STRATEGIC VISION
Volume 4, Issue 23
w
October, 2015
for Taiwan Security
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ISSN 2227-3646
Balanced Diplomacy
Charles Yang
Swarm Defense Tactics
Tobias Burgers
Syrian Refugees
Dean Karalekas
Cooperation in
the Malacca Strait
Suchittra Ritsakulchai
Resurgent Japan
A Cause for Regional Concern?
Jae Yeop Kim
STRATEGIC VISION
Volume 4, Issue 23
for Taiwan Security
w
October, 2015
Contents
Concerns over Japan’s rise in Asia...................................................4
Jae Yeop Kim
Taiwan’s balance between China and the United States.................8
Charles Yang
Syrian refugee crisis...................................................................... 14
Dean Karalekas
Swarm defensive strategy.............................................................. 19
Tobias Burgers
Maritime cooperation in the Malacca Strait.................................23
Suchittra Ritsakulchai
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Cardinal.
Editor
Fu-Kuo Liu
Executive Editor
Aaron Jensen
Associate Editor
Dean Karalekas
Editorial Board
Tiehlin Yen
Raviprasad Narayanan
Richard Hu
James Yuan
Carlos Hsieh
Lipin Tien
STRATEGIC VISION For Taiwan Security
(ISSN 2227-3646) Volume 4, Number 22,
August, 2015, published under the auspices
of the Center for Security Studies and National Defense University.
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From The Editor
T
he editors and staff of Strategic Vision would like to
wish our readers well as we usher in the autumn season. Major events in the Asia-Pacific continue to unfold
and take shape. We hope that policymakers and scholars in the
academic community have the chance to keep up with these
events. In support of that effort, we offer our latest edition of
Strategic Vision.
We open our fifth issue of the year with an analysis of how history influences perceptions of Japan’s increasingly active regional
security role by Dr. Kim Jae Yeop. Dr. Kim is a senior researcher
at the National Defense Strategy Institute at Hannam University
in South Korea.
Next, Dr. Charles Yang, a graduate of National Taiwan
University’s Graduate Institute of National Development argues
that Taiwan should seek a more balanced policy in its relationship between the United States and China.
Strategic Vision’s own Dean Karalekas provides an overview
of the global dimensions of the Syrian refugee crisis and argues
that Taiwan should also play a role in providing aid and outreach to the refugees.
Tobias Burgers, a doctoral candidate at the Otto-Suhr-Institute
of the Free University Berlin argues that Taiwan’s military should
utilize the swarming strategy, which employs large numbers of
unmanned systems, to better defend itself against larger powers.
Finally, Suchittra Ritsakulchai, a PhD student at National
Chengchi University in Taipei, Taiwan, looks at regional antipiracy cooperation in the Malacca Straits.
We hope you enjoy this issue, and look forward to bringing you
the finest analysis and reporting on the issues of importance to
security in the Taiwan Strait and the Asia-Pacific region.
Dr. Fu-Kuo Liu
Editor
Strategic Vision
4 b Strategic Vision vol. 4, no. 23 (October, 2015)
Expanding Roles
Japan’s expanding security role in Asia causes apprehension among neighbors
Kim Jae Yeop
photo: Jose L. Hernandez
US Air Force Lt. Gen. Dolan confers with his counterpart, Japan Air Self-Defense Force Lt. Gen. Sugiyama during bilateral training at Misawa Air Base.
W
orld War II in the Asia-Pacific was initiated by Japan’s invasion of Manchuria
in 1931. In the name of the Greater East
Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, Japan expanded its war of
aggression to the Chinese mainland, Southeast Asia,
and even the Pacific Ocean with the attack on Pearl
Harbor in 1941. Japan’s ruthless violation of regional
peace was finally ended by the surrender of Emperor
Hirohito on August 15, 1945, after two atomic bombs
devastated Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
try’s previous militaristic policy by renouncing the
potential for waging war, the right of belligerency, and
the use of force as a means of settling international
disputes. Under the leadership of Prime Minister
Shigeru Yoshida in the early 1950s, Japan concentrated its national efforts to become the world’s leading economic powerhouse, relying on the US defense
commitment for national security. The Self Defense
Forces (SDF) of Japan, established in 1954, could only
exercise power to the minimum necessary for defend-
The defeat fundamentally changed the course
of Japan’s national policy. The so-called “Peace
Constitution” of Japan in 1946 abolished the coun-
ing territory against foreign invasion.
Now that 70 years have passed, Japan is once again
emerging into a major military power. In 2014, de-
Dr Kim Jae Yeop is a senior researcher at the National Defense Strategy Institute at Hannam University, and
is currently a visiting scholar at National Chengchi University in Taiwan. He can be reached for comment at
[email protected]
Expanding Roles b 5
fense expenditures in Japan were the seventh largest in the world, and the second largest in Asia. The
SDF is armed with cutting-edge, top-class weapons
systems such as six ballistic missile defense (BMD)capable Aegis destroyers, three light aircraft carriers,
more than 200 F-15 combat aircraft, and four aerial
refueling tankers. Since 1992, SDF troops have been
dispatched on peacekeeping, anti-piracy, and humanitarian relief missions overseas, including deployments to Cambodia, Iraq, the Gulf of Aden, and
South Sudan.
Collective action
It is noteworthy that Japan began to take a far more
assertive stance on foreign policy only after Shinzo
Abe, the prominent conservative leader, returned to
power by winning the general election in December
2012. During his visit to the United States on February
2013, Prime Minister Abe proudly declared “Japan
is back.” Japan’s first-ever National Security Strategy
Report, published in December 2013, unveiled a vision of a “Proactive contribution to peace,” which emphasized the strengthening and expanding of Japan’s
own capabilities and roles to cope with security chal-
lenges from recent shifts in the regional balance of
power, mainly due to China’s rapid military rise.
Today, Japan seeks to legalize the right of collective self-defense as a top priority for expanding its
role in regional security. Since the end of World
War II, Japan’s post-war cabinets have maintained
the legal interpretation that Japan cannot exercise
collective self-defense, because it exceeds the minimum necessary level for defending Japanese territory, under the restriction placed by Article 9 of
the Constitution. On July 1, 2014, however, the Abe
cabinet publicly approved a change of the interpretation of the Constitution to allow Japan to exercise
collective self-defense. This decision was followed
by legislating a package of 11 security-related bills,
which were highly involved with exercising collective self-defense. While opposition parties and civic
groups denounced the legislation as “war bills,” the
Abe cabinet’s controversial security legislation was
approved in Japan’s upper house of Parliament on
September 19.
Japan’s move to allow collective self-defense is a major change from the country’s traditional, post-war
security policy. It will enable the SDF to carry out a
broader range of military missions anywhere in the
photo: Trevor Welsh
The Arleigh Burke-class destroyer USS Benfold departs San Diego on its way to join forward-deployed naval forces in the Pacific.
6 b STRATEGIC VISION
world, which was previously considered a violation
of the Constitution. These new missions include protecting US naval warships under attack, intercepting
ballistic missiles against allied states, countering naval blockades at major international sea lanes, and
forcibly stopping and inspecting suspicious vessels
that may be carrying weapons destined for countries
hostile to Japan’s allies. Such missions carry risks, and
could lead to involvement in high-intensity, combatrelated armed conflicts, which may lead SDF troops
to take an offensive posture outside Japanese territory.
The Abe cabinet has pledged that Japan’s newlylegalized right of collective self-defense will only be
exercised when attacks on other countries threaten
Japanese people’s life, liberty, pursuit of happiness
and pose a direct danger to the national security of
Japan. Critics of Abe and his cabinet have complained
that this criteria is too abstract, and can be lead to
the mobilization of the SDF in international conflicts
through an arbitrary decision by the cabinet. After
all, they point out: legalizing the right of collective
self-defense will grant Japan more chances to expand
its role and influence on the regional security order,
by projecting the SDF’s sophisticated armed power
beyond Japanese territory.
Moving forward
Japan’s active stance for security in the Asia-Pacific
region is already in process. In his keynote speech
at the annual Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore on
May 30, 2014, Prime Minister Abe called for respect
of the “rule of law at sea” and “freedom of navigation
and overflight.” This is in ideological contrast with
China’s sovereign-centric logic of “core interests,” on
which Beijing bases its claims in its various maritime
disputes. Additionally, Japan has begun to provide
substantial security assistance to the Philippines and
Vietnam—two nations that are especially beleaguered
by China’s aggressive prosecution of its claims in the
South China Sea. Japan has already agreed to hand
over to these two countries a number of used naval
patrol boats and coastguard vessels. In May of this
year, Japan sent a naval frigate and a maritime pa-
“opposition parties in Japan are too
weak to check, control and stop the Abe
cabinet’s more assertive foreign policy”
trol aircraft to the South China Sea to take part in
a joint exercise with the Philippines and Vietnam.
Admiral Katsutoshi Kawano, the head of the Japanese
Maritime SDF, admitted that Japan may consider
joining the United States Navy in conducting patrols in the South China Sea, as a means to cope with
China’s maritime expansion.
International circumstances are favorable for Abe
and his cabinet to implement a greater regional security role for Japan. Abe’s ruling Liberal Democratic
Party won a majority in general elections in 2012 and
2014. As a result, opposition parties in Japan are too
weak to check the Abe cabinet’s more assertive foreign policy moves. There is growing attention and
concern in the Asia-Pacific over China’s military rise,
and this has been the impetus for Japan’s ambition to
expand its military capabilities and power projection.
It has also led to great support for Abe’s move, both
domestically and in countries involved in diplomatic
or military conflicts with China.
Above all, the United States, Japan’s former adversary in World War II, is now fully supporting Japan’s
move to take a greater security role in the Asia-Pacific
region. The United States expects that Japanese armed
forces, once free from being shackled by the pacifist
Constitution’s geographic and functional restrictions
on the range of missions they are able to conduct, will
provide a great help to US efforts to balance China’s
military rise and adventurism in the Asia-Pacific.
This is why the revision of the Guidelines for U.SJapan Defense Cooperation, announced in April of
Expanding Roles b 7
photo: Abraham Essenmacher
Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Adm. John Richardson shares a laugh with his Korean counterpart Adm. Jung Ho-sub during a fleet engagement visit.
this year, includes a geographically and functionally
expanded role for the Japanese SDF, according to the
needs of collective self-defense.
The biggest concern about Japan’s ambitious move
toward a “proactive contribution to peace” is that it
is being led by political leaders accused of engaging
in historic revisionism. Prime Minister Abe has been
criticized for remarks that seemed to deny Japan’s
responsibility for acts of aggression and war crimes
during World War II. “The definition of aggression
has yet to be established in academia or in the international community,” Abe said at an Upper House
session. China, especially, expressed official outrage
at Abe’s December, 2013 visit to the controversial
Yasukuni Shrine.
Even Abe’s public statement during an August 14
event commemorating the 70th anniversary of the
end of World War II, at which he pointed out that,
over the years, Japanese leaders had expressed “feelings of deep remorse” and issued “heartfelt apologies”
for Japan’s actions during the war, raised the ire of
his critics. Opponents pointed out that his phrasing
was such that the remarks were just a reaffirmation
of previous statements, not a direct and fresh apology
from Abe himself. Critics also chafed at his assertion during a press conference that Japan’s post-war
generations, who had nothing to do with the misdeeds of World War II, should not be predestined
to apologize in perpetuity.
Controversy over Japan’s historical revisionism
is not just a mere accusation of wrongdoings that
ended several decades ago. It is an important test of
whether Japan is a responsible, peace-loving power
in the Asia-Pacific region. Denying or justifying old
actions including colonial rule, the war of aggression, the Nanking Massacre, and the practice of using comfort women cannot be compatible with a
proactive contribution to peace’. If Abe sticks to his
own distorted historical view, Japan’s move toward a
more assertive military power will become another
destabilizing factor in regional security, heightening
tensions and distrust.
Japan’s increased diplomatic and military influence
must be based on universal, international values such
as peace, non-aggression, and human dignity; not
historical revisionism. Detailed and reliable measures
must be taken to ensure that Japan’s exercise of its
collective self-defense will not violate its principle
of an exclusively defense-oriented policy. These are
necessary if Japan is to win support and understanding from neighboring countries for its greater role
in the regional security order. n
8 b Strategic Vision vol. 4, no. 23 (October, 2015)
Balancing Act
Shifting developments in Asia necessitate rebalancing of Taiwan’s relations
Charles Yang
R
ather than simply aligning itself with
one side as China continues to rise both
economically and militarily, the government in Taipei should seek to derive advantages from
both the United States and the People’s Republic of
China (PRC). In other words, the government of the
Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan should strive
to strike a balance between these two powers, rather
than bandwagoning with the United States.
There are several developments which argue for
such a policy change. First, the national power of
the PRC is increasing. A good relationship with this
emerging economic powerhouse would greatly benefit Taiwan’s economic interests. Conversely, Taiwan
would suffer if it seeks to integrate itself with the
economic strategy of the United States and Japan.
Second, American power is declining. America’s
China policy has changed from one approximating
containment, to one approaching détente: one might
say, from congagement to hedging. Scholars such as
Charles Glaser and John J. Mearsheimer have suggested that the United States should abandon its longstanding commitments to Taiwan because the government in Taipei is not being serious about its own
photo: William Jamieson
A French La Fayette frigate on patrol in the Indian Ocean. These highly capable vessels also form an important component of Taiwan’s surface fleet.
Dr Charles Yang is a graduate of National Taiwan University’s Graduate Institute of National Development.
He specializes in the political-economic development of China and US-PRC-ROC relations. He can be reached
for comment at [email protected].
Balancing Act b 9
Henry Kissinger, seen here with Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong, made a secret visit to China and met with Communist leaders to negotiate a rapprochement.
defense, and because the ruling Kuomintang (KMT)
is becoming too close to the Chinese Communist
Party.
Third, the ensuing security competition will not be
good for Taiwan, no matter how it turns out in the
end. Last but not least, the United States has not always been completely trustworthy when it comes to
the ROC’s interests: In 1971, Henry Kissinger made a
secret trip to China where he readily acknowledged
Beijing’s position and made other commitments to
harm ROC interests, e.g., to withdraw two-thirds
of US forces from the island once the Vietnam War
had ended.
However, a more balanced cross-strait policy is hard
to achieve with the current realities of ROC arms pur-
power has grown. We can see that, from 1970 to 1989,
when the PRC was relatively weak, Taiwan was able to
purchase arms from countries other than the United
States, which accounted for 9.3 percent of its defense
needs. However, in the period between 1990 and 2014,
Taiwan only purchased 4.5 percent of its defense articles from countries other than the United States. In
other words, the PRC’s behavior is pushing Taiwan
to depend more heavily on the US willingness to sell
defensive weapons to Taipei.
chases from the United States. It is well known that
Taiwan is most often unable to purchase the arms it
needs to secure the country’s defense. For the sake
of isolating Taiwan, and trying to push it toward
annexation, The PRC does its best to pressure any
country which wants to sell weapons to Taiwan. This
pressure has become increasingly effective as China’s
cases, the answer is yes. In 1958, French President
Charles de Gaulle announced that he wanted to establish the Defense Procurement Agency to improve
France’s defense industry in order to achieve an independent defense and foreign policy. As a nonaligned
country during the Cold War, India did not restrict its
arms purchases to a single country. In the period from
Difficult decisions
Will a country A continue to depend on country B
when most of A’s weapons are supplied by B? In most
10 b STRATEGIC VISION
1949 to 1989, arms from the United Kingdom accounted for a mere 22 percent of India’s weapons purchases,
while the Soviet Union accounted for 65 percent.
Meanwhile, 96 percent of Japan’s arms came from
the United States, and Japan’s foreign policy has clearly followed America’s foreign policy since the end of
World War II. The history of Vietnam’s arms purchases also shows a clear connection between relations and arms sales: Before China’s 1979 war with
Vietnam, Hanoi imported just 3 percent of its weapons from Beijing. Since the war, however, Vietnam
has chosen not to do business with the PRC for any
“The DPP should understand that
now is an opportune time to negotiate more equally with the US on arms
sales.”
of its defense purchases, even as China’s status as an
arms exporter has increased.
During the Yom Kippur War, Israel faced the difficult situation of being over dependent on its supplier
of arms. Prior to the Yom Kippur War, Israel conducted a strategy of pre-emptive war in the three previous
Arab–Israeli Wars, in an early morning meeting on
October 6, 1973, six hours before the war broke out,
Israel prime minister Golda Meir made a decision:
there would be no pre-emptive strike. The reason
for this decision was that other developed nations,
being more dependent on OPEC oil, took more seriously the threat of an Arab oil embargo and trade
boycott, and had thus stopped supplying Israel with
munitions. As a result, Israel was totally dependent
on the United States for military support, and particularly sensitive to anything that might endanger
that relationship.
Therefore, before the war, American leadership,
including Kissinger and Nixon, consistently warned
Meir that she must not be responsible for initiating a
Middle East war. On the day the war began, Kissinger
told Israel not to undertake a pre-emptive strike. Meir
confirmed to him that Israel would not. She believed
that Israel might need American assistance soon, and
it was imperative that it not be blamed for starting the
war. “If we strike first, we won’t get help from anybody,” she said. After Meir made her decision, at 10:15
am she met with US ambassador Kenneth Keating
in order to inform the United States that Israel did
not intend to pre-emptively start a war. This decision
led to massive Israeli casualties when the war began.
In contrast to supplier abandonment, it is also possible for the dependent country to sever the arms
sale relationship, this has occurred on at least two
occasions. During the Cold War, Egypt purchased
massive amounts of Soviet arms since 1955. It acquired 91 percent of its foreign arms from the Soviet
Union in the period from 1955 to 1977. However, the
Soviets sought to avoid a new conflagration between
the Arabs and Israelis so as not to be drawn into a
confrontation with the United States.
At that time, both the Soviets and the Americans
were then pursuing détente, and had no interest in
seeing the Middle East destabilized. That was why
Egypt was only able to obtain defensive materiel,
such as anti-aircraft missiles. This Soviet policy became one of the causes of Egypt’s military weakness.
This was unacceptable to Egyptian leaders. Therefore,
in July 1972, President Anwar Sadat boldly expelled
almost all of the 20,000 Soviet military advisers
from his country and reoriented the country’s foreign policy to be more favorable to the United States.
Eventually, Egypt ceased purchasing Soviet weapons
altogether after 1978.
Iran also experienced a similar situation. The United
States had supported the regime of Mohammad Reza
Shah Pahlavi in Iran, and hoped that his country
could become a stabilizing force in the Middle East.
Washington supplied Tehran with large quantities of
weapons, and in 1974, when Nixon’s National Security
Advisor Henry Kissinger visited Tehran, Iran became
Balancing Act b 11
photo: 11th MEU
An AH-1Z Super Cobra helicopter is being flown by a US Marine. The AH-1W variant of these military helicopters are also operated by Taiwan’s military.
the first country to operate the F-14 armed with the
formidable Phoenix long-range air-to-air missile.
The Iranian Air Force also bristled with formidable
weapons like F-4 Phantom jets, which the United
States was using to pulverize North Vietnam, and
with which Israel devastated Egyptian Air Force and
tank columns in 1973. US-made weapons accounted for 85 percent of Iran’s foreign arms purchases
between 1953 and 1979. However, after the Iranian
Revolution in 1979, the new Iranian government
led by the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeinei instantly
ceased importing US-made arms.
These two examples show that a previously dependent country can dissolve the relationship with its
dominant foreign arms suppliers as long as they have
viable alternatives or can accept the security consequences. Therefore, Taiwan should at least theoretically be able to follow these examples, and thus an
examination of realistic alternative arms procure-
ment is needed, as well as a sober assessment of the
security consequences of Taipei ceasing to buy arms
from Washington.
In Taiwan, there is currently a great priority placed
on maintaining the strong relationship with the
United States, and the concomitant arms sales that
result. This has sometimes spilled over into other political areas, such as in 2012 when the KMT government tried its best to pass a controversial amendment
in the Legislative Yuan to allow US beef imports with
certain levels of Ractopamine, a leanness enhancing
drug. During this process, legislators from the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) occupied
the Legislative Yuan for five days, preventing the legislature from conducting business. While the furor
over Ractopamine levels in US beef (for which there
is not a large market in Taiwan), may have seemed
like a tempest in a teacup, opponents of the legislation saw it as a dangerous precedent that could be
12 b STRATEGIC VISION
(and subsequently was) applied to Ractopamine levels
in US pork, for which the market in Taiwan is huge,
and so they sought to protect local pork producers.
One of the KMT’s reasons for supporting the controversial amendment had nothing to do with leanness
drugs or beef: it was because the party worried that
this case would affect Taiwan’s arms purchases from
the United States.
Taiwan’s military strategy has also been affected
by the United States because it decides the priority of arms sales. US decisions are based on highlevel security officials who build different channels
to communicate their opinions. The Monterey Talks
is a clear case of this situation. The talks were organized by both military and civilian leadership for
discussions of strategy. The initial focus of the talks
was “software, not hardware,” those in attendance
claimed that they would avoid discussing arm sales,
in the beginning. By the third round, however, US
officials had obtained, and even changed, information
about Taiwan’s defense priorities. More than a dozen
US Department of Defense military surveys and assessment teams were dispatched to assess Taiwan’s
weaknesses and military needs, and left their recommendations with Taiwan military authorities as well.
Response needed
It is necessary for an autonomous country or government to have different options for arms purchases.
Even as Taipei is criticized for being over economically over dependent on Chine, the PRC often criticizes Taiwan for being over dependent on the United
States. It is clear, however that the PRC is responsible
for Taiwan’s dependence, because China prevents other countries from selling arms to Taiwan. Due to PRC
pressure, Taiwan is essentially limited to purchasing
arms from a single supplier, the United States. More
attention should be focused on this point as Taiwan
is being placed in an unfair position.
Therefore, to reduce the degree of reliance on
American arms, and in the absence of any viable
alternatives, the only option is the domestic industry. A government has an unavoidable duty to
pursue its country’s best interests, and so it is necessary for the ROC government to put the indig-
photo: Jose O. Nava
Military personnel from Australia, the United States, and China prepare for Exercise Kowari in Australia. Such multinational exercise are increasing in Asia.
Balancing Act b 13
photo: Andre T. Richard
The sun begins to rise over the US Navy aircraft carrier John C. Stennis as it prepares to get underway for operations with allies in the Pacific.
enous defense industry on the front burner. The
DPP has supported this effort and has published a
series of Defense Policy Blue Papers which argue for
this position. In the fifth blue paper, titled, “China’s
Military Threats against Taiwan in 2025,” the authors
suggest that Taiwan should seek to pursue what they
call national defense development with Taiwanese
characteristics.
While this sounds encouraging, it is important that,
should the DPP prove victorious in the upcoming
elections, the leadership pursue national defense development with Taiwan’s best interests in mind, and
not seek merely to satisfy US interests.
As a case in point, the Blue Paper points out that
the military budget should reach 3 percent of Taiwan’s
GDP, this ratio exactly matches the request of the US
Department of Defense’s “Annual Report to Congress:
Military and Security Developments Involving the
People’s Republic of China 2013.” In addition, the
DPP’s plan focuses on the development of indigenous
production of submarines, advanced vertical and/or
short take-off and landing (V/STOL) fighters, and
indigenous production of advanced long-range un-
manned combat air vehicles. These goals have lead
some to suspect that this plan is meant to align itself
with the US Air-Sea Battle concept.
Second, the DPP should understand that now is an
opportune time to negotiate more equally with the
United States on arms sales. Washington is shifting
its approach and is putting more effort into balancing China’s rising influence. In March of 2015, the
Council on Foreign Relations published a special
report titled “Revising US Grand Strategy Toward
China,” written by Robert D. Blackwill and Ashley J.
Tellis. In it, they point out that the United States has
responded inadequately to China’s growing power,
and should craft a new grand strategy toward China
that centers on balancing, rather than continuing to
assist in Beijing’s ascendancy. If this trend does indeed become policy, then Taiwan may have greater
opportunity and leeway in its efforts to acquire arms
from its traditional supplier, and more importantly,
to ask for a greater transfer of technology. With increased technology transfer, Taiwan can in turn do
more for its own industries, and ultimately, its own
defense. n
14 b Strategic Vision vol. 4, no. 23 (October, 2015)
Humanitarian Hope
Taiwan also has a part to play in responding to the Syrian refugee crisis
Dean Karalekas
T
he refugee crisis that is currently being
played out across Europe and the Middle
East, while still an ongoing phenomenon, is
one that will be analyzed by academics for years to
come. It’s effects, moreover, will no doubt be felt for
generations, dictated by how well the world responds
to the unprecedented flow of refugees, most fleeing the ongoing civil war in Syria, but many seeking
greener pastures than the chaos and bloodshed that
mark day-to-day life in the post-Jasmine revolution
Middle East and North Africa. As the nations of the
world scramble to react to this fast-moving crisis,
the Republic of China (ROC) must resist the temptation to remain on the sidelines, and must use this
opportunity to do its part as a responsible member
of the international community by assisting in the
resettlement of those left homeless by the chaos that
now reigns in their homelands.
In order to accomplish this, however, the government and people of Taiwan will have to adopt a less
parochial view of citizenship through the adoption of
immigration and refugee policies appropriate for the
21st century. As it stands now, official policy, and the
social conception on which it is based, are predicated
on perception of citizenship based on the principle
of jus sanguinus, whereas what is required is a shift
to a jus solis orientation.
The jus solis principle, simply put, means a person’s
photo: Mystyslav Chernov
Refugees sleep on the streeets of Budapest. Such images only tell a part of the story of the massive humanitarian crisis which is unfolding.
Dean Karalekas is a researcher with National Chengchi University’s Doctoral Program in Asia-Pacific Studies
and associate editor of Strategic Vision. He can be reached for comment at [email protected].
humanitarian hope b 15
nationality, or identity, is dependent on where he was
born. The just sanguinus principle, in contrast, assigns identity on the basis of blood heritage. In most
of Europe, for example France, Holland, Sweden and
the United Kingdom, they rely on the jus solis, as do
(almost by their very definition) Canada and the
United States. In these nations, citizenship is largely
determined by place of birth. Germany, on the other
hand, retains even today a philosophy of jus sanguinus. This is largely a relic of the creation of the modern German state. Though antiquated, this “law of the
blood” is carried on even today, where the German
identity is based on race. As pointed out by Rado
Pribic, the Oliver E. Williams Professor of Languages
& Literatures and Chair of International Affairs at
Lafayette College, those with German ancestry are
easily conferred German citizenship regardless of
acculturation, whereas second- and third-generation
descendents of immigrants, though born in Germany,
have a difficult task obtaining such citizenship. It is
this conception of blood heritage in Germany that
famously contributed to the obsession with racial
purity and “Aryan” descent in the first half of the last
century. Despite this orientation, Germany today is
one of the leading European nations responding with
compassion and humanity to the refugee crisis, and
is the nation to which the vast majority of refugees
seek to reach.
National choices
Broadly speaking, A good indicator of whether a
nation operates on a principle of jus solis or jus sanguinus is its citizenship laws. The legislative codification of who is and is not allowed to be considered
a member of the group is directly influenced by the
prevailing conception in that society of membership
and how it is achieved. According to a study by the
US Office of Personnel Management, which compiled
information on the citizenship laws of most of the
world’s countries, the ROC confers citizenship according to the principle of jus sanguinus. The defining piece of legislation is the Nationality Law of the
Republic of China, enacted in 1929, which stipulates
that citizenship is based on descent from the father,
except in cases where the father is unknown or stateless, but where the mother is an ROC citizen. In other
“While many of Taiwan’s ethnicities fall under the umbrella of Han
Chinese, they are as culturally distinct
from one another as British are from
Americans.”
words, being born in Taiwan does not necessarily, in
and of itself, automatically confer citizenship rights:
only if the father is an ROC citizen. This applies regardless of the nationality of the mother, or in certain situations whether or not the child is born out
of wedlock. The law was amended in 2000 to allow
transmission of citizenship through either parent,
but a strong patrilineal tendency in Taiwanese society continues to dominate.
Clearly, Taiwan is very much a jus sanguinus society, and yet there are indications that it is better
positioned to be able to accept and accommodate
an influx of refugees better than its neighbors. Japan
and South Korea are both remarkably ethnically homogeneous, whereas Taiwan is home to a number of
different ethnic groups, including Hoklos, Hakkas,
and members of the island’s many aboriginal ethnic groups. Indeed, in the exodus of 1949, refugees
from virtually all the diverse corners of China were
forced to retreat to Taiwan, there to live together in
close quarters. While many of Taiwan’s ethnicities
fall under the umbrella of Han Chinese, they are as
culturally distinct from one another as British are
from Americans. Moreover, unlike Indonesia and
Malaysia, there remain few class divisions in society
conferring privilege on some and hardship on others
16 b STRATEGIC VISION
photo: UK Department of International Development
Syrian children attend class in a refugee camp in Lebanon. The future of these children lies in the hands of the international community.
(though to be fair, much work remains to be done to
empower Taiwan’s indigenous peoples).
Indeed, with each passing year, the ethnic isolation
of Taiwan is being erased. The increasingly globalized
economy has Taiwan’s workers and businesspeople
plugged into virtually every region of the world; increased levels of tourism and travel have led to an
increasingly cosmopolitan and worldly Taiwanese
population; and a high rate of dual citizenship (while
there are no hard numbers available, it has been reported that hundreds of thousands of ROC citizens have obtained citizenship in the United States
alone) shows that the population of Taiwan now enjoy strong, substantial ties to the outside world, and
they are far from the isolated islanders they were just
two generations ago.
Embracing diversity
The increasingly cosmopolitan nature of the Taiwan
identity is emerging at just the right time, as the nation no longer can afford to remain isolated from the
outside world and, following the aforementioned jus
sanguinus principle, avoid taking in immigrants and
refugees. The main reason for this has to do with demographics, which paint a bleak picture of Taiwan’s
future. According to the information website Index
Mundi, the birth rate is 8.7 births/1,000 population,
with a total fertility rate of 1.1. This is a very low fertility scenario with grave implications for Taiwan’s
population growth, especially given the culture’s traditional aversion to immigration intake (with a net
migration rate of 0.03 migrant(s)/1,000 population).
With a median age of 38.1 and a population growth
rate of just 0.29 percent, this reveals a greying population with all the associated problems that that
entails. These problems can continue to be pushed
down the road for subsequent administrations to
deal with, but they cannot be ignored indefinitely. As
countries in America and Europe have discovered,
the only way to deal with this problem is by adopting an immigration policy that is proactive, realistic,
and, most importantly, not race-based. At the current time, while it is not codified in legislation, the
main trickle of incoming immigrants to Taiwan do
so by marrying Taiwanese. The vast majority of these
are women marrying Taiwanese men, and many of
these are coming from China. This appears to have
humanitarian hope b 17
the tacit approval of policymakers, as
the linguistic similarity minimizes the
sort of socialization problems that the
government would eventually have to
address. Short of opening the door to
the 1.5 billion people of China, the
current paradigm is ill-equipped to
solve the demographic problems that
Taiwan is just now beginning to face,
and which will inevitable grow.
There is, quite naturally, resistance
in Taiwan to the idea of revamping
the immigration laws to accept more
outsiders. But in this way, Taiwan is
far from unique. There is resistance to
change in any society, as can be seen in
photo: UK Department of International Development
the debates raging in Eastern Europe
A UN aid worker poses with children in the Za’atari refugee camp in Jordan.
over how to deal with the current crisis. In this regard, Taiwan is not special. Yet most of
of transport makes this argument moot. For another,
this resistance is based primarily on little more than
Taiwan is too small to be able to accommodate such
fear, xenophobia, and a desire to avoid taking action.
a population influx. Yet this argument too is weak,
In Asia, the refugee crisis is widely seen as a European
especially after the people of Iceland, with a national
problem: in Europe, many see it as a Middle-Eastern
population of less than 350,000, have offered to take
problem (with many asking why the Gulf states aren’t
more than 10,000 Syrian refugees into their homes.
doing more to absorb the refugee population). In
Moreover, Taiwan is no stranger to taking in refugees
fact, it is a global problem, and what we are witness(of a sort), with the 1949 exodus from China adding,
by some accounts, some two million people to the
“Taipei would be sending the sig- island’s existing population of six million. Obviously
nal that Taiwan is part of the global the acceptance of a few Syrian refugees would pale
community.”
in comparison to the difficulty of accommodating
the 1949 influx.
ing now will have social, cultural, and demographic
Another argument against such a plan is that the
repercussions that will be felt for a generation.
migrants are too culturally and linguistically different
There are several arguments that could be made
from the Taiwanese. While this is true, that difference
against the notion of Taiwan accepting refugees. For
is no more pronounced than the difference between
one thing, there is the distance: Taiwan is too far away
the Syrian refugees and the cultures of Germany,
from the region of conflict. However, this argument
Iceland, Canada, or many of the other nations that
does not hold up—Taiwan is no farther away than
are doing the most to deal with this unprecedented
America or Canada, both of which are contributing
global event.
to the effort and accepting refugees, and today’s ease
For another, there is the fear, spread by many far-
18 b STRATEGIC VISION
right parties in Europe and America, that the influx of refugees into Europe contains a poison pill
in the form of Islamic State fighters, disguised as
refugees and seeking to infiltrate Western society for
the purpose of later terrorist acts. While this may be
true in a small number of cases, it does not absolve
states of the moral imperative to act on behalf of that
vastly larger number of those who are true refugees.
Moreover, by allowing this argument to factor into
its response to the crisis, the government of Taiwan
would be aligning itself with those far-right governments and parties in Europe espousing this view, and
distancing itself from its more traditional allies in the
parliaments of Europe.
Action needed
The final, and perhaps most cynical reason for action is optics: By offering to take in refugees and
making a good-faith effort to help them integrate
into society, Taiwan would be taking the moral highground, and setting an example for the rest of the
nations in Asia that the region is more than the just
the world’s factory. It would be doing its part help to
alleviate what is truly a global crisis. Taipei would be
sending the signal that Taiwan is part of the global community: This is especially important since
Taiwan is, at present, not a part of the world—due
to the diplomatic blockade perpetrated by Beijing,
and a tendency o the part of the ROC government
to keep a low international profile and not call too
much attention to itself.
Taiwan has long been a leader in cross-border and
international humanitarian efforts: it fields some of
the best-trained and best-equipped search-and-rescue operators and disaster relief teams in Asia, and
regularly assists nations in needs after being struck
by natural disasters; for example the people of Taiwan
contributed more in terms of money and relief goods
to the people of Japan after that country was struck
by the Fukushima nuclear disaster in 2011. But true
humanitarianism is not about giving and then disappearing: it is about making the long-term commitment to help alleviate the problems that confront
the international community in times of need. Now
is such a time. n
photo: US Department of State
The massive Za’atari refugee camp spills over the desert floor in Jordan. The huge flood of refugees is beyond the capacity of neighboring countries.
b 19
Strategic Vision vol. 4, no. 23 (October, 2015)
Asymmetric Advantage
Utilizing large numbers of unmanned systems key to maintaining Taiwan’s defense
Tobias Burgers
photo: John Linzmeier
Airmen from the 320th Special Tactics Squadron perform a helo casting jump during an amphibious exercise off the coast of Okinawa.
T
aiwan’s position of defense advantage
vis-à-vis China has, over the last two decades, largely faded. Before the turn of the
millennium it still had significant military capabilities against China, and the general consensus was
that Taiwan would be capable of defending itself and
defeating any attempted Chinese invasion of the island. However, as a result of the growth of the People’s
Liberation Army—growth which can be largely at-
China (ROC) on Taiwan seems and sounds more
modest compared to what it was a decade or two
ago. It currently argues that it should seek to defend
itself, try to inflict as many losses as possible, and
undertake a sustained insurgency campaign. In this
approach, it is hoped that a prolonged battle, which
would follow after a successful invasion, would be too
costly in economic, diplomatic and political terms
for China to sustain in the long term. At the same
tributed to its increased defense budget which has
doubled over the last decade—China would now
have the military upper hand in a cross-strait conflict.
Indeed, the defense strategy of the Republic of
time there is a common understanding within the
Taiwanese defense establishment that, without the
support of outside powers—foremost among them
the United States, and alternatively Japan—Taiwan
Tobias Burgers is a doctoral candidate at the Otto-Suhr-Institute of the Free University Berlin, he also conducts research for CRISP Berlin on conflict situations. He can be reached at [email protected].
20 b STRATEGIC VISION
would not be able to defend itself, let alone achieve
victory, in a long-term campaign.
The situation of military imbalance between China
and Taiwan is not likely to change anytime soon.
Although China has in recent months suffered from
a number of economic setbacks and its economic
growth has declined, it still has formidable economic
growth and its military build-up, as witnessed in
the recent victory day parade, is impressive and is
only likely to increase in the future. Furthermore, the
Taiwanese defense budget has changed little and it remains to be seen if Taiwan’s society would be willing
to invest more in defense. At the present time a military conflict between the two nations is not directly
imminent, and given the state of current relations, a
conflict will not take place anytime soon. However,
Taiwan should nevertheless ensure that its defense
capabilities remain up-to-date, and the current efforts within the administration of ROC President
Ma Ying-jeou to acquire new military capabilities or
enhance existing equipment illustrate that it indeed
aims to maintain its defense capabilities.
The recent acquisitions of Blackhawk helicopters
and P-3 Orion patrol planes, and the desire to acquire
attack submarines, all indicate this. These efforts are
necessary, but at the same time Taiwan should seek alternative strategies in order to bolster its defense. Any
such alternative should be primarily centered around
the idea that any possible amphibious invasion by
China should be as costly to Beijing as possible.
Cost effective
The concept of swarming would provide Taiwan with
a strategy that could significantly bolster its defenses.
A number of reasons exist why the strategy of swarming should be seriously considered by the Taiwanese
defense establishment. First, from an economic perspective, the pursuit of a swarming strategy would be
a cost-effective approach. The initial step to develop
swarming capabilities would be costly. However, the
swarming strategy leans heavily on the deployment
of many small and cheap unmanned systems, rather
than large, manned and costly systems. The price
range for small armed unmanned systems (UAV and
UUV) is somewhere between thousands of dollars to
several hundred thousand dollars. While this might
at first glance seem costly, it would be significantly
less expensive compared to the development and deployment of attack submarines, for example, which
are expected to cost somewhere between US$600
million and US$1 billion for a single submarine, notwithstanding their operational costs.
New capabilities
Second, from a social and political perspective, the
deployment of unmanned swarms can offer a further
benefit: The absence of manned operators reduces,
though does not eliminate, the risk of human casualties, which in itself is already an aim worth pursuing.
Furthermore, in an age in which Taiwan’s younger
generations are not too keen on joining the military,
the concept of a more digital, tech savvy, highly technological, and non-lethal job assignment might just
convince more young people to consider a career in
the armed forces.
Third, the technology to develop and deploy swarms
might currently still be difficult, but Taiwan has the
necessary technological capabilities to acquire and
develop the skills and capabilities to develop swarming vessels in large numbers. The recent demonstration of its indigenous Medium Altitude Long
Endurance (MALE) UAV developed by the National
Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology
(NCSIST) during the Taipei Aerospace & Defense
Technology Exhibition (TADTE) illustrates the technological capabilities of Taiwanese defense manufacturers and gives hope that the needed technological
requirements can be developed by its defense indus-
asymmetric advantage b 21
photo: Samuel Weldin
Sailors at Misawa Air Base in Japan assemble inert training mines during an exercise. Naval mines present a deadly threat to ships at sea.
try. Additionally, as swarming technology depends
to a high degree on advanced software, the military
establishment should consider seeking a collaborator relationship with the civil technological sector. Taiwan’s civil software sector is highly advanced
and considered among the world’s best. It is a source
of potential the defensive establishment should tap.
Beyond its indigenous sector, the defense establishment might seek cooperation with other friendly
partners, such as the United States and Japan, both of
which have a highly advanced robotics and software
sector. Given the political situation and the expected
Chinese backlash, this might be a difficult move, but
if Japan’s increasing efforts to balance against China
are taken into account, it is one that should be considered, possibly in a non-governmental framework.
Outlook unclear
Fourth and most important is the possible military
advantage of swarming strategies. China, and few
other nations for that matter, have not yet developed
capabilities to effectively defend against swarming
tactics. Current defensive systems focus foremost
on countering large threats in double-digit numbers. Here lays in essence the greatest benefit of the
“It remains to be seen if Beijing can
effectively develop systems that
could counter maritime swarms.”
swarming strategy: the overwhelming of the adversary’s defensive capabilities. Furthermore, the defense
against swarming strategies is often a costly affair.
Missiles and other systems are often expensive to deploy. This is probably best illustrated by Israel’s Iron
Dome system: A single missile costs approximately
US$100,000, whereas any Hamas rocket generally
costs somewhere between US$500 and US$1,000. As
such, defending against swarming would very rapidly
become a costly affair that militaries might not be able
to afford and sustain. This situation could change if
laser-based weapons were employed. However, the
development and operational use of laser weapons
22 b STRATEGIC VISION
photo: Aaron Jensen
Taiwan’s ability to produced unmanned systems is highlighted by the recent development of the Medium Altitude Long Endurance (MALE) UAV.
still will take many years to develop. Until weapons
of this nature become operational, swarming vessels
have the clear offensive advantage.
Swarming tactics should be foremost used in air
and seaborne operations. In air operations the development of unmanned systems has advanced the
furthest among the four sectors, which would make
it less complicated to create small UAV systems capable of utilizing swarming strategies. Furthermore,
the limited degree of possible natural barriers in the
air further favors the development of UAV swarms.
Although aerial swarming operations would be the
easiest to achieve, it is in the seaborne sector that
defense mechanisms possible. Second, naval vessels
are most vulnerable underwater, thereby achieving
the maximum result. Third and finally, China has
limited Anti-Submarine Warfare capabilities. This
will change in the future, yet it remains to be seen
if Beijing can effectively develop systems that could
counter maritime swarms.
A prime example of the systems envisioned here
could be the current generation of maritime swarm
vessels under development by the Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency, the US armed forces research arm, which is developing sea pods. These automated unmanned systems remain at the bottom
of the sea until the order is given to deploy. Such
systems are highly suitable for Taiwan. Similar to
mines, these pods are hidden so deep that the People’s
the application of a swarming strategy could achieve
the best results. First, it would allow unmanned systems to hide in the water, thereby achieving a degree of stealth that would be highly valuable in a
conflict. Numerous automated (and possible preprogrammed) swarms of vessels arising from the
sea bottom would pose a significant threat, with few
Liberation Army Navy would have difficulty detecting and subsequently defending against them. As
such, the strategy of swarming would not need to
be deployed operationally, but rather should be envisioned as cost-effective approach which would, to
some degree, enable Taiwan to increase its deterrence
vis-à-vis the Chinese armed forces. n
Potent possibilities
b 23
Strategic Vision vol. 4, no. 23 (October, 2015)
Regional Resolve
Anti-piracy efforts in Malacca Strait provide lessons in maritime cooperation
Suchittra Ritsakulchai
photo: Walter M. Wayman
US and Japanese ships steam in formation with the aircraft carrier USS John C. Stennis following an undersea warfare exercise in the Pacific.
T
he Strait of Malacca is located between
the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean,
and between the Malaysian Peninsula and
Indonesia’s island of Sumatra. This strait is the most
important sea transportation route in Southeast Asia.
From the past to the present, maritime transportation through the strait has operated at low cost while
moving large quantities of goods. Statistics show that
international trade depends on maritime transport
for more than 95 percent of all goods, especially energy products such as petroleum and natural gas from
the oil-producing countries, which are shipped from
the Middle East to Northeast Asia. It was, and still
is, an important commercial passageway between
China and India. The Malacca Strait is an important choke point which ultimately links Asia to the
oil-exporting countries of the Middle East, and the
important ports of Europe.
In the wake of the 9-11 attacks, this crucial passage
has suffered from bad propaganda and been deemed
a high-risk area due to its image of being a piracyprone area, and the perceived threat of terrorism in
its waters. Media coverage speculating on links between piracy and terrorist attacks in fan the flames
of fear. The custodians of the strait face an array of
challenges, but the major concern remains ensuring
Suchittra Ritsakulchai is a Ph.D. student in the International Doctoral Program in Asia-Pacific Studies at
National Chengchi University. She can be reached for comment at [email protected]
24 b STRATEGIC VISION
safe passage for the vessels traversing these waters.
Already saddled with the threat of piracy, which has
long been a bane for users along the waterway, the
potential threats from terrorism and war increase the
burdens on the littoral states to maintain security in
the waterway. Moreover, the intense concentration
of cargo traffic in the strait has spawned a complex
web of hub-and-feeder shipping networks within the
region and with the rest of the world. The strait thus
presents opportunities to both pirates and terrorists.
Piracy and maritime terrorism in the Malacca Strait
has long been a threat to ship owners and mariners
in the sea lanes. The Strait of Malacca’s geography
makes the region very vulnerable, and attractive, to
continued piracy. The special character of the strait is
defined by its narrow, shallow chokepoint, its thousands of islets, and its numerous river outlets, making it ideal for pirates to hide in and evade capture.
The pattern of operation which pirates have developed in Southeast Asia to perform “maritime terrorism” is to target vessels on the open ocean, as well as
other locations such as docks, barges, and navigation
systems. This threat not only increases insecurity in
the maritime transportation system but also dam-
ages the economy.
Kidnapping remains one of the most common aspects of piracy, particularly given the great danger
it poses to crew members. The current practice is
for the employers of kidnapped crews to pay ransoms for their release. It is widely acknowledged by
experts in this field that not only does paying ransom encourage further kidnappings, but the ransom
money often goes to finance weaponry to be used
in further attacks. A policy of non-negotiation with
kidnappers must be adopted to make kidnapping a
non-profitable industry.
Piracy also causes environmental problems. During
vessel takeover, the structure of the ship can sometimes sustain damage, which can lead to fuel leaks.
If pirates take control of a vessel in an attempt to
sail it to an alternative port, the limited maritime
skill of these pirates sometimes leads to accidents or
instances of vessels running aground on reefs or in
other sensitive areas.
International pressure has been exerted on the littoral states, in particular on Indonesia and Malaysia,
to address the problem of piracy. This effort began
in 2000, when piracy attacks peaked in the Malacca
photo: US Pacific Command
US and Laotian personnel pose during infection and epidemiology training in Vientiane, Laos. Such efforts improve disaster-response capabilities.
regional resolve b 25
Strait, and increased even more following the events
of 9-11. At this time, both Japan and the United States
took a greater interest in the region, and indicated
a desire to participate in enhancing security in the
waterway.
Taking action
In light of these problems, several maritime security initiatives were introduced in the Malacca Strait
between 2004 and 2007. Although significant, they
have arguably been constrained in their scope and
capability by both the unwillingness of some of the
littoral states to cooperate fully and also because of
resource shortages. Nonetheless, these developments
provide an important framework for the evolution
of current cooperation.
The first multilateral measure to be introduced by
the three littoral states was the Trilateral Coordinated
Patrol, codenamed MALSINDO. Launched in July
2004, this agreement calls for the navies of Malaysia,
Indonesia, and Singapore to patrol their waters in
a coordinated fashion. Following the introduction
of this new measure, however, there was a lack of a
provision for cross-border pursuit into each of the
participating state’s territorial waters, which has been
cited as the main flaw of this measure. Cross-border
pursuit would have been viewed by the participating
states as a violation of their sovereignty.
In September 2005, the initiation of joint air patrols
over the strait by the littoral states marked another
important step in combating piracy. The three states
each donated two planes for the patrols, known as the
Eyes in the Sky (EiS) plan. The plan permits aircraft
to fly for up to three nautical miles into the twelvenautical-mile territorial waters of the participating
states; it was hoped that this measure would provide
a valuable supplement to the trilaterally coordinated
sea patrols, which were limited to their own territorial waters.
Politically, EiS was significant because it was the
first time the littoral states had been willing to put
aside concerns over the sovereignty of their territorial waters and allow foreign forces to cross the
border. This compromise included the agreement
that each patrolling aircraft would have on board a
representative from each of the three littoral states.
Later, in April 2006, both MALSINDO and EiS were
brought together under the umbrella of the Malacca
Strait Patrols.
The most recent antipiracy initiative to be implemented was the Regional Cooperation Agreement
on Anti-Piracy (ReCAAP), which came into force
in 2006. The agreement, which encompasses the
whole region, was drafted in 2004 and required the
signatures and ratification of 10 of the participating
countries. All the members of the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations added plus Japan, China,
Korea, India, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka supported
the agreement. The aim of the initiative, which is
the first antipiracy measure to be implemented on
“The question of safety of navigation
and the security of the maritime zones
remain of interest to all nations.”
a government-to-government level, is to foster multilateral cooperation to combat the threat of piracy
and armed robbery against ships. Its activity takes
the form of information sharing, capacity building,
and cooperative arrangements.
During this period of increased multilateral activity
among the littoral states, another process has been
under way at the international level. Cooperation
under the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) was
initiated in 2004 with the aim of promoting a comprehensive approach to security, safety, and pollution
control in critical sea-lanes around the world. Known
as the “Protection of Vital Sea lanes” initiative, it
takes as its current focus the Strait of Malacca and
26 b STRATEGIC VISION
photo: Juan Bustos
US Marines take aim during Exercise PHIBLIX 15 in Crow Valley, Philippines. Such exercises help combat terrorism and piracy in the region.
Singapore. A series of meetings was convened under
the title “Strait of Malacca and Singapore: Enhancing
Safety, Security and Environmental Protection,” the
first of which occurred in Jakarta in 2005. This was
followed by another meeting in Kuala Lumpur in
2006, and then one a year later in Singapore.
Applying lessons
Maritime security is a complex issue. While in the
past, issues primarily concerned military confrontation and conflict, today’s maritime concerns include
such problems as organized crime, environmental degradation, sea piracy, armed robbery against
ships, smuggling, hijacking, illegal immigration,
search and rescue and the potential threat of maritime terrorism. Due to the continued dependence
of global commerce on safe and secure sea lines of
communication to effectively move people, goods,
and services, the question of safety of navigation
and the security of the maritime zones remain of
interest to all nations.
The example of cooperative security in the Malacca
Strait may hold lessons for other regions as well. One
such region which could benefit from increased cooperation is the South China Sea. Although some
of the security problems in the South China Sea are
similar to those of the Malacca Strait, there has been
little in the way of multinational effort to address the
problems.
Initiatives developed to combat piracy in the
Malacca Strait could be developed and enlarged in
order to address problems in the South China Sea.
ReCAAP is the largest organization devoted to antipiracy and its members include those nations which
have a stake in stability in the South China Sea. Thus,
ReCAAP is well situated to expand its mission to
include problems which affect the South China Sea.
The MALSINDO and EiS initiatives could also benefit nations which have a claim in the South China
Sea. By tackling piracy, and other maritime problems,
with joint patrols, which are allowed to cross national
borders, the nations in the region would essentially be
engaging in a type of Confidence Building Measure.
The lessons, trust, and institutions developed from
such an activity could have positive spillover effects
for the region and help produce solutions for larger,
long-term challenges in the South China Sea. n
STRATEGIC VISION
for Taiwan Security
Center for Security Studies
National Chengchi University
No. 64, Wan Shou Road
Taipei City 11666
Taiwan, ROC
www.mcsstw.org
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