena of human life and existence, and whereby its ‘objectivity’ is established on radically new grounds,
and arguably in a non-metaphysical way.
Nussbaum’s defense of a pluralistic, historically enlightened ethical universalism
Nussbaum’s effort in this regard is especially noteworthy, and in some
sense, particularly conciliatory. Though her work intersects on many points
42 Nussbaum finds it difficult to figure out what Williams’ positive alternative to ethical and
political theory amounts to, if anything. Interestingly enough, she writes:”It was only when
the postmodernists showed him the excesses of his own position that he brought out, against
them, his old Cartesian rationalism, and his always deep commitment to truth, along with an
equally strong commitment to social criticism”. Moreover, she adds: “The dialectic between
his Enlightenment self and his Nietzschean self makes his last, enigmatic book (Truth and
Truthfulness: an Essay in Genealogy, 2002) especially precious to me” (Nussbaum, 2003 p. 22).
43 In recent years, Habermas seems to have softened his position in the sense that he now accepts
the claim that “philosophy has no business playing the part of the highest arbiter in matters of
science and culture”. However, he continues to hold that philosophy ought to concern itself
with justificatory discourse in all areas of life and with the validity claims raised in all conversations. Philosophy’s proper role is thus that of interpreter or “stand-in” as opposed to that of
a judge within a Kantian tribunal of reason (Habermas, 1990, p. 14 and 19).
44 One may even note that a charitable interpretation and overall re-assessment of Williams’ work
can justifiably lead us to believe that he would ultimately be supportive of the approach advocated herein, namely, one that attempts to bring together appropriately construed and judiciously
re-conceived notions of “pluralism”, historical enlightenment”, and “ethical universalism”.
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with Williams’ –esp., regarding his interest in ancient Greek thought and
the moral and political importance accorded to the hitherto neglected phenomena of the imagination and emotions, she departs radically from him
on a number of points.
Thus, she rejects normative culturale relativism and seeks to articulate
a universalist ethical and political theory grounded in a Marxian/Aristotelian conception of human flourishing45, as a “free-standing conception”. She
claims that the latter could be the object of a worldwide “overlapping consensus” –to use Rawls’ expression, without however restricting it or placing the kinds of constraints he places on it (Rawls, 1996, p. 133-172). By
“overlapping consensus”, Nussbaum means “that people may sign onto this
conception as the freestanding moral core of a political conception, without accepting any particular metaphysical view of the world, any particular
comprehensive ethical or religious view, or even any particular view of the
person or of human nature”. Indeed, she adds, “it is expected that holders
of different views in those areas will even interpret the moral core of the
political conception to some extent differently, in keeping with their different starting points (Rawls, 1996, p. 144-145).
Though her view is by her own admission closely allied to Rawls’ “political libéralisme”, it differs from the latter’s in that she seeks to extend it
beyond the narrower confines of “Western liberal democratic sociétés”.
Whether this extension is defensible or not could constitute grounds for
contention and controversy, and perhaps even a non-starter. I choose therefore to leave this issue aside for now.
Besides, unlike Rawls’ procedurally oriented conception of justice46, in
45 As Nussbaum interprets Aristotle and Marx’s use of his ideas, “the core of his account of human
functioning is a freestanding moral conception, not one that is deduced from natural teleology
or any non-moral source. Whether she is correct or not on this point, and this is clearly another
possible point of contention, she insists however that her neo-Aristotelian proposal is intended
in that spirit –and also (clearly unlike Aristotle’s) as a partial, not a comprehensive, conception
of the good life, a moral conception selected for political purposes only. The only essentialism
she wishes to countenance is internal, as opposed to external (Nussbaum, 1992). Her search for
universal values does not proceed therefore from external metaphysical considerations, but rather
from internalist considerations informed by history and our best knowledge about the world.
By thus being anchored in our natural and historical reality, her moral inquiry seeks to derive
some ethical principles or recommendations based only on a number of ethical premises.
46 In his reply to Habermas’ objection that “justice as fairness” is in fact more substantive than
Rawls realizes or is prepared to admit, and not merely or strictly procedural, Rawls argued that
these two aspects of a conception of justice are in fact connected and perhaps even inseparable.
One may however choose to put the emphasis on one rather than the other. In his case, he
prefers to emphasize the procedural aspect of his conception of justice. He then goes on to
“return the ball” to Habermas and points out that the latter’s conception based on discourse
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her view the strongest form of social contract theory today, which countenances a Kantian conception of the person as a rational being, her approach
is arguably more of an outcome-oriented approach to justice47. It eschews the
Kantian conception and adopts instead Aristotle’s conception of the person as a social and political animal, who shares complex ends with ­others
at many levels.
While Rawls’ conception of “justice as fairness” is essentially “resourcist” and focuses on “primary social gonds”48, Nussbaum’s conception of
justice is underwritten by her focus on what she calls “central human capabilities” (that is, what people are actually and truly able to do and to be). Her
approach is “in a way informed by an intuitive idea of a life that is worthy of
the dignity of the human being” (Nussbaum, 2000, p. 5, italics added)49.
Unlike Sen, who opts for a position of “deliberate and assertive incompleteness” in his version of the capabilities approach (Sen, 1992, p. 49),
Nussbaum identifies a list of ten such capabilities (Nussbaum, 2000,
p. 78-80) as specific political goals and presents them within the context
of a kind of “political liberalism” (as opposed to a “comprehensive liberalethics and communicative action is in fact more substantive that he realizes or is inclined to
say (Rawls, 1996, p. 421-432).
47 One could say alternatively that it is an opportunity-based approach as long as one insists however that she is talking, just like Sen, about ‘real and substantive opportunities’ and not merely
“formal opportunities.’ The former could yield desired and desirable outcomes (i.e., capabilities)
if one has the means, resources and proper conditions for choosing (or not) to actualize them
(i.e., achievements and functionings). Whereas the latter often add up to naught or mere lofty
pronouncements as when one talks about the desirability for people “to bootstrap themselves”
out of poverty and utter deprivation when in fact they have neither boots nor straps, nor even
the minimal conditions under which they could acquire either of them.
48 For Rawls, the list of “primary social goods” includes (1) basic rights and liberties, (2) freedom
of movement and free choice of occupation against a background of diverse opportunities,
(3) powers and prerogatives of offices and positions of responsibility in the political and economic institutions of the basic structure of society, (4) income and wealth, and (5) the social
bases of self-respect. He was also prepared to countenance (6) leisure time, and (7) freedom
from physical pain (Rawls, 1996, p. 181-182). See also (Rawls, 1996, p. 182-87) for a discussion
of the merits of his conception relative to the one proposed by Sen’s capabilities approach in
an effort to address in a feasible and practical manner the serious problem of variations and
heterogeneities among people.
49 Elsewhere she characterizes “central human capabilities” as “developed opportunities for functioning that are necessary for a life in accordance with human dignity”. Examples of these
would be: the ability to live to the end of a human life of normal length, the ability to have
health care, an education, to enjoy bodily integrity, to participate in the social and political life
of one’s community, to be able to form one’s conception of the good life, to be able to use one’s
senses, imagination and mind in a truly human way. to have and to care for friends, to have
control over one’s material and political environment, to enjoy the social bases of self-respect
and non-humiliation up to an adequate threshold level, to enjoy a healthy emotional life, and so
forth (for details on the complete and revised list proposed, see Nussbaum, 2000, p. 78-80).
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ism”), “in a manner free of any specific metaphysical grounding”50. She
thus believes that “the capabilities can be the object of an overlapping consensus among people who otherwise have very different comprehensive conceptions of the good” (ibid., p. 5). She argues further that the capabilities
in question should be pursued for each and every person, treating each as
an end and none merely as a means for the ends of others –in accord with
the Kantian categorical imperative. She adopts therefore what she calls “a
principle of each person’s capability, based on a principle of each person as
end (ibid.) –which, she claims, has particular critical force with regards to
women’s lives which are all too often, alas, viewed as accessories or appendages to the lives of others. Finally, she insists on the idea a threshold level for
each capability, beneath which it is commonly held that truly human functioning is not available, and argues that the social and political goal of each
society and community should be getting its members above this ­capability
threshold. Her account is not intended to provide a complete theory of
social justice, but designed instead to be a general and flexible framework
which each community (society or nation-state) is to fill in on its own and
in its own way –relative to its particular circumstances and conditions51.
By attempting thus to defend an approach to the foundations of basic
political principles using the idea of human capability, Nussbaum believes
that we can uphold “a form of universalism that is sensitive to pluralism and
cultural difference” and that could “enable us to answer the most powerful
objections to cross-cultural universals” (ibid., p. 8). In effect, she is interested
in developing a particular type of normative philosophical theory –not one
that is monolithic, tyrannical or dictatorial but one that remains attentive
and responsive to various particular empirical facts and considerations.
Nussbaum is not content with merely pointing to the “poverty of relativism” and putting forth “historical arguments about non-Western cultures
that show the descriptive inadequacy of many anti-universalist approaches”
–as Amartya Sen (Sen, 1999), her colleague and pioneer of the capability approach in economics has presumably done. She has not only produced explicit and strongly nuanced arguments against relativism, whether
it be derived from considerations about culture, diversity or paternalism
50 Even though Nussbaum believes that “we need a substantive account of central political goods,
of the sort that the capabilities approach gives us”, she insists that her approach is diametrically
opposed to “Platonist accounts of the good” (Nussbaum, 2000, p. 8).
51 It is worth noting here that this is reminiscent of Scanlon’s “parametric universalism” discussed
earlier.
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(Nussbaum, 2000, p. 41-59)52, but sought to articulate a strong and sustained philosophical defense (of the need for) universal norms and values
(ibid., p. 13 and 34-110).
Against anti-theory thinkers (such as Williams, and even more radical
ones such as Annette Baier and Richard Posner) who argue that all philosophical theorizing in ethics is somehow suspect and useless, and that we
are better off sticking to everyday language, common intuitions and conceptions, Nussbaum writes, quite rightly, I think:
[…]I am convinced that this wholesale assault on theory is deeply mistaken,
and that the systematic arguments of theory have an important practical function to play in sorting out our confused thoughts, criticizing unjust social realities, and preventing the sort of self-deceptive rationalizing that frequently make
us collaborators with injustice. It’s perfectly obvious, too, that theory has great
practical value for ordinary non-philosophical people, giving them a framework
in which to view what is happening to them and a set of concepts with which to
criticize abuses that otherwise might have lurked nameless in the background
of life. (Nussbaum, 2000, p. 35-36)
Nussbaum is acutely aware of the possible serious objection faced by
anyone making a concrete proposal for a universal framework to assess and
evaluate human well-being and flourishing in a particular cultural context.
It may be objected for example that the particular categories and concepts
chosen are likely to reflect immersion in one’s own particular theoretical or
cultural tradition and may thus be external and, at least in some respects,
the wrong ones for undertaking such an assessment in that context or even
across contexts (ibid., p. 39-40). She even wonders quite perceptively and
boldly ‘whether it is appropriate to use a universal framework at all, rather a
plurality of different though related frameworks”, and whether the proposed
framework, if a single universal one, is “sufficiently flexible to enable us to do
justice to the human variety we find” and that we have good reasons to countenance and take into account. She even acknowledges that the challenge is
serious because so many proposals in the past “have gone wrong through
insufficient attunement to cultural variety and particularity” (ibid., p. 40).
Nevertheless, she goes on to argue that however crucial it is to understand how a particular context shapes both the choices and aspirations of the
people concerned, it remains that certain basic aspirations to human flourishing are recognizable across differences in context (ibid., p. 31). For it is one
52 Since I have addressed similar arguments previously in my essay, and will do so again in the
forthcoming discussion, I need not rehearse here or dwell on Nussbaum’s specific treatments,
even though they are insightful and duly nuanced.
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thing to say we may need local and particular knowledge to fully understand
the problems particular people face and properly direct our attention to the
aspects of their lives that others may take for granted. “It is quite another
matter to claim that certain very general values, such as the dignity of the
person, the integrity of the body, basic political rights and liberties, basic
economic opportunities, and so forth, are not appropriate norms to be used
in assessing the lives of individuals –regardless of where they live” and what
cultures they (claim to) belong to. And she asks rhetorically, or rather sarcastically: “How might one argue this more contentious point?” (ibid., p. 41).
Indeed, how could anyone in good conscience object to the desirability for
each and all human beings of the general values and goals she mentions?
Nussbaum recognizes the obtuseness and objectionable nature of various ways of thinking across cultural boundaries and urging a universalist
approach –e.g., those of the ethnocentric Enlightenment of yesteryears,
colonialism, “neo-liberal global marquetèrent”, and even some allegedly
open-minded and progressive contemporary Western intellectuals. It is in
part the blindness of these various ways to “cultural complexity” that has
made many people skeptical about any and all forms of universalism.
It is because such approaches seem obtuse –neglecting tradition and context
and their role in constructing desire and preference, neglecting the many different conceptions of the good that citizens of different nation have and their
urgent need to be able to live in accordance with these conceptions –that many
sensitive thinkers feel all universalizing approaches are bound to be obtuse, and
mere accomplices of a baneful globalizing process. Such thinkers see before
them the prospect of a world in which all interesting differences, all the rich
texture of value, have been flattened out, and we all go to McDonald’s together.
(Nussbaum, 2000, p. 32)
But, of course, ethical universalism need not have such defect, and the
fact that some (or even most) universalist approaches proved to be seriously
objectionable need not compel us to indict any and all such approaches.
Universal values may even be necessary, she reminds us, for an adequate
critique of the misguided ways. “Pluralism and respect for differences are
themselves universal values that are not everywhere observed; they require a
normative articulation and defense” and that is one of the things Nussbaum
hopes to provide (ibid., p. 32).
In this context, it may be relevant to recall the point made earlier (section 2.2.4), in my discussion of pluralism and universalism. I then argued
that they offered and constituted a better and more appropriate response
than relativism to the fact of real and genuine moral disagreements, as well
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as to the fact and genuine respect of cultural diversity. Calling for an ethical
universalism need not consist in advocating a unique value or even one set
of values. Nor does it have to take the traditional form based on authoritarian and paternalistic values and norms. It is instead underwritten and ‘justified’ by a pluralism, which enables it to demonstrate its respect for cultural
differences –under some minimal normative constraints.
Thus, the kind of “pluralistic, historically enlightened ethical universalism” that she wishes to defend would be prepared to leave space to individuals who may wish to adopt a traditional way of life. But it would also
be prepared and determined to criticize unjust cultural practices wherever
they are found. In drawing correctly the consequences of cultural complexity in a historically enlightened way, she insists that intra-cultural criticism is deeply entrenched in all cultures. “Culture are dynamic and full of
contestation” (ibid., p. 59), and not static nor uniform or homogenous, as
proponents of relativism often seem to assume or suggest. She is also prepared to countenance and even endorse the view according to which “we
should provide spaces in which valuably different forms of human activity
can flourish” (ibid., p. 59). In other words, “we should not stamp out diversity, or even put it at risk, without a very good reason (ibid., italics added).
However she is quick to add the following comment: “But in light of the
fact that some traditional practices are harmful and evil, and some actively
hostile to other elements of a diverse culture, we are forced by our interest in diversity itself to develop a set of criteria against which to assess the
practices we find, asking which are acceptable and worth preserving, and
which are not” (ibid.). Finally, she is insistent on the fact that her view is
underwritten by a political rather than a comprehensive liberalism. It is one
that urges respect for the many different conceptions of the good that individuals may have, and promotes a political climate in which they will each
be able to pursue the good (whether religious or ethical) according to their
own lights, so long as they do no harm to others.
In effect, as suggested earlier, what Nussbaum is advocating is the search
for universals that are “facilitative rather tyrannical” or dictatorial, that create and protect spaces for freedoms and choices rather than dragooning
people into one desired or desirable total and totalizing mode of being and
living. Such an argument, she contends, is not only compatible but even
required by the search for cross-cultural universals.
For it is all about respect for the dignity of persons as choosers. This respect
requires us to defend universally a wide range of liberties, plus their material
conditions; and it requires us to respect persons as separate ends, in a way that
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reflects our acknowledgment of the empirical fact of bodily separateness, asking how each and every life can have the preconditions of liberty and self­determination. We have good reasons already, then, to think that universal values are not just acceptable, but badly needed, if we are really to show respect for
all citizens in a pluralistic society. (Nussbaum, 2000, p. 59-60)
Elsewhere in her discussion, she sums her position forcefully as follows:
We want an approach that is respectful of each person’s struggle for flourishing,
that treats each person as an end and as source of agency and worth in her own
right. Part of this respect will mean not being dictatorial about the good, at least
for adults and at least in some core areas of choice, leaving individuals a wide
space for important types of choices and meaningful affiliation. But this very
respect means taking a stand on the conditions that permit them to follow their
own lights free from tyrannies imposed by politics and tradition. This, in turn,
requires both generality and particularity: both some overarching benchmarks
and detailed knowledge of the variety of circumstances and cultures in which
people are striving to do well. (Ibid., p. 69)
To the critics who, despite her explicit claims to the contrary, accuse
her of advocating a comprehensive Western-centric liberal doctrine, and
another variant of the rigid ethical universalism of yesteryears construed
in terms of a monolithic Western-centric content, albeit one that presumably aims to widen progressively so as to include other cultural contents,
she replies forcefully and categorically that she has been misunderstood (see
Barclay, 2003, Nussbaum, 2003c).
In all fairness, Nussbaum is, once again, acutely aware that a major
risk of ethical universalism is inclusivism, which is often motivated by good
intentions and advocated in the name of justice. As she knows very well,
“the road to hell is often paved with good intentions”. To avoid this trap,
Nussbaum insists that her list of capabilities, which has been arrived at as a
result of years of a broad and open “cross-cultural discussion” (Nussbaum,
2000, p. 76), does not provide for a specific achievement or functioning
prescription. It only includes those meaningful spheres of a truly human
life which are present in each country and for each and every person. No
ethical content is to be defended at all costs, especially if such defense goes
to the detriment of the other’s flourishing life. “It is in this sense that the
list is, emphatically, a partial and not a comprehensive conception of the
good” (ibid., p. 96).
Her version of the capabilities approach and the ethical universalism
underwriting it does not seek to impose specific functionings but to open
up possibilities, by giving each person the opportunity to be herself, in the
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way she deems best. She insists that “capabilities” (and not functionings)53
are and must remain the appropriate political goal –i.e, to give each person
the opportunities to choose (or not) to actualize certain valuable beings and
doings in accordance with her conception of the good life (ibid., p. 87)54.
She also points out that her critics often fail to distinguish between two
sets of issues which are easily conflated: one is the issue of justification, and
the seconde, that of implementation (ibid., p. 101-105). The former must be
done in terms of rational and universally valid arguments55, while the latter must countenance plural specification, and will obviously be context­sensitive, taking into account the relatively different circumstances and
resources available in different measures to different communities around
the world, and therefore be multiply realizable (ibid., p. 77).
In her view however, “the legitimate concerns for diversity, pluralism,
and personal freedom are not incompatible with the recognition of universal norms”. Indeed, she believes that “universal norms are actually required
if we are to protect diversity, pluralism, and freedom, treating each human
being as an agent and an end”, and that “the best way to hold all these concerns together […] is to formulate the universal norms as a set of capabilities for fully human functioning, emphasizing the fact that capabilities protect, and do not close off, spheres of human freedom” (ibid., p. 106).
[…][I]n a time […] when non-moral interests are bringing us together across
national boundaries, we have an especially urgent need to reflect about the moral
norms that can also, and more appropriately unite us, providing constraints on
53 At times however, she seems to be wavering in this regard, or rather, to make an exception in
the case of the most deprived and poorest people for whom it only makes sense to insist on
certain basic and fundamental functionings or achievements.
54 As Nussbaum conceives of the capabilities, they obviously have a “very close relationship to
human rights” (Nussbaum, 2000, p. 97). And though the language of ‘rights’ play a powerful
role in public discourse and international debates, one significant advantage of her focus on the
‘capabilities’ is, as she points out, that it is not linked to one particular cultural and historical
tradition, as the former is often believed to be –albeit wrongly. But this is another issue. Even
Williams recognizes the advantage of the language of ‘capabilities’ over that of ‘rights’, when
he writes in his commentary over Sen’s view: “I am not very happy myself with taking rights as
the starting point. The notion of a basic human right seems to me obscure enough, and I would
rather come at it from the perspective of basic human capabilities. I would prefer capabilities
to do the work, and if we are going to have a language or rhetoric of rights, to have it delivered
from them, rather than the other way around” (Williams, 1987, p. 100). The relationship
between the two concepts (‘capabilities’ and ‘rights’) require however further scrutiny and such
a task is obviously the limited scope of this essay (see Nussbaum, 2000, p. 98-101; and others
of her writings on this matter).
55 In this regard, Nussbaum is, I believe, in agreement with Habermas. However, once again, I
believe that such arguments must be couched as much as possible in non-foundationalist and
non-metaphysical terms.
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the[…] choices nations may make[…]. Seeking such norms is an urgent task; if
we do not seek them, we will be governed without the input of our own critical reflection, by interests and processes that very likely could not withstand the
scrutiny of ethical argument. (Nussbaum, 2000, p. 32, italics added)
In the long run, Nussbaum believes that it would be highly desirable
that “the community of nations should reach a transnational overlapping
consensus on the capabilities list, as a set of goals for cooperative international action and a set of commitments that each nation holds itself to for
its own people”. In agreement with Pogge (1989, 2002) on this point, insofar as her list is closely related to the contents of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, she contends quite rightly that “such a consensus already
exists about some items on the list”, and that “there is reason to hope that
we can build from these to the others” (ibid., p. 104).
Especially in era of rapid globalization, the capabilities approach is urgently
needed to give moral substance and moral constraints to processes that occurring all around us without sufficient moral reflection. It may be hoped that
the capabilities list will steer the process of globalization, giving it a rich set of
human goals and a vivid sense of human waste and tragedy, when choices are
pondered that would otherwise be made with only narrow economic considerations in view. (Ibid., p. 105)
For Nussbaum, justice must take priority in our social and political
reflection (ibid., p. 33)56. The capability approach she advocates begins,
in the political arena, from a basic yet powerful intuition, namely, certain
human abilities exert a moral claim that they should be developed57. This,
she says, must be understood as a freestanding moral idea, not one that relies
on a particular metaphysical, religious or teleological view. In other words,
she contends that her argument begins from ethical premises and derives
ethical conclusions from these alone, and not from any further premises.
To determine whether this is so or not would require a closer and tighter
scrutiny than I can provide herein. In any case, this may be another point of
56 Compare with Rawls’ claim (1971) that “justice is the first virtue of society”.
57 As she states elsewhere: “The intuitive idea behind the approach is twofold: first, that certain
functions are particularly central in human life, in the sense that their presence or absence is
typically understood to be a mark of the presence or absence of human life; and second, –this
is what Marx found in Aristotle –that there is something that it is to do these functions in a
truly human way, not merely animal way. We judge, frequently enough, that a life has been so
impoverished that it is not worthy of the dignity of the human being, that it is a life in which
one goes living, but more or less like an animal, unable to develop and exercise one’s powers”
(Nussbaum, 2000, p. 71-2). She also notes: “This idea of human dignity has broad cross-cultural
resonance and intuitive power” (ibid).
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Nader N. Chok r
fragility and contention in Nussbaum’s position. Nonetheless, she believes
that we can get a consensus of the requisite sort, for political purposes,
about the core of our moral argument concerning the moral claim of certain human powers (ibid., p. 83). In an interview given in 2004, she stated
unequivocally that she firmly believes that we can achieve an ‘overlapping
consensus’ on a list of basic and central capabilities as a basis for social planning and human development in a pluralistic world. Moreover, she added
interestingly enough:
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, whose contents is rather closely
related to my capabilities list, was such a document, framed, as Jacque Maritain
(one of the framers) stressed as a practical political account of central human
goals that could be endorsed by people from all sorts of different religions and
traditions. Many constitutions the world over have list of fundamental entitlements similar to my list, and the work I’ve done on constitutionalism and on
the Indian constitution in particular has closely informed my work. The trick
in getting such a consensus, as both Maritain and Rawls stress58, is to make
the political conception “freestanding”, that is, not grounded in metaphysical
ideas[…] that are the property of a particular tradition and not shared or sharable by all. I see no reason why this can’t be done. In fact, whether in Bangladesh or
South Africa or Poland, it is done all the time. I think we should look for agreement on conclusions without agreement on premises, and that it is not despair
but respect that informs such a search. (Nussbaum, 2004, p. 63, italics added)
Closing remarks in guise of final evaluation and conclusion
In the final analysis however, it would seem that Nussbaum’s attempt
to articulate and justify “a pluralistic, historically enlightened ethical universalism” grounded in her version of the capabilities approach “seems to
rely on intuition to a greater degree than procedural approaches” (of the
kind that Rawls defended), as she herself admits in her most recent work
(Nussbaum, 2006, p. 83). She does seem to recognize some version of this
problem and has periodically grappled with it (see for example Nussbaum,
2000, p. 101-103). The charge here is one of question-begging on the part of
what seems to be “a preconceived notion of justice”. How can Nussbaum
deal with this charge and related problems?
Two or three ways are worth considering. First, she could give an a priori foundationalist justification of her proposed list of capabilities. Second,
she could refurbish and strengthen the a posteriori, naturalist and histori58 As noted earlier, we might also add Charles Taylor (2001) to this list. See Chokr, 2006a.
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cal, case she made in Women and Human Development (Nussbaum, 2000,
p. 101-105) –namely, that the items of her list emerge from the way distinct yet interacting accounts and traditions of the conditions under which
human and non-human life flourishes intersect and yield mutual agreement. Or third, it may be that bringing up the whole question of ‘justification’ in this way is to misunderstand (the articulation of ) her project. It
may be that, instead of emerging from some given or found common notion
of human flourishing, the items on the list are meant to constitute and articulate the most basic and abstract modes of that flourishing, and rather than
needing a foundation, it is meant to serve as one.
While none of these proposals would satisfy everyone, they at least constitute some possible responses to the problem at hand. Strangely enough
though, Nussbaum uses none of them in her most recent work (Nussbaum,
2006). Instead, she puts forth the rather bizarre claim that Rawlsian social
contract theorists rely on intuition just as much, if not more, than proponents of the capabilities approach, in the design of the contracting situation itself (Nussbaum, 2006, p. 183). In effect, what Nussbaum is saying
is that Rawls’ original position (along with his proposed list of “primary
social goods”) is just as question-begging as her list of capabilities. Whether
this is true or not is beside the point. I don’t see how dragging down the
account of one’s opponent or competitor can serve as a defensible response
to a criticism of one’s own view. In all candor, Nussbaum seems to have a
remarkable knack for leading her readers right to the edge of these sorts of
deep and intriguing philosophical knots, only to leave them almost completely untied.
Of the three options sketched out above, it seems that only the second
one constitutes a viable and defensible response, one that is consistent with
the main thrust of her position. Since her latest work (Nussbaum, 2006)
does not in the end shed more light on the problem at hand, we are better off, I believe, returning to her 2000 work59. She writes: “In ­general, the
account of political justification I favor lies close to the Rawlsian account
of argument proceeding toward reflective equilibrium” (Nussbaum,
2000, p. 101). And she proceeds to explain briefly how this kind of non­foundationalist and non-metaphysical justification goes.
We begin by laying out the arguments for a given theoretical position,
59 Is Nussbaum’s view in this regard different from the way it was articulated before 2000? This is
perhaps a question worth entertaining, but better left for others to answer. She seems in any
case to have taken a clearer and more explicit position by then.
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holding it up against the provisional “fixed points” in our moral intuitions,
and we then try to see how these intuitions both test and are tested by the
conceptions we are examining. In particular, we look to see how the various conceptions we are examining correspond (or not) to our intuitions.
In some cases, we may find good reasons for holding a particular conception or theory (e.g., the capabilities approach) and rejecting others (e.g.,
utilitarianism, subjective welfarism, social contract theory or resourcism).
In others, our considered judgments or moral intuitions may have to be
rejected when we find out that the particular conception or theory we favor
and uphold on other grounds cast them into doubt and calls them into
question. By running through this process over and over, we may come
in time to achieving some sort of consistency and fit with our considered
judgments and moral intuitions taken as a whole. We do so by modifying
particular judgments or intuitions when this is required and called for by a
theoretical conception that seems in other respect powerful and compelling
enough, and modifying or even rejecting the favored theoretical conception when it has failed to fit in with the most secure and stable of our moral
intuitions or considered judgments.
Needless to say, we seem to apply such a procedure toward reflective
equilibrium in many different areas or domains, but Rawls applied it specifically to the political domain (Rawls, 1971, p. 20-22, 46-53, and Rawls, 1996,
p. 28, 45, 381 n.12, 384, n.16) in seeking to “justify” a political conception of
justice to which people with different comprehensive doctrines or conceptions of the good life can agree –within a Western-style liberal democracy
with its attendant ‘public culture.’ Obviously, such a procedure entails that
we take into account not only our own intuitions or judgments and theoretical conceptions, but also those of our fellow citizens within the context
of a nation-state (Rawls’ view) or fellow human beings across nation-states,
within the broader context of the “global community” that we now constitute (Nussbaum’s view)60.
In her 2000 work, Nussbaum takes only two steps by her own admission in applying this procedure in an effort to reach a wide reflective equilibrium about her approach within the national context (Nussbaum,
2000, p. 102). Presumably her 2006 work is meant to take further steps
along this line within the broader global context, as it seeks to cover
60 As Rawls later clarified, “wide, not narrow reflective equilibrium (in which we take note only
of our own judgments) is plainly the important philosophical concept…This equilibrium is
fully intersubjective: that is, every citizen has taken into account the reasoning and arguments
of every other citizen” (Rawls, 1996, p. 384-5 n. 16).
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the cases not only the disabled, but of different nations and beyond, to
include human species relative to other living species. As I have suggested
earlier however, it is not clear how successful her argument and justification for it are in the last instance.
Nussbaum recognizes that the process that such a procedure for political
justification entails is bound to be protracted, long and arduous, and may
never in fact be complete. If this process were ever complete (if it ever could
be)61, then, she claims, “that very fact would give us the confidence to move
ahead, boldly building the conception so affirmed into the foundations of
both national societies of many sorts and international documents that
specify what nations hold themselves to”. Moreover, she is quick to add:
“Even then, however, we would still need to think about issues of appropriate procedure and about how to effect a transition from the current status
quo in a nation to the capabilities conception” (Nussbaum, 2000, p. 102).
It is true, as she points out, that we would be helped in this regard by the
fact that we would have the actual agreement of all citizens; but, as she also
recognizes, “we would still need to devise transitional procedures that are
appropriately respectful of their choices (ibid., p. 103). At this stage, and to
her credit, I must say, Nussbaum asks the most crucial question. “What do
we do about implementation, she wonders, when the process of political
justification remains, as it always very likely will remain, incomplete –when
we have a promising conception that has survived many tests and has the
backing of many people, but regarding which no wide reflective equilibrium in the full Rawlsian sense has as yet been found?” (ibid.). Admittedly, the political conception of justice itself makes already a great deal of
room for pluralism with regards to comprehensive conceptions of the good.
However, another serious issue with regards to pluralism itself emerges at
this point: What should we do when other political conceptions remain possible contenders and still garner strong support? How should we proceed?
From all the above, it seems clear that an unbridled and unconstrained
pluralism is not attractive and in fact untenable from a normative point of
view62. Certain boundaries and constraints are needed. It is difficult to see
how tolerance about alternative frameworks or conceptions can be maintained unless we suppose that there is some viewpoint independent of these
61 “Reflective equilibrium […] is a point at infinity we can never reach, though we may get closer to
it in the sense that through discussion, our ideals, principles, and judgments seem more reasonable
to us and we regard them as better founded than they were before” (Rawls, 1996, p. 385).
62 See Chokr (2008) for the articulation and defense of “a pluralism under rigorous and severe
normative restraints”.
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alternative conceptions or frameworks from which to evaluate them. Many
philosophers have concluded that there is such a viewpoint, although they
concede it can only countenance a very broad standard imposing limits on
the range of acceptable conceptions or frameworks63. Pluralism holds that
a range of different conceptions or frameworks exists and can be tolerated,
but only within limits. In other words, no matter how desirable pluralism and the tolerance it counsels are, there must be limits to what can and
should be tolerated, i.e, a threshold of the intolerable that we should not
cross with impunity. Pluralism must therefore be placed under rigorous
normative constraints of some kind.
There are naturally different forms of pluralism, and it is worth considering two of the most pertinent in this context. One form of pluralism
might be based on a kind of indeterminacy among acceptable conceptions or
frameworks: it begins with a universally valid, broad and general framework
for any acceptable standard, including for example the demand that any
valid standard must treat like cases in like manner –e.g., fairly and impartially. Such a framework alone is not itself a standard for determining rightness or wrongness, and so cannot provide any kind of meaningful guidance.
It is, rather, like a second-order standard, or a standard for any acceptable first-order standards. We might say, furthermore, that this framework
marks off and delineates somehow a “range” property of standards, in the
sense that no standard fits the framework any better than any other standard –as when, for a given circle, no point within the circle is more within
it than any other (Rawls, 1971, p. 508). As long as a given standard fits the
framework, it is acceptable, but an indefinite number of different standards
could meet it. This case offers no grounds for judging that any standard is
“better” or “worse” than any other, based on the second-order framework,
except to say that either a standard fits the framework or it does not. Limited and morally justifiable tolerance, then, would amount to approving of
those standards within the range that fit the framework and disapproving of
those outside of that range –based on the second-order standard of acceptability provided by the framework.
A different form of pluralism would be based simply on epistemic modesty (i.e, a justifiable reticence to assert claims that one does not know to be
true with any sufficient degree of confidence and certainty). This may be
akin to Rawls’ notion of the “burdens of judgment” which in effect counsels
63 Philosophers such as David Wong (1996) and Michael Walzer (1994) don’t shun the label
‘relativists”, but they are perhaps better described as “pluralists”.
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reasonable pluralism (Rawls, 1996, p. 56-66). It can be combined with parametric universalism, according to which a single universally valid framework yields different standards that deliver opposed conclusions in a given
case depending on the circumstances of its application or implementation.
Epistemic modesty implies here that even if there is a determinate answer to
the question whether, for any given action, conduct, behavior, or practice,
it is right or wrong, it may not be possible to be confident or certain enough
of this judgment in any case. In other words, no one can be confident that
she knows how that framework is to be put into practice in any particular
culture. That is, she does not know which of the available standards that fit
the framework is best, given the circumstances. And so, where one is not
confident or certain about one’s judgment, one should be tolerant.
In the end however, it is not clear that either kind of pluralism can
serve our purposes to meet the challenge of developing a coherent, morally
plausible or compelling defense of tolerance. Pluralism based on epistemic
modesty implies a kind of diffidence in the face of alternative standards that
is sufficient to prevent the modestly just from condemning the alternative
standards. Yet it must also leave one confident in the importance of one’s
own standard. As for pluralism based on indeterminacy, it allows us to see
our own standard as acceptable in that it meets a certain minimum, but this
is hardly the sort of endorsement that can sustain “its grip on us” –to paraphrase Williams– in the face of a variety of equally acceptable alternative
standards from a moral point of view.
‘Reasonable pluralism’ counsels tolerance of different practices that conform to alternative standards, and tolerance is acceptablse and can readily
obtain in a number of areas such as etiquette, humor, culinary taste, and
perhaps even standards of beauty and others. However, the stakes are altogether different when it comes to what is deemed valuable, reasonable/
rational, or worthy of the dignity of human beings. Because of the relative
lack of importance in our thinking and living of the former areas, we can
somehow maintain our way even while taking an external view of them as
simply one way and one standard among others. However, in the case of the
latter, the subject matter itself raises the stakes –as I pointed out at the outset (note 13). Once the stakes are raised, we seem less able to take an external
view, to maintain our views about what is morally worth doing or being,
or what is reasonable to believe. And yet, we must somehow come to terms
with the plurality of values, traditions, and lifestyles in the world as we
know it today. Is it however possible to avoid falling into a messy and indiscriminate pluralism that robs us of the necessary resources for ­criticism,
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social and political reflection without at the same time yielding to a monolithic, rigid and oppressive form of universalism? This is the challenge that
philosophers such as Nussbaum have taken up, and it is, I believe, the right
one. Her effort in this regard, though still fraught with various problems
and difficulties as I have shown, is nevertheless compelling and commendable –despite her critics’ claims to the contrary. For this reason, she deserves
to have the final word in this essay:
Many people […] confuse relativism with the toleration of diversity, and find
relativism attractive on the ground that it shows respect for the ways of others.
But of course it does no such thing. Most cultures have exhibited considerable
intolerance of diversity over the ages, as well as at least some respect for diversity. By making each tradition the last word, we deprive ourselves of any more
general norm of toleration or respect that could help us limit the intolerance
of cultures. Once we see this, our interest in being relativists should rapidly
­diminish. (Nussbaum, 2000, p. 49)
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